WP0 BaSSy SSPA Report40053946-3 - EfficienSea · Introduction 6 SSPA REPORT NO: 4005 3946-3 AUTHOR:...

SSPA Sweden AB

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REPORT Subject

WP0 Baltic Sea Safety - BaSSy summary

Report

40053946-3

Project manager

Peter Grundevik

Customer/Contact

The BaSSy research project has been financed by the Nordic Council of Ministers, VINNOVA (The Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems), Swedish Maritime Administration, Finnish Transport and Communication Ministry, Finnish Maritime Administration and Danish Maritime Fund

Author

Peter Grundevik

Order

Date

2009-07-06 Rev 2009-09-10

SSPA Sweden AB Claes Källström Peter Grundevik Vice President Project Manager Research department Research department

2

SSPA REPORT NO: 4005 3946-3

AUTHOR: Peter Grundevik

TABLE OF CONTENTS SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................3

1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT .................................................................................4

2 INTRODUCTION ..............................................................................................4

2.1 BACKGROUND ......................................................................................................4

2.2 PARTNERS AND ADVISORY BOARD ......................................................................6

2.3 DISSEMINATION ....................................................................................................6

3 WORK PACKAGES ..........................................................................................7

3.1 WP1 BASSY PROGRAM TOOL DEVELOPMENT (DTU, GATEHOUSE) ....................7

3.2 WP2.1 HF IN BRIDGE SYSTEMS (SSPA, CHALMERS, MSI DESIGN) ...................11

3.2.1 WP2.1.1 North up / Head up (SSPA) .................................................................11

3.2.2 WP2.1.2 S-mode investigation (Chalmers) ........................................................14

3.2.3 WP2.1.3 Radar design mock-up (MSI Design) ..................................................16

3.3 WP2.2 DECISION SUPPORT FOR VTS OPERATORS (SSPA) .................................19

3.4 WP2.3 ANALYSES OF THE VTS (MSI DESIGN) ..................................................23

3.4.1 WP2.3.1 MTO profiling (MSI Design) ..............................................................23

3.4.2 WP2.3.2 VTS Survey (VTT, MSI Design) ........................................................27

3.5 WP3.1 HARMONIZED FSA ANALYSIS - SEA OF ÅLAND (VTT) ..........................29

3.6 WP3.2 FSA DATABASE (VTT) ...........................................................................33

3.7 WP3.3 BALTIC SEA FSA STUDIES (VTT, DTU, SSPA)......................................35

4 PROJECT REPORTS .....................................................................................36

5 CONCLUSIONS ...............................................................................................37

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SUMMARY

The Baltic Sea area has been identified as a high potential risk zone due to the increased maritime transport of oil and due to its sensitive ecosystem. With this background SSPA Sweden, VTT, Technical University of Denmark, MSI Design, Gatehouse and Chalmers have carried through the Baltic Sea Safety (BaSSy) project during 3½ years starting in 2006. Within BaSSy a toolbox has been designed, that allows maritime authorities to evaluate the present risk level in a consistent manner and to evaluate the risk reducing effect of risk mitigating initiatives under consideration. IALA has, free of charge, made the collision and grounding frequency modules of the BaSSy toolbox available for all its members. IALA will host a server for gathering all collision and grounding frequency analysis performed by its members using the BaSSy toolbox. VTT also host a BaSSy web database including guidelines for risk assessment, links for downloading of the toolbox, documents and user results collection within the Baltic Sea. The use of this will be two-fold: partly it will provide world wide based estimates of the collision and grounding frequencies, and partly it will allow for assessing the risk reducing benefits of different means of aids to navigation. Maritime Administrations, Coast guards, Rescue Services and IMO may use the tool as a risk reducing instrument regarding collisions and groundings in sensitive areas. The BaSSy project also focused on

– Developing a harmonised Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) framework to estimate consequences of ship collisions and groundings

– Studying radar and electronic chart dispalys with respect to human machine interaction aspects, standardised presentation and risk reducing abilities

– Man Technology Organisation profiling of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) centre

– Designing a VTS Decision support concept for collision avoidance – Accomplish a case study in the Sea of Åland including different safety

measures and a comparison of cost analysis methods in the Bornholm Gat – Designing a prototype BaSSy web database – Collision and grounding frequency analysis using the BaSSy tool and AIS

data for southern part of the Swedish east coast and for Gulf of Finland The project partners in Sweden, Finland and Denmark have used their complementary competences to achieve the results of the BaSSy project. The co-operation has resulted in transfer of competences between partners and that new knowledge has been made possible. A very good climate of easy co-operation has existed among the partners.

AcknoWledgement

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1 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

The BaSSy (Baltic Sea Safety) project has been financed by Nordic Council of Ministers, VINNOVA (The Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems), Swedish Maritime Administration, Finnish Transport and Communication Ministry, Finnish Maritime Administration and Danish Maritime Fund.

2 INTRODUCTION

2.1 Background

The Baltic Sea area is identified as a high potential risk zone with increased maritime traffic of oil transport and a sensitive ecosystem. When forming the project proposal the following figure, showing the oil transport in the Gulf of Finland, was included.

0

20

40

60

80

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1987 1997 2001 2002 2003 2010

Total

Helsinki

Sköldvik

Kotka

Hamina

Vistino Bay

Vysotsk

Primorsk

St Petersburg

Batareynaja

Ust-Luga

Lomonosov

Aseri

Kunda

Vene-Balti

M iiduranna

Tallinn

Introduction

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The table was done 2003 and the prognosis for 2010 was 150 million tones. This figure was almost reached 2008. The prognosis for 2010 was for a while up in 300 million tones but due to the financial crises the figure is now 175 million tones. With this background the BaSSy project objectives have been formulated:

- The main goal was to establish an integrated framework - a toolbox, that allows estimation of the risk to human, assets & environment caused by collision and grounding

- Maritime authorities may use the tool to evaluate present risk level & risk reducing effect of risk mitigating initiatives

- An open risk database allows authorities to learn and utilize the most from others experience in other areas. Risk levels are presented using the GateHouse presentation software for easy understanding

- To illustrate the risk analysis method some test cases have been prepared: One in open water & winter navigation in the Sea of Åland and one in a dense traffic area, the Bornholm Gat as well as the Southern East coast of Sweden and the Gulf of Finland.

- Risk reducing effects of different safety improving measures have been analysed, like modified route layout, introduction of traffic separation zones, etc

- Studying radar and electronic chart displays with respect to human machine interaction aspects, standardised presentation and risk reducing abilities

- Man Technology Organisation profiling of a Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) centre

- Designing a VTS Decision support concept The connections between the work tasks are presented in the block diagram below.

The project has been running from 2006 to the mid of 2009.

Introduction

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2.2 Partners and Advisory Board

Partners in the project were: SSPA Sweden, VTT, DTU, MSI Design, GateHouse and Chalmers Shipping and Marine Technology.

An advisory board / reference group were formed consisting of the following representatives. Nordic Council of Ministers (NMR) appointed one representative from each of the participating countries to follow the project.

