YONG CHING FATT - Leadership Chinese in SG

7/29/2019 YONG CHING FATT - Leadership Chinese in SG

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Department of History, National University of Singapore

Leadership and Power in the Chinese Community of Singapore during the 1930sAuthor(s): Yong Ching FattSource: Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Sep., 1977), pp. 195-209Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Department of History, National University ofSingaporeStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20070224 .

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Leadership and Power in theChinese Community of Singaporeduring the 1930s

YONG CHING FATT

The 1930s was a unique, exciting, explosive and highly politicised decade for theChinese in Singapore and Malaya due to the blossoming forth of Chinese nationalismaimed at China's national salvation in the wake of the Japanese invasion. ThisChina-oriented nationalism took various forms. There was a boycott movementagainst Japanese goods; there were public and political rallies, cultural varietyshows, and propaganda in the press and the schools, stirring up national feelings.There were campaigns for the return of skilled and professional Chinese in servingthe Kuomintang (KMT) Government at Chungking, and for relief funds and fundsfor strengthening China's war footing. Undoubtedly, the Chinese nationalism thatbegan in 1928 was amass movement, and at its height in 1938 and 1939, themovementinvolved some 300,000 Chinese in Singapore for national salvation work, or 50 percent of the total Chinese population on the island.1 It was during this politicallyvolatile decade that various socio-enonomic forces within the Chinese communitysurfaced or re-surfaced in the bid for leadership. It also saw the rise, consolidation,collaboration and rivalry of various emergent elites and counter-elites in a ratherrestricted political arena, sensitively guarded and regulated by the British authorities.It is the concern of this paper to identify the nature and composition of variouscontending elites and counter-elites, to examine their roles in the national salvationmovement and, finally, to analyse why a non-partisan elite headed by Tan Kah Kee(WKHI 1874-1961) was able to capture and maintain the leadership during theperiod under examination.From the very outset, it should be recognized that the Chinese community in thepre-War era was not a homogeneous entity. Itwas split between the Straits-born andEnglish-educated on the one hand, and on the other China-born and Chineseeducated, with the British authorities favouring the former as spokesmen for theentire Chinese community on most occasions. This is understandable as the Straitsborn, English-educated professionals were British subjects by birth, posing nolanguage barriers. They were capable of appreciating the value of both Britishinstitutions and way of life, and were willing to serve the colonial regime as Legislativeor Executive Councillors. Although they were despised by the latter group as lackinginChinese culture, thus earning themselves the rather derogatory term, the "Babas",the Straits-born and English-educated elite was often unashamedly proud to claimitself as being "the King's subject". By 1941, the Straits-born and English-educatedhad produced a long list of capable, enlightened, westernised and modernized leadersserving both the British authorities, the Chinese community and the society ofSingapore at large.2 Few within this elite saw the need to promote the concept and

movement of aMalayan nationalism vis-a-vis the Chinese nationalism. Fewer stillwithin this group were either mentally willing or ideologically capable of leading1CO 273/641, Monthly Review of Chinese Affairs (MRCA), 100 (December 1938), 24.2CF. Yong, "A Preliminary Study of Chinese Leadership in Singapore, 1900-1941",Journal of Southeast Asian History, IX, 2 (Sept. 1968), 264.

195


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196CF. Yongthe upsurging Chinese nationalist movement about which they cared little. It was acommon complaint among the Chinese language press that the majority of theStraits-born and English-educated population did not contribute any money for therelief of war victims in China.3 Thus, during this crucial decade, the leadership ofChinese nationalism either simply bypassed the Straits-born and English-educatedelite, or was consciously or unconsciously forfeited by it. With this elite outside thefield of leadership contention, it was natural and logical that the leadership shouldfall into the hands of the China-born and Chinese-educated elites and counter-elites.

Again, the China-born and Chinese-educated community was even more divisiveand fragmented along the lines of ideology, dialect, economic power and personality.There were two clandestine political parties in operation, the KMT and theMalayanCommunist Party (hereafter MCP), and six dialect groups (or pang ^ in Chinese),such as the Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew, Hainanese, Hakka and the San Chiang,with the Southern Hokkiens dominating the community economically andnumerically. There were frequent personality clashes, notably between the mostpowerful Hokkien leader, Tan Kah Kee and the wealthy Hakka leader, Aw BoonHaw (?95C?C 1882-1954). Nationalism undoubtedly had the effect of uniting thecommunity but it certainly failed to prevent personal and leadership rivalry, betweenTan Kah Kee and Aw Boon Haw, for example. WTiile the KMT and MCP wereconstantly at loggerheads among themselves since the parting of the way in 1927,the Chinese community was seemingly regulated and controlled by the SingaporeChinese Chamber of Commerce (SCCC $ftj]Ql&* #&S&), which was formed in1906 with proportionate pang representation. The SCCC was regarded as the highestbody in the community, a body dominated by reputable and wealthy merchants whowere at the same time pang leaders. Up to date, the SCCC has been an intm-pangorganisation serving the interests of commercial circles particularly and the wholeChinese community generally. During its existence from 1906 until the eve ofWorld War II, the SCCC certainly had considerable success in harmonising variouspang relationships, in promoting Chinese culture and education, in negotiating withthe British authorities on Chinese community affairs as a pressure group and infostering closer links between the Chinese community and the various Chinesegovernments during the Manchu and Republican eras. On numerous occasions,more energetic SCCC leaders initiated ? willingly or unwillingly ? fund-raisingcampaigns for the relief of flood, drought, or war victims in China. At times theSCCC even supported the nationalist cause of China's salvation against Japaneseinvasion. However, the Chamber was essentially a commercial and non-politicalbody, quite unsuited legally, structurally and, at times, ideologically, to leadingthe national salvation movement. There is little doubt that the SCCC supportedthe national salvation movement during the 1930s, by promoting the sale and useof goods manufactured in China, permitting its premises to be used for politicalrallies and entertaining the KMT emissaries and politicians from China, etc. It didnot and could not give leadership to a political movement. Thus, the field for theemergence of a political leadership was further contracted.It is understandable that the KMT would contest the leadership as it had beenattempting to do since the formation of the Tung Meng Hui (the United League)in 1906. However its attempts and ambitions were deliberately thwarted by theBritish authorities in the Straits Settlements in 1914 and inMalaya in 1925. Repressive measures against the KMT, however, did not hamper it from providingsome leadership to the national salvation movement during the 1930s. It is equallylogical that theMCP, formed in 1930, would capitalise on the resurgence of Chinesenationalism for obvious reasons, such as recruitment of new members, expansion

3Nanyang Siang Pau (NYSP), 31 Mar. 1939.


