RICHARD M. ZANER

The Problem of Embodiment

SOME CONTRIBUTIONS TO A

PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE BODY

• MARTINUS NIJHOFF / THE liAGUE / Ig64

)

Copyright z964 by Marti.nus Nijholf, The Hague, Netherlands All rights reserved, including the right to translate or to

reproduce this book or parts thereof in a?iy form

PRINTED IN 'I'HE NETHERLANDS

To My Wife, ] unanne, for lier patient a1id e1ttiuring love

603054

PREFACE

Early in the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomeno­logie und phiinomenologischen Philosophie, Edmund Husserl stated concisely the significance and scope of the problem with which this present study is concerned. When we reflect on how it is that consciousness, which is itself absolute in relation to the world, can yet take on the character of transcendence, how it can become mundanized,

We see straightaway that it can do that only by mea~f a certain participation in transcendence in the first, originary sense, which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experiential relation to the animate organism does consciousness become really human and animal (tierischen) , and only thereby does it achieve a place in the space and in the time of Nature.1

Consciousness can become "worldly" only by being embodied within the world as part of it. In so far as the world is material Nature, consciousness must partake of the transcendence of material Nature. That is to say, its transcendence is manifestly an embodiment in a material, corporeal body. Consciousness, thus, takes on the characteristic of being "here and now" (ecceity) by means of experiential (or, more accurately, its intentive) relation to that corporeal being which embodies it. Accordingly, that there is a world for consciousness is a conse­quence in the first instance of its embodiment by 2 that corporeal body which is for it its own animate organism. Conversely, that corporeal body becomes a genuinely animate organism (Leib), as opposed to a mere physical body (Karper), only by means of

I Husserl, I dun .ru einer erinen Phdnomenotogie und phtinomenotogischen PAilosopkie ErstesBuch, Max Niemeyer (Halle a. d. S., 19:r3), p. 103.

2 We use the preposition "by" advisedly, especially to avoid the spatial conno· tations of the more usual "in". Spatial determinations arise after, not before, em­bodiment.

VIII PREFACE

consciousness' intentiveness to it as its own animate organism -that is to say, as its own embodiment, or mundanization.

The significance of the animate organism, of the intended embodiment of consciousness in a world, for the crucial range of problems relative to the constitution of Objective reality (the alter ego, physical things, cultural objects, society, and so on) is thus apparent. As Merleau-Ponty has put it, "le corps propre" is the first stage of this constitution.

While Husserl was thus quite cognizant of the central place of the animate organism, he did not himself devote much space in his published writings to the analysis of it; and, what has subse­quently appeared of his unpublished manuscripts contains little more than highly suggestive clues toward the development of such an analysis. On the other hand, MM Gabriel Marcel, J ean­Paul Sartre, and Maurice Merleau-Ponty have each developed important theories of the animate organism, each of which purports to be a strictly descriptive explication of this phenome­non. They each, therefore, deserve careful attention. Whether or not, on the other hand, any or all of these theories may be called "phenomenological," in theHusserlian sense, is a question lying outside our immediate concerns, though we shall not be able to ignore it completely.

Irrespective of how that may be ultimately decided, each of these theories is highly interesting in itself for the development of a systematic phenomenology of the animate organism. This being so, it has seemed advantageous to us to undertake a critical examination of each of them: first, to determine the major points of each; second, to examine each critically; finally, to determine the extent to which each contributes to the phenomenology of the animate organism.

This, t hen, is the proposal of this present study. By means of it, we hope eventually to be able to establish at least the essential structures of the animate organism, of the order of the consti­tution of the animate organism, and thus to pave the way for a systematic phenomenological analysis.

A brief note of explanation regarding the considerable refer­ences to the works of the philosophers discussed herein in is order. In all but a few instances, I have felt it best to render these

PREFACE IX

passages into English myself. Regarding Marcel's works, I have utilized the generally excellent translations of his Metaphysical Journal (the translation by Bernard Wall approved by M. Marcel), and those of Homo Viator (by Emma Craufurd} and Man Against H1tmanity (by Donald Mackinnon). In all other instances I am responsible for the translations.

Regarding Sartre, while I have referred constantly to the translation of L 'Etre et le Neant by Hazel Barnes, all the trans­lations from that work are my responsibility. Regrettably, neither of Merleau-Ponty's major works have appeared in English translation.1 Thus, all references to these, as well as my references to M. A. de Waelhens' study of Merleau-Ponty, are my own. Similarly, regarding the references to Bergson, while there are good translations available, I have referred constantly to the French editions of bis works and am responsible for the trans­lations into English.

Finally, concerning the works of Edmond Husserl to which I have made reference, the truly outstanding and remarkably sensitive translations of Professor Dorion Cairns - evidenced in his translation of Husserl's Cartesia,nische Meditationen, and his as yet unpublished G-uide to Tran.slating Husserl, which Dr. Cairns kindly made available to me in a partially complete form - have been of immeasurable help to m e. Nevertheless, with the exception of the references to the Cartesian Meditations, I am entirely responsible for the translations of Husserl into English.

In view of this, that I have taken on myself the task of trans­lating the majority of references, and in view of the fact that all but the very best of translations are inferior to the original, I have felt it only proper to include the original texts in a special appendix. All the major passages, therefore, are marked in the text with an asterisk (*) ; these passages will be found in the Appendix, with the proper textual references (both to the original work and to this study).

A final word of acknowledgment is, in my judgment, necessary.

1 Subsequent to the writing of this essay, Merleau·Poo.ty's Phbwmenologie de la Perception has appeared in English translation, published by Rutledge and Keegan Paul {1962), translated by Colin Smith.

x PREFACE

Certainly the indebtedness I owe to others, and particularly to my teachers, can never be fully expressed. The obligation to do so, however, far surpasses the difficulty of the task. Without attempting to determine rank or degree, therefore, I must in humility and honesty express my profound appreciation and gratitude to those without whom this study would not have been possible.

My gratitude and appreciation is expressed to my teachers: Professors Maurice Natanson, Alfred Schutz, Dorion Cairns, Aron Gurwitsch, Hans Jonas and Werner Marx - each of whose influence has been considerable, and whose teachings, I hope, have to some degree been assimilated in a philosophical manner, but who can in no way be held responsible for the content of this study.

I should like to take this opportunity as well to express my deep appreciation to Mr. Frederick I. Kersten, whose friendship and discussions have been steady and strong, and whose en­couragement has proved vital.

My gratitude must also be extended to the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science, of the New School for Social Research, to whom this study in another form was first sub­mitted as my doctoral dissertation, for awarding this dissertation the Alfred Schutz Memorial Award, and for malting available to so many students a climate of genuine scholarship and a faculty of truly remarkable dimensions.

Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude to the Research Committee of Lamar State College of Technology for awarding me the research grant without which I could not have completed this work. I must also thank Miss Nancy Darsey, who has exluoited considerable patience and endurance in typing the final draft of the study, and whose knowledge of grammar and syntax has proved to have been of great help.

I can only hope that the study, for all its shortcomings, will in some part merit the profound trust and faith of all those who have helped me to bring it about.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface . ................... .

PART I: MARCEL'S THEORY OF THE BODY AS MYSTERY.

Chapter I: Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . {l) Survey of Marcel's Philosophy. . . . . . . . . (2) The Genesis of the Problem in Marcel's Thought. . (3) Methodological Considerations: The Problem of

System ............... .... .

Chapter II: The Theory of the Body-Qua-Mine as Mystery (1) My Body Qua Mine ............. .

(a) The Qui-Quid Relation in Having . . . . {b) The "Within-Without" Relation . . . . . (c) Having as "Before the Other qua Other" .

(2) The Meaning of Sentir . . . . . . . (3) My Body as Etre-Au~Monde . .... (4) My Body as the Repere of Existence .

Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . . . . . . . . (1) The Relation Between "Feeling" and "Acting" (2) The Meaning of Bodily Acting. . . . . . . . (3) The Meaning of the "Urgefuhl" . . .

PART II: SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY OF THE BODY.

Chapter I: Introduction . . . . . . . . . {l) Sartre's Ontology . . . . . . . . . (2) The Theory of the Other . . . . . .

vn

3 3

12

14

21 22 25 'Z7 28 35 38 42

44 46 49 53

57

59 60 69

Chapter II : The Ontological Dimensions of the Body 81 (!) The Body as Being-For-Itself: Facticity . . . 83

xn CONTENTS

(2) The Body-For-Others . . . . . . . . . . . 98 (3) The Third Ontological Dimension of the Body. 102

Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . . . . . . 106 (1) The Apprehension of the Body-For-Itself. 107 (2) The Body as a Center of Reference . . . 116 (3) The Problem of " Ontological Dimensions" 119 (4) The Problem of the Other's Body-For-Me, and :My

Body-For-The-Other. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123

~ PART III: MERLEAU-PONTY'S THEORY OF THE BODY-PROPER 127

Chapter I: Introduction . . . . . . . . 129 (1) The Problem of "Form" . . . . . 130 (2) Merleau-Ponty's " Phenomenology" 135 (3) Merleau-Ponty's "Existentialism" . 146

Chapter II: The Theory of the Body . . 149 ( 1) The Body-Proper as an Instrument of "Knowledge" J 52

(a) The Body-Proper as "Sense-Giving" 154 (b) The "Corporeal Scheme" . . . . 164 (c) The "Intentional Arc" . . . . . . 172

(2) The Body-Proper as Etre-Au-Monde . . 180 (a) The Body as "Belonging-to" the World. 182 (b) The Body as "Being-to" the World 185 (c) The Body as "Temporai,ite-engagee" 189

(3) The Body-Proper as "Expression" 192 (a) The Body as Sexual Being 192 (b) The Body as "Expression" 196

Chapter III: Critical Remarks . . . 198 (I) Methodological Problems . . . 199 (2) The Theory of the Body as "Knowledge". 204

(a) First Thesis: The Body is a Latent Knowledge. 205 (b) Second Thesis: The Body is "tout etabli" . 208 (c) Third Thesis: The Body as an Ambiguity. . 218 (d) Fourth Thesis: Temporality . . . . . . . . 224

(3) The Meaning of Merleau-Ponty's Existentialism . 233 Epilogue . 239 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262 Index 290

PART I

MARCEL'S THEORY OF THE BODY AS

MYSTERY

I

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In several respects, the problem of the body (or, as we shall have to say later, the metaproblem of the body) is the matrix of Gabriel Marcel's philosophical work. In order to see this properly, it will be necessary to describe the general feautures of his work as a whole.

(1) SURVEY OF MARCEL'S PHILOSOPHY

In the course of a discussion of the body (in his early "meta­physical journal"), Marcel wrote, " I think that now I see the meaning and bearing of the foregoing inquiries. We are concerned essentially with determining the metaphysical conditions of personal existence." 1 Again, in a later work he returned to this statement, noting that his concern with the "fundamental experiences inscribed in our condition," has taken the form of a "philosophical anthropology."2

By the time of his Gifford Lectures {I949-50), published in two volumes as Le M ystere de l' Etre, s certainly his most mature work, 4 he had come to realize that the reference of all his work to man is fundamental; and he went on to affirm, "it is necessary to add that it is a reference not at all abstractly thought, but _to the contrary intimately lived .... " (ME, I, 54} This theme, as will be seen, is the unifying thread of his work.

In spite of the fact that he sees this theme as central to his

1 Metaphyskal Journal, H. Regnery (Chicago, 1952), p. 255, translation by Ber­nard Wall authorized and approved n.od with a "Preface to the English Edition," by ?.L Marcel. (Hereafter cited in the text as M].)

a Du Refus a l'InvccaJion, Gallimard (Paris, 19-40), p. 122. (Hereafter cited in the text as RI).

3 u Mystere de l'Etr.e: Vol. I, Reflexion et Myst~re; Vol. II, Foi et Reallte, Aubier (Paris, 1951). (Hereafter cited in the text as, respectively, ME, I, and M.E,ll.)

• Cf. D. E. Roberts, E:i:isumialism and Religious Belu/, Galaxie Books, Oxford U. Press (New York, 1959), p. :i78.

4 MARCEL

concern, however, it was only in the Gifford Lectures that he clearly recognized it as such. And, at the same time, he recognized that the fundamental question of a "metaphysics of the human condition" must be: "Who, or what, am I ?" 1 (ME, I , 141) Earlier, reflecting on the general crisis of modem man - which he interprets as essentially a Joss of the sense of being 2 - Marcel took note of "un paradoxe essentiel." At the heart of the loss of the sense of being, there is as well an "exigence ontologique" (ME. I. 47-66; PA, 51-53), a deeply seated inner urgency to know oneself, to be as'sured of oneself and of what (or who) one is. Yet, when one inquires into .being, in order to comprehend the nature of this loss, an abyss opens out beneath one:

Is there Being? What is Being? J3ut, I cannot bring my reflection to bear on these problems without seeing a new abyss open out under my. feet: I, who inquire into Being, can 1 be assured that I am?• (PA, 54)

I , who ask this question, cannot place myself outside the problem I formulate: "reflection shows me that this problem in some way inevitably encroaches on this theoretically preserved proscenium.'' (PA, ibid.) In other words,. it is impossible to inquire into being, into this exigence I sense as urgent. to me, without forthwith bringing myself into the very sphere of the problem I seek to formulate:

Who am I, I who question Being? In what way am I qualified to proceed with these investigations? If I am not, how shall I hope to see them to an end ? Even admitting that I am, how can I be assured that I am? • (PA, ibid.)

Thus the very task of a philosophical anthropology seems at the outset to run aground: precisely what must be investigated is inseparable from the one doing the investigating, and thus the problem seems to destroy itself qua problem - a state of affairs presented as in principle "outside" or "before" me in the sense that it could be investigated by anyone, and thus presented as admitting a solution which could be arrived at by anyone. (PA, 55) I, who ask, "Who am I? ," am also the one asked about.

l In the same place, he refers to several passages in bis earlier writings which foreshadow the crucial role of this question: Cf. Etre et Avofr, Aubier, Editions Montaigne (Paris, 1935), pp. 72, 73, r58-59, .180-81, passim. (Cited textually as EA.); RI, pp . .188- 89; etc. . . '

~ Marcel, Position et A f>f>roches concr.ltes du MysUre ontologique, Introduction by Marcel de Corte, J. Vrin (Paris, 1949}, pp. 46-51. (Cited textually as PA.)

-

INTRODUCTION s Asking "Who am I ?," on the other hand, I straight away recog­nize that this question (this quest for myself) is itself its own assuredness, it is an affirmation of myself as at least existing-in­qoest of myself. In order to utter it, I must be:

One could say in an inevitably approximate language that my inquiry nto Being presupposes an affirmation with respect to which I would in

some manner be passive,l a11d of which I would be the stage rather than the subject.

But that is only a limit which I cannot realize without contradiction. Therefore, I find myself taking the position of, or recognizing, a partici­pation which possesses a subjective reality; this participation cannot, by very definition, be an object of thought; it cannot function as a solution, bu.t appears outside the world of problems: it is metaproblematical.• (PA, 56--57)

The human condition, then, is fundamentally an exigence which is concretely manifested as a quest: Man is that being who, in his being, is in quest of his being, of who he is. However much this quest may be masked or hidden in its essential meaning, 2

and in whatever ways, this metaphysical disquiet is essential to man as such. s But just in so far as this exigence 4 is a quest for one's own essential identity, it resolves into a fundamental mystery, or synonymously, a metaprobletn. This term, certainly the most technical and rigorous one Marcel uses, should not be understood in any theological se~se whatever; he himself has often emphasized this. (Cf. PA, 88-<)1) In a strictly philosophical sense, a mystery is "a problem which encroaches on its data, which invades them and thereby surpasses itself as a simple

~ Cf. W. E. Hocking, "Marcel and the Ground Issues of Metaphysics," Philcsophy and Phenomenological Research (hereafter referred to as PPR). Vol. xiv, No. 4 (June 1954), pp. 43!r"69· Hocking points out that "passive" does not mean "inert": "Here at the core of individual awareness, Being is no concept, no category, no vocable 'eon tent'; neither is it an ineffable, pervasive dull thud or datum-pressure: say that it is unsayable, and you must add that it is nevertheless passion-filled presence. Allow that Descartes' "I am" is a statement true when uttered; it does not follow that it is all that can -be said .•. There is something equally true in the New England colloqui­alism, "I be," which. suggests what Gilson calls "the aa of being." lt is tr:u.e that my being appears to me as something I discover, i;:oing on there without having- consulted my wishes, - something done to me. . . What happens is - if I correctly catch an instantaneous deed-of-response - an act by me of consent and corroboration, as if what is done to me I also do for myself- two deeds merging in one active fact, "l be." (p. 443)

2 Cf. below, pp. 16-18. 3 Cf. Homo Viator, H. Regnery (Chicago, 1951), p. r38, translated by Emma

Craufurd. (Cited textually as HV.); and ME, I, p. 14; and MJ, p. 290. 4 Hocking, op. cit., p. 444, notes that this crucial notion is Marcel's own native air,

his own original insight, derived from nobody else, and that it is just this same exi­gence which inspired his own intensive study of it.