– Matti Aaltonen, Finnish Maritime Administration and NMR representative

– Kari Kosonen, Finnish Maritime Administration – Martti Mäkelä, Finnish Ministry of Transport and

Communications – Carl-Göran Rosén, Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate – Christian Lindquist, Swedish Maritime Safety Inspectorate – Markus Lundqvist, Swedish Maritime Administration and NMR

representative – Per Marzelius, Swedish Shipowner Association – Jeppe Juhl, Danish Maritime Authority and NMR representative – Morgens Schröder Beck, Danish Maritime Authority – Kaj Jansson, Viking line – Leif Lindman, Åland Sea safety centre

2.3 Dissemination

The BaSSy project is presented and reports will be placed at some web sites. The main BaSSy site is under the SURSHIP web site. − http://www.surship.eu/project/bassy/overview − http://www.sjofartsverket.se/forskningsdb/ − http://www.vtt.fi/proj/bassy/ − http://www.sspa.se/research/projects/baltic-sea-safety-surship-

project-bassy A BaSSy logo has been designed.

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BaSSy has been disseminated in the following journals, meetings and conferences − Nordic Council Mariehamn, 15 May 2006 − NTF safety seminar in Espoo, 21-22 Nov. 2006 − BaSSy article in SSPA Highlights, Dec. 2006 − Transportforum in Linköping, 11 Jan. 2007 − Article in Nautisk Tidskrift, 2/07 − Nordic Council of Ministers meeting Mariehamn,

4 Sept. 2007: Local radio, Newspaper, 1 hour meeting presentation − Transportforum in Linköping, 10 Jan. 2008 − Article in the journal Sjöbefäl 1:2008 − ”2nd Intern Workshop on Risk-based approaches in Maritime

Industry, SAFEDOR” in Glasgow, 6 May 2008 − American Bureau of Shipping conference in USA, October 2008 − NAV08 conference in London, 27 - 30 October 2008 − Transportforum in Linköping, 13-14 Jan. 2010

3 WORK PACKAGES

3.1 WP1 BaSSy program tool development (DTU, Gatehouse)

The BaSSy toolbox has been developed by DTU and Gatehouse. At an early stage of the program development IALA (International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities) found interest in the product development. The collaboration with the IALA follow group resulted in a name change of the BaSSy toolbox to GRISK (GateHouse Risk), IWRAP (IALA Waterway Risk Assessment Program) MK II. IALA supports this version of the program and recommend its members to use this for assessing collision and grounding frequencies in navigational geographical areas. The IALA program can be downloaded by members at the IALA web site. The input to the program consists of: − Traffic distribution − Waypoints − Manoeuvring aspects − Legs − Causation factors − Wind conditions

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− Water depth contours − Some settings to the risk models Using these inputs the program will calculate the collision and grounding frequencies. To well describe the real traffic distribution a combination of different distributions such as normal and uniform statistic distribution is used in the fitting process. A calculation of a scenario in the BaSSy / GRISK / IWRAP toolbox, includes the following steps (shown in the figures below) 1. Define leg 2. Define traffic distribution in each direction 3. Define causation factors 4. Define number of ships in each direction 5. Run the job and read results

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The present BaSSy / IWRAP program code includes Google Earth maps and manual input of AIS or other ship traffic data. Land contours, depth contours and aids to navigation can be inserted manually. It includes route layouts, waypoints, traffic distribution, a collision model and a grounding model. Commercially an automated input of the required data will probably be provided by Gatehouse.

The program calculates the expected number of collisions Ncollision =

NG PC

where NG is the number for blind navigation – nothing is taken into

account to avoid an upcoming situation and PC is the causation factor – ability for a the ship crew not to react in time and to avoid the collision. The causation factor is the one that will be elaborated using BaSSy risk reducing options, like for example the effect of a VTS centre or traffic separation schemes. The collision types used in the program are head-on, overtaking, merging, bending and crossing collisions. A manual input of ship traffic data is used in ship types and length categories. Lloyds register can be used in the definition of the ship types. It is possible to have different causation factors for each ship type as well as for overtaking, head on, crossing, merging and bend situations as well as powered grounding. 14 different most common ship types and 17 length classes are defined in the tool. The input of navigational routes has to be done manually in the program. AIS data is used to create density plots and in that way get the definition of the routes and the traffic composition in each leg is also derived using AIS data. This information is fed into the program.

Groundings have to be defined through areas that will be represented by polygons for different water depths. Powered groundings are calculated by the same principles as the

collisions: Npowered_grounding = NG PC The model includes an assumption of awareness of the crew to check the position of the vessel regularly. Drifting grounding calculations are based on a black-out frequency, a drift speed range, a repair time distribution and a representative wind rose for the area. The frequency of drifting groundings is then derived. As described the code includes collision and grounding modules. The grounding model concerns both powered groundings and drifting groundings. The program includes facilities to flexible fit different traffic distributions (not only normal distribution). Speed information,

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ship type and Lloyds database are the inputs to a ship power model giving fuel consumption. In the next step CO2, SO2 and NOX emissions are estimated for the main engine. Auxiliary engines have to be added separately. A consequence module is also included. Damage calculation, estimation of oil spill and sinking probability are implemented as well and collisions against fishing vessels and leisure crafts are implemented on a conceptual basis. The traffic intensity of fishing and leisure crafts are defined in a bigger area since it is more likely that this information can be estimated. If motivated it is possible to define the intensity in sub areas.

Figure: Presenting results in the model view and in a table showing ship-ship collisions

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The BaSSy tool has been validated by DTU in many different areas around Denmark and in the Baltic Sea. The general agreement between the calculations and real accidents is

- 70 – 80 % for groundings (ratio: calculation compared to historical real values data)

- 20 – 25 % for collisions (ratio: calculation/ historical values) The reason for the poor agreement for collisions may be insufficient knowledge regarding the causation factors or possibly that the ships have become better now than in the past or insufficiency in the modelling of the traffic distribution. The causation factor estimation is based on historical data. If the ships have become better it seems reasonable that this fact also could be identified in the groundings comparison, which was not the case. So it seems that more efforts have to be done to enlarge the knowledge of causation factors and the traffic distribution modelling. There was an IALA meeting in Malaysia April, 2009 where the BaSSy / IWRAP tool has been evaluated covering operational issues and user requirements. The general positive conclusion is put forward. Omar Frits Eriksson, DAMSA, a driving force in the implementation of the tool is the IALA contact point. The access to program updates will be handled on a server at Gatehouse.

3.2 WP2.1 HF in bridge systems (SSPA, Chalmers, MSI Design)

The work in WP2.1 has been divided into three parts where each involved partner organisation had taken the responsibility respectively.

3.2.1 WP2.1.1 North up / Head up (SSPA)

SSPA and Chalmers have investigated user modes of radar and electronic charts. Some background information:

- Radar normally used in north-up for off-shore and near-shore traffic

- Radar normally used in head-up for in-shore navigation - Paper sea chart only usable in north up - Electronic chart can be in either north up or head up

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- Nautical academies teach north-up for radar collision avoidance and navigation.

