Document of The World Bank FOR OFFMC1AL USE ONLY Reprt No.10948 PROJECT COMPLETIONREPORT BRAZIL SKILLS FORMATION PROJECT (LOAN 2810-BR) nULY 27, 1992 A~~~0,Ct Population& Human R, -ces OperationsDivision Country Department I Latin America and the CaribbeanRegional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipientsonly in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized Public Disclosure Authorized
Transcript
Document of
The World Bank
FOR OFFMC1AL USE ONLY
Reprt No. 10948
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZIL
SKILLS FORMATION PROJECT(LOAN 2810-BR)
nULY 27, 1992
A~~~0,Ct
Population & Human R, -ces Operations DivisionCountry Department ILatin America and the Caribbean Regional Office
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance oftheir official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
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ACRONYMS
CFMO Federal Manpower CouncilFUNDACENTRO National Foundation for Occupational Safety, Hygiene and
MedicineGOV Government of BrazilLAlPH Population and Human Resources Operations DivisionNVTS National Vocational Training SystemMOE Ministry of EducationMOL Ministry of LaborRVP Regional Vice-PresidentSAR Staff Appraisal ReportSENAC National Service for Commercial ApprenticeshipSENAI National Service for Industrial ApprenticeshipSENAR National Service for Rural ApprenticeshipSMO Manpower Secretariat of the MOL
CURRENCY
Name of Currency: Cruzeiro (Cr$)
Appraisal Year: USS1=17.02 Cruzado (Cz$) at the time of Appraisal
Completion Year: USS1=298.00
WEIGHT AND MEASURES
Metric System
FOR OMCIAL USE ONLYTHE WORLD BANK
Washington, D.C. 20433U.S.A.
Office of Diretor-GeneralOperataon Evaluatio
July 27, 1992
MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on BRAZILSkills Formation Prolect (Loan 2810-BR)
Attached, for information, is a copy of a report entitled "ProjectCompletion Report on BRAZIL - Skills Formation Project (Loan 2810-BR)" preparedby the Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Office with Part II of the reportcontributed by the Borrower. No audit of this project has been made by theOperations Evaluation Department at this time.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authotion.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZILSKILLS FORMATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2810-BR)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PREFACE ................................. ...... ............ ...... .... i
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performanceof their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZILSKILLS FORMATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2810-BR)
PREFACE
This is a Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Skills Formation Projectin Brazil, for which Loan 2810-BR in the amount of US$74.50 million was approvedon May 12, 1987. The loan amount disbursed was US$13.04 million and US$58.90million was canceled. The difference, an undisbursed amount of US$2.56 million,will be disbursed before loan closing no later than June 30, 1996.
This PCR was prepared by the Human Resources Division of the TechnicalDepartment in the Latin America and Caribbean Regional Office following a missionto Brazil between May 6 to 17, 1991. Preparation of the report was based, interalia, on the Staff Appraisal Report, the record of the Board discussion of thisproject, the Loan Agreement, all material in the Bank's file pertinent to thisproject and the findings of the mission.
The draft PCR (Parts I and III) was sent to the Borrower with a requestto Prepare Part II in July 1991. Their comments (Part II) were receivedOctober 30, 1991.
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PROJECT COMPLiTION REPORT
BRAZILSKILLS FORMATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2810-BR)
EV.1LUATION SUMMARY
Introduction
1. Identification of the Skills Formation Project was carried out by a Bankmission in November 1985. The project was appraised in August 1986, approved bythe Board May 12, 1987 and the loan became effective December 15, 1987. Theproject's total cost was estimated at US$166.40 million, including US$74.50million from the Bank loan and US$81.90 million from the Government of Brazil.Because of Brazil's unprecedented economic difficulties and implementationproblems, the Government requested cancellation of the Loan on October 17, 1990.An amount of US$58.90 million was canceled.
Obiectives and Content of the Proiect
2. The objective of the project was to improve the responsiveness ofvocational training to rapidly changing technologies through: (a) strengtheningthe CFMO and the SMO to develop their policy f rmulation capabilities so theycould inform and guide the evolution of NVTS p. - cy; (b) improving the policy andprogram management and implementation capacicies of SENAI. SENAC, SENAR andFUNDACENTRO; and (c) enhancing the quality, relevance and coverage of trainingprovided by the three training agencies and FUNDACENTRO.
3. At appraisal, the nine-year project was comprised of the followingelements: (a) several background studies aind proj -sals for institutionaldevelopment; (b) a comprehensive human resources training program for about15,080 technical staff and administrators; (c) a technical assistance program ofspecialist services for about 2,780 staff-months, and fellowships for about 2,020staff-months; (d) occupational analyses of about 95 professions to updatetraining content; (e) new training modules for about 650 skills; (f) preparaticonof instructional materials (manuals, slides, cae-attes, etc.); (g) instructionalequipment for 208 mobile units/sets and 42 existing training centers; and (h)construction and equipping of 37 training centers (29 new ones and eight existingones).
Implementation: Experience and Results
4. Project implementation was cut short after three and a half years.Total disbursements were only US$13.04 million* or just about 17% of the US$74.50million equivalent committed. The substantial cutback in project implementation
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was due in part to factors beyond the content of project management: politicalinstabllity, rapidly rising inflation, and growing budgetary restrictions, whichfroze the use of counterpart funds both for government-financed (SMO andFUNDACENTRO) and autonomous agencies (SENAI and SENAC). Insufficient and delayedfinancial support by the government for MOL (SHO) and FUNDACENTRO alsocontributed to implementation difficulties.
5. The significant organizational changes that took place in the MOLcontributed to the limited accomplishments of the aborted project. Althoughoverall project performance was far below acceptable Bank standards, the projectachieved a modicum of success in partially implementing some components in SENAIand SENAC (para. 10). The SENAR's component were never initiated, however andthe institutional development objectives such as reinforcing the capability ofthe MOL to guide policy formulation and provide supporting services for the NVTS,were not achieved at all.
Sustginabilitv
6. The project did not achieve its major objectives. Therefore, it isunlikely that the institutional strengthening of the NVTS will be sustainable.Nevertheless, since expanding the demand for services ensures institutionalsustainability, the SENAI, SENAC, and FUUDACENTRO training centers will continueto function over the medium to long term.
Findings and Lessons
7. The project appraisal team paid insufficient attention to the provision ofcounterpart funds for SMO and FUNDACENTRO, it was overly optimistic regarding theBorrower's commitment to the institutional development objectives of the projectand it underestimated the project management weaknesses of the MOL. Experiencewith this project highlights the need for: (a) ensuring firm political andfinancial commitment for projects, including more careful assessment andprojections of counterpart funding availability over the life of the project; and(b) instituting a viable implementation mechanism.
