1
XX
ELENACAGNOLIFIECCONI
ARISTOTLEONTHEAFFECTIVEPOWERSOFCOLOURANDPICTURES
Penultimatedraftpleasecitefrompublishedversion
ABSTRACTAristotlersquosworksonnaturalscienceshowthathewasawareoftheaffectivepowersofcolourAtDean421a13forexamplehewritesthathard-eyedanimalscanonlydiscriminatebetweenfrighteningand non-frightening colours In the Nicomachean Ethics furthermore colours are the source ofpleasuresanddelightThesepleasuresunlikethepleasuresoftouchandtasteneithercorruptusnormakeuswiserAristotlersquosviewsontheaffectivepowersofcoloursraiseaquestionaboutthelimitsheseemstoplaceon theaffectivepowersofpicturesatDean427b15-24wherehe implies thatpicturesdonot affect us immediately In thispaper I examine the contrast betweenthe affectivepowersofcolourandtheaffectivepowersofpicturesIarguethatcolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaininthemselvesandgenerateemotionsincidentallySimilarlypicturescanpleaseusoraffectusinthemselvesandincidentallyInlightofthisaccountIsuggestthatonaplausiblereadingofDean427b15-24theaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsarenotimmediatebecausetheyrequire an intervening cause inorder tobe effectiveThe representationsofpicturesandstatuesaffectuseitherwiththemediationofdeceptionorwiththemediationofinterpretation
1Introduction
Between 1966 and 1970 Barnett Newman produced four abstract paintings entitled
WhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueThepaintingsgaverisetostrongemotionalreactionsin
thosewhofirstsawtheminstillingangerratherthanfearforthemostpartbecausethey
broketheconventionsofwhatcouldcountaslsquoartrsquoWhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueIIIis
impressiveinsizemeasuring224by544cmItfeaturesastripofblueontheleftsideofthe
canvasandastripofyellowonitsrightsideTherestofthepaintingisuniformlyredThe
intensereactionspromptedbyviewingthispaintingreachedtheirzenithwhenitwasthe
objectofaknifeattackin1986aneventthatledtoaninfamouslyunsatisfactoryrestoration
2
thatforsomequalifiedasasecondattack1WhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueIIIIIIandIV
arenotfigurativeyettheymovethosewholookattheminpartbecausetheychallengetheir
assumptionsandbeliefsaboutcolourandartInthispapermyfocusisonAristotlersquosviews
ontheaffectivepowersofcolours innatureand inart I arguethatAristotledevelopeda
sophisticatedaccountof theaffectivepowersofcolourHeobviouslydidnotenvisagethe
possibilityofcolourinartmovingandangeringthespectatorsinthewayNewmanrsquosworks
didHoweverhediscussedthewayinwhichcoloursinnaturecanbeaffectiveinthemselves
andincidentallyInadditionhediscussedtheaffectivepowersofcoloursinartefactsinaway
thatsuggestsaninterestingdifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcoloursinthemselves
andasconstitutiveofamimeticrepresentation
InhisethicalworksAristotlearguesthatwecanbepleasedbycolourperceptionAtDe
an421a8-15hesuggeststhatcertainanimalsmayonlydiscriminatedifferencesincolours
onthebasisofwhetherornotthesecoloursgiverisetofearInthispaperIstartfromthese
passages in order to reconstruct the relationship between colours and affections like
pleasureandtheemotionsIarguethatforAristotleseeingaspecificcolourcanpleaseus
both in itself and incidentally ie because the vision gives rise to a pleasant memory
perceptionorthoughtHencewecanrejoiceinthevisionofashadeofredinitselforbecause
itremindsusofabeautifulsunset Inadditionacertaincolourcangiverise toemotions
incidentallyashadeofvioletcanbefear-inducingbecauseweassociateitwithafearsome
stormysea
InthesecondsectionIarguethatthisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursinnature
raises somequestions forAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof colours invisual art
Aristotleimpliesthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately(Dean427a22-24)whichcanbe
takentosuggestthatwhilecolouraffectsusinnatureitisnotaffectiveaspartofapictorial
orsculpturalrepresentationThisviewishoweverimplausibleifcolourscanbeaffectivein
themselves then pictures should be affective simply because of their colouration
Furthermore pictures seem to affect us incidentally These theses are defended in the
Aristoteliancorpusforexampleinthediscussionofthelinkbetweenpleasureandpictures
atPoet1448b5-19InlightofthisandothertextsinthePoeticsIarguethatforAristotlea
1TheincidentisnarratedwonderfullybyMARS(2019)
3
picturecanmoveus incidentallybecause itremindsusofsomethingorsomeonethatwe
missApicturecanalsoaffectusinitselfforexamplebecauseofitscolouration
InthethirdsectionIarguethatAristotlersquosthesisthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately
may still be coherent with the account I reconstruct His view might be that the
representational content of a picture moves us through the mediation of deception the
mediation of interpretation or the mediation of association On this view we are not
immediatelyaffectedbyascarydepictionofacentaurbecauseinordertobefearfulofitwe
needtobedeceivedbyittolookatitinlightofitsculturalcontextortoassociateitwith
somethingwefindscary
Mystudyoftheaffectivepowersofcolourscanhelpustointerprettheaffectivepowersof
picturesinDeanimaAristotlersquosviewonthesemattersisnotfullyspelledoutbutitcanbe
madecoherentinawaythatsuggestsdifferentnuancesinthelinkbetweencolourvisionthe
visualartsandtheemotionsOnmyinterpretationAristotledoesnotquestiontheaffective
powerofrepresentationalcontentofpicturesbuthetakesittobemediatedbytheobserverrsquos
psychologicalcondition
IfthisiscorrectforAristotlethereisadifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcolours
in nature and art compared to the affective powers of pictures as mimetic objects This
differenceisamatterofimmediacyunderstoodastheabsenceofinterveningcausesColours
can affect us immediately both in nature and as part of artistic representations Thus
picturesaffectusimmediatelybecauseoftheircolouringorexecutionAsmimeticobjects
however pictures affect us through the mediation of interpretation deception or
associationAtfirstsighttheimmediateaffectivepowersofcoloursmayseemsurprisingas
a counterpart to themediated affective powers ofmimetic pictorial representationsWe
normallyassume thatemotions requireasophisticated intentional contentwhich ismost
effectivelyandimmediatelyconveyedbyrepresentationalormimeticartwepityOedipus
because a play represents his cursed fate However as the case of music shows
representations are not necessary to transmit pleasure pain or other affections Music
especiallyifitisnotaccompaniedbywordscaninspirefearwithoutrepresentingsomething
as fearsome Hence by bringing together Aristotlersquos remarks on the affective powers of
coloursvisualartandmusicwecanreconstructamorenuancedviewOnthisviewthecase
ofsimplecoloursandcolouredpicturesisparalleltothecaseofsimplesoundsandcomplex
4
melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex
melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational
contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby
virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation
orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry
2AffectiveColours
AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in
relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe
pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing
ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2
Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle
thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe
sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis
notanintemperateperson
FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither
please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with
somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle
explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and
soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe
liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-
23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise
notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth
2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind
5
Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing
andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy
beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe
sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and
pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto
whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat
we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-
440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe
seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe
samelines(Sens440b18-23)4
These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour
discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour
cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that
involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud
1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This
recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake
pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective
inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they
follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic
1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5
Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe
thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention
anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens
436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe
sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese
sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe
especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-
preservation
4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)
6
TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours
cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength
InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe
contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof
smell
ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6
Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan
inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings
savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar
to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them
discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot
The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These
animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink
betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings
either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-
fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn
the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive
greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen
6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24
7
andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind
fearfullikeapredator8
Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on
colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally
iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese
remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that
humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe
candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings
thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and
avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception
ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise
anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus
todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit
remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe
irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects
likeflowers
Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof
certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However
Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan
findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso
capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of
perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from
seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its
8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
2
thatforsomequalifiedasasecondattack1WhorsquosAfraidofRedYellowandBlueIIIIIIandIV
arenotfigurativeyettheymovethosewholookattheminpartbecausetheychallengetheir
assumptionsandbeliefsaboutcolourandartInthispapermyfocusisonAristotlersquosviews
ontheaffectivepowersofcolours innatureand inart I arguethatAristotledevelopeda
sophisticatedaccountof theaffectivepowersofcolourHeobviouslydidnotenvisagethe
possibilityofcolourinartmovingandangeringthespectatorsinthewayNewmanrsquosworks
didHoweverhediscussedthewayinwhichcoloursinnaturecanbeaffectiveinthemselves
andincidentallyInadditionhediscussedtheaffectivepowersofcoloursinartefactsinaway
thatsuggestsaninterestingdifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcoloursinthemselves
andasconstitutiveofamimeticrepresentation
InhisethicalworksAristotlearguesthatwecanbepleasedbycolourperceptionAtDe
an421a8-15hesuggeststhatcertainanimalsmayonlydiscriminatedifferencesincolours
onthebasisofwhetherornotthesecoloursgiverisetofearInthispaperIstartfromthese