Several research studies of maps have assessed head-up to be preferable compared to north-up, during route monitoring. The studies concern Car driving, Air traffic (in air and on ground) and Synthetic laboratory tests. In a Swedish synthetic laboratory test study (Porathe, Mälardalens Högskola), north up was shown to be the most complicated, head up better and 3D presentation the best. Collision risk increases 30-100 times when outside visual information is omitted (low visibility) according to a Japanese study. The use of north-up presentation in marine radar is dominating. Important benefit of north-up mode is that the PPI (Plan Position Indicator) is stabilized so turning and yawing will not cause a cluttered display and the display is north orientated that facilitates to correlate it to a north-up oriented chart. The drawback is that it is uncorrelated ship heading. Today many ships are equipped with electronic chart displays that have functionality for head-up or course-up orientations. The functionality does often also include radar overlay on the chart or map underlay on the radar. In order to compare head-up and north up qualities when navigating relative large ships in different conditions, full-mission simulations have been carried out by active officers in Chalmers full mission simulator. Seven active sailing master mariners have acted as test persons. Six scenarios (3 north-up, 3 head-up) have been included. The scenarios comprise

– Time critical open sea collision avoidance – Harbour approach with pilot boarding – Arriving/departing at crowded anchorage area

The simulation was measured and evaluated by two subjective questionnaire methods, NASA-TLX (NASA task load index) and COCOM (Contextual Control mode). In order to get performance bases evaluation a method for calculating collision risk has been developed and used. Command events of changes course and engine setting were recorded. Physiological stress measurement was carried out although not evaluated due to problems during the measurements. The result indicates small difference between the north-up mode and the head-up mode with respect to mental work load and collision risk. NASA-TLX indicates lower mental workload in north-up mode and the COCOM showed that the sense of control was higher in north-up mode. The collision risks were slightly higher in north-up mode.

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Despite the differences were relatively small the most of the test person express that they were not comfort with head-up mode. The overall conclusion from the result for this relative small test group of experienced mariners is that the north-up mode is the most advantageous. None of the participant did normally use head-up mode and they were not trained in using it. It is known that education and practice have strong influence on performance so this is an important factor when assessing the result. Another limitation is that the test radar did not support true courses and bearings in head-up mode. There was also a weak north indication in the ECDIS in head-up mode. Although the aggravating circumstances for head-up, the test questions were correctly answered by the test persons both in head-up and north-up. A conclusion that can be drawn from the study is that in spite of much forehand favour for north-up in the test, only one evaluation method (COCOM) gave a substantial favour for north-up compared to head–up mode.

Figure: Results in relative mean values of the display modes To get a better comparison of the two display modes the participants need to be equally trained and prepared in the display modes and the test equipment should have comparable features.

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3.2.2 WP2.1.2 S-mode investigation (Chalmers)

SSPA, Chalmers and MSI Design met David Patraiko, Nautical Institute and find common interest in research regarding the ideas around the general concept S-mode. The S (standard or simple) mode means a default setting with a standardised design for all equipments/manufacturers. It should only include essential functions and be known by all users. There is no such standard today. Chalmers has done Interviews/ questionnaires regarding the definition of an S-mode radar design. The back ground information given in the questionnaire is three conceivable scenarios: new officer, pilot or awakened captain on the bridge. The questions asked are: − What does the radar look like when you initialise S-mode? − Available controls/buttons − Other available information − Available menus 54 European respondents have participated initially. 17 officers at an Indian shipping company have also responded to the questionnaire. The Europeans give a clear yes answer to information needed regarding: Range 6 NM marking, North up, True vectors. They give a clear no answer to Range 12 NM marking and Head up. The Indians give also a clear yes answer to information needed regarding: Range 6 NM marking and North up but they also said yes to Range 12 NM marking and Relative motion. The Europeans respondents also wanted hard controls for VRM, EBL, gain, manual sea clutter, manual rain clutter and relative/true vector mode. Some conclusions from the study: − Better data quality is reached when discussing with the seafarers

(European) than if only sending out questionnaires (Indian) − Participants could misinterpret questions which probably occurred

in the India case − Many results are quite clear while others need more probing to

reach a conclusion − No major differences between data from merchant shipping and

navy − Some differences between European and Indian results. The method

might have to be developed further to cope with different cultures There are many questions around the S-mode but for the moment very few definite answers. There has been discussion during the BaSSy meetings around the S-mode. Below is a summary of ideas: − It is important to have the suppliers / manufactures into the process

of developing the S-mode. Much has been won if they are positive.

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This is also a strong wish from the Nautical Institute who is a big player regarding the S-mode introduction.

− It is important to inform IMO about the research going on and the results so far. The aim must be to include S-mode specifications into regulations.

− The reason for introducing the S-mode is to get an easy, understandable presentation and better awareness. However the proposals have to be shown to reduce risks. A FSA risk analysis is needed and comparison to the present situation. What is the cost/benefit? Is there any negative risk aspects? Support from accident investigations would be beneficial.

− General contra individual: The basic idea with the S-mode is one standardised, default interface for the main window presentation. There will be many other window presentation possibilities behind the main one that are unique for different suppliers and where the operator may form his/her individual presentation character. There will most probably be necessary with some settings also in the default S-mode page. Generally there is no contradiction using the new “car” technique of having a personal setting identity card in the pocket, communicating this information with the system onboard.

− Would it be possible to upgrade a modern software based radar system with an S-mode interface? The answer is probably yes - if the buyer and the supplier are interested in this feature.

− The AIS information now available at the ship shall be integrated into / merged with the radar presentation giving identification information about the targets. This technique gains ground.

− The speed presentation shall include speed through water to correspond to COLREG. However since the speed through water may not be accessible, the speed over ground information delivered by GPS is also important to include.

− Among modern radars menu driven systems dominate. They are often several steps to reach a function. There shall preferably be more than one way to execute important functions. Short cut commands are put forward as for example “change range”.

− A role of thumb is that it takes 4 - 5 years before a new software based system is debugged and can be used in critical operation!

− A forth scenario interesting to include to the 3 defined scenarios in the study above is - watch change.

− It is unacceptable that officers are unfamiliar with the equipment they are using, which not seems to be unusual today.

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3.2.3 WP2.1.3 Radar design mock-up (MSI Design)

Often human – machine interaction (HMI) investigations have focused on reviewing existing systems to find limitations and shortcomings. The purpose of this task is to take the design process some steps further and explore the capability of some new ideas. MSI Design has therefore developed an alternative radar graphical user interface (GUI) based more on conventional instrumentation principles as well as employing more iconic representation of functions as opposed to text based representation. The idea is to use function groupings, standardised symbols instead of text, standardised colour coding, a more analogue presentation and the inclusion of necessary primary functions. These are defined by standards and also include recommendations according to the previous S-mode study describe in the previous section.

Figure: Alternative radar design To examine how effective the alternative radar interface would be, a test set had been carried out. The experiment was executed in a simulated situation whereby the test subjects had not seen this interface before – similar to a situation when the test person comes aboard a vessel and is confronted with a system they have never used previously – but is still expected to work with. The underlying premise is that not all officers may have had training on a given system prior to signing on a new ship. The main question is whether or not the experimental alternative is sufficiently intuitive to permit relatively rapid orientation in the system functions and of course system use in such a situation. The experiment was intended to examine how long it takes to conduct a

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test scenario of 31 tasks of varying complexity. In order to evaluate this, the experiment concentrated upon two primary factors – the first is the time required in searching for a function, identifying the functions and finally executing the prescribed function. The second measure of task performance is in terms of the number of uncompleted tasks of the 31. Four tests have been conducted – one with a completely novice user without any previous radar experience whatsoever, two students from a maritime college and one ship’s master with long experience at sea. A baseline was included where the time for the designer as a surrogate experienced user is indicated. This time amounted to about 3 minutes. As could be expected the novice ‘s performance took longer (39 minutes) as compared with the other three test subjects (between 11 and 17 minutes).

