wp181_kurtenbach

8/3/2019 wp181_kurtenbach

1/33www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers

GIGAW

orkin

gP

apers

serv

etodis

semin

atethere

searchre

sults

ofw

orkin

pro

gre

ssprior

topublic

ation

toen

coura

getheex

ch

an

geofid

easan

dacademic

de

bate.

Inclu

sion

of

apaperin

theW

orkin

gP

apers

serie

sdoesn

otcon

stitutep

ublication

an

dsh

ouldn

otlimit

public

ationin

anyotherv

en

ue.

Copyrigh

trem

ain

swith

th

eauthors.

GIGA Research Programme:

Violence and Security___________________________

State-Building, War and Violence:

Evidence from Latin America

Sabine Kurtenbach

No 181 November 2011


2/33

GIGAWP181/2011

GIGAWorkingPapers

Editedbythe

GIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudies

LeibnizInstitutfrGlobaleundRegionaleStudien

TheGIGAWorkingPapersseriesservestodisseminatetheresearchresultsofworkinprogress

prior to publication in order to encourage the exchange of ideas and academicdebate.An

objectiveoftheseriesistogetthefindingsoutquickly,evenifthepresentationsarelessthan

fullypolished. Inclusionof apaper in theGIGAWorkingPapers seriesdoesnot constitute

publicationandshouldnotlimitpublicationinanyothervenue.Copyrightremainswiththe

authors.Whenworkingpapersareeventuallyacceptedbyorpublishedinajournalorbook,

thecorrectcitationreferenceand,ifpossible,thecorrespondinglinkwillthenbeincludedon

theGIGAWorkingPaperswebsiteat.

GIGAresearchunitresponsibleforthisissue:

GIGAResearchProgramme2:ViolenceandSecurity

EditoroftheGIGAWorkingPapersseries:BertHoffmann

Copyrightforthisissue:SabineKurtenbach

Englishcopyeditor:MeenakshiPreisserEditorialassistantandproduction:SilviaBcke

AllGIGAWorkingPapersareavailableonlineandfreeofchargeonthewebsite

.

Foranyrequestspleasecontact:

Email:

Phone:+49(0)4042825548

TheGIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudiescannotbeheldresponsibleforerrors

oranyconsequencesarisingfromtheuseofinformationcontainedinthisWorkingPaper;the

viewsandopinionsexpressedaresolelythoseoftheauthororauthorsanddonotnecessarily

reflectthoseoftheInstitute.

GIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandAreaStudies

LeibnizInstitutfrGlobaleundRegionaleStudien

NeuerJungfernstieg21

20354Hamburg

Germany

Email:Website:


3/33

GIGAWP181/2011

StateBuilding,WarandViolence:

EvidencefromLatinAmerica

Abstract

InEuropeanhistory,warhasplayedamajorroleinstatebuildingandthestatemonopolyon

violence.Butwarisaveryspecificformoforganizedpoliticalviolence,anditisdecreasing

onaglobalscale.Otherpatternsofarmedviolencenowdominate,onesthatseemtounder

mine statebuilding, thuspreventing the replication ofEuropean experiences.As a conse

quence,themainfocusofthecurrentstatebuildingdebateisonfragilityandalackofvio

lencecontrolinsidethesestates.

EvidencefromLatinAmericanhistoryshowsthatthespecificpatternsoftheterminationof

bothwar and violence aremore important than the specific patterns of their organization.

Hencethesepatternscanbeconceptualizedasacriticaljunctureforstatebuilding.Whilemili

taryvictoriesinwar,thesubordinationofcompetingarmedactorsandtheprosecutionofper

petrators are conducive for statebuilding,negotiated settlements, coexistence, and impunityproduceinstabilityduetocompetingpatternsofauthority,legitimacy,andsocialcohesion.

Keywords: statebuilding,war,violence,criticaljuncture,LatinAmerica

Dr.SabineKurtenbach

is apolitical scientist and senior research fellow at theGIGA Institute ofLatinAmerican

Studies.

Contact:

Website:

importancia de la terminacion

de la guerra! guerra y

violencia como

determinantes para la

creacion de Estado!!!


4/33

StateBuilding,WarandViolence:

EvidencefromLatinAmerica

SabineKurtenbach

ArticleOutline

1 Introduction

2 MultipleFormsofViolence

3 WarandStateBuilding

4 StateswithinstatesandStateBuilding

5 InterpersonalViolenceandStateBuilding

6 ViolenceandStateBuildinginLatinAmericaAPathDependentRelationship

AnnexDataonViolenceinLatinAmerica

References

1 Introduction1

War,violence,andstatebuildingareintertwinedbuthaveanambiguousandcomplexrela

tionship.Althoughinthefollowing,thetermviolencewillbeusedonlyfordirectphysical

andlethalviolenceagainstotherpersons,evensuchalimitedperspectiveshowsverydiffer

entandmanifoldformsandexpressionsofviolence.Mostofthedebateontherelationship

betweenviolenceand statebuilding focusesonwar,avery specific formof collectivevio

lence.Historically, the termwarwas reserved forarmed conflictbetween sovereign states

1 MythankstoAndreasMehlerandLeslieWehnerforvaluablecommentshelpingmetosharpentheargument.

Def: Violencia


5/33

SabineKurtenbach:StateBuilding,WarandViolence: EvidencefromLatinAmerica 5

andthusappliedtohighlyorganizedandcentralizedformsofpublicviolencebystateactors.

Heremobilization foraswellas legitimizationofviolencewerebasedon the formulationof

politicalgoals,e.g.nationalism,religion,andethnicidentity.Clausewitzsphrasedefiningwar

asthecontinuationofpoliticsbyothermeansshapesthenotionofwareventoday.Atthesametime,thetheoreticaldebateisdominatedbyEuropeanexperiencesofwar

makingasstatemaking(Tilly1985),leadingtoamonopolizationandmuchlatertothe

democraticcontrolofthemeansofviolence.Theseprocesseshavenotbeenreplicatedinde

velopingcountries.Scholarshaveputforwardtwolinesofargumenttoexplaindifferentpat

terns in the global South. One argument posits that changes in the international context

guaranteetheexistenceofbordersandstateswithlowlevelsofinternalcohesionorviability

(Srensen2004).Asecondargumentisthatstatebuilding(orstateformation)isalongterm

historicalprocess.Hencetheviolencewecurrentlyobservemightbepartofalongerprocess

whoseoutcomeremainsunknown (Schlichte2006).Thisdebate isfurther linked to theob

servationofchangingpatternsofviolencenamely,thedecreasingimportanceofthestateas

anactorinviolence,adevelopmentthatseemstobedemonstratedinthedeclineofwarona

worldwidescaleandtheincreaseofotherformsofcollectiveviolence.2Regardingtheseother

formsofviolence,thedebatelacksanexplicithistoricalcomparativeperspectivemostofall

duetothelackofreliableandsystematicdata.

Again,ananalysisofEuropeanstatebuildingcanprovide interestingevidenceashere,

too,themassiveuseofviolencewasnotexclusivelyorganizedintheformofwar.Hencenot

all formsofviolence contributedhistorically to the two factors standingat the coreof the

statebuildingdebate:themonopolizationofthemeansofviolenceanditsciviliancontrol.It

isthusnecessarytodistinguishbetweendifferentformsofviolenceandanalyzetheirspecific

impactsonstatebuildingandtonotjustequalizeviolencewithfragilityusingviolenceasa

majorindicatorforstatefragility.HeremostempiricalevidencecomesfromsubSaharanAf

ricaandtheMiddleEast,andexperiencesinLatinAmericanandAsiaaredisregarded.

Thispaperseekstocontributetothedebateonstatebuilding,war,andviolence,system

atizingimplicationsforstatebuildingcausedbydifferentformsofviolence.Thepaperwill

focusmainlyontheconsequencesofwarandotherformsofviolenceforthemonopolizationofthemeansofviolence,mostlyseenasaninitial,necessarysteptowardsstatebuilding.Dis

tinguishingbetween specific forms, related actor constellations, and historical patterns of

conflictisnecessarytoidentifytheconsequencesforstatebuildingprocesses.

Themainargumentputforwardhereisthatthepatternsofwarandviolencetermination

aredecisiveforstatebuildingacrossdifferentformsofviolence.Theoutcomecanbeconcep

2 Thisdebatestartedwiththenewwarthesisfocusingonnonstatearmedactors,thedominanceofeconomic

goalsandhigh levelsofatrocitiesagainstnoncombatants,seeKaldor (1999),Mnkler (2002).Onchanging

patternsoforganizedviolencecf.HumanSecurityProjectReport (2011),SIPRI (2011),Fox/Hoelscher(2010),

Bealletal.(2011).BycontrastPinker(2011)arguesthatallformsofdirectphysicalviolencehavedeclinedsig

nificantly.

Def: Guerra

entre E

(regular)

No hay

relacion

directa

violencia-

fragilidad pol.

Argumento

central!!!


6/33

6 SabineKurtenbach:StateBuilding,WarandViolence: EvidencefromLatinAmerica

tualizedasacriticaljunctureasitshapesspecificpowerrelations,policyoptions,andtime

horizonsforstatebuilding.3Atthesame time,warasthemostcentralizedformofcollec

tiveviolenceallowsforpatternsofcollectiveorganizationandmobilizationconducivefor

statebuildingwhileotherformsofcollectiveviolenceandhigh levelsof interpersonalviolenceimplydifferentlogicsoforganizationandmobilization.Thisperspectiveontheorgani

zationandlogicofviolenceallowsforamorenuancedandlessEurocentricanalysisofthe

relationshipbetweenstatebuildingandviolence.At thesame time,statebuilding isa long

andcomplexprocessinfluencedbyhistoricaldevelopmentsandshapedbyotherfactorsre

latedtoviolence,too:forexample,theintensityofdestructionorthelegitimizationoftheuse

offorce.

From thisperspective, it isreasonabletoconceptualizestatebuildingnotjustas thees

tablishmentofspecificformalinstitutionsorbureaucraciesbutasaprocessthataimstoes

tablishapoliticalorder.AccordingtoMigdal(2001:1516,emphasisinoriginal),

[t]hestateisafieldofpowermarkedbytheuseandthethreatofviolenceandshapedby

(1)theimageofacoherent,controllingorganizationinaterritory,whichisarepresentationof

thepeopleboundedbythatterritory,and

(2)theactualpracticesofitsmultipleparts.