6 MARCEL

problem." (PA, 57) More·simply, a mystery is a problem which cannot in principle exclude me, the one for whom it is a problem, from consideration; and if I am taken as unessential to it, the entire situation is altered. Thus, asking the fundamental question of a philosophical anthropology, I, the one who asks it, am drawn into the sphere of my own question: I become, that is to say, the stage, and not the subject (over against an object), of the quest.

Now, Marcel insists, it is not the case that this doubling back of the question renders the inquiry into myself impossible; nor is it a kind of metaphysical treasurehunt; nor, he contends, does it make any sense to give up the quest, and seek instead to investigate myself as if I were an object, like a table, or a complex machine. For him, an object is in principle what is indifferent to me, the one for whom the object would be object:

An object as such is defined as being independent of the characteristics that make me be this particular person and not another person. Thus it is essential to the very nature of the object not to take "me" into account; if I think it as having regard to me, in that measure I cease to treat it as an object. (MJ, 261)

But I myself, inquiring into myself, cannot realize this sort of distance. I cannot be n'importe qu,i in relation to myself, or if I am so considered, I then cease to treat myself as myself. Being an object and being myself (or, for something to be an object, and for it to be treated as having regard to me) are mutually exclusive alternatives.

To put the matter differently, the kind of reflection which takes me or things as objects, Marcel calls "pmsee pensee," or "first reflection"; that which apprehends me as me-myself, or things as essentially having regard for me, he calls "pensee pensante," or "second reflection." (Cf. RI, 2r; ME, I , 97-g8) Briefly, for him, the former dissolves the lived unity of experience, this separation occurring in a double manner. First, by treating whatever presents itself to me as an object (synonymously, as problem), it necessarily sets up to begin with a separation between a "here" which is "subject," and a "there" which is "object" (i.e., "problemati~").l Aiming at "pure objectivity," secondly, it excludes what is " here" ("subject") from the " there"

1 As we shall see later on, just this separation is most unacceptable for Marcel; his most penetrating questions bear on what meaning can be assigned to "outside." Cf. below, pp. 12-4, and pp. 38-42.

INTRODUCTION 7

("objects") deeming it a taint on objectivity to haveanything"me­rely subjective" enter into the "problem." First reflection is thus at once an act of alienation and of desertion, seeking an ideal non­involvement by the spectator in the spectacle. (EA, 25-26; ME, I , I38-40) The paradigm for this "problematizing reflection," Marcel believes, is natural-scientific inquiry - by no means a pejorative evaluation. Even of one were to point out that the scientist is indeed quite committed to and caught up in his investigations, this would still not affect Marcel's argument. For the kind of commitment here is essentially bound up with the ideal anonymity of scientific research: the scientist, qua scientist, forgets himself for the sake of the undertaking, and may indeed be quite involved in his non-involvement. But, Marcel points out, he does not bring himself into the sphere of the problem-at-hand (unless he establishes a Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy) . (ME, I, II- 14)

Now, Marcel has no quarrel with this type of reflection per se; it is only when one attempts to be analogously "scientific" about the self, subjectivity, or consciousness, that he raises his objection: just in so far as one takes it as "object" or "problem" one will have missed precisely what one set out to discover. For, the self cannot be an "object " and still be considered as "self": to be a self is to be myself; and for me, my self cannot be an object. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to reapproach the entire domain of subjectivity, in order to be able to apprehend it from within, that is, by recovering the unity shattered by first re­flection.

"Second reflection," thus, is essentially a "recueillement," (PA, 63-64; ME, I, 98) a recapture of myself as the unity I am concretely.1 Here, every distinction between "subject" and "object," "within" and "without," and the like, disappears; there can be no detachment, so characteristic of the type, homo spectans (first reflection) . To the contrary, Marcel emphasizes, second reflection (recueillement) is a mode of participation (of the type, homo particeps). (ME, I, 138-40; EA, 25-26)

The "metaphysics of personal existence," or "philosophical

1 lt is not so much a question of a BergsOniaJl intuition as oI a concentration and "inner reflection'': Man Against Humanity, Harvill Press {London, 1952), p. 68. {Hereafter cited textually as MAH.)

8 MARCEL

anthropology," therefore, is a "reflection fixed on a mystery." (EA, 146) This "mystery" is most fundamentally me myself; when, accordingly, I undertake to inquire into it, I find myself confronted with a metaproblem. The first, and in the end, "the only metaphysical problem is that of 'What am I?', for all others lead back to this one." (HV, I38) However, at just the point that one clearly recognizes this as a mystery, he runs up against a peculiar opacity. For, although "the question, 'Who am I?', seems to require a conceptualizable response," (EA, 158) it seems that, as Camus put it, "Between the certainty I have of my existence and the content I try to give to that assurance, the gap will never be filled. Forever, I shall be a stranger to my­self." 1 Who, indeed, am I?

In a genuine sell:se, Marcel insists, this question, no longer being posed as a problem with a particular solution, becomes a quest for assuredness about myself, a sort of appeal: I seem to know that I am, but what is this "thatness ?" The quest for the human condition becomes directed, thus, toward an "indu,bitable ex­istentiel," a sort of "existential landmark capable of being designated .. . . " (ME, I, Io3; also RI, 25-26)

One might think here of Descartes' quest for certainty, a quest for an indubitable foundation for all knowledge. But, for Marcel, as Pietro Prini points out correctly in his excellent study,2 the Cartesian quest is completely beside the point. "Nothing," Marcel remarked in his early Journal, "is less instructive than the Cartesian 'l am'." (MJ, I82) It was not clear to him until later, however, why it is so uninstructive. Essentially, Prini observes, Marcel's criticism consists in bringing out the intrinsic confusion in the Cartesian reduction to the cogito:

In the Cartesian analysis of the "cogito," the obscure and global certainty of itself which consciousness maintains while in the process of doubting and the indubitable evidence of a pure abstraction (that is to say, of the subject deprived of all individual determination and all adherence to the world) have been confused with each other.3

1 Albert Camus, The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays, Vintage Books (New York, 1959), pp. i:4- 15.

a Pietro Prini, Gabriel Marcel a la Methodologie de l'Inverifiable, Descl~e de Brou­wer (Paris, 1953).

3 Ibid., p. 31.

INTRODUCTION 9

The "sum" of Descartes' "cogito, ergo sum," is not itself made thematic by Descartes; when one does so, the sum is seen to be a pure abstract, and not at all the "I am" which manifests itself as in quest of itself (exigence).

The reality that the cogito reveals ... is of quite a different order from the existence that we are trying not so much to establish as to identify in the sense oi taking note of its absolute metaphysical priority. The cogito introduces us into a whole system of affirmations and guarantees their validity. It guards the threshold of the valid . ... 1

Accordingly, since the "Who am I?" is not a question of objective validity, but rather one bearing on the sense of the "I exist," Descartes' cogito is highly uninstructive. In fact, just because it "guards the threshold of the valid," it never gets beyond the level of first reflection; and the "I exist" does not even appear at that level. As Unarnuno had emphasized, we are interested in "the concrete and personal 'I'," the "man of flesh and bone," the "I exist" in its indecomposable unity.2 (Cf. ME, I, I05)

Ignoring here Marcel's critical discussion of certain types of skepticism which arise at this point, 3 we can pass directly to Marcel's own disengagement of the "existential indubitable":

To think, or more exactly, to affirm the metaproblematic is to affirm it as indubitably real, as something I cannot doubt without contradiction. We are bere in a zone where it is no longer possible to dissociate the idea itself and the certainty, or the index of certainty which affects it. For, this idea is certainty, it is assurance of itself; it is in this degree something other than, and more than, an idea.• (PA, 62)

Thus, Marcel is able to say even of a skepticism as passionate and sensitive as that of Camus, that it is in the end "extremely simpleminded," and that Camus "has never reached the stage of ... second reflection." (MAH, 87) Camus' skepticism, depending upon the radical distinction between the certitude of the "I exist" and a "content" I would somehow have to give to it, falls to the ground, just because that distinction is inadmissable: my affirmation is assurance of itself.

This "I exist," then, is essentially metaproblematical, and

1 "Existence and Objectivity," appended essay to the Metaphysical Journal, p. 325, and written by hlm in 1925. (Hereafter cited textually as M], E-0).

1 Miguel de Unamuno, Tragic Sei~e of Life, Dove.r Books, (New York, 1954), p. 8. 3 Cf. for th.is discussion, ME, I, pp. 103-05; RI, pp. 25-26; and MJ, E-0, pp. 320-

25.

IO MARCEL

forms the assurance which was sought: it is myself who ·exists, and thus I am the assurance of myself, I am this emphasis which I give to myself in my affirmation, "I exist." (HV, I5) Perhaps the best way to express this affirmation-assurance, he writes, is not as an

I think, not even I live, but I experience (i'eprouve), and here it is neces­sary to take this word in its maximal indetermination. The German language is here a great deal more adequate than the French: ich erlebe . .. to the point where the Ich erlebe is indistinguishable from the Es erlebl in mir . ... • (RI, 26)

But what is the "more" which, Marcel states, this certitude yields?

We should think here, lie advises, of the situation in which a child, picking a flower, races up to his mother and exclaims, "Look, I, I myself and no one else, picked these for you!" (HV, r3-r4) Or, as in Ray Bradbury's enchanting Dandelion Wine, the same exuberant sense or awareness of this " I, I myself!," is pronounced with fresh wonder by Doug, the young ten-year-old boy: " I'm alive ... I'm really alive! he thought. I never knew it before, or if I did I don't remember!"

This "hearth-fire" or "passion-filled presence," as Hocking calls it,1 is precisely what must be focused on. To say, " I exist," Marcel insists, is not to pronounce the result of a process of inference, nor to produce a judgment about some quality I possess: " In every case I produce myself, in the etymological sense of the word, that is to say, I put myself forward." (HV, 15) This emphasis which one gives to himself, this exuberance over oneself, Marcel later calls "an exclamatory consciousness of self ... the exclamatory consciousness of existing." 2 (ME, I, 106)

"Existence," in this exclamatory sense, "is not separable from a certain astonishment," (RI~ 88) from a certain sacredness and wonder. (MAH, 46-56, 67-?o; PA, SI) Accordingly, the philoso­pher seeking to unravel the exigency intrinsic to the human condition must maintain himself in "wonder" in order to keep faith with his own task. He must, that is to say, maintain a kind of fundamental shock, or, in Marcel's own happy phrase, he

i Rocking, op. cit., p. 444. • That this awareness can be lost, obscured, masked, and so on, is certainly true,

but not relevant to the point here. Indeed, Marcel will say that this possibility is es~en ti al to this consciousness of sel!.

INTRODUCTION II

must acquire and keep "la morsure du reel." (RI, 89) It thus becomes evident that, in his terms, only "second reflection" is capable of fulfilling the task of explicating the human condition, for only it can recover the unity of the " I exist." To take it as an "object" would be to destroy its unity. Indeed, Marcel believes, to explicate themeaning of this exclamatory awareness of self fully, one should say, not ,,j'existe," but "jesi,is manifeste" (ME,l, Io6):

When I say: " I exist," I incontestably aim at something more. Obscure­ly, I aim at this fact that I am not only /or myself, but that I manifest ~yself- it would be necessary to say that I am manifest. The prefix "ex," in "exist," in so far as it traces a movement toward the exterior, as it were a centrifugal tendency, is here of the greatest importance. [exist: this means that I have the wherewithal to make myself known or recog­nized, either by another or by myself in so far as I affect for myself a "borrowed otherness" (une alMrite d'emprunt) .... • (RI, 27)

And, he continues, at just this point in the inquiry one recognizes the source and manifestation of the opacity one set out to ex­plore: "all of that is not separable from the fact that 'there is my body'." (RI, 27; ME, I, 106) The inquiry into the human condition, the conditions for personal existence, and the question­ing into myself, lead directly to the donne-Pivot of the quest, the central datum for metaphysics: the mystery of embodiment, my etre-incarnee. To exist is to manifest oneself as a consciousness of oneself as embodied, and in this sense to rise up or emerge outward by means of an altbite d' emprmit.

On the other hand, another theme becomes connected with this central one. To exist, we noted, is to rise up, to manifest oneself.

But it's clear that if I can in some way tum myself outward in order to make myself more distinct for others, I can also turn myself toward my inwardness; and, just that happens from the moment I draw within myself (je me recueille) . (ME, II, 33)

As Ortega y Gasset points out, while the brute always lives in estrangement, is "beside" itself, its life thus being "essential alteraci6n," man, though certainly prey to this "unremitting disquietude," is essentially different from the brute in that he can "ensimismarse." 1 Man can, in Marcel's terms, "se reciteillir," withdraw into himself and apprehend himself as such .

.i ~wan and People (authorized translation from the Spa.nish by Willard Trask), W. W. Norton (New York, 1957), pp. 15- :zo. This term, the translator notes, means, literally, "within·oneseli-ness," while "alteraci6n" means "otheration." The former seems parallel to Marcel's "recueillement," thel atter to his " alterite d'emprunt."

---

12 MARCEL

Marcel is proposing that what we do only from time to time in this manner, should be adopted rigorously as the method of inquiry into the self. Pensee pensante is precisely this recueille­nient, or ensimismamiento; it is the manner in which one appre­hends himself as incarnate, and thus it discloses to reflection the fundamental datum of all metaphysics : my body qi1;a mine.

As Marcel de Corte points out, what is essential here is that, "Pensee pensante is an embodied thought, caught up in a body and, by means of this body, in Being." 1 And, Marcel contends, there is no "intelligible retreat in which I could establish myself outside of or apart from my body." (RI, 31) I, who think on myself, am myself embodied by my own body, whose essential sense for me is that it is mine alone. The problem, then, becomes determining the sense of the "mine," the meaning of "having" in this case.

Thus, the essential mystery which second reflection discovers is the axis of all metaphysics, as of all human life: my body qi1;a mine.

(z) THE GENESIS OF THE PROBLEM IN MARCEL'S THOUGHT

Historically, Marcel was perhaps the first to discover the phenomenon of "my body qua mine" as a central datum, to be investigated for its own sake and in its own terms, in terms of one's own experience of his body.

In the earliest pages of the Metaphysical journal (on January 16, 1914), Marcel began a series of meditations which led directly to his first insight into the problem, or metaproblem, of the body. The specific problem he raised therein concerned the existence of objects as "outside," "external" to, the mind: what is meant, he asked, by this "outside?" (MJ, I3) His proposed solution to this question immediately brought out the metaproblematical status of the body. To say that an object exists "outside" is to say, first, that the object is "constructed" as object: "that is to say," as be stated then, "-and by definition - as independent of the perceiving subject." (MJ, 14) Nevertheless, the construction is neither posterior to experience (empiricism) nor anterior (idealism), but rather "identical and coextensive with it." (MJ, ibid.) Hence, in the second place, though constructed as "inde-

1 PA, "Introductiollpar Marcel de Corte," p. xs.

INTRODUCTION 13

pendent," "To think a thing as existing is to think oneself as the perceiver, it is to extend one's experience in such a way that it comprehends even that which it appeared to leave outside itself." (MJ, ibid.) Thus, the existence of "outside" objects presupposes "a relation ... to my thought," and not merely to a thought. (MJ, ibid.)

Whatever one may think of these journal notes themselves, what they prompted in Marcel's own thought is highly important. We cannot attempt to reconstruct what must have occurred to him in the course of these mediations. It is possible to see, nevertheless, the question which was crucial to him at the time: What does "outside" mean ? And, the first suggested solution above prompted him, it is possible to see, to recognize (in a quite phenomenological manner), 1

that we can only speak of existence with regard to objects given in an immediate relation to a consciousness (which is at least posited as possible) . As we can conceive a multiplicity of ways in which one and the same object ... might be given to consciousness in an immediate fashion, we must conceive an infinite series of planes of existence relating to the possible modes of apprehension. (MJ, 17)

SinGe, Marcel believed, the existence of objects of any kind is connected essentially to the consciousness of them, the question immediately arises: In what sense does consciousness itself exist? And, he wrote, consciousness can be thought as existing only

in the measure in which it is given in an immediate relation either to itself or to another. And, as soon as we state the problem in this way, we are on tlie road to a solution. For it is clear that the datum common t-0 my conscioustiess and to other possible 'consciousnesses is my body. (MJ, 18, my underlines)

This point, however, raises an even more fundamental question: What is the relation between my consciousness and my body? And here, he immediately saw, we are faced with at least "two absolutely distinct modes of existence" as regards my body itself. On the one hand, my body is given to me as a datum in space by means of my sensuous perception of it; ori the other hand, it is· given internally through certain coenesthetic data:

i Marcel's relation to phenomenology has beell exceilently traced by H. Spiegel­berg, Tise Phenomenologieal Movamenl: A Hislorical lntrodudion, Volume Two Martinus Nijhoff (The Hague, 1960), pp. 421-443.

