bsl McChristian - direct
1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OJ:' NEW "YORK
3 ____________________________________ x
4 GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND,
5 Plaintiff,
6 v. 82 eiv. 7913 PNL
7 COLUMBIA BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
8 GEORGE CRlLE, MICHAEL WALLACE and
9 SAMUEL A. ADAMS,
10 Defendants.
11 ------------------------------------x 12 February 6, 1985
13 10:00 a.m.
14 -------------
15
16 (Open court)
17 THE COURT: Cal1 the j u:!rY, plea.s"e.
18 (,Jury present)
19 THE COURT: Good morning members of the jury.
20 JURORS: Good morning, your Honor.
21 THE COURT: Let me make mention of my admiration
22 ano grati tude to all of you for getting heit;a promptly this
23 morning.! know the conditions made it difficult for a lot
24 of you, but it's very much appreciated.
25 I have a cou~le of notes from the jury. First,
SOUTHER.< OISl"RICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y .. - '91~1020
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1 I was advised by the clerk that one of the jurors is not
2 feeling well and may want to ask for a recess from time to
3 time. Please do not be bashful about just raising your
4 hand or calling out, if necessary, and we will call a brea k
5 so that you can take a recess.
6 I have a note from the jury asking whether the
7 ju ry can be permitted to eat in the cafeteria because of
8 the bad weat he r, and there is a courthouse rule, as I guess
9 you have been told, that puts the cafeteria off limits to
10 the jurors, and the reason for that is so that the jurors
11 will not find themsel ves too close by to people who are
12 participants or interested persons in the case. It's part
13 of the business that I have explained to you in the past
14 about keeping t h e jurors quite separate, quite isolated
15 from all other persons connected with the case.
16 I am afraid under today's conditions I am going
17 to deny your request to use the cafeteria. The fact is
18 that the cafeteria is absolutely crawling with people who
19 are either participants in the case, as l awyers, witnesses,
20 parties, or are spectators, regular spectators, re porters,
21 press people covering the case on a daily basis, and it
22 would be virtually impossible, given the size of those
23 facilities, for the jurors to be isolated, and you might be
24 in a position in whi ch your conversations would be heard by
25 other persons or you would hear other peoples'
SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS, U.S. COURTHOUSE
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1 conversations.
2 And s o, under today' s wea ther cond i tions, I
3 don't think the emergency situation is bad enoug h to
4 warrant relaxing that rule. It really isn't all that bad
5 out there . I am told they think the snow has about stopped
6 and it's not terribly cold .
7 If jurors do not want to go out, I think that
8 it's perfectly -- I think that it's easily possible to send
9 out for food. I th ink that there are a number of
10 cafeterias in the area that will send meals over by
11 messenger and maybe you can talk to the clerk about that at
12 the next recess .
13 If any of you want to stay in the jury room, I
14 am quite sure that the clerk knows the telephone numbe rs of
15 cafeteri,,~· 'd t can be called to deliver in at lunchtime.
16 I have another note _ ........ -"-- juror who
17 reasons is asking a lot of rather detailed
18 about when the trial will end, and I cannot
19 those questions now . I will take up your note with
20 c nsel and try to give you as firm answers as we can.
21 T will not be v ery precise answers, but maybe they can
22 you a little help. If you don't hear back from me on
23 please remind me to make sure it doesn't sli p
24 my
25 All right. You will be calling a witness, M~.
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
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1 Boies?
2 MR. BOIES: Yes, your Honor, the defendants
3 call as their next witness, General Joseph McChristian.
4 THE COURT: Members of the jury, if you recall
5 yesterday afternoon we interrupted the reading of the
6 deposition of Colonel Cooley and just for convenience,
7 rather than continue the reading of the deposition now, we
8 are going to proceed with the next live witnesses, General
9 McChristian, and the remainder of the deposition of Colonel
10 Cooley will be taken up at a later time.
11 JOSEPH ALEXA~DER McCHRISTIAN,
12 called as a witness by the defendants, having been
13 duly sworn, testified as follows:
14 THE COURT: General McChristian, that microphone
15 is on a swinging boom, so you don't need to lean forward to
16 go to it. You can sit back comfortably, if you keep the
17 microphone out a certain distance in front of you. Speak
18 out in a loud voice so you can be heard throughout the room.
19 THE WITNESS: Thank you, your Honor.
20 DIRECT EXAMIN ATION
21 BY MR. BOIES:
22 Q. General McChristian, how old are you?
23 A. Sir, I am a little over 70 years ole.
24 Q. How many years did you spend in the United
25 Sta tes Army ?
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1 A. Thirty eight.
2 Q. When did you enter the United States Army?
3 A. I enlisted as a private in 1933.
4 Q. Did there come a time when you entered the West
5 Point Military Academy?
6 A. Yes. I WdS enlisted for slightly over two years
7 and then I entered the United States Military Academy on an
8 appointment from Senator Trammell of Florida.
9 Q. ~hen did you graduate from West Point?
10 A. I graduated in June of 1939.
11 Q. Khen did you retire from the Army?
12 A. I retired in 1971.
13 Q. Of the thirty eight years you spent in the
14 United States Army how many of those years were spent in
15 military intelligence?
16 A. Approximately fourteen.
17 Q. Could you trace briefly your experience in the
18 Army from the time you graduated from West Point until you
19 were assigned to the Military Assistance Command in Vietnam.
20 A. Yes. I graduated in 1939. I selected infantry
21 branch out of choice and was fortunate to be assigned to
22 the 29th Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia. I was there a
23 short while when an order came down to remove me and some
24 of my classmates, from the 29th and assign us to the 67th
25 Infantry Me dium Tanks, because at that time General Patton
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUS E
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1 was organizing the Second Armored Division, of which I
2 became a member of the original cadre.
