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Institute of eneral Semantics

MAPPING THE CAUSES OF WORLD WAR I TO AVOID ARMAGEDDON TODAYAuthor(s): Martin H. LevinsonSource: ETC: A Review of General Semantics, Vol. 62, No. 2 (April 2005), pp. 157-164Published by: Institute of General SemanticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/42580167

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2/9

AlthoughWorld War occurrednearlyone hundredyears ago, its egacy

is more

present

than we

may

think.The volatile

politics of

the Middle

East

and

of

Balkan

Europe

stem

directly rom

World War and its immediate

aftereffects.

merica's current

reoccupation

with

championing democracy

throughout

he world is also a

product of

the Great War.

MAPPING THE CAUSES OF

WORLD WAR

I

TO

AVOID

ARMAGEDDON TODAY

Martin

H.

Levinson,

h.D.*

Most Americansdid

not

experience

he tremendous

pset

that

WorldWar

I

caused in

Europe. Korzybski

ad

experienced

hedebacle

of

theEastern

Front,

with

tsdevastation

f

Poland and

parts

of

Russia. He

brought

his

memory

withhim

when the Russian

Army

ent him to Canada and

the

United tates n

December, 1915,

to oversee the

cceptance of

orders

or

military upplies.

Throughout

he chaotic

years

near the war s

end,

he

kept sking himself,

How could thisbe

prevented?

-

M.

Kendig

AlfredKorzybski:Collected Writings920-1950, p.xxi

^pHE

devastation

nd social

collapse

caused

by

WorldWar

(also

called the

-L

Great

War)

led Alfred

Korzybski

to formulate

eneral

semantics,

sys-

tem formore

effective uman evaluation. Withthis

system,

Korzybskihoped

humankind

ould never

gain engage

in such wanton

nd needless destruction.

That destruction

was

brought

bout

by

nationalism,

ntangled

lliances,

nar-

rowethnic oncerns, nd desiresfor oliticalgain- forces hat re stillwithus

today.

*

Martin .

Levinson,

h.D.,

who

ecently

etireds directorf

PROJECT

HARE,

New

York

ity

chool-based

rug

reventionrogram,

riteshe TC Books

eature.

157

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3/9

158

ETC

April 2005

Korzybskinoted thathuman

beings, using language

and other

symbols,

have the

bility

o transmit

nformationcross time.As a

result,

ach

generation

is able to benefit fromthe

experience

of

previous generations.

n

order to

contribute o this

process,

which

Korzybski

called

time-binding,

nd withthe

hope

that

earning

boutthe

past

can

help

avert

arge-scale

onflicts n the

future,

I will

map

out some of the causes of World War

I,

and

propose

ten

mportant

cautionarygeneral

semantics

essons for the leaders of the world's nations.

(Although

World War I occurred

nearly

one hundred

years ago,

its

legacy

is

more

present

hanwe

may

think.

he volatile

politics

of theMiddle East and of

Balkan

Europe

stem

directly

romWorldWar and its

mmediate ftereffects.

America's current

reoccupation

with

championing emocracy hroughout

he

world s also

a

product

f the Great

War.)

The Start of World War I: An

Orgy

of Declarations

The

precipitating

ventforWorldWar was the

assassinationofArchduke

Franz

Ferdinand,

n June

28,

1914.

Ferdinand,

he heir to the

Austro-Hungar-

ian

throne,

was killed

by

theBlack Hand

-

a Serbian

nationalist ecret

ociety.

Austria-Hungary's

eactionto the death was to issue an ultimatum o

Serbia,

which,

o the extent hat t demandedthe assassins be

brought

o

ustice,

effec-

tively

violated

Serbian

sovereignty. ustria-Hungaryxpected

Serbia to

reject

the

severe

termsof the

ultimatum,

hereby roviding

n excuse to launch a

limited

war

against

Serbia.

Serbia had

longstanding

lavic ties with

Russia,

but the

Austro-Hungarian

government

id not thinkRussia would be drawn

nto the

dispute,

ther han

perhaps issuing

a

diplomatic protest.