MARCEL

One is by definition objective, that is to say it applies to any con­sciousness endowed with conditions of perception analogous to ours; the other is by definition purely individual, Le., bound up with my conscious­ness. (MJ, 19)

This distinction, as we shall see, later became a principle feature of Marcel's study of "my body qua mine": it is a dis­tinction, later, between the body as an object, a physico-chemical system defineable by means of natural laws; and the body as mine, as I experience it qua mine.

It is with his recognition of the body qua mine as the ''central problem," upon which every other problem depends, (MJ, r26) however, that Marcel is able to go beyond the traditional series of dualisms stemming from Descartes. In short, the metaproblem of etre-incarni becomes seen as the central problem for philoso­phy and the central phenomenon of the human condition, and on its explication will depend that of the so-called "mind-body" problem. (MJ, rzs)

(3) METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: THE PROBLEM Or' SYSTEM

A brief word should be added regarding Marcel's method­ology.

Marcel's journals, especially the early one (r914- 1923), had originally been intended as the preparation for a systematic treatise in metaphysics. In some of the passages quoted above, indeed, it is easy to see this early design. Within a few years, however, he came to the somewhat melancholy conclusion that he would never be able to complete this treatise. (Cf. MJ, vii-ix) For, as soon became apparent to him, the phenomena he was attempting to focus upon and explicate simply do not admit of a "systematic" exposition. Since, however, by "system" he means either the Hegelian, or the Spinozistic, kind, it seems rather obvious that Marcel is justified in his rejection. As Kierkegaard had maintained against Hegel, "An existential system cannot be formulated ... Reality itself is a system - for God; but it cannot be a system for any existing spirit." l Or, as against the Spinozistic type of system, Marcel maintains that the concretely

1 Kierkegaard's C011clvding Unsci~ntijic Postscript, translated from the Danish by David F. Swenson, Princeton U. Press (Princeton, 1944). p. 106.

INTRODUCTION 15

existing individual cannot be deduced from axioms established s1tb specie aetemitatis.l

Nevertheless, as Hocking rightly sees, these are not the only meanings of "system": there is also a "system-from-within," he points out,2 which, in the end, is nothing other than the integral unity and order of that about which the thinker thinks. And, one might almost say, Marcel's otherwise justified hesitancy regarding "systematic exposition" tends to blind him to the intrinsic and necessary order of his own work, which we have outlined above.

It would take us too far afield to explicate this in detail, but we must at least indicate it in order to bring out his methodology and its intimate connection with the meta_problem of the body. The unifying theme of his work, we have already stressed, is the ontological exigence which is of the essence of man as such: it is essential to man to seek himself, and thus to be in quest of his own condition - and, Marcel's own philosophy is precisely an expression of this inner urgency. Man is a being who exists in disquietude; he is the exigence to seek resolution to this disquiet, i.e., he is a quest. This inner demand or call upon the self by itself is at once the motivating force and the guide of its own existence as quest. But , as nothing is here pre-determined, the existence of man is essentially to "be able to ... ," to "be open to ... ," and thus it is essential that man be able to deny himself, to betray, obscure, misunderstand, himself, and so on. That is, the essence of "being free" is that at any moment, one can deny oneself as free:

lt is of the essence of freedom that it can be exercised by betraying itself. Nothing outside of us can close the door to despair. The way is open; one can even say that the structure of the world is such that abso1ute despair seems to be possible there.• (EA, 138)

Thus, the quest for oneseJf, which is the manifestation of the exigence, is free in so far as it is undertaken with the self­conscious recognition that it can fail, be betrayed, and the like: the quest is constituted as a "test" (epreuve) s and thus is always

i Cf. Hocking, op. cit., pp. 439-«0. i Ibid., pp. 46o-61. We would emphasize even more than Hocking that ~Marcel's

philosophy manilesls a system, of a certain order. s Cf. Pan! Ricoeur, Gabriel Marcel et Karl jaspers, Editions du Temps Present

(Paris, 1947), pp. lII-14.

16 MARCEL

a concrete act which has a fundamental "stake" (enfeu) consti­tuting it as significant, and thus as free. illtimately, this enfei' is me myself; I am "at stake" in my actions, and my actions are free in so far as I recognize this, which means in so far as I recognize that I can betray myself, deny myself, and so on, in my acts. (ME, I, u6-17; EA, 129-30) Since "it is essential to the test to beablenot to recognize itself as such," (RI, 102) the exigence can become masked to itself, it can fail to see itself as such, distort its own nature, and so on. This masking takes place, he believes, primarily by means of what he calls the categories of the "tout naturet" and the "n'imporle qui." (Cf., e.g., PA, 50) Taking myself as a "completely natural" creature, that is, as on the same level as "any other" natural creature, as a con­figuration of "functions" (vital, psychological, social, and the like), I become in my own eyes " just like anyone else" - and thus my exigence to seek myself as such loses its essential nature and direction, or, as he expresses it, I lose the sense of my own being. Instead of being directed inward, it leads away from me toward "Das Man," the "just anyone," and my quest for the sense of my own life becomes a sort of flight away from me, an inter­minable "window-shopping" for its own sake. If I am but a faisceau of functions (PA, 47) then I am like anybody else, and can know myself in a wholly objectivistic manner; and precisely thereby, I lose for myself the sense of my own subjectivity as a being in quest of itself.

At this level of the human condition, the exigence discloses itself as mere dissatisfacion, curiosity, and uneasiness. But, just because the exigence is essential, it cannot be completely masked, and thus man in the "natural" attitude is thrust into despair: being fundamentally a quest, an urgency, for himself, yet seeking himself within the "tout nature!" and the "n'importe qui," he becomes a dissatisfaction in a continual dissatisfying search for himself, thrust into a sort of carnival of "problems" which "everyone" has, with "solutions" in principle applicable to "everyone."

My world, the socio-cultural world into which I am born and in which I live, conduct my affairs, and die, is itself rooted in the categories of the "tout nature}" and the "n'importe qui," and seems even to encourage my desorbitation of myself as "merely

INTRODUCTION r7

functional"; it itself seems to discredit my genuine urgency to find myself, by urging me to the belief that, after all, I am "nothing other than" what "everybody else" is. And, thus, I am diverted from my quest into a kind of unending search for "solutions" to "problem," and my own essential mystery is obscured from me. Modern man, Marcel believes, has lost the sense of the mysterious; for him, "mysteries" are "old hat" of a bygone age. Nothing, in such a global situation, seems sacred, not even my own life:

The fact is that to the average man today, whose inner life tends too often to be a rather dim affair in any case, technical progress seems the infallible method by which he can achieve a sort of generalized comfort ... this generalized comfort ... seems the only possible way to make life tolerable, when life is no longer considered as a divine gift, but rather as a "dirty joke." The existence of a widely diffused pessimism, at the level of the sneer and the oath rather than that of sighs and weeping, seems to me a fundamental given fact about contemporary humanity '. . . a pessi­mism not so much thought out as retched forth, a sort of physical nausea at life .... (MAH, 42)

In the face of this wholesale despair, whose presence no more depends upon self-awareness than a kidney disease dep~nds upon the patient's awareness of it,l admits of no refutation on its own grounds:

In the end, an effective refutation must be impossible here: despair is irrefutable. There is place here only for a radical option, beyond all dialectics. (EA. 16o)

That is to say, only a sudden breakthrough, a fiat, can break the hold of naturalizing modes of thought - that of first reflection. For, within that sphere, there are no "reasons," no "grounds," nor any "persuading evidence" to the contrary. All I can do, Marcel argues, is opt: being "fed up" with the half-solutions to irresolvable "problems," having had "too much" of "everybody," I have open to me only a radical fiat, " I will not. .. I"

This opting, however, has equally radical consequences, for it bringsinto play "an ascending dialectic" which "bears at once on reality and on the being who apprehends it." (EA, 247) 2 That is to say, the question, "Who am I?" changes its significance,

1 Cf. Kierkegaard, The Sick11&~s U11lo Daa.Sk, Doubleday {New York, x943), pp. 154-161.

t Prini, op. cit., pp. 79-82.

I8 MARCEL

becoming now a sort of appeal, an asking which is essentially a calling-for a response. And, Marcel continues,

Perhaps to the extent that I become conscious of this appeal qua appeal, I am led to recognize tha.t this appeal is possible only because, within my O\'ill depths, there is something more inward to me than me myself - and at the same stroke, the appeal changes its sign.• (EA, 181)

Thus, when I recognize my own quest as an appeal, it again changes its significance, becoming now, Marcel later emphasized, a response to the appeal, to those depths within me which are "more inward to my self than me myself": my quest for myself becomes a response to that very appeal, in the form, fundamental­ly, of my vocation, my life. (ME, I, I87-zo5; HV, 256-60) My being, that is to say, is now recognized by me as a " being­beyond-myself'.: sum is sursum; etre is etre-en-route, or homo viator, (HV, 8-n) and the exigence which I sense as my innermost being becomes fully manifest to me as such, as the supreme moment of this ascending dialectic.

In this way, only schematically indicated here, the "system" intrinsic to Marcel's work stands out most clearly: it is the same which is manifest in human life itself. The "philosophical order" in a philosophy which has as its task the explication of the human condition can only be the "order" of that condition itself. In this sense, Marcel speaks of "a logic of freedom," which, he goes on, is a term not without its difficulties,

But it has the advantage of throwing light on this essential truth, that philosophical.progress consists in the series of successive steps by which a freedom, which is seized at first as the simple ability of saying "yes" and "no," is embodied, or, if one wants, is constituted as a real power by conferring on itself a content at the heart of which it discovers and recog­nizes itself.• (RI, 40)

Similarly, as Prini points out, the concept of "second re­flection" is precisely that of an "interpretation liberatrice," or, of a "logic of freedom," l which, by concentrating on the human condition in concreto, might well make it possible for man to come to a recognition of his own essential exigence and mystery.

This type of quest Marcel calls "concrete approaches." (MJ, viii) Methodologically, it is worked out by means of certain "categOTies." That is, as Marcel understands this term, what is

1 Cf. Prini, op. ci,., pp. 78-?9.

INTRODUCTION r9

lived by man concretely provides the access to the interpretation and comprehension of man's concrete condition. More particu­larly, since the task of his philosophy is to explicate the structures of concrete, daily existence,l an initial difficulty arises: if, as Alfred Schutz has shown, 2 man in his everyday, natural attitude does not make the style of his own existence as such thematic, then it is necessary to step back from this commitment in order to make it appear, and thus to explicate it. But, having done this, one is faced with the serious problem of descriptively explicating that style of being in its own terms. How is such a task accomplished?

For Marcel (and for Natanson as well, who has given an excellent and lucid statement of this whole problem in the work just cited 3) what is lived in concreto becomes at the level of philosophical scrutiny a category, an instrument, by means of which the former can be understood. By descriptively explicating lived experience as it is in itself, as it is lived (death, joy, hope; the body; and so on), the philosopher can comprehend the human condition. Natanson goes on: "The category is made possible by the experience and then the category makes possible the interpretation of the experience." 4 Or, as Marcel puts it, speaking of the categories of lived experience, his procedure consists "invariably . . . in moving from life up toward thought and subsequently descending back from thought toward life, in order to attempt to clarify the latter."* (ME. I, 49)

Thus, such experiences as that of "my body," being "in situation," being "with others," as well as the fundamental exigence over oneself, become for Marcel categories by means of which the human condition in its on-going course and style can be explicated. That such a task is extraordinarily difficult is certainly true, but that it is meaningless or impossible is not at

i Cf. Maurice Natanson, "Existential Categories in Contemporary Literature," Carolina Quarterly (1959), p. 20: he points out that one m.ust reflectively grasp and explicate his own style of belng·in-reality, his concrete "style of being in the world at the level of ordinary, commonsense life, so that lhe philosophical characte:c of that level of experience can be clarified."

2 Cf. Schutz, "Multiple Realities," PPR, Vol. v. No. 4 (June, 1945). pp. 55<r52: man in the natural attitude makes constant and non·thematic use of a specific epoche - of doubt: he suspends the doubt that the world and its objects might be otherwise than they are believed to be.

s Cf. Natanson, <>/J. cit., p. 23. ' Natanson, op. cil., p. 25.

20 MARCEL

all the case. Marcel's own work, along with that of many others, stands as living testimony to its possibility, but more, to its remarkable fruitfulness. As Hocking remarks, in fact , it is "an aspect of the broadened and heightened empiricism which may well be, in its completion, the major achievement in epistemology of this present century." 1

With these preliminary remarks, it is now possible to turn to Marcel's own study of the body.

1 Hocking, op. cU., p. 441.

CHA PTE R 11

THE THEORY OF THE BODY-QUA-MINE AS MYSTERY

The quest for an "existential indubitable," we have seen, locates one, to be sure, but it is an indubitable of a very strange type: while the explosive " j 'existe !" (or: "je suis manifeste," "es erlebt in mir") bursts forth with unmistakable energy, it yet presehts itself as fundamentally opaque. Being me myself as embodied by this body which is mine, I am unable to put it over against me; reflectively observing it, on the other hand, I only make thematic that very unity itself, with its intrinsic opacity. What does it mean for this physical organism to be mine? Do I "have" it like a triangle "bas" three angles? Or is there some other sense to the "mine" here ? Am I my body? Or, is it rather the case that " I" and "my body" are, not self-identical, but in some way " unified?" If they are not the same, but are unified, what kind of unity is it that combines this physical " stuff" with what is absolutely opposite to "stuff," namely, "me," or "mind?"

Such questions, Marcel believes, must motivate a complete break with what has by now become a traditional way of con­ceiving consciousness:

Break, accordingly, once and for all with the metaphors which represent consciousness as a luminous circle around which there would be only shadows. It is, to the contrary, the sbadow which is at the center.• (EA, 15)

This "shadow" is "my body" : Consciousness, being essentially embodied, is embodied by this specific individual body: my own animate organism. Hence, at the center of consciousness is a fundamental night, an opacity which is not transparent to itself - a mystery in the technical sense of the term,1 that is to

~ In a footnote to the same passage, written five years later, Marcel notes that he had a tendency to confuse "opacity" with "mystery," but that nevertheless he anticipated there what be was later to say regarding mystery. (EA, "15)

22 MARCEL

say, my embodiment. My body qua mine cannot be put over against me as a specific object ("problem") to be investigated according to the style of positive science. What the latter in­vestigates is not at all "my" body as lived by me, but rather "a," or "the," body - the body as a particular physico-chemical system defineable by means of natural scientific laws. "My" body, to the contrary, is a phenomenon disclosed only to "my" own experience of this organism. The problem, therefore, is to explicate this organism in so /ar as it is experienced by me as mine (and not in so far as it is merely one object among others, reveal­ing the essentially same anatomical-physiological structures).

There are, in Marcel's diverse studies of the body qua mine, several distinguishable moments or aspects to this phenomenon. Although he does not himself delineate these as clearly as one might wish, it is necessary, I believe, to treat them separately -recognizing that one unitary phenomenon is being discussed. Most generally, these moments are: r) the sense of my body's belonging to me, i.e., the bond between me and my body; and on this fundamental ground, three further moments: 2) the meaning of "feeling" or "sensation" (sentir); 3) my body as my insertion in the world (etre-au--monde); and 4) my body as my "repere" for all existence. We shall take up each of these in order.

(t) MY BODY QUA MINE

What does it mean for my body to be mine? Does my body belong to me in the same way in which my cat belongs to me, or the way in which my typewriter belongs to me?

For my cat to be mine, one might point out, it is necessary that it either live with me, in my house, or, at least, that it be lodged at some place where I have decided it shall live. Wherever it resides, I assume the responsibility for seeing that it is cared for. More than this, however: it is necessary that there be in some at least minimal sense a reciprocal relation between my cat and me. It must manifest in some way the recognition that it belongs to me (it obeys me and no one else, or, it shows in its behavior a certain affection toward me which it does not show in the same way toward others, and so on). Even Salamano, the remarkable character in Camas' L' et1'anger, "has" a dog; in spite, or perhaps just because, of their rather strained relations, Sala-

THE BODY-QUA-MINE 23

mano is genuinely grieved when his dog is lost. Is there in this mode of ownership an analogy to the type of possession that makes my body mine?