Actualstatesareshapedbytwoelements,imageandpractices.Thesecanbeoverlap

pingandreinforcing,orcontradictoryandmutuallydestructive.

From thisperspective, the congruence or at least the compatibility between territorial

borders with patterns of social cohesion and legitimacy is essential for successful state

building.Butstatebuildingisanonlinearprocessinpermanentmotiononacontinuumbe

tween fragile/weakandstrongstate imagesandpractices.Theserelynotjuston territorial

controlbutalsoonfinancialresourcesaswellas theestablishmentofaminimumofsocial

cohesionand legitimacy.Ahistoricalapproachallowsus to identifyhowspecific formsof

violenceshapestatebuildingacrossdifferentcontexts.Thisenablesustoovercomethequite

simplisticdichotomyofthestatebuildingfragilitydebateandallowsfortheinclusionofthe

influencesofchangingexternalcontextsaswellastheirrelationshipwithinternaldynamics

andpowerrelations.

LatinAmerican experiencesprovide interesting insights into these relationshipsas the

regionmirrorsglobalexperiencesofchangingformsofviolencesinceitsindependence200

yearsago from internationalwarsduring thenineteenth century to internalwars in the

twentiethcenturytoprivatizedviolenceduringthelasttwodecades.4ThevariationsinLatin

Americanstatebuildingcanbeexplainedbyvariationsinthehistoricalpatternsoftheinter

3 OntheconceptofcriticaljuncturesseeamongothersCappocia/Kelemen(2007).

4 Although this trend is ratherundisputed, thereareneitherhistoricalnor reliable systematicdataonother

formsofviolence.Pinker(2011)isanexceptionprovidingatleastsomesketchydataacrosstime.

Orden Pol.=

Construccion del

E.

Como

resultado

historico,

cultural y pol.


7/33


actionbetween statebuilding,war,andviolence.Hence theanalysis can contribute to the

broaderdebateontherelationshipbetweenthosethreeprocesses.

Thepaperisorganizedintofivesections:Iwillstartwithashortsurveyondifferentcon

ceptsandformsofviolenceandthedataforLatinAmerica.Iwillthenexplorethedifferentconsequencesofwarandotherformsofviolenceandtheiroutcomeforstatebuilding,start

ingwith internationaland internalwars, looking thenatother formsofcollectiveviolence

andthenattheimpactofthecurrentwaveofinterpersonalviolence.Intheconcludingsec

tion, Iwill summarize thedifferentphasesandpatternsof statebuildingandpresentevi

denceregardingthethesisofvictoriesascriticaljuncturesinstatebuilding.

2 MultipleFormsofViolence

Violenceisamultifacetedphenomenon.Distinctionscanbemadeaccordingtodifferentcri

teria(e.g.leveloforganization,space,goals,actors,relationship,intensity),butclearcutclas

sificationsaredifficult,aschangingdefinitionsofwarshow.5Historicaldefinitionsempha

sizingtheroleofsovereignstateshadtobeadaptedwiththeincreasingimportanceofarmed

conflictinsidethesestatesafterWorldWarII.Nevertheless,thestateremainsanimportant

actor.TheUppsalaConflictDataProject(UCDP)defineswarasacontestedincompatibility

thatconcernsgovernmentand/orterritorywheretheuseofarmedforcebetweentwoparties,

ofwhichatleastoneisthegovernmentofastate,thatresultsinatleast1,000battlerelated

deathsinonecalendaryear.Qualitativedefinitionsusesimilarcriteriaalthoughlackthees

tablishmentofaquantitativethresholdforbattlerelateddeaths.6Bothdefinitionsreflectthe

realityofwarduringmostofthetwentiethcentury.

Butwhileotherformsofviolencehaveexistedinhumanhistory,theturnofthecentury

hasbeenmarkedbyagrowingawarenessofcollectiveviolence incontextswhereacentral

stateisweak,fragile,ornonexistent.Here,privateandnonstateactorslikewarlordsormi

litiasplayan importantrole;economicenrichment isperceivedasamajorgoal.While this

debateonthenewwarshashighlightedanumberofimportantpatternsofviolence,ithas

somehow idealized interstate and civilwars in the tradition ofClausewitz.Even in these

wars,notallviolencehasbeenpoliticalor restricted to formal combatants.Historical evi

denceforgreedandeconomicenrichmentaswellasforviolenceagainstcivilians(women,

children,ethnicminorities)abounds.7

5 FordifferentpossibilitiesofcategorizationseeWHO(2002:7),Tilly(2003)andBrzoska(2007:102103)ondata

forotherformsofcollectiveviolence.

6 FortheUppsaladefinition,see(08November2011);foraqualita

tivedefinitionseeGantzel/Schwinghammer(1995:31ff.).

7 For example, plundering and rape in many interstate and internal wars; see Kalyvas (2006) and Gerlach

(2010),amongothers.

Resumen

Violencia

Colectiva:

Poder

central debil.


8/33


Duringthelasttwodecades,thenumberofwarshasdecreasedalthougharmedviolence

isstillasignificantproblemacrosstheglobe.TheGlobalBurdenofArmedViolenceReport

(GenevaDeclaration2008)claimsthatcurrentlytwothirdsofthevictimsofarmedviolence

dieoutsideofcollectivelyorganizedarmedconflicts.Other reportsperceive similar trendsand seepoliticalviolence in the formofwarsand armed conflicts asbeingon the retreat

while other patterns of violence, namely from gangs and organized crime is increasing

(SIPRI2011,HumanSecurityReportProject2011).Hencethestateseemstohavelostitspre

dominanceinorganizedarmedviolenceasaperpetratoraswellasacontrollerofviolence.

Butastherearenosystematiccollectionsofhistoricaldataondifferentformsofviolenceout

sideofwar,itisimpossibletodeterminewhetherwhatischangingarethepatternsofvio

lenceorthelevelsofawareness.Hencethereisaneedforsystematichistoricaldatacompila

tionandresearch.8

Maybemorethanwarfareitself,whathaschangedsinceWorldWarIIhavebeenthein

ternationalperspectivesonviolence aswell as themodesof legitimationofviolence.The

UniversalDeclarationofHumanRightsandtheCharteroftheUnitedNationshaverestrict

edstatesrighttouseforceindealingwitheachotheraswellasinternally.Asaconsequence,

theuseofviolencehasincreasinglybecomeamatterofpublicobservationanddebate.New

and rapid formsof international communicationenableus towitnessviolence thatwould

haveremainedunnoticedbyacademicobserversand thegeneralpublicdecadesago.9Asa

consequence,therehasbeenaprocessofdelegitimizationandthuscriminalizationofthe

useofviolence,alongwith increasing levelsofdirectand indirect intervention intoviolent

contexts.Forexample,theestablishmentofthelegalconceptofcrimesagainsthumanityor

theresponsibility toprotect enables externalactors to intervene intowhat,before,were

internalaffairs.Theimpactofthesechangingnormsandperceptionsofviolenceonstate

buildinghavenotyetbeensystematicallyexplored.

ExistingdataforLatinAmericashowagreatvarietyofviolence:10Since1945theregion

experiencedonlyafewandmostlyveryshort interstatewars. Intrastateorcivilwarswere

dominantinthesecondhalfofthetwentiethcentury,buttheirintensityandleveloforgani

zationhaschangedduringthelastdecades.Currently,violenceoccursmostlyinthecontextoforganizedcrime(mostofallinrelationtothedrugtrade)andgangs,aswellasintheform

of interpersonalviolence in theurbanareas.Dataon collectiveviolenceafter1945 showa

highlevelofvariationacrossLatinAmerica.Colombiaisdefinitelythecountrywiththemost

8 SeeBrzoska(2007)ontheproblemsinprovidingdefinitionsandcollectingdataregardingtheseotherformsof

collectiveviolence.Nevertheless,ithasbecomeincreasinglyevidentthatthebordersbetweenwar,armedcon

flict,andotherformsofviolenceareblurredandlackclearcutdistinctions.

9 ThepowerofimagesvisvisthemobilizationofinternationalpublicopinionhasbeenobvioussinceRobert

CapasfamousphotographofthedyingrepublicancombatantintheSpanishCivilWar,despitetherecental

legationsthatthepicturewasasetup.

10Cf.Tables1to4intheAnnex.AlthoughviolencehasbeenandisaneverydayexperienceinLatinAmericas

ruralareas(seeKay/Salazar2001;Kay2009)nodatahavebeensystematicallycollected.

Contra-

arguemnto!!1

Cambio en la

concepcin de

guerra entre Ey a nivel

interno.

DD.HH


9/33


intense experienceofdifferent formsofviolence,whileother countries showvariancede

pending on timeperiod (e.g.Argentina) and the forms of violence (e.g.Brazil,withhigh

homicideratesandnointrastatearmedconflict).

Inthefollowingsections,IwilldiscusstherelationshipbetweenstatebuildingandviolenceusingempiricalevidencefromLatinAmericancases.IwillstartwithTillysargument

onthecloserelationshipbetweenwarandstatebuilding.

3 WarandStateBuilding

Mostresearchregardingtherelationshipbetweenstatebuildingandviolencehasfocusedon

thehistoricaldevelopmentof theEuropeannationstate,specificallyEnglandandFrance.11

Themainargumentistwofold:Whilethemodernstateisaproductofwarandviolentconflict,itwasabletoestablishamonopolyonviolenceinsideitsterritory,providingthebasis

for internalpacificationorcivilization.12Hence,controlling formsofviolenceconsidered

illegitimate isacore functionofstatesbasedonaprocessof framingand interpretingvio

lence.But empirically this function isnotalwaysorganized in the formofamonopolyof

forceasestablishedintheEuropeanstates,norarethedefinitionsoflegitimateorillegiti

mateandthuscriminalformsofviolenceuniversal.Theydifferwidelyacrosshistoricaland

culturalcontexts.

InhisfamousarticleWarMakingandStateMakingasOrganizedCrime,CharlesTilly

identifiesfour importantmechanismsfortheestablishmentofthestatesmonopolyonvio

lence(1985:181):

Underthegeneralheadingoforganizedviolence,theagentsofthestatescharacteristi

callycarryonfourdifferentactivities:

1) Warmaking:Eliminating or neutralizing their own rivals outside the territories inwhichtheyhaveclearandcontinuouspriorityaswieldersofforce.