1. Sector DeveloDment Objectives. During project appraisal, theBrazilian government envisaged a continuation of the rapid economic growth of theearly 19809 and of technological advances particularly in ranufacturing. The GOBalso intended a concerted drive to expand exports of manufactured goods, whichrequired keeping pace with rapidly changing and increasingly complex productionmethods (for example, digitally controlled machine tools, laser technology,robotics. biogenetics). With Brazil's proven ability to waster and incorporatenew technologies, these objectives were realistic and under more stablecircumstances achievable. Incorporating new technologies into economicproduction at the expected rapid pace required an equally rapid expansion ofprograms for orienting and training workers in their use and maintenance.
2. Policy Context. Goverrment policies toward vocational training weremeant to enhance labor productivity. Key policies were to: promote a shifttoward the private sector in responsibility for training; retrain workers to meetchanging industrial needs and to promote safety in the work places and, raise thequality of vocational training. Particular emphasis was given to providingservice-related training for rural youths in poorer regions to increase theiremployability. Effective use of existing and potential training resources andexpansion of training opportunities were also part of the overall policyobjectives.
3. Linksges between Proiect. Sector and Macro Policy Objectives.These general policy aims complemented broader sectoral objectives for economicand social development and were appropriately linked with project objectives.
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The project was intended to improve sector policies, enhance managementcapabilities, and trai.-tng effectiveness, in addition it was to improve coverageand quality of training.
C. Prolect Obiectives and Description
4. Prolect Obiectives. The objective of the project was to improve theresponsiveness of vocational training to rapidly clanging technologies through:(a) strengthening the CFMO and the SMO to develop their policy formulationcapabilities so they could inform and guide the evolution of NVTS policy; (b)impsrving the policy and program management and implementation capacities ofSENAI, SENAC, SENAR and FUNDACENTRO; and (c) enhancing the quality, relevance andcoverage of training provided by the three training agencies and FUNDACENTRO.
5. Prolect ComDonents. The project components encompassed thefollowing:
(a) preparing several background studies and proposals forinstitutional development;
(b) implementing a comprehensive human resources training program forabout 15,080 technical staff and administrators;
(c) implementing a technical assistance program for specialist servicesof about 2.780 staff-months and fellowships for about 2.020 staff-months;
(d) executing occupational analyses of about 95 professions to updatetraining content;
(e) developing new training modules for about 650 skills;
(g) providing instructional equipment for 208 mobile units/sets and 50existing training centers; and
(h) constructing and equipping 37 training centers (29 new ones andeight existing ones).
D. Proiect Desian and Organization
6. The project was designed and prepared by the government over aperiod of nine months with assistance from Bank staff and internationalconsultants. Based on the experience of the previous Bank project (Ln.1452-BR)with the MOL in Brazil, the conceptual basis of the project was clear. However,the organization and the management models had risks and flaws that inhibitedeffective project implementation. While the role and responsibilities of MOL
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under the project were clearly defined and nnderstood at the onset, changes instaff, reorganizations within the Government and shifts in policy prioritiescontributed to the delays and the abrupt termination of the project.
7. In the case of SENAC, in retrospect, it appeai a that while the Bank"packaged" all project components appropriately with subs,antial institutionaldevelopment subcomponents, SENAC does not appear to have ever been fullycommitted to its essential elements. During implementation, this agency failedto carry out a serious analysis of the economic efficiency of its vocationaltraining programs, although this was meant to be the first step in theinstitutional strengthening of SENAC. Given the government's perspective asindicated in Part II, the Bank also failed to meet the perceived needs of thegovernment in the design of the project, suggesting a possible breakdown inrelations sometime during preparation.
E. Prolect ImDlementation.
8. After three and a half years of implementation, only 'JS$i. 20 millionor 16% of the US$74.50 million loan was disbursed. Implementation of the projectfaced many adverse circumstances, some unforeseen and others overlooked, that hadserious implications for project content, progress and outcome: (a) a substantialfall in the country's economy, new government restrictions (1987 and 1988) andnew economic policies (1989 and 1990), which effectively froze the use ofcounterpart funds both for government-financed (SMO FUNDACENTRO) and autonomousagencies (SENAI and SENAC); (b) a change of government administration in 1989,which caused a period of uncertainty and delays in decisionmaking because the CMFwas eliminated and its responsibilities transferred to SMO; and (c) an economiccrisis in Brazil in 1989/1991, which led to drastic austerity measures andchanges in Government priorities concerning external financing, includingcancellation of outstanding loans.
9. The following lessons for future project design, organization andimplementation may be drawn: the borrower's capability to provide counterpartfunding and manage the project should be assessed carefully at appraisal, pendingorganizational changes and sensitive political issues need to be considered andprojects designed accordingly, project design and supervision need to besufficiently flexible to adapt: to changing circumstances. The experience in thisproject shows that the appraisal assessment did not identify a number of risksthat ultimately compromised the project including freezing of counterpart funds,and shifting of institutional roles and responsibilities. In addition, althoughthe SAR indicated the risk of management weakness, the severity of this risk andits consequence for project implementation were perhaps underestimated.
F. Proiect Results.
10. The first objective, of institutional development throughstrengthening of NOL capabili. os in policy formulation and supporting servicesfor the NVTS, was not met t .1.. The second objective, improving policy and
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program management and implementation capacities of the training agencies, hadonly a marginal impact, and much remains to be done in this area. The thirdobjective, to improve the quality, relevance and coverage of training, wassomewhat achieved, but not within the framework envisioned at project appraisal.
11. The project contributed somewhat to improvements in vocationaltraining standards, particularly in SENAI, by introducing new teachingtechniques, providing more technologically appropriate training equipment andupgrading instructors' skills. Its fellowship programs enabled staff to receiveadvanced training in the so called "tecnologias de ponta". Some expansion ofcanacity, particularly in the commercial and services fields (SERAC), also tookpLace. The project fell quite short in meeting its targets in FUNDACENTRO wherethe project implementation component proved to be a frustrating task for theagency's managers. This was due mainly to difficulties in obtaining timelycounterpart funding. SERAR was caught in the shifts in its legal standing.Counterpart funds were never authorized for SENAR by the MOL since theConstitution endowed it with autonomous status. However, SENAR's autonomy wasnever made effective and therefore resources were not budgeted for the agency.
G. Proiect Sustainabilitv.
12. Given the recent transfer from the MOL to the MOE of policy, strategyand coordination functions for vocational training, there is uncertaintyregarding the policy formulation capability of and source within the federalgovernment. Once the economy improves, the benefits from ongoing efforts underthe project can be realized, and could raise the investment returns of theproject. These efforts are unknown at present, however. As sustainability alsoresults from growth in demand for training, the SENAI,SENAC, and FUNDACENTROtraining centers may be sustained over the medium and longer terms.