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Singapore Chinese Leadership in the 1930s 197of its cells, organisation of industrial strikes for class warfare, and preparation fora mass political movement against the British colonial regime inMalaya. While theKMT leaders remained respectable social and political elites in the Chinese com

munity, the MCP leaders became the counter-elites in the eyes of the Britishauthorities. Both the KMT and the MCP represented opposing political elites,ideologies and traditions in pre-War Malaya. In between these two elites, ideologiesand traditions, there was, however, a third elite, consisting of non-partisan nationalists led by none other than the strong leadership of Tan Kah Kee. He was clearly apang leader before 1928, but became a community and political leader during thenine-month campaign of the Shantung Relief Fund in 1928 and 1929, which resultedin some 130,000 Chinese in Singapore donating funds, a number representing about25 per cent of Singapore's total Chinese population.4 The emergence of Tan KahKee as a political force for nationalism since 1928 in some way neutralized the

potential conflicts between the KMT and the MCP and prevented either fromcapturing the leadership of the national salvation in their own right.The social composition of both the KMT and the non-partisan elite came fromthe mercantile sector of the Chinese community. Many were bankers, rubber

magnates, manufacturers and traders who had among themselves something incommon : wealth, position and social status. A great majority of these elites hadbeen at one stage or another executive members of the SCCC. Some like LimKeng Lian (#?# 1893-1968), Lim Nee Soon (WmM 1879-1936), Lee ChoonSeng($^^Pc 1888-1966)andLeeKongChian($;}fcM 1893-1967), had even beenPresident of the SCCC in the 1920s and 1930s. Many of them were proven andwell established pang or community leaders, recognized by the Chinese Governmentfor their promotion of Chinese culture and education and by the British authoritiesfor their charitable disposition and strong conviction in law and order. Among ahost of prominant KMT leaders in Singapore, Teo Eng Hock (?l^c? 1871-1958)and Lim Nee Soon played a very prominant role in the KMT politics during theearly part of the 1930s. They were followed by Lee Chin Tian ($MBk 1875-1965),Chew Hean Swee (/SjftSg 1884-1964), Hau Say Huan (ftH? 1883-1944), LeeChoon Seng, Lee Choon Eng ($:#?), Lim Keng Lian, Ang Poh Sek (^?fffi),Ong Kiat Soo (?$?), Tan Kai Kok (|ft|HIH)>and Lum Boon Tin (#? EB),etc.

Many of these were either executive or supervisory committee members of the DirectBranch of the Singapore KMT during the decade under study, or were closelyassociated with the KMT's front organisations, such as the United Chinese LibraryflsHMffRitt) founded in 1910,and theTung JinClub (f?tl??S?), formed in the1910s by leading KMT members and sympathisers from the Cantonese pang.Because the British authorities kept constant pressure on theKMT, including raidingthe KMT branches, prosecuting office-bearers, imprisonment of their leaders,deportation of more "subversive" elements and refusal to recognize the KMT as alegal political party, the KMT in Singapore was never able to organise itself properlyand function effectively. Moreover, from 1914 itwas never allowed to enlist support

openly in the Chinese community, or to initiate any political activities legally. Theovert opposition on the part of the British authorities severely restricted the growthof the KMT as a political force. As a result, KMT membership fluctuated violentlyand so did its branches. In 1914 there were some 2,000 members in Singapore alone5but by 1929 the numbers had dropped to a mere 1,270.6 While there is no official4 C. F. Yong, "The Shantung Relief Fund Committee and Tan Kah Kee", Sin Chew JitPoh (SCJP), 25Aug. 1976 (text inChinese).5 Png Poh Seng, "The Kuomintang inMalaya, 1912-1941", Journal of Southeast AsianHistory, II (Mar. 1961), 10.6NL 5937, GD/C/212, Governor, SS, to the Colonial Office, 4 Sept. 1929.


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198 CF. Yongfigure as to the membership of the KMT in the 1930s, it is estimated that itsmembership would not be larger than 2,000, bearing in mind that the aggregate of its supporters and sympathisers would certainly be considerably bigger than that number.As regards the numbers for branches and sub-branches of the KMT, the figures areincomplete. The official figure given by the British authorities for 1926 was 21sub-branches,7 while in 1929, the KMT in Singapore had 1 direct branch, 9 subbranches and 41 divisional sub-branches.8 In the 1930s, due to the hard-line policyof the government towards the KMT, the party became much more disorganised.

By 1934, theMalayan Chinese Secretariat in Singapore was able to report that "theposition of the Kuomintang was considerably weaker than it had been at any timeafter January, 1924," 9 and that "the Malayan Head Branch ceased to exist and thebranches with a few exceptions were moribund."10 Although the KMT in Singaporewas much revitalized during the later stage of the national salvation movement from1937 to 1941, the British authorities were less concerned about the KMT revival thanthe resurgence of the MCP as a potentially more "dangerous" political force withmass support.11 Nevertheless, as theKMT was favoured by the Chinese Governmentand the Party High Command as well as the Chinese Consul-General in Singaporeto lead the National salvation movement, it remained a potent political force in itsown right.As mentioned above, the non-partisan elite was largely drawn from the samesource as that of the KMT. However, there were at least two features which markedthe difference between this elite and that of the KMT. The first was that this elitehad a towering leader in Tan Kah Kee who had proved to have possessed suchleadership qualities as forceful and charitable character, organisational ability,conviction, dedication, integrity and pragmatism, unmatched by any of his contemporaries. Second, this non-partisan elite had its power base at Hokkien pang. Infact, it drew its leaders more narrowly from three influential institutional organisations, namely, the Hokkien Huay Kuan (;T#?#tl)12 with Tan Kah Kee as Chairman from 1929, theEe Ho Hean Club (f??l?f ???),13 amillionaire's social club,with Tan Kah Kee as Chairman for most of the time between 1923 and 1941, and theSingapore Rubber Dealer's Association 0&JS!?:#)14 which was controlled since1919 by his colleagues, close relatives and clansmen. From these three sourcescame some of the staunchest supporters of Tan Kah Kee, including three capableand seasoned KMT leaders, Hau Say Huan, Lee Chin Tian and Chew Hean Swee.From them too came the core of the non-partisan elite, including Yap Geok Twee(? :?*?),a bi-lingual and aman of action, Lee Kong Chian, his son-in-law, amultimillionaire, another popular bi-linguist, Tan Lark Sye (^7\i^ 1897-1972), hisclansmen, a rubber magnate and later on founder of the Nanyang University atSingapore, and Tan Boon Kak ((^5tf8), a brother of Tan Lark Sye and a rubber