Marcel (ME, I, II2-14) believes that the analogy is a good one, and in considering it, we can come to see certain limiting cases beyond which my body would cease to be mine.

In the first place, as with my cat, I have an indisputable claim on my body: my body belongs to me and to no one else. Even in the instance of the crudest kind of slavery, Marcel contends, the slave still retains at least a minimal sense of his body still being his own, and this sense is perhaps one of the roots of the type of resentment felt by the slave toward the master. At the limit, the slave must feel his body to be his own, however marginally; else, Marcel points out, it would be highly question­able whether or not we could consider the slave still as human. This, he states, is the "lower limit." Here, the basic question must concern, we should point out, the nature of "feeling'' which motivates (phenomenologically) the apprehension of this body as "mine."

I also, we said, care for my cat; I feed it, see that it has proper exercise, and so on. Similarly, Marcel says, since my body is mine and no one else's, I have in the first instance the responsibility for providing for its subsistence. I must "maintain" my own body, by feeding, exercising, grooming it, and so on. My body is mine, in this sense, in so far as I '1ook after" it. The limiting case here is evidenced by a kind of total asceticism. In so far as I no longer look after the subsistence and maintenance of my body at all, it becomes questionable whether or not my body is any longer experienced by me as mine. The question, again, concerns the nature of those "feelings" in virtue of which I do experience my body as mine.

Furthermore, as in the example of my cat, I have an imme~te control of my body. As Husserl pointed out later, my own animate organism is uniquely singled out, in part, by virtue of the circum­stance that it is "the only object 'in' which I ',,uze and govern' immediately, governing particularly in each of its 'organs'." i It is that by means of which my " I can" is most immediately

1 E. Husserl, Carluian Meditations, translated by D. Cairns, Marti.nus Nijhoff (The Kague, 196o), p. 97.

24 MARCEL

actualized: wanting to raise the glass to my lips, this volition is immediately actualized by my body. But here as well, Marcel recognizes, there is a limiting case, in this instance an "inner" one: if I should lose all control of my body due to some illness or injury, it would cease to be my body, and~ in a sense, it would be meaningful to say ''I am no longer myself." (ME, L u4) l

The basic question here will concern the nature of this "acting" an.d awilling."

The analogy with my cat ceases, however, when it is recognized that, after all, my cat is external to me, it is spatio-temporally distinct from me, as my body is not. Nevertheless, Marcel insists, the question. of possession remains: What does it mean to have my body? In or.der to answer this question, it is necessary to raise the more general one: What does it mean to "have" something whatever? If this can be determined, it will throw light on the first question.

The senses in which "to have" are used, even legitimately, _are notoriously plentiful. We can say, for example, "I have an automobile, a dog, books, children, a wife," and the like; "I have the feeling that ... "; "I had a miserable time ... "; "I have an idea of what you are taking about"; "He has the measles"; "They have the right ... ";"the circle has such and such a radius"; "this thing has such and such a quality"; and so on. A catal0gue of these usages will not help us much, however; no amount of analysis of "common usages" will yield the essential character­istics of a phenomen0n. What we must do, Marcel maintains, is to consider these instances in which ''having is manifestly taken in the forceful and precise sense .... " (EA, 229) Doing this, Marcel believes that two such senses can be distinguished: ''having­as-possession" and "having-as-implication." 2 (EA, 229-30)

1 .As we shall see in Part III, much of the experimental matEirial to which Metleau­Ponty refers tends to support Marcel's views here - though he never makes use of such material- especially the phenomena .of agnosia and the "phantom-member" ·give credence to these "limiting cases."

2 This distinction, unfortunately, after having been made with the intent of develoI?ing it into a "Phenomenologie de l'avoir" (the title of the section of Etre et Avoir to which we are here referring, pp. 223-255), is to all purposes dropped immedi­ately after he makes it.

Au he says about "l'avoir-implication" is that everything said about "l'avoir possession" "s'applique entieremeut a l'avoir implication . . . ," (EA, 232) with the exception. that tile latter does -not seem to exhibit the kind of "puissance" whicll the former reveals.

TffE BODY-QUA-MINE 25

Since the type of having relevant to the problem of the body is the former (avoir-Possession), we must restrict outselves to this. And here, on the basis of Marcel's aClmittedly brief study, it is possible to delineate three moments or strata in all such having (Cf., EA, 2I9, and 230-34): I) One can speak of having only where there is a certain quid related to a certain qui, and where the latter appears as the center of apprehension and inherence for the relation; 2) in all having, it is necessary to speak in terms of a "within" ("dehors") and of a "without" ("dedans"); and 3) all having involves a reference to what is other qua other.

(a) The Qui-Quid Relation in Raving

Having is essentially a relation, between what is had and a haver. The former, speaking in the widest possible terms, the quid, presents itself as related to the latter, the qui, in such a manner that the qui is the center of inberence for the quid. This is to say that the qui is in some sense transcendent to the quid -"transcendent" in the neutral sense, descriptive of the circum­stance that the qui is on a different level or stratum than the quid, or, more simply, that the haver has the had and not vice versa (for the moment at least).

This quid-qui relation, however, is itself founded on a more fundamental relation of having: all having is built on the proto­typical relation where the qui is none other than me myseU:

Every affirmation bearing on a "having" seems indeed to be based in some manner on the model of a kind of prototypical situation in which the qui is nothing other than myself. It seems, indeed, that the having would be felt in its force, that it takes its value, only from within the "l have." If a "you have" or a "he has" is possible, this is only in virtue of a sort of transfer which, moreover, cannot be effectuated without a certain loss.• (EA, 231)

For every "I," the "he has" ("we have," and so on) are all derivative modes of having, founded on the "I have" and derived by means of a transfer of sense. This transference is from

It is clear, to be sure, that his real interest in this brief Esguisse is in "l'avoir­possession," since, he believes, it is this type of having which is really relevant to the problem o{ my body as possessed by me. Nevertheless, it must be stated, just because the problem of "haviiig" is so essential to his philosophy (Cf., e.g., MJ, 3r:c), it is regrettable that he did not see lit to inquire further into having-as-implication. (See also, MJ, 307-;313; ME, I , no-15; and EA, Part I, passim.)

20 MARCEL

the "I have" to the other modes, moreover, because of the nature of having itself. To "have" is to "have the power to," in the sense of "to have the disposal of" : "to have is to be able to (pouvoir), because it is indeed in a sense to dispose of (disposer de). Here, we touch on what is most obscure, and most fundamen­tal, in having." (EA, 2r7-r8) And, Marcel later emphasizes,

The latter is clarified somewhat when one thinks of the relation which manifestly unites the "having" to the "being able to," at least where possession is effective and literal. "Be.ing able to," or "having the power to," is something which I experience by exercising it or by resisting it -which, after all, is the sa,me thing.• (EA, 231)

Thus, the "I have" is fundamental just because "having" is essentially "having the disposal of," and the latter is funda­mentally something which I myself experience: I experience my "being able to . . . " (pouvoir), and this experience founds the relation of "having" as "having the disposal of."

"Avoir," considered as "pouvoir," then, involves a kind of "contenir": however, Marcel insists,

and this is central, the containing (le contenu) cannot be defined in terms of pure spatiality. It seems to me that it always implies the idea of a potentiality; to contain is to enclose; but, to enclose is·to prevent, it is to resISt, it is to be opposed to what can overflow, be spilled, escape, etc.• (EA, 231)

With this we arrive at a crucial point in the analysis: through the pouvoir we are able to make out, he contends, at the heart of avoir a kind of "suppr.essed dynamism" which shows most clearly the structure of what was called the transcendence of the qui over the quid. There is an irreversible .movement or direction (again, however, nonspatial) from the qui toward the qu,id, which appears as intrinsic or interior to the qui. This relation which goes from the qui to the guid in the first instance is revealed, Marcel notes, even in our language:

. The verb "to have" is used passively only in tnost exceptional cases. Everything happens as if we were in the presence of a sort of irreversible process going from the qui toward the quid. And, I add that it is not a question simply of a step accomplished by the subject reflecting or having. Not at all ; this process appears to be effected by the qui itself, to be inward to the qui. Here, it is helpful to pause momentarily, for we are approaching the central point. (EA, 232)

This "central point" to which these reflections carry us, constitutes the second moment of avoir.

THE BODY-QUA-MINE

(b) The "Within-Without" Relation

The structure of this movement shows that we can speak of a relation of having only where, in some fashion, it is possible to speak in terms of the "opposition du dedans et du dehors." (EA, 232) More particularly, "to have" is "to have to oneself," to "keep to oneself" (avoir a soi), and in this sense, "to conceal" (dissimuler}: the haver, by being in an irreversible relation t0 the had, has the had to himself. He has the book, and in this sense, he keeps the book to himself; it is his and no one else's. To " keep to 0neself," that is to say, is to keep to oneself over against another qua other, who is also capable of having. The relation reveals, thus, a tension, a "dialectique de l'interiorite," most clearly evident in the example of the "secret." The " tension' of the relation of having a secret appears precisely because

The secret ls a secret only because I keep it, but also, and at the same time, because I could betray it. This possibility of betrayal or of exposing it is inherent to it, and contnbu~s toward defining it qua secret. (EA, 233)

To have is thus to have to oneself over against the other qua other, and thus to be able to disclose what one has, to be able to dispose of it - witho'14-t, however, actually doing so, since then the relation of having would disappear. If I let the other "in" on the secret, my secret is no longer a secret, or at least it has lost much of its force.

In other words, it is essential to the very structure of having that there be a ''within" and a "without" which are kept separate yet together. 'Bhis tension is defined by the disposability of what is had: "The characteristic of having is to-be-ex.posable." (EA, 233) There is a "within" (me, the haver) and a " without" (it, the had), which essentially can be shown, disposed of, but which I must, as haver, keep to myself while keeping as well its character­istic of being showable to others without giving it to them. The secret is "showable," but not shown; I can at any moment show it, but so long as I "have" it in the full sense of the term, I do not show it, but let others know that I have a secret which I coiJ.ld reveal, if I chose.

To have, then, is to have in the sense of being able to betray the had, in the general sense in which what is had would no longer be ''had" if I let it go (whether it be a secret or a book, an

MARCEL

idea or a wife). This ever-present possibility of disposing of the had, of showing it, involves, thus, the more covert dialectic which makes of the had something which I have: my secret, for example, like the drawings which a painter keeps ever-ready in his portfolio, is mine, something I have, only in so far as I am recognized or acknowledged as "the one who has something" by others. The haver who has the had, has in addition the possibility of getting rid of it (showing it), which means that the haver has the had only in so far as he manifests himself as the haver before the none-havers.

(c) Having as "Before the Other qua Other"

The suppressed dynamism in all having is thusex posed: through the possibility of betrayal (disposal, being shown), there is a reference to the other; this reference, however, returns to its own source, i.e., to the haver, and constitutes him as a haver. For, after all, the had which this haver bas must be recognized by the other as had by the haver and not by himself. The haver most by essence be acknowledged as haver. Thus, having as such is a suppressed dialectic which maintains itself in the relation of having as a kind of play before the other.

But, this "other" need not be another man: this "other" may be myself, in so far as I take myself as the one who has something, ideas, books, my body, and so on.

In so far as I take myself as having in me, or more precisely, as having to myself ce.rtain c~aracteristics, certain attributes, I consider myself from the pomt of vtew of an Other to which I oppose myself only on condition of first implicitly identifying m.yself with him .... • (EA. 234)

When, for instance, I say to myself that I have certain ideas, I implicitly mean that my ideas are not those of everyone else, and this separation of "mine'' from "theirs" is possible only if I have first of all at least fictively assimilated the other's ideas, made them mine at least in pretence. Hence, Marcel concludes, it is essential to having to be a tension between ''l'exteriorite et l'interiorite."

Just because the "within-without" structure is essential to having, this inseparability is constituted for the haver as essential-1 y threatened. For, in so far as what is had is a "without" for a "within," and is maintained constantly as "without" (that is, as

THE BODY-QUA-MINE 29

"showable," "disposable," and the like). the had is essentially open to the possibility of being lost (stolen, destroyed, plagiarized, and so on), and this possibility constitutes what Marcel has called the tension of having, its suppressed dynamism. This threat intrinsic to having as such, he believes, reveals itself as the hold of the other qua other:

Without doubt there is in having a double permanence: of the qui, and of the qt1id. But this permanence is essentially threatened; ... And this threat is the hold of the Other qua. Other - which can be the world in itself - and in the face of which I feel myself so painfully as me. I hug to myself this thing which may be taken from me; I attempt desperately to incorporate it to.me, to form with it a unique, indecomposable complex. Desperately, vainly .... • (EA, 236-37)

The domain of having appears thus as that of despair. (Cf., RI, 76ff; EA, I49ff; PA, 48ff) For, the fact that the had appears as essentially exposed to loss, i.e., as threatened, means that the haver is caught up in a constant anxiety over what he has. He is forever "on the lookout" for possible dangers to what he has; and, as often happens, the more one attempts to secure the relation of having, the more one seeks to "insure" it against just that threat - which, constituting the had as had, increases in proportion as the "insurance" increases. In this sense, the haver seeks to close the gap between himself and what he has, to make it disappear and thus to achieve a privileged realm of being: that of the "secure." At the same time, however, in order for having to continue to be having, it is essential that that threat remain in full force; and thus, for Marcel, having is the core of despair. The essence of the quest for "security," Marcel might well have said, lies in its effort to transcend the domain of having by means of ... having itself! To bring the relation of having to an end through having itself is the mark of despair at the level of "first reflection;" and this is but another way of expressing the essential nature of prob1ematizing reflection.

However suppressed the essential nature of having may become, moreover, the haver as such is in some sense aware of the gap between himself and what he has, and it is only in this sense that such a phenomenon as "pride in one's possessions" can be understood. Only in so far as this gap remains, in fact, Marcel points out, can there be a "play before the other," a "play" which can be achieved only by having. Thus, while there

/ 30 MARCEL

are many levels of the "suppressed dialectics" of having, and many kinds of having, all these reveal the essential character­istics indicated.

This despair appears as more acute when we observe that to the same degree that the haver becomes thus attached to the had, the latter exercises a certain power over him. It "reaches back underground," Marcel says, to the haver and seems to absorb him - he, the very one who conferred the attachment in the first place. What promises relief from the anxiety over what is had, i.e., truly having and thus securing the had, turns out in the end to be just the opposite, bringing him to despair. Like ;Mrs. Gereth in Henry James' The Spoils of Poynton, the pos­sessions seem to absorb, to exercise a tyranny over the haver, a tyranny which this very possessing itself confers on them. Yet again, as Kierkegaard so clearly saw, even this tyranny is a futile one, for it can never reach its goal:

The fact that despair does not consume him is so far from being any comfort to the despairing man that it is precisely the opposite, this comfort is precisely the torment .... This precisely is the reason why he despairs - not to say despaired - because he cannot consume himself, cannot get rid of himself, cannot become nothing. This is the potentiated formula for despair, the rising ofthefeverin the sickness of the seli.l

But now, we must return to the question of the body: we must now ask what it would mean for my body to be something which I have. Unquestionably I can, by means of first reflection, take my body as something I have in the above senses; and just this happens, Marcel contends, when I take my body as a "problem" or as an "object." In this sense, I look upon my body as some­thing which I use, which I have and by means of which I am able to manipulate things: I possess my body, and, possessing it, I possess the things it has. 2 My body would then be an instru­ment whose use I happen to have, though, all such bodies being essentially alike, I might just as well have had the use of any other one. The question thus is: Is my body an instrument ?

An instrument, of whatever particular kind, is essentially a

1 S. J{jerkegaard, TM Si&kness Untci Death, op. cit., p. 151. Cf. EA, p. ISO, where Marcel agrees wholeheartedly with Kierkegaard's analysis of despair.

2 As William James had expressed it: "What possesses the possessor possesses the possessed." Principles of Psychology, Volume I , Henry Holt and Co. (New York, 1890), p. 3~0.

THE BODY-QUA-MINE 3I

means of extending or of strengthening a certain power or ca­pacity for doing something. The instrument, that is, is intei:posed between what is acted upon and that which does the acting with or by means of the instrument (the hammer, for example, is between me and the board). What does this interposition signify?