H. Bank Performance.
13. Bank performance during project development was strong in introducingthe innovative institutional development components to the Borrower. From theinitiation of project implementation, Bank staff contributed timely professionaladvice to complement the research efforts of the Borrower. However, the Bank didnot provide adequate guidance to the Government and should have been more activein addressing two important issues: (a) the lack of counterpart funding. In1990, the project agencies were unable to use the counterpart funds allocated inthe national budget because the Ministry of Economy froze the accounts of someprojects; and (b) the Government's decision to cancel the project. In theinterval from May 1989 to June 1990 no supervision mission was carried out.During this period, the reorganization of the public institutions took place, andthe Government first indicated that project cancellation was a possibility.
14. The lesson here is that project supervision and implementation shouldbe given the same degree of attention as design and preparation. Missions shouldbe fielded at appropriate and flexible intervals, they should be adequately
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staffed, and problems should be dealt with immediatrly and with the neceonaryresources. Project flexibility could have been enhanced by closer supervisionas well. Moreover. it is evident from Part II that Bank staff were notsufficiently clear in their instructions and guidance to Brazilian officialsduring implementation.
I. Borrower Performance.
15. The major weaknesses in the Borrower's performance can be categorizedas financial, political and managerial. The Borrower had serious financialdifficulties in meeting its counterpart funding obligations, a major reason forthe slow pace of project implementation. Additionally, the Ministry of Economyhindered the smooth implementation of the project by restricting counterpartfunds, even where budgetary allocations had already been approved. The Borrowermade several decisions for reasons of expediency (understandably given changesin government and the economic crisis) that reduced project effectiveness: newstaff appointments; shifts of functions and personnel within the MOL; transferof policy, strategy and coordination responsibilities from the MOL to MOE.
16. The agencies' performance was unever, varying according to theirorganizational and staffing capacities and autonomy, and to the availability ofcounterpart funds. There were a few notable exceptions, such as SENAI's highlevel of professionalism, which facilitated the effective use of loan funds fortraining abroad.
17. The main lessons learned are that:
(a) adequate coordination of all executing agencies is paramount toeffective and smooth implementation; and
(b) executing agency staff must be aware of contractual agreementsbetween the Borrower and the Bank in all areas, including financialagreements, to ensure that they act in accordance with Borrower andBank requirements.
J. Proiect Relationships.
18. Despite the unexpected cancellation of the project there wereamicable working relations between the Bank and the Borrower, and among thevarious participating agencies themselves. Effectiveness of communication,however, appears to have been less than ideal due to the confusion expressed bythe Government in Part II.
K. Consulting Services.
19. The Bank relied heavily on consultants during project preparation andappraisal. Judging from the files, the consultants seemed to have performedwell, and the consultant services contracted by the MOL and the other agencieswere adequate in most cases. Consultant services during project implementation
fell short of expectations. At the time of project cancellation, only about 10percent of the technical assistance targeted under the project implementationschedule had been contracted. In retrospect, closer Bank supervision of thetechnical assistance component would have improved loan utilization and thedefinition of priorities.
L. Prolect Documentation and Data.
20. The Staff Appraisal Report included several action plans that werecritical to the success of the institutional development component of theproject. Although they provided a useful framework for the Bank duringimplementation, it is not clear that this was true for the Borrower. Actionplans have limited usefulness if the Borrower finds them difficult to implement,for financial, political, legal, or other reasons. In retrospect, it is betterto have the Borrower resolve critical issues prior to appraisal rather than asactions to be addressed during project implementation. If the Borrower faces theissue at the onset, the Bank and Borrower can define an appropriate and mutuallyacceptable project design at the planning stage and avoid subsequent delays andmisunderstandings.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZILSKILLS FORMATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2810-BR)
PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE'
A. Introduction
1. The project now under examination was canceled by the Government inOctober 1990. It was canceled for economic policy reasons as part of the effortto reduce public expenditures, trim subsidies, etc. The Ministry of Economy alsobased its decision on operating difficulties and the high cost of its projectfunctions.
2. Because of this, the analysis cannot be performed as if the projecthad been completed. The early cancellation--even before the mid-term evaluationscheduled for June 1991 (Section 3.05 of the Loan Agreement)--makes it impossibleto achieve the objectives and the anticipated medium- and long-term impacts.
3. In order to avoid repetition, the following review is limited toaspects not covered in Part I, and those covered but requiring some qualificationor where our views differ.
B. Prolect Design and Organization
4. The project was conceptually well designed and reflected a keenperception of Brazil's Vocational Training problems and needs. It was designedas a logical continuation of Loan Agreement 1452-BR, implemented between 1977 and1985. The evaluation of that loan indicates that the project was successful interms of its physical and financial objectives but fell short in itsinstitutional development objectives (see PCR. World Bank, January 1990).
5. For this reason, the design of the new project, along with largeinvestments in key technological and sectoral areas, placed great emphasis on theinstitutional question., aimed at changes and adjustments to optimize the
'Translation of submitted review in Portuguese by the Ministry of Labor andSocial Security. Original is in Annex 2.
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management capability of the Vocational Training System and its executingagencies.
6. Despite the strong signals of social change (democratic transition,drafting of a new Constitution. and other economic, political and institutionalchanges), the underlying assumption at appraisal was "business as usual." 2 Thesole alternative scenario was suspension of project disbursements as noflexibility was built in to accommodate changing circumstances.
7. In light of these factors, the institutional design of the projectdid not take into consideration the operational characteristics and institutionalrelationships of the SENAI-SENAC systems. For example, for efficient projectimplementation it would have been preferable if the Borrower had concludedagreements with the National Directorates (DNs) of the SENAI and SENAC agencieswho would have had the power to make the regional directorates (Drs) comply withtheir agreed plans.
8. Since the regional branches are legally autonomous agencies, thecommitments entered into by the National Directorate are not automaticallybinding for the Drs. This autonomy led the SENAC DR-SP (which in the project hadimportant responsibilities in the CFP construction works) to withdraw from theproject because it did not agree with the bidding rules and procedures (eg.multiple and long drawn-out approval procedures), arguing that the reimbursementrate (19 percent) was below the monthly inflation rate. Honoring itscommitments, SENAC-DN decided to replace the Sao Paulo CFPs by others in theNorthern and North-eastern states, financing them from its own resources.
9. This decision had its costs in a general lag in the constructiontimetable. Less drastic effects occurred in connection with SENAI. Even whenauthorized by the National Directorate, SENAI regional branches delayed theirinvestment applications under the project. It should be noted that in thesecircumstances neither the Project Management Units (of the MTb and the agencies)nor the National Directorates themselves had the capacity (power) to resolve thesituation.
