XXI Bomber Command, Analysis of B-29 Losses

8/8/2019 XXI Bomber Command, Analysis of B-29 Losses

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XXI BOMBER COMMAND

ANALYSIS OF8-29 LOSSES

ClWoation c ~ e 2 1 0 0 1 ~ ~ f f e C t 1 ve 28 Nov. SaIlOD DIIlD:'l'rB 10." .

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STATISTICAL STUDY OF &-29 LQSSES

r ~ ~ , . , _ i!( ' OlI.

INrRODUCTIONThe success of aqy combat unit may best be evaluated through a cOlllparlsonof it s target destruction with the cost of achieving this destruction. Targetdestruction i s th e primarY objective, but th e selection of plan to secure th .l sobjective 1s based upon minimizing t he cos t 1n terms of men and materials. B,y8xI1!Jlining th e 105ses which this comman:i has experienced, i t i s hoped that th isstudy " i l l a t leas t clarify somo of the problE:;ms concerned, i f no t aid in their

solution.The bUlk of this study is concerned with an examination of 162 losses onbombing am mining rll1ssiol19 which th o cOll l l l l lmi had sustained up to 30 April 1945.As discussed in greater detail on th e fol lowing pagse , severll1 cOlI:lusions lIllly

be drnwn from th e s tat is t ical data tht l t has been cxamined:1. The 1050 r ~ t e per a i rborne ai rcraf t , which averaged 3% - 5% fo r N o V l ~ -beT _ February, has drOPljed t o le ss than 2'f, during March um April.2. A reduction in cembot operational losses*has been chiefly th e resul tof (a ) lower bombii' flltitude, (b) availabil i ty of 1'/1"0 as an emergency lan:Ung

field, and (c ) correction of specific malfunctions.3. A reduction in losses caused by enemy action am unknown reasons hasbeen chiefly th e resul t of (a ) less enemy a ir o p ~ o s i t i o n , (b) uti l izing a largerpercent of the c = n d ' s effort against lesD heavily deft:!ooed targets, (e ) th eavailabil i ty of 1'11'0, and (d) greater striking force over th e target .4. For daylight missions, lo s se e to enel!lY aetion am Uflknol'ln reasons haveconcentrated in th e f i rst groups over th e target . For night misslol'l8. losses

have been spr ead throughou t the force.SCOPE OF THE STUDY

This stu:l.y covers a totnl of 194 8-29 losses whieh had he ,n susta ined bythis COIllIll&nd from the s tar t of opera tions to 30 April 1945. This to ta l ls CCIIl-p ri se d o f t he followlllil

TYpe Qf Los sLost On Or As The Re,ult Qf COIlIbtt QperatiollB

BOlIlblf1i am Ifln1f1i If1ssiorlllother Type I fl ss iorl ll training am Ad.minbtrative FlightsOn The Ground Due To Eneml Agtion

No. Ale

162612

Percent of Total

. ) . ~4.!J).!J6.'-

liar han Aircraft -!T


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Thll a i rc r af t l o st on other t ype miss ions aN the followina:

Vary withpposition wil l.. Target Area. - Type an ! s tNngth of enemysiCnif1c"rce of tt.rget.2. Altitude Of Attack - This wil l affect type and accuracy of f la k . nd a-bJ.llty of anemy f ig h te r s t o a tt ac k . Thu chance fo r mechanical failure I 'Dmally

i n c r c ~ s e s with increase in bombine alt i tude.

The effect of each of these factors on ai rcraf t losses cannot be measured,bu t thrO\lih a careful examimtion of them we should be able to a...lyze with Ca: l -parativo accurncy th e t remn of th e COllII:landls loos ratos .

J. Pro" Or Night Att!ck - E n e ~ fight.or opposition is less and f la k a cc u racy t tl l' ds t o d ec re as e fo r night attacke, depending on the effect ivoness of th eenemy rOOar system.4. Time Exposed To Enemy Action - Route to an:!: from target al l well us ta r-g et a re a i t s e l f wil l influence this factor. By reducing spread between f i rs t

and lus t a i rcraf t , losses from enemy action cen be minimized.