As a

protection against

the

nearly-

unimaginablepossibility

hatRussia did

declarewar,Austria-Hungaryought

assurancesof

support

rom

Germany

nder mutual lliance.

Germany

uickly

agreed,

and

even

encouragedAustro-Hungarian ellicosity.

On

July

8, 1914,

Austria-Hungary ejected

Serbia's

reply

to the ultima-

tum,

which for he most

part

was

quite placating,

nd declared war

on Serbia.

Bound

by treaty

o

Serbia,

the Russian

army

mobilized.

Germany

viewed

the

Russian mobilization s an act of war

against Austria-Hungary,

nd declared

war

on Russia on

August

1

France,

bound

by treaty

o

Russia,

respondedby

declaring

war

against Germany,

nd

by

extension

Austria-Hungary,

n

August

3. Germanyquickly responded by invadingneutralBelgium, so as to reach

Paris

by

the

shortest oute.

Britain,

llied to France

by

a

loosely

worded

treaty

which

mplied

moral

obligation

o mutual

defense,

declared war on

Germany

on

August

4. Britainwas also

obligated

to defend

Belgium by

the terms f

a



4/9

Mapping

he

Causes of World

War

I

to Avoid ArmageddonToday

159

seventy-five-year

ld

treaty.

ike France,Britain

by

extensionwas also at war

with

Austria-Hungary.

As thewar

began,

Britain's olonies and dominions broad

e.g.,

Australia,

Canada,

India,

New

Zealand,

and the Union of South

Africa)

offered ssis-

tance. The United States

declared a

policy

of

neutrality

an

official tance

that

nded in 1917 when

Germany'spolicy

of unrestricted

ubmarinewarfare

seriously

hreatened merica's

commercial

hipping.Japan,

honoring

mili-

tary greement

with

Britain,

eclaredwar on

Germany

n

August

23. Two

days

later

Austria-Hungary esponded by declaring

war on

Japan. Italy,althoughallied to

both

Germany

nd

Austria-Hungary,

as able to avoid

entering

he

war,

by citing

clause

permitting

t

to

renege

on its

obligations

o both.

Entangling

Alliances

What was

intended o be a

strictly

imitedwar between accuser and

ac-

cused,

Austria-Hungary

nd

Serbia,

had

rapidly

scalated into

global

conflict.

One main

reason for hat

onflictwas an alliance

system

hat

brought

bout a

mindless

mechanical reactiononce hostilities

egan.

Otto von

Bismarck,

first

Prime Minister f

Prussia and then Chancellor of

the German

Republic,

was

the

prime

mover

n

setting p

this

ystem.

Bismarckhad

constructed heGerman tate

hrough olitical

machinations

and war

against

Austria and

France.

In 1

866 he

engineered

war with

Austria

over

disputed

erritory.

he

resulting

onflict,

the Seven

Weeks

War,

ended

with

ompletevictory

or

Germany

nd

a

NorthGerman

Federation. o achieve

similar esults n the

south and to unite ll

statesunder he Prussian

banner

-

Bismarckwent to war with

France. As was the

case with

Austria,

he

Prus-

sian

army emolished rench orces. rance eded Alsace andLorraine o Prussia

and was forced o

pay

about a billion

dollars

using

a modern

xchange rate)

n

reparations.

he southernGerman

tates

greed

to an

alliance with heirnorth-

ern

counterparts,

esulting

n

the creation f

the German

Republic.

Bismarck

ought

o

protect

heGerman

Republic

from

otential

hreats. e

was

quite

aware

that

he French

wanted to

avenge

their

efeat,

particularly

he

loss of

Alsace and Lorraine.

Bismarckdid not fear n

alliance betweenBritain

and France because Britain

had a

policy

of

splendid

isolation,

choosing

to

opt

out of

European politics.

He looked

to Russia and to

defeatedfoe Austria-

Hungaryfor lliances.