10. Another critical flaw in the design of the project stemmed from thefact that about 30 percent of the loan amount was accounted for by the item "notallocated" (physical an.1 price contingencies), and that disbursements wereconditional on the existence of an entity (SENAR) that would have to be createdby the Brazilian legislature. This raised the project costs, and involvedconsiderable risk for project implementation.
2 The sole reference to an alternative scenario can be found in section5.01 (a) of the Agreement, which mentioned that the Bank would suspend theproject in the event that FUNDACENTRO, SENAI and SENAC ceased to exist in theirconventional form. This wording reflected concern about the discussions in theConstituent Assembly, in which reference was made at one time to possiblenationalization of SENAI and SENAC.
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11. The case of SENAR also illustrates the "business as usual" assumptionand the weakness of the institutional appraisal. The investment cost and demanddefinition was based entirely on information from an entity in process ofextinction (SENAR-Mtb), which would have to be replaced by an institution, to becreated and managed by the private sector. It was apparently assumed that thenew entity would take over the functions and obligations of SENAR withoutsignificantly altering the institutional base or priorities. This position wasat the very least rash, since the change-over meant transferring the managementof SENAR to the private sector, which would obviously set its own priorities andworking arrangements with government entities.
12. These design shortcomings, in addition to those mentioned in Part I,hinderad implementation, generating delays and providing a strong basis forproject cancellation.
C. Proiect Implementation
13. Implementation of the project began during a fairly critical phasein the country's development. The fiscal crisis, that was already looming dueto the slowdown in economic activity, assumed major proportions following the taxreforms of the 1988 Constitution. The traditional high monthly inflation rates(running into triple digits), economic agents channeling their surpluses andsavings to the financial market, unorthodox shocks, economic plans, etc. addedto instability. Moreover, the enactment of the 1988 Constitution significantlyreduced the Executive Branch's room for action by (a) giving the NationalCongress control over the budget; and (b) placing restrictions on the Executive.
14. The period was also marked by great administrative instability:between 1987 (effective date) and 1990 (cancellation date), the Ministry of Laborwent through four internal reorganizations. In addition to the formal structuralchanges, three different interpretations of the mandate and functions of theMinistry of Labor occurred over the three years.
15. It also must be borne in mind that preparation of the project beganat the end of 1985, became formally effective at the end of 1987, and reacheda normal execution pace at the end of 1988, four years after it was designed.Even given absolute administrative continuity, it would be natural to expect thatduring the interval between the project's design and effectiveness dates, theagencies' priorities could have been changed; and new ideas, new technologies,new commitments could have emerged; etc.
16. In addition, the Vocational Training area of the extinct Mtbpresented a special feature: for the first time in recent years, its managementwas assumed by people with no background or connection with the agencies.Traditionally (for example, Loan Agreement 1452-BR), the relationship of the SM0with the agencies was very fluid because, among other reasons, its managementstaff and a large part of its technical staff consisted of agency officialstransferred to the Mtb.
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17. Moreover, by empowering Congress to draw up, control and define thebudget, the provisions of the new Constitution also created unprecedentedsituations. The level of detail of the accounts was extended and the Executive'sbudget flexibi'lity was restricted. For example, differing interpretations of astandard or of an accounting classification sufficed to block implementation ofthe project for long perioda.
18. Until 1991, there were no corstraints in counterpart (financial)funds, and resources were available to SENAI and SENAC to meet theirexpenditures. The exception was 1987, when counterpart funds were available--with some delay at the beginning of each year--even to the SMO and FUNDACENTRO.IBRD resources were always present in the CESA and FESA account.
19. Financial resources were available during the entire project life.What did not exist (because it was delayed or incorrect) was a budget. Accordingto the rules, even if resources existed expenditures (agency reimbursements)could not be made without a budget. Thus, the agencies slowed their rate ofactivity because they knew that they would not be reimbursed until the governmentreleased the budget for project execution. [Thus there was a budget allocationbut no appropriation was made to authorize release of funds for projectimplementation.]
20. Added to this, agencies' management engaged in the practice commonto all enterprises in times of high inflation: while awaiting release of thebudget, they redirected their investments to other projects relevant to thefulfillment of outstanding commitments; and, as a way of protecting resourcesagainst erosion by inflation, invested in the financial market. Note that theSAR (Annex III) analyses financial flows in static nominal terms, withoutconsidering possible operational constraints on agencies' cash flow and theirrelationship to the investments to be made under the project. Nor did the SARcontain a financial analysis of the agencies' current and medium-term liquidityratios. These omissions are consistent with the previous comments in the sectionon project design. The combination of these factors added to designdeficiencies, and inevitably led to relatively low project execution levels.
21. The Bank's statement that SENAC was never truly committed to theessential elements of the project (page 3, Part I, paragraph 7 of this report)needs to be qualified, since the agency's physical and financial performancedemonstrates the opposite. Contrary to what is said in Part I, SENAC's positionon the question of evaluating the economic efficiency of Vocational Training wasthat the agency did not accept the methodology suggested by a Bank consultant;this position was endorsed unanimously by the Research Committee. Leaders ofSENAC were intransigent in defending this position, even going so far as topropose that the Studies and Research component be canceled. Subsequently, onthe basis of a new proposal drafted by Dr. Mehedef and Dr. Beloni (and approvedin part by IBRD), the agency after some hesitation agreed to participate in theprocess.
22. This hesitation reflected the fear that the Vocational TrainingSystem might be evaluated and judged purely on financial and economic criteriawithout due attention to the agency's social and educational functions. This
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process of negotiation was difficult and delayed the progress of this activity,which was truly vital to the project.
23. It must, however, be remembered that the contractual responsibilityto perform that evaluation belonged to the Ministry--Agreement, Annex 2, Part A(b) (iii)--and not to the agencies; from that point of view, responsibility forthe defects that occurred over this issue lies primarily with the Ministry. Butblame must be shared by the Bank itself, which also did not know how to, or wasnot in a position to, define its expectations clearly, confining itself tocovering a "cost-effectiveness" evaluation without clarifying the relevant costcriteria or effectiveness concepts.
D. Prolect Results
24. It is clear that, because of the cancellation, none of the project'sthree major objectives was achieved. The IBRD's analysis in this PCR (page 3,Part I, F.10) is valid and irrefutable.
25. However, reference was made in the previous item to a low relativelevel of project execution. This statement is confirmed by the statisticalindicators in Section III: of the first 12 indicators listed, at least threeshow execution percentages compatible with (or higher than) those of theexecution timetable; two show performance lags of a year, while others show twolags of two years.
26. Bearing in mind that effective project "take-off" did not take placeuntil 1989, their performance is even more significant since it indicates that,even with all the problems indicated, the agencies and the Mtb accomplished agreat deal and did so with a relatively high degree of efficiency. It isreasonable to assume that with conducive operating conditions and adequatematuration time, the project would in large part have achieved its objectives.