magnate himself. These last three leaders had been also former employees of Tan

7NL 5949, GD/C 41, Governor, SS, to the Colonial Office, 16Feb. 1927.8NL 5937, GD/C/222, Governor, SS, to the Colonial Office, 15Sept. 1929.9 CO 273/597, MRCA, 48 (August 1934), 43.10 Ibid.1?An interview with the Rev. A. B. Jordan, the Secretary for Chinese Affairs of theChineseSecretariat, Singapore, 1934-1941, at his home atNottingham, England, on 24 April 1974.12CF. Yong, "The Hokkien Huay Kuan in Pre-War Singapore", SCJP, 21Apr. 1976(textinChinese).13CF. Yong, "The Ee Ho Hean Club and the Pre-War Chinese Community of Singapore",SCJP, 17Mar. 1976 (text inChinese).14CF.Yong, "The Pre-War Singapore Rubber Dealer's Association and the ChineseCommunity", SCJP, 7Apr. 1976 (text inChinese).


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Singapore Chinese Leadership in the 1930s 199Kah Kee, hence allowing the latter to assert amoral leadership on them in times ofneed. As the head of this elite, Tan Kah Kee, with a few exceptions, had the loyalsupport of both the KMT and non-KMT leaders from the Hokkien pang. Whileit could be said that most of the KMT leaders who supported him belonged to hisage group, the non-KMT leaders came generally from a younger generation. However, unlike both the KMT and theMCP, this elite did not have a single permanentorganisation; itwas an elite with a cause but without a party. It worked throughvarious voluntary fund-raising organisation (e.g., the Shantung Relief Fund Com

mittee,^ 3CHflg#, the Singapore China Relief Fund Committee, 1937-41, JI^H|g# and the Southseas China Relief Fund Union, 1938-1941,^^?|g*|#, etc.)which were established when occasions arose. This in itself was a blessing indisguise, as the British authorities were more willing to legitimise their claim forleadership as non-partisan leaders in the nationalist movement.Unlike the KMT and the non-partisan elites, the MCP had much more diverse

political ambitions and goals, two of them being the overthrow of British colonialisminMalaya and the destruction of capitalism through class struggle. By nature oftheir aims, strategies and revolutionary programmes, they were the counter-elites ofboth Singapore and Malaya. Founded in 1930 after some five years of experience inorganising labour, students and youths, the MCP became a pan-Malayan politicalparty, having branches inmost of the States in both Malaya and the Straits Settlements. Its industrial arm, the Malayan General Labour Union, was also organisedon a State basis. By 1935, theMCP and its affiliate, theMGLU, were able to launcha series of better co-ordinated strike actions, first at Batu Arang, Selangor, amongthe coal-miners, followed in 1936 and 1937 with more, one of which is said to haveinvolved some 30,000 labourers in pineapple canning and building industries in bothSingapore and Johore.15 It was not until September 1940, when the strategy ofstrike action was finally abandoned upon the instructions from the Chinese Communist Party to concentrate upon the patriotic anti-Japanese campaign and tocease disrupting the British war effort.16 By then the MCP and its various affiliatesand front organisations had become a formidable political force with a broad massbase promoting Chinese nationalism, sharing the leadership of the national salvationmovement and deepening their influence in the Chinese community.Who were the MCP leaders and leaders of its affiliates and front organisations

during this decade? Due to a dearth of original sources and poor documentation,it is difficult to present a more accurate picture. For fear of persecution and prosecution, many of these leaders were forced to remain as the so-called "facelessmen". There is no evidence to show that leaders of theMCP and its various frontorganisations came from the mercantile sector of the Chinese community. In fact,they were largely drawn from the proletariat (such as workers and union leaders,etc.) and petty bourgeoisie (such as clerks, teachers and journalists, etc.). Manywere China-born and hence Chinese-educated. This is largely borne out by the factthat many were deported to China under the Banishment Ordinance which permitteda non-British subject to be deported as an "undesirable" alien. In 1937, for example,20 of the Party's senior command were deported under this law.17 In 1938, at least11China-born leaders of the Communist-controlled Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy

15 M. R. Stenson, Industrial Conflict inMalaya (London 1970), pp. 14-18; and G. Z. Hanrahan, The Communist Struggle inMalaya (Kuala Lumpur 1971), pp. 52-53.16CO 273/666, File No. 50336/41, Extract from aMalaya Combined Intelligence Summary,No. 8. 1st to 31st October 1940which included policy of theMCP to the effect mentioned in thetext. 17V. Thompson and R. Adloff, The Left Wing inSoutheast Asia (New York, 1950), p. 128.Cited by G. Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 58.