3 I was a platoon leader of tanks. I commanded
4 the first platoon of medium t anks ever manufactured in this
5 country and s ent out to the Army.
6 I ran the recruit school for General Patton and
7 he personally gave me the instructions of what he wanted
8 done. He was a f ine man in that regard, and in every
9 regard that I knew him .
10 I then went from the 67th to become an
11 instructor in his we apons sc hool for officers. From there
12 I went to Pinecamp, New York in the cadre of the 4th
13 Armored Division, commanded a company, was aide-de-camp to
14 the division commander; was the commander of a provisional
15 battalion for a very short period of time; attended the
16 Command and General Staff School short course in Fort
17 Leavenworth and was ordered back there shortly after I had
18 graduated to be on the faculty .
19 I instructed in armor offensive -- all types of
20 armored operations at the time I was on the faculty at
21 Le avenwo rth and then I left there and went to the lOth
22 Armored Division at Camp Gordon, Georgia, where I was the
23 commanding officer of the 6l.st Armored Infantry Battalion
24 t ilat I trained there for some nine months and took it
25 overseas, and my division was a follcwup division that was
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COU RTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791 · 1020
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1 landed in Cherbourg Peni"nsula.
2 Shortly after being committed into operations, I
3 was taken out of my battalion and made the chief operations
4 officer of the division, referred to as the G- 3. I had
5 that job for a few months and during the attack on Trier,
6 which I had planned, our division headquarters was under
7 severe attack , had quite a few casualties, one of them
8 being our Chief of Staff, and I was then appointed Chief of
9 Staff of the lOth Armored division, a job which I r etai ned
10 until the end of combat in Korld War II, and shortly after
11 combat was over, General Patton took me out of my di v ision
12 and made me chief of intelligence of Third Army under him.
13 That was my first intelligence assignnent, other
14 than a very very minor one such as the intelligence officer
15 of one of the battalions in training back in Fort Benning,
16 Georgia.
17 I was his chief of intelligence until General
18 Patton was relieved of his command and then I moved with
19 the Third Army headquarters to Heidelberg where Lieutenant
20 General Keyes was the commander. I was his deputy there,
21 and he went on to Vienna to be tile high commissioner in
22 Austria and he took me witt him as the deputy director of
23 intelligence for the Unitej States Forces Austria.
24 I was in that job for a little over a year and
25 then I was transferred back to Kashington and I was
SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK, N.Y. - 791.1020
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1 assigned to the intelligence division, but I was only there
2 about two or three days when my assignment was cha nged and
3 I was made a commanding officer of the second battalion of
4 the Third Infantry, the old guard, as we called it, the
5 oldest regiment in the Army history, and they are our
6 national honor guard regiment in Washington, and I had a
7 lot to do with the organization of that regiment and I
8 commanded all of the honor guards wh en the President would
9 go out and meet incoming dignitaries and so forth.
10 From that assignment I was signed to Athens ,
11 Greece on the first joint United States Military Assistance
12 and Advisory Group during the Greek-Communist war.
13 Perhaps I s houl d state here for just a momemt
14 that in these various assignments that I had, for example,
15 in combat in Europe, I had a great deal of experience that
16 helped me later on in Vietnam. Example: Eisenhov.'er's
17 headquarters had issued what was called an automatic
18 arrestee list. This listed the various jobs in the Nazi
19 party, that if a person occupied one of those jobs he was
20 an automatic arrestee .
21 This was very similar to the Vietcong
22 infrastructure in the war in Vietnam where we f elt you had
23 to eliminate the leadership of the political party in order
24
25
to control that type of a war. I give this as an example.
hhen I went to Greece -- the Greek-Communist war
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COU RTH OUSE
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1 has been referred to many times, and I feel in my own
2 judgment it is a pattern that was initiated by the
3 Communists as a wa r of national liberation, and the methods
4 they us ed to harass or to gain control of the local
5 population, to gain their support, and so forth, were the
6 beginnings of that type of war, which, of course, was
7 highly refind thereafter in -- by Ho Chi Minh and others.
8 From Greece -- I was there for a year in this
9 advisory group during that war, and from there I was
10 ordered back -- in fact, I was kept on an additional year
11 because the Greek government requested our government to
12 extend me to a fourth year.
13 I then was offered the command of any armored
14 regiment in the Army of my choice. They said I had done a
15 fine job and I could have it. And I said no, that's a
16 plumb, that would be great for my career, but I volunteered
17 to be assigned to command a regiment in the Armor Training
18 Center at Fort Knox , Kentucky , because it was my feeling
19 that at that time in the United States Army we were
20 bringing young men into the Ar~y for six months and
21 training them and then back to civilian live, so we had a
22 large number of people coming through, and this was the
23 ?lace within our army where we were indoctrinating the
24 fundamentals of soldiering to t he maximum number of our own
25 citizens.
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1 I felt I could make a better contribution in
2 doing something like that. I felt that was something that
3 I would really be happy doing . So I volunteered for that
4 job and I received command of an armor training regiment,
5 but I only had it about a month until the major general and
6 brigadier general, who were demanding that training center,
7 were transferred out to other jobs, and being th e senior
8 colonel, I took over command of the center that had eleven
9 regiments in it and they let me keep that for a year.
10 I lucked into that . I was very fortunate to have such a
11 fine assignment .
12 I was then ordered from there to the Pentagon
13 into the office of the chief of intelligence . In that
14 assignment I was the colonel in charge of what was called
15 the We s tern Division . The Western Division was res?onsible
16 for production of intelligence as required on about 50
17 nations in the western world .
18 That gave me the opportunity, not only to be
19 kept abreast of the intelligence daily that was coming in,
20 but the intelligence t hat was being developed into studies
21 and estimates on that part of the world, and also, not to
22 the same extent , but world - wide; it put me in a job where I
23 had that op?ortunity .