Figure: Illustration of total time required to complete the 31 tasks comprising the scenario. The most time was required by the novice while the baseline represents the developer’s time

The following positive and negative comments about the mock up were registered:

- Feedback message field good as well as its location – lets you know what the system is doing

- The design provided a better overview of information - You can see all related options in one pop up window at the

same time – no submenus - More efficient – a step forward - Few menus to work with is good - Visually appealing - Wind and current info display good

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- Automatic pop up of settings panel when starting up system is good

- Wind and drift good to have when entering port at low speed, should not be located in subordinate menus or pop up window however

- The upper iconic repeater field is a good idea for displaying primary settings – lets you know how the system is setup.

- Linkage of the repeater indicators to the appropriate set up panel is good

- Compass rose cardinal points good - No decimals in longitude and latitude – irritating - Reorient the ship symbol in the wind/drift display – should

always point in the same direction as the bow. - Difficult with many symbols with small variation of attributes,

should include legends or tool tips - EBL/VRM increase/devrease arrows confusing - Symbols in themselves not so self evident in meaning – should

include a label - Depth under keel not clear nor immediately visible and

discernible, however the depth alarm function however showed a good recognition rate

- A more clear separation between ECDIS/ARPA and AIS system modules (information) is desirable

- Both ARPA and AIS data could be shown simultaneously – name, status and destination plus info similar to ARPA layout required for AIS data

…. Generally the results do appear encouraging despite the limited number of tests performed. Performance times were within a 15 minute +/- time frame which we may consider as good considering they had never worked with the design before nor for that matter even seen it prior to the testing. The design as a result of the tests, exhibited some problem areas which are identifiable either as either somewhat lengthy task completion times for a given step in the scenario or in the number of uncompleted task segments comprising the scenario. As far as the percentage of uncompleted tasks go, the lowest task completion result showed an 80% completion rate and the best recorded completion rate was 96%. The results indicate that in essence the design proves promising with refinement in conjunction with those identified problem areas and also that it does provide an alternative to extensive text based menu driven interfaces. The design’s test results also illustrate that the use of hierarchical menu structures in a radar interface is not necessarily the most optimum means to display or access a system’s functions.

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It would be interesting to do a comparable study of a “normal” radar to find possible differences in performance between the “normal” one and the alternative design.

3.3 WP2.2 Decision support for VTS operators (SSPA)

Today AIS and radar gives a close to real-time picture of the traffic situation in a VTS centre. Some accidents could possibly be avoided by the VTS if the traffic situations were scanned and evaluated in short time intervals. With this aim a decision support concept for collision avoidance has been developed. The scope has been to investigate the feasibility, needs and requirements for computer assisted decision support to VTS operators. Answering two questions have been of high importance:

- What rules/criteria's are required to be able to sort out critical situation from normal situations

- What time spans are required to form a usable tool and what time frames are present in real accidents

Another way of describing the work within this task is that a dynamic risk evaluation tool is conceptually developed. Several steps have been included in the study. They are:

- Interview with VTS operators to formulate and clarify needs and demands for a decision-making support tool

- Identification and analysis of typical accident scenarios, by studying accident and incident reports including near-misses

- AIS data was identified as an important source of information. To be able to use the data, the quality and limits of AIS data was investigated

- A C++ code has been written to convert the AIS raw data to ASCII data

- MATLAB codes were developed to analyse the data - A test case has been chosen to analyse typical distances to

fairway limitations, critical objects, buoys, islands and passing ships

- Finally a proposed dynamical warning system is defined based on AIS data for a fairway. The decision-making tools for the VTS operators have been separated into three separate scenarios or modes;

o Grounding o Collision o Identification of drifting vessels

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Experienced VTS operators have been interviewed in order to identify critical circumstances. To identify operational conditions the VTS in Göteborg was visited several times and the personnel interviewed. The problems around a decision support warning system have been discussed and an actual grounding case discussed in more detail. Some conclusions are:

- In dense traffic situations it is impossible to manually detect all un-normal situations

- Knowledge of the ships intended routes will provide means for early detection of un-normal conditions

- The challenge is to design algorithms that only gives alarm for critical situations

- The tool must be “intelligent” in order release the VTS operator from manually entering lots of data to the system

- In many cases the time between detection of un-normal condition to accident is short (too short for VTS to alert ship)

160 different real cases of groundings/ contacts, collisions and near-collisions have been analysed. To gain further insight into realistic time spans which can be used for a warning system, accident and incident reports have been studied. It has been found out that on the average there is little time to warn vessels prior to collisions, due to the low CPA and TCPA which are accepted by seafarers. For grounding accidents there is usually more time, which can be used to warn the crew of the vessel in danger. In narrow waterways like harbour entrances or channels the time spans are much shorter. Since this decision support system rely on the use of AIS data, knowledge of the quality of this data is very important. In the analysis some interesting results have been obtained. Common errors are wrong Heading and Time & date of arrival not set. Other errors are Draught not set and Antenna position unknown. Another problem is wrong MMSI number. A comment was that some old GPS receivers used in the AIS systems give incorrect position information. The conclusion is that:

- AIS draught information cannot be used as an indicator for grounding accidents

- Position data have to be used carefully in the algorithms - Heading has also to be used carefully. Better to use COG

Finally the proposed dynamical warning system is defined based on AIS data for a fairway. The decision-making tools for the VTS operators have been developed based on the information gained in the previous steps. Three separate scenarios or modes have been defined:

- A graphical module for ship collision warning including critical passages. The collision warning system is mainly in the format of graphical information, but can also be used as an indicator

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and active warning system for the VTS operator before critical overtaking or other passages occur.

- A module for ship grounding warning based on AIS statistics in predefined grid cells. The grounding avoidance system identifies unusual speeds, courses and positions of certain vessel classes (ship size and type) based on AIS data history.

- A module for identification of drifting ships. The drifting vessels are identified by algorithms which can find unusual combinations of speed, course, heading and ship length.

Figure: Detailed density plot of traffic for 2006 based on the AIS data in the Göteborg archipelago entrance

Message 17 in the AIS protocol is proposed to be used for transmitting ship waypoints and / or route plan report. If this would be realized the support system have possibilities to give even earlier warnings for the VTS operator (both grounding and collision). Conclusions: There is the possibility seen by VTS operators to get support through decision support tools to help identifying collision and grounding “candidates” as early as possible. The analysis of collision scenarios reveals that there is not a lot of time to warn the vessels prior to a collision, but the VTS operator and the crews should be informed as early as possible about possible meeting spots to avoid the meeting or overtaking in difficult parts of the fairway. Only the vessels involved need to be informed and the number of warnings appearing for the VTS operator should be limited.