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200 C. F. YongBacking-Up Society (A.E.B.U.S. ??S?ASSC^S'?') were arrested for taking partin "subversive" activities and were later deported.18 Moreover, this counter-elitewas generally young and hence more idealistic. The party secretary, Lai Teck(SS4#) was 33 years old in 1939, while the average age of the policy-making CentralExecutive Committee and Standing Committee was 26.19 Lai Teck, a Cominternagent, was born inVietnam and came to Singapore in 1935 to reorganise the MCP.He must have been a rather dynamic character for under his competent leadershipthe MCP expanded both in size and influence. He has been alleged by varioussources to have become a double agent, first for the British colonial Government,then for the Japanese regime during the Japanese occupation of Malaya.20 AnotherCommunist leader was Lam Swee (#tK), who, in 1938, was in his early twenties.Driven by the preachings of nationalism and Marxism, he became actively involvedin the work of Communist-led secret patriotic societies and trade unions.21 He wasChinese-educated. Other leaders of the MCP-led patriotic front organisations in1938 (such as the A.E.B.U.S.) were Wong Yen Chee (3ii?2/), Lain Wen Hua(tt^C^), Soo Tong Ing (??K) and Koo Chung Eng;22 all were China-born andChinese-educated young men. Soo Tong Ing was President of Singapore ChineseClerks Association while the other three leaders could not be identified as to theprofessions they held.When it comes to ascertaining the figures of MCP membership and that of MCPfront organisations, it soon becomes a guessing game. The highest figure of 100,000members of the MCP is given by V. Thompson and R. Adloff23 for the year 1939,while G. Z. Hanrahan thinks that Party membership in this period most probablynumbered not more than 5,000 at the most.24 J. H. Brimmell agrees on Hanrahan'sfigure but adds that the Party controlled a much larger mass base of Chinese sympathisers, perhaps of the order of over 100,000.25 Official estimates of the membership of various A.E.B.U.S. inMalaya in 1939 was 30,000.26 This figure tallied withthe one provided by the Governor of the Straits Settlements on 29 December 1939.27The role played by these three elites during the 1930s are as complex and absorbing as they are intriguing. While there were periods of intense rivalry andintrigue among these three elites, there were also periods of co-ordination, cooperation and collaboration for the common good. However, it is fair to say that

18CO 273/641, MRCA, 96 (August 1938), 14-20. CO 273/646, File No. 50500/38, TheGovernor, SS, toMalcolm MacDonald, Colonial Office, 5Oct. 1938.19 G.Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., pp. 58-59.20 Ibid., 75. Colonel Chuang Hui Chuan, "I and Lim Boh Seng", International Times, CI(Jan/Feb. 1969), 26 (text in Chinese). Yoji Akashi, The Nanyang Chinese National Salvation

Movement, 1937-1941 (Kansas 1970), p. 170 (35n). J.H. Brimmell, Communism in SoutheastAsia (London and New York 1959), pp. 194-195.21 M. R. Stenson, op. cit., p. 21. Cited from Lam Swee, My Accusation (Kuala Lumpur1952), p. 2.22Yoji Akashi, op. cit., p. 173 (57n). Yoji Akashi regards both Soo Tong Ing and Koo ChungEng as cadres of theChinese Liberation Vanguard Corps butMRCA, 96 (Aug. 1938) states thatthey were ringleaders of the A.E.B.U.S. The former was controlled by Hau Say Huan whilethe latter by theMCP. Akashi's information is incorrect on this point.

23 V. Thompson and R. Adloff, op. cit., p. 126.24 G. Z. Hanrahan, op. cit., p. 59.25 J.H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 148.26 M. R. Stenson, op. cit., pp. 22-23. Cited from Annual Report on the State of Crime andtheAdministration of thePolice Force, F.M.S. 1939, 20.27 CO 273/662, File No. 50336/40, Subject: Labour Unrest inMalaya, containing a confidential despatch from the Governor, SS, toMalcolm MacDonald, Colonial Office, 29 Dec.1939.


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Singapore Chinese Leadership in the 1930s 201there were rivalries within the framework of collaboration (i.e., united front between1938 and 1941), rivalries for leadership of the national salvation and for masssupport.

Dating back to 1928, theMCP, then called the Nanyang Communist Party, hadbegun in a moderate way to challenge the political leadership of Tan Kah Kee. Itformed a rival relief fund organisation called the Nanyang Shantung Fund-raisingCommittee28 to undermine and challenge Tan Kah Kee-led Shantung Relief FundCommittee. The campaign of the latter was a great success with the collection of asum of $1 34million (Straits currency) for relieving war victims in Shantung provinceresulting from amilitary clash between the Northern Expedition Armies of ChiangKai-shek and the Japanese Armies on 3 May 1928.29 Soon after the Japaneseconquest of Manchuria in 1931, the Chinese in Singapore again launched an antiJapanese boycott movement, in the form of the Union of Overseas Chinese. TheMCP followed suit by setting up its anti-Japanese organisations and

soon succeededin seizing control of the Overseas Chinese Union.30 It was a resounding victory fortheMCP in the nationalist movement of the early 1930s. Following the declarationof war between China and Japan in July 1937, the MCP set up their own front

organisations in both Singapore and Malaya, e.g., the A.E.B.U.S., etc. to challengeTan Kah Kee's leadership and Tan Kah Kee-led Singapore China Relief FundCommittee (SCRFC). Between August 1937 when the front organisation of theMCP, the Overseas Chinese A.E.B.U.S. was formed, until April 1940 when that

MCP-led front organisations, 1937-19411. theChung Hwa National Salvation Society2. theChung Hwa National Salvation Backing-up Society3. the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Mobilization Society4. Resist-the-Enemy and Exterminate the Traitors Volunteer Corps5. the Singapore Shop Assistants Resist-the-Enemy Backing-up Society6. the Overseas Chinese Youths National Salvation and Exterminate the Traitors VolunteerCorps7. the Singapore Overseas Chinese All Circles Resist-the-Enemy Backing-up Society8. Malayan Chinese Vocational Workers' Anti-Enemy Backing-up Society9. Malayan Labourers Anti-Japanese Corps10. theMalayan Chinese National Salvation Corps11. Exterminate theTraitors Corps andMobile Troops

12. the Iron and Blood Corps13. theRacial Revival Corps14. the Chinese Anti-Enemy National Salvation Traitor Removing Corps15. the Malayan Overseas Chinese Students' Anti-Enemy Backing-up Society16. Singapore Chinese Various Trades Shop Assistants Anti-Enemy Backing-up Society17. Overseas Chinese Anti-Enemy National Salvation Society18. Singapore Chinese National Salvation Service Corps19. Youth National Salvation UnionSources: Various issues ofMRCA from August 1937 toMay 1939. The last threeorganisationson this listwere founded in 1940 after the claimed destruction of various branches ofA.E.B.U.S. For this information, see CO 273/666, File No. 50336/41. Extract from

the Malaya Combined Intelligence Summary, 9 (1st November to 30th November1940).28NYSP, 28 June 1928.29 C. F. Yong, "The Shantung Relief Fund Committee and Tan Kah Kee", SCJP, 25 Aug.1976 (text inChinese).30 J. H. Brimmell, op. cit., p. 146.