24 At t hat time was the missle crisis in Cuba, and
25 I was selected to set up for the Department of Army a
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1 special task force to c~llect intelligence on and to be
2 able to report on the situation in Cuba, and it was then
3 that I kept insisting to my intelligence staff that we were
4 getting only little scraps of information , little bit here,
5 a little bit there. And I said every little scrap of
6 information to an intelligence officer is like nickels and
7 dimes to a banker. It takes a lot of it to make a profit,
8 to bring up something big, but you must account for every
9 piece.
10 You've got a tiger by the tail with that piece
11 of information. You must hold on to it until you confirm
12 it or you refute it.
13 Well, we just happened to get enough information
14 that I felt that the overflights that were being made over
15 Cuba to see if they could locate any missles in Cuba, that
16 I kept insisting , here's a part of Cuba that should be
17 photographed, but the planes never went there, and finally
18 I went to my chief and I sai d , "Sir, this is really beng
19 ignored. We s hould fly it here. We don't have proof of it,
20 but there's a good indication it may be something."
21 lie got the mission flown, and that was the
22 flight that discovered the missles in Cuba.
23 Shortly after that assignment -- or while I had
24 that assignment in Washington, I was selected for promotion
25 to brigadier general. I was assigned as the chief of
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORT ERS. U.S. coua THO USE
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1 intelligence for the United States Ar~y Pacific, located
2 with headquarters in Hawaii. I had that job in Hawaii for
3 two years.
4 During that time I was responsible for
5 intelligence of the United States Army in an area that
6 bordered on the borders of India and everything in between
7 there and North Korea.
8 So I had the mission, the requirement and the
9 great opportunity to travel throughout the entire Pacific,
10 to work in intelligence operations with all of our friends
11 from one aspect to another, some very close cookdination
12 and cooperation, some not quite so good. But I had an
13 opportunity to really get to know that part of the world
14 and the way people thought and the way they did as far as
15 intelligence throughout that part of Asia.
16 ~hile I was in Hawaii -- there a few things that
17 I think would be pertinent to my experiences there. One of
18 the first things that I did was say to my commander, "If I
19 may, I would like to see the war plans of the United States
20 Army Pacific. I would like to review them to determine, is
21 the intelligence force structure, the troops and all the
22 resour,:es, is that adequate to support that war plan if we
23 had to implement it?"
24 I had to learn a lot about intelligence force
25 structure. I had never gone to an intelligence training
SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS . U.S. COU RTH OUSE
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1 school per se, but I've certainly taken advantage of every
2 opportunity to learn it and to educate myself and to visit
3 every type of intelligence organization that we had,
4 wherever it may be in the world, and I visited them around
5 the world, sat down with the sergeants and everybody at
6 their positions and said, "Tell me how you do your job." I
7 said, "I will come back tbrough here and I will tell you
8 what impact it's having."
9 I really believe that on that job I had the
10 chance to educate myself, but I to ok the war plans and as a
11 result of developing the force structure that should
12 support them , two things I think were important to me for
13 future operations : One, I thoroughly learned all about
14 intelligence force structur e . Secondly, I was able to go
15 to the Department of Army, through my headquarters, and
16 request that an intelligence battalion composed of various
17 capabilities, organized the way I thought it should be, in
18 order to support our war plans, be activated, organized and
19 actually stationed in Hawaii, where the people could be put
20 on assignments in the various countries throughout Asia to
21 get to know the language, get to know the culture, get to
22 know what was t he re during the period of time of traini ng
23 and t hen come back to Ila waii and rotate back to some other
24 country so we would have a nucleus of people who were
25 indoctrinated on the area, who were all prepared if need be
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S, U.S. COU RTHOUS E
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1 to support our plans.
2 This battalion that I requested, we all thought
3 that the chances were very slight, but, 10 and behold, the
4 Army approved it. The organization was formed and it was
5 sent to Hawaii before I was ordered out on my next
6 assignment.
7 Also, while I was in this job, I reviewed my
8 missions. One of the missions that I had a directive on
9 was to produce intelligence on North Vietnamese Armed
10 Forces.
11 So I went to work right away. I 'Nent out to
12 Vietnam. I visited Vietnam . I traveled throughout the
13 country. I was very interested in what was going on in
14 interrogations and in captured documents and their
15 translation.
16 I am a firm believer that the greatest source of
17 intelligence in the world i s an indi vidual who's
18 knowledgeable on what you want to know, and you have access
19 to that indi v idual and you can get the information from
20 them if they are willing to give .
21 The second best is what he puts down out of his
22 brain on to a piece of paper and you get, so I was very
23 interested in those things. And the y are always available
24 on the battlefield if there is somebody to fight.
25 So I traveled allover the country with those
SOU THER N DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
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I things very much in .... . , .. nd when I would visi t Vietnam. .. -2 So I came back to Hawaii. I put in a
3 requirement for interrogation to be done, for documents, so
4 that the information would be sent to me from Vietnam,
5 where I could put it together, send it to the Defense
6 Intelligence Agency in Washington, because I was
7 responsible for doing that. But I learned -- the Commander
8 in Chief Pacific, Chief of Intelligence, called me o v er a nd
9 said, "We have this requiremen t that you have sent throug h .
10 Nothing doing. The command out in Vietn a m is not in combat.
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They are . " 1 n ......
(Continued on next page.)
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPOR TERS. U.S. COUR THOL:S£
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1 THE COURT: Let me just interrupt you.
2 THE WIT NESS: Yes, sir.
3 THE COURT: I think you're going a little beyond
4 the question.
5 Q. General McChristian, let me just follow up. ~
6 I correct that your next assignment after your position as
7 chief of intelligence for United States Army Pacific was to
8 go to Vietnam?
9 A. Yes, sir. After that assignment, I was two
10 years in the G-2 U.S. Army Pacific, and t hen I was
11 transferred to Vietnam to be t h e J-2 MACV .