Table I am Chart I present a s\Jlllll8ry by Co.uso o f t he a ir cr o. ft losses onbombing em l lIinlne tdssiol'lB.

5. Weather - Bad weather by interfering with f i gh t er i n te r cep ti on and flakaccuracy may Illore than offset effect of such ueather on our a irc raf t .alrcruft - Engine trouble; 1 crash landed.1 aircraft - Pilot error on crash landing.1 aircraft - L a r d l ~ gear collapsed upon Iandinc.Nar Weary aircra!t include 5 olrcraft which were returned to the U.S. durlr1i lIo.rch ud April an:! 1 loirer,,!t which h as b ee n redeslgf\ll.ted to TB-29,1.. Thedecision to return an aircraft to tho U.S. involves tho problem of whether th etime required to lIlLke the aircraft fu l ly opero.tional Ill1ght bett.er be spent onrepairing other aircraft . The Guam Ai r Depot has set. l imit of a p ~ r o x 1 m a t o l y6000 lIlfI.n-hoUI's or 45 days of repair on II. sil l i le aircraft beyoR:!. which it i s moreprcctical to return the aircraft. t.o the U.S. Although th e mabel' of a ir cr af t i n

this cateipry i s dXpected to inc reue , at t he p re sent time they MVI l constitutedonly a small percent of the Comman:!.ls toto.l losses.

. ,.'.. .he 10sles frOlll ere:lY . ' , ' ccurred in 1944 \ hen Suipan "18th e t.arget fo r enemy rdders f rom Iwo. One encDIY attack wnll part icul l l rly of,feet.1ve, that of HovaDlber 27 when 8 B-29's were los t . The other 4 a irc raf t WorulOlt on r aids o f December 7 and December 25.or the 105ses on traln1ne and administrative flights, three were the reBult: of crash landings while t he o ther three aircraft either croshed or ditched atsoa. Tho details on these aircraft are as rollo"81

None or the losses in . of th e above categories, on ground by eneDlY ac t ion, on t ra in i ng o r administrative fl ights, war-weary, or on other missions,repreflents an W'Ullually high figure consideril1i the operation of th e Comman:!. as11 "'hole. !loreover, the losses are eo few that any fur ther examlnaticm of th efigurcs 1Iould not be stat ist ical ly sound.

From an examil1!l.tion of this table, it i s evident tha t th e loss rete duringUarch an:.l April is auhatnnt ia l ly below th e Decembor - Febrl .l ll rY rato. Moreover,this tren:!. holds fo r a ll t.hree gemr a! c a te gor ie s o f loss: Kl'lOlI'n enelllY action,com"ba.t operational, an.! unknown.

CQMBAT QPEllATIOlaL LOSSES

Listoo belOit UTe th e 1Il0re specific causes fo r th o c08lbat operational lossfIBof this COJnmam:

The following i s a more detailed analysis rolating th o factors noted aboveto these loss rates. The comba.t ope ra t iona l lossee will be considered f i r s t .

The reduced 1085 r ut e f or combat operationnl reasons is the rf sul t of th efollOWing factors: (I ) Specifio remedies fo r certD.in 1IIIl1functions have beenperfected an:!. installed. (Example - Fuel t r ~ n 5 f e r system).(2) As combat crew personml have become more experienced,105see from personnel error ha.ve declined.(J ) The reduction in bombing alt i tude has pu t l es s e t ra inon i l l mochnnical aspects of B-29 operation ae well as on th e combat crew.(4) The availo.bility of Iwo Jima as an emereency landingfield hQS meant that m a ai rcraf t i l l diff icul ty, p a r t i c u l a r ~ those short offuel , no longer hnvo to ditch.