E. Bank Performance
27. The Bank's performance, like that of the project, left much to bedesired, particularly considering its long operating experience in Brazil.Mention has already been made in Part I of a number of shortcomings (EvaluationSummary, para. 7, and various sections in Part I); none of the factors mentionedis recent, they existed throughout the project.
28. Other shortcomings (not all attributable to the Bank) have also beendealt with here in Part II (Project Design). However, a number of questionsconcerning IBRD's behavior in the understanding of the contractual aspectsdeserve to be examined for their impact on project execution.
29. These inconsistencies and contradictions in the Bank's behaviorultimately undermined and restricted the ability of the executing agency (theextinct Mtb) to influence and pressure other government agencies I involved in the
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execution of the project. This behavior suggests that] contract compliance maybe at least partially optional, and that in the extreme noncompliance withcontractual clauses can be overcome or resolved through a good understanding withBank officials.
F. Borrower Performance
30. As seen in Part I and various sections of Part II, Borrowerperformance, as is normally the case at the start of any project, was generallyweak and in many cases inconsistent. Even when the executing agencies sought toovercome the difficulties encountered, as a whole they were defeated by thespecial circumstances within which they worked.
31. It must be stressed that significant results were obtained in thesingle normal year of operation, which points to the existence of managerial,financial and political capacity. It would be unreasonable to expect or requirenormal results in a project that suffered from design constraints and wasimplemented under unstable or even inimical risk conditions.
32. The Borrower's inconsistency is reflected in its instituting atechnical upgrading policy setting forth objectives identical to, and requiringinvestments similar to, those provided for in the project, and at the same timepartially canceling the Loan Agreement. While criticizing the poor projectperformance, it was not sufficiently competent to bring about the minimumconditions required to improve that performance.
33. The lessons learned are many and fruitful. A number of these havebeen mentioned in Part I and throughout this section. They concern the entireproject cycle from design to the cancellation process itself, wUhch wasunprecedented in the confusing manner in which it was conducted by all parties.
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PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
BRAZILSKILLS FORMATION PROJECT
(LOAN 2810-BR)
PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION
1. Related Bank Loans
Year ofLoan Title Purpose ARproval Status Comment
755-BR Education I Agricultural and Technical 1971 closed 3 yearsEducation in 1978 delay
1067-BR Education II Basic and Secondary 1974 closed 3 yearsEducation in 1982 delay
1452-BR Education III Vocational Training 1977 closed 3 yearsin 1985 delay
2366-BR Education V Agricultural and Technical 1983 closed 2 yearsEducation in 1990 delay
2412-BR Education VI Urban Basic Education 1984 Closed Canceledin 1990 before
closing.
2489-BR Education VII Science and Technology 1984 Ongoing
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2. Proiect Timetable
Item Planned Date Revised Date Actual Date
Identification n.a. n.a. 11/85
Preparation 5/86 - 3&7/86
Appraisal Mission 7/86 9&10/86 8&9/86
Loan/Credit Negotiations 1/87 2/87 3/87
Board Approval 3/87 4/87 5/12/87
Loan Signature 7/27/87 - 7/27/87
Loan Effectiveness 9/29/87 11/13/87 12/15/87
Loan Completion 6/30/95 n.a. n.a.
Loan Closing 6/30/96 - 6/30/96a/
a/ On 10/17/90 $58.9 million was cancelled and additionalwork on the project ceased, except for work alreadyagreed to (for which $2.56 million undisbursed fundswere set aside).
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Comments
Preparation and appraisal phases were compressed into too short time toaccommodated in-depth discussions of project institutional developmentcomponents.
3. Loan Disbursements
Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursements(US$ 1000)
3.01 (a) Project to be carried out 2 The Project wasefficiently and provided with allocated inadequatesufficiently operational funds. operational funds
during implementation.
(b) Borrower to make contractualarrangements with each ofthe Training agencies andwith the Central Bank. 1
3.03 (a) Borrower to maintain PIU 2 PIU operational since Projectwithin SMO. effectiveness; after the 1990
administrative reform, movedfrom SHO and placed underNational Secretary of Labor.
(b) Training Agencies to set up Imanagement units.
(c) Borrower to maintain a 2 The committee operates onlyconsultative committee informally.
3.04 (a) Borrower to maintain a Research The committee workedCommittee for the approval until June 1989.of studies. 2
(b) Borrower to established 2 Request complied with in 1987.guidelines for policy and As CFM0 was abolishad in 1989,coordination functions of CFMO its functions were assumed byby December 31, 1988. SMO; no requests were made to
amend the loan to reflect thoseinstitutional changes.
(c) CFMO to broaden its membership Portaria Mtb-3172/88 broadenedby August 31, 1987. CFMO coh?osition; CFMO was
abolished in 1989.
(d) Borrower to reorganize SMO 3 SMO was reorganized in 1989 toby September 30, 1987. assume CFM0 functions; in 1990,
it was transformed intoVocational Training Departmentand lost most of CFM0 and SMOfunctions.
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3.05 (a) Borrower to review in depth 3 The government canceled thethe project by June 30> 1991. project by October 17, 1990.
(b) Borrower to evaluated 3annually project institutionaldevelopment objectives.
(c) Borrower ard the Bank to 3discuss results of -eviewsstipulated in (a) and (b).
4.01 (a) Borrower to maintain records, 1accounts and providedinformation to Bank as requested.
(b) Borrower to provide audit 1report within four monthsafter end of fiscal year.
RATINGS: 1 - Complied with, without undue difficulty2 - Complied with, with major problems3 - Not complied with
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7. Use of Bank Resources
A. Staff Inputs (S/W) a/
Stage of Proiect FY87 FY88 FY89 FY90 FY91
Preparation 18.3 4.0 - - -
Appraisal 24.9 - - -
Negotiations 4.0 - - -
Supervision 11.9 .0 7.2 -
Completion 2.0
a/ only field work
B. Missions
Stage of Month/ No. of persons S/W in Perform.Ratinz Type ofProiect cycle Year & Speciali. a/ Field Status b/ Trend c/ Problem
Supervision I 9/87 4(A,E:2,T7) 9.1 2 MSupervision II 3/88 2(A,E) 2.8 2 FSupervision III 11/88 S(E:2,TE) 6.2 FMSupervision IV 5/89 1(TE) 2.8 2 MSupervision V 6/90 3(A,E,TE) 7.2 3 FM
Subtotal 28.1
Completion 5/91 1(A) 2.0
Total 87.3
a/ A= architect; E economist; EP= educational planner; F= financial analyst;GE= general educator; TE= technical educator.
b/ 1- problem free or minor problem; 2= moderated problem; 3/4- major problem.c/ 1= improving; 2= stationary; 3/4= deteriorating.