In 1873

Bismarck

negotiated

heThree

EmperorsLeague,

which

tied Ger-

many,

Austria-Hungary,

nd Russia to

each other's aid in

time of war. Russia

withdrew

n

1878,

leaving

Bismarck to

adopt

a Dual

Alliance with Austria-

Hungary

n

1879. This

treaty romised

aid

to each other n

the event of an



5/9

160

ETC

April 2005

attack

by

Russia, or if Russia aided another

ower

at war with ither

Germany

or

Austria-Hungary. Austria-Hungary

used

this

agreement

to command

Germany's

ssistance

against

Russian

support

or Serbia

-

a nation

hatwas

protected y treaty

with

Russia.)

In

1881,

Italy oined Austria-Hungary

nd

Germany

o form

Triple

Alli-

ance. It

specifically

romised

hat

f

France attacked ne of the

signatories,

he

other wo would

oin

the

fight gainst

theFrench.

n

addition,

t declaredthat

f

any

of the threeAlliance members

were to declare a

preventive preemptive)

war,

the other wo would

remainneutral.The

Triple

Alliance was

essentially

meaningless,

ecause

Italy

ntered nto secret

reaty

with

France,

under

which

Italy

would remainneutral

f

Germany

ttackedFrance.

In 1

892,

to counter he

potential

hreat f the

Triple

Alliance,

Russia formed

an alliance withFrance. The Franco-Russian

Military

Convention

tated hat

f

France or Russia was

attacked,

r even was threatened

ith

ttack,

y

a

Triple

Alliance

member,

he

other

power

would

provide military

ssistance.

Britain

began

to realize

that

Germany

had

expansionistdesigns

and that

policy

of

splendid

solation would not

offer ufficient

ecurity. ermany

was

also embarking n a massive shipbuilding rogram.n 1902,Britain greedto

a

military

lliance with

Japan,

imed at

limitingGermany's

colonial

gains

in

the east. Britain also entered

nto a

shipbuilding

ompetition

with

Germany.

German

ambitions esulted n

pushing

Britain nto the

European

alliance

sys-

tem

and,

some have

argued,

made war more

possible.

In

1904,

Britain

igned

the EntenteCordiale

with

France.

The

agreement

resolved certain olonial

conflicts nd called for

greaterdiplomaticcoopera-

tion.

Three

years

aterRussia

signed

an

agreement

with Britain.

Together,

he

two

agreements

ormed

tri-part

lliance that

laced

a moral

obligation upon

the ignatories o aid each othern timeof war. t was thisprovision hat rought

Britain nto he

war in

defense

of

France,

lthough

Britain laimed to be

honor-

ing

the 1839

Treaty

f London that ommitted

ritain o defend

Belgium

neu-

trality.

The nations of

Europe

had formed

public

alliances and secret

treaties o

advance their

protection.

ut

they

had bound themselves

ogether

ike chain-

gang prisoners.

When one

gang

member

pulled

hard

on the chain the other

gang

membershad little hoice but to

mindlessly espond.

Other Factors

Leading

toWar

In

1905,

antagonism

between Russia and

Japan

over

Japanese

nterestsn

Manchuria and Korea culminated

n a

humiliating

efeatof the Russian

fleet.

The scale of the defeat

contributed,

n

part,

o the

attempted

ussian Rvolu-



6/9

Mapping

he

Causes of World War I to Avoid ArmageddonToday

161

tion of 1905 and led Tsar Nicholas II to look for

ways

to restoreRussian

dig-

nity.Military

onquest

could offer

hat

pportunity.

Meanwhile,

n

the

Balkans,

troublewas

brewing.

n

1912,

Italy

defeated

Turkish orces nd

Turkey

was forced o hand over

Libya

and other

erritory

o

Italy.

oon

thereafter,

urkey

was

engulfed

n

war withfour mall nationsover

the

possession

of Balkan territories.ntervention

y European powers brought

an end to thisFirstBalkan War.

Later,

n

1913,

the Second Balkan War

erupted

with

Bulgaria,

Romania,

and

Turkey

fighting

ver

territory.

eace

finally

emerged

ut

grievances

had not

really

been settled nd tensions an

high.Manysmall nationsunderTurkish r

Austro-Hungarian

ule seethedwithnationalis-

tic fervor. hese Balkan

nationswanted distinct oice and

self-determination,

but

hey

wereunited n

dentifying

hemselves s

pan-Slavicpeoples,

with

Russia

as

their hief

ally.