2) Statemaking:Eliminatingorneutralizingtheirrivalsinsidethoseterritories.3)

Protection:Eliminatingorneutralizingtheenemiesoftheirclients.

4) Extraction:Acquiringthemeansofcarryingoutthefirstthreeactivitieswarmaking,statemaking,andprotection.

Eachoftheseactivitiesleadstocharacteristicformsoforganization:warmakingtoarmies,

statemakingtoinstrumentsofsurveillanceandcontrol,protectiontocourtsandassemblies,

11Cf.amongothersGiddens(1985),Tilly(1990),Holsti(1996:4160).LookingattheEuropeanlatecomersin

statebuilding, most of all Italy and Germany, it is obvious that the relationshipbetween war and state

buildingismuchmorecomplicated.

12NorbertElias(1976)hasdescribedtherelatedviolentconflictsaseliminationcontests.Themonopolization

ofthemeansofcoercionandof taxationareatthecoreofMaxWebers (1972)definitionofamodernstate,

althoughintheprocesstheycantakeverydifferentforms(seeTilly1985:181182).


10/33


andextractiontofiscalandaccountingstructures(ibid.).InEuropetheseformsoforganiza

tionareterritoriallyboundandembeddedinstatesocietyrelations.ButTillyalsopointsto

thefactthatthereplicationoftheseprocessesinthedevelopingcountriesofthesecondhalf

ofthetwentiethcenturyisdifficultandunlikely.InEurope,externalwarfareallowedforthedistinctionbetween the internal and the external supporting specific and territorially

bound formsof socialcohesionand identity,namelynationalism.On thecontrary,most

developing countrieshaveacquired theirmilitaryorganization fromoutside,without the

same internal forgingofmutual constraintsbetween rulersand ruled (ibid.:186).Hence,

thesepoliticalentitieslackcomparableformsofsocialcohesionatthenationallevel.

LatinAmericaisrarelydiscussedfromthisperspective.Centeno(2002,2003)isanexcep

tion,arguingthatLatinAmericanhistorylacksexperiencesofwarthatwouldpushtowards

the centralization ofboth state capacities and power due to easily available external re

sources.Asaconsequence,theneedtointegrateandcontrolsocietyhasbeenlow,andlevels

of taxation, conscription, and social welfare have remained underdeveloped. Ideological

commonalitiesbetweenelitesexceededthoseinsideterritorialborders,inhibitingtheriseof

nationalism.Althoughthispatternisquitecommon,thereareinterestingexceptionsandex

amplesfortheearlyEuropeanmodelofstatebuildingwiththesupportofexternalandin

ternalwars.13

Chileinthenineteenthcenturyisacaseinpoint:InthesocalledSaltpeter/NitrateWaror

WarofthePacific(18791883),ChileincreaseditsterritorynorthwardsattheexpenseofBo

livia (which lost itsaccess to thePacificOcean)andPeru. Incontemporarycategories, this

was a classical resource war. Chilesmilitary victory provided control over one of the

worldslargestnitratedepositsandthusbecamethecentralsourceofincomefortheChilean

centralstate.14Theseresourceswereusedtoestablishandcentralizestateinstitutions,firstof

allthearmedforces.Nevertheless,thewardidnotestablishanewrelationshipbetweenthe

dominantelitesand thepopulation.Thepoliticalregimeremainedexclusive; theoligarchy

andthearmedforcescontrolledthestate.ConsequencesofthewaronstatebuildinginBo

liviaweredifferent, as thedefeatdeprived the state froman important sourceof income.

Nevertheless,inBoliviaaswellasinChilethewarwasanimportantbasisfortheconstructionofnationalidentity:superiorityinthecaseofChile,theconstructionofChileasathreat

13The followingempiricalevidence isneithercompletenorrepresentativebut illustratesvariance in therela

tionshipbetweenwarandstatebuilding.

14Thedisputedterritorywashometotheworldslargestdepositofsaltpeter,anitratethatgainedimportanceas

afertilizeraswellasagunpowderfortheproductionofexplosivesinthesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury.

Whiletheeconomicimportanceofsaltpeterdeclinedafteritwassubstitutedwithsyntheticproducts,theAta

camaDesertisalsorichincopper,whichreplacednitrateasChilesmostimportantexportproductattheturn

ofthetwentiethcentury.Eventoday,Chileistheworldsleadingexporterofcopper.SeeKurtz(2009)forthe

importanceofspecificsocialrelationsforinstitutionaldevelopmentinacomparativestudyofChileandPeru

attheendofthenineteenthcentury.

Diferencia

entre Europa

y A.L.


11/33


inBolivia.15Inbothcountries,theconstructionofthelinebetweentheinternalandtheexter

nalsupportedidentitypatternsalongnationalistlinesinspiteofsocialandpoliticaldivi

sionsacrosssocialclasses,ethnicity,ortheconflictoverstatechurchrelations.

Insurgentvictories in theMexicanandCuban internalwars/revolutionshadsimilareffects.Theyprovidedthestatewithsignificanteconomicresourcesviataxationandstateen

terprisesand thusa financialbasis forsocial integration.At thesymbolic level,both intro

ducednationalrevolutionarynarratives thathaveonlyrecently lost theirwidespread in

ternalappeal.CostaRicaisanotherexampleofsuccessfulstatebuildingafteritsinternalwar

endedwithamilitaryvictory.Butdifferent from theMexicanand theCubanexperiences,

CostaRicaestablishedademocraticpoliticalsystem.Thenarrativeofnationalstatebuilding

isbasedontheconstructionofCostaRicaasapeacefulandnonviolentsocietyincontrastto

neighboringcountries.16

Government victories after internal wars or armed conflicts in many cases accom

plishedthroughdirectinterventionbyormilitaryaidfromtheUnitedStatesledtothemo

nopolizationofthemeansofviolencewithavarietyoforganizationalfeaturesofthespecific

state.Regimes range from thekleptocracyof theSomozaclan inNicaragua to thebureau

craticauthoritarianregimesintheSouthernCone.Asaconsequence,therepressivestateap

paratuswasexpandedandservedasamainmechanismtomaintainthesocialandpolitical

statusquo,atleasttemporarily.

ColombiashistoryofcivilwarbetweentheLiberalandConservativepartiesprovidesa

ratherdifferentandinterestinglessonregardinginternalwarswithoutaclearoutcome:Even

inthenineteenthcenturythesewarsinvolvedhighlevelsofmobilizationandorganizationof

thepopulation,forcingColombianstotakesideswithonepoliticalparty.Asaconsequence

ofnearlyonehundredyearsofrecurringarmedconflictalongtheselines,culturalidentities

developedbeyond the local level.However, thesestrengthenedpoliticalparty identitiesat

theexpenseofanationalColombian identity,dividing thecountrybetweenLiberalsand

Conservatives.17

Fromthisperspective,itbecomesevidentthatitisnotjustwaritselfthathasacloserela

tionshiptostatebuildingbutthatthespecificoutcomeisimportant,ifnotdecisive.18

Thisismost evident for the states legitimacy. External wars provide an important basis for

strengtheninginternalpatternsofsocialcohesion(nationalist,ethnic,religious)while inter

nalwarspointtowardsdeficitsinthestateslegitimacy.Iftheyarewon,externalaswellas

15SeeWehner(2010:1318),whoalsoshowshowdifficultitistochangethesebilateraldiscoursesfromrivalry

tocooperationandmutualtrust.

16 OnthepowerofstoriesseeSelbin(2010).OnthenonviolencediscourseinCostaRicaseeHuhn(2011).

17OnColombiasviolenthistoryseeamongothersKurtenbach(1991,1999),Berquist/Pearanda/Snchez(2001),

Gonzlez/Bolvar/Vzquez(2003).

18OncivilwarterminationandtheprobabilityofwarrecurrenceseeDuffy(2010,2010a),whoarguesthatrebel

victoriesproducethemoststableoutcomesduetohigherlevelsofinstitutionalcapacityandlegitimacy.Both

factorsarealsoveryimportantforstatebuilding.

importante!

!


12/33


internalwarsmaynotonlyenhance thesymbolicdimensionofunitybutcanevenprovide

necessaryfinancialormaterialresourcestoenhancecohesion.Whilelosinganinternational

warmayprovidethebasisfornationalmyths,too,itcanalsoleadtofragmentationandfra

gility.After internalwars, the longtermstabilityofstatebuildingwilldependonthepoliciesthevictorspursuevisvisthelosers.Examplesrangefromopenlyrepressingtosubor

dinatingpotentialopponents(e.g.inpostrevolutionaryMexico)tocooptingthroughpower

sharingmodels(e.g.inColombia,wherethelosingpartywasconcededaminorityparticipa

tioningovernment).

Butwhileinthepast,militaryvictorieshavebeenthemostcommonformofwartermi

nation,therehasbeenan importantshift in thepatternsofwar terminationduring the last

twodecades.According toKreutz (2010:246), thepercentageofvictories in intrastatecon

flictshasdeclinedfrom58.2percentfor19461989to13.6percent19902005.19Inrelationto

statebuilding, the advantage of amilitary victory rests in the establishment of relatively

clearcutpowerrelationsthatis,theeliminationorneutralizationofinternalrivalsviamili

taryvictory.Suhrke(2011)callsthisavictorspeace.Againstthisbackground,U.S.strate

gistEdwardLuttwak (1999)hasmadeacall togivewara chance.Butmilitaryvictories

havebecomeanunlikelymethodofwar terminationunder todays internationalpriorities,

whichpromote and favormediation andnegotiated agreements to end internalwars and

armedconflicts.Asaconsequence,eventheformalterminationofwarorarmedconflictdoes

notnecessarilyestablishstablepostwarorders,butinmostcasesleadstohighlevelsofin

stability,fragility,and inequality(Licklider2001:697f.).Srensen(2001)andMigdal(2001:

137150)argue that the international community thus supports the survivalofweak states

that would have fallen apart orbeen annexedby others without todays guarantee of a

recognitionof internationalbordersorcooperationinstrengtheningfragilestates.20Thene

gotiatedwar terminations inCentralAmericaended internalwaraftermore thanadecade

butwereunabletoestablishastablepoliticalorder(Kurtenbach2010).