passages in order to reconstruct the relationship between colours and affections like
pleasureandtheemotionsIarguethatforAristotleseeingaspecificcolourcanpleaseus
both in itself and incidentally ie because the vision gives rise to a pleasant memory
perceptionorthoughtHencewecanrejoiceinthevisionofashadeofredinitselforbecause
itremindsusofabeautifulsunset Inadditionacertaincolourcangiverise toemotions
incidentallyashadeofvioletcanbefear-inducingbecauseweassociateitwithafearsome
stormysea
InthesecondsectionIarguethatthisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursinnature
raises somequestions forAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof colours invisual art
Aristotleimpliesthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately(Dean427a22-24)whichcanbe
takentosuggestthatwhilecolouraffectsusinnatureitisnotaffectiveaspartofapictorial
orsculpturalrepresentationThisviewishoweverimplausibleifcolourscanbeaffectivein
themselves then pictures should be affective simply because of their colouration
Furthermore pictures seem to affect us incidentally These theses are defended in the
Aristoteliancorpusforexampleinthediscussionofthelinkbetweenpleasureandpictures
atPoet1448b5-19InlightofthisandothertextsinthePoeticsIarguethatforAristotlea
1TheincidentisnarratedwonderfullybyMARS(2019)
3
picturecanmoveus incidentallybecause itremindsusofsomethingorsomeonethatwe
missApicturecanalsoaffectusinitselfforexamplebecauseofitscolouration
InthethirdsectionIarguethatAristotlersquosthesisthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately
may still be coherent with the account I reconstruct His view might be that the
representational content of a picture moves us through the mediation of deception the
mediation of interpretation or the mediation of association On this view we are not
immediatelyaffectedbyascarydepictionofacentaurbecauseinordertobefearfulofitwe
needtobedeceivedbyittolookatitinlightofitsculturalcontextortoassociateitwith
somethingwefindscary
Mystudyoftheaffectivepowersofcolourscanhelpustointerprettheaffectivepowersof
picturesinDeanimaAristotlersquosviewonthesemattersisnotfullyspelledoutbutitcanbe
madecoherentinawaythatsuggestsdifferentnuancesinthelinkbetweencolourvisionthe
visualartsandtheemotionsOnmyinterpretationAristotledoesnotquestiontheaffective
powerofrepresentationalcontentofpicturesbuthetakesittobemediatedbytheobserverrsquos
psychologicalcondition
IfthisiscorrectforAristotlethereisadifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcolours
in nature and art compared to the affective powers of pictures as mimetic objects This
differenceisamatterofimmediacyunderstoodastheabsenceofinterveningcausesColours
can affect us immediately both in nature and as part of artistic representations Thus
picturesaffectusimmediatelybecauseoftheircolouringorexecutionAsmimeticobjects
however pictures affect us through the mediation of interpretation deception or
associationAtfirstsighttheimmediateaffectivepowersofcoloursmayseemsurprisingas
a counterpart to themediated affective powers ofmimetic pictorial representationsWe
normallyassume thatemotions requireasophisticated intentional contentwhich ismost
effectivelyandimmediatelyconveyedbyrepresentationalormimeticartwepityOedipus
because a play represents his cursed fate However as the case of music shows
representations are not necessary to transmit pleasure pain or other affections Music
especiallyifitisnotaccompaniedbywordscaninspirefearwithoutrepresentingsomething
as fearsome Hence by bringing together Aristotlersquos remarks on the affective powers of
coloursvisualartandmusicwecanreconstructamorenuancedviewOnthisviewthecase
ofsimplecoloursandcolouredpicturesisparalleltothecaseofsimplesoundsandcomplex
4
melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex
melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational
contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby
virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation
orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry
2AffectiveColours
AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in
relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe
pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing
ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2
Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle
thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe
sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis
notanintemperateperson
FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither
please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with
somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle
explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and
soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe
liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-
23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise
notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth
2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind
5
Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing
andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy
beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe
sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and
pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto
whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat
we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-
440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe
seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe
samelines(Sens440b18-23)4
These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour
discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour
cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that
involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud
1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This
recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake
pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective
inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they
follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic
1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5
Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe
thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention
anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens
436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe
sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese
sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe
especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-
preservation
4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)
6
TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours
cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength
InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe
contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof
smell
ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6
Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan
inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings
savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar
to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them
discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot
The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These
animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink
betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings
either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-
fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn
the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive
greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen
6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24
7
andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind
fearfullikeapredator8
Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on
colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally
iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese
remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that
humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe
candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings
thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and
avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception
ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise
anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus
todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit
remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe
irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects
likeflowers
Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof
certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However
Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan
findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso
capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of
perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from
seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its
8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
3
picturecanmoveus incidentallybecause itremindsusofsomethingorsomeonethatwe
missApicturecanalsoaffectusinitselfforexamplebecauseofitscolouration
InthethirdsectionIarguethatAristotlersquosthesisthatpicturesdonotaffectusimmediately
may still be coherent with the account I reconstruct His view might be that the
representational content of a picture moves us through the mediation of deception the
mediation of interpretation or the mediation of association On this view we are not
immediatelyaffectedbyascarydepictionofacentaurbecauseinordertobefearfulofitwe
needtobedeceivedbyittolookatitinlightofitsculturalcontextortoassociateitwith
somethingwefindscary
Mystudyoftheaffectivepowersofcolourscanhelpustointerprettheaffectivepowersof
picturesinDeanimaAristotlersquosviewonthesemattersisnotfullyspelledoutbutitcanbe
madecoherentinawaythatsuggestsdifferentnuancesinthelinkbetweencolourvisionthe
visualartsandtheemotionsOnmyinterpretationAristotledoesnotquestiontheaffective
powerofrepresentationalcontentofpicturesbuthetakesittobemediatedbytheobserverrsquos
psychologicalcondition
IfthisiscorrectforAristotlethereisadifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofcolours
in nature and art compared to the affective powers of pictures as mimetic objects This
differenceisamatterofimmediacyunderstoodastheabsenceofinterveningcausesColours
can affect us immediately both in nature and as part of artistic representations Thus
picturesaffectusimmediatelybecauseoftheircolouringorexecutionAsmimeticobjects
however pictures affect us through the mediation of interpretation deception or
associationAtfirstsighttheimmediateaffectivepowersofcoloursmayseemsurprisingas
a counterpart to themediated affective powers ofmimetic pictorial representationsWe
normallyassume thatemotions requireasophisticated intentional contentwhich ismost
effectivelyandimmediatelyconveyedbyrepresentationalormimeticartwepityOedipus
because a play represents his cursed fate However as the case of music shows
representations are not necessary to transmit pleasure pain or other affections Music
especiallyifitisnotaccompaniedbywordscaninspirefearwithoutrepresentingsomething
as fearsome Hence by bringing together Aristotlersquos remarks on the affective powers of
coloursvisualartandmusicwecanreconstructamorenuancedviewOnthisviewthecase
ofsimplecoloursandcolouredpicturesisparalleltothecaseofsimplesoundsandcomplex
4
melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex
melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational
contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby
virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation
orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry
2AffectiveColours
AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in
relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe
pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing
ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2
Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle
thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe
sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis
notanintemperateperson
FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither
please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with
somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle
explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and
soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe
liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-
23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise
notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth
2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind
5
Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing
andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy
beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe
sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and
pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto
whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat
we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-
440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe
seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe
samelines(Sens440b18-23)4
These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour
discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour
cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that
involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud
1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This
recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake
pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective
inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they
follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic
1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5
Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe
thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention
anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens
436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe
sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese
sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe
especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-
preservation
4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)
6
TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours
cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength
InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe
contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof
smell
ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6
Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan
inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings
savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar
to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them
discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot
The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These
animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink
betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings
either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-
fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn
the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive
greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen
6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24
7
andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind
fearfullikeapredator8
Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on
colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally
iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese
remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that
humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe
candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings
thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and
avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception
ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise
anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus
todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit
remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe
irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects
likeflowers
Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof
certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However
Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan
findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso
capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of
perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from
seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its
8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
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GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
4
melodiesSimplesoundsandsimplecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpainwhilecomplex
melodiesandcomplexcolouredpicturescanaffectusindependentlyofanyrepresentational
contentWhentheydosotheyaffectuswithoutmediationHoweverpicturesaffectusby
virtueoftheirrepresentationalcontentonlythroughthemediationofdeceptionassociation
orinterpretationInthisrespectpicturesdifferfromothermimeticartslikepoetry
2AffectiveColours
AtEthNic1118a1-b7Aristotlediscussesthescopeof temperanceavirtuousstate in
relationtobodilypleasureandpainHearguesthattemperanceisstrictlyspeakingaboutthe
pleasuresoftouchandtasteandnotaboutthepleasuresofsightandhearing
ldquoForthosewhofindenjoymentinobjectsofsightsuchascoloursshapesapicturearecalledneither temperate nor intemperate even though itwould also seem possible to enjoy theseeitherrightlyorexcessivelyanddeficientlyThesameistrueforhearingnooneisevercalledintemperate for excessive enjoyment of songs or playacting or temperate for the rightenjoymentofthemrdquo2
Onecanenjoycoloursshapesandpicturesmorethanoneshould3HoweverforAristotle
thisisnotintemperancebutsomeotherviceperhapsakindofobsessionwithvisualartThe
sameholdsforthepleasuresofhearingSomeonewhoenjoyssongsandplaysexcessivelyis
notanintemperateperson
FromthispassagewecaninferthatcolourscanpleaseusThevisionofacolourcaneither
please us (or pain us) in itself or please us incidentally because we associate it with
somethingelseThisdistinctionemergesveryclearlyinthefollowinglineswhereAristotle
explains thathumanandnon-humananimalsenjoy theperceptionof colours smells and
soundsincidentallywhenitremindsthemoftheprospectsoffoodorsexualpleasureThe
liondoesnotdelightinthesightofwildlifebutintheprospectofeating(EthNic1118a18-
23)InacloselyrelatedpassagefromtheEudemianEthicstheseincidentalpleasuresarise
notonlybecauseofenvisagedprospectsbutalsoinvirtueofonersquoshopesandmemories(Eth
2οἱγὰρχαίροντεςτοῖςδιὰτῆςὄψεωςοἷονχρώμασικαὶσχήμασικαὶγραφῇοὔτεσώφρονεςοὔτεἀκόλαστοιλέγονταικαίτοιδόξειενἂνεἶναικαὶὡςδεῖχαίρεινκαὶτούτοιςκαὶκαθrsquoὑπερβολὴνκαὶἔλλειψινὁμοίωςδὲκαὶἐντοῖςπερὶτὴνἀκοήντοὺςγὰρὑπερβεβλημένωςχαίρονταςμέλεσινἢὑποκρίσειοὐθεὶςἀκολάστουςλέγειοὐδὲτοὺςὡςδεῖσώφροναςEthNic1118a3-9TranslationsoftheEthNicarefromIRWIN(1999)3Platorsquosloversofsoundsandsightsatcometomind
5
Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing
andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy
beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe
sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and
pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto
whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat
we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-
440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe
seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe
samelines(Sens440b18-23)4
These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour
discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour
cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that
involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud
1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This
recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake
pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective
inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they
follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic
1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5
Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe
thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention
anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens
436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe
sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese
sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe
especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-
preservation
4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)
6
TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours
cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength
InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe
contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof
smell
ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6
Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan
inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings
savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar
to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them
discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot
The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These
animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink
betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings
either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-
fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn
the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive
greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen
6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24
7
andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind
fearfullikeapredator8
Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on
colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally
iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese
remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that
humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe
candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings
thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and
avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception
ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise
anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus
todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit
remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe
irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects
likeflowers
Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof
certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However
Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan
findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso
capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of
perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from
seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its
8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
5
Eud1231a5-10)Whilebothhumanandnon-humananimalstakepleasureinvisionhearing
andsmellingincidentallyinthesepassagesAristotleexplainsthatonlyhumanscanenjoy
beautifulcoloursmelodioussoundsandthefragrantsmellofflowersinthemselvesInDe
sensu he even provides a scientific explanation of the link between specific colours and
pleasuresInthecontextofadiscussionofthelsquojuxtapositiontheoryrsquoofcolouraccordingto
whichhuesresultfromwhiteandblackjuxtaposedindifferentproportionshearguesthat
we find pleasant colours that are juxtaposed in awell-proportioned ratio (Sens 439b31-
440a6)Lateronherejects the juxtapositiontheory in favourofamixturetheorybuthe
seemstoconsiderthistheorysuitabletoexplaintheproportionsofpleasantcoloursonthe
samelines(Sens440b18-23)4
These passages invite further investigation on the relationship between colour
discriminationandpleasureFromEthNic1175a29-36weknowthatpleasuremakesour
cognitive statesmore vivid andsalient This applies to high level cognitive activities that
involvethinkingandlearningbutitseemstoextendtolowerlevelactivitiestooAtEthEud
1237a23-26 taking pleasure in something leads us to recognise it more easily This
recognitionmaybeeitherperceptualorintellectualFurthermorethefactthatwecantake
pleasureincolourseitherinthemselvesorincidentallysuggeststhatcolourvisionisaffective
inabroadersensePleasureandpainarecloselyconnectedwiththeemotions(pathecirc)they
follow or theymay accompany emotions like fear confidence envy and so on (EthNic
1105b21-23EthEud1220b12-14andMagmor1186a34-35)5
Astudyoftherelationshipbetweenthesenseofsightandself-preservationsupportsthe
thesisthatcertaincoloursmaycatchourattentionandelicitemotionsEmotionsattention
anddesiresguideananimalrsquosbehaviourinawaythatpromotesitsself-preservationAtSens
436b18-22animalswhoarecapableoflocomotionhavesighthearingandolfactionforthe
sakeoftheirself-preservationIncooperationwithdesiresandotheraffectivestatesthese
sensesenableanimalstopursuefoodandtoavoiddangerHencespecificcoloursmaybe
especiallyvividinananimalrsquosexperienceandelicitemotionsinawaythatcontributestoself-
preservation
4OnsimplecoloursbeingpleasantandbeautifulperseseePLPhlb51b35Thesenseinwhichpleasuresandpainsfollow(hepomai)theemotionsrequiresfurtherstudySeefurtherDOW(2011)LEIGHTON(1982)FORTENBAUGH(1975)
6
TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours
cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength
InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe
contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof
smell
ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6
Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan
inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings
savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar
to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them
discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot
The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These
animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink
betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings
either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-
fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn
the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive
greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen
6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24
7
andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind
fearfullikeapredator8
Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on
colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally
iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese
remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that
humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe
candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings
thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and
avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception
ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise
anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus
todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit
remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe
irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects
likeflowers
Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof
certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However
Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan
findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso
capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of
perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from
seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its
8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
6
TheroleofcolourperceptioninAristotlersquospsychologyandbiologyindicatesthatcolours
cangiverisetoemotionseveniftheaffectivepowersofcoloursarenotdiscussedatlength
InadditionAristotlementionsthelinkbetweenfearandcertaincoloursatDeanii9inthe
contextofadiscussionofthepeculiardifficultiesthatoccurintheanalysisofthesenseof
smell
ldquoMattersconcerningsmellandtheobjectofsmellarelesseasytodeterminethanthosethathavealreadybeendiscusseditisnotclearwhatsortofthingsmellisnotinthewaythatitisinthecasesofsoundandcolourThereasonforthisisthatwedonothavethissensewithprecisionbutareinferiortomanyanimalsForhumanssmellthingspoorlyanddonotperceiveanyobjectofsmellwithoutitsbeingpainfulorpleasantbecausethesensoryorganisimpreciseItisalsolikelythathard-eyedanimalsperceivecoloursinthiswayandthatdifferencesincolourarenotespeciallyclearforthemexceptingthosewhichdoanddonotinspirefearSotooisthehumanracewhenitcomestosmellsrdquo6
Analysingthesenseofsmellisdifficultbecauseinhumansitisinferiorandlessprecisethan
inotheranimalsAssuchourpoorsenseofsmelloftenleadstoaninabilitytosmellthings
savethosewithaconnectiontopleasureorpainOurconditioninrelationtosmellissimilar
to the condition of hard-eyed animals in relation to vision which only allows them
discriminatedifferencesincolouronthebasisofwhethertheyinspirefearornot
The animals Aristotle calls ldquohard-eyedrdquomay be insects crustaceans or lizards7 These
animalshaveimprecisevisionastheircapacityforcolourdiscriminationreliesonthelink
betweencertaincoloursandfearInnotingthislinkAristotlemaymeanoneoftwothings
either hard-eyed animals only categorise colours in two groups the fearful and the not-
fearfulortheyonlyrecognisedifferencesinhuewhentheseinspirefearorconfidenceOn
the first interpretation hard-eyed animals donot have away to categorise and perceive
greenandredsayasgreenandredOnthesecondtheycanperceivegreenandredasgreen
6περὶδὲὀσμῆςκαὶὀσφραντοῦἧττονεὐδιόριστόνἐστιτῶνεἰρημένωνmiddotοὐγὰρδῆλονποῖόντίἐστινἡὀσμήοὕτωςὡςὁψόφοςἢτὸχρῶμααἴτιονδrsquoὅτιτὴναἴσθησινταύτηνοὐκἔχομενἀκριβῆἀλλὰχείρωπολλῶνζῴωνmiddotφαύλωςγὰρἄνθρωποςὀσμᾶταικαὶοὐθενὸςαἰσθάνεταιτῶνὀσφραντῶνἄνευτοῦλυπηροῦἢτοῦἡδέοςὡςοὐκὄντοςἀκριβοῦςτοῦαἰσθητηρίουεὔλογονδrsquoοὕτωκαὶτὰσκληρόφθαλματῶνχρωμάτωναἰσθάνεσθαικαὶμὴδιαδήλουςαὐτοῖςεἶναιτὰςδιαφορὰςτῶνχρωμάτωνπλὴντῷφοβερῷκαὶἀφόβῳmiddotοὕτωδὲκαὶπερὶτὰςὀσμὰςτὸτῶνἀνθρώπωνγένοςDean421a8-16TransofDeanbasedonSHIELDS(2016)7 HICKS (1907) 391 suggests insects on the basis of Part an 657b29-658a10 ROSS (1961) 254 includescrustaceansandlizardsonthebasisofHistan525b15-526a11Histan537b12Partan683a27Partan691a24
7
andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind
fearfullikeapredator8
Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on
colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally
iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese
remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that
humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe
candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings
thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and
avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception
ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise
anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus
todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit
remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe
irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects
likeflowers
Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof
certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However
Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan
findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso
capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of
perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from
seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its
8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
7
andredbuttheyonlydosowhenthesehuesareassociatedwithsomethingthattheyfind
fearfullikeapredator8
Independently of which interpretation we find most persuasive Aristotlersquos views on
colourandpleasureimplythathard-eyedanimalsfindcertaincoloursfearsomeincidentally
iebecausetheyassociatethemwithpredatorsorothersourcesofdangerInadditionthese
remarks on colour perception and fear in hard-eyed animals allow us to suppose that
humanstoocanbeaffectedbycoloursbeyondtheircapacitytotakepleasureinthemWe
candiscriminateandcategorisedifferentcolourhuesandassociatethemwithfearfulthings
thus fearing the colour incidentally Although Aristotle does not discuss pursuit and
avoidanceinrelationtocolourvisionhedoesdiscussitinrelationtothevisualperception
ofmovementAtDean431b5-10seeingthemovementofabeaconwecometorecognise
anenemyapproachingandpresumablywefeelfearorangerThisassociationmayleadus
todevelopafearofcertainbeaconsSimilarlywemightdevelopafearofvioletbecauseit
remindsusofastormysea9Unlikethebeacon-phobiaaviolet-phobiaofthissortwouldbe
irrationalasvioletisoftenassociatedwithperfectlysafefoodslikeplumsorpleasantobjects
likeflowers
Thereisnoevidenceinthecorpusthatbeingslikeuscouldalsodevelopintrinsicfearsof
certain colours without the need to associate them with other fearful things However
Aristotlearguesthatwecanbeaffectedbycoloursinthemselvesatleastinsofaraswecan
findthempleasurable(EthNic1118a1-5)Otherpassagessuggest thatwemightbealso
capable of finding colours painful in themselves At De an 429b1-3 intense objects of
perception (sphodra aisthecircta) like strong (ischyra) colours and smells prevent us from
seeing and smelling In this context the strength of a colour presumably refers to its
8ContraFREELAND(1992)238n10andJOHANSEN(1996)4n5whoassumethattheremarkmustbetakentomean that hard-eyed animals can only categorise colours as fear-inducing or non-fear inducing See alsoPhiloponusrsquocommentaryinDean153871-35Thispassageseemscompatiblewiththeviewthathard-eyedanimals can categorise different colours but onlywhen they concentrate on thembecause of fearOn theprecision of the senses see further Gen an 781b1-29 where Aristotle suggests that discrimination ofperceptualdifferencesmaydependonwhethercertainmovementsreachourcentralperceptualorganietheheartPerhapshisviewisthatinhard-eyedanimalsduetothenatureoftheireyestheperceptualmovementsrelatingtodifferencesincoloursreachthecentralorganonlyinassociationwithaffectionslikefearorpleasureIdiscusstherelationshipbetweenmovementsinthesensoryorganspleasureperceptionandattentionfurtherinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(forthcoming)9ThisthesismightfindsupportintheviewthatGreekcolourterminologyistiedtoprimaryexperiencesegfecundoozinggreenvitalityseeCLARKE(2004)orobjectsegplantcolouredseeBRADLEY(2013)
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
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GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
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andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
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MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
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25
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88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
8
brillianceassuggestedbyGenan780a9-11whereanexampleofastrongblindingcolour
isthecolourofthesunSimilarlyatDean426b2-7sightisdestroyedbyexcessivelybrilliant
(lampra) anddark colours (seealsoPr 959a37-b4)Brilliant coloursaredestructiveand
lookingatthemispainfulHencethesecoloursmaybetheonesthatpainusinthemselves
and not incidentally According to themixture theory of colour in Sens 439b15-440b25
differenthues(likepurplecrimsonandsoon)arealltheresultoftwobasiccolours(white
andblack)mixedindifferentratiosOnthemostplausiblereconstructionofthisviewwhite
has to be understood as the brightest colourand black as the darkest Aristotlersquos theory
thereforemightbebasedontheobservationthatanincreaseorreductionintheproportion
levelofbrilliancegeneratesachange inhue thesun iswhitebut itappearsredwhenits
brilliance decreases because it is seen through the clouds (Sens 440a10-11) If different
levelsofbrilliancecorrespondtochangesinhueitmakessensetothinkofcertainhuesas
painfulbecausetheyarebynatureblindingandpainfultobehold10
IfthisreconstructionisrightforAristotlehumancolourperceptioncanbeaffectivein
itselforincidentallyInthefirstcasecolourscanbethesourceofpleasureandpainbyvirtue
oftheirbalancedorexcessivebrillianceInthesecondcasecolourscanbeaffectivebecause
theyareassociatedwiththingsthatwe(ortheotheranimals)findscaryorattractivelike
thestormyseaapredatororasunset11
10 Aristotlersquos mixture theory and its Empedoclean and Democritean ancestors are discussed in detail byKALDERON(2015)ch45and6IERODIAKONOU(2018)(2005)SORABJI(1972)Thereareofcourseproblemswith regarding hues as a result of different combinations of light and dark especially if one is used to amultidimensionalorderingof colours inaccordancewith theirbrightnesssaturationandhueSeeOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)AristotlersquosunidimensionalorderingstrikesusasincorrectbecauseitislimitedbutitisnotofcourseanindicationofsomesuspiciousethnolinguisticthesisabouttheallegedldquocolourblindnessrdquoorinsensitivitytohuesoftheancientsSeeBRUNO(1960)47-51andPOLLITT(2007)againsttheethnolinguisticthesisdefendedmostfamouslyinGLADSTONE(1858)488andtosomeextentinPLATNAUER(1921)SeeKALDERON(2015)133-136onhowAristotlersquosmixturetheoryisnotaresultofhisinsensitivitytohuesandcanevenbeseenasanancestorofmodernreflectancetheoriesAstudyofGreekcolourterminologyisbeyondthescopeofthispaperforanexcellentreconstructionandliteraturereviewseeBRADLEY(2009)12-30SASSI(2003)(2009)11AristotlersquosanalysisoftheaffectivepowersofcolourbringstogetherthetwomainstrandsofinterpretersofGreek(andRoman)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionseeSASSI(2015)AccordingtointeraliaBRADLEY(2009)andCLARKE (2004) colour terminologyandcolourperceptionare tobeexplainedbyvirtueof theirrelationshipwitheitherspecificobjectsorcognitivedomainsAccordingtoOSBORNE(1968)PLATNAUER(1921)andIRWIN(1974)colourterminologyandcolourperceptionareexplainedasexpressingdifferentdegreesoflightanddarkness
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
9
3AffectivePictures
IntheprevioussectionIarguedthatcoloursareaffectivetheygiverisetopleasurepain
andotheraffectionsinthemselvesandincidentallyIfthemostprimitiveobjectofvisioncan
beaffectiveinthiswayinnatureitseemsplausibleforAristotletoassumethattheyaffect
us as part ofobjects of vision in artefacts like pictures and sculptures InDe anima iii 3
however he suggests that pictures or drawings scarcely move us This idea plays an
importantroleinhisaccountofthedifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersofbeliefandthe
affectivepowersofphantasia
For Aristotle phantasiai and phantasmata are perceptual remnants or traces of past
perceptionsthatwestore inoursoulsThesetracesareat thebasisof theexplanationof
phenomenalikedreamsperceptualillusionsandmemoryHereIchoosetoleavetheterms
untranslated For the purposes of this discussion it is for themost part suitable to take
phantasiatocorrespondtoimaginationandphantasmataandphantasiaitocorrespondto
appearances12ThepointatthecentreofthisanalysisisAristotlersquosviewthatphantasiaand
pictureshavesimilaraffectivepowers