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Annex 1Proiect Results by Aaencv
Indicators SMO SENAI SEtmC FUNDA TOTAL
A. Construction and Equipping of
(i) New Centers n.a. n.a. 7 n.a. 7(ii) Existing centers n.a. n.a. 5 n.a. S
B. EquLpping of Existing Centers n.a. 11 5 1 17
C. Equipping of Mobile Units n.a. 0 1 n.a. 1
D. Staff Training
(i) Local 370 2,120 2463 2S4 5,207(ii) Abroad 32 126 s 1 164
(i) Centers n.a. 10,677 36,145 0 46,822(ii) Mobile actions n.a. 0(iii) In-Plant training n.a. n.a. n.a. 0
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Annex 2
Part II as submitted by the GOB
Project review from borrower's Perspective
Introduqao
01. Por decis&o do Governo, o Projeto ora em exame foi canceladoem outubro do 1990. As razoes do cancelamento foram de politicaeconomica, como parte do esforqo em reduzir o gasto pTblico, cortarsubsidios etc. 0 representante do Mutuario, o Minist6rio deEconomia, baseou tamb6n sua decislo nas diticuldades operacionaise no alto custo de seus-encargo6.
02. Neste sentido a anilise nao pode oer realizada como se aprojeto tivesse chelado normalyRqntC a Rijn r¶AtA tie t6rmino. 0^.a.a4mwcLamenro precoce -antes mesmo da "mid term evaluation" previstapara junho de 1991- (Seq&o 3.05 4o Acordo de Emprestimo) fezinviAvel a alcance de objetivos e dos impactos esperado6 a medio alongo prazo.
03. Visando e.itar repeti;des, a revis&o apresentada a sequirlimita-se aos aspectos nao tratados na Parte I ou aspectos quemesmo tendo sido tratados merecom alguma qualificaq&o e os queapresentam diverg6ncias nos pontos de vista.
Projei-.L Dun1jn and vrganizarton
04. Projeto foi ben concebido em seus aspectos conc ;iag e&yid3=&,_a gu4d percep'ao aos proo1emas e necessidades brasileirasna Area de Formaqo Prof issional e foi desenhado como uracontinuacao l6qica do Acordo de Empr6stimo kr. 1452-BR implantadoontre 1977 a 1985. As avaliages levadas a cabo a respeito doAcordo 1452 indicaram que a Projeto foi ur sucessos do ponto devista de seus objetivoa ficicos a financeiros, mae deixou a desejarem seus aspectos e alcance de objetivos de desenvolvimentoinstitucional (cfr: PCR, Banco Mundial, Janeiro de 1990).
05. Por esta raz&o a novo Projeto, a par do importantesinvestimentos voltados, notadamente, parax as Areas de tecnologiasde ponta e de desenvolvimento setorial, tol concebido com unagrande dnfase na quostla institucional, objetivando mudanqas eajustes para aprimorar a capacidade de gerenciamento do Sistema doFormagao Profissional e das ag&ncias executoras.
06. Apesar dos fortes sinais de transformaSaes sociais (transi.50democritica, prepara&Ao de nova constituigAo, alterag6esecon8micas, politicas e institucionais), a hipotese subjacente, 6de quo o Projeto gs desenvolveria em um quadro de "business asusual". A dnica referencia a um quadro alternativo podo serpercebida quando, no contrato (cfr 3eqao 5.01 (a)), se menciona quoo projeto seria suspenso polo Banco caso FUNDACENTRO, SENAI a SENACdoixassem de existir em sua forma convencional; esta redaqA0ref letia preocupaq5es com as discussOeS na assembleia constituinte,que, em determinado momento sinalizaram sobre uma poss1velestatiza;lo das agqncias SENAI e SENAC. Ou seja o 6nico quadro
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alternativo induziria'a uma suspens&o dos desembolsos do Projeto.
07 Considerando estes elementos, o desenho institucional doProjeto (basvado na anrlise de viabilidade institucional do mesmo)nao considerqA Sg caractArfst1iAS a particularidace speLacio1.aiwdos Sistemas SENAI-SENAC. 0 exemplo mais acabado desta deficionciareside no fato de que para a eficiente implementa;&o do projetosoria suficiente que o nutuArio celebrasse convenios com asDiretorias Nacionais das ag6ncias SENAI e SENAC e que estas teriamcapacidade de fazer com que as diretorias regionais cumprissom comos planos estabelocidos.
08. Ora, como as regionais sao legalmente ag6ncias autOnomas, oscompromissos assumidos pela DN nao comprometiam automaticamente asregionais. Esta autonomia levou a qua o SENAC DR-SP (que noprojeto tinha responsabilidades importantes nas constru;6es de CFP)decidisse retirar-se do projeto por nAo concordar com as regras eprocedimentos de licitavAo ( md1tiplos e demorados processos doaprova;1o), alegando que a percentagem de reembolso (19%) erainferior A taxa mensal de inflagAo ; o SENAC-DN honrando seuscompromissos, resolveu substituir os CFPs de Sao Paulo por outrosnos estados do norte e nordeste a serem financiados com seusrecursos pr6prios.
09. Esta decisAo teve um custo: o atraso geral nos cronogramas deexecu,cfo das obras. Situag6es renos dr&sticas foram tamb6mobservadas em relaq&o ao SENAI: regionais, ainda quando autorizadospelo Nacional, atrasavam suas aplicagdes.Ae investimento previstaspolo projeto. Note-se que nestas circunstancias, nem as Unidadesde Gerenciamento do Projeto, (do MTb e das Ag&ncias) nem aspr6prias Dire98es Nacionais tinham efetivamente capacidade (poder)de reverter a situa9Ao.10. Outro elemento critico no desenho do Projeto se referia aofato de que aproximadamente 30% do valor do emprestimo equivaliama rubrica do "n5o alocado" (conting6neias fisicas a pregos) ou dedesembolso condicionado a existencia de uma entidade (SENAR) quodeveria ser criada pelo poder legislativo. Esta situa98oencareceu os custos dos encargos do projeto e, do ponto de vista dateori.a de avalia9&o de projeto, estaria indicando um investimentosuper dimensionado ou de alto risco.
11. 0 caso do SENAR 6 tamb6m ilustrativo da hip6tese "business asusv'al", e da pobreza da avaliaqao institucional. Toda a detini9Sode custos a de demanda de investimentos foi feita baseada em dadosde uma entidade em extingdo (SENAR-MTb) que deveria ser substituidapor outra a ser criada e gerenciada polo setor privado.Aparentemente se pensava quo a nova entidade assumiriaintegralmente os direitos e obriga98es da anterior sem alterarsignificativamente a base institucional e as op;8es doinvestimento. Esta hip6tese era no minimo temer&ria, J& quo amudanfa implicava transferir o gerenciamento do SENAR para o setorprivado qua obviamente utiliza outros padr6es de gerenciamento.