Hencestatebuildingafteranegotiatedendofinternalwarswithoutaclearwinneroraf

terasecessionintoanewpoliticalentityismuchmorecomplicatedthanitwouldbeaftera

victory.Herethewarringfactionswillhavetofindawaytolivetogetherindependentofdifferentpatternsoforganizationandmobilizationandtheexistenceofmostlyautoexcluding

patternsoflegitimacy.21Themainweaknessofnegotiatedsettlementsisnotrelatedtotheir

19Although using different definitions, other datasets show similar shifts: see Schreiber (2009, 2010), Duffy

(2010,2010a).

20Thecausesaswellas theconsequencesofstate fragilityandexternal interventionstrategieshavebeendis

cussedbroadlyinthelasttwodecadesfromdifferentperspectivesbutwithinconclusiveresults.Foranover

viewon therelateddebatesseeBoegeetal. (2009).Nevertheless, thesedebates lacka focusonasystematic

comparisonofdifferencesintheinternalstructureofthesesocieties(legitimacy,patternsofsocialcohesion,etc.),

Migdal(1988)beinganexception.

21Ethnicityandreligionarethemostprominentfactorsinthesedebates.Butotherpostwarorpostconflictcon

textsshowexclusionarypatternsoflegitimacy,too.Differentformsandmodelsofpowersharingandinstitu

La pol- se

define segun

el ganador

sobre el

perdedor!


13/33


contentbuttoalackofsanctionsfornonimplementation(Duffy2010a:34).Hencepolitical

authorityisimportanttoenforcecompliance.

Looking atLatinAmericas experienceswithwar and statebuilding, two generalpat

ternsbecomeobvious:a) Externalwarsaswellas internalwarsthatendwithaclearmilitaryvictoryofoneside

mirror the European warstatebuilding nexus regarding the monopolization of the

meansofviolenceat least temporarilythrough theeliminationofrivalsand theprotec

tionofclientsinsideaspecificterritory.

b) Internalwarsendingwithanagreementneverthelessleadtorecurrentcyclesofwarduetoalackofpolitical,economic,andsocialhegemonyasformerrivalshavetocohabitate

withoutclearcutpowerrelations.Henceexternalinterventionstopromotenegotiations

maypromotefragileoutcomes.22

But successful statebuilding isnota static condition: it is subject topermanent changeas

processesofsocialdifferentiationaswellaschanges in theexternalenvironmentmaypro

videnewopportunitiesforstatebuildingorundermineexistingformsofintegration.23

4 StateswithinstatesandStateBuilding

Themainfocusofthecurrentdiscussiononstatebuildinganalyzescollectiveviolencebelow

the levelof the territorialstate institutionsperpetratedbynonstatearmedactors likewarlordsorarmedentrepreneurs.24Thesepolitical entitiesat timesestablish territorial control

andfulfillstatelikefunctions(likecollectingtaxesandprovidingsecurityand/orsocialser

vices).Althoughtheirorganizationallevelandinstitutionalcapacitiesdiffer,Kingston/Spears

(2006) subsume them under the concept of stateswithinstates. Even in cases where

stateswithinstatesestablishmoreor lessdurable formsofcontrol, theseentities lackju

ridicalstatusandinternationalrecognition.Somalilandisacaseinpoint,whilestatebuild

inginTimorLesteandSouthSudanwassuccessfulafterdecadesofwaragainsttheirrespec

tional engineering arepromoted toovercome theseproblems,but the results are rather inconclusive as to

whatworksandwhatdoesnot(seeBasedau2011).

22Thisdoesnotimplythatmilitaryvictoriesshouldbepromotedoraccepted.Underthecurrenthumanrights

regimetheyaredefinitelynot.Butinternationalactorshavetocometotermswiththefragilityoftheoutcome

theycreatevianegotiationsandneedtoinvesthumanandfinancialresourcesintoimplementationandcom

pliancebeyondtheexistingoptionsthatformaldemocraticelectionsprovide.

23MexicoandCubaareexamples.Inbothcases,therevolutionsupportedquitestablestatebuildingprocesses

thatonlyneededselectiveformsofviolence.ItwasnocoincidencethattheChiapasrebellioninMexicohap

pened themoment theMexicaneconomyopenedup, invalidating therevolutionspromisesofagrarianre

formthathadneverreachedMexicospoorsouth(Barry1999).

24OnnonstateactorsandtheirvariedrelationshiptothestateseeKrause/Milliken(2009)andDavis(2009).Onthe

dynamicsofnonstateactorsseeSchlichte(2009).ForadebateregardingLatinAmericathatfocusesonthemili

tary,seeDavis/Pereira(2003),Koonings/Kruit(2002),Holden(2004).OnotheractorsseeKoonings/Kruit(2004).

Def: E.

Intra E.


14/33


tivecentralstates.However,notallof theseentitiesaim toachieve independentstatehood,

theymaywanttooverthroworsubstituteanexistinggovernmentorachieveautonomy.

Todistinguishbetweendifferentpatternsofstateswithinstates,wecanusetheactivi

tiesTillyidentifiedasafundamentallinkbetweenwarandstatebuilding(seeabove).Therearestateswithinstatesthat

havecoercivepower(providingprotectionforsomegroups), controlaspecificterritory,and/or extracteconomicresources.Beingcapableofallthreeactivitiescanbeanindicatorofincipientprocessesofstatebuilding

although theseprocessesmaynotaim toestablish controlover larger territories.The rela

tionshipbetweenstateswithinstatesandviolence is twofold.Violencecanbeamainre

sourcefortheestablishmentandthesurvivaloftheseentities,asitcanbeaconsequenceoftheirexistencewhen the relationshipbetween the internationally recognized stateand the

statewithiniscontested.

AlthoughLatinAmericanexamplesdonot figureprominently in thesedebates, there

gionhasarichhistoryofstateswithinstates.Wecan identifyfourpatterns thathavebeen

importantduringdifferenthistoricalphasesorregionalcontextswithvaryingpatternsofco

ercivepower,territorialcontrolandresourceextraction:25

1) Communities of indigenous populations havebeen stateswithinstates formuch ofLatinAmericanhistory asneither the colonialnor the independent central states controlledterritoriesfarfrom theurbanandeconomiccenters.Manyof thesecommunities

and territorieswere subordinated (violently) to the central stateduring the late nine

teenthandearlytwentiethcenturyfollowingtheclassicalterritorialexpansionpath.Ar

gentinasviolentmilitarycampaigninPatagoniaandChileswaragainsttheMapuchein

the south are examples (see Urban/Sherzer 1991). In other regions, these indigenous

communitieswereneglectedandsurvivedas longas the territory they lived inhadno

economicorpoliticalvalue.This came toanendwith increasingdemographicdensity

andtheshiftingofagrarianfrontiers,forexampleintotheAmazonandotherneglected

areas like theNicaraguanMosquitoCoast.Recently,globalnormson indigenousrights25Externaleconomicenclavescouldbeconceptualizedasanotherbutnotnecessarilyviolentpattern.Fromthe

endofthenineteenthcenturytothefirstfewdecadesofthetwentiethcentury,forexample,theUnitedFruit

Company(UFCo)wasatruestatewithintheGuatemalanstate,havingcontrolledaboutonethirdoftheterri

tory,havinghaditsownjurisdictionandpolice,andhavingestablishedapostalserviceandarailwaysystem.

ThisdeprivedtheGuatemalanstateoffinancialresourcespoliticalwillprovidednecessaryforthecoun

trysdevelopment. Similarpatternsof foreigndominatedenclavescanbeobserved todaydue to increasing

globalizationinsomeexportprocessingzonesandinmanyLatinAmericanminingregions.Heretherespec

tivestatepassesconcessionstointernationalcorporationsandreceivesonlyamarginalfeeorroyalty.Work

ingandhealthconditionsarepoorasworkersarenotallowedtoorganize,environmentalstandardsarelow,

andconflictsabound.Inmanycases,theseenterprisesleavethemomentthestatetriestogetmorecontrolor

whenwagesgoup.Securityismostlyprovidedbyprivatesecuritycompanies.

Proposito de

estos (guerrilas)

Comunidad

Indigena!


15/33


16/33


gangsjustcontrol their immediateneighborhoods.Organizationalpatternscan range

fromclearlytopdownhierarchiestodifferentformsofinterrelatednetworks.

Table: PatternsofStateswithinstatesinLatinAmerica

Coercive

power

Territorial

control

Resource

extraction

Indigenouscommunities low yes yes

Liberatedzones high yes yes

Militaryautonomy high yes partly

Organizedcrime high partly yes

Externalinterventionsinthesecontextshavebeenfrequent;theireffectsonstatebuildingare

ratherambivalentastheycanshiftpowerrelationstowardsonesideortheother.Whileeco

nomicenclaveshaveweakenedthesovereignstatesfinancialcapacities,U.S.assistancewas

fundamentalfortheestablishmentofmanymilitaryregimes,whowereabletomonopolize

themeansofviolenceinthestate.

Tosumup, theconsequencesof theseformsofcollectiveviolenceonstatebuildingde

pendontheoutcomeofconflictsbetweenthestatewithinandthesovereignstate.Theex

pansionofthesovereignstatesclaimtopowerandcontroloverlocalorsubnationalorgani

zationshasbeenandstillisacauseofincreasingconflictoftenleadingtoviolence.

a) Where the sovereign state is able to subordinate thesepolitical entities, statebuildingwill at least in the short termbe strengthened.While these conflicts were solved via

eliminationcontestsinEuropeanhistory,thispath isnolongeraviableoption today

due tochanges in the internationalenvironment,withotherstatesrecognizingexisting

stateboundariesandpromotingnegotiatedendstoarmedconflictandviolence.

b) Where the sovereign state and the statewithinthestate coexist or compete, statebuildingwillbedifficultduetotheincompatibilitybetweentheexternalandtheinternal

logics of organization. Even if the statewithinbecomes subordinate, longterm state

buildingcanbeendangeredby incompatibleandexclusionarypatternsof identityandsocialcohesion(e.g.alongdifferentethnicorreligiouslines).

Dos variables resultantes de la manera en

que el E legitimo y sus competidores

pueden afectar la manera en que se

construya el Estado. Contexto internacional

y Coexistencia entre actores!