Russia

encouraged

this

belief,

for side from n

emotional

attachment,

t

provided way

to

regain

a

degree

of lost

prestige.

Austria-Hungary, decrepit mpire

thatruled over a

collection

of

people

with

very

ittle n

common,

was

greatly

ffected

y

the troubles

n

the Balkans.

Its

aging Emperor,

ranz

Josef,

worked hard

at

keeping together

he various

warring

thnic

groups

hat

fellunder

Austro-Hungarian

ontrol.The assassina-

tion of Franz Ferdinand

by

Serbian nationalists

ave Austria-Hungary

n ex-

cellent

opportunity

o flaunt ts

authority

n the

region.

Russia,

an

ally

of

the Slavs

-

and therefore erbia

-

had been

struggling

to hold back internal evolution ince theirnaval

defeat

n

1905. The Russian

government

aw war with

Austria-Hungary

s a

means

to

restore ocial order.

France wanted

revenge

for he

military

efeat

uffered

n

theFranco-Prus-

sian

Warof 187 1 To

this nd France devised a

strategy,

lan

XVII,

whose chief

aims were the defeatof

Germany

nd the restoration f Alsace and Lorraine.

An unwrittenartof this trategy elied on France's valuable secretweapon

-

the lan

(vitality

nd warlike

spirit)

f the French

rmy.

Germany

was in flux.

One hundred nd ten socialist

deputies

had been

elected to

the

Reichstag

n

1912. This made Chancellor

Bethmann-Hollweg's

taskof

negotiating

etween

he

Reichstag,

n

autocraticKaiser Wilhelm

I,

and

the

right-wing ilitary

xtremely

ifficult. e decided

Germany's

best

hope

of

averting

ivil unrestwould be war

-

preferably

short,

ecisive

conflict,

ut

European-wide

ostilities ould also do the

ob.

On

July

, 1914,

whenAustria-

Hungary

was

considering

whatto do about

Serbia,

Bethmann-Hollweg

ffered

Austria-Hungary blank check - an unconditional uarantee fsupport or

any

decision made

by Austria-Hungary.

Wilhelm

hought

war could

getGermany

more

colonies and

greater romi-

nence

on the world

stage.

To achieve

this,

his chief of

staff

mplemented

he

Schlieffen lan

-

a

two-front ar

against

France and Russia to

be conducted



7/9

162

ETC

April 2005

with

ightning peed. (Wilhelmpredicted,

n thefirstweek of

August,

hatGer-

man

troops

would be back home before he eaves have fallenfrom he

rees. )

The German

plan

did not considerBritain's

entry

nto

the

war.

It

was

thought

Britainwould

stay

aloof from heconflict nd

protect mportant

ritish

rading

routes.

It has been

suggested

hat

f

Britainhad declared an intention o enter he

war

sooner,

Germany

would have backed

away

from conflict hat

romised

o

be

larger

han

originally nticipated.

he British

oreign

Minister

ttempted

o

mediate

throughout uly, eserving

t all

times Britain's

right

o remain de-

tached from he conflict. t was

only

as thewar

began

thatBritain's

position

o

enter he conflict ecame

apparent.

Ten

Cautionary

General Semantics Lessons for the Nations of the World

This sectiondetailsten

cautionary

GS lessons for ur nations' eaders

using

GreatWar

examples.

The formats as follows: a GS formulationnd definition

followed

by

a short

xegesis

with n

example.

The last esson

departs

rom his

format.

1.

Delayed Evaluating

(a

potential

to

stop

immediate,

utomaticbe-

havior

long enough

to

sufficientlynvestigate

he current ituation

before

ction).

National leaders

should

think wice before

deciding

to

take land from nother

ountry.

hat

countrymay

seek

revenge

(e.g.,

one reason France went

to war with

Germany

was

to

get

back

Alsace

and

Lorraine).

2.

Indexing (a

reminder hatno two

things

re

identical).

Not all allies

are the ame.