ldquoItisclearthatmerethoughtandsuppositionarenotthesameTheformeraffection[scthoughtorphantasia]isuptouswheneverwewant(itinvolvesputtingsomethingbeforeoureyesasthosewhoconsidertheirmemoriesandconstructimages)believinghoweverisnotuptousforitisnecessaryeithertosaythetruthortospeakfalselyFurthermorewheneverwebelievethatsomething is terrible or frightful we are immediately affected and the same happenswithsomething audaciousWith respect to phantasia we are like someone looking at terrible oraudaciousthingsinapicturerdquo13
12Insomn458b25ffDean429a1-2Dean429a4-5InthispaperIdonotattempttoprovideacomprehensiveaccountofAristotlersquosnotionofphantasiaOntheunityordisunityofhisaccountseeespeciallyCASTON(1996)SCHOFIELD(1992)andFREDE(1992)OntheroleofphantasiainAristotlersquosethicsseeMOSS(2012)13 ὅτι δrsquo οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ αὐτὴ [νόησις] καὶ ὑπόληψις φανερόν τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ τὸ πάθος ἐφrsquo ἡμῖν ἐστιν ὅτανβουλώμεθα (πρὸ ὀμμάτων γὰρ ἔστι τι ποιήσασθαι ὥσπερ οἱ ἐν τοῖς μνημονικοῖς τιθέμενοι καὶεἰδωλοποιοῦντες)δοξάζεινδrsquoοὐκἐφrsquoἡμῖνmiddotἀνάγκηγὰρἢψεύδεσθαιἢἀληθεύεινἔτιδὲὅτανμὲνδοξάσωμενδεινόντιἢφοβερόνεὐθὺςσυμπάσχομενὁμοίωςδὲκἂνθαρραλέονmiddotκατὰδὲτὴνφαντασίανὡσαύτωςἔχομενὥσπερἂνεἰθεώμενοιἐνγραφῇτὰδεινὰἢθαρραλέαDean427b15-24In15IretainνόησιςandIfollowthemajorityofmanuscriptswhichhaveἡαὐτὴasopposedtoαὕτηseehoweverBARBOTINJANNONE(1966)IfollowPolansky Freudenthal and Hamlyn inter alia in taking noecircsis in the first line to stand for phantasia (seePOLANSKY[2007]410HAMLYN[1968]132FREUDENTHAL[2010])cfSIMPLInDean2065andPHLPInDean49224ForasimilaruseseeDean433a9-10SHIELDS(2016)77n44obtainsthesameresultbyeitherreadingphantasiainsteadofnoecircsisorbysecludingnoecircsisSinceinthispassageAristotleiscontrastingbelief(doxaorhypolecircpsis)andphantasiaitisclearthattopathosinthesecondlineisphantasia
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
10
Believingandimaginingaredifferenttheformerisnotuptouswheneverwewantthelatter
isuptousInadditionbelievingthatsomethingisterriblefrightfuloraudaciousaffectsus
immediatelyIfinsteadofabeliefwehaveaphantasiaofsomethingfrightfulwereactina
different way which Aristotle thinks is similar to how people react when they look at
audaciousorterriblethingsinapicture
Inattemptingtoelucidatethecontrastbetweenbeliefandphantasiainthispassagesome
haveassumedthatforAristotlepicturesdonotmoveusemotionally14Thisassumptioncan
bemademorepalatablebyanobviousqualificationphantasiaiorpicturesleaveusunmoved
unlesswetakethemtobetrue15Ifforsomereasonourreasoningcapacitiesarecovered
overandwearedeceivedbyapictureoraphantasiawewillreactaccordinglySomeonewho
is fooled by a well-crafted trompe lrsquoœil of a growling predator will feel fear Similarly
someonewho takesaperceptual illusion tobe truemay react emotionally to itAristotle
describesacaseofthissortinhisaccountoftheillusionsthatarecharacteristicoffeverish
peopleat Insomn460b9-17 in thegripof fevercracksonthewallmight look like living
animalstothesickpersonIfthefeverishighitmightescapehernoticethattheanimalsare
notactuallythereandshemightmovetowardthem(kineisthaiprosauta)Surelyifwemove
towardfalseappearanceswhenwearedeceivedbythemwecanalsobeaffectedbythem
Similarlywecanbeaffectedbyapictureifwefailtodistinguishitfromreality16
Despitetheaddedqualificationthatwecanbeaffectedwhenappearancesandpictures
deceive us this account of the affective powers ofphantasia and the affective powers of
picturesislikelytostillstrikeusasunsatisfactoryevenwithinthecontextofAristotlersquosown
writingonthesetopicsLetusbeginwiththecaseofphantasiaInhispsychologicalworks
Aristotleallowsthatmerelycontemplatingfearsomethingscanaffectusevenifwedonot
takethemtobetrulyfearsomeAtDean432b29-433a1justthinkingofsomethingfearsome
canmakeourheartleapevenifourintellectdoesnoturgeustoescapeortofeelfear(De
14ThetraditiongoesbacktoThemistiusinhiscommentaryOnAristotleOntheSoul8918SeealsoHICKS(1907)498DOW(2009)164-165n69assumesthatpicturesdonotmoveusemotionallyandnoteshowthisclaimisintensionwiththePoetics15PEARSON(2014)sec7cfMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)whointroducesthenotionofrestrainttoaccountforourresponses to appearances Both authors note that this qualification does not on its own account for ouremotionalresponsestofiction16SeeegandPlinyrsquosfamousaccountofZeuxisrsquopaintedgrapeswhichweresorealisticthattheydeceivedbirds(NH3536)
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
11
motuan701b16-22Demotuan703b4-8)17Ifendorsementisnotnecessaryinthesecases
itishardtoseewhyitshouldbeinthecaseofphantasiaFurthermorewefindevidencethat
phantasiacaninduceemotionslikeangerifitisnotrationallyendorsed18Forinstancethe
desire for retaliation that is characteristic of anger can be the result of dwelling on the
phantasmaofapleasantrevengeatRh1378b1-10Itisalsoplausibletothinkthatphantasia
gives rise to emotions and desires that go againstwhatwe take to be the case such as
recalcitrantemotionsandurges(EthEud1235b25-29Dean433b5-10)Ifyouareafraidof
weaselsdespiteyourbeliefthattheyareharmlessinAristotlersquosviewyourfearislikelytobe
basedonaphantasiaoftheweaselasfearfulThisphantasiaisaffectiveyetitisnotoneyou
rationallyendorse19
OnreflectionthenAristotlemightnotbesoconvincedthatphantasiaisaffectivelyinert
unlesswerationallyendorseitsrepresentationsNordoesheseemcommittedtotheview
thatlookingatpicturesofterribleandaudaciousthingsleavesusunaffectedHementions
cases inwhichpicturesgiverise toemotionsatPoet1454b19-1455a21wherewefinda
detailedsummaryofthevariouswaysinwhichacharacterrsquosidentitycanbeunveiledina
play
17SeeBELFIORE(1985)whotakesthesereactionstobeanalogoustotheoneswehavetofictioningeneralandpicturesinparticularBelowIsuggestthatinfactforAristotleourreactionstopicturesaremorecomplexthantheseinvoluntaryphysiologicalreactions18SeefurtherMOSS(2012)69-9419InadditiontoMOSS(2012)SeealsoCOOPER(1998)417STRIKER(1996)291SIHVOLA(1996)59-60Unlikethese authors I do not take the cognitive basis of recalcitrant emotions as evidence that emotions arenecessarilybasedonphantasiaThequestionofthecognitivebasisofemotionshasreceivedmuchattentionintheliteratureHeremyaimismerelytoshowthattakingsomethingtoberationallytrueisnotnecessarytobeaffectedby itevenoutside thecontextofourengagementwith fictionThusmyviewis incompatiblewithinterpretations that take theevaluativecognitions at the basis of all humanemotions to beendorsedDOW(2009)(2014)LEIGHTON(1982)NUSSBAUM(1996)307Howevermyviewiscompatiblewiththosewhoarguethatemotionsarebasedonphantasiaandhenceneednotbetakentobetruebycognitivelywell-functioninghumansMOSS(2012)75COOPER(1998)STRIKER(1996)NIEUWENBURG(2002)PEARSON(2014)arguesthatthecognitivebasisofouremotionalstatesismixedieitincludesbothbeliefsandphantasiaiHereIarguethatphantasiacanaffectuswithoutassent(rationalornon-rational)becauseitcangiverisetorecalcitrantemotionsagainstwhatwetaketobethecaseItakeitthatthereisnoevidenceinAristotlefordifferentkindsofassentsonerationalandanothernon-rationalbutIagreethatwemightmakesenseofhisviewbyintroducingthesenotionsseeegDOW(2014)Thecentralpointofthispaperstillstandsevenifonegrantsthatphantasia isaffectiveonlywhenweassenttoiteitherrationallyornon-rationallyThiswouldstillmeanthatphantasiaaffects us with the mediation of assent just as painting affect us with the mediation of deception or ofinterpretationTheanalogywouldhoweverbelessneatbecausewhilepaintingrequireseitherdeceptionorinterpretationphantasiawouldpresumablyonly requireakindofassentThepresenceofothermediatingpsychologicalconditionswouldberelevantonlyinsofarastheygiverisetoasortofnon-rationalassent IthankPaoloCrivelliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
12
ldquo[Examplesofthisarein]TheCypriansofDicaeogenesthesightofthepicturemakesthemanburstintotearsandinthetaleofAlcinoushearingthelyreplayerandreminiscingOdysseusweepsThustheyarerecognisedrdquo20
Intheseexamplesthemaincharactersgiveawaytheirdisguisebecausetheyaremovedby
whattheyseeorhearForourpurposesitmattersthatinonecasethecharacterissomoved
bythesightofapicturethatheburstsintotears21ThissuggeststhatAristotlewasaware
thatpicturescanbeaffectiveincidentallywhentheygiverisetomovingmemoriesInthe
samewaymusicorstoriescanbemovingbecausetheyremindusofpasteventsasthelyre
playerremindsOdysseusofthefallofTroy
FurthermoresimilartothecaseofcoloursAristotlersquosdiscussionofthepleasuresthat
viewerstakeinpictorialrepresentationssuggeststhattheycanbeaffectiveinthemselves
even if they do not remind usof something else22 In thePoetics Aristotle draws on our
engagementwithpicturesinordertoexplainthesenseinwhichmimecircsiscomesnaturalto
beingslikeus23
ldquoMimeticactivityisnaturaltohumansfromchildhoodandtheydifferentiatethemselvesfromtheotheranimalsbecausetheyaremostmimetictheyfirstlearnthroughmimecircsisandtheytakepleasureinmimeticobjectsAsignofthisiswhathappensinpracticeforwetakepleasureincontemplatingthemostprecisepicturesoftheverythingswefindpainfultoseetheformsforexampleoftheworstanimalsandofcorpsesTheexplanationisthistolearnsomethingismostpleasantnotonlyforthephilosophersbutsimilarlyforeveryoneelseeventhoughtheyhavelittleaccesstoitthereasonwhytheydelightinseeingpicturesisbecauseastheycontemplatetheylearnandreasonwhateachthingisegthatthisoneisthatonesinceunlessonehappensto have seen it before it will not generate pleasure as a mimetic object but because of itsexecutioncolouringorsomeothersimilarcauserdquo24
20ὥσπερἡἐνΚυπρίοιςτοῖςΔικαιογένουςἰδὼνγὰρτὴνγραφὴνἔκλαυσενκαὶἡἐνἈλκίνουἀπολόγῳἀκούωνγὰρτοῦκιθαριστοῦκαὶμνησθεὶςἐδάκρυσενὅθενἀνεγνωρίσθησανPoet1455a1-4TransofthePoeticsareadaptedfromBywaterrsquosinBARNES(1991)21WedonotknowmuchabouttheCypriansbeyondthisreferencetotherecognitionscene22SeealsoHALLIWELL(1990)23IleavethetermandcognatesuntranslatedasaninterpretationofAristotlersquosaccountofmimecircsiswouldbeimpossibletotackleinthispaperSeefurther(andinteralia)HALLIWELL(2002)andWOODRUFF(1992)24τότεγὰρμιμεῖσθαισύμφυτοντοῖςἀνθρώποιςἐκπαίδωνἐστὶκαὶτούτῳδιαφέρουσιτῶνἄλλωνζῴωνὅτιμιμητικώτατόνἐστικαὶτὰςμαθήσειςποιεῖταιδιὰμιμήσεωςτὰςπρώταςκαὶτὸχαίρειντοῖςμιμήμασιπάνταςσημεῖονδὲτούτουτὸσυμβαῖνονἐπὶτῶνἔργωνmiddotἃγὰραὐτὰλυπηρῶςὁρῶμεντούτωντὰςεἰκόναςτὰςμάλισταἠκριβωμέναςχαίρομενθεωροῦντεςοἷονθηρίωντεμορφὰςτῶνἀτιμοτάτωνκαὶνεκρῶναἴτιονδὲκαὶτούτουὅτιμανθάνεινοὐμόνοντοῖςφιλοσόφοιςἥδιστονἀλλὰκαὶτοῖςἄλλοιςὁμοίωςἀλλrsquoἐπὶβραχὺκοινωνοῦσιναὐτοῦδιὰγὰρτοῦτοχαίρουσιτὰςεἰκόναςὁρῶντεςὅτισυμβαίνειθεωροῦνταςμανθάνεινκαὶσυλλογίζεσθαιτίἕκαστονοἷονὅτιοὗτοςἐκεῖνοςmiddotἐπεὶἐὰνμὴτύχῃπροεωρακώςοὐχᾗμίμημαποιήσειτὴνἡδονὴνἀλλὰδιὰτὴνἀπεργασίανἢτὴνχροιὰνἢδιὰτοιαύτηντινὰἄλληναἰτίανPoet1448b5-19
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
13
Humanbeingsarethemostmimeticanimalswhichisprovenamongotherthingsbythefact
thattheytakepleasureinmimecircsisInordertoexplainthenatureandworkingsofourmimetic
pleasures Aristotle chooses the example of taking pleasure in seeing a picture (eikocircn)25
Somepictures give uspleasure in themselves ormerely by virtue of their colouring and
technical execution In this caseAristotleexplains thatwedonotenjoy themasmimetic
objectsContemplationofapictureasamimeticobjectgivesrisetoaspecificpleasurethe
pleasureoflearningandreasoning26Evidenceforthisisalsothefactthatweenjoylooking
at pictures of things thatwe find disgusting or fearsome like corpses (see alsoPart an
645a8-15andRh1371b4-10)
Interpretershavestruggledtounpackthenatureofthereasoninglearningandpleasure
thatwetakeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsWecangetasenseofthedifficultiesthatthis
passageraisesbyreflectingonwhyAristotlethinksthatwecanenjoyapictureasamimetic
object only if we have seen it before Depending on the nature of this presupposed
acquaintanceweendupwithverydifferentexplanationsofthesortofpleasureandlearning
thatpicturesasmimeticobjectsaffordPerhapsAristotlesimplymeansthatweneedtobe
familiarwiththepersonorthethingthatthepicturerepresentsHenceweneedtohaveseen
CoriscustotakepleasureinaportraitofCoriscusThissuggeststhatthepleasurethatwe
takeinpicturesasmimeticobjectsissomethinglikethepleasureofrecognitionorperhaps
thepleasureofunderstandingthatthepictureisafine(orrealistic)representation27From
thisperspectivewecanexplainwhythepleasureinquestionisaccessibletoallhumansand
whywecantakepleasureinlookingatpicturesofthingswedonotfindpleasurableinreal
lifeRecognisingthesimilaritiesanddifferencesbetweenapictureandwhatitrepresentsis
something all of us can do Furthermore we can take pleasure in this recognition
independentlyofwhetherornotwefindtheobjectoftherepresentationpleasant
This interpretation however is notwell suited to explainwhyAristotle describes our
pleasant engagement with pictures as a form of learning (manthanocirc) and reasoning
25Insomecontextseikocircnmeansportrait(egMem450b21-451a15)butIfollowHALLIWELL(2002)183andGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)intakingeikonestostandforpicturesingeneralhere26ThesamedifferenceisatplayatPoet1450b1-4wherewetakedifferentpleasuresinbeautifulcolourslaidoverwithoutorderinorderlyblackandwhitepictures27SeerespectivelyTSITSIRIDIS(2005)HEATH(2009)