12 Q. When did you become J-2 MACV in Vietnam?
13 .r; • On th e 13th of July 1965.
14 Q. I want to skip over that period and come back t o
15 i t in some detail, but first I would like to compl e te your
16 ex per i ence in the Army. When did yo u leave your p osition
17 as J-2 of M~CV?
18 A. On the 1st of June 1967.
19 Q. ..'hat position d id you assume follo",ing June of
20 1967?
21 A. I was the commanding general of t he Second
22 Armored Division in Fort Hood , Texas.
23 Q.
24 Division?
25 A.
A~d how long did you comm and t he Second Ar mo red
I had that j09 and concurre nt with it I als o was
SOL'THER:-.s DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COUR THOUSE
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1 in command of the III Corps, which included the First and
2 the Second Armored Divisions, for a period of slightl y over
3 one year.
4 Q. How many men were included in the III Corps?
5 A. Including the two armored divisions, the corps
6 troop s, the other installations on the post, it was pretty
7 close to 50,000.
8 Q. What did you do after commanding the III Corps?
9 A. I was transferred to Washington to be the chief
10 of intelligence, United States Army, in the Pentagon.
11 Q. And did you hold that position until yo u retired
12 in 1971?
13 A. Yes, sir.
14 Q. Is the chief of intelligence of the United
15 States Army sometimes referred to as ACSI?
16 A. Yes , sir , ACSI, t he assistant chief of staff
17 intelligence.
18 o. And is that the chief intelligence officer for
19 the United States Army?
20 A. Yes, sir.
21 o. And could you briefly describe what the duties
22 are of t he ACSI or chief intelligence o ff icer of the Army ?
23 A. The job of the chief intellige nce officer of th e
24 Arm y is primarily to see t ha t the intelligence force
25 str ucture of the Army is developed and trained and is ready
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1 to support the Army and also to prepare the various
2 estimates and studies that support the Army planners.
3 The intelligence that goes into those studies is
4 pre~ared by the Defense Intelligence Agency. The chief of
5 Army intelligence is not in the business of the preparation
6 or the development of that intelligence. That's done today
7 by the Defense Intelligence Agency.
8 Q. During your military career did you receive any
9 medals or commendations or awards?
10 A. Yes, sir.
11 Q. Could you give me some examples?
12 A. We ll, I have received two Distinguished Service
13 Medals, one for my job as t he chief of Army intelligence
14 and one as the J-2 MACV, I recei ved a Silver Star for
15 gallantry in action -- I commanded an infantry battalion in
16 a river crossing, the capture of a bridgehead, in World War
17 II -- I have the Legion of Merit, I have a Bronze Star wit h
18 three or four oak-leaf clusters, I have the Expert Infantr y
19 Badge, I have the Combat Infantry Badge, I have been
20 decorated by Vietnam with several decorations, I have been
21 decorated by Korea, I have been decorated by France, I h ave
22 the Medal of Metz, I have the Croix de Guerre with Bronze
23 Palm, I have the Croix de Guerre with Gold Palm, I have
24 been decorated by Spain.
25 Those are the primary ones t ha t I recall rig h t
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1 now.
2 Q. General McChristian --
3 THE COURT: Let me just interrupt to get a
4 couple of dates.
5 You say you left the position of MACV J-2 on
6 June 1, 1967?
7 THS WITNESS: Yes, sir.
8 THE COURT: Is that right?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
10 THE COURT: What was the date, as closely as you
11 can recall, when you transferred from III Corps to the
12 position of ACSI?
13 THE WITNESS : As I recall, sir, sometime in '6 8 ,
14 earl y ' 68.
15 THE COURT: Can you be somewhat more precise?
16 When in '68 ? Did I understand you to say --
17 THS WITNESS: I would sa y it was probably around
18 August of '68, sir.
19 THE COURT: August of '68?
20 THE WITNESS: Yes .
21 THE CO URT: And so in between the time when y ou
2:! were J-2 of MACV, ending on June 1 of 1967, and August of
23 1968, when y o u took the position of ACSI, in between those
24 dates you were in command of an armored division?
25 THE WITNESS: Yes, s i r, and concurrent with it
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1 for most of the time of the corps also . I had two commands.
2 THE COURT: All right . Proceed.
3 BY MR. BOIES:
4 Q. Let me now focus your attention, General
5 McChristian, on the two years that you were MACV J-2 in
6 Vietnam. I believe you commenced that service in July of
7 1965, is that correct?
8 A. Yes, sir .
9 Q. Could you briefly describe what the functions of
10 . the ~ACV J - 2 were during the period of time that you were
11 there?
12 Yes, sir. The J stands for joint, and it
13 represents a command that is made up of Army, Navy, Air
14 Force and Marines, and as the J-2 the 2 stands for
15 intelligence -- I had the joint staff responsibility for
16 the supervision of Arm y , Navy, Air Force, Marine
17 intelligence in s upport of Gene r al Westmoreland's, my
18 commander's, mission.
19 Q. Was General Westmoreland the commander of MAC V
20 during the entire period of t ime that you were in South
21 Vietnam?
22 1\. Yes, sir .
23 c. Incidentally, am I correct that General
24 Westmoreland was also the 1\rmy chief of staff when you were
25 1\CSI?
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1 A. That's correct, yes, sir.
2 Q. In connection with your work at MACV as the J-2
3 or chief intelligence officer did you have responsib ility
4 for preparing order of battle estimates?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. Would you describe for me what the purpose of an
7 order of battle estimate is?
8 1\. Yes, sir. First of all, order of battle is the
9 military term that enco~passes about eight what we say
10 order of battle factors. These factors help us describe
11 the capabilities and the vulnerabilities of an enemy unit
12 or force.