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12. Estas deficienc1as de desenho, alfm das mencionadas na ParteI deste relat6rio contribuiram para- dificultar a implementagao,gerar atrasos e proporcionar apoio a tese de cancelamento do mesmo.
Project implementation
13. 0 projeto inicia sua implementarao em um periodo bastantecritico da vida do pals. A crise fiscal que ja so anunciava emrazAo do decr6scimo da atividade econ6mica assume maioresproporg6es a partir da reforma tributhria instituida pelaConstitui;Ao de 1988; as tradicionais altas taxas de inflag&ocaminhando para os 3 digitos mensais, agentes econ6micosdirecionando seus excedentes e poupanga para o mercado financeiro,choques heterodoxos, planos econdmicos etc.
14. Por outro lado a promulgagAo da Constitui9Ao de 1988 reduzsignificativamente as margens de aqao do poder executivo, dando aoCongresso Nacional capacidades de controle e ingerencia noexecutivo a partir da definiq;Ao orqamentlria e das restrig8esimpostas ao executivo.
15. 0 periodo foi tamb6m caracterizado por uma grandeinstabilidade administrativa: entre 1987 (data da efetividade) e1990 (data do cancelamento), o Ministerio do Trabalho teve 4dirigentes, tres propostas de reestrutura9&o administrativa e duasreorganizaaes internas efetivas. PM4m dos aspectos formais(estruturais), o entendimento do mandato e funq8es do Minist6rio doTrabalho sofreu tamb6m pelo menos tres alteraees. 1
16. Tampouco pode ser esquecido quo o Projeto iniciou suaprepara&o em fins de 1985, sua efetividade formal se deu em finsde 1987 e o ritmo de execuqAo so se tornou normal em fins de 1988,ou seja 4 anos depois de sua concepOAo. Mesmo se houvesse absolutacontinuidade administrativa, seria normal admitir que, face aotempo decorrido entre o desenho do projeto e sua efetividade,prioridades das agancias pudessam ser lteradas, novas id4ias,novas tecnologias, novos compromissos a sumidos etc.
17. No Ambito destas mudan9as, a Area de FormaqAo Profissional doextinto MTb apresentou ainda uma particularidade: pela prizeira vesem anos recentes, a direqA&o da mesma foi assumida por pessoas seaun background de vinculaqAo com as agOncias; tradicionalmente (ex:Acordo de Emprksttmo 1452-BR) a rela&Ao da EMO con as ag6ncias eramuitto fluida, entre outras circunst&ncias, porque cs quadros dediregAo e grande parte dos quadros t6cnicos da SMO estava compostopor funcionArios das ag4ncias cedidos ao MTb.
18. Por outro lado, as novas disposi,9es constitucionais, aoconterir ao Congresso poderes de elaborar, controlar e definirorgamento, geraram tambdm situages in6ditas. 0 nivel dedetalhamento das contas foi extendido e restringido ao executivo* 1_ ..... .-_ . _. _.
- 26 -
legislativo), interpretaqes dispares de uma norma, ou deo1assifEiaq&o c4LGIal f ucm suficiente para bloquear a execuqlo doProjeto durante longos perfodos.
19. De fato. at& 1Q41, runca houvc restrigao de fundo5(financeiros) de contrapartida: o SENAI o SENAC sempre tiveramdispon1tvpi ns recurcoc para Custear seus gauLou s, exceco em 1987,mesmo a SMO e a FUNDACENTRO, com algum atraso no come;o de cadaano, tiveram disponibilidade de contrapartida; recursos do BIRDsempre estiveram presentes na conta CESA a FESA.
20. Ou seja, recursos financeiros estiveram disponiveis todo otempo. 0 que nAo existia (por estar atrasado, incorreto) eraor9amento; e como, segundo a norma, mesmo existindodisponibilidade financeira nao se pode -sem orgamento- efetivargastos (rembolsos As agencias), as ag&ncias reduziam seu ritmo deatividade pois sabiam que nAo seriam reembolsadas enquanto ogoverno n&o liberasse a execu;do do or9amento.
21. A estes fato deve-se acrescentar que o management das agtnciasrepetia a pratica comum As empresas em momentos de elevadalnflaqAo: aguardando a liberago orgamentAria, redirecionavam o6seus investimentos em outros projetos pr6prios a tamb6mimportantes, na liquida;Ao de compromissos j& assumidos, ben como,resguardando os SOUs recursos da erosao inflacionAria, realizavamaplicag6es significativas no mercado financeiro. - Note-se quo aSAR (Anexo III) estuda do forma estAtica o fenOmeno das aplicag8esfinanceiras, nao indicando possiveis efeitos operacionaisrestritivos no cash-flow das ag6ncias em relatao aos investimentosprevistos pelo Projeto. Tampouco realiza uma anilise financeirados Indices de liquidez corrente r de m4dio prazo das agdncias.Estas omiss8es analiticas sAo consistentes com os comentAriosanteriores realizados na seqao relativa ao desenho do Projeto.
22. A combinaAoo destaRs lpmpnton, associadoc &a dofioi6naias dedesenho, redundou nos baixos niveis relativos de execug&o para oProjeto.
23. A afirmaqAo do Banco de que o SENAC nunca esteve realmuentcomprometido cost os elementos essenciais do Projeto ( pag.3, ParteI, D.7, deste relat6rio) merece ser qualificada, pois a desempenhofisico e financeiro da agencia demonstra o contrArio. A posig!odo SENAC em relaq&o a questao de avaliar a eticiAncia econ6mica daForma95o Profissional, ao contr&rio do que consta na Parte I, foia de que a agencia n5o aceitava a proposta metodol6gica sugeridapor uma Consultor do Banco; esta posi9ao foi ref erendadaunanimemente pelo Comit6 de Pesquisas. Ao defender esta posiglo,dirigentes do SENAC foram intransigentes, chegando a proporinclusive o cancelamento do Componente de Estudos e Pesquisas.Posteriormente, em base a uma nova proposta elaborada por Dra.Mehedef e Beloni (e aprovada parcialmente pelo BIRD), a agencia,depois de alguma hesita'!o, aceitou engajar-se no processo.
- 27 -
24. Esta hesitagao refletia o temor de que o Sistema de FormaQaoProfis'sional pudesse ser analisado e julgado por critfrtospuramente financeiros a economlcistas, sem a devida ateng8o aosmandatos e fungoes socials e educacionais 42 AgAfnni,A, Uutnnrnnnnno id IviL uAt&c, LVI ujlj. e atrasou o progresso destaatividade realmento vital ao Projeto.