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
14
(syllogizomai)28Beingabletorecognisethesubjectofapaintingdoesnotseemtorequire
something as sophisticated as reasoning29 Similarly distinguishing a painting from its
subject is a trivial cognitive exercise30 Inaddition the scopeof thepleasureswe take in
contemplatingpictureswouldbeverynarrowiftheyonlystemmedfromdistinguishing(or
identifying) therepresentationswiththeiroriginalAtPoet1448b5-19Aristotlemakesa
generalpointaboutmimeticpleasuresThissuggeststhathehadinmindsomethingthatgoes
beyondportraitsofspecificpeopleorthingsPresumablyhealsoconsideredrepresentations
ofmythicalsubjectswithwhichheandhiscontemporarieswouldhavebeenveryfamiliarIf
thisisso it isunlikely thathetookthepleasurethatonetakes inviewingapicturetobe
dependent on whether they had seen its subject before because no one has genuine
perceptualencounterswithaherooragiant IfAristotle ismakingapoint thatappliesto
picturesofthiskindtoohemustmeanthatwetakepleasureinlearningfromapictureifwe
connectitwithsomepre-existentknowledgeofthemythitrepresentsincludingperhapsour
previousacquaintancewithotherrepresentationsof themythPerhaps thisalso involves
grasping ethical universals that explain the relevance of themyth ifwe see a picture of
Medeawecanadjudicatetheemotionsitexpressesandthecharacteritrepresentsonthe
basisofourviewsontheappropriategroundsforangerandtheappropriateexpressionsof
vengeanceThuswemightdrawacloseanalogybetweenthewayinwhichpoetryspeaksof
universalsatPoet1451b5-7andthepleasureoflearningfrompictures31
This dense passage from the Poetics therefore suggests that we can take pleasure in
pictures in two ways We might take pleasure in the artistic skill or colouring that
characterises them perhaps because of the brilliance of their colours or the innovative
techniquewithwhichtheywerecreatedWemightalsotakepleasureinpicturesasmimetic
objectsWhenwedosowetakepleasureinlearningfromtherepresentationalcontentof
28Afullsketchofthissortofreasoningrequiresacloseranalysisofthetermsinquestionandoftheexpressionhoutos ekeinos at Poet 1448b17 and analogous expressions at Rh 1371b9 and Rh 1410b19 See furtherGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)andHALLIWELL(2002)188-193Evenifwedonottakesyllogizomai tosignify lsquotoconstructsyllogismsrsquointhetechnicalsenseitseemsappropriatetotakethisactivitytoinvolvesomekindofreasoning29SeeHEATH(2009)contraTSITSIRIDIS(2005)30SeeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)contraHEATH(2009)31OnthiscontroversiallinkseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)HALLIWELL(2002)ch6HALLIWELL(2001)NUSSBAUM(1986)388 seems tome right in noting thatwe should allow the kind of reasoning and learning that stems fromcontemplating a picture to be wide-ranging and to include reflection on moral maxims as well as basicrecognition
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
15
the picture If the representation is simple the learning might concern the anatomical
structure of an animal that we never have the opportunity to observe closely If the
representationiscomplexthelearningmightgoasfarasinstillingorrecallingmorallessons
aboutbraveryinbattleorabouttheappropriatenessofangerandvengeance
ThecaseofpicturesissimilartothecaseofsimplecoloursinsomerespectsPicturescan
pleaseandpainus incidentallywhen they remindusofsomethingpleasantorpainfulor
becausewe learn from the things they represent They can also please us or pain us in
themselvesbecausetheydisplaybrilliantorterriblecoloursandtechniquesIfthisiscorrect
wehavegoodreasontothinkthatforAristotlepicturescanbeaffectivebeyondtheirability
togeneratepleasureAswehaveseen inourdiscussionofcolourspleasureandpainare
closely related to the emotions and the ability to generate pleasure and pain is a good
indicationofathingrsquosaffectivepowers
Thisanalysisalsoallowsustodrawanimportantdistinctionintheaffectivepowersof
pictures We are affected by the colouration and execution of a picture and also by its
representationalormimeticcontentWhenheimpliesthattheaffectivepowersofpictures
are limited at De an 427b15-24 Aristotle might only be concerned with their
representationalcontentHisviewthenneedsnotbeintensionwiththethesisthatcolours
canpleaseusandaffectuswhetherornottheyarepartofapictorialrepresentationHence
Aristotlecancoherentlymaintainthatthereisnodifferencebetweentheaffectivepowersof
coloursinnatureandcoloursaspartofanartisticrepresentationSincepicturescanplease
usbothbecauseoftheircolourationandasmimeticobjectshoweverthisclarificationleaves
uswiththechallengetoexplaintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsAfterall
Aristotlegrantsthatpicturescanaffectusasmimeticobjectsatleastincidentallywhenthey
remindusofsomethingwefindmoving(Poet1455a1-4)
4TheAffectivePowersofPicturesasMimeticObjects
Inordertoaddresstheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsitishelpfultolook
atAristotlersquosmostdetailedaccountofthewayinwhichpicturesrepresentcharacterfound
in thePolitics In this contextAristotlersquos concern is toexplain thedifferencebetween the
educationalroleofthevisualartsmdashsuchaspaintingandsculpturesmdashversusmusicHeargues
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
16
thatbothhavesomepotentialbutmusicismorepowerfulbecauseitcontainslikenessesof
character
ldquoItsohappensthatintheotherobjectsofperceptionasintheobjectsoftouchandtastethereisnolikenessofcharactersalthoughintheobjectsofvisionthereisalittle(figuresareofthiskindbutonlyalittleandnoteveryonesharesinthiskindofperceptionFurthermoretheseresultingfiguresandcoloursofcharactersarenotlikenessesofcharactersbutrathersignsandthese signsaredistinguishingmarks for the emotions in so faras even contemplating themmakesadifferencetheyoungmustnotlookattheworksofPausonbutatthoseofPolygnotusand of any other ethical painter) but in melodies themselves there are imitations ofcharactersrdquo32
In the objectsof vision there are not likenesses of characters butmere signsFiguresor
shapes(schecircmata)ofpaintingandstatuarycontainsignsofcharacterandthesesignsarethe
marks of emotions Aristotle here is emphasising the limits of paintings and sculptures
Unlikemusic theseart formscannotcontain likenessesofcharacterpresumablybecause
theydonotchangethroughtime33InthefollowinglinesAristotlegoesontoarguethatan
indicationoftheabilityofmusictocontainlikenessesofcharacteristhatitaffectsitslisteners
emotionally(Pol1340a40-b15)Howeverthisdoesnotmeanthatpaintingscannotaffectus
orrepresentcharacterAfterallinthisverypassageAristotleallowsthatpaintingscanmake
adifferenceinmoraleducationwhichiswhytheyoungshouldlookatPolygnotusrsquoworkand
notPausonrsquosAsweknowfromPoet1448a5thedifferencebetweenthesetwoartistsisthat
theformerrepresentedpeopleinafavourablelightmakingthembetterthantheytendtobe
whilethelatterrepresentedhissubjectsasworsethanpeoplenormallyareHencethesigns
ofcharacter inapaintingallowustorecognisemoralexemplarsandtheiroppositesNot
manysourcesintheAristoteliancorpusofferclarificationonthedifficultpointthatfigures
32συμβέβηκεδὲτῶναἰσθητῶνἐνμὲντοῖςἄλλοιςμηδὲνὑπάρχεινὁμοίωματοῖςἤθεσινοἷονἐντοῖςἁπτοῖςκαὶτοῖςγευστοῖςἀλλrsquoἐντοῖςὁρατοῖςἠρέμα(σχήματαγὰρἔστιτοιαῦταἀλλrsquoἐπὶμικρόνκαὶltοὐgtπάντεςτῆςτοιαύτης αἰσθήσεως κοινωνοῦσινmiddot ἔτι δὲ οὐκ ἔστι ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ σημεῖα μᾶλλον τὰγιγνόμενασχήματακαὶχρώματατῶνἠθῶνκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινmiddotοὐμὴνἀλλrsquoὅσονδιαφέρεικαὶπερὶτὴντούτωνθεωρίανδεῖμὴτὰΠαύσωνοςθεωρεῖντοὺςνέουςἀλλὰτὰΠολυγνώτουκἂνεἴτιςἄλλοςτῶνγραφέωνἢτῶνἀγαλματοποιῶνἐστινἠθικός)ἐνδὲτοῖςμέλεσιναὐτοῖςἔστιμιμήματατῶνἠθῶνPol1340a23-39TransofthePoliticsarebasedonKRAUT(1997)ThetextandcontentofthispassagearedifficulttointerpretIfollowOCTandaccepttheconjecturalinsertionofοὐbeforeπάντεςat1340a31contraJOWETT(1885) Another possible emendation is σχήματα γὰρ ἔστι τοιαῦτα καὶ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰσθήσεωςκοινωνοῦσιν ἀλλrsquo ἐπὶ μικρόν see SUSEMIHLHICKS (1895) 593 A similar reading can be obtainedwithouttransposingseeGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)183n32Formypurposesitdoesnotmatterwhichreadingoneadopts33IdefendthispointatlengthinCAGNOLIFIECCONI(2016)whereIarguethatmusicisnotrepresentationalbutcontainsthesameorderinvarietythatcharacterdispositionsandactionsdisplay
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
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GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
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PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
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MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
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AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
17
andcoloursaresignsofcharactersordistinguishingmarksfortheemotions34Hisviewmight
bethatapaintingrsquoscolouringandshapescangiveusanindicationoftheemotionsfeltbythe
subjectsrepresentedTheseemotionsinturnareasignoftheircharactertraits
Inabsenceof furtherevidenceonewaytounderstandthisviewbetter takesus to the
workofotherauthorswhodescribeethicalandemotionalpaintingsandsculptures35For
exampleinMemorabilia310XenophondescribesaconversationbetweenSocratesandthe
painterParrhasiusinwhichtheydiscusswhetheritispossibletodepictmoralcharacters
(ethecirc)inpaintingSocratesconvincesParrhasiusthatispossibletopainteyesandgazesso
astorepresentattitudeslikemalevolenceandbenevolenceSimilarlypaintedfacesmotions
and states can represent character traits like prudence (to phronimon) or insolence (to
hybristikon)InthesubsequentinteractionbetweenSocratesandasculptorCleitonSocrates
persuadeshisinterlocutorthatitispossibletorepresentemotionalstatesinsculptureFor
examplethismaybeachievedbyimitatingthethreateningeyesofafighterorthetriumphant
lookofthevictorOnersquosfaceeyesandposturecanindicateonersquosemotionsandcharacter
whichiswhyemotionsandcharactercanberepresentedinsculptureandpaintingThisview
finds an echo in the pseudo Aristotelian Phgn 812a12-b12 where a pale yellowish
complexionandwhiteeyesindicatefearandcowardicewhilebraveryandaggressionare
signalledbybright(charypos)eyes
Similaraccountsofthedepictionofemotionsandcharactercanbefoundinlatersources
IntheZeuxisLucianappreciateshowZeuxiscommunicatesthefathercentaurrsquosbrutishness
andsavagenessevenifhedepictshimaslaughing(Zeuxis5-6)Aelianaboutacenturylater
describesapaintingbyTheonwhichdepictsasoldierwithafierce(gorgon)lookinhiseyes
Thesoldierissaidtoappearbloodthirstyandreadytokillhispostureshowingthathehas
nointentiontospareanyone(Variahistoria244)36
Ifpaintingscanrepresentcharacterandemotioninthiswayitisplausibletothinkthat
theycanalsogenerateemotionswithintheirviewersWhilethesesourcesdonottellusmuch
34ThisexpressiontranslatesἐπίσημαἐντοῖςπάθεσινtakingtheepisecircmatobedistinguishingmarksfortheemotionsAnotheroptionistheemendationκαὶταῦτrsquoἐστὶνἐπὶτοῦσώματοςἐντοῖςπάθεσινseeegREEVE(2017)whotakesthepassagetomeanthatcoloursandshapesaresignsofabodyaffectedbyemotions35ThisanalysisisindebtedtoGONZAacuteLEZ(2019)36 For emotions depicted inwar andbattle themedpaintings seealso PLUTDe glor Ath 346e-347a BothpassagesaredescribedinSHEPPARD(2015)
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
18
about the emotional reactions of the spectators we can speculate that these expressive
paintingsmighthavebeenaffectiveifaidedbythecontextualassumptionsorbackgroundof
theviewerLucianseemsabletoappreciateTheCentaurFamilyanditsdepictionofasavage
centaurbecausehehassomebackgroundknowledgeofthecontrastsbetweencentaursand
humansThisbackgroundwouldallowhimtofeelfearoraweincontemplatingthecentaur
AeliantellsusthatwhenTheonrsquossoldierwasfirstunveiledTheonarrangedforatrumpeter
toplaythecalltoattackItishardtoseehowthesoundmighthavefooledtheaudienceinto
thinkingthatthesoldierwasrealgiventhatthepictureisstaticPresumablytheterrifying
soundwasmeanttoenhancetheterrifyingeffectofthepaintingbyevokingthecontextofan
upcomingbattle
Thisanalysisofhowpaintingscancontainsignsofcharacterandemotionsifitisright
suggeststhatpaintingscanalsomaketheirviewersfeelemotionalHowevertheydosoby
relyingoneitherbackgroundassumptionsoronthe interpretiveeffortof theviewerThe
viewerhastocontextualisethepaintingofthesoldierwithanapproachingviolentbattleto
beaffectedbyitSimilarlytheviewermusthavesomeknowledgeofthenatureofcentaurs
tobeaffectedby their frighteningdepiction Invirtueof thisbackgroundknowledge the
vividnessofapaintingcanbeveryeffectiveinmovingitsspectators37
Inthisviewpaintingsandsculpturesdifferintheiraffectivepowersfromotherartforms
likemusicandtragicpoetrywhichcanaffectusevenifwelackanyinterpretivebackground
assumptionsorknowledgeMusicinparticularforAristotleisimmediatelyaffectiveeven
whenitisnotaccompaniedbywords(Pol1340a40-b151340a10-15seeFord[2004]on
thisdifficultpassage)Tragicpoetryinturncangiverisetopityandfearwithoutrequiring
interpretiveeffortfromthespectator38Atragedycanmoveusbecauseofthespectaclebut
accordingtoAristotlethebestwayforittogiverisetopityandfearisbyvirtueofitscomplex