13 These factors are basically -- o n e is strength
14 of the unit, the identification of the unit, the
15 composition, what's it made of, infantry, armor, the
16 disposition, where it is located, the training, w'lat
17 training has this unit had, its leaders h i p , its ~orale, its
18 logistics, what's it equipped with, what type of weapons,
19 what logistics can support it, can sustain it, that when
20 you gather information on all of these factors you are
21 really coming up with what is the quantity and what is the
22 quality of this enemy force that you are trying to evaluate.
23 So order of battle is gathering ever y bit of
24 information you can in those factors and then putting it
25 all together, collating it, evaluating it, and then in each
SOUTH ERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COUR THO L'SE
FOLEY SQUARE, N EW YORK . N.Y. - 791 · 1020
McChristian - direct 9003
1 of th e se areas I have talked about to get the best picture
2 of that enemy you can.
3 Order of battle brings this information together
4 into statistical studi es. For example, strength is so
5 important in this overall picture that most people get
6 wrapped up in just the strength on it, which is extremely
7 important, but it is one of those factors. The order of
8 battle then goes on to other people. It is the basic data
9 base of what is this force. It is not the estimate of the
o capabilities or the vulnerabilities, but that goes to t he
11 estimators, and they take many other thing s into
12 consideration to make the estimate of the enemy's
13 capabilities.
14 Q. Is it impo rtant t ha t an order of battle estimate
15 be based on the best, most honest intelligence a va ilable?
16 .r.. • ~bsolutely. The intelligence officp~ ~~st
17 always keep in mind that he is responsible to provide
18 timely, accurate, an ad equate amount of the bi g p icture,
19 and usable intelligence on the enemy , so that all
20 decision-makers, from the Commander in Chief in the l'1hite
21 House to the company commander on the battlefield, know the
22 facts concerning t he enemy, so that they may arrive at
23 sound decisions.
24 o. What role , if any, s hould political
2S considerations play in order of battle estimates?
SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 791·1020
•
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1 A. In my judgment, none whatsoe v er. The facts
2 should speak for themselves in order to give an honest,
3 true picture of the enemy.
4 Q. Why is that, sir?
5 A. In order to make a sound decision you sh o uld put
6 out the facts, and the entire facts, on the problem and let
7 those who must make t h e decisions on it eva l u a te their
8 responsibilities.
9 Q. While you were J-2 or chief intelli gence officer
10 at MACV, before you sent an intelli g ence rep ort to
11 Washington did you have to get prior approval of CI NCPAC?
12 1\.. No, sir.
13 Q. Co u ld you explain what CINCPAC was?
14 1\.. CINCPAC is the acronym t h at means Commander in
15 Chief Pacific. The Commander in Chief Pacific was one of
16 the immediate commanders to whom Genera l Westmoreland
17 reported. An d if you're talking about a normal command
18 responsibility, as I recall, our cables would normall y g o
19 to CINCPAC a nd t o the Jo i nt Ch i efs of Staff, unless it was
20 just a response to one or the ot h er for a specific question.
21 THE COU RT: Excuse me , ~r. Boies. I would like
22 to ask you to g o .::lack ov~r the previo\.:,;: q uestion. Your
23 question included the issue of wh ether a ? 9rOv a l of CH~CPAC
24 was ne e c e d before sending an intelligence report to
25 Washing t on. I wo u ld li ke to as k y ou to clear u p b y a
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPO RTERS. U.S. COU RTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUAR E, NEW YO RK N .Y. - ~91 . I 020
McChristian - direct 9005
1 question what you meant by to Nashington, .,hat the witness
2 meant by to Washington.
3 Q. During your tour of duty as MAC V J-2 did you
4 send intelligence reports to Washington?
5 A. Yes, sir.
6 Q. Could you tell me to whom in Washington those
7 intelligence reports were sent?
8 A. Now, we're talking about reports that I would
9 send through intelligence channels. I would send reports
10 the normal distribution would include in Washington the
11 Defense I ntell igence Agency and the other m i li tary and
12 civilian agencies in \'7ashington who had indicated a desire
13 to have that particular report, if it's a recurring t y pe of
14 re~ort.
15 o. At an y point during your tour as
16 THE COURT: Can you pursue that? Such as? Who
17 were some of the ones that were on the list, what was t h e
18 normal distribution of that kind of a list for the reports
19 that you were producing as J-2 MACV?
20 THE WITNESS: Let's take for example the monthl y
21 order of battle summary. As I recall, we published just
22 under 500 copies of that report that were sent out in
distribution.
Distribution in Washington would include the
Defense Intelligence Agency, the Central Intelli g ence
SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPO RTERS . U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. :-.l .Y. - ~91. 1020
McChristian - direct 9006
1 Agency, the National Security Agency, the State Department
2 intelligence, the Army , Navy, Air Force, Marine
3 intelligence officers, and many others. But that would be
4 basically all of the intelligence services of our country
5 who had evidenced a desire to receive from us that type of
6 information.
7 Q. Now, at any point during your tour as J-2 or
8 chief intelligence officer for MACV did you ever have to
9 get approval from CINCPAC before you could send an order of
10 battle report or other intelligence report to the Defense
11 Intelligence Agency or the Joint Chiefs or the CI A or any
12 of the other intelligence agencies in Washington?
13 A. To my recollection, Mr. Boies, the only gui dance
14 on this is what came out of the intelligence conference in
15 Hawaii, which was held in February of 1967, and that
16 particular conference was concerned very much with criteria,
17 methodology and definitions, and they were also concerned
18 with the various documents that MACV issued that carried
19 this type of information in them.