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202 C. F. Yongorganisation was claimed by the colonial Government to have been destroyed,31the MCP was frantic in penetrating into schools, clubs, associations and otherforms of corporate life in the Chinese community.32 Furthermore, it set up numerousclandestine and illegal organisations to stir up national feeling, boycott Japanesegoods, exterminate traitors, recruit new members for the Party, disseminate Communist ideology and prepare the ground for an eventual mass movement againstthe British colonial regime.

Despite harsh repressive measures taken by the British authorities against theleaders of the A.E.B.U.S., the British in 1938 had to admit that it "had attained toconsiderable power throughout Malaya generally and particularly in Singapore"and that the organisation "was comparatively well organised and numericallystrong."33 It was further reported by the British that "its members are given abadge, for which they pay 50 cents, the badge worn pinned inside the trousers pocket.The badges are serially numbered, and in Johore a number higher than 3,000 hasbeen seen."34 In December 1939, the British authorities further confirmed that theA.E.B.U.S. was still "the most powerful and active" organisation in the MalayanChinese community, with a membership of some 30,000.35The organisational ability of theMCP and the growing influence of the A.E.B.U.S.within the Chinese community prompted some individual committee members of theSCRFC to form and finance a clandestine front organisation, the Chinese NationalEmancipation Vanguard (CNEV, *


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Singapore Chinese Leadership in the 1930s 203forces and actions that they took stern measures inDecember 1939 to deport HauSay Huan and other ringleaders.41 With Hau Say Huan leaving and CNEV disorganised, there ended a year of clandestine co-operation between the SCRFC and

MCP. This severed link was not to be reconnected again until the Japanese invasionof Malaya in December 1941. Ironically, it was the British on this occasion whohelped to bring about unity among the KMT, MCP and the non-partisan elites in theface of a pending Japanese invasion on the East Coast of Malaya.Prior to the co-operation between the A.E.B.U.S. and the CNEV inDecember1938 as mentioned, the challenge from the former against the leadership of TanKah Kee and SCRFC was nonetheless real. Between March and May 1938, theSCRFC repeatedly refused to yield to the pressure from the A.E.B.U.S. and otherleft-wing organisations to sponsor amateur dramatic performances in aid of theRelief Fund.42 The SCRFC's decision was based on two considerations, the first

being the overt disapproval of such activities by the Chinese Secretariat in Singapore,and the second being the fear for the dissemination of political propaganda of theA.E.B.U.S.43 Expectedly, a series of protests was lodged from these pressure groupswith no avail. A second more serious confrontation between the two camps whichtook place in July and August 1938 concerns the issue of commemoration of thefirst anniversary of August 13, a date which marked the outbreak of Sino-Japanesehostilities in Shanghai. Again, the A.E.B.U.S. and its affiliates exerted considerablepressure on the SCRFC into organising a commemoration service on that day.However, their demands were roundly denounced by Tan Kah Kee who commentedthat "bad characters were trying to create trouble on August 13 and were threateningpeople into suspending business on that day".44 Upon the failure to involve theSCRFC in organising it, they held a public rally on their own on that day with over400 people attending.45 Their success on this occasion was ephemeral, for eleven oftheir ringleaders were soon rounded up by the British authorities for deportation.The above incidents highlighted the tensions that existed between the two rivalcamps and reveal the SCRFC's conscious efforts to dissociate itself from the MCPled organisations.Unlike the MCP and its affiliates, the KMT did not have a broad mass andorganisational base. Their branches and front organisations were few and membership small. Although the KMT elite did remain pretty well intact during the1930s, itwas prevented by the British authorities from branching out on its own tolead the national salvation movement. As a result, the KMT elite was forced totake part in it as individuals. Since the 1928 Shantung Relief Fund campaign, theKMT elite in Singapore, with a few exceptions, had sided with the non-partisan elitefor national salvation work. It provided 9 representatives on a 32-member ShantungRelief Fund Committee.46 Again, of the 31 executive members of the SCRFC in1937, at least 10 could be identified as being KMT leaders.47 In both these ReliefFund organisations, they controlled such key positions as Treasury (by Lee ChinTian), Organisation (by Hau Say Huan) and Propaganda (by Chew Hean Swee),thus contributing substantially to the success of both these two movements. In fact,

41 Ibid.42 CO 273/641, MRCA, 93 (May 1938), 19-20.43 Ibid., 19.44 CO 273/641, MRCA, 96 (Aug. 1938), 24.45 Ibid.46 C. F. Yong, "The Shantung Relief Fund Committee and Tan Kah Kee", op. cit.47 PangWing Seng, "The Double-Seventh Incident, 1937: Singapore Chinese Response tothe Outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, IV, 2 (Sept. 1973),299.


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204 C. F. Yongit is not unreasonable to say that their full and loyal support for Tan Kah Kee waslargely responsible for the political supremacy of the latter. The three KMT leadersmentioned above were all Southern Hokkiens as was Tan Kah Kee; they were all hisclose friends, intimate colleagues and reliable comrades. All four worked closely asfellow members of the Ee Ho Hean Club, the Singapore Rubber Dealer's Associationand the Hokkien Huay Kuan.Another weakness of the KMT leadership in Singapore was the dissension amongits leaders along pang lines. One revealing example was the purge of Wang Chingwei and Hu Han-min by Chiang Kai-shek in 1931 in China which split the KMTleaders in Singapore. While the Teochew faction of the KMT leaders headed byTeo Eng Hock and Lim Nee Soon sided with Wang Ching-wei and Hu Han-min, theCantonese faction supported Chiang Kai-shek and his action.48 The split in 1931did, to a certain extent, mar the solidarity among the KMT leaders from various