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The tool gives the VTS operator the meeting location visualised and inappropriate passages can be pinpointed via an alarm which alerts the VTS operator. The role of the VTS operator to inform, advice or control the involved vessels is an interesting question. Today the intention in most of the VTS centres is to inform only. The grounding scenario solution should facilitate early detection. The system can be based on AIS data of historical traffic and statistics when the ship exceeds typical course over grounds/ headings, typical speed ranges or common fairway areas. Typical time span for this phase is on the average about 12 minutes. It will be easier to detect early un-normal situations in wider fairways. The drifting vessels information tool might be of great importance for the VTS centre and all ships in the surrounding. The system can have the potential to be used even on vessels. While downloading the newest sea chart to the ECDIS system, the common routes for the area can be downloaded as well as typical traffic distributions and densities. This can give efficient dynamic information about the fairway, possible dangerous parts of the planned route, possible alternatives and typical appropriate speeds. Critical issues are the time for action involved, methods to be used on the VTS and on the ship bridge as well as how the contact between the VTS operator and the ship navigator shall be performed. The warning from the VTS to the ship is most probably by VHF voice communication. The time frame for a VTS operator is normally in the 10 minutes range, representing a strategic view, whereas the bridge crew have to handle themselves the operational view which may be within the 1 minute perspective. In principle the proposed system concepts may be used onboard and not only on the VTS, but the point here is that the VTS operator and the support system, having full focus on the ship traffic, may be used to get complementary eyes. Further steps are put forward to be studied in more detail in order to be able to answer questions that have been raised in this study. A continuation of this research and development will be performed within the EfficienSea project.

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3.4 WP2.3 Analyses of the VTS (MSI Design)

3.4.1 WP2.3.1 MTO profiling (MSI Design)

A Man Technology and Organisation profiling of the Helsinki VTS centre has been conducted by MSI Design. The purpose of this particular study was to identify potential problem areas and possible areas of improvement either requiring remedial action or to be considered in future VTS centre development. The work covered four main assessment areas – the sociotechnical system (organisation, procedures etc.), control room design, workstation design and finally the support system interface and interaction design. In order to conduct the study, a new VTS specific set of analysis templates was adapted from the basic MarMet methodology. The total time devoted to on site measurements and observations was about 5 weeks followed by the data compilation and analysis phase. Completing the analysis, specific design checklists based upon IMO. IALA, ISO etc. were applied in order to arrive at a numerical approval rating for the previously mentioned main areas of investigation. This was intended to provide us with some form of measurement regarding the centre’s various design factors. As there is little research done regarding VTS centres and human factors issues, this study represents a particular milestone in establishing a profile of a contemporary VTS monitoring centre. Below some results are presented: Sociotechnical systems

- As part of the analysis, an in depth work flow modelling was conducted to map those tasks and procedures conducted at the VTS centre. This showed that a number of ancillary tasks are performed by the operator including not only traffic monitoring, but also the necessary contravention report filing, reporting maintenance requirements for aids to navigation etc. revealing a many faceted job situation

- A highly developed process for personnel selection, recruitment, training and operator certification had been implemented.

- Some procedural differences between the GOFREP and sector

monitoring were noticed – mostly in regards to terminology and reporting

- The primary principle for manning was that no operator stations is left unmanned at any time which does entail a higher level of personnel manning – back up operators must be available

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- Being physically adjacent with the Finnish coast guard command centre is highly beneficial for both parties and provides the possibility of sharing information much more easily

Control room

- Generally the control room receives a good rating with some few exceptions. The layout of the individual workstations could have been somewhat more optimal to improve free passage areas but this is limited by the room’s physical dimensions

- The control room layout and use of large screen displays did provide o good overview of all sectors.

- The Kotka workstation seems to have landed out in the peripheral area outside of the mainstream of activity. This is due to the fact that it was installed last.

- Direct glare occurs at workstations 2 and 3 and is due to the large terrace window/door. Lighting level of incoming light does present a problem and also may contribute to the experience of cold and drafts (winter) or heat (summer).

- The room’s surface treatment could be considered as not providing a non cluttered peripheral visual field - as there are many distractions due to differing luminance factors of objects within the visual fields

- There has been a spate of false fire alarms which resulted in the fire alarm going off. The uncomfortably high acoustical level of the alarm has been rectified by covering the horn with foam rubber to reduce the acoustical effect

- The maintenance access to the back sides of the LSD monitors is insufficient. These tend to generate some hat and also ambient background noise

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Figure: View of the control centre and the workstations

Workstations

- The workstations generally receive a high rating with some minor exceptions.

- Individual workstation lighting was preferred by the operators as opposed to the control room’s general lighting

- The layout and arrangement of the displays and other equipment related to the workstation function well

- Connecting electrical plugs into the workstation outlets is a problem and these should be relocated

- A more uniform procurement policy would be advisable for keyboards, display screens etc. to ensure a uniform colour scheme, light reflectance and gloss factor considering the extensive work with computer displays

HSI design (traffic monitoring system)

- This could be considered a problem child of the installation. Generally one finds deficiencies to a greater or lesser degree regarding almost every facet of the system

- The relatively low compliancy rating for this system is par for the course, compared with other software interface evaluations.

- The software interface would benefit from a major review and overhaul to make it more effective

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- Of interest is the fact that paper charts are still used – detailed computer generated charts with all functions activated are considered too cluttered and od in fact impede visual taks performance.

- Documentation provided by the supplier could be considered as below standard and not acceptable.

- Forty percent of interviewed operators indicated that the system stopped functioning without providing any alarm.

- The system provides no indication if it has stalled. Since target movements often are slow you will not notice that the screen is frozen which apparently happens every now and then

- The system has no accelerator commands that would reduce the need for extensive mouse/cursor manipulation

- There are too many menu dialogues for making settings or changing parameters which could account for the limited use of system functionalities

- Non optimized windows and contents - several windows could be integrated reducing the extensive navigation required

- Illogical and extensive search trees in the menu system will tend to lead to confusion

- The system functions do not seem to support the visual coding of vessels carrying dangerous goods which would assist the operator in identifying potentially hazardous situations.

A risk model for VTS operations was also presented. The basis is the TESEO model. Some factors have been added to the model (K6-K9). The factors in consideration are K1 = type of activity as routine or non-routine with probability between 0.001 (highly routine) to 0.1 (non-routine) K2 = temporary stress factors (based upon the time available for task performance = time to critical collision/grounding). For routine activities the factor lies between 0.5 and 10 while for non-routine activities the factor lies between 0.1 and 10 K3 = operator qualities including expertise, training and selection where the factor range is 0.5 to 3 K4 = activity anxiety factor based on the gravity of the situation such as serious emergency, potential emergency or nominal conditions scaled from 0.5 to 3 K5 = environmental ergonomic conditions as microclimate, control centre design and VTS control centre interference with a range from 0.07 to 10 K6 = the systems for monitoring traffic and those functions provided including interface design K7 = automatic situational detection and alarm generation functions K8 = communications between VTS and vessel, and between vessels. This also includes arrangements between vessels themselves via other means of communication than VHF

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K9 = control centre manning procedures of workstations which reflect the number of personnel available This method could hopefully be of assistance in a coming VTS risk assessment procedure. However this does require some future development. The traffic separation schemes in Gulf of Finland existed up to 2002 without any VTS facility. Then it was about 50 rule contraventions a month. After introducing the VTS the violations has decreased to less than 10 a month. Having a VTS does provide a positive policing effect. In order to globally spread the systematic method to develop VTS further, a specific presentation for IALA had been proposed.