One thing can be interposed between two other things, one term between two other terms, and so on. But, can my body be thus interposed ... between what and what?

When I say that my body is interposed between me and things, I am only expressing a pseudo-idea, because what I call me cannot be identified with a thing or with a term.1 Of course it is possible to say that my body is interposed between a body A which affects it and a body R on which it reacts. But in that case what happens to me, to the subject? The subject seems to withdraw into an indeterminate spheYe from which it contemplates -without existing for itself - the anonymous play of the universal mechanism. (MJ, E-0, 332)

In the end, to attempt to consider my body as an instrument is to become involved in a quicksand of absurdity:

When I make use of any kind of tool, in reality I do no more than prolong and specialize a way of behaving that already belongs to my body (whether to my limbs or to my senses) ... Not only is the instrument relative to:my body - between the instrument and my body there is a deep community of nature. But given these conditions can I treat the body itself as an instrument? As soon as we get to grips with the meaning of this question we discover that we are obliged to imagine a physical soul furnished with powers and faculties; and the mechanical terms, to which my body seems reduced, are really only prolongations or transpositions of1:hese powers or faculties. (MJ, E-0, 333)

If, that is to say, we are to consider my body as an instrument of which I have the disposal for a period of time, then the same relation must obtain between me and my body as that between any instrument and that for which it is an instrument: namely, a " deep community of nature." They are of the same kind: hence, I, who have this body as my instrument, must be of the same kind as my body. Either, then, one considers me as physical, or the body as spiritual. But, in either case, we land in absurdities and distort the actual state of affairs, where, descriptively, the body is not "mental" nor the mind "physical."

Hence, either we are condemned to an infinite regression (of physicalinstrument of a physical instrument, and so on), or else we

L Precisely this interposition was implicit in traditional conceptions of sense peiceiving, and thus in the various theories of the body implied in such theories.

32 l\IARCEL

stop, quite arbitrarily, along the way and say that the last term in the series is the instrument of something which is not itself of the same nature as the instrument which it has and uses. But then the whole problem simply returns to the one with which we began; that is, the "way out" of the difficulties simply begs the question. The problem here, Marcel believes, can be seen and explicated only in terms of lived experience: in what sense is my body mine? Taking it as an instrument avoids the whole issue.

A body, certainly, can be considered as an object , since "a" body is, precisely, no one's (or, anyone's), and hence a possible instrument, a tool which can be used (as when a master uses his slave to build his castle). But, if I attempt to take my body as an instrument, I simply lose the sense, "mine." Accordingly, Marcel argues, to the degree that I take it as an instrument, I treat it as not-mine. Qua mine, my body is not an instrument, nor an object over against which I would be a subject. Taking it as an instru­ment is the position of most traditional thought, as well as that of "first reflection"; taking it as mine is the position recovered by means of "second reflection." In this sense, second reflection is not a rebuttal of the results of first reflection ; rather it is a re~ covery of the unity lost by first reflection, it is a recollecting (recueillement) of the pieces which were scattered by first re­flection. 'What, however, is here recovered ?

My b0dy qua mine is not something which I have: rather, it is the prototype of having, it is " the first object, the prototype of object ... and it seems indeed that we here are at the most secret, the most profound, core of having. The body is the prototype of having." (EA, 237) In this sense, Marcel wants to speak of an "absolute instrument." My body is not itself either an object, an instrument, nor something had, but is that which in the first place makes possible any having whatever, any instrument, any object. (Cf., ME, I , n2- r4; MJ, 248) Am I then in an immediate relation to my body? Denying that my body is an instrument, and hence that it is not a tern in an instrumental relation, do I therefore deny all mediation between my body and me?

To suppose . . . that I can become anything whatever, that is to say, that I can identify myself with anything wbatever, by the minimum act of attention implied by an elementary sensation without the intervention of any media#ion whaJsoever, is to undermine the very foundations of spiritual life and pulverise the mind into purely successive acts. But I can no longer

THE BODY-QUA-MINE 33

conceive this mediation as being of an instrumental order. I will therefore call it "sympathetic mediation." (MJ, 246) 1

The problem here is to attempt to get at the experience which this "sympathetic mediation" describes.

It is evident that, in the first place, Marcel wants to say that the type of relation which binds me to my body is not of the same type as that which obtains between two objects or two instru­ments; that it is not, furthermore, a relation of having. What, then, is this relation?

While my connection to my body "is in reality the model, not represented but felt, to which all possession is related," (ME, I, n3) it is not the case that this connection is itself a manner of possession.

The .truth .is rather that witliin all possession, of every kind of possession, there lS as it were a felt kernel, and this nucleus is nothing than the experience, in itself non-intellectualizable, of the connection by means of which my body is mine.• (ME, I, n3)

But obviously, this does not help us too much, since it is precisely that "lien" which must be explicated. There is, however, an important clue in Marcel's statement: the "noyau senti" is, he says, precisely "the experience ... of the connection by means of which my body is mine." In so far as my body is "l'avoir­type," it is experienced as "le pouvoir-type," that it is to say, as the ensemble of powers. This ensemble, however, is more than a mere aggregate or collection of abilities ; rather, we must say, "each of its powers is only a specification of this unity itself," (ME, I , n5) the unity, namely which is completely sui generis and which "constitutes my body qua mine." (ME, I, u3-14)

It is, then, this unity which must be focused upon. Negatively, Marcel states,

. My body is min~ for as much as l do not look at it, as I do not place any interval ?etween 1t and me, or rather for as much as it is not an object for me, .but 1n so fa~ as I am my body ... To say 1 am my body is to suppress the interval which, on the other hand, I re-establish if I say that my body is an instrument.• (ME, I, u6)

Furthermore, he goes on, to say that I am my body qua mine is not to say that I am that body which is an object for others, the one which others see, touch, and so on. This body, he contends,

~ li!arcel notes twenty-five years later that he still has not found any better way of expressing what he has in mind here. We shall have to reconsider this later on.

34 MARCEL

is as much other for me as for them - i.e., it is le corps-objet. When, therefore, I say that my body is mine, !mean that I am my body, but only "for as much as I come to recognize this body as not , in the last analysis, being assimilable to that object, to an object, asnotbeingsomething." (ME, I , II6-17) Thus, we must distinguish from the "corps objet" the "corpssujet." The latter, my body qua mine, he goes on, is my embodirn.ent, "the situation of a being who appears to himself as fundamentally, and not accidentally, connected to his body." (ME, I , II7) This embodiment is the fundamental meaning of the "mediation sympathique" of which Marcel had spoken earlier in his Metaphysical J o•urnal.

Now, as we have noted earlier, there are certain limits beyond which my body ceases to be mine - that is to say, beyond which my body ceases to be experienced by me as my embodiment. The meaning of these limits can now be stated: "my body qua mine presents itself to me as felt ; 1 am my body only in so far as I am a being who feels (im etre sentant)." (ME, I , II7)

In order to determine what Marcel means here by "senti" it is necessary to go back to his investigations in the Metaphysical ] ot4rnal, the only place where he attempts to penetrate this phenomenon:

. . . it is essential to disentangle the exact meaning of the ambiguous formula: " I am my body." It can be seen straight away that my body is only mim inasmuch as, however confusedly, it is felt. The radical abo.lition of coenesthesia, supposing it were possible, would mean the destruction of my body in so far as it is mine. If I am my body this is in so far as I am a being that feels. It seems to me that we can even be more exact and say that I am my body in the measure in which uiy attention is brought to bear on my body first of all, that is to say before my attention can be fixed on any other object whatsoever. Thus the body would benefit from what I may be allowed to call an absolute priority.

I only am my body more absolutely than I am anything else because to be anything else whatsoever I need iirstof all to make use of my body .... (MJ, 243)

In this central passage we have perhaps the best (albeit the only) clue to the meaning, for Marcel, of "sentir." For him, as is clear, it is only in so far as "je sens mon corps" that it is experienced by me as mine, and the "sentir" here refers to the way in which my body is given to me in "internal perception," as when I sensuously perceive myself as tired, hungry, energetic, and so on. (MJ, 19: here, Marcel says outright that "coenesthetique"

THE BODY- QUA-MINE 35

feelings of internal perception account for my body being experi­enced by me as individually mine.) Thus, in order to feel anything else, I must first of all feel my body as mine; in this sense, my body is given to me as absolutely prior. My body is that by means of which there are other objects which can be felt. It is this priority, moreover, which is expressed in the formula that my body is the prototype of all having (as well as of all instrumental relations, and of all object relations). Being the absolute condition in this sense, it cannot itself be at the same level as having (correlatively, as that of instruments, or of objects in general).

Thus, we can say, my body is mine in so far as it is experienced by me through the mode of sentir Marcel calls coenesthesique - a notion which we shall have to examine at a later point. To say that I am my body, then, is to say that I maintain with my body the sui generis relation of "mediation sympathique," i.e., of embodiment. Embodiment, finally, is always being-embodied (etre-incarnee), which is to say, experienced-embodiment - i.e., embodiment is mediated by means of "sentir," a sentir which is given to me as absolutely prior to everything else.

This analysis is only part of the whole story; on its ground, it is necessary to delineate three further strata of Marcel's theory of the body.

(2) THE MEANING OF SENTIR

As the t erm Marcel uses indicates, he is not talking of "feeling" in the sense in which it is said, in English, that "to feel" is "to touch"; Marcel does not use the French toucher or tater. Never­theless, what he has to say as regards sentir in respect of the body qua mine has a direct bearing on what one usually understands by sensuous perception (i.e., so-called "outer perception"). For, since the sentir of the body-as-mine is fundamental to all other modes of sentir, what holds for it must hold for the latter as well. However, it must be emphasized that Marcel, as we shall see shortly, undertakes no positive theory 0f sensuous perception, beyond several hints;l his real interest is rather in determining the essential nature of sentir as such than in developing a detailed theory of the nature of sensuous perception. That such a theory

l Hints which, incidentally, we shall find more fully developed in the theory of Merleau-Ponty, although, characteristically, Merleau-Ponty does not mention Marcel.

MARCEL

is at least implied in his work seems evident from the circum­stance that he develops his views primarily by means of a penetrating and decisive critique of traditional theories of sensu­ous perception.

Essentially, all such theories (and, in our day, even the "view" of commonsense) have the same schema, what Marcel calls the "message-theory." To sense something is to " receive" certain data from it; sentir is taken to be a sort of "message" transmitted from one pole (for example, a flower) to another pole (for ex­ample, the sensitive membrances of the nose) . Something is emitted by the one, which then travels or is transmitted under objectively determinable conditions and is received by the other, and is there "translated" into the "language" of sensation (in the case of the flower, into "olfactory language"). In this sense, we are inclined to conceive the act of feeling as a sort of com­munication like that between two telegraph poles. (MJ, E-0, 327) To perceive something with the senses is to gather in specific nformation from, and about, it.

When we use the terms, "to·receive," "to emit," and so on, we compare the organism to a pole to which a certain message comes. More precisely, what is gotten by this pole is not the message itself, but an ensemble of data which can be transcn"bed with the help of a certain code. The message in the strict sense, indeed, implies a double transmission, the first being produced at the point of origin (the sensed object) and the second at the point oi termination (the sensitive organism) .... • (RI. 37)

Whatever modifications there have been among the various theories, it is this schema which holds for them all.

Now, Marcel contends, this entire mode of interpretation breaks down in its own terms. In the first place, is it possible to conceive sensation as a "message" which, on " reception" by the sensitive pole from the "emitting" pole, is "translated" into the appropriate " language?" This, he contends, is absurd:

We are dupes of an illusion when we confusedly imagine that the re­ceptive consciousness translates into sensation something which is initially given to it as a physical phenomenon., as a disturbance for instance. What, in fact, is "translation"? To translate is in every case to substitute one group of data for another group of data. But, the term, "data," requi,res that we take it rigorously. The shock experienced by the organism or by its members is in no way a datum; or more precisely, it is a datum for the obs61'Ve1' who perceives it in a certain manner, but not for the organism who suffers it.• (RI, 37-38)

THE BODY-QUA-MINE 37

For the percipient to be able to translate, it is necessary that he have before him the set of data to be translated and the set of data into which the first is to be translated, and this is itself inconceivable on the grounds of the theory itself - the first set of data is by definition not at all given to the percipient. And, if it were, there would ne no need for the translation. If one were to say that the physical disturbance transmitted by X to Y is received by Y as an " unconscious," or "non-noticed," datum, this merely pushes the same problem back a stage: in order to translate the unconscious or non-noticed datum into a conscious or noticed one, whatever this might mean, it would be necessary for the first to be given to the percipient as a datum, be readily accessible to him, and just this is ruled out by the theory at the outset. An unsensed message is not a message at all. If it is called " irreducible" and "unanalysable," then, again, it is not a message since to be a message is to admit of translation.

This "message-theory," it is clear for Marcel, comes about via first reflection - in this context, through the assumption that the act of feeling or sensing is, not an act at all, but passive reception, and that it occurs by means of a series of terms or objects, and hence can be interpreted along the lines proper to the sphere of objects.1 The thing sensed, and the sensation, as well as the sensing organism, are all equally "objects." From the perspective of first reflection, such a view is inevitable. For, first reflection invariably takes the body as an instrument (however "privileged" it may be thought to be), and for this reason, " it must needs appear to be interposed between us and objects, and we are therefore convinced that it mediatizes our apprehension of objects ... " (MJ, 258) In this way, all sentir appears as funda­mentally mediatized, conditioned by a series of mediations at the level of objects. Thus, the transmission of messages (any instru­mental act at all) is actually a kind of object-mediation.

Io take the body as instrument, however, is to exclude this body as mine, and hence to exclude the act of feeling as, not only an act, but as my act - the "fe sens." When the situation of

.i Once again, it should be noted in advance that Marcel's criticism reappears in almost identical form in both Sartre and Merleau-Pooty. From bis earliest writings, Marcel never altered this fundamental criticism, and it reappears as such in each of bis major works.

MARCEL

sentir is apprehended by second reflection, however, Marcel believes that it becomes necessary,

to recognize that the initial assumption must be placed in doubt, and certainly not be compared to a message. This is the case for the fundamen­tal reason, that every "message" supposes a sensation at its base -precisely in the same manner as any instrument, as we have already seen aetually presupposes my body as pre-existant to it. (ME, I, n4)

And here, Marcel emphasizes, as soon as we bring my body back into the sphere of sentir by means of second reflection, we are forced "to the affirmation of a pure immediate, that is to say an immediate which by essence is incapable of mediation," (MJ, E-0, 329) and thus, of a non-mediatizable immediate. (ME, I, r25) The act of sentir which inseparably connects me to my body (the "fe sens") is non-mediatizable precisely because it is itself the founding stratum of all mediation whatever, it is the act of feeling beginning from which the feeling of anything else is made possible, and in this sense it is an Urgefuhl. (M], 247) As such, it is not itself characterizable in the manner prescribed by the message-theory of first reflection. However, being non-characterizable does not mean, Marcel points out, that this primal feeling at the basis of all feeling whatever is indetermi­nate. It means rather

that the mind when confronting it cannot ad"f'l without contradicti<m the attitude that is needed for characterizing something. (MJ. E-0, 330)

The body, then, as an Urgefuhl, cannot be regarded in terms of instrumentalities, messages, and the like. This being the case, it becomes necessary to alter our very notion of sentir. This revision takes us over to the third moment of the body-qua-mine.

(3) MY BODY AS P.TRE-A.U-MONDE

If a sensation or feeling is not a communication nor a relation between two " poles," then Marcel believes, "it must involve the immediate participation of what we normally call the subject in a surrounding world from which no veritable frontier separates it." (MJ, E-0, 331- 32) The initial mistake of the message-theory is to presuppose such a frontier: on the "outside" is the world, and on the "inside" is me. But, what meaning "outside" and "inside" can have, is a question which was rarely, if ever, even posed; and, if it is asked, amounts to absurdity. Furthermore, on the

THE BODY-QUA-MINE 39

basis of this assumption, it became necessary for that theory to give an account of how it happens that I, being " inside," and some object, being "outside," ever could be related to one another. Since, according to the principle of division, I can never "get outside my skin," then, in order to be able to sense such "outside" objects, it must be that they "come to me" -and the way in which this path is traveled, while variously conceived (from the eidolon of the Greek Atomists to the "sense­data" of classical and modern psychology), is always from the object to the percipient subject. To feel, or sense, is on this view always to suffer, to receive passively.