pangs for a considerable period of time. Moreover, the KMT leadership in Singaporewas further undermined with the departure of Teo Eng Hock for China in 1933 andthe prolonged ill health and eventual death of Lim Nee Soon in 1936. The loss ofboth these capable and seasoned veterans in the 1930s must be damaging to theprospect of the KMT leading the national salvation movement.While the majority of the KMT leaders were supporters of Tan Kah Kee, thereis evidence that a few were against his leadership on the grounds that he was nonpartisan and "autocratic". Lim Keng Lian, for example, was said to have sidedwith Aw Boon Haw, Tan Kah Kee's arch-rival.49 Tan Kah Kee was vocal againstLim Keng Lian, Vice-President of the SCCC for the years 1937-1938, for being"ineffectual" and "corrupt".50 In fact, Tan Kah Kee launched a fierce campaignagainst Lim Keng Lian during the 1939 SCCC elections and succeeded in havinghis son-in-law, Lee Kong Chian, elected as the new President of the SCCC.51Two other major KMT sources of opposition to Tan Kah Kee came from somenon-Hokkien KMT leaders (such as Leong Sin Nam 9k$feM of Perak and H. S. Lee$#? of Kuala Lumpur) from Malaya and the Chinese Government as from 1940onwards. Before 1940, it should be noted that Tan Kah Kee's community andpolitical leadership in Singapore had the approval and blessings of Chiang Kai-shek,his Government and Party in China. Tan Kah Kee was appointed an HonoraryAdviser to the Overseas Affairs Committee (#t??S?l #) at Nanking since its inception in 1929 until 1936 when Tan Kah Kee tendered his resignation.52 In recognitionof his services to China in promoting education, the Chinese Government conferredupon him in 1935 the Order of the Brilliant Jade, Second Class.53 The acceptabilityand acceptance of Tan Kah Kee's leadership by the Chinese Government no doubtadded status, prestige, influence and aura to him. However, during his 9-monthtour of 14 provinces in China inMarch-December 1940, Tan Kah Kee was rapidlyout of favour with Chiang Kai-shek and the Party High Command. His outspokencriticisms of government corruption in Chungking and the KMT misgovernment in

48 NYSP, 29 and 30May 1931.49 Information obtained on 5 Feb. 1976 in Singapore from an interview with the sameChinese who would prefer to remain anonymous. According to this person, Aw Boon Hawprovided a sum of S$250,000 to Lim Keng Lian and others from the Hokkien pang for undermining Tan Kah Kee's leadership roles. Lim Keng Lian, for example, mobilised his Ann Koeypeople to oppose the setting up of a Sub-Committee of the SCRFC at Lim Chu Kang.50 Tan Kah Kee, My Autobiography, I (Singapore, 1946), 82 (text inChinese).51 Ibid.52 CO 273/572, MRCA, 11 (July 1931), 13-14.CO 273/614, MCRA, 68 (Apr. 1936), 25.53CO 273/606, MCRA, 58 (June 1935), 40.


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Singapore Chinese Leadership in the 1930s 205Fukien province brought him trouble. He met Chairman Mao Tse-tung at Yenanfor the first time and was full of praise and admiration for the Communist austerelifestyle and their will to fight against the Japanese. He was bitterly incensed with the

attempt of the Party High Command to persuade the British authorities in Singaporeto prevent him from returning to Singapore in January 1941 on the grounds that hehad become sympathetic with Communism.54 Upon his return to Singapore inJanuary 1941 a smearing campaign against him, mounted by the newly arrivedKMT emissary, Wu T'ieh-ch'eng (^?SSc), and the Chinese Consul-General, KaoLing-pai (U?2??3 ), was under way. Tan Kah Kee was accused of being a Communist.55 Suffice it to say here that, throughout 1941, the Chinese Government'scampaign against his leadership remained unabated. As regards the two MalayanKMT leaders' opposition to Tan Kah Kee, it should be seen in the context of pangrivalry rather than ideological conflict, because both Leong Sin Nam and H. S. Leewere Hakka leaders and staunch supporters of Aw Boon Haw, the Tiger-balm kingand a multi-millionaire in Singapore. Aw Boon Haw detested the political domination of the Hokkiens generally and of Tan Kah Kee particularly. It is perhapssignificant to note that all the KMT attacks on Tan Kah Kee were confined atpersonal level and at no time did they fall on the SCRFC.

Despite periodical opposition from both theKMT and theMCP to his leadership,Tan Kah Kee had remained in command of the national salvation movement. Heheaded the officially recognized SCRFC which was responsible for the raising ofrelief funds and the sale of Liberty Bonds issued by the Chinese Government. Hewas elected inOctober 1938 as Chairman of the Southseas China Relief Fund Union(SCRFU), which was responsible for co-ordinating all fund-raising campaigns inthe whole Southeast Asia. As Chairman of the SCRFU, Tan Kah Kee could nodoubt claim to be the leader of some 8 million Chinese in the region. It is indeed

unique that he has remained the only person to lay such a claim up to date. Althoughhis campaign for relief funds did meet with some setbacks with the deportation of hisright-hand man, Hau Say Huan, since December 1939, he continued to become theChairman of these two organisations till the end. In December 1941, he wasnominated by the Governor, Sir Shenton Thomas, as the head of the Chinese com

munity to assist the British with the civil defence of the island against the Japaneseinvasion. This was a final recognition of his leadership by the colonial government.Although the dedicated and forceful leadership of Tan Kah Kee was partly

responsible for the success of the SCRFC, the importance of organisation shouldnot be underestimated. Firstly, the concept of proportionate representation on theSCRFC along pang lines was adopted with 14 Hokkien members, 9 Teochew, 4Cantonese, 2 Hakka, and 1 each for the Hainanese and the San Chiang. In otherwords, the 31 member Committee was dominated by both the Hokkien and Teochewpangs. Each pang was in turn to organise its own relief fund campaigns. Thistechnique of fund-raising had proved to be effective during the Shantung Relief Fundmovement some ten years earlier because it allowed healthy competition amongvarious pang organisations. Second, although such methods of fund-raising tendedto be decentralised, they did allow more fund-raising offices or sub-committees to beset up. With more such organisations being formed in each district in the city, theChinese could not possibly escape the network of the fund-raising machinery. Thefollowing descriptions by a Japanese historian, Yoji Akashi, are accurate :

". . . the Association had an office in each district of the city. Within each officewere sub-offices set up for professional guilds, such as those of seamen, railway54 Tan Kah Kee, My Autobiography, II, 230, 320.55 Ibid., 301-303.