No. Of AircrAft An:!. Cause

Search

ShnkedownWeatter Str ikeIYPe Of M!ssion

1 Alc - Engine failure enroute t o t ur ge t.J Alc - Bad weather, poor navigation rusultedin exhausted fuel supply. 1 Alc - Hieh winds and exhausted fuel supply;ditched 0 nroute fre/ll turget t o b as e.1 Ale - Engine fallure enroute from target tobuse.I Alc - Crash l and ing wi th 2 enginas out .lAIc - Ercine ar d .,ing caught firo; Aircraftcrashed at sea.

I t s ~ o u l d be noted that I'Dne of the above lossus werc th e result of anomyaction. rhese l os se s cons ti tu te a small percentage of th e total airborne onthese missions. For exumplb, the six aircraft los t on w ~ a t h e r strike r n i s ~ i o n sare 1.5% of the total WSM Borties.

AIRCRAFT LOSSES ON MIssIOtThe problem of a n n l y ~ i n s aircraft losses is c o m p l i c ~ t e d by the number oCfUltors Yary1ng from mission to mission which influence thf,t vulnerability o f a lr 'croft to loss . AIlIo,. th(!se, th e fol lowi, . predaal1nate:

CaUDeI&ochanicalEnginto Failure

No. Ale20

.......2 Alc attellpttld early retour.J craahtd atbue . 8 JlC crll.ahtll1 OD t&Ice-ott or Mc:trt1T"thereo.1'ter. 1 Ale cr. .b laldld ..to no JUa.2 Ale craah.ed CID returD.


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tha t th e r at e w il l r ise oga in t o th e December - February level .'Cause Remarks LOSSES FROM EIID!Y ACTION AND UNKOO\\'N CAUSES

From th e tablb i t cnn be seen thr t loss l"ut


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Another important factor affecting th e Commandls loss rate is t he l en gt hof time that th e striking force is over enemy territory. In order to measurethis factor on dayl igh t mis si cn s, t he following tc,ble was preparcd classifyingth e losses according to th e order of th e a f r c r ~ f t over th e target .

During th is period, fighter escort was flirnished f or t hr ee missions. Thef i r s t Ulission wa.c #58 to Nakajima I ~ u s a s h i n o in which th e fighters "ere ins t rumental in keeping B-29 losses down to J aircraf t in th e face of 531 enemy a t-tacks. The second mission fo r which escort "a s prOVided "US against th e sametarget , but o nl y l ight en6D1Y opposition was ~ n c o u n t o r e d and no 8-29'8 were los t .Fighter escort was also prOVided fo r one d ay 's r ai ds against Kyushu when e n e ~opposition was very weak. On th e mission o f Apr il )0 , fighter escort was scheduled bu t rendezvous "U S no t DIflde with th e bombers. Up to 21 Iilay, poor weathe rprevented fightlOr escort from accvmpanying Ill'\}' Yay missions.

I t should be noted that another important factor affecting th e loss rateduring recent months i s t he in cr ea sin g e iz e o f t he B-29 strikll ' force. II I anattompt to isolate th e effect of larGe scale attacks on losses , a study wasllIAdeof th e comparative e f fe c ti vene ss o f enemy fighter attacks on 8-29 raids.Al l daylight missions against J a p ~ n were listed according to size of th e attackin g force. Then the mmber of cnelllY nir attacks and th e nunber of 8-29's los tor dumaged from enemy aircraft w ~ r e l is ted . I t was found that th e number ofeDeQY attacks pe r B-29 los t or damaged from enemy aircraft "a s 41 fo r small scalemissions and )8 f or l ar ge scale missions. 'i'hus th e eneay a ir force has achieved tho saoe effectivlness , in terms of n u n ~ r of B-29 a i r c r ~ f t lost and damnged, r eg ar dl es u o f t he size o f t he a tt ac ki ng f o r c ~ . However, the increasedsize o f t he a tt ac ki ng f or ce has meant a substantial decrease in B-29 alrcrcftlos t and damaged, in terms o f per cent of aircraft over th e target . The in ercaGed s i ze hasn lt reduced th e number of 105505, bu t i t has reduced th e lossrate .