17/33


5 InterpersonalViolenceandStateBuilding

Interpersonalviolenceisalessorganized,nonpoliticalformofviolence.29Itismostlyframed

ascriminalviolence,althoughclassificationsofcrimearehighlycontextspecific,andincreas

ingamountsofinterpersonalviolencehavepoliticalcausesaswellaspoliticalconsequences

(Kurtenbach2011).Classicalstatebuildingtheoryemphasizesthefact thatsuccessfulstate

buildingisthebasisforasignificantreductionininterpersonalviolence.Therefore,highlevels

ofinterpersonalviolencecanbeanindicatorofdeficitsinthemonopolizationofthemeansof

violencebutcanalsopoint towardsotherprocessesofsocialchange like thedestructionof

traditionalformsofsocialcontrolorofnormsrestrainingtheuseofviolence.30

Increasing levelsof interpersonalviolencehavebeenageneral trend inLatinAmerica

since the1980s (seeTable4 inAnnex).Allother thingsequal, countries inLatinAmerica

tend tohavehomiciderates thatare,onaverage,roughly twiceashighas those insimilarcountrieslocatedoutsidethisregion(Cole/Marroqun2009:763).

TheincreaseininterpersonalviolenceinLatinAmericahasinitiatedabroaddiscussion

onitscauses,dynamicsandconsequences.31Theinteractionwithstatebuildinghasnotbeen

amajor focusbutwas addressed fromdifferent perspectives.Waldmann (2002) takes the

highlevelofinterpersonalviolenceasproofoftheexistenceofanomicstatesinLatinAmeri

ca.Regarding the calls for mano dura approaches (thoseparticularly toughon crime),

JennyPearce (2010) identifiesaprocessofperversestatebuilding.Here thediscourseon

violenceandthedemandformanodurastrategiesisusedbytheelitesinthemostviolentso

cieties(Guatemala,ElSalvador,Colombia,Honduras)tolegitimatetheirpoweralthough(or

because) theyhavebeenunsuccessful in reducingviolence andprovidingpublic security.29Homicideratesarethemostimportantindicatorofinterpersonalviolence.Theyarebasedonthenumberof

homicidesper100,000 inhabitants.Dataaredifficult to comparedue tomethodologicaldifferences in their

collectionorpoliticalmanipulation(WHO2002:79).DataonLatinAmericahaveimprovedsignificantlyover

the last two decades as different organizations like the PanAmerican Health Organization, the Inter

AmericanDevelopmentBank,theWorldBankandUNODChavesupporteddatacollectionandanalysis.On

variationsinhomicideratesseeFajnzybler/Lederman/Loayza (2002),Neumayer(2003)andBriceoLen/Villa

veces/ConchaEastman(2008).Interpersonalviolencehaslongbeenarealmofsociologyandcriminologyand

hasonlyrecentlybeenstudied fromaconflictandstatebuildingperspective.SeeGenevaDeclaration2008,

Fox/Hoelscher2010,Bealletal.2011.On theotherhand,Kalyvas (2006)hasshown that inmanywarsand

armedconflicts,interpersonalviolencecanbeasideeffectatthemicrolevelfollowingdynamicsquitediffer

entfromtheconflictsmastercleavage.

30Theoretically,violencecanbecontrolled throughdifferentmechanismsalong thespectrumofexternalcoer

cion (police, military) and internal control (norms, values, socialization). Historical criminology affirms a

trendofdecreasinghomicideratesforWesternEuropebutalsoclaimsthatitisnecessarytoidentifythespe

cificmechanismsleadingtoviolencereductionandviolencecontrolinstateandsociety(Eisner2003).Inthe

currentdebateonstatefragility,violenceisthemostprominentindicator.Threeofthetwelvecategoriesofthe

FailedStateIndexarerelated to thesepatterns:criminalization,widespreadviolationsofhumanrights,and

thesecurityinstitutionsasastatewithinthestate(see.

31Cf.Ayres(1998),Bodemer/Kurtenbach/Meschkat (2001),BriceoLen (2002),Frhling/Tulchin (2003),Bobea

(2003),amongothers.

Def:

Funcin de

Policia!


18/33


Although there is evidence forboth arguments, thehigh levels of variation in the region

pointtowardsamorecomplicatedrelationship.

VariationbetweenLatinAmericancountriescanbeexplainedbydifferencesinhistorical

statebuildingpatterns.Allcountrieswitharathersuccessfulmonopolizationofthemeansofforcethroughvictoriousinternaland/orexternalwarsaswellasthesubordinationofstates

withinstateshavelowlevelsofhomicide:Chile,CostaRica,Cuba,Peru,Uruguay.Buthigh

levelsofhomicideseemtobebasedonnegotiatedoutcomesofwarand/orthecoexistenceof

stateswithinstates:Guatemala,ElSalvador,andColombiaarethemostobviouscases.

Butinterpersonalviolencealsoshowsvariationinsidethemostviolentcountries:

InGuatemala,violence isdistributedunevenlyalongacorridorofviolencebetweentheAtlantic coast, the east,and the southern coastup to theMexicanborder.Thede

partmentofPetn(borderingonMexicoandBelize)isanotherviolencehotspot,hometo

4ofthe15mostviolentmunicipalities(PNUD2007).

InMexico,thefederalstatesofGuerrero,Nayarit,Chiapas,Michoacn,andMoreloshavethehighesthomiciderates,whileaccordingtothepresident,57percentofthehomicides

related to thedrug tradeoccurred inChihuahua,BajaCalifornia,andSinaloa (Bentez

Manautetal.2009:318319).

InColombia,violencewasconcentrated inMedelln,BogotandCaliat theendof the1990s,while armed conflict andviolencehave traveled into the countryside (PNUD

2003,Chapter4).

Asthesecountriesareallinvolvedinthedrugtrade,interpersonalviolenceismostlyconsid

eredabyproduct.32Obvioushistoricalpatternsofstatebuildinginteractwithcurrentdevel

opmentsinthetransnationalizationofviolentcrime.

Canhighlevelsofinterpersonalviolencecontributetostatebuildingoronlytofragmen

tationandfragility?Lookingattherelevantmechanismscoercivepower,territorialcontrol,

protectionand resource extraction themostplausibleargumentwouldbe that it cannot

contributetostatebuilding.ButlookingatLatinAmericanexperiences,itbecomesobvious

thatagainoutcomeisimportant.

Here,outcomecanbedistinguishedaseithertheprosecutionofviolentactorsorimpunity.

Whileitisevidentthatthestateisnottheonlyinstitutionabletosanctionviolenceregarded

as illegitimate,regardingstatebuildingtheestablishmentofminimumstandardsofruleof

law isessential.Themostviolentcountries inLatinAmericanotonlyhavehighhomicide

ratesbutalsohavehighlevelsofimpunity.

Under theseconditions,persistentlyhigh levelsof interpersonalviolencemay lead toa

downwardspiralofdecreasingstatecapacitiesthatmaybedescribedasfollows:

32But drugtrading is not necessarily linked to violence, see Naylor (2009), Andreas/Wallmann (2009), and

Snyder/DuranMartinez(2009).


19/33


Highlevelsofviolenceanddeficitsinpublicsecuritydelegitimizethestateprovidinga

basisfortheprivatizationofstatefunctionsfurtherweakeningthestateorleadingtocalls

for strongmen andmano durapolicies.Thesewill furtherweaken state institutions and

statelegitimacyaswellaslimitthespacefornonviolentactors.33Thisprocesscanhavethreedifferentconsequencesoroutcomes:

apermanentblockadeorastrugglebetweendifferentarmedactors,stateinstitutionsbeingoneofthem(e.g.ElSalvador),

a downward spiral dismantling existing statelike institutions and organizations (e.g.Guatemala),or

effortstostrengthenthestate(e.g.Colombia).ThefirsttwooutcomescanleadtotheperversestatebuildingpatternPearce(2010)identi

fied,whilethelastmayreflectsomeEuropeanexperiencescentralizationasaninitialsteptowardsstatebuilding.Whilepoliticiansandmediapubliclyblameviolenceforbeingafun

damentalproblemacrossall three contexts, success in strengthening the statedependson

confrontingandreducingimpunity.HenceinColombia,thetrialsagainstparamilitariesmay

beat leastas importantasUribesdemocratic securitypolicy in strengthening the state.

Hencehighlevelsof interpersonalviolencecanbeasourceoffragilityaswellasacatalyst

forstatebuilding.

6 ViolenceandStateBuildinginLatinAmericaAPathDependentRelationship

In this concluding section, I will summarize the different phases and patterns of state

buildingandpresentevidenceregardingthethesisofpatternsofwarandviolencetermina

tionascriticaljuncturesinstatebuilding.Disaggregatingtherelationshipbetweenwar,vio

lence,andstatebuildingalongdifferentformsofmobilizationandorganizationwecaniden

tifydifferenthistoricalphaseswherespecificformsofviolencepredominatedandinfluenced

statebuilding:

In theaftermathof independenceduring thenineteenth century, externalwarson the

controlofterritoryandresourcesdominatedasdidstateswithinstatesintheformofin

digenous communitiesandmilitaryentrepreneurs in the formof caudillos.LatinAmerican

countrieswhosewarsorarmedconflictsendedwithamilitaryvictoryorthesubordination

of the stateswithinstates were able to follow the early European model of state

building, successfullymonopolizing themeans of violence.Chile,Argentina, andMexico

provideexamplesofthis.

Duringthetwentiethcentury,internalwarsaswellasstateswithinstatesintheform

ofliberatedterritoriesandmilitaryautonomyduetodifferentpoliticalagendasshapedcon

flictandviolenceintheregion.Statebuildingwassuccessfulincasesofvictoryandsubordi33Richani(2002)hascalledthissystemsofviolence,otherslabelthesecontextsasnarcoorshadowstates.


20/33


nation(e.g.CostaRica,Mexico)andremainedfragileincasesofnegotiationandcoexistence

(e.g.Colombia,Guatemala).

With the turn of the century, other statewithinstate patterns emerged (drug lords,

gangs) that have still today notbeen subordinated and that undermine monopolizationwhereithadbeenachieved(Mexico)andmakeitsestablishmentextremelydifficultwhereit

neverexistedinthefirstplace(Colombia,Guatemala).