3.4.2 WP2.3.2 VTS Survey (VTT, MSI Design)

A parallel personnel survey at the FMA (Finnish Maritime Administration) VTS centre had been conducted. The purpose was to conduct a survey of the personnel working at the centre. The survey consisted of an extensive questionnaire compiled and modified by VTT researchers. The results of this would provide a complementary baseline to the MTO findings above. The questionnaire involved about 400 questions covering a broad range of issues – from the physical work environment to working with the computer systems supporting the operator’s tasks. The results were submitted to the FMA as an input in developing the centre further. VTT have performed an analysis of the questionnaire, which was sent to 38 operators and of which 23 have answered. The areas addressed in the questionnaire were

- Demographics - Health Physical - Work Environment - Watch keeping and duties - VTS systems - The traffic monitoring and identification system (NTIS) - Updating software and manuals - Future development of VTS

Other outcomes of the study included:

- Possibility to focus VTS development - Possibility to conduct follow-ups & comparisons - Improved knowledge on VTS work and ways to support it

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- Identified challenges: e.g. 30 - 45 % of the respondents had no training on the use of primary VTS tools (i.e. NTIS, AIS, VHF & radar system) and Reimari

- 75 % of the respondents indicated that training regarding malfunctions was not sufficient

- 90 % of the operators have encountered vessel related machinery failures or blackouts when monitoring traffic

- There was a certain degree of ambiguity in the instructions and guidelines. Unclear instructions were indicated as a major problem area in the operator interviews

First of all, the study provided a state of the art description of the situation in the Helsinki VTS centre. The results showed how different aspect of the operator work was considered by the operators. Both positive and negative aspects could be identified and they can be, and have already been utilised, in the development of the VTS centre, its equipment and operator training. The results of the development can therefore be evaluated by repeating the survey. Results considering health showed some problems typical to “the office like work” which are difficult to eliminate but can be partly tackled e.g. by encouraging stretching during watch and physical exercises. Some of the problems found regarding the physical work environment are related to the open space control room, which allows close collaboration but can cause undo ambient noise and where individual preferences considering e.g. temperature are difficult to take into account. According to the results considering watch keeping duties and factors affecting work and work satisfaction, the situation at the centre was quite good. The amount of negative factors present in the daily work was quite low although some problems can be identified related to instructions. The overall work satisfaction also seemed reasonably good among most of the operators. What is particularly positive is that almost all operators responded that the “ability to affect maritime safety” is a positive contribution to one’s work satisfaction since that is the main purpose of the VTS activity system. Regarding the technical systems at the VTS centre, it can be concluded were considered as acceptable by the operators. There were, however, some problems e.g. related to repair time after malfunctions, information availability, usability and reliability in some systems as well as the system response time in the traffic monitoring system. The results describe the situation at a particular VTS centre at a particular time. Thus they cannot be generalized as such to any other centre in Finland or other countries. However, the study also yielded information about VTS work in general such as what type and variability of factors it constituted, how these affect the operators’ work satisfaction etc. This is the second contribution. Of course, some of these characteristics and their relations are still highly contextual experience

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The new VTS specific questionnaire developed in this study offers a method to conduct a similar study in any other VTS centre. So, the third contribution is methodical. This study was a pilot and gave also feedback about the functionality and adequacy of different questions. Also, characteristics of the studied centre and its surveillance area should be taken into account. Thus, the questionnaire should be modified before reuse in a different situational context.

3.5 WP3.1 Harmonized FSA analysis - Sea of Åland (VTT)

A case FSA (Formal Safety Assessment) study of The Sea of Åland has been completed by VTT. During the study process, VTT has been cooperating with the Danish University of Technology DTU in matters related to the BaSSy tool used in the risk analyses. The aim of this FSA study was to assess the effectiveness of the proposed routing measures supported with monitoring, reporting and navigational assistance systems as measures to improve maritime safety in the Åland Sea area by reducing the risk of casualties and increasing the protection of marine environment. The system proposed for implementation in the Åland Sea is described in NAV 54/3/7. To start with the work comprised a traffic analysis, which is essential in the FSA-process. A tool for analysing the AIS information has been developed. With the tool, the ship tracks can be presented divided into different ship types. In addition with the tool, the traffic flow directions, changes in speeds and courses of each ship can be indicated. The AIS record available for the traffic analyses was not fully extensive so the analysis was complemented with the traffic statistics collected from the ports having traffic out from the Gulf of Bothnia. In FSA-process, the costs of the damages to the environment that are caused by an accident have to be evaluated. The Finnish Environment Institute performed for VTT calculations of the oil spreading after an oil spill in the Sea of Åland area. In addition, VTT performed a Questionnaire study to the municipalities on the Sea of Åland area about environmentally or economically important areas which could be damaged as a consequence of an oil or chemical spill. The results of the questionnaire were complemented with a covering Internet search. VTT has arranged as a part of the FSA-process three expert workshops in 2006 and 2007. The expert workshops were structured brainstorming sessions where a computerized group support system was used. The

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object in each of the workshops was the navigational safety in the Sea of Åland. In the first workshop the focus was hazard identification and in the second identification of relevant risk control options. In the third workshop the effectiveness of different risk control options was evaluated in more detail. 30 accidents have been studied and environmental sensitivity with respect to oil spill has been investigated. The risk modeling framework used in the present study was based on the BaSSy tool software, which estimates collision frequencies based on historical AIS traffic, and estimation of the situational awareness of the navigators in different situations, which affect their ability to avoid accidents in potentially hazardous situations. The calculations needed to estimate the collision frequencies were performed using the BaSSy tool and Bayesian networks. The BaSSy tool was first used in creating of the traffic legs for the current traffic based on AIS data and for the traffic after implementation of the traffic separation scheme and the deep water route as well as in calculation of the accident risk.