20 So that conference recommended that if at any
21 time in the future, after that conference, that I as MACV
22 intended to change the cri 1:eria or the definitions that
23 were goin? to go in those s pec ific documents that I should,
before using that change in the documents, circulate those
changes to the intelligence community, not just to
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPO RTER S. U.S. COU RTH OUS E
FOLEY SQU AR E. N EW YORK . N.Y. _ 791.1 020
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1 Commander in Chief Pacific, for their comments, not just to
2 DIA, but for comments on the criteria and methodology.
3 But as far as reports themselves, no. This is a
4 very, very narrow -- I should explain, perhaps, why that
5 was important, if I should.
6 Q. Go ahead, sir.
7 A. There had been some confusion on the great mass
8 of reporting that had developed over the period of time of
9 the war and the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
10 wanted to be sure that there would be that this would be
11 looked into, and if there was any, to do away with it and
12 to set up procedures whereby in the future we could avoid
13 any errors from creeping back in.
14 So he said "Okay, on these some eight reports
IS that are being put out by MACV, if at any time you're going
16 to change a definition," he didn't say "you have to send a
17 report to us ," but "if you're going to change a definition,
18 a criteria or some methodology, get the viewpoints of the
intelligence community before you just come out and put it
on anybody, because here we have had a conference now to
get it all squared away."
So this is the only thing that I am aware of as
to where we had to get some -- and this didn't come through
command channels as an order for us to do it, but it came
out of the conference that we all agreed that that was a
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. u.s . COUR THOt;SE
FOLE Y SQUARE, NEW YORK. N.Y. _ 791.1020
~cChristian - direct 900 8
1 good thing to be done as a coordination among the
2 intelligence agencies.
3 Q. If during the period of time that you were J-2
4 MACV you concluded that enemy strength had increased or
5 decreased did you have to get the approval or concurrence
6 of CINCPAC before notifying the agencies in Washington that
7 you have identified of that increase or decrease?
8 A. NO, sir.
9 o. You mentioned the Honolulu conference . That was
10 a conference that was held in Februar y of 1967, correct,
11 sir?
12 A. Yes, sir.
13 Q. And did you attend that conference?
14 A. Yes, sir.
15 Q. Was there any discussion of enemy strength
16 estimates at that conference?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 THE COURT: \'1ould you come up just a second,
19 please?
20 I don 't need th e reporter.
21 (At the side bar; discussion off the record)
22 (In open court)
23 BY MR. BOIES:
24 Q. During the time that you were J -2 at M~CV did
25 you from time to time send intelligence reports to the
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COU RTHOUSE FOLEY SQU ARE , NEW YORK. NY. _ ;91.1010
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1 office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington?
2 A. Intelligence reports would be sent to the
3 Defense Intelligence Agency if they were being sent through
4 intelligence channels. If they were being transferred
5 transmitted through command channels, which they might have
6 been, they would be addressed to the JCS, the Joint Chiefs
7 of Staff.
B Q. And who was the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
9 Staff during the period of time that you were in Vietnam,
10 if you recall?
11 A. General Wheeler.
12 Q. Let me ask a couple of more questions about the
13 Honolulu conference, if I can, sir.
14 Was there discussion at the Honolulu conference
15 as to what categories of the enemy should be included in
16 the enemy order of battle?
17 A. Yes, sir.
18 Q. Did the representatives at the Honolulu
19 conference reach an agreement as to what categories of the
20 enemy should be included in the order of battle?
21 A. Yes, sir.
Q. Was that a unanimous agreement?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What did the rep resentatives at the Honolulu
conference conclude were the categories of the enemy that
SOUTHERN OISH.leT REPO RTERS. u .s. COURTHOUS E
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. _ i9 1_ 1020
McChristian - direct 9010
should be included in the enemy order of battle?
A. They included the combat forces, made up of the
3 maneuver forces and the combat support forces, the
4 administrative services, the irregulars, comnosed of the
5 guerrillas, self-defense and secret self-defense forces,
6 and the political order of battle.
7 Q. Was General Westmoreland informed of the
8 conclusions of the Honolulu conference?
9 A. When I returned from that conference I debriefed
10 the chief of staff on what had taken place at the
11 conference, and a copy of the report would be sent to the
12 chief of staff's office, and it was routine that the chief
13 of staff would keep the commander informed of these various
14 reports.
15 THE COU RT: Who was the chief of staff at that
16 time?
17 THE WITNESS: As I recall, sir, it was General
18 Rosson.
19 Q. There has been reference in this trial to
20 something called CICV or the Command Intelligence Center
21 Vietnam. You are familiar with that, are you not, sir?
22 A. Yes, sir.
23 Q. And was that or ganiz a tion created during your
24 tour of duty as MACV J-2?
A. Yes, sir. That was ref e rred to as CICV, C I C V,
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTER S. U.S. COU RTHOUSE
FOLE Y SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y. - 791.1020
McChristian - direct 9011
1 and it stood for the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam,
2 and I created that as part of an extensive organization of
3 combinad activities, and I created that almost within the
4 first week that I took over as the J-2 out of existing
5 resources that were available.
6 Q. What was the function of the CICV part of the
7 intelligence component?
8 A. Any intelligence operation must have an
9 extensive data base, files on the enemy that are being kept
10 up to date all the time. CICV was the data base for the
11 command not only on order of battle information, both
12 ground forces and political, but it was the data base on
13 area analysis, on all mapping, on all photography of the
14 country, on all studies of the terrain, all studies put out
15 to assist units in their planning for activities, it was
16 the research and analysis center, where you could get all
17 this information .
18 For example, thousands of reports ca~e into CICV
19 every week. It ran around the clock. In the daytime there
20 were over 500 people at work in it, in the evenings around
21 250. But as all reports came in, forgetting order of
22 battle for a moment and going down to the area analysis, or
23 the research part of CICV -- this is research other than
24 order of battle -- they would take the information and plot
25 it on over lays.