So,

a nation hould nottrust ll of them o remain llies

if

a

war

starts

e.g., Italyreneged

on its

obligations

o the

Triple

Alli-

ance

by cutting

secretdeal with

France).

3.

Logical fate

(from

ssumptions onsequences

follow).

A nation

may

be

able to head offwar

by

sending

clear

signals

to all

parties

n ad-

vance

e.g.,

Britain

might

ave

given

Germany

econd

thoughts

bout

going

to war

by announcing

n

July

f 1914 that n attackon Bel-

gium

would make

participation bligatory).

4.

Dating (attaching

ates to our evaluations s

a

reminder hat

hange

occurs over

time).

Nations

seeking

to

regain

ost

pride

can be

dan-

gerous e.g.,

one reason thatRussia

(1914)

entered nto the war was

to

wipe away

the

humiliation hatRussia

(1905)

had suffered rom

naval defeat

by Japan).



8/9

Mapping he Causes of World War

I

to

Avoid ArmageddonToday

163

5. A

map

maynot adequately describe theterritorywithwords,de-

tails can be left

out).

Governments

may give incompleteexplana-

tionsfor

why

theirnations re

going

to war

e.g.,

Germany

nd Rus-

sia enteredWorldWar

I,

largely,

o divert

ttention rom heir

rob-

lems at

home).

6. Etc.

(one

cannotknow

all about

anything).

t's

tough

o

predict

what

will

happen

when a nation tarts war

(e.g. Austria-Hungary

ntici-

pated

a

very

imitedwar

against

Serbia. Russia's

entry

nto the

war,

on the Serbianside,came as a huge surprise).

7. Extensional

orientation

search

for he facts of a

situation).

Get-

ting

nto

entangling

lliances withothernationscan be

risky e.g.,

a

key

reason forWorldWar was

an alliance

system

hat

rought

bout

a mindlessmechanical reaction

once hostilities

egan).

8.

Distinguish

between

nferences

nd

facts (failure

o do so can result

in

umping

to

wrong

conclusions).

A

nation should

not overconfi-

dently

ssume

an

easy victory

n a war

e.g.,

France

figured

he lan

of theFrench rmywouldguarantee quick conquestoverGermany.

Germany

onsidered he

Schlieffen lan

foolproof

nd

victory

nevi-

table n a matter f

months).

9. Statistical

Thinking degrees

of

probability

re involved in all our

knowledge).

Ethnic

pride

s

tough

to

fight.

t

may

be wiser for na-

tion to not waste time and resources

battling roups

who view such

actions

s

oppression,

e.g., Austria-Hungary

nvaded Serbia to domi-

nate an ethnic

group

thatdidn't want outside control.Russia entered

the

war

againstAustria-Hungary,

n

part,

ecause of Serbian

appeals

to

pan-Slavism).

10. To have a

peaceful

world,

national leaders should learn and

apply

the

ormulations fgeneral

semantics. t's unfortunatehese formu-

lations weren't around at the

beginning

f World War I.

If

they

had

been

available,

and had nationsused

them,

millionsof human

beings

would have been

spared pointless

deaths.

More

than

eight

million

military ersonnel

nd six millioncivilians died

in WorldWar

.)

How can we make thesegeneralsemantics ools known to worldleaders,

and

persuade

them

o

use

them?Here are a few

suggestions:

If

you

are

a

government

fficial

ngaged

in

foreign olicy

matters,

and

you

are

reading

his

rticle,

hare ts ontents

ith

your olleagues.



9/9

164

ETC^

April 2005

Ifyou are nota governmentfficial ngaged in foreign olicymat-

ters,

but

you

know

one,

send this articleon to

them.

Talk to

your

relatives, riends,

nd

neighbors

bout

thevalue of

using

GS tools to

promote

rational

foreign olicy.

Such an endeavor an

have a twofoldbenefit:

t

can

sharpenyour

own

thinking

bout for-

eign policy

issues,

and

it

may

introduce he

personyou

are

speaking

with

o

a

system

hat,

ince its formal ntroduction

n

1933,

has been

dedicated

to

advancing

human

harmony

nd

progress.

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