But, if the initial assumption is unjustified, especially in its own terms as Marcel shows, then sentir does not mean "to suffer," it is not a "passive reception" of a something supposed to be "out there" impinging on me who am "in here," but is to the contrary to participate - that is to say, to receive, but in a quite different sense:

To receive is to bring into one's home someone from the outside, it is to introduce him ... to feel is to receive; but it would be necessary immediately to specify that to receive, here, is to open myself, and consequently to give myself to, rather than to suffer, an external action.• (RI, r22-23)

To receive, in the case of sentir, is to receive in the sense in which a host receives his guests into his home. It is necessary, that is to say, to take " reception" and "receptivity" here in terms of a certain prior willingness, or being able, to make oneself open to what is to be received. (ME, I, 134) One "receives" by means of sentir, but only

in relation to a self, who can moreover be the self of another - and I understand by "self" someone who says, or who is at least supposed to be able to say, I, positing itself or being posited as I ... Still, it is necessary­thls is here, even, what is essential - that this self experience as his a certain domain.• (RI, no)

Thus, one senses objects by receiving them into a domain which is by essence felt as his own, that is to say, only by means of his body felt (senti) as his own. Only my body senses; "a," or "the," body does not feel anything, it is the body of "anybody". To perceive is always an "I perceive," a "je sens." "One receives in a room, in a home, strictly, in a garden (dans im 1·ardin): not in a vague place, the countryside or in a forest." (RL, 120) To receive, in this sense, is for Marcel to participate.

40 MARCEL

And, it is this notion of participation which, he believes, will allow us to understand the fundamental act of feeling - that it is an act and not a mere enduring or suffering, an act in the sense of the "je sens," "a non-objective participation." (ME, I, 130) It is clear, however, that there are gradations of participation, ranging from, for example, sharing in a birthday cake, sharing in a business corporation, to the fundamental mode of partici­pation which Marcel calls "non-objective," such as when one " takes part" in an event like the marriage of one's close friend. In the latter case, one cannot define participation merely in terms of the number of persons objectively present at the same time and place. Rather, he argues, the participation depends on something else, a sort of "idee" -that 01 the marriage, friendship, or of some social "tause," and the like - which "idea" itself makes the participation possible, is that in terms of which the participation emerges. At the level of sentir, however, one cannot speak of such participation: from the participation which emerges on the basis of an event, it is necessary to distinguish one's willingness to participate in it in the first place, that is, "participation immergee." (ME, I, 130) Before one can take part in it genuinely, he must have already made himself available (disponible) or open to such participation. The latter, moreover, is possible only "on the basis of a certain consensus which, by definition, can only be felt .... " (ME, I, r32)

This level of sentir is still not that manifested at the level of the body. It refers, rather, to the kind of bond which unites, for instance, the farmer to his soil, the shipmaster to the sea, the artist to his creation, and the like. Thus, to participate in some undertaking, a task of some sort, with one's whole being, is possible in this sense only because of, or on the ground of, a sentiment which is in reality a bond uniting one to his task and to others who also participate in it. That is, the feeling here is in fact a coesse, a "Bei-sich-sein," an act of feeling which is perhaps best rendered in French by "accueillir," or even better, Marcel adds, by "responsivite." (ME, I , 135) Only in terms of this responsivity, this coesse, is the undertaking made worthwhile, and it is a "being-with" without which it would be impossible to endure the trials, risks, and failures of the undertaking. The question for us at this point, however, bears on the relation of

THE BODY-QUA-MINE

this "feeling-participation" to the "feeling" uniting me to my body.

Once we have seen that feeling cannot involve a communi­cation of a message, but to the contrary that all communication presupposes feeling, in this sense, it is no longer possible to interpret feeling in terms of in/onnatio'>i. Feeling is not a "sign" or "symbol, it does not give us information about the world or about objects in the world. To the contrary, Marcel states, "To feel is to be affected in a given manner .... " (MJ, 187) That feeling can be regarded as a sign giving information, is of course quite true; but, Marcel emphasizes, what we must note is that this is in reality a step beyond the immediacy of feeling, it is an inter­pretation placed on the fact of feeling and an interpretation which fractures that immediacy. It is, in short, from the pers­pective of first reflection, from that of the body-as-object, that feeling appears as a message. (RI, 38-39; MJ , I87-88)

When we, by way of second reflection, recapture that immedi­acy and original unity, however, we see that to feel is not to suffer, but rather to act, that it reveals at its center an activity, a making-of-oneself-open-to ... , a taking upon oneself (assumer), an accueillir. In short, sentir is participation, and the ground for this participation is my being-embodied, my embodiment by this body which is mine. Finally, to be incarnate is to be ex­posed, or open, to the world, to objects in it; and, in this sense, to be sensitive to objects is to be present to them, to be "at" them, to belong to the world by participating in it by means of my body. This fundamental stratum of sentir Marcel calls my etre-att­monde. l (RI, 33) To "ex-ist" as an "alterite d'emprunt," then, is to manifest oneself to the world as embodied by one's own body, and thus is to be exposed to the world, to its seasons, its elements, its course and influences. As embodied, not only do I become able to engage myself in the world by means of bodily activities; I also and just because of that, open myself to the world's actions on me. I partake of the world by means of my fundamental sentir which connects me to my body, and by means that, to the world itself. In this sense, I can act on the world by means of my body only because I can also be acted upon by the

i This category, as we shall see in Part lTI, forms the essential stratum of the body· proper for Merleau-Ponty - though he does not refer to Marcel in this connection.

42 MARCEL

world, by its objects. My etre-i1icarnee then, as etre-au-monde, "must be understood as a participation, not at all as a relation or communication." (RI, 33)

This brings us to the final moment of the body.

(4) MY BODY AS THE REP~RE OF EXISTENCE

When Marcel discovered the "exclamatory consciousness of existing," he believed that he had discovered as well the "repere" of all existence as such. It is now possible to see why he comes to this. To say that my body ex-poses me to the world as such is to say that "my body is in sympathy with things . .. that I am really attached to and really adhere to all that exists - to the universe which is my universe and whose center is my body." (MJ, 274) Thus, he goes on, to say that something exists is to say that I maintain relations with it which are of the same type as those that I maintain with my body; that, in other words,

To say that a thing exists is not only to say that it belongs to the same system as my body (that it is connected to =y body by certain rationally determinable relations); it is to say that that thing is in some fashion united to me as my body is united to me. (EA, n)

A thing exists for me, he stated earlier, only if it in some way is a "prolonging of my body." (MJ, 245) In other words, to think of a thing as an object, that is as being indifferent to me, as not taking account of me, is to alter its character as existent for me. "Existence and Objectivity," as the title of his essay appended to his Metaphysical J <>t-£rnal runs, are mutually exclusive terms. Thus, to speak of "existence" as an "object," a "datum," as for instance John Wild does,1 is for Marcel self-contradictory. "In reality," he points out, "existence and the thing that exists are obviously inseparable," (MJ, E-0, 321) and the thing which exists is bound to me in the same type of relation by which I am united to my body. This relation is preciselythat "participation non objec­tive," the relation ofsentir, which we have explicated. In this sense, Marcel can speak of the body as being in sympathy with things, that my body is thus the center of all exists, and that a thing is or becomes an "object" only by being disregarded qua existent.

Accordingly, "The first indubitable," Prini points out, "is not

1 "Phenomenology and Metaphysics," in: The Return to Ruison, edited by j obo Wild, Beary Regnery Co. (New York, .r953), pp. 49-55·

THE BODY-QUA-MINE 43

thought as a reflection or doubt, but the presence of my corporeal sensibility as anterior to doubt itself." 1 And, this presence is at once the prototype of existence and the "repere" of existence. Thus, at the center of the universe, my universe, Marcel claims to discover a fundamentally non-transparent and non-mediatizable immediate, one which is presupposed by all mediation just because this immediate is absolute, making all mediation possible. (MJ, 275)

This discovery is the discovery of mystery, of the domain of the metaproblematic, and makes necessary the

very important distinction between data that are susceptible of forming the occasion for a problem - that is, objective data- and data on which the mind must be based so as to state any problem whatsoever ... Sensation ( = the fact of feeling, of participating in a universe which creates me by affecting me), and the intellectually indefectible bond that unites me with whatl call my body, are data of this second kind. (MJ, E--0, 338)

To say, accordingly, that I am incarnate in my body qua mine is to say that in some sense I am my body, or, more moderately, that it is not true to say that I am not my body, that my body qua mine is an object or thing. I am my body. This signifies, Marcel says, that

I am my body only in virtue of mysterious reasons which account for my continually feeling my body and because this feeling conditions for me all other feeling ... This feeling seems bound up with real fluctuations that scarcely seem to me to be capable of bearing on anything save on the body's potential action, its instrumental value at a given moment. But if this is so my body is only felt inasmuch as it Me-as-acting: feeling is a function of acting. (MJ, 26o)

Thus, as Bergson had already pointed out, and as both Mer­leau-Ponty and Sartre will say later, my body is mine only because it is "me-as-acting"; and, the world exists only because it is there for my acting on it, in so far as I am embodied as a "felt" system of actions for which objects form a "context" of poles of action. The "feelings" which unite me to my body are thus a "function of acting"; were it not for the fact that my body is the most immediate manifestation of my fundamental "I can," my body would not be experienced by me as mine

In this way, through the four moments of my body-qua-mine, Marcel believes that he has at least circumscribed the funda­mental meaning of "my body."

1 Prini, op. cit., p. 42.

CHAPTER Ill

CRITICAL REMARKS

It is most difficult to entertain many serious objections to a body of thought as fresh and original as Marcel's. Inspired by a rare intellectual integrity and exigence for truth and clarity, he unquestionably ranks as one of the major figures in contemporary philosophy. Because of this, though, those who take it on them­selves to examine such work in a critical manner, however constructively, must always, it seems, appear to themselves as not a little pretentious. On the other hand, just because such a thinker discloses hitherto unsuspected horizons and dimensions of our experience, it becomes possible and even necessary for others to "see for themselves" what has thus been opened up; and, thus, it becomes possible to accept the invitation to "check" the philosophical insights with the phenomena themselves. Just as Descartes invited the critical minds of his day (those who were willing and able, he states in his Preface to the Meditations, to set aside their own beliefs and prejudices) to read through with him the course of his thought, and thereby see for themselves the legitimacy of his claim to have discovered a new territory, so, too, Marcel gives us an open invitation to follow along with him. As Descartes' invitation prompted a voluminous correspon­dence, so Marcel's work must prompt equally serious consider­ation.

Unfortunately, however, at least thus far, the real originality and significance of his philosophical work has not received the recognition which it merits, especially by Sartre and Merleau­Ponty. As for the latter, it will soon become apparent how seminal~arcel's achievenrent;-fur;asr~-tundan1enlai insights, hardly anythingnew is aa<ioo by either of his younger contemporaries, particularly as regards the prOble~ the.body.

As for fhe former, many of Marcel's interpreters have pro-

CRITICAL REMARKS 45

ceeded on the assumption that, being a Catholic (though a converted one, his conversion taking place after the publication of the Metaphysical jowrnal, in which much, but not all, of the ground-work for his later thought was set out}, Marcel's philo­sophical work is essentially relig!ousi iJL ~ ~~risti~s, I submit, j§ a mis.take, one pointed _9ut by Marcel himsefi when, in his Lettre-Preface to Pietro Prini's book, he praised M. Prini for having

the very great merit of going back to the source of all my metaphysical development, quite beyond all explicit adherence to the Christian reli­gion .... 1

And, much earlier, Marcel explicitly affirmed that

It is quite possible that the existence of fundamentally Christian data would, in fact, be required in order to permit the mind to conceive certain notions which I have attempted to analyze. However, one cannot say, certainly, that these notions would be dependent on Christian revelation -Jhese notions do not presuppose it. (PA, 89)

Thus, it is quite necessary to take Marcel at his own word, and _not to preinterpret such categ_ories as "mystery," "exigenee," and the like, as Christian. It would perhaps be better to say just the reverse: the human condition, while it may be the mundane source of religion, need not be taken as necessarily motivating any specific religioU.s views whatever. In fact, Marcel himself comments at one point that he thinks it quite possible for a non­Christian to be able to adhere consistently to the essential features of his philosophy, and even to have come to this on his own accord. The question regarding the religiousness of his work is entirely separate from that of its philosophical merit.

On the other hand, O..lliL!ll~t not preinterpret Marcel as...an "existentialis~," Qf. wh.atever sort. Here again, we must heed Ma.reel himself. In ~e same place in his Lettre-Pref ace, he again praises Prini for havingrefrained from consideiing llls- work--in "la dangereuse etiquette existentialiste." 2 And, in his important "Author's Preface to the English Edition" of his Metaphysical Journal, Marcel states his belief that he has to his satisfaction disspelled the belief that he is a "Christian existentialist."

1 Prlni, op. cil., p. 7. 2 Idem., Ibid. In a talk, "Religion and-Philosophy," given at The Rice University in

Houston, Texas, on November 4, rg6r, and in a personal conversation with me follow­ing this lecture, M. Marcel vigorously re.affirmed this point, as well as the necessity for distinguishing his philosophy from bis religion.

MARCEL

All of these warnings only ~int ..QU.!_ the necessity for con­sid~hiS wof1f as a strictly philosophical endeavor, and it is in thi.s_.spjrit that we shall enter_!afu severcil Critical remarkS. We must keep in mind as well, in the course of these remarks, that Marcel at no time in his career professes to have worked out the definitive solutions to any of the "metaproblems" he has tackled - particularly as regards the body. He even confesses with not a little reluct-ance that -he-has lefLmosLaLthe-WOrk to be done by others, claiming only to have opened up the grounds. Our critical remarks, then, are intended only to fill some of these gaps, take up some of his hints, and follow out some of his sug­gestions.

It will, however, be best to leave to the side any and all minor problems or confusions, and attempt to go straight to the heart of his inquiry into the body. Our comments, therefore, concern only what we consider to be the essential theory.

(x) THE RELATION BETWEEN 'FEELING' AND 'ACTING'

Restricting ourselves, then, to the phenomenon, "my body qua mine,'' there is little doubt what the essential question is for Marcel: ~~sit !D~n_.t.o_ca.ll...my..bod..Jt-mi.neJ Or, synony­mously, In virtue of what do I experience my body as mine? Bergson had recognized the necessity of posing the problem of the relations of mind and matter in terms of the body. Marcel, agreeing with this {though he apparently arrived at it inde­pendently of Bergson), goes a step further: it is not simply a question of the body, but of etnb-odiment. To talk of "the body as lived" is to talk of the body ~ embodying me, the one whose bodyttis.

Although we have been able to delineate four stages of his analysis, his response to the question is really two-fold: I) on the one hand, my body is mine, and thus, it embodies me, in virtue of its being "felt as mine," this "feeling" being described by him as coenesthetic; 2) on the other, my body is experienced by me as mine only in so far as it manifests my actions in an immediate fashion, or by means of "sympathetic mediation." It is, in his tenns, my body's potential actions, its "potencies," that found my feeling my body, and thus that found my experiencing of my body as that which embodies me in the world.

CRITICAL REMARKS 47

~t, when it comes to describing, on the one hand, each of these phenomena themselVes, -ano on the other, the relation between them, Marcel seems more inclined to hedge the issues than to come directly to terms ~th th~. The way be states them shows this most clearly.

For him, one can only say that if feeling is a function of acting, then these two are "inseparable." Or, in other terms, "sympa­thetic mediation" (that between me and my body) is "insepa­rable" from " instrumental mediation" (that between my body­as-acting and things-as-acted-upon). (MJ, 247, 258) The former, we have seen, he calls a "non-mediatizable immediate"; the latter, on the other hand, is a certain exteriorization of force or energy. (MJ, 258) Since the former is itself an act, though, we must distinguish two distinct kinds of acts here: the act by means of which I grasp my body as mine (i. e., the act which he calls the "Urgefuhl"), and the exteriorized act, the actual gearing into the world. He recognizes, however, that it would be a crucial mistake to interpret these two acts as corresponding to an "inside" and an "outside." For, as is implied at least in his analysis, in the first place, just as I cannot sense anything other titan my body without feeling my body itself (through certain coenesthesias), so there is no exteriorized act apart from the fundamental UrgefiiJzl whereby my body is felt as mine. In the second place, although that is true, my body is felt as mine only through the act of exteriorizing or emitting a certain force or energy - the actual gearing into the world with a bodily acting.

But what, after all, is this "inseparability?" Let us grant, for the moment, that the two phenomena in question are as he describes them. The question is, are "feeling" and "acting" on different levels? This would seem to be what Marcel wants to say when he describes the one (feeling) as a "function" of the other (acting). On the other hand, when he states that there can be no "instrumental mediation" without "sympathetic ediation," and vice versa, it would be incorrect to say that they are on different levels. And, if the Urgefuhl is really fundamental for my apprehension of this body as my body, then in what sense can he state that this "feeling" is a "function" of "acting?" Is the relation between these two mediations one of functional dependency? Finally, is it correct to speak here of "mediations?"