While external interventionshavebeenpresentacross these timeperiods, their impact

hasvaried.Military interventionsduring the twentiethcenturysupportedanauthoritarian

patternofmonopolizationunderthecontrolofmilitaryleadersorthemilitaryasaninstitu

tion.Economicinterventionsintheformofeconomicenclavesaswellasunderthepremise

of neoliberalism deprived the Latin American states of economic resources necessary to

complementmonopolizationwithsocialintegration.Diplomaticinterventionsinsupportof

negotiationshaveledtooutcomeswithhighlyfragilepoliticalcontexts.

ThreeissuesareimportantbeyondtheLatinAmericanexperience.

1) ExternalandinternalwarsendingwithavictoryaswellasthesuccessfulsubordinationofstateswithinstatesenablestatebuildingalongthelinesoftheearlyEuropeanmodel.

Patternsofwarterminationareanimportantinterveningfactorastheyshapethepowerrela

tionsafterwarsendandcanthusberegardedascriticaljunctures.Militaryvictoriessupport

themonopolizationofthemeansofviolenceaswellastheestablishmentofpatternsofsocial

cohesionand identity throughnarrativesalonga territoriallybound internalexternaldivi

sion.Whethertherelevantactorswillusetheirpowerforstatebuildingisattheirowndis

cretion.InLatinAmericanhistory,mostmilitaryvictoriesledtostatebuildingunderauthor

itarianconditions.Buttheseregimesbecameunstableduetonewlyarisingconflictsandso

cialchange.CostaRicaistheexceptionalcaseduetointelligentconflictmanagementanda

favorable internationalandregionalenvironment in1948.Thisallowed for theabolitionof

thearmedforcesandthenoninterferenceoftheU.S.(contrarytotheGuatemalanSpringsix

yearslater).

2) Internalwarsendingwithnegotiatedsettlementsaswellastheexistenceofstateswithinstatesproveproblematic forstatebuildingas they rarely lead to theestablishmentofastablepoliticalorder.

Negotiatedsettlementsmaketheestablishmentofastablepoliticalordermoredifficulteven

ifpactsbetween the leadersof former combatantpartieshelp toend somewars. Inmany

cases,thepriceforthesepactsistheexclusionofallotheractorsandalimitationofsocietys

broaderparticipation.TheColombianNationalFront (19581978) isanexampleof this,as

are many pactsbetween different oligarchic groups throughout the nineteenth century.

Whilepeaceaccordsreflecta(temporary)consensustoendorganizedarmedconflict,evenin

caseswherecomprehensivepeaceagreementsareinplace,thisdoesnotnecessarilyimplyageneralconsensusonbasicreformsorchanges to thepolitical,social,andeconomicorder.

Peaceaccordsmayjustbetacticalpoliticalconcessions(e.g.toweakeninternalopponentsor

Exclusion:

frente

nacional

como una

medida

negociada

modelo

autoritario

como

resultado de

una victoria

militar


21/33


toappeaseexternalactors)whoseimplementationdependsonexistinglocalpowerrelations.

GuatemalaandElSalvador show the relateddifficulties.Henceexternalactorspromoting

negotiatedwar terminationmustalsoprovide longtermresourcesfor implementationand

sanctionsfornoncompliance.Evenwithoutpermanentviolence,thecoexistenceofthesovereignstatesandthestates

withinstatesprovesdifficult.ThedifficultiesLatinAmericanstatesfacetryingtosubordi

nate their armed forces are an interesting example of the related consequences on state

building with a variety of outcomes. CostaRica and Panama (after the U.S. intervention

1989),aswellas theSandinistagovernment inNicaraguaabolishedor reconstructed their

armed forces after a military victory (criticaljuncture). Other Latin American countries

struggleeventodaytolimitorsuspendmilitaryprerogativesandautonomy.Thecurrentde

velopmentsinMexicoandGuatemalashowthenegativeimpactonstatebuildingduetothe

establishmentofviolentnetworksbetweenactiveandformermilitaryofficersandcriminal

organizationsinvolvedinthedrugtrade.

3) Interpersonalviolencecanleadtodestructivedownwardspiralsregardingstatebuilding,althoughinspecificcontextsitcanserveasacatalystforthestrengtheningofthestate.

ThecurrentwaveofinterpersonalviolenceinLatinAmericaprovidesevidenceofthediffi

cultrelationshipwithstatebuilding.Thediscourseofmanodurastrategieshelpstoestablish

adistinctionbetweenus(thepeacefulandlawabiding)andthem(theviolent)andthusmay

legitimizespecificelitesandstrengthentherepressivecapacitiesofthestate.Butwithoutef

fortstoreduceimpunity,thesepoliciesdonotleadtoareductioninviolence.Hencethestate

mayincreasecoercivepowerwithoutbeingabletoprotectitscitizens.Itthusloses(orisun

abletoestablish)territorialcontrolandresourceextraction.Theslumsofmanymajorcities

thatarenogoareasforthepoliceandotherstateinstitutionsacrossLatinAmericaareacase

inpoint.Asaconsequence,thepopulationwillseekprotectionfromothersourcesleadingto

aprocesswherehighlevelsofinterpersonalviolencecandevelopintostateswithinstates.

Thecloserelationshipbetweendifferentformsofviolenceisobviousinthesecases.

Hence across the different forms of war and violence, what matters most for state

buildingarethepatternsofwarandviolencetermination.Whilevictory,subordination,andprosecutionareconducivetothemonopolizationofthemeansofviolenceandtheestablish

mentofrelatedinstitutions,otheroutcomesleadnotnecessarilytocollapseordecaybutto

hybridorderswithhighlevelsofinstability.Thisisrelevantnotonlyforthemonopolization

ofthemeansofviolencebutforthecontrolofeconomicresourcesaswell(e.g.economicen

claves)asthesearenecessaryforsustainablestatebuildingthroughsocialintegration.These

findingsneedtobetestedinandacrossotherregionalcontexts.

Externalaswellasinternalactorstryingtoreduceandcontrolviolenceconfrontatwo

fold dilemma. The European statebuilding model is hardly transferable, and outcomesalongthislineofdevelopment(monopolization)areunlikelyundertodaysglobalizedcon

ditions.Butat the same time, established internationalnormsdonotallow forpoliciesof

La forma en qtermina le

guerra

determina...


22/33


noninterference (givewar a chance) regardinghigh levels of violence.Hence themain

challengeforstatebuildingintheactualcontextisrelatedtothequestionofhowthechanges

in internationalnorms regarding theuse and legitimization of violence canbe reconciled

withtheinternalsocietalstructuresofdevelopingsocietiesandtheneedforviolencecontrolandamodicumofstability.

The analysis of current statebuilding processes and the related international policies

shouldbebasedonthedisaggregationofdifferentformsofviolenceandfocusonthepat

ternsofwarandviolence termination.Thiswillallowus to identify thevariations in, the

chancesfor,andtheobstaclestoeffectivelycontrollingviolence.Whilethemonopolizationof

themeansofviolencemightwork insomecontexts, thedevelopmentofadequateequiva

lentsorsurrogateswillbenecessary inothers.While fewwilldispute thenecessityofvio

lencecontrol insociety, thespecific formof itsorganizationmayvarybroadlyacross time

andspace.

Importante!


23/33


AnnexDataonViolenceinLatinAmerica

Table1: InterstateWarsinLatinAmerica(18221945)

Argentina 18251828(withUruguayvs.Brazil)18361839(withChilevs.Bolivia.andPeru)

18391852(Uruguay)18641870(withBrazilandUruguayvs.Paraguay)

Bolivia

1827(withColombiavs.Peru)18361839(withPeruvs.ChileandArgentina)18791883(withPeruvs.Chile)1902(Peru)19321935(Peru)

Brazil 18251828(Argentina,Uruguay)18641870(withArgentinaandUruguayvs.Paraguay)

Chile18361839(withArgentinavs.BoliviaandPeru)18651866(withPeruvs.Spain)18791883(BoliviaandPeru)

Colombia 1827(withBoliviavs.Peru)1863(Ecuador)1932(Peru)

CostaRica 18551857(withHondurasandElSalvadorvs.Nicaragua)1897(Nicaragua)

DominicanRepublic1822(Haiti)1862(Spain)19171918(U.S.)

Ecuador1859(Peru)1863(Colombia)19411942(Peru)

ElSalvador

18551857(withHondurasandCostaRicavs.Nicaragua18651867(withHondurasvs.GuatemalaandNicaragua)1885(Guatemala)

1906(withHondurasvs.Guatemala)1907(withHondurasvs.Nicaragua)

Guatemala18651867(withNicaraguavs.ElSalvadorandHonduras)1885(ElSalvador)1906(Honduras,ElSalvador)

Haiti 1822(DominicanRepublic)18551856(DominicanRepublic)

Honduras

18551857(withCostaRicaandElSalvadorvs.Nicaragua18651867(withElSalvadorvs.GuatemalaandNicaragua)1906(withElSalvadorvs.Guatemala)1907(withElSalvadorvs.Nicaragua)

Mexico 18381839(France)18461848(Mexico)

Nicaragua

18551857(CostaRica,Honduras,ElSalvador)

18651867(withGuatemalavs.ElSalvadorandHonduras)1897(CostaRica)1907(Honduras,ElSalvador)

Paraguay 18641870(Brazil,Argentina,Uruguay)19321935(Bolivia)

Peru

1827(Bolivia,Colombia)18361839(withBoliviavs.ChileandArgentina)1859Ecuador18651866(withChilevs.Spain)18791883(withBoliviavs.Chile)1902(Bolivia)1932(Colombia)19411942(Ecuador)

Uruguay

18251828(withArgentinavs.Brazil)

18391852(Argentina)18641870(withBrazilandArgentinavs.Paraguay)

Source:Luard(1986).


24/33


Table2: CollectiveViolenceinLatinAmerica19452010

Interstate Intrastate outcome War ArmedConflict War ArmedConflict* ***

Argentina 1982(U.K.)