Figure: Example of a histogram showing the observed lateral distribution of the traffic on a leg in the Sea of Åland

A verification of the BaSSy tool regarding collision frequency results has also been completed. Expected collision frequencies in Sea of Åland estimated with the BaSSy tool were compared to accident statistics, near miss statistics and expert judgements. Only collisions between "AIS-vessels" were covered. The calculations were using the traffic situation for 2006. The accident data was collected for the period 1985 – 2007. The conclusions are:

- Qualitative validation o the BaSSy tool identifies "hot spots" quite well o near miss statistics show a significant number of incidents

involving one or two passenger ships - Quantitative validation ( a factor 4 too small, about the same

result as in WP1)

5

59.4°

59.6°

59.8°

60.0°

60.2°

60.4°

18.5° 19.0° 19.5° 20.0° 20.5°

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o BaSSy collision frequency estimation : 0.043 per year (1 in 23 years)

o collision frequency statistics: 0.174 per year (4 in 23 years) - Small number of collisions gives imprecise estimate of

expected collision frequencies - Sources of inaccuracy identified but not compensated for - BaSSy has shown its potential in assessing expected collision

frequencies of a specified sea area - BaSSy gives reasonable results for the Sea of Åland when

comparing the relative collision risks of different sub areas, collision types or ship types

- However, the validity of the causation factors as good estimates of the global average values leaves unanswered

In the FSA study four different Risk Control Options (RCOs) were evaluated

- RCO 1: traffic separation scheme and deep-water route - RCO 2: RCO 1 added with monitoring - RCO 3: RCO 2 added with reporting systems - RCO 4: RCO 3 added with VTS with navigational assistance

service The results of the causation factor assessment are the following:

Inside TSS effect area Outside TSS effect

area

RCO 1 RCO 2 RCO 3 RCO 4 RCO 3 RCO 4

Reduction coefficient 0.69475 0.49167 0.41655 0.40517 0.84722 0.82408 Baseline causation

factor 0.0003

New causation factor 0.00021 0.00015 0.00012 0.00012 0.00025 0.00025

The benefit of improved safety was measured in terms of expected reduced consequence cost. The cost-benefit performance of the RCOs was assessed in terms of the total return of the investment. The estimation of the consequence costs of each accident identified in the risk analysis was divided into different cost categories: 1) reparation costs of the damaged vessel, 2) costs of the oil combating operations at sea, 3) costs of the shoreline oil removal, 4) costs of the damages affected by the oil spill to the sea dependent means of livelihood: tourism, fishing and fish farming and 5) costs of damages affected by the oil spill to the sea environment. Life cycle costs and cost-benefit calculations have been done for the different RCOs. The lifecycle costs are the following

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The outcome of the FSA study clearly indicates that the implementation of the proposed traffic separation systems and deep-water route to the Åland Sea is highly recommendable. In addition, implementation of a Ship Reporting System, similar to the one in the Gulf of Finland, is also recommendable. The FSA study was first focused on the ship-to-ship collision risk, which represents the dominant risk type affected by traffic separation schemes. The study was later complemented with grounding analysis giving more certain evidence of the cost-effectiveness of RCOs 2 - 4.

Figure: Example of the assumed lateral distribution of the traffic after implementation of a TSS. The traffic in RCO 1 (right) is slightly more overlapping than in RCOs 2 - 4 (middle), due to lack of surveillance of the traffic.

From an economic point of view the conclusions are:

- The investment in RCO 1 can be highly recommended based on the cost-benefit analysis

- The investment in RCO 3, which would decrease the accident risk further, can also be economically justified

- If investing in RCO 2 is considered, it is recommendable to invest in RCO 3 at the same time. Investing in RCO 2 does not give full value for the money, as a relatively small additional amount of money required for implementing also RCO 3 would yield a considerable improvement of safety

- RCO 4 cannot be recommended

RCO LCC [k€] RCO 1 20 RCO 2 562.2 RCO 3 662.2 RCO 4 5640.0

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Some comments were put forward on BaSSy meetings: - RCO 4 can be recommended out of safety aspects. - Somebody has to handle the reporting system included in

RCO3. The system itself is not a risk reducing factor. - The proposed traffic separation scheme has several bends that

gives a higher risk factor. The reasons for the bends are several grounds and it is not economical justifiable to remove them since the traffic in this deep water route is to low.

- A big part of the traffic in the Sea of Åland takes place in the night during the 4 to 6 time window. That may possibly explain a higher accident level.

The Sea of Åland FSA study has been sent to IMO. Åland Sea TSS and Deep Water Route were accepted in IMO MSC for enforcement.

3.6 WP3.2 FSA database (VTT)

The BaSSy FSA database first version is completed by VTT. It is put under the web pages of VTT with the address http://www.vtt.fi/proj/bassy/ FSA process using BaSSy tool

The objectives of the BaSSy FSA web pages

The BaSSy FSA web pages are established to provide to the coastal states of the Baltic Sea a portal with an

access to the tools and guidelines for performing Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) studies in order to analyse

the risks in the Baltic Sea area and to assess the effectiveness of different risk control options to decrease the

risks.

The tools available on these web pages were mainly developed in the Nordic project BaSSy (Baltic Sea

Safety). (Read more information about BaSSy)

The main functions of the FSA database is to guide coastal states around the Baltic Sea in performing FSAs on their own sea areas and to offer a platform for the results of performed FSAs. Contents in the BaSSy FSA sub pages:

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- A description of the Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) process including a link to the IMO guidelines for performing FSA studies

- Reports of FSA studies performed for different areas of the Baltic Sea o Åland Sea FSA o Risk Analysis of Sea Traffic in the Area around Bornholm o Navigational safety in the Sound between Denmark and

Sweden (Öresund) o FSA on the Navigational Safety in the Baltic West o Risk Analysis of Navigational Safety in Danish Waters o The implementation of the VTMIS system for the Gulf of

Finland. Formal Safety Assessment study

- BaSSy tool download including o Link to the web pages of GateHouse for downloading the

latest versions of GRISK software and the manual o Link to the web pages for downloading the latest versions

of the tool for traffic analyses based on the historical data from the Automatic Identification System (AIS). With the tool the route legs the amount of traffic divided into ship type and size categories as well as the lateral distributions of the traffic on the legs can be analysed from the AIS-data. (Not implemented yet but Gatehouse has such a software in process)

- Input data needed for the BaSSy tool

o Instructions on how the AIS raw material has to be prepared suitable for the BaSSy tool (prepared samples of AIS data included)

o Instructions on how the electronic chart material has to be prepared suitable for the grounding frequency analyses using BaSSy tool (prepared samples of electronic chart data included)

- Cost benefit analysis. Methods and data for estimation of the

consequence costs of an oil accident including o oil spill probability in an accident o size and type of the possible oil spill o amount of spilled oil that can be collected at sea by oil

combating vessels o width of the contaminated coast area o costs of oil combating and cleanup operations o consequence costs divided as follows:

- Result verification

o Links to sources of accident statistics and analysis

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o Links to sources of traffic statistics This is seen as a good starting point for the database. There is a question regarding the update of the website in the future, since without updating it will lose its value. VTT hope they will have the possibility. However the handling of the database after the BaSSy project has to come to a head in other forums. For the moment the focus of the web page is the Baltic Sea, to limit the work. A future discussion of a world wide FSA database would be of great interest.

3.7 WP3.3 Baltic Sea FSA studies (VTT, DTU, SSPA)

One overall aim with the work in this task is to gain experiences from using the BaSSy tool in analysis of large sea areas. This will give possibilities to improve the tool. Originally it was planned a Bornholm Gat case study within BaSSy under the responsibility of VTT. Before this work had started COWI did a risk analysis for Bornholm Gat on a public commission and has developed a code of their own. COWI and DTU had also got governmental support for cooperative work. The BaSSy tool was used on the Bornholm Gat by COWI to compare their software with the BaSSy tool. Much of the Bornholm Gat work planned within BaSSy has been covered by COWI (that is formally not a partner in BaSSy). A comparison of the cost analysis methods of the Bornholm FSA performed by COWI and the Åland Sea FSA has been performed. Vessels, oil spill probability and size, clean up costs, ship damage, life lost, livelihood costs, environmental damage costs and other costs have been compared. Some problems are put forward:

- Are the statistical averages of the spill probability and the spill size comparable with the results obtained with the simulation program for the consequences of ship-ship collisions?