SOUT HERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COU RTHOUSE
FOLEY SQU ..... RE . NEW YORK . N. Y. _ 791 -1020
McChristian - direct 9012
1 On one overlay would be the sighting of all
2 units during a time frame. ~ dot would be placed with a
j date. ~nother overlay would have reports of all rice
4 cashes, where food supplies would be. ~nother one would be
5 of all hospitals, another one of all training centers,
6 another one of ambushes, every a~bush site. We went back
7 to the days of the French fighting Ho Chi Minh and we got
B all their past records. We plotted every place an ambush
9 had been conducted from histor ical records.
10 We took all these overlays in our research area
11 and we put them over a 1 to 50,000 scale map and then we
12 would see through a series of maybe eight overlay s certain
13 patterns.
14 It was as a result of this type of analysis that
15 we developed a system called the pattern analysis technique,
16 and with this technique we were able to say this particular
17 area here is one of their base areas, this is one of their
18 base areas for training, this is one of their base areas
19 for hospitalization, and so forth, and by doing this we
20 were able to report here are th e base areas throug ho ut t h e
21 country.
22 This in turn sent to the intelligence collectors
23 you don't have to collect intelligence on the entire
country for a certain type of operation, we can focus on
these base areas, if that's the type of operation we're
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPOR T ERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK. N.Y . _ 791-1 020
McChristian - direct 9013
1 after, which gave us what I considered the economy of
2 intelligence effort. Instead of looking at the whole
3 country we were able to boil it down to maybe 20 percent of
4 the country that we had to do certain collection in.
5 CICV, in my opinion -- I saw the intelligence
6 setups in World War II; I was Patton's chief of
7 intelligence and inherited all of the data bases and the
8 document centers and so forth at the immediate end of the
9 war in Europe -- I consider that CICV was one of the finest
10 supports of combat intelligence that was ever developed in
11 support of our forces in wartime and absolutely an
12 essential part of what we were doing.
13 Q. Du ring the period of time that you were chief
14 intelligence officer for MACV who on your staff would you
15 primarily go to for enemy strength estimates?
16 A. To the chief of my order of battle branch on my
17 staff, and that was Colonel Gains Hawkins.
18 Q. When you were MACV J-2 who was the person on
19 your staff that you considered to be the primary ex pert on
20 enemy order of battle?
21
22
23
11.. Colonel Hawkins.
Q. Did you work directly with Colonel Haw<ins?
11.. I did.
Q. Based on your exneriences working with Cclonel
Hawkins while the two of you were serving in Vietnam, did
SOUTHER N D ISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COU RTH OUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK 1'1 Y. _ 791.1020
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1 you form an opinion of Colonel Hawkins' abilities as an
2 intelligence officer?
3 A. I did.
4 Q. What was that opinion?
5 A. I considered him a highly qualified professional
6 officer in order of battle. I found that he was extremely
7 conscientious, paid great attention to detail, worked well
8 with his people. I had full confidence in him and I
9 t~ought .he did an outstanding job.
10 Q. During the period of time that you were MACV J-2
11 do you ever recall requesting officers in your current
12 intelligence branch to provide you with estimates of total
13 enemy strength?
14 . '1. No, sir, I don't recall that •
15 Q. Did the estimates branch at MACV J-2 produce
16 esti mates of total enemy strength while you were serving as
17 MACV J-2?
18 .... I didn't catch all of those words. Would yo u
19 please repeat it?
20 Q. Certainly, sir. Did the estimates branch at
MACV produce estimates of total enemy strength during the
time t~at you were the chief intelligence officer or J-2
officer of :-IACV?
A. They used the total estimate of enemy strena t h
in the production of what we referred to as the estimate of
SOUTHER N DISTR ICT REPORTER S. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK N Y - i91-I020
McChristian - direct 9015
1 the enemy situation, which is the apex of all of your
2 intelligence activities. All of your reports, all of your
3 studies, go to your estimators . Your estimators have
4 access to all types of intelligence, whatever it may be,
5 and then they, taking into consideration the objective of
6 the estimate, come up with their estimative procedures.
7 If you wish, I could go into that estimate
8 objectives to clarify it, if you wish.
9 Q. Why don't you do so, briefly, sir.
10 A. The estimate starts out with a statement of the
11 commander's mission . This is very important. The
12 statement of the commander's mission.
13 Then the next part of the estimate lists those
14 enemy forces who have a capability to adversely affect the
15 accomplishment of the commander's mission. And I would
16 like to repeat that. It lists those enemy forces that have
17 a capability to adversely affect the accomplishment of the
JP :vmmander's mission .
19 Now, the intelligence officer is not only
responsible for the enemy, but he is responsible to report
on the weather and the terrain and the enemy. So the
estimate will also include things on those two, but I won't
get into it. The y aren't as germane.
Then he goes on, after those forces, and
discusses the various categories of those forces as to what
SOUTHER N DISTR ICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK . N.Y. - ~9 ! - I010
McChristian - direct 9016
1 are the capabilities of those forces and trying to
2 translate those capabilities into the enemy can attack this
3 position with a strength of two divisions within a matter
4 of 24 ~ours or tr ying to get specific with what
5 capabilities do they have or this force can do that or the
6 other.
7 And then it ends up with sa ying based upon all
8 of these, the most probable course of action that the enemy
9 is going to take is such and such, trying to ascertain --
10 now, maybe you are fortunate enough to have captured his
11 plans and you can say his plans are to do this and this and
12 he does have the capabi 1 i ty to do it or he doesn' t, and you
13 also highlight t h e weaknesses of the enemy that you might
14 be able to exploit.
15 Q. During the time that you were J-2 at MACV who
16 produced estimates of total enemy strength?
17 A. This was under Colonel Hawkins, and he recei ved
18 the input from the Combined Intelligence Center Vietnam,
19 and he also obtained from the current intelligence and
20 indications center the highly classified information that
was not available at CICV and was able to use that either
through some f~rm of sanitizing that information or by a
supplementar y report that would go in under a different
classification.