1955

19631974197519761977

Victory

VictoryVictory

Bolivia 1946 19521967

VictoryVictoryVictory

Chile 1973 Victory

Colombia** 1994

2001200220042005

196419791980199319952000

20032006

OngoingCostaRica 1948 Victory

Cuba 1958 1953

195619571961

VictoryVictory

VictoryVictoryEcuador 1995 (Peru)

ElSalvador 1969(Honduras) 198119891972

1979198019901991

CoupPeaceagreement

Guatemala

194919541963

1965196719681995

VictoryVictory

LowactivityLowactivity

Peaceagreement

Haiti 198919912004

VictoryVictory

LowactivityHonduras 1969(ElSalvador) 1957(Nicaragua)

Mexico 1994

1996

PeaceagreementLowactivity

Nicaragua 1957(Honduras)19781979

19831988

1977

19821990

VictoryCeasefirewithconflictregula

tionPanama 1989(U.S.) 1989 Victor

Paraguay 1947 19541989


Peru**** 1995(Ecuador)

1983198519881991

19651982

19861987

199219992007

Victory

MRTA:Ceasefirewithconflict

regulation

SenderoLuminosoongoingUruguay 1972 Lowactivity

Venezuela 196219821992


Source:UCDP/PRIOArmedConflictDatasetv.42011,19462010;UCDPConflictTerminationdatasetv.20101,194620010.

*Thismayincludeepisodesofviolenceinthecontextofcoupsdtats.**ColombiasViolencia(19481958)isnotincludedintheUCDPDatabasebecauseitisclassifiedasnonstateand

onesidedviolence.Butwhilethepoliticalpartieswerethemainactors,thestateandthemilitarywerepartytotheconflict,e.g.thepoliceparticipatedintherepressionofLiberals.Manyfeaturesofsocallednewwars(e.g.privatizedactors,indiscriminateviolenceagainstthecivilianpopulation)werealreadyapparentinLaViolencia.

*** UCDPsConflictTerminationSetmaysubsumevariousconflicteventswithdifferent intensity;e.g.Nicaraguasarmedconflict(1977)andwar(19781979)terminatedwiththeSandinistavictory.

****InthecaseofPerutherehavebeendifferentformsoftermination.WhiletheconflictwiththeMovimientoRevolucionarioTupacAmaru (MRTA) iscodedasaCeasefireAgreementwithConflictRegulation,thearmedconflictwiththeotherguerrillagroup,SenderoLuminoso,isongoing.


25/33


Table3: OneSidedandNonStateViolence(19892008)

Onesidedarmedconflict(againstcivilians) Nonstatearmedconflict(betweenorganizedgroups)

Bolivia 2000Qaquchacas

Brazil1993Government2005Government

2001TerceiroComando2004TerceiroComando

Colombia

1990ACCU19901991Government19972005AUC1998ELN20002001ELN19942010FARC1989MedellnCartel1993MedelnCartel

1990MedellnCartel1993PEPES19971999FARC20002001FARC20022005FARC2000ELN2001ELN

Ecuador 2003Tagaeri

Guatemala 2005MaraSalvatrucha

Haiti1991Government19931994Government2005Government

1991SupportersofRogerLafontant

Jamaica 2001SupportersofPNP

Mexico1997PazyJusticia2010LosZetas

1993PenaRojasClan2002SantoDomingoTeojomulco2004SinaloaCartel2005SinaloaCartel20082010JuarezCartel2008SinaloaCartel2008TijuanaCartel

2010GulfCartel2010BeltrnLeyvaCartel2010LosZetas

Peru 19891993SenderoLuminoso

Source:UCDP,minimumof25deaths.


26/33


Table4: HomicideRatesinLatinAmerica

Homicidesper100,000inhabitants

1980 1990 2009/10

Argentina 3.9 4.8 5,5

Belize 41,7

Bolivia 8,9

Brazil 11.5 19.7 22,9

Chile 2.6 3.0 3,7

Colombia 20.5 89.5 33,4

CostaRica 11,3

Cuba 4,6(2008)

DominicanRepublic 24,9

Ecuador 6.4 10.3 18,2

ElSalvador 66,0

Guatemala 41,4Haiti 6,9

Honduras 82,1

Mexico* 18.2 17.8 18,1

Nicaragua 13,2

Panama 2.1 10.9 21,6

Paraguay 5.1 4.0 11,5

Peru 2.4 11.5 5,2

Uruguay 2.6 4.4 6,1

Venezuela 11.7 15.2 49,0

Sources:Homicide:1980,1990Ayres(1998:3);20032010:mostrecentinUNODC2011.*HistoricaldataforMexicoshowadeclineofhomicideratesduringthe20thcentury,while

currentdataindicateastrongincreaseafter2008(Ros/Shirk2011:6).


27/33


References

Andreas,Peter,andJoelWallmann(2009),Illicitmarketsandviolence:What is therelation

ship?,in:Crime,Law,andSocialChange,52,3,225229.

Ayres,RobertL.(1998),CrimeandviolenceasdevelopmentissuesinLatinAmericaandtheCaribbean,

Washington,D.C.:TheWorldBank.

Basedau,Matthias(2011),ManagingEthnicConflict:TheMenuofInstitutionalEngineering,GIGA

Working Papers, 171, Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global andArea Studies,

online:.

Beall,Jo,TomGoodfellowandDennisRodgers(2011),Cities,ConflictandStateFragility,Work

ingPaper, 85, 2,CrisisResearchCentre,LSE,online: (20September2011).

BentezManaut,Ral,etal.(2009),AtlasdeSeguridadyDefensadeMxico2009,MxicoD.F.:

ColectivodeAnlisisdeSeguridadconDemocracia.

Berquist,Charles,RicardoPearandaandGonzaloSnchez(eds.)(2001),ViolenceinColombia

19902000.WagingWarandNegotiatingPeace,Wilmington:Delaware.

Boege,Volker,AnneBrown,KevinClementsundAnnaNolan (2009),OnHybridPolitical

OrdersandEmergingStates:WhatisFailingStatesintheGlobalSouthorResearchand

PoliticsintheWest?,in:MartinaFischer,andBeatrixSchmelzle(eds.),BuildingPeaceinthe

AbsenceofStates:ChallengingtheDiscourseonStateFailure,Berlin:BerghofDialogueSeries,

8,1535.

Bobea,Lilian(ed.)(2003),Entreelcrimenyelcastigo.Seguridadciudadanaycontroldemocrticoen

AmricaLatinayelCaribe,Caracas:NuevaSociedad.

Bodemer,Klaus,SabineKurtenbachandKlausMeschkat(eds.)(2001),ViolenciayRegulacinde

ConflictosenAmricaLatina,Caracas:Ed.NuevaSociedad.

BriceoLen,Roberto(ed.)(2002),Violencia,SociedadyJusticiaenAmricaLatina,BuenosAires:

CLACSO.

BriceoLen,Roberto,AndrsVillavecesandAlbertoConchaEastman(2008),UnderstandingtheunevendistributionoftheincidenceofhomicideinLatinAmerica,in:International

JournalofEpidemiology,37,751757.

Brzoska,Michael (2007),Collective violencebeyond the standarddefinition of armed con

flicts,in:SIPRIYearbook2007,94106.

Cappoccia,Giovanni,andR.DanielKelemen(2007),TheStudyofCriticalJunctures:Theory,

Narrative,andCounterfactualsinHistoricalInstitutionalism,in:WorldPolitics,59,3,341369.

Centeno,MiguelAngel(2002),BloodandDebt.WarandtheNationState inLatinAmerica,Uni

versityPark,Pennsylvania:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress.


28/33


Centeno,MiguelAngel (2003),LimitedWarandLimitedStates, in:DianeE.DavisandAn

thonyW.Pereira(eds.),IrregularArmedForcesandtheirRoleinPoliticsandStateFormation,

Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,8295.

Cole,JulioH.,andAndrsMarroqunGramajo(2009),HomicideRatesinaCrossSectionofCountries:evidenceandInterpretations,in:PopulationandDevelopmentReview,35,749776.

Davis,DianeE.(2003),ContemporaryChallenges,andHistoricalReflectionsontheStudyof

Militaries,States,andPolitics,in:DianeE.DavisandAnthonyW.Pereira(eds.),Irregular

ArmedForcesandtheirRoleinPoliticsandStateFormation,Cambridge:CambridgeUniver

sityPress,334.

Davis,DianeE.(2009),NonStateArmedActors,NewImaginedCommunities,andShifting

Patternsof Sovereignty and Insecurity in theModernWorld, in:ContemporarySecurity

Policy,30,2,221245.

DuffyToft,Monica (2010):Securing thePeace: theDurableSettlementofCivilWars,Princeton,

N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress.

DuffyToft,Monica(2010a):EndingCivilWars.AcaseforRebelVictory?,in:InternationalSe

curity,34,4,736.

Eisner,Manuel(2003):LongTermHistoricalTrendsinViolentCrime:EmpiricalFindingsand

Theoreticalapproaches to Interpretation, in:WilliamHeitmeyerandJohnHagan (eds.),

InternationalHandbookofViolenceResearch,Dodrecht,Netherlands:KluverAcademicPub

lishers,4159.

Elias,Norbert (1976),berdenProzederZivilisation,FrankfurtamMain:SuhrkampVerlag

(Orig.1937/39).

Fajnzylber, Pablo, Daniel Ledermann and Norman Loayza (2002), Inequality and Violent

Crime,in:JournalofLawandEconomics,45,1,140.

Fox,Sean,andKristianHoelscher(2010),ThePoliticalEconomyofSocialViolence.TheoryandEv

idencefromaCrossCountryStudy,CrisisStatesWorkingPapersSeriesNo.2,WorkingPa

per,72,online:(20September2011).

Frhling,Hugo,andJosephS.Tulchin(eds.)(2003),CrimeandViolenceinLatinAmerica.Citizen

Security,Democracy,andtheState,Washington,D.C.:WoodrowWilsonCenterPress.

Gantzel, KlausJrgen, and Thorsten Schwinghammer (1995),Die Kriege nach dem Zweiten

Weltkrieg19451992,DatenundTendenzen,Hamburg/Mnster:Lit.

GenevaDeclaration(2008),ReportontheBurdenofArmedViolence,Geneva.

Gerlach, Christian (2010), Extremely Violent Societies.Mass Violence in the TwentiethCentury

World,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Giddens,Anthony(1985),TheNationStateandViolence.VolumeTwoofAContemporaryCritiqueofHistoricalMaterialism,Oxford:PolityPress.