- The selection of the cost categories are different in the two studies

- Traffic data is not available in the COWI report - Accident frequencies are not reported for different ship types

Complementary data material from COWI is needed to perform the final investigation. This will be done after the summer 2009.

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A collision and grounding frequency analysis using the BaSSy tool for the Gulf of Finland is ongoing. The preparation of the electronic chart material is completed and the preparation of the 2007 AIS data has been acomplished with the help of Erik Ravn, former DTU and now DAMSA. The process of AIS data conversion has been more complicated and has taken much more time due to the fact that both the scientists dealing with this at DTU left their positions. The finalization of the study with complementary material will be done after the summer 2009. A collision and grounding frequency analysis for southern part of the Swedish east coast using the BaSSy tool based on 2007 AIS data is almost completed. Data has been adapted, traffic legs defined and the BaSSy tool has been used. Accident reports have been studied but the analysis and the report remains. The AIS data conversion has been acomplished in the same way as described above. The finalization of the study with complementary material will be done after the summer 2009.

4 PROJECT REPORTS

WP0 Management (SSPA) WP0 BaSSy SSPA Report40053946-3 WP1 BaSSy program tool development (DTU, Gatehouse) WP1 BaSSy_Frequencies WP1 BaSSy grisk_manual_v1_0_19 WP2.1 HF in bridge systems (SSPA, Chalmers, MSI Design) WP2.1.1 North up / Head up (SSPA)

WP2.1.1 BaSSy SSPA Report 40053946-2 WP2.1.1 BaSSy Report40053946-2 appendix 1 WP2.1.1 BaSSy Report40053946-2 appendix 2

WP2.1.2 S-mode investigation (Chalmers)

WP2.1.2 BaSSy S-mode investigation WP2.1.3 Radar design mock-up (MSI Design)

WP2.1.3 BaSSy ARI Report Rev 2 WP2.2 Decision support for VTS operators (SSPA)

Conclusions

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WP2.2 BaSSy SSPA Report 4005 3946-1 - rev1 WP2.2 BaSSy Rapport 4005 3946-1 Appendix WP2.3 Analyses of the VTS (MSI Design) WP2.3.1 MTO profiling (MSI Design)

WP2.3.1 BaSSy VTS Report Rev 4 WP2.3.2 VTS Survey (VTT, MSI Design)

WP2.3.2 BaSSy VTS Survey WP3.1 Harmonized FSA analysis - Sea of Åland (VTT) WP3.1 BaSSy FSA_raportti_Aland_Sea_11_3_2009 WP3.1 BaSSy Sea of Åland FSA Research Report_DRAFT_1 WP3.1 BaSSy APPENDICES_Aland_Sea WP3.1 BaSSy IMO_FSA_raportti_final_Aland_Sea WP3.1 BaSSy IMO_FSA_Appendices_Aland_Sea WP3.2 FSA database (VTT) http://www.vtt.fi/proj/bassy/ WP3.3 Baltic Sea FSA studies (VTT, DTU, SSPA) WP3.3.1 BaSSy Cost comparison - Bornholm and Åland Sea FSA WP3.3.2 BaSSy tool analysis - Gulf of Finland WP3.3.3 BaSSy tool analysis - Southern Swedish east coast

5 CONCLUSIONS

Deeper conclusions from the BaSSy project are found in the separate tasks described above. Below some conclusions on a more general level are drawn: Within BaSSy an efficient tool for performing risk analysis of collision and grounding incidents in specific navigational areas has been developed. The model makes use of registered AIS ship traffic data that are collected and registered by the Nordic Maritime Administrations. All SOLAS ships (over 300 GRT) are obliged to use AIS and to send identity, position and other information. The risk assessment tool contains much automatic functionality and represents a big step towards thorough, efficient and easier risk analysis and assessments. The models implemented in the BaSSy toolbox for

Conclusions

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the assessment of the collision and grounding frequencies represents the state of the art. But most importantly is that this tool is made available free of charge for interested bodies. This implies that the navigational risk assessment will be performed using the same theoretical basis, and as such it will be much easier to compare and validate completed risk analyses. Further, since the conducted analyses use the same basis, it is possible to establish or gather experiences using the tool in different areas into a database. The information needed to perform FSA studies is scattered in several sources. To make the process easier a BaSSy web database including links to the data sources is hosted by VTT. It also includes a link to the BaSSy Toolbox software and relevant manuals and documents about the theoretical background of the risk analysis method and also the general instructions how to perform FSA study as well as user results collection within the Baltic Sea. IALA also hosts a server for gathering all collision and grounding frequency analysis performed by its members using the BaSSy toolbox. This will allow different maritime authorities to effectively harvest effective navigational risk reducing measures gathered by other authorities. In several areas BaSSy Toolbox has achieved promising project results. Some of them represent levels of deep understanding, whereas others have given good starting points for further progress. The ship traffic has an unpredictable nature as regards to its density at the sea area. This has an effect to the workload of the VTS operators who are monitoring the sea area. During workload peaks, the attentiveness is often directed to a certain part of the monitored sea area another threatening situation elsewhere may have completely escaped the operator’s attention. On the other hand during quiet moments, the operators often take on extra responsibilities, and the core task, traffic monitoring, may stay in the background. In addition, the traffic in the Baltic Sea is increasing but the resources to increase the number of VTS operators are limited. To alert the operators of possible developing hazards an automatic monitoring and decision support concept has been developed. This concept seems very promising and further development will be performed within the EfficienSea (EU Baltic Sea Region) project. Most of the ship bridges and engine control rooms are unique and lacking standardisation. In addition the principles of human centred design are not utilized in their plans. Studies how to improve the situation have been performed within BaSSy project. This has included a North up / Head up user mode comparison, an investigation of a radar S-mode interface as well as a design mock-up of simplified radar functionality.

Conclusions

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A rigorous case FSA (Formal Safety Assessment) study of The Sea of Åland has been within the BaSSy project. The aim of this FSA study was to assess the effectiveness of the proposed routing measures supported with monitoring, reporting and navigational assistance systems as measures to improve maritime safety in the Åland Sea area by reducing the risk of casualties and increasing the protection of marine environment. The system proposed for implementation in the Åland Sea is described in NAV 54/3/7. The FSA study has been sent to IMO. Åland Sea Traffic Separation Scheme and Deep Water Route were accepted in IMO MSC for enforcement. In order to gain experiences from using the BaSSy tool in analysis of large sea areas and further risk analysis of different areas in the Baltic some more studies were performed within BaSSy. The collision and grounding frequency analysis studies were done in the Gulf of Finland and the Southern part of the Swedish east. To get insight in cost analysis methods a comparison of Bornholm and Åland Sea FSA has also been performed. The project partners in Sweden, Finland and Denmark have used their complementary competences to achieve the results of the BaSSy project. The co-operation has resulted in transfer of competences between partners and that new knowledge has been made possible. A very good climate of easy co-operation has existed among the partners. This working relation seems a bit unique.

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