MARCEL

It seems to me that Marcel has confused two very diff~nt phenomena. In the first place, t;.kmg these terms in the way in which Marcel does, if there is no acting without at the same time feeling, and if there is no feeling without at the same time acting, tlle~tl:ie-one cannot beJ aken as a "function,., of the other. That is, if I can feel my body as mine only in so fat as there is bodily acting going on, and if this bodily activity could not go on without my feeling my body as mine - then, it seems to me, we must speak here of a relation of mutual foundedness. Each of these is a "function" of the other; an a.rm which I would not "feel" when it was moved would not be "my "arm, any more than I would experience as mine an arm which could not be moved by me.

In the second place, moreover, to interpret this relation (itself incorrectly described by Marcel) as he does, as "mediating" my body to me and thereby me to the world and its objects, is to confuse this phenomenon of mutual foundedness with another, completely different, phenomenon. The Urge/uhl (whatever may be its specific nature, and we have not yet turned to this), whatever else it may do, does not, as Marcel thinks, mediate my body to me; rather, we must say, it embodies me. Marcel speaks quite correctly of my itre-incarni as the fundamental phenomenon here; but he then goes on to say that "feeling'' and "acting" mediate this embodiment, forgetting, apparently, that embodiment is itself a sui generis type of relation. To say, in other words, that I experience this body as mine, is to say that it embodies me immediately.1 There is no room here for any mediation whatever. Marcel's insistence on this term may very well be a carry-over from his early, but not completely successful, struggle with Hegelian idealism.

Now, to say that these two relations, each of which is sui generis, obtain here, is not to say, as is implied in Marcel's argu­ment, that there are two acts, the one of "feeling" and the other of "exteriorization" - and thus, it is incorrect to speak of an "inseparability.'' Rather, there is only one act, or, rather, there are two aspects of a single, on-going act; that is to say, the act of

1 See, for example, Husserl, Idem JIU einer reinen Phdnomenolo~ie un~ .plldnomeno­wgiscMn Philosophie, Zweites Buch, Husserliana, Band I V, Marti.nus N1Jhoff (Haag, 1952), pp. 236-47.

-

CRITICAL REMARKS 49

embodinient is a complex, on going affair. On the other hand, just because we must speak here of an act, that is, of a process, one which goes on (and goes on, moreover, continuously), we must say, over and above what has thus far been stated, that em­bodiment is not an occurrence which is "once done, forever done." For, it is always possible to become dis-embodied, and even to become dis-embodied in a partial manner (as, for instance, by means of a partial paralysis, or artifically by means of an­esthetization). This indicates, it seems to me, that the fact of embodiment is descriptively one of animation.: my body is not just a ''body" (eiti Kerper), but is rather an "animate organism" (ein Leib). Thus, we can say, to call my body an animate organ­ism is to say that I am embodied by it by means of a complex act: this single act reveals (thus far, at least) two components, feeling and acting, which are related in the relation of niutual foundedness. The mutual foundedness of feeling and acting, conversely, or the fact that I always feel my body as mine only in acting and that in acting I feel my body as mine, is but another expression for the other aspect of the act of embodiment. It is in virtue of the mutual foundedness of this feeling and acting that I experience only this specific animate organism as mine; but the relation between feeling and acting must not be confused with the relation of embodiment.

(2) THE MEANING OF BODILY ACTING

Thus far, we have been assuming as given several crucial phenomena: both the "feeling" and the "acting." Let us now grant that there is an Urge/fi-hl of some kind (without prejudging what it might be) and inquire into what Marcel calls "acting," namely the exteriorization of a certain force or energy.

We have already suggested briefly that this exteriorization signifies that my animate organism is given to me as the most immediate actualization of my volitional activity. As Husserl expressed it, we saw, my organism is the only object in which I rnle and gover-n immediately. In this sense, it actualizes my fundamental "I can." What, we must now ask, is the structure oi this actualization ? And what does it signify for my organism?

Let us recognize first of all that there is an ambiguity in Marcel's analysis, one due to his otherwise quite legitimate

50 MARCEL

concern for the "What am I ?" It is not the case that, because my body is experienced by m e as mine, I , this specific person or ego, grasp what he calls the UrgefuJzl, or even that I can appre­hend it straightforwardly (and on that basis recognize i t as mine). I do not say that Marcel argues this way; rather, it seems clear that he simply takes it for granted. For, in stating that " I feel my body" as mine, that my body is "m~~acting," and so on, he does not see clearly enough that the most originary conscious­ness of this body as my animate organism is not at all a spon­t aneous, active, "Ich-ackt," but is rather a consciousness of it at an automatic or pr~personal level.1 That is to say, my organ­ism is given to me, this concrete person, as having already always been mine (and thus, for example, I am often astonished over certain hitherto undiscovered parts of it, or I am often unable to recognize my hands when I see a picture of them, I find my recorded voice "strange," and so on). When I reflectively con­sider my body as mine, it presents itself as already mine; that is to say, it has this sense for me. Thus, it seems to m e incorrect, or at least misleading, to say that "I am my body," in whatever sense. To say this is to confuse the sense or m eaning which this animate organism has for me (namely, "mine"), and the "I" who recognizes his animate organism as "mine." In other words, those processes which give this animate organism the sense, "mine," are not at the same level as those which explicitly apprehend this animate organism as "mine," those by means of which it is grasped as "mine": the former are automatic, the latter spontaneous.

With this clarification, we can now proceed to the phenomenon of " exteriorization," or, as we prefer to say, of the actualization of strivings. These go on continuously and in many different ways throughout the course of my on-going living. And, in the great majority of cases, I myself neither actively attend to most of them, nor actively "will" them as such. Concentrating on a passage in a book, the itchy place on my neck gets scratched quite automatically, without in the least interrupting the course of my attention. Walking in the street, my feet quite automatic­ally push ahead one after the other, while I perchance am busied in a conversation with my friend. Again, when I advert to my

1 Cf. Husserl, Cart&ian MeditatWrls, op. cit.,§§ 38-39.

:

CRITICAL REMARKS sr headache, not only does it give itself to my active attendings as "having been going on all along" (though I was not attending to it), but also it gives itself with the sense of having been disliked, having been uncomfortable, and so on, though I was not at the time actively disliking it .

The distinction between "active" and "automatic" conscious­ness is not, of course, a rigid one. Described in terms of Bewusst­seinserlebnisse, some of these show themselves as having an "ego-quality"; that is, I "live in" some of them, directed toward their respective objects, while as regards others I am perchance only marginally aware of their respective objects, and finally, there are some "in" which I, this person, cannot "live. "1 The distinction, then, is rather one between two poles of a continuum than between two sharply distinguished spheres. 2

This distinction holds for the whole sphere of mental activity. Thus, as Husserl points out, not only are there automatic per­ceivings (as, when I am perceiving the typewriter, there goes on an automatic perceiving of the floor beneath my feet, of the movements of my fingers, and so on), but also there are auto­matic strivings, likings, dislikings, and so on. s And, among the automatic intendings it is necessary to distinguish between "habitual" ways of perceiving, "habitual" attitudes, likes and dislikes, and the like, and what Husserl calls the sphere of "primary automaticity." 4 Thus, I may have certain habitual ways in which I pick up objects which I see (I reach for the book with my right hand), but the correlation between the tactual and visual fields is not at the same level. As we shall see, the phenomenon of exteriorization, of "acting," is fundamentally encountered in the automatic sphere, and more particularly, it is descriptively a primarily automatic process.

The point of this all-too-brief discussion is that Marcel ap­proaches the phenomenon of "acting" at much too high a level:

1 Cf. Husserl, ldeen .ru einer reinen Phdnomenologie und pluinomenologischen Philosophie, Erstes Buob, M. Niemeyer (Halle a.d.S., i913), § 92.

i Cf. Husserl, Formale und Transsend,;uale Logik, M. Niemeyer (Halle a.cl S., i929), §§ 3 and 4.

a Cf. Husserl, Erfahru11g und Urteil, Red. und Hrsgn. von L. Landgrebe, Claassen Verlag (Hamburg, 1954), pp. 73-74·

• Husserl's term is "Pa.ssivitdJ;" as Prof. Dorion Cairns points out, though, this does not mean "inert" or "inactive." Hence, the besl translation is "automaticity." Cf. Carlesian M editaJicms, § 38.

MARCEL

"exteriorization" is in the first instance an automatic phenome­non, such that strivings are actualized immediately by my organism in an automatic fashion, and only on this basis is it then possible for me, this concrete person, to advert (zuwenden) t o my organism and grasp it as ''Me-as-acting," as well as to develop certain bodily habits, postures, and attitudes.

But there is more to be said here. For, if my body thus gives itself as the most immediate actualization of my strivings (I want to pick up my pipe and already my hand moves out and grasps it), then my body itself has the sense for me of being what Husserl calls a "Willensorgan". That is to say, my animate organism is that single body which is movable in a spontaneous fashion, while all other things can be moved only mediately, that is, by means of my organism; it is that which produces movements in other things. In this sense, my organism has the sense of being a system of "potentialities" or "abilities" by means of which the automatic, and at a higher level, my spontaneous and active, strivings are actualized. To the extent that I am embodied by this body, then, its "powers" (Verm6gm) are my "powers." 1

In short, my organism has the sense "mine," in this respect, in virtue of the fact that it is automatically constituted (synthesized) as being that which most immediately actualizes my strivings, and in particular (though Husserl in this work had not yet clearly seen this) of automatic strivings.

Thus, the act of embodiment, of the animation of this specific animate organism, is most immediately accomplished by means of the actualization of primarily automatic strivings. Hence, we must say, it is incorrect to say that the Urgef1#,hl is correlated with "me-as-acting"; the " exteriorization" takes place already, and fundamentally, at the automatic level, before any " I­activity" occurs. The relation of mutual foundedness between the "feeling" and "acting" obtains, then, not between an Ur­gefultt and the " I, " but rather between the former and certain automatic processes of consciousness.

In our general conclusions, we shall have to return to this phenomenon.

L Husserl, Ideen, II, op. cit., p. 152.• rt should be noted, though, that here Husserl had not fully discerned the automaticity of the actualization of strivings. He speaks, instead, of the "'6ine11 Tell'' as that which ~has these "potencies" or "powers." See the Appendix, p. :a65-66, for the full passage.

CRITI CAL REMARKS 53

(3) THE MEANING OF THE URGEFUHL

However, the above being the case, a further, more basic, question arises: Granting now that my body is a "Willensorgan," what are those "feelings" which arise only by means of my body's actualization of strivings? For Marcel, we have seen, they are " coenesthetic," though, again, it must be recognized that he is as always quite tentative, and only commits himself to this position several times in his writings. (CF. esp. MJ, 19, and 243) Elsewhere, he merely describes it as "smtir."

That there are such data is certainly true; but, it seems to me, there are more fundamental "feelings" which are directly correlated to the body as a "Willensorgan." Suppose I (to con­sider an example in the sphere of activity) "will" to close the door: I set aside whatever I am doing, stand up, cross the room, and, grasping the door with my hand, swing it shut. Or (to con­sider an example from automaticity), in the course of my on­going writing and thinking, "I" reach out and pick up a package of cigarettes, pull one out, light it and begin to smoke - while all along continuing my train of thought and perhaps even writing.

If we examine these "exteriorizations of a certain force" more carefully, it seems possible to describe their occurrence in more detail. Willing to close the door, this global volitional conscious­ness "sets in motion" a whole series of component processes: laying aside my pen, standing up, walking across the room, reaching out to grasp the door, swinging my arm ... Similarly, in automatic strivings, a global volitional consciousness l sets going a whole series of component processes, all having their own intrinsic place and significance in the total context of movement which I called "reaching for my cigarettes."

Looking at any one of these component processes, it presents itself to reflective observation as a certain "flow" or "pattern" of movement, essentially connected to the entire context of movement. More particularly, any one of these actualizations of striving sets in motion certain patterns of kinaesthetic flows (Ablaufe).2 Willing to close the door, there is actualized a series

1 Because we call this consciousness "global" does not imply that it is vague or ambiguous (though it may be); rather, it indicates only that there is a total intention which_bas component parts.

2 Cf. Husserl, Idem, II, op. ciJ., pp. 56, 128.

54 MARCEL

of kinaesthesias which, as in every case, has an "if-then" style: "if" my hand is moved (and, with it, "if" its members [fingers] are moved) in specific ways, "then" my pen will be released and placed on my desk; "if" other kinaesthesias connected with my trunk and legs are set in motion, "then" the clair on which I am sitting moves back and the upright posture is actualized; "if" I then set in motion strivingly certain locomotive kinaesthesias, "then" I move across the room; and so on. As is obvious from our experience, however, we do not have to attend to each phase of these movements. In other words, this "if-then" style is funda­mentally automatic, it is the style of experience which conscious­ness undergoes at every moment, whether or not "I" am actually engaged in these processes, or whether or not I even can become so engaged.

The analysis could be detailed much more, showing how each component pattern of kinaesthesia is constituted as a compenent, and more particularly, how eaeh be,comes constituted for consciousness as the actualization· of a certain typical kind of movement (setting in motion such and such kinds of kinaes­thesias "in" my bead as that which will actualize such and such types of changes in my visual field, and so on). The point to be made here, following Husserl's hints in his Ideen, II, though, is that not only are these kinaesthesias, or kinaesthetic flow­pattems, functionally correlated with certain W ahrnehmungs­empfindungen (if I tum my head. in such and such a manner, then such and such visual "objects" appear)l but also, and more importantly for our purposes, these kinaesthetic flow-patterns are themselves; in their correlation with perceptions, experienced by consciousness, "felt" as Marcel puts it, in the sense of being urgefuhlt. That is to say, the acflualizauon of strivings in the form of kinaesthetic flow-patterns (of whatever specific kind, head­movements, finger-movements, torso-:movements, and the like) is itself experienced by consciousness as that by means of which it becomes embodied in that specific "LeibktJrjer" which immediately actualizes its strivings. by gearing into the world as perceived. Hence, if we are correct here, it is not at all the case that coenesthetic data form the Urgefuht for which Marcel seeks as the fundamental "feeling" in virtue of which my body is experi-

1 Cf. Idun, II, pp. s1-s8, u8.

CRITICAL REMARKS 55

enced as mine. These, if anything, are at a much different ievel (constitutively) than the kinaesthetic flow-patterns.

We must note, however, that Marcel's analysis of the body as the "avoir-type" seems to suggest the phenomenon which we are here pointing out. He maintains that my body is established as mine by means of a "noyau senti" which, he goes on, is the "experience. . . of the connection by means of which my body is mine." (ME, I, u3) This "felt nucleus" establishes my body as the prototype of all having; "having," in turn, as we have seen, is "having the power to .... " (pouvoir-type) Thus, this "felt nucleus" indicates, we may say, that the body as mine is a unified ensemble of powers or potentiaVities; each particular "power," in turn (as, for instance, my being able to grasp objects with my hand), is a particular specification of that unified context of powers which is my body, (ME, I, 113-n5) that is, each such power or potency is what it is only within the unified totality of all my body's potencies. To say, as Marcel does, that the relation between me and my body is a "sympathetic media­tion," or that my body is a "non-mediatizable immediate," and so on, is, then, to suggest that these organized and unified potencies (that my body as the "avoir-type" and "poi4voir-type") are experienced as that which embodies me but which I cannot make into "objects," in the etymological sense of the term. Seen in this light, these potencies are indeed "felt," but are not specific types of coenesthetic data but rather are kinaesthetic flow-patterns which are experienced or "felt" as that which places me in a world of objects: they embody me "at" the world by actualizing my strivings. This, then, is the fundamental signification of what Marcel calls my "etre-aUrlnonde."