29/33


Gleditsch,NilsPetter,PeterWallensteen,MikaelEriksson,MargaretaSollenbergandHvard

Strand(2002),ArmedConflict19462001:ANewDataset,in:JournalofPeaceResearch,39,

5,615637.

Holden,RobertH.(2004),ArmieswithoutNations.PublicViolenceandStateFormationinCentralAmerica18211960,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Holsti,KaleviJ.(1996),TheState,WarandtheStateofWar,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

Press.

Huhn,Sebastian(2011),KriminalittinCostaRica.ZurdiskursivenKonstruktioneinesgesellschaft

lichenundpolitischenProblems,StudienzuLateinamerika,12,BadenBaden:Nomos.

HumanSecurityReportProject (2011),HumanSecurityReport2009/2010:TheCauses ofPeace

andtheShrinkingCostsofWar,NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Kaldor,Mary(1999),New&OldWars.OrganizedViolenceinaGlobalEra,Oxford:Blackwell.

Kalyvas,Stathis(2006),TheLogicofViolence inCivilWars,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

Press.

Kay,Cristbal,andGracielaSalazar(2001),Estructuraagraria,conflictoyviolenciaenlaso

ciedadruraldeAmricaLatina,in:RevistaMexicanadeSociologa,63,4,159195.

Kay,Cristbal(2009),EstudiosruralesenAmricaLatinaenelperododeglobalizacinneo

liberal:unanuevaruralidad?,in:RevistaMexicanadeSociologa,4,71,607645.

Koonings,Kees,andDirkKruit(eds.)(2002),Political

Armies.

The

Military

and

Nation

Building

intheAgeofDemocracy,London,NewYork:ZedBooks.

Koonings,Kees,andDirkKruit(eds.)(2004),ArmedActors.OrganisedViolenceandStateFailure

inLatinAmerica,London,NewYork:ZedBooks.

Krause,Keith,andJenniferMilliken(2009),Introduction:theChallengeofNonStateArmed

Groups,in:ContemporarySecurityPolicy,30,2,202220.

Kreutz,Joakim (2010),Howandwhenarmedconflictsend: Introducing theUCDPConflict

Terminationdataset,in:JournalofPeaceResearch,47,2,243250.

Kurtenbach, Sabine (1991), StaatlicheOrganisation und Krieg in Lateinamerika. Ein historischstrukturellerVergleichderEntwicklungeninKolumbienundChile,Hamburg/Mnster:Lit.

Kurtenbach,Sabine(1999),Kolumbien:PolitischeGewaltkultur,derStaatunddieSuchenach

Frieden,in:IberoamerikanischesArchiv,NF,25,34,375396.

Kurtenbach,Sabine(2010),WhyisLiberalPeacebuildingsoDifficult?SomeLessonsfromCen

tralAmerica,in:EuropeanReviewofLatinAmericanandCaribbeanStudies,88,April,95110.

Kurtenbach,Sabine(forthcoming2011),ElladopolticodelaViolenciaapoltica,in:Gn

therMaiholdandWernerMackenbach (eds.),La transformacinde laviolenciaenAmrica

Latina,Madrid:Vervuert.


30/33


Kurtz,MarcusJ.(2009),TheSocialFoundationsofInstitutionalOrder:ReconsideringWarand

theResourceCurseinThirdWorldStateBuilding,in:Politics&Society,37,4,479520.

Licklider,Roy(2001),ObstaclestoPeaceSettlements,in:ChesterA.Crocker,FenOslerHamp

sonandPamelaAall(eds.),TurbulentPeace.TheChallengesofManagingInternationalConflict,WashingtonD.C.:GeorgetownUniversity,697718.

Luard,Evan(1986),WarinInternationalSociety.AStudyinInternationalSociology,London:I.B.

Tauris.

Luttwak,Edward(1999),GiveWaraChance,in:ForeignAffairs,78,4,3646.

Migdal, Joel S. (1988), Strong Societies and Weak States. StateSociety Relations and State

CapabilitiesintheThirdWorld,Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress.

Migdal,JoelS.(2001),StateinSociety:StudyingHowStatesandSocietiesTransformandConstitute

OneAnother,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

Mnkler,Herfried(2002),DieneuenKriege,ReinbekbeiHamburg:rowohlt.

Naylor,R.T. (2009),Violenceand illegaleconomicactivity:adeconstruction, in:Crime,Law,

andSocialChange,52,3,231242.

Neumayer, Eric (2003), Good Policy Can Lower Violent Crime: Evidence from a Cross

NationalPanelofHomicideRates,198097,in:JournalofPeaceResearch,40,6,619640.

Pearce,Jenny(2010),PerversestateformationandsecuritizeddemocracyinLatinAmerica,in:

Democratization,17,2,286306.Pinker,Steven(2011),TheBetterAngelsofOurNature:WhyViolencehasDeclined,NewYork:Vi

kingAdult.

PNUD(ProgramadeNacionesUnidasparaelDesarrollo)(2007),BogotconDesarrolloHumano.

Ah est el Detalle (Sinopsis), Bogot, online:

(23January2008).

Reno,William(2009),ExplainingPatternsofViolenceinCollapsedStates,in:ContemporarySe

curityPolicy,30,2,356374.Richani,Nazih (2002),SystemsofViolence.ThePoliticalEconomyofWarandPeace inColombia,

Albany,N.Y.:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress.

Schlichte,Klaus(2006),StaatsbildungoderStaatszerfall?ZumFormwandelkriegerischerGe

waltinderWeltgesellschaft,in:PolitischeVierteljahresschrift,46,4,547570.

Schlichte,Klaus(2009),IntheShadowofViolence,Frankfurt,NewYork:Campus.

Schreiber,Wolfgang(2009),KriegsbeendendeFaktoren,in:FelixGerdes(ed.),Verregelungder

Gewalt,AKUFArbeitspapier,6,Hamburg,5968.


31/33


Schreiber,Wolfgang(2010),WieKriegeenden,in:sterreichischesStudienzentrum frFrie

denundKonfliktlsung (ed.),Krieg imAbseits.VergesseneKriegezwischenSchattenund

LichtoderdasDuellimMorgengrauenumkonomie,MedienundPolitik,60,Wien:Lit.

StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute(SIPRI)(2011),Armaments,DisarmamentandInternationalSecurity2011,Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Snyder,Richard,andAngelicaDuranMartinez (2009),Does illegalitybreedviolence?Drug

traffickingandstatesponsoredprotectionrackets,in:Crime,Law,andSocialChange,52,3,

253273.

Srensen,Georg(2001),WarandstateMaking.WhyDoesntItWorkintheThirdWorld,in:

SecurityDialogue,33,3,341354.

Srensen,Georg(2004),TheTransformationoftheState.BeyondtheMythofRetreat,Houndsmill,

Basinkstoke:Palgrave.

Suhrke,Astri (forthcoming2011), Introduction:ThePeace inBetween, in:AstriSuhrkeand

Mats Berdal (eds.), The Peace in Between: Postwar Violence and Peacebuilding, London:

Routledge.

Tilly Charles (1985), State making as organized crime, in: Peter B.Evans, Dietrich

Rueschemeyer and Theda Skocpol (eds.), Bringing the State back in, Cambridge: Cam

bridgeUniversityPress,212241.

Tilly, Charles (1990), Coercion, Capital and European States, Cambridge, MA, Oxford UK:

Blackwell.

Tilly,Charles(2003),ThePoliticsofCollectiveViolence,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress.

UCDP/PRIO (UppsalaConflictData Program/PeaceResearch InstituteOslo) (2011),Armed

Conflict Dataset v. 42011, online: (01November2011).

UNDP (UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgram) (2010),HumanDevelopmentReport2010:The

RealWealthofNations:PathwaystoHumanDevelopment,NewYork:Palgrave.

UNODC(UnitedNationsOrganizationonDrugandCrime)(2011),International

Data

on

Hom

icide, online: (01November2011).

Urban,Greg,andJoelSherzer(eds.)(1991),NationStatesandIndiansinLatinAmerica,Austin,

Texas:UniversityofTexasPress.

Waldmann,Peter(2002),DeranomischeStaat.berRecht,ffentlicheSicherheitundAlltaginLa

teinamerika,Opladen:Leske&Budrich.

Weber,Max (1972),WirtschaftundGesellschaft.GrundriderverstehendenSoziologie,Stuttgart:

MohrSiebeck.


32/33


Wehner,Leslie (2010),FromRivalry toMutualTrust:TheOtheringProcessbetweenBoliviaand

Chile,GIGAWorkingPapers,135,Hamburg:GIGAGermanInstituteofGlobalandArea

Studies,online:.

WHO(WorldHealthOrganization)(2002),WorldReportonViolenceandHealth2002,Geneva:

Although.


33/33

All GIGA Working Papers are available free of charge at www.giga-hamburg.de/workingpapers.For any requests please contact: [email protected].

Recent Issues

No 180 Laurence Marfaing and Alena Thiel: Chinese Commodity Imports in Ghana and Senegal:Demystifying Chinese Business Strength in Urban West Africa, November 2011

No 179 Hugo Dobson: The G20: Engine of Asian Regionalism?, November 2011

No 178 Johannes Vllers: Fighting for a Kingdom of God? The Role of Religion in the IvorianCrisis, October 2011

No 177 Marco Bnte: Burmas Transition to Disciplined Democracy: Abdication or Institutio-

nalization of Military Rule?, August 2011

No 176 Anna Barrera: Turning Legal Pluralism into State-Sanctioned Law: Assessing the Impli-cations of the New Constitutions and Laws in Bolivia and Ecuador, August 2011

Exporting Countries, August 2011

Governance in India and South Africa, August 2011

No 173 Maria Bondes: Negotiating Political Spaces: Social and Environmental Activism in the

Chinese Countryside, July 2011

Administration: A Comparative Study of Three World Regions, July 2011

June 2011

No 170 Nicola Nymalm: The End of the Liberal Theory of History? Dissecting the U.S. CongressDiscourse on Chinas Currency Policy, June 2011

No 169 Matas Dewey: Fragile States, Robust Structures: Illegal Police Protection in Buenos Aires,June 2011

No 167 Nina Korte: Its Not Only Rents: Explaining the Persistence and Change of Neopatrimo-nialism in Indonesia, May 2011

Date post:	06-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	juan-acosta
View:	220 times
Download:	0 times

wp181_kurtenbach

Documents