plotTheplotonitsownissufficienttomoveusprovenbythefactthatmerelyreadinga
tragedycanmakeusfeelpityandfear(Poet1450b18-191453b1-7)Thewayinwhichthe
37Thispointbringstomindlateraccountsofhowaninterpretiveactivity(intellegere)bringsouttheemotionalimpactofapictureseeegPLINNH3598andKEULS(1978)103-10538IdonotmeantosuggestherethatinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthecatharticpowersoftragedyRatherinterpretationisnotnecessaryforthemerearousalofemotionsIthankTomMackenzieandMariaMichelaSassiforpushingmetoclarifythispoint
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
19
plot secures theseeffects ismultiform ithastobeplausible (Poet 1452a12-13) itmust
representtherightkindofchangeoffortunes(Poet1452b33-1453a10)itcanenhanceits
emotional impact in virtue of the correct effects including the discovery of a characterrsquos
identitythatleadstoareversalofhisorhersorts(Poet1452a22-b9)
Thustheaffectivepowersofpicturesandsculpturesarenotasimmediateasotherart
formsInlightofthissuggestionwecanmakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkinDeanimawhich
servedasourstartingpointwhenwebelievethatsomethingisterribleorfrightfulweare
immediatelyaffected(euthyssumpaschomen)butthesamedoesnothappenwhenwehave
aphantasiaorwhenwelookatsomethingterribleoraudaciousinapicture(Dean427b15-
24)InthispassageAristotleisnotnecessarilyclaimingthatwearenotaffectedbypictures
or phantasiai He writes more specifically that phantasia and pictures do not affect us
immediately(euthys)Theadverbeuthysinthiscontextdoesnothavetoindicatetemporal
orspatialproximityInsteaditcanindicatetheabsenceofotherinterveningcauses39These
interveningcausesthatenablepicturestoaffectusmdashaccordingtotheadmittedlyspeculative
explanationIproposedmdashgobeyonddeceptionandincludetheviewerrsquosinterpretiveactivity
andherbackgroundknowledgeInadditiontheyincludetheassociationbetweenwhatthe
picturesrepresentandotherthingstheviewermightfindscaryormoving(Poet1455a1-4)
Theinterpretationcanalsobesupportedbytheanalogybetweenpicturesandphantasia
A phantasia like a picture can be affective even when it is not endorsed However its
affectivepowersareoftenmediatedbyamorecompleterangeofmentalactivitiesorstates
IntheRhetoricwefindanumberofcasesinwhichphantasiagivesrisetoemotionswhen
accompaniedbyothermentalstateslikehopesbeliefsordesiresTakeforexamplefear
definedasldquoapainordisturbancearisingfromthephantasiaofadestructiveorpainfulfuture
evilrdquo(Rh1382a21-22)ThephantasiaofafutureevilthatgivesrisetofearAristotleexplains
isaccompaniedbyotherphantasiaitheevilmustappearclose(Rh1382a25)Furthermore
the people who feel fear must be in a certain condition (diakeimenoi) which Aristotle
39SeeBONITZ(1870)296onthisuseofeuthyswhichoccursalsoatEthNic1140b17Ph235b3Ph248b19MyviewissimilartotheonedefendedbyMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)20-25whotakestheeuthystoindicateaceteris paribus generalization and concludes that beliefs are generally or for themost part affectivewhilephantasiaiarenotInmyinterpretationphantasiaisaffectivethroughthemediationofaninterveningcausebeliefisaffectivewithoutHoweverunlikeMcCready-FloraIdonotthinkthatthisconsiderationallowsustogeneralisethatphantasiafailstoaffectusinmostcircumstancesorinnormalcircumstances
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
20
describesfromRh1382b26onwardsThisconditionmayincludedifferentsetsofmemories
andexperiencesforexamplepeoplewhoareaffectedbyaphantasiaofanincumbentevil
arethosewhohavenotbeenveryfortunateforfortunatepeopletendtothinknoevilislikely
tohappentothemThustheytendnottofeelfear(Rh1382b25-1383a13)
Similarlyconfidence(tharsos)whichistheoppositeoffearisldquosothathopeofsafetyis
accompaniedbythephantasiaofitasbeingclosewhilefrighteningthingsareabsentorfar
offrdquo(Rh1383a16-19)InthiscasetooAristotlegoesontodescribetheconditionofconfident
individualsastypicalofthosewhohaveovercomemanydangersornodangersatallforboth
inexperienceandexperiencecanhelpustobefearlessinthefaceofdangers
Another case to consider is pity ldquoa pain taken in an apparent (phainomenocirci) evil
destructiveorpainfulbefallingonewhodoesnotdeserve itwhichonemightanticipate
oneselforsomeoneclosetoonesufferingandthiswheneveritappears(phainecirctai)nearrdquo(Rh
1385b13-16)Howevernoteveryoneisintheconditiontobeaffectedbytheseappearances
orphantasmataofevilsbefallingonthosewhodonotdeserveitForexampleinsolentpeople
orpeoplepronetopanicdonotfeelpitybecausetheyaretoofocusedonthemselvestocare
abouttheothers(Rh1385b30-1386a4)
ThecasesoffearconfidenceandpityarenotisolatedIntheRhetoricAristotledoesnot
only describe the appearances that give rise to our emotions but also the background
conditions such as other mental states typical of those who are prone to feeling these
emotionsThissuggeststhatalthoughphantasiacanbeaffectivewhenitisnotendorsedits
affective powers are often mediated by onersquos wider psychological condition Some
interpreterstakethesemediatingconditionstosuggestthatAristotleisnotusingphantasia
asatechnicaltermforappearanceintheRhetoricbutasanequivalentofbelief40However
thisinterpretationclasheswithAristotlersquosowndiscussionofphantasiaasthekindofmental
phenomenonthatweexperienceindreamsandthatiscloselyrelatedtoperceptioninRh
1378b1-10andRh1370a28-3541
40SeeDOW(2009)whodefendsadifferentviewinhisDOW(2014)41SeeMOSS(2012)78MyviewherediffersfromMossrsquoandfromDOW(2014)inthatItakethefurthermentalstatesthatgiverisetotheemotionsnottobeendorsementsoftheaffectivephantasmatabutaccompanyingbackgroundconditionslikegeneraldispositionsfurtherphantasmataorbeliefs
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
Workscited
BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
21
The suggestion thatphantasia does not cause fully fledged emotions immediately but
whenitismediatedbyotherpsychologicalstatescanalsofindsupportintheNicomachean
Ethics InEthNic76Aristotlearguesthatakrasiawithrespect tospirit (thymos) is less
shamefulthanakrasiawithrespecttoappetite(epithymia)Ourbehaviourislessshameful
whenweactagainstourdecisiontorestrainourangerthanwhenwereachoutforathird
pieceofcakehavingdecidedthattwowereenoughThisisbecausespiritfollowsreasonin
awaywhileourappetitedoesnotSpiritislikeaservantwhodoesnotheartheinstruction
ofthemasterinfullorlikeadogwhobarksatthepersonatthedoorwithouthavingchecked
whetherornotitisafriend
ldquoIn the same way since spirit is naturally hot and hasty it hears but does not hear theinstructionandrushesofftoexactapenaltyForreasonorphantasiahasshownthatwearebeingslightedorwantonlyinsultedandspiritasthoughithadinferredthatitisrighttofightthissortofthingisirritatedatonceAppetitehoweveronlyneedsreasonorperceptiontosaythatthisispleasantanditrushesoffforgratificationrdquo42
Spiritinthispassageseemstobeclosertoanemotionalreactionlikeangerthantoamere
desireIfthisisrightunlikeanappetitivedesireanemotionlikeangercanariseonthebasis
ofamereappearanceorisolatedthoughtbutitneedsfurthermediationinordertoflourish
as a fully-fledged emotion Aristotle argues here that spirit engages in a quasi-inference
(hocircspersyllogisamenos)whichinadditiontotheinitialthoughtorphantasiasupportsitin
boilingup43Whenspirithasmediatedtheinitialinputofreasonorphantasiaitisirritated
atonce(euthys)Inthiscontexttheadverbeuthysdoesnotindicatetheabsenceofmediation
buttemporalvicinityThispassagethereforesuggeststhatphantasiaandsometimeseven
reasontendsnottocausecomplexemotionsinisolationItcausesemotionsasapartofa
morecomplexpsychologicalconditionthatcaninvolvereasoningorquasi-reasoning
Atthispointonemightbepersuadedthatphantasiaisnotimmediatelyaffectivebecause
it often requires other background conditions in order to generate an emotion such as
further appearances beliefs or dispositionsHowever onemightwonderwhy phantasia
42οὕτωςὁθυμὸςδιὰθερμότητακαὶταχυτῆτατῆςφύσεωςἀκούσαςμένοὐκἐπίταγμαδἀκούσαςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴντιμωρίανὁμὲνγὰρλόγοςἢἡφαντασίαὅτιὕβριςἢὀλιγωρίαἐδήλωσενὃδὥσπερσυλλογισάμενοςὅτιδεῖτῷτοιούτῳπολεμεῖνχαλεπαίνειδὴεὐθύςmiddotἡδἐπιθυμίαἐὰνμόνονεἴπῃὅτιἡδὺὁλόγοςἢἡαἴσθησιςὁρμᾷπρὸςτὴνἀπόλαυσινEthNic1149a30-b143 The nature of this quasi-reasoning is debated seePEARSON (2011)Whatmatters formypurposes herehoweverisjustthatheresomethingmorethananisolatedphantasiaisneededforonersquosangertoboilup
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
22
differsfrombeliefinthisrespectItisconceivablethatabeliefthatsomethingisscarycould
failtoaffectusgivenotherbackgroundconditionsTheseincludeourformerexperiences
andmemoriesaboutdangerouseventsorotheremotions thatwemightbe feelingat the
same time Aristotle does not necessarily overlook these conditions inhis accountof the
affective powers of belief Rather some passages in the ethical works suggest that
intervening conditions can prevent beliefs from affecting us The brave person on some
interpretationsatleastdoesnotfeelfearinthefaceofdeatheventhoughpresumablythey
believethattheyarefacingadangeroustask44IfthisisrightinAristotlersquosviewbeliefand
phantasia seem tobe specularoppositeswithrespect to the immediacyof their affective
powersMediatingcausesenablephantasiatobeaffectivebuttheypreventbelieffrombeing
affective
Wearenow in theposition to take stockonAristotlersquosviewof theaffectivepowersof
coloursandpicturesLike colourspictures canbeaffective in themselvesor incidentally
Picturesaffectusbecauseoftheircolourationandexecutionbecauseoftheirmimeticnature
and because they lead us to recall moving memories Nonetheless for Aristotle the
representationalcontentofpicturesdoesnotaffectusimmediatelyInordertogiveriseto
anemotionasmimeticobjectspicturesrequiresomemediationWeareaffectedbythem
whenweinterpretthemwhentheydeceiveusorwhenweassociatethemwithsomething
wefindmovingThislackofimmediacyintheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjects
makesthemasuitabletermofcomparisonwithphantasiai
5Conclusion
InAristotlersquosworksonpsychologyrhetoricalpersuasionbiologyandaestheticswefind
acomplexandattimesincompletemapoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursandpicturesMy
interpretationofthesetextsaboveallowsustofillinsomelingeringgapsinthemaptoform
acoherentaccountAccordingtoAristotlecolourscangiverisetopleasureandpaineither
in themselves or incidentally In addition colours can give rise to emotions like fear
incidentallyPicturessimilarlycanaffectusincidentallyorinthemselvesInthefirstcase
44EthNic1115a53-b4seealsoMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
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BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
23
theyaffectusbecausetheyremindusofthingswefindscaryormovingorinvirtueoftheir
representationalcontentInthesecondcasepicturesaffectusbecauseoftheircoloursand
executionThesedistinctionshelpustomakesenseofAristotlersquosremarkthatpicturesdonot
affect us immediately at De an 427b15-24 In this passage Aristotle is not necessarily
contradictinghisaccountoftheaffectivepowersofcoloursbecausehemightbeconcerned
withtheaffectivepowersofpicturesasmimeticobjectsHisconsideredviewmaythusbe
thatpicturesaffectusasmimeticobjectsthroughthemediationofinterpretationdeception
or association It is in this sense therefore that pictures are similar to phantasiai An
appearance of a scary prospect does not affect us on itsownhowever vivid itmight be
Ratheritaffectsusthroughthemediationofothermentalstatesanddispositions45
Thisdifferenceinemotionalimmediacybetweenpicturesasmimeticobjectsandcolours
istheresultoftheattempttofillinsomegapsinAristotlersquosanalysisofcoloursandpictures
Itmaybeseenasareflectionofhiscarefulanalysisofthelinksbetweenperceptionthearts
andtheemotionsAristotlethoughtthatcolourperceptioncanbeimmediatelyaffectivejust
asnon-representationalartslikemusiccanmoveuswithoutaninterveningcausePictures
however raise a whole new set of problems when we consider their representational
contentInordertoaddresstheseproblemsonemightspeculatethatpicturesmoveusin
virtueofwhattheyrepresentonlywhenweinterpretthemwhenwearedeceivedbythem
orwhenweassociatethemwithsomethingelseInawaypicturesrequirethisfurthereffort
on our part because they are at the same time too complex and too simple to affect us
immediatelyasmusicandcolourperceptiondoWhiletheirrepresentationalnatureaddsto
their complexityunlike tragediespicturesarenot representationally complexenough to
affectuswithouttheaidofcontextandinterpretation46
45Theaffectivepowersofphantasiamightbedifferentinthecaseofnon-humananimalsthatlackreasonandbeliefSincenon-humananimalemotionsarebasedoneitherperceptionorphantasiaitisplausibletothinkthatphantasiainthiscasedoesnotrequiremediationbecauseitistheprimarysourceofaffectionsThesameviewcanbedefendedifonegrantsthatphantasiarequiresassentinordertobeaffectiveNon-humananimalsmightbethoughtofasassentingtophantasiabydefaultifonethinksthattheyarecapableofgivinganon-rationalkindofassenttotheirimpressionsseeegMCCREADY-FLORA(2013)IthankPaoloNataliforpushingmetoclarifythispoint46IamimmenselygratefultoFiachraMacGoacuteraacuteinTomMackenzieandtheparticipantstotheEntretiensfortheirveryhelpfulandinsightfulcommentsonanearlierdraft