Q. Some issue has been raised in this trial as to
SOUTHERN DISTRICT RE PORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQU ARE. NEW VO RK . N.Y. _ 191.1020
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1 whether or not the MAC V enemy order of battle summary was
2 an "historical document."
3 At the time that you were MACV J-2 did you
4 consider the order of battle summary an historical document?
5 A. No, sir, I did not .
6 Q. Was the MACV order of battle summary a document
7 during the time that you were there that was updated on a
8 monthly basis?
9 A. Not only was it updated on a monthl y basis, it
10 was published on a monthly basis, it was updated by cable
11 daily if information warranted, and it was updated weekl y
12 by cable to put together everything that had happened
13 during the week, so that the people could keep their
14 monthly summary up to date without waiting for the next
15 hard copy to get around to them .
16 Q. And did Colonel Hawkins have the overall
17 responsibility for this?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You mentioned, General McChristian, in
connection with the Honolulu conference, the enemy's
self-defense and secret self - defense forces. While yo u
were MACV J-2 did you review intelligence information
regarding those forces?
A. Ye s, sir .
Q. And was it part of your duties as MACV J-2 to
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COU RTHOUS E
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1 review that intelligence information relating to the
2 self-defense and secret self-defense forces?
3 A. Yes, sir.
4 Q. Did you form an opinion based on your experience
5 as MACV J-2 as to whether or not the enemy's self-defense
6 and secret self-defense forces belonged in the order of
7 battle?
8 A. Yes, sir.
9 Q. What was that opinion?
10 A. It was my strong conviction from the beginning
11 that they were definitely a force who could and who did
12 adversely affect the accomplishment of the commander's
13 mission and should be in the order of battle .
14 Q. Did that view ever change while you were in MACV?
15 A. It only became more convincing to me as more
16 intelligence became available and as it became apparent
n that we now had the resources and the organization and
18 everything in place to be able to collect much more
19 information as each month went by.
Q. Why did you believe that self-defense and secret
self-defense forces should be in t he enemy order of battle?
A. The self-defense and secret self-defense forces
were subordinate to the local political leadership i n the
village or the hamlet. They were organized into three-man
cells, and no one should e v er overlook the great
SOUTHERN DISTRICT REPORTE RS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. N EW YORK . N.Y. - 791 . 1020
McChristian - direct 9019
1 disciplinary and psychological influence t~at a three-man
2 cell exercises over its members and it as a member of an
3 organization as far as a Communist structure is concerned.
4 It is throughout the Communist world.
5 They were organized into those three-man cells.
6 They had missions assigned to them that had to do with the
7 defense of their hamlet and village. That's where they
B stayed to carry out their missions.
9 Their missions also involved the interface
10 between the political Communist structure that was in
11 charge, t~at commanded everything, and the social parallel
12 front, the national front for the liberation of South
13 Vietnam, and both of these units, the political structure
14 and the parallel administrative structure of the liberation
15 front, existed from the national level all the way down
16 through the hamlet and down in the hamlet and the village,
17 which from the point of view of the enemy, t~at was their
18 real battleground, and the self-defense and secret
19 self-defense were an interface between the political
struggle of the enemy and the violence strug~ le of the
enemy.
They supported the activities. Maybe we use the
word propaganda. That was one of their missions,
propaganda. Harassment. Harassment can be something very
simple. If one man with a rifle in the evening-ti~e fires
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FOLEY SQUARE. NEW YORK . N.Y. - 191.1020
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1 five or six rounds into a village the village chief has got
2 a dilemma. ~Ihat does he do? Is he expecting an attack?
3 Is he going to ask for some help? Does he ignore it? I,hat
4 happens? This is five rounds, not very expensive, not very
5 difficult. But that type of harassment could go on and
6 these people were very competent of that.
7 In the defense of their hamlets and villages
8 they constructed rUdimentary fortifications, they implanted
9 punji sticKs, mines, booby traps. We know for a fact these
10 were creating casualties among our forces, they were
11 inhibiting the movement of our forces through those
12 villages and hamlets .
13 But of greater concern to the ene~y, and from
14 their point of view, their object, their overall object in
15 the war was, number one, to extend their control over the
16 South Vietnamese people, number two, to reduce the control
17 of the government of Vietnam over these people, number
three was to to bolster the will of the South Vietnamese
people to support their cause and to persevere in a
protracted conflict, and number four was to undermine the
will of the American people to continue such a war. Those
were the announced objectives that the enemy was after.
So down in the hamlet and in t he village the
self-defense -- they weren't trained for offensive military
action. That wasn't their job . Their job was to carr y out
SOUTHER N DISTRICT REPORTERS. U.S. COURTHOUSE
FOLEY SQUARE. N EW YORK. NY. - 791·1 020
McChristian - direct 9021
1 these roles, these missions, down within the hamlets and
2 villages, and also they were looked upon as a training base
3 and a mobilization base to upgrade the local and the main
4 Vietcong forces.
5 So I was -- we knew that they were located
6 throughout the country, we knew that they were adversely
7 affecting our pacification program, we knew t hat it was our
8 job to provide an atmosphere of security, an environment of
9 security, in which the citizens and the legal government of
10 South Vietnam could operate without the harassment of the
11 enemy, and these self- defense and secret self-defense
12 forces had a capability , and one of the big objectives I
13 had was to improve our ability to give better information
14 on the capability of these forces . We knew that they were
15 there, we knew that they were adversely affecting it, but
let's get more information on them.
Q. During the period that y ou were in Vietnam did
the extent of your intelligence on the self-defense and
secret self-defense forces improve?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. By the time that you left Vietnam in June of
1967 did you ~now more about t he strength and composition
of the self-defense and secret self-defense forces than you
had known in 19667
A. Yes, sir.
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FOLEY SQUARE . NEW YORK . N.Y. - 191· 10 20
•