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206 C. F. Yongworkers, retail businessmen, and workers employed by foreign firms. These suboffices were further split into smaller units according to speech pangs (Fukinese,Cantonese, Hakka, Teochiu, and Hainanese) and other groups, such as womenand Babas (local bom Chinese)."56

Third, since the formation of the SCRFU inOctober 1938, new techniques for fundraising were experimented with great success. Hau Say Huan and other activistswere instrumental in setting up over 20 sub-committees with more than 200 branchesall over the island.57 Among those Sub-Committees of the SCRFC accountablewere: Thomson Road; Tiong Bahru; Pasir Panjang-Alexandra Road; Pulau Ubin;

Geylang; Changi; Bukit Timah; Katong; Pasir Panjang; Seletar; Tanjong Rhu;Blakang Mati; Telok Mata Ikan; and Chua Chu Kang, etc.58 By 1939, the ChineseSecretariat in Singapore became more alarmed when the SCRFC began to set upsuch Sub-Committees along the lines of trade and industry. The following descriptions are a reflection of this alarm:

"Its influence in the Chinese labour sphere inMalaya is to be seen in the formationof Relief Fund Sub-Committees for particular trades and industries, e.g., in Singapore rickshaw pullers, seamen, domestic servants in European households, builders,coffee shops, barbers, shoemakers all have separate sub-committees of the SingaporeChina Relief Fund Committee, and in the increasing use which is being made ofthese sub-committees or ofmembers of theRelief Fund Organisation inconciliationand arbitration of persons (usually employees) in a single industry or trade for thepurpose of arranging for the collection of Relief subscriptions from fellow-workersin the same industry or trade has undoubtedly encouraged the spirit of solidarityamong labourers and the formation of Trade Unions."59

The success of the SCRFC campaigns can be seen from statistics for relief funds.Between August 1937 and December 1938, Singapore Chinese donated a sum of$3-2 million (Straits currency), the total for the whole ofMalaya being $10-5 million.60Between July 1937 and November 1940, the Chinese community inMalaya remittedan estimated sum of $146 million (Chinese currency) towards China Relief and byFebruary 1942, the Chinese in Southeast Asia were believed to have contributed atotal of $400 million (Chinese currency) towards relieving war victims.61 Tan KahKee himself estimated that during the 1937-1942 period the Chinese in SoutheastAsia remitted a staggering sum of over $5,000 million (Chinese currency) to Chinafor all purposes.62In the light of available materials on the pre-War Chinese elites consulted, it isdifficult to deny each of the three its claim for political success. In fact each elitehad its fair share of honour and glory: the MCP had deepened its organisationalinfluence among the grass-roots ; the KMT had won considerable support from thebourgeoisie while the non-partisan elite could claim to have led the Chinese in Southeast Asia generally and those inMalaya particularly. Nevertheless, in the rivalry forpower and leadership of the national salvation movement, Tan Kah Kee stood out

56 Yoji Akashi, op. cit., p. 29.57 CO 273/641, MRCA, 100 (Dec. 1938), 24.58 Ibid., 23-24; and CO 273/641, MRCA, 101 (Jan. 1939), 30.59 CO 273/654, MRCA, 106 (June 1939), 34.60 CO 273/654, MRCA, 103 (Mar. 1939), 22.61CF. Yong, "Emergence of Chinese Community Leaders in Singapore, 1890-1941",Journal of South Seas Society, 30, 1& 2 (Dec. 1975), 18.62 Tan Kah Kee, op. cit., II, 345. Southseas China Relief Fund Union, ed., The GreatWar and the Southseas Chinese (Singapore 1947), 47. Tan Kah Kee, Collection of SpeechesandWritings of Tan Kah Kee (Singapore 1949), p. 123 (text inChinese).


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Singapore Chinese Leadership in the 1930s 207as a "complete community leader", a leader with ability and leadership qualities,social, institutional and economic bases, brain trust, financial and intellectual talentsas well as Chinese and British recognition; a leader with power, mass support,complex interlocking links with friendly and contending forces.63 There is no doubtthat itwas a combination of favourable factors that allowed Tan Kah Kee to achievea breakthrough from the status of a community leader to that of a political leader.Often enough such a breakthrough could end up in disaster under the rule of colonialregimes, but in this case it resulted in triumph for Tan Kah Kee. Just what are theanswers?

Maybe, part of the answers could be found firstly in Tan Kah Kee's relationshipwith the Chinese Secretariat, a department in charge of the colony's Chinese affairs,and secondly, in the role and strategy of colonial administration in countering thecontending elites of a political movement. It is clear that Tan Kah Kee had a reasonably good relationship with the Chinese Secretariat, its Secretary for ChineseAffairs being A. B. Jordan and its Chinese Assistant to the Secretary being Sng ChoonYee (1897- ,#:jftflfr). Sng Choon Yee, a member of Ee Ho Hean Club from1927, was a close friend, a consultant and an admirer of Tan Kah Kee. Being anon-partisan nationalist at heart, Sng Choon Yee sided with Tan Kah Kee for theorganisation of relief funds. On numerous occasions (e.g., the Shantung ReliefFund campaigns, the re-organisation of the Hokkien Huay Kuan in 1929, the 1936campaigns for the purchase of aeroplanes for General Chiang Kai-shek's 50thbirthday, and the formation of the SCRFC inAugust 1937, etc.) itwas Sng ChoonYee who either smoothed things out for him within the Chinese Secretariat or helpedhim capture the leadership of a legitimate organisation.64 Tan Kah Kee was gratefulto him and trusted him completely.65 Having benefited from the advice and consultation rendered by Sng Choon Yee, Tan Kah Kee was more sure where he was

going and how far he could go in the national salvation movement. As Sng ChoonYee's relationship with Tan Kah Kee was built by mutual respect and trust, so wasA. B. Jordan's relationship with Sng Choon Yee.66 This is perhaps a case of "notwhat you know but who you know" that got things done. Here are two examples ofthe importance of prior consultation between Tan Kah Kee and Sng Choon Yee.The first concerns Tan Kah Kee's intention to organise a committee for fund-raisingtowards purchasing aeroplanes for celebrating Chiang Kai-shek's 50th birthday;he duly applied for permission with the Chinese Secretariat but was "surprised"to obtain it.67 The second example involves the formation of the SCRFC on 15August 1937. On the eve of a planned mass rally which was to form the SCRFC, hewas invited by A. B. Jordan for ameeting during which he was told that theGovernorand the Secretary for Chinese Affairs both thought he should be in charge of therelief organisation.68 Having accepted the sanctions and legitimacy from theBritish authorities, Tan Kah Kee became fully accountable to them.69