24
Workscited
BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
24
Workscited
BARBOTINEJANNONEA(1966)AristoteDelrsquoacircme(Paris)BARNESJ(ed)(1991)CompleteWorksofAristotle(Princeton)BELFIOREE(1985)ldquoPleasureTragedyandAristotelianPsychologyrdquoCQ35349-361BONITZH(1870)IndexAristotelicus(Berlin)BRADLEYM(2009)ColourandMeaninginAncientRome(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(2013) ldquoColourasSynaestheticExperience inAntiquityrdquo inMBRADLEYKBUTLER(eds)
SynaesthesiaandtheAncientSenses(London)127-141BRUNOV(1960)FormandColorinGreekPainting(NewYork)CAGNOLIFIECCONIE(2016)ldquoHarmoniaMelosandRhytmosAristotleonMusicalEducationrdquoAncPhil
36409-424mdashmdashmdash(forthcoming)ldquoAristotleonAttentionrdquoAGPhCASTONV(1996)ldquoWhyAristotleNeedsImaginationrdquoPhronesis4120-55CLARKEM(2004)ldquoTheSemanticsofColourintheEarlyGreekWordHoardrdquoinLCLELANDKSTEARS
GDAVIES(eds)MediterraneanWorld(Oxford)131-139COOPERJM(1998)ldquoAnAristotelianTheoryoftheEmotionsrdquoinJMCOOPER(ed)ReasonandEmotion
EssaysonAncientMoralPsychologyandEthicalTheory(Princeton)406-427DOWJ(2009)ldquoFeelingFantastic-EmotionsandAppearancesinAristotlerdquoOSAPh37143-175mdashmdashmdash(2011)ldquoAristotlersquosTheoryoftheEmotionsEmotionsasPleasuresandPainsrdquoinMPAKALUK
GPEARSON(eds)MoralPsychologyandHumanActioninAristotle(Oxford)47-74mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoFeelingFantasticAgain-PassionsAppearancesandBeliefsinAristotlerdquoOSAPh46
213-253FORDA(2004)ldquoCatharsisThePowerofMusicinAristotlersquosPoliticsrdquoinPMURRAYPWILSONMusic
andtheMusesTheCultureofMousikeintheClassicalAthenianCity(Oxford)309-336FORTENBAUGHWW(1975)AristotleonEmotionAContributiontoPhilosophicalPsychologyRhetoric
PoeticsPoliticsandEthics(London)FREDED(1992)ldquoTheCognitiveRoleofPhantasiainAristotlerdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERG
RORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)279-295FREELANDC(1992)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofTouchrdquoinMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY
(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeAnima(Oxford)227-248FREUDENTHALJ(2010)UumlberdenBegriffdesWortesldquoPhantasiardquobeiAristoteles(Goumlttingen)GLADSTONEW(1858)StudiesonHomerandtheHeroicAge(Oxford)GONZAacuteLEZJM(2019)ldquoTheAristotelianPsychologyofTragicMimesisrdquoPhronesis64172-245HALLIWELLS(1990)ldquoAristotelianMimesisReevaluatedrdquoJHPh28487-510mdashmdashmdash (2001) ldquoAristotelianMimesis and HumanUnderstandingrdquo in Oslash ANDERSEN J HAARBERG
MakingSenseofAristotleEssaysinPoetics(London)87-107mdashmdashmdash(2002)TheAestheticsofMimesisAncientTextsandModernProblems(Princeton)HAMLYNDW(1968)AristotlersquosDeanimaBooksIiandIiiwithCertainPassagesfromBookI(Oxford)HEATHM(2009)ldquoCognitioninAristotlersquosPoeticsrdquoMnemosyne6251-75HICKSRD(1907)AristotleDeanima(Cambridge)IERODIAKONOUK(2005)ldquoEmpedoclesonColourandColourVisionrdquoOSAPh291-37mdashmdashmdash(2018)ldquoAristotleandAlexanderofAphrodisiasonColourrdquoinBBYDEacuteNFRADOVICTheParva
NaturaliainGreekArabicandLatinAristotelianismSupplementingtheScienceoftheSoul(Cham)77-90
IRWINE(1974)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Toronto)IRWINT(21999)AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthics(Cambridge)JOHANSENT(1996)ldquoAristotleontheSenseofSmellrdquoPhronesis411-19JOWETTB(1885)ThePoliticsofAristotle(Oxford)
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
25
KALDERONME(2015)FormWithoutMatterEmpedoclesandAristotleonColorPerception(Oxford)KEULSEC(1978)PlatoandGreekPainting(Leiden)KRAUTR(1997)AristotlePoliticsBooksVIIandVIII(Oxford)LEIGHTONSR(1982)ldquoAristotleandtheEmotionsrdquoPhronesis27144-174MARS R (2019) The Many Deaths of a Painting Retrieved from
lthttps99percentinvisibleorgepisodethe-many-deaths-of-a-paintinggtMCCREADY-FLORAI(2013)ldquoAristotlersquosCognitiveScienceBeliefAffectandRationalityrdquoPhampPhenR
88394-435MOSSJ(2012)AristotleontheApparentGood(Oxford)NIEUWENBURGP (2002) ldquoEmotion and Perception in AristotlersquosRhetoricrdquoAustralasian Journal of
Philosophy8086-100NUSSBAUMMC(1986)TheFragilityofGoodnessLuckandEthicsinGreekTragedyandPhilosophy
(Cambridge)mdashmdashmdash(1996) ldquoAristotle on theEmotions andRationalPersuasionrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY (ed)
EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)303-321OSBORNEH(1968)ldquoColourConceptsoftheAncientGreeksrdquoBritishJournalofAesthetics8269-283PEARSON G (2011) ldquoNon-Rational Desire and Aristotlersquos Moral Psychologyrdquo in J MILLER (ed)
AristotlersquosNicomacheanEthicsACriticalGuide(Cambridge)144-170mdashmdashmdash(2014)ldquoAristotleandtheCognitiveComponentofEmotionsrdquoOSAPh46165-211PLATNAUERM(1921)ldquoGreekColour-PerceptionrdquoCQ15153-162POLANSKYR(2007)AristotlersquosDeanima(Cambridge)POLLITTJJ(2007)ldquoPeriChromatonWhatAncientGreekPaintersThoughtAboutColorsrdquo inMA
TIVERIOSDSTSIAFAKIS(eds)ColorinAncientGreeceTheRoleofColorinAncientGreekArtandArchitecture(700-31BC)(Thessaloniki)1-8
REEVECDC(2017)AristotlePoliticsANewTranslation(Cambridge)ROSSWD(1961)AristotleDeanimaEditedwithIntroductionandCommentary(Oxford)SASSIMM(2003)ldquoIlproblemadelladefinizioneanticadelcolorefrastoriaeantropologiardquoinMM
SASSISBETA(eds)IcolorinelmondoanticoEsperienzelinguisticheequadrisimboliciAttidellaGiornatadistudio(Siena)9-23
mdashmdashmdash (2009) ldquoEntre corps et lumiegravere Reacuteflexions antiques sur la nature de la couleurrdquo in MCARASTRO(ed)LrsquoAntiquiteacute en couleurs Cateacutegoriespratiques repreacutesentations (Grenoble)277-300
mdashmdashmdash (2015) ldquoPerceiving Coloursrdquo in P DESTREacuteE P MURRAY (eds) A Companion to AncientAesthetics(Oxford)262-274
SCHOFIELDM(1992)ldquoAristotleontheImaginationrdquo inMCRAVENNUSSBAUMAOKSENBERGRORTY(eds)EssaysonAristotlersquosDeanima(Oxford)249-277
SHEPPARDA(2015)ldquoImaginationrdquoinPDESTREacuteEPMURRAY(eds)ACompaniontoAncientAesthetics(Oxford)254-265
SHIELDSC(2016)Deanima(Oxford)SIHVOLAJ(1996)ldquoEmotionalAnimalsDoAristotelianEmotionsRequireBeliefsrdquoApeiron29105-
144SORABJIR(1972)ldquoAristotleMathematicsandColourrdquoCQ22293-308STRIKERG(1996)ldquoEmotionsinContextAristotlersquosTreatmentofthePassionsintheRhetoricandHis
MoralPsychologyrdquo inAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosRhetoric(Berkeley)286-302
SUSEMIHLFHICKSRD(1895)ThePoliticsARevisedText(London)TSITSIRIDISS(2005)ldquoMimesisandUnderstandingAnInterpretationofAristotlersquosPoetics41448B4-
19rdquoCQ55435-446WOODRUFFP(1992)ldquoAristotleonMimecircsisrdquoinAOKSENBERGRORTY(ed)EssaysonAristotlersquosPoetics
(Princeton)73-97
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
26
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
27
DISCUSSION
AGrand-CleacutementDansvotrecommunicationlesprincipaleseacutemotionslieacuteesauxcouleurs
quiressortentsontleplaisir(quelrsquoonadeacutejagraverencontreacuteavecMariaMichelaSassi)maisaussi
la peur Existe-il des exemples preacutecis de couleurs particuliegraverement effrayantes Aristote
mentionne-t-illrsquoorparmilescouleurssuscitantduplaisir
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Aristotle does not mention specific colours that one might find
fearsomeorterribleeventhoughhedoesmentioncoloursthatarepleasantinthemselves
like τὸ ἁλουργὸν καὶ τὸφοινικοῦν at Sens 440a1 Perhaps the reasonwhy he does not
mentionspecificcoloursisbecauseasthediscussionmademerealisehedoesnotthinkthat
coloursgiverisetoemotionslikefearorangerinthemselvesbutincidentallyiebecause
weassociatethemwithotherfearfulthingsInthisrespectthusthereisadifferencewith
intrinsicallypleasantcolourslikecrimsonorpurpleandcoloursananimal(humanornon-
human)maycometofearasaresultofapainfulexperiencelinkedtoit
DBWharton Inyour chapteryoudiscusseddifferent situations inwhich colorsmight
excite emotions according toAristotle including for example paintings by artistswhose
workAristotleeitherrecommendsorcondemnsasbeingappropriateorinappropriatefor
youthtoviewInsuchsituationswhatusesofcolordoimagineAristotlemighthavehadin
mind that would excite either appropriate or inappropriate emotional reactions in the
paintingrsquosviewersandwhatmightthoseemotionsbe
K Ierodiakonou How do you understand exactly the characterisation of a painter as
ἠθικός
ECagnoliFiecconiForeaseofexposition IgroupedthesequestionstogetherAtPoet
1448a5andatPol1340a23-39AristotlecontraststheworksofPolygnotustotheworksof
PausonInthePoeticshearguesthatPolygnotusdepictedsuperior(beltiones)peopleand
Pausoninferior(cheirones)peoplewhileinthePoliticshesuggeststhattheyoungshouldbe
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
28
exposedtotheworksofPolygnotusItishardtoreconstructwhetherAristotlehadinmind
aspecificuseofcolouroraspecific technique inrecommendingtheworksofPolygnotus
HoweveronemayspeculatethatPolygnotusismoreappropriateforyoungpeopleinsofar
ashedepictsgoodmoralcharactersThismightbethepoint incallinghimἠθικόςatPol
1340a35-39Ifthisisrightthecharacterizationofapainterasἠθικόςreferstothefactthat
the painter in question not only represents characters but more specifically represents
morallygoodorvirtuouscharacters
K Ierodiakonou According to your interpretation of Aristotlersquos passages colours and
soundsareimmediatelyaffectivewhereasthecoloursandsoundsofartisticworksareless
affectiveDoesAristotlefollowthePlatonictraditiononthisthusdevaluingtheimportance
ofart
ECagnoliFiecconiWhileIarguethatforAristotlepaintingisnotimmediatelyaffectivein
sofarasitismimeticIdonotmeantoimplythatitislessaffective(inthesensethatitgives
riseemotionalreactionswhicharelessintense)Ialsodonotmeantoimplythatmusicisless
affectivewhenitisaccompaniedbywordsInfactIthinkthatmusiccanalsobeimmediately
affectivewhenaccompaniedbywordsInasensethecaseofpicturesisspecialthelimiton
theiraffectivepowersisaresultofthefactthattheyarebothmimetic(unlikesimplecolours
and sounds) and static (unlikemusicwith orwithoutwords and tragedy) The question
concerningAristotlersquosrelationshipwiththePlatonictraditionisveryinterestingandalsotoo
large to be answered satisfactorily in a few lines I do not think Aristotle devalues the
importanceofartinfactunlikePlatointheRepublic10heseemstothinkthatarteveninits
currentformmaybesuitableformoraleducationPerhapsartcannottakeusallthewayto
virtuebutitcanbeastartingpointinPol8InadditionforAristotleartissuitableforother
purposeslikerecreationAnotherinterestingpointofcomparisonbetweentheAristotelian
traditionand thePlatonic tradition concerns the roleofpainting InRepublic10 it isnot
obviousthatthegreatestchargeagainstpoetryiethatitcorruptseventhebestofusalso
applies to painting Aristotle if I am right also thinks that painting is less powerful that
poetryat least inso faras itrequiresmediation inordertoaffectusThesecomparative
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
29
issuesrequireofcourseamorecarefultreatmentanditwouldbehelpfultotakeintoaccount
thereceptionoftheseideasinlaterthinkers
MMSassiYourdiscussionabout thedifferentway inwhichtragicpoetryandpainting
elicitemotionsinthespectatorsmeetsoneofthemostintriguingproblemsofbothancient
andmoderntheoryofartandliterature(fromutpicturapoesistoLessingandbeyond)and
I like your subtle argument about it However it would not seem fair tome to deny an
intellectualinvolvementandsomeinterpretiveeffortintheemotionalexperienceoftragic
theatreYourfinalclaimthatldquotragicpoetrygivesrisetopityandfearwithoutrequiringan
interpretiveeffortfromthespectatorrdquosoundstometoostrongwithrespecttothehardissue
oftheconceptofkatharsisinAristotlersquosPoeticsIwouldlikejustremindyouinmostgeneral
termsthatAristotleinthePoliticspresentsthepurificationinducedbythetragicspectacle
as integral to theeducationof theAtheniancitizen In this connexion Iwould likeyou to
clarifyifyouadmitthatinfollowingtheimitationofethecircthroughthemythosthespectator
learnssomethingabouthimherselforinotherwordsthereisacognitivecomponentin
causingtragicemotions
E Cagnoli Fiecconi Tragic emotions have a cognitive component but this cognitive
componentdoesnotalwaysrequireaninterpretiveeffortWepityOedipusevenifweare
unabletointroducefurtherexternalinterpretivepointsandevenifwedonotknowthemyth
Thishappensbecausethetragedyrsquosplotgivesusenoughinformationabouttheunhappyfate
ofOedipustogenerateemotionsBythisIdonotmeantodenythatinterpretationenhances
orsupportstragicemotionsI justmeantosaythatinterpretationisnotnecessarytogive
rise to them The topic ofkatharsis is so complex that any treatment Imay offer here is
doomedtobeunsatisfactoryandsuperficialKatharsismayindeedrequireinterpretationand
itisincorrecttoimplyasImayhavedonethattragedydoesnotrequireinterpretationfor
itscatharticfunctionHoweverevenifkatharsisisveryimportantinboththePoeticsandthe
Politicsitisnotapreconditionofthepityandfearthattragicpoetryinstilsbutitseemsto
be a subsequent elaboration (orpurificationdepending on the correct interpretation) of
theseemotionsSoperhapstheroleofkatharsisneednotbetakenintoaccountwhenwelook
atthenecessaryconditionsforthearousaloftragicemotions
30
30