25. Ngo obstant., dove-se recordar quo a responsabilidadecontratual de realizar tal avaliagAo cabia ao Minist6rio (cfr.Acordo, Anexo 2, Parte A (b)(iii)) e n8o U ag8ncias; neste sentidoas responsabilidades sabre as falhas ocorridas neste "issue'residem primariamente no Minist6rio mas devem ser compartidastamb6m polo pr6prlo Banco, qua tampouco soub- ou pOde qualificarclaramente suas expectativas, limitando-so a cobrar uma avalia9go"custo-efetividade" sem clarificar crit6rios de custo ou conceitosde efetividade aplic&veis ao caso.
Project results
26. Tomando como referencia o8 tree objetivos maiores do Projeto,torna-se evidento que, devido ao cancelamento, nenhum folplenamente alcan9ado. A anAlise do BIRD neste PCR (Parte I, F. 10,pag 3) 4 procedente e irretoc6vel.
27. No entanto, no item anterior mencionou-se um baixo nivelr.fativa de execu9&o do projeto. Esta afirmaq8o pod. serconfirmada observando-se os indicadores estatlsticos da Seg8o III:dos 12 primeiros indicadores listados, pelo menos 3 apresentasporcentagens de exeauq&o compativeis (ou superiores) com as docronograma de implementa98o; dois apresentaa desempenho atrasado emum ano a outros 2 com atraso do 2 anos.
28. Se considerarmos que o "take off" efetivo do Projeto dou-sesomente em 1989, o desempenho 6 ainda mais significativo,indicando quo mesmo com os todos Os problemas apontados houve usgrande esforgo de implementag&o por parts das ag6ncias e do pr6prioNTb e com grau de eficiencia relativamente olevado. t razo&velsupor-se que, com um minimo de condi;8es operacionais a o tempo dematuragio, o projeto alcancaria grande parte dos objetivospropostos.
Bank Performance
29. 0 desempenho do Banco, tanto quanto o do Projeto, deixou muitoa desojar, principalmente considerando-se a longa experi&ncia domesmo em operaq8es no Brasil. Ao longo da Part- r deste rolat6rioja foram mencionadas vhrias defici6ncias (Evaluation Summary.7,E.9, H.12 e 13): nenhum dos olementos mencionados & recente;. ago,de fato, constantes na existAncia dos projetos.
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30. Otras deficienctas (nao todas imputAveis ao Banco) foramtamb6m apontadas nesta Parte II (Desenho do Projeto).
31. Entretanto algumas questaes relativas ao comportamento do BIRDno entendimento dos aspectos contratuais merecem ser examinadas porseu impacto na execuqao do projeto.
32. 0 acordo estipula que as aquisiq5es de bens devem dar-se deacordo com o "Guidelines" do Banco; no entanto o convenio entre oMTb e as ag6ncias (pre-condigdo para a efetividade; Seoao 6.01 (c))estabelece que as aquisiq8es se darao segundo estabelecido na letbrasileira (DL 2.300); a aceita,cAo pelo arRD desta condiq&o nega naprttica o estipulado no contrato, introduz uma dupla norma para omesmo obJeto e cria confus5es no ambito da execu;Ao. Outroexemplo, o Guidelines e o PTN 6 (Procurement Technical Notes Nr. 6- PD-BIRD) consideram inaceit6veis procedimentos de p6s-qualifica9&o ou a utilizaQAo do sistema de dois envelopes; ambosprocedimentos foram aceitos e utilizadosr inclusive em concorr#nciasinternacionais.
33. As Condiqes Gerais estipulam tamb6m que c8 compromisso6 eobr4qaqOes do acordo ado validos e devem ser implementadosindependente da exist&ncia de lei qu eastipule o contrario. Ora,um dos compromissos vitais do mutuArio (e do executor) era o defazer o repasse de recursos as agAncias executoraS; se, por raz8esquaisquer, o executor se declara incapaz de faz6-lo por existir leirecente que o proibe (ou norma que, em termos praticos inviabilizao repasse), seria razoavel esperar que o Banco exigisse ocumprimento do contrato em sua plenitude, requeresse medidascorretivas (Se&o 5.01 (b)) e caso isto nAo fosse obtido, restariamos "Remedios" previsto5 na Se9do 6 das CondiLqes Gerais. Nadadisto ooorrcu, as pcm4s5sA&, u empenho dos executores em buscarsolu.oes ou simplesmente oferecer explica9pes conjunturais foiaceito pelo BIRD como suficiente, ainda quando as causas econdigOes estruturais permanecessem inalteradas.
34. Estas inconsistAncias e contradir8es no comportamento do Bancoterminam por enfraquecer e restrinrgir a capacidade do agentsexecutor (o extinto MTb) em pressionar os demais niveisinstitucionais envolvidos nos processos operacionais (ag6ncias auo pr6prio governo). Permite que se interrogue quals partes docontrato slo para serem cumpridas, e no limite, permite tamb6m quese deduza que, o nAo cumprimento de clausulas contratuais pode sersuperado oam um bom entendimento com oficiais do Banco.
Desempenho do Mutuhrio
35. 0 desempenho do mutuArio, conforme foi visto na Parte I ev6rios itens desta Parte Il, e como normalmente ocorre no iniciade qualquer Projeto, fot de modo geral, pobre e em muitos casos,inconsistente. Ainda quando os executores buscaram superar asdificuldades encontradas, no seu conjunto, foram vencidos pelascircunstancias especiais nas quais se involucravam.
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36. Dave-se salientar que em um (nico ano de operaqAo minimamentenorma 1 resultados significativos -foram alcanqados, indicandoexistencia de capacidade gerencial, financeira e politica. N&oseria razoavel esperar ou exigir resultados normais em un projetocom restri¢6es em seu desenho a implementado em condi;8es derisco, instaveis ou at4 hostis.
37. A inconsist4ncia do mutu&rio decorre do fato de qua, no mesmomomento em que instalava uma poliltica de capacita9ao tecnol6gica,explicitando objetivos iddnticos aos estabelecidos no Projeta sexigindo investimentos semelhantes aos previstos no Projeto,decidia pelo cancelamento parcial do AcOrdo de Empr6stimo. Aomesmo tempo que criticava o baixo desempenho do Projeto, n8o foisuficientemento competente para viabilizar as condic6asoperacionais minimas quo permitiriam melhorar tal desempenho.
38. As liq8es aprendidas sAo muitas e ricas. Na Parte I e ao longodesta secAo vdrias foram mencionadas; referem-se a todo O ciclo doProjeto, desde o desenho at6 o pr6prio processo de cancelamentoque foi inBdito e conduzido de forma confusa por todas as partes.
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