Why then did the British legitimise his leadership during the years 1937-1941?There is a host of reasons which could be advanced. Pang Wing Seng has tentatively63 CF.Yong, "Emergence of Chinese Community Leaders in Singapore, 1890-1941",

op. cit., 1-18.64 C F. Yong, "Pre-War Singapore Chinese Protectorate, Ho Siak Kuan and Sng ChoonYee", SCJP, 17and 24Nov. 1976 (text inChinese).65 Ibid.66 An interview with the Rev. A.B. Jordan at Nottingham, England, on 24 Apr. 1974.According to the Rev. Jordan, Sng Choon Yee was his right hand man during his term of office asthe Secretary for Chinese Affairs prior to Japanese occupation of the island.67 Tan Kah Kee, My Autobiography, I, 42.68 Ibid.69 Pang Wing Seng, op. cit., 277.


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208 CF. Yongbut plausibly suggested a few clues as to the motives of colonial administrators in1937 : first, itwas essentially for self-interest that "properly constituted relief funds"should be organised and controlled by responsible pang leadership lest the KMT ortheMCP might capture the leadership by capitalising on the ground-swell of genuinepatriotic feelings among Singapore Chinese; second, Tan Kah Kee was more prepared to take full responsibility for the management and co-ordination of reliefactivities.70 As his interesting microscopic study of the Chinese response to the"Double Seventh" event in Singapore is essentially confined to a rather small periodof history, hence the limitations of his explanations to be applied to the decade ofthe 1930s. There is little doubt that Tan Kah Kee was hand-picked by the Governorand the Secretary for Chinese Affairs and there were good reasons for it. First,Tan Kah Kee was a non-partisan nationalist, and more importantly, a naturalisedBritish subject since 1916. He was appointed a Justice of the Peace in 1918 and amember of the Chinese Advisory Board in 1923. The Chinese Advisory Board servedas an institution for the legitimization of either pang or community leadership.Besides, Tan Kah Kee was recognised by the local government as one of the greatestindustrial entrepreneurs of pre-War Malaya and was well-known for his promotionof education and charity. An example of the government's appreciation of hiseffective leadership was the setting up of a Fire Relief Committee by the HokkienHuay Kuan in August 1934 to raise funds for some 7,000 fire victims of Bukit HoSwee.71 As Chairman of the Fire Relief Committee of the Hokkien Huay Kuan,Tan Kah Kee closely co-operated and co-ordinated with the Secretary for ChineseAffairs, A. B. Jordan, over a period of 3 months for the relief and resettlement offire victims. Moreover, Tan Kah Kee's other fund-raising campaigns of a politicalnature (e.g., the Shantung Relief Fund campaign and the 1936 campaign for thepurchase of aeroplanes in honour of Chiang Kai-shek's 50th birthday, etc.) werepeaceful and orderly. On the eve of the formation of the SCRFC, Tan Kah Kee wasrated among the most influential, respected and effective leaders in the Chinesecommunity. His condemnation of violence and his appeal for moderation in therising tide of Chinese nationalism marked him out as a "law and order" leader. Inthe eyes of the British, Tan Kah Kee's creditability was excellent. The nationalistfervour that arose out of the Sino-Japanese War swept across the Chinese com

munity in Malaya like a hurricane, potentially "destructive" and uncontrollable.Who else could do a more effective job than Tan Kah Kee to diffuse such an explosivesituation, thus easing the pressure and danger for actions from the grass-roots?With Tan Kah Kee winning the leadership of the "properly constituted" relieffund organisation, the SCRFC, the British succeeded in forestalling the ambitions ofthe MCP air? KMT to capture it. From the formation of the SCRFC until theJapanese invasion of Malaya, the British policy was to sufficiently control or influence the directions of SCRFC72 while discouraging and preventing the creationof a united front between the SCRFC and theMCP. On the other hand, repressivemeasures (e.g., deportation, imprisonment, etc.) were often employed to weed out

70 Ibid.71NYSP, 9, 11 and 17Aug. 1934.72 The British did succeed in imposing various constraints on the SCRFC and later SCRFU.For example, the SCRFC could not collect funds for purposes other than relief. It could neitherbe allowed to advocate the boycott of Japanese goods nor its enforcement of the boycott movement. InNovember 1938, the Chinese Secretariat tightened up the activities of the SCRFC byimposing more rigid rules "designed to protect the public from annoyance, intimidation andfraud by collectors". Also, the Relief Fund Committees throughout Malaya were called upon to

apply for registration under the Societies Ordinance and Enactments. See CO 273/628, MRCA,84 (Aug. 1937), 18 and CO 273/654, MRCA, 103 (Mar. 1939), 15-20.


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Singapore Chinese Leadership in the 1930s 209"subversive" elements and prevent them from radicalising the national salvationmovement. The timely deportations of 11 ringleaders of the A.E.B.U.S. inOctober1938 and of Hau Say Huan in December 1939 are cases in point. However, theserepressive measures must be seen in the context of an overall strategy of Divide andRule, without which the British policy towards the leadership and power of thenational salvation movement would have been less successful. While keeping boththe MCP and KMT at bay at all cost, Tan Kah Kee was allowed to be seen to besharing some political power with the government, and his organisation to be rec

ognised as the only legal fund-raising body. This was the key to the success ofthe divide and rule strategy. Without the collaboration of Tan Kah Kee, it is quiteconceivable that the British would have confronted more difficulty in containing theChina-oriented nationalist forces within the country. From Tan Kah Kee's pointof view, he must be well satisfied with what he had bargained for : power, prestige,leadership and millions of Straits dollars flowing into the much depleted coffers ofthe Nationalist Government at Chungking. This is beside the point. The point isthat the British authorities did play a vitally important role in the fortunes and misfortunes of contending elites during the decade of the rising nationalist tidal wave.

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YONG CHING FATT - Leadership Chinese in SG

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