The third significtlnt change in operations d \ ' r J . r ~ th e par,t tIVO :nonth:; hasbeen the reduction in bombing altitu::le. To stu::lj" t he e ff "!ct of th is c h a ~ e onth e loss ra tes , i t WilS necessury to stOOy a serios ot' attacks a t different.. a l-t i tudes bu t against the Sll.Cle Wrget at approximately th e same time. Only f'Jl'daylight a tt ac ks t o the Tokyo area is s u f f i c i ~ n t data available to 5eet theses p e c 1 f ~ c a t i ( ' n s . A SIBalal"Y of t he se attacks is prestonted. in th e follo'll':I ng tllble:

T h ~ l ' e 15 insufficient e v i ~ n C e to co6"parc th e refO.tive cost of day amn igh t a tt acks again st other Japanese tlU'ret arel1.5.

the second important factor ..Crectine 10SS5s to enemy action is the ta rgetattacked. Regardless of the time or a lti tu de of a tta ck , th e Tokyo areas hasbCtn ani s t i l l remains the costliest target area for th e Bomber Command. TheNagoya area is practically as costly 115 Tokyo f o r dayl igh t operations bu t isless expensive for night operations. This would indicate that the searchlightam anti-aircraft d e f ~ n s c s are less effective in the Nagoya t ha n th e Tokyo area'"The lOfs rate fo r both the Kooo-Qsa\ul. area an i the Kyushu area is very low ohn.Yth e COlllIlaOO has not lost an aircraft in it e raids against targets in th e KOl'l_yams. or Shizuoka areas. The aini1@: lrls51ol1ll, considered sepnTo.tely, hO-ve sustained 11 l os s rat e of 1.)3%.

PLrt of th e reduced loss rate fo r March and April, therefore, can be as cribed to t he inc reased effort on l e ss cos tly targets , Osaka, Kobe, Koriywnaall1 the Kyushu airfields. '

TOKYO DAYLIGHT RAIDSII)ssr.sAIRCRAFI' %OVER TJ.RGET ENEMY AITJ..CKS A"."TACKS OF J./" "lISSI0?i3NO. O? BOLlB!N:i PER PER pm B-29 OVER liI':'H fl'R

l I I S S I O ~ ALTITUDE MISSION TarAL MISSION OVER---.1ARGf:.1. A& T J \ @ ~ ' I ' . oQ')hT.24 November - 4 March

.,. 27000 ,) 7 71 3063 438 ' .7 34 6.3% 0moo 7 - JO April4 12000 421 10 ' 1061 26, 2., 7 1.7% 219000

Exclu::les 3 raids on which weather "a s bn.d and no el}E,my opposition IfI\C en -cowtered.1his table brines ou t the changes that have oecu..red in the condi tionsJ.::roun:l:lng t he day li gh t a tt acks on tho:! Tokyo area. AlOIl6 ;"lith th e chenge intu::le t.as come an iooreasc in the striking force am a decline in th e enemy cdfighttr opposition. Both of these factors have more than balanced th e increaslosses frOlll anti-aircraft that resulted from the lewer bombing altitude. Twoo the r f ac t or s e f fe c ti ng the lower 1055 rate were the availabil i ty of Iwo andt he p rot cc ti on o f fighter escort on two of t he f ou r mis si ons at lower nltitude.None of these factors can be isolated, bu t a ll of them contributtld to th e netresult; nEUllely, that bombing at tho:! lower c. lt i tu:le has turned ou t to be lesSc o s t l ~ than at t he higher altitude. The loss rates fo r duylight operat iOns aaainst llueoya reflect the S!ll:lC pattern. The two missions flown agsinst thisarea It less than 20,000 feet,) cllClNntered rrleq.;ely lecs enemy a ir oppo:>itionan::! sustained sma ll er losses ns at hiEher nlt i tudes.

Fran this table i t can be seen that a disproportionate shnre o f l os se s a reo c c u r r i ~ to groups f i rs t over the target . Upon examination. i t baa been !ourdt ha t t hi s is particularly t ru e o f l oz sc s frem e aircraf t . This iDdicmtesthat to ta l til:le over target has not apprcc1abl af'teet.ed 10llSes on d8.7l1cbtmiBsi orw. The f i au re s a l so in:licate the 1JIlportance of eI1Jlloy1Qi t1cbter e.oOl"twith the f i r s t fo rmations over the t araet .

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17.2220.26719924.J 14.05

14.18

9.2 7

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11.J J

,.154.12

- TABLE I -

7.2 7

7.2 77.27

J.122.08

J.41

J.41

,.68

81.09

111.504.8'

4.8'

1J2.75

173.59

2.48

1.24

2.48

124

71.69

102.41,1.20

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-TABLE !I -XXI BOMBER COMMA Ii )LQSSFS FROM EmlIX ACTION & UfI(WWN CAUSESAIRCRAFI' P E R C E W ; ~ ~ F . , liRCRAFI' OVER TH,ETli..ARJ':;1' AREANUIl8E1 aVER Sf EOY ACTION & N

AREA AND TIME I 01 TARGET E ~ -I 1 U t " " ~ ~ AIDS AREA EN!lIYAle I'OKla - (DAI) 2.26Above 25000' la 975 .1a I 41 1 2.77 1 .9211 '.&115000-25000' 2 196 .a .51 .51 1.02 .0 1.02Below 15000' 2 225 .44 .89 .89 2.22 .0 2.22

Total - Day " , .,,,t. , ,-"._ -TOKYO - (NIGHT) .a 4.00 4.0015000-25000 1 1 25 .a .a . Below 15000- 7 l22J. .25 ." .49 1.06 1.72 2.78TotalN1,ht 8 . y ' - 2 1. 1. 2.89-_-TOTAL - TOKYO 22 2645 .98 .30 .49 1.78 1.17 2 ~ _.-_ ..-NAGOYA - (DAY), Above 25000' 7 ~ W ' ~ .21 loa, I 2.48 I l.a'll ).5ao. 15000-25000' --L ~ 8 _:5 1.:0 .0 1.66 .0 1.66, , I Below 15000' -Total Dt.y 8 667 1.05 .45 .75 2 ~ 2 5 I .7511 '.00- - -_ ._- - -&OOYA-( NIGHT)Below 15000' 4 8lB .a .24 .a .24 .' 7 .61

, mAL - NACOlA 12 1485 .47 .)4 .)4 1.14 .54 1.68KOBE&OSAKA (DAY) I I 1 1 : ~ Ibove 25000' I 71 11.41 I .a .a .a 111.4115000-25000' 1 98 .a .a .a .0 .0Below 15000' a

Total - Day 2 I 1&1 I .59 I .a I ';0' f .59 I .a II .59KOBE-OSAKA (NIGHT) H + elo" 150001 .68___ ITOTAL - KOBE-OSAXA 4 757 .13 .66KORIYA!M - (DAY) I I I I .a f I f .a II .aBelow 15000' 2 15a .a .a .a-IllING I.lISSrOll5

(NIGItt) J-4-- 6 .a .a .a .aAbova 25000. 1 .0Below 15000' 6 ;ao .a 1.36 .a 1.36 .a 1.36TOTAL-LIlIUOO r . l r ~ S I O 7 226 .a 1.:33 .0 1.33 .a 1.33.--K Y U S H ~ H I K O K U (DAY) 1)17 H- .0 .15 .5) .a : 5000-25000 1 10Below 1 , 2 23 .43 .43 .a 85 .. :'l'OTAL-KYUSHU-sHlItOlU 12 1552 .39 .06 .1) .58 .a .58


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% OF AIRCRAFT, OVER TARGET5

_ ENEMY AIRCRAFTANTI - AIRCRAFT

1::3 ENEMY AlC a ANTI-A/CUNKNOWN

BELOW15,000

15,00025,000ABOVE BELOW?5,OOO 15,000, R F ' - ~ K ~

BELOWBOVE25,000

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XXI Bomber Command, Analysis of B-29 Losses

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