It is not the case, then, that these kinaesthesias are themselves "objects'·' for consciousness; rather, it is by means of them that consciousness directs itself to "objects" as transcendent to itself; they are lived, not "looked at." As Husserl points out in the passages referred to in ldeen, II, the "data" in the various sensuous fields are given as functionally correlated with the kinaesthetic flows, in an "if-then" style. Nevertheless, it seems to me, and I believe this is what Marcel is pointing to (albeit in a vague way), these kinaesthesias are themselves experienced by consciousness - such that, as we shall see later on, in every

MARCEL

perceptio1i o/ an "external" object, the orgatiism is always co­perceived:

in every experience of spatial, corporeal objects, the animate or­ganism, as the perceptual organ oi the experiencing subject, is co­perceived "al<mg with it" .... • t

Accordingly, not only is my body constituted as a Willensorgan, as the actualization of automatic strivings, but it becomes constituted for consciousness (i.e., it acquires the sense) as that "with" which consciousness perceives, and on that basis, it becomes that "in" which consciousness "rules and governs im­mediately.'' My animate organism, thus, is a ''/reibewegtes Sinnes­organ," both a "Willensorgan" and a "Wahrnehtnungsorgan." 2

To say, then, that I experience my body as mine in so far as it is "felt" in its exteriorizing of force (Marcel), is to say that my animate organism ha.S · th:e sense "mine," is the experienced embodiment of consciousness, because it is uniquely singled out s for my experience as a "freely-moved and -movable organ or complex of organs'' which at once, and on that basis, actualizes my strivings and is that by means of which there is a world of sensuously perceived and perceivable states of affairs.

We have indicated in the preceding pages certain ambiguities in Marcel's analysis of the body qua mine, and have suggested that it contains highly suggestive clues which point to a more detailed explication of this phenomenon. In the sections that follow, we shall be attempting to determine whether the analyses of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty can take us any further along in our effort to develop such a detailed theory of embodiment. In our final conclusions, we shall, of course, have to return to Marcel and the others in order to state in a more systematic manner the principle characteristics of this phenomenon which have been discovered by these thinkers. On that basis we shall be in a good position to outline systematically a phenomeno­logical theory of the animate organism.

1 !"en, II, op. cit., p. I4+. This, indeed, explains the mediati:ting role which the body bas according to Marcel.

• Ibid., pp. xs1-s2. :i Cf. Ca.rwia.ti M edilaiions, op. cit., § 4+

PART 11

) SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY OF THE BODY

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

To understand Sartre's theory of the body, it is necessary to place it in the context, first of his general ontology and second in that of his theory of intersubjectivity. In the first place, _as is well-known, two of the three "ontological dimensions" of the body- the body-of-the-Other and my body-for-the-Other - make their appearance, ontologically, only subsequent to the encounter with the other.l The appearance of the Other as "dans son corps," indeed, is itself made possible only in and through my own "objectite," my own being made an object by the Other's "look." Making an object of the Other presupposes having been made an object by him.2

In the second place, Sartre seems to contend that the other, the first, dimension of the body - my body-for-itself - is as well subsequent to the encounter with the Other. This would seem to be the case, on the one hand, in view of the fact that Sartre's discussion of the body follows his development of the encounter with the Other. On the other hand, passages like the following seem to argue as well for this interpretation:

If, therefore, being-looked-at, apprehended in all its purity, is no more connected to the body of the Other than my consciousness oi being a consciousness (in the pure effectuation of the cogito) is connected to my own body - then it is necessary to consider the appearance of certain objects in the field of my experience (in particular the convergence of the Other's eyes in my direction) as a pure monition, as the pure occasion for the realization of my being-looked-at.• (EN, 336)

That is to say, the encounter with the Other is, as we shall see shortly, accomplished ontologically prior to the appearance of any ontological dimension of the body.

1 L'Etre a le Nianl, Librarie Galliard (Paris, 1943), p. 40s. (Hereafter cited textual­ly as EN.) Cf. also pp. 335-36.

1 Cf. EN, p. 347. We shall return to these points in the second section of this chapter. The author is responsible for all translations of Sartre. The original texts of important passages will be found in the Appendix.

60 SARTRE

Finally, the theory of the Other is .itself but a part of Sartre's general ontology and cannot be divorced from that. Accordingly, before we shall able to explicate the theory of the body, we must consider, though quite briefly, the principle features of his ontology and of his theory of intersubjectivity.

(x) SARTRE'S ONTOLOGY

The theory of th.is encounter with the Other rests, it seems to me, on a particular series of oppositions intrinsic to his ontology and derived from his criticism of the Cartesian cogito: while the subject-object and object-subject relations are possible, the subject-subject and object-object relations are impossible. We shall return to this later in more detail. For the moment, it is necessary to point out that the possibility and impossibility of these oppositions rest on a very specific way of regarding "know­ledge" (a view which, as I hope to show later, is founded on a transformation of the Cartesian position) :

If I am looked-at, in fact, I have a consciousness of being an object. But this consciousness can be produced only in and by the existence of the Other. In this respect, Hegel was right. However, this Other conscionsness and this Other freedom are never given to me [i.e., there can be no subject-subject relation] since, if they were, they would be known, and thus objects, and I would cease to be an object.• (EN, 330)

"Knowledge" is defined by the "subject-to-object" relation. As such, for Sartre, it is subsequent to and founded on the "object­to-subject" relation (i.e., the Other's making an object of me), (EN, 347) which is a relation of "being." l

It is therefore necessary to understand Sartre's rejection of the primacy of "knowledge" in order to explicate meaningfully his theory of the Other, and therefore his theory of the body. This rejection is attempted in his famous "Introduction a la Recherche de l'Etre."

Accepting the Husserlian conception of consciousness as intentional, Sartre then states, as his point of departure: "If the essence of the appearance is an 'appearing' (un "paraUre") which is no longer opposed to any being, there is a legitimate problem

1 "And whenl posit naively tbat it is possible tbat I am (without giving an account of this) an objective being, I implicitly suppose thereby the existence of the Otb~­for, bow can T be an object if it is not for a subject? Thus, the Other is, in the fust instance, for me the being for whom I am object, that is to say the being by rohom I acquire my objectivity." • (EN, 329)

INTRODUCTION 6r

of the bei1ig of this appearing." (EN, I4) But, he goes on, this "being of the phenomenon" cannot itself be the "phenomenon of being''; one cannot pass from the existent to the phenomenon of being like one passes from "red" to the genus, "redness." On the one hand, the phenomenon of being cannot be merely one of an object's properties, since the being of the object is the being of allits parts eqqally. The phenomenon of being, then, is neither a particular property of an object, nor is it the genus of which the being of the phenomenon would be the species. But neither, on the other hand, can one say that the phenomenon of being is the essence of the object in question: if by "essence" one means sub­stantia, then, according to Sartre, it itself would never appear (since this could be known only by means of attributes) ; if one means the "meaning" of the object, then, again, it would be necessary to inquire into the being of this "essence." All one can say of the object as regards its being is: "it is!" Its only manner of being is. . . to be. In short, Sartre argues, the existent refers only to itself, it designates itself as an organized totality of qualities and determinations. "The existent is a phenomenon; that is to say, it designates itself as an organized ensemble of qualities ... Being is simply the condition of all disclosure: it is 'being-in-order-to disclose' and not 'being-as-disclosed'." * (EN, rs)

If one were, in the manner of Heidegger, to pass from the ontic to the ontological, all one would have done is to set the very same problem back one stage: the phenomenon of being supposedly reached itself turns out to be but something appearing, something disclosed, an appearance, "which as such, in turn, requires a being on the ground of which it could be disclosed." (EN, ibid.)

With this position, Sartre bas already set the stage for his criticism of the primacy of knowledge: if, in attempting to make the phenomenon of being itself appear, all I acquire is, again, the being of a phenomenon (having its own phenomenon of being as its condition of appearance) , then it must be that the phenome­non of being cannot be made an obfect for inspection or reflection. It cannot be placed with.in knowledge, since knowledge requires just that distance. In Sartre's terms, the phenomenon of being is "transphenomenal,'' and since knowledge is only and essential-

62 SARTRE

ly "phenomenonal" 1 (a relation of consciousness to a phenome­non), being is "more fundamental" than knowledge: " ... The being of the phenomenon, although coextensive with the phe­nomenon, must escape the phenomenal condition - which is, to exist only for as much as it is disclosed- and, consequently, it overflows and founds the knowledge which one has of it." • (EN, 16) Hence, the being of the appearing is not identical with the appearing itself. Sartre is not, however, arguing for a sort of ontological esse est percipi. He rejects this possibility for two reasons:

(1) As regards the percipere, one can and must always recognize that every knowledge of something is itself something that is. Knowledge itself is, and as such "the being of knowledge cannot be measured by knowledge; it escapes the [condition of the] 'percipi'." (EN, 17) Similarly, if one maintained that being is revealed in acting, "still it would be necessary to establish the being of the acting before action." (EN, 17, footnote l) Hence, Sartre concludes, the being of the percipere must itself be trans­phenomenal.

This transphenomenal being, neverthless, is the being of the knowing subject; and, since its mode of being is precisely to­be-consciousness (since knowing refers to knowledge, which refers to consciousness), "Consciousness is not a mode of particu­lar knowledge, called intimate awareness (sens intime) or know­ledge of self, but rather the dimension of the transphenomenal being of the subject." (EN, 17) Thus, consciousness is the being of the subject, and not its being-known; and, knowledge is not primary, but is grounded on being - consciousness is something more than a mere knowledge turned back on itself (reflection). To be a particular knowledge, consciousness must first of all be; as regards its knowing, we must then say, Sartre argues, that knowing is the mode of being of conscim,sness.

Now, consciousness, as Husserl had seen, is essentially in­tentional and positional: it transcends itself in order to reach an object and is, Sartre's characterization continues, exhausted therein. That is to say, as Sartre interprets this, it is nothing but

1 In spite of the Kantian tone of this argument, Sartre would, I believe, deny any parallel between his terms and Kant's "phenomenal.noumenal" distinction, main­tainiDg that "phenomenal" derives from Husserl What "transphenomenal" can mean, however, is a difficult question, as we shall see.

INTRODUCTION

this transcendence of itself toward objects. Though not all consciousness is knowledge, all knowing consciousness can only be a knowledge of objects. "However," Sartre contends,

the necessary and sufficient condition for a knowing consciousness to be consciousness of its object is that it be a consciousness of itself as being that knowledge. It is a necessary condition: for if my consciousness were not a consciousness of being a consciousness of a table, it would then be a consciousness of that table without consciousness of being so. Or, if you will, it would be a consciousness which would be ignorant of itself, an unconscious consciousness - which is absurd. It is a sufficient condition: for my consciousness of being a consciousness of that table suffices in1act for my being a consciousness of it. That certainly does not suffice to perm.it me to affum that that table exists in itself - but rather that it exists for me.•.1(EN,18)

This consciousness of being consciousness of ... , is not itself reduceable to an idea of an idea ... , a knowledge of a knowledge ... ; this would merely introduce into consciousness the "subject­object duality, which is typical of knowledge." (EN, 19) Further­more, to interpret this type of consciousness as knowledge involves the dilemma: either we stop arbitrarily at one term in the series - known, the knower known, the knower known by the knower, and so on - which is absurd and unjustifiable; or else we become involved in an infinite regress - which for Sartre is equally absurd. Thus, " if we want to avoid the regression to infinity, there must be an immediate, noncognitive relation of the self to itself." (EN, 19) Consciousness of self is not dual: every positional consciousness of an object, in Sartre's terms, is at the same time a non-positional consciousness of itself as being that specific consciousness which it is. This condition of every consciousness, then, makes it possible for reflection itself to occur: "there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito." (EN, 20) Descartes' mistake, indeed, Sartre pointed out in his essay on the transcendental ego,2 was to have believed that the ego and the ego cogito are on the same level, when in truth, at the level of non-positional consciousness, there is no ego.

However, Sartre continues, it is not that there are two distinct consciousnesses joined together in some fashion. Rather, every

l Sartre does not attempt to justily or establish this position .here; this task is reserved for the first few sections of the text.

' The Transcendence of the Ego, Noonday Press (New Yorlt, 1957), cf.. pp. 50-53.

SARTRE

particular consciousness whatever is necessarily a non-positional consciousness of itself, and thus Sartre elects to use parentheses to express this ontological fact: consciousness of an object is at the same time non-positional consciousness (of) itself as being consciousness of the object. This, in fact, is "the only mode of existence which is possible fO'T a consciousness of something." (EN, 20)

Accordingly, if consciousness is in this manner essentially an intentional directedness to objects and a pre-reflective conscious­ness (of) itself, the essence of consciousness is to exist in this double manner: as Sartre will say, consciousness exists itself. Finally, consciousness as thus conceived exists as an absolute interiority: it can be limited only by consciousness, and it is through-and-through a consciousness (of) itself as being conscious­ness of objects.

(2) The second reason Sartre refuses to accept the Berkeleyian dictum as applicable to his own ontology stems from the being of the percipi. Although the being of consciousness has been uncovered, can consciousness provide the foundation of what appears to it qua appearance? The percipi refers to the percipiens, and thence we arrived at the being of consciousness; but what of the being itself of the appearing: can consciousness provide this?

The being of the thing perceived is not reduceable to any of the adumbrations of it, for it (e.g. the table) is perceived in each of these synthetically connected adumbrations. "The table exists before consciousness and cannot be assimilated to the knowledge which is had of it-for otherwise it would be conscious­ness, that is to say a pure immanence, and it would disappear as table." (EN, 24) Thus, it is legitimate and necessary, in Sartre's view, to seek the being of the percipi. Even if it is rel::i.tive to the percipiens, to the knowing of it, it is still necessary to seek beyond its " being-known" for its "being."

If, as Sartre claims (but does not, it should be noted, establish), the being of the percipi is passivity (a "doubly relative phenome­non" - relative to an activity on the passive thing, and relative to the existence of the passive thing itself which suffers the activity}, then consciousness, which.is pure activity, can in no way act on it, on a passivity, nor can the passive thing genuinely

INTRODUCTION 65

modify or act on consciousness (as, for instance, Descartes had maintained). Consciousness, Sartre contends, is "complete activity, all spontaneity. It is precisely because it is a pure spontaneity, because nothing can get a bite on it, that conscious­ness cannot act on anything."• (EN, 26) Hence, the dictum, esse est percipi, cannot be correct.

Furthermore, he argues that Husserl's attempt to solve this problem by introducing passivity into the noesis (in the form of the non-intentive component of the Erlebnisstrlim, the hyletic data) is to no avail. Consciousness does not create them, and, for that matter, it does not even perceive them as such, since they are forthwith construed (aufgefasst) as appearances of objects. Consciousness transcends them towards objects: where, then, do these beings come from? If they are en-soi, then the identically same problem reappears again: How can a pure spontaneity act on them? 1

Thus, the problem remains: What is the being of the percipi? Being passive, it cannot be relative to the percipiens, for it exists whether known or not. This being cannot be reduced to a series of appearences of being; the being of the phenomenon is not the phenomenon of being.

At this point, Sartre introduces his well-known "ontological proof" in order to establish the transphenomenal being of the phenomenon. The clue to this "proof" is precisely the pre­reflective being of the percipiens.

To say that consciousness is intentional, Sartre believes, means that either consciousness is constitutive of the being of its object, or that is by essence a relation to a transcendent being. Sartre argues that the first possibility destroys itself: subjectivity, being essentially a pure interiority, all activity and spontaneity, cannot "part from itself in order to posit a transcendent object," in such a way that impressions of it are made into qualities of an

1 Sartre's dlscussion of this seems to involve a serious ambiguity in the term, "act." Putting it in terms of activity·passivity, especially in regard to the Hussetlian analysis of hyletic data, merely confuses the issues. There is no question at all, for Husserl, of consciousness in some magical fashion acting on (in the sense of effectively modifying) .hyletic data. Rather, consciousness intentively construes them. 1.e., they are components of the Erlebni$$lrlim, the non-intentive components. Thus, if " act" means "intend," there is no problem; and, if "act" means "effectively alter or modify,'' there is no problem, since Husserl never claims this anywa~. As we sball see, this is Sartre's own problem, one generated strictly from his own ontology.

66 SARTRE

object. (EN, 27) But if one, with Husserl, nevertheless wishes to make the being of the phenomenon depend on consciousness, then the object becomes, not the expected presence (the object as presented to consciousness "in person"). but rather an absence. The object is not wholly before consciousness at any one moment, but is rather only horizonally intended: "the" object (and by this Sartre seems to mean only sensuously perceivable objects, a limitation which weighs heavily against his entire discussion of Husserl - in addition to other points), Sartre seems to argue, is "present" only horizonally, and hence the "present" intending of it is an intending of an absence. These intending are thus, he says, "empty," they are intentive of a "non-being" (i.e. , "the" object itself), and are thus .intentive of an absence.1

Now, while it is evident that Sartre is quite unfair to the Husserlian theory of intentionality, Sartre's " ontological proof" does not depend upon whether Husserl says what Sartre says Husserl maintains. Rather, it swings on a specific way of inter­preting and transforming the intentionality of consciousness, on a specific transformation of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality. As Maurice Natanson has shown,2 Sartre is most impressed with the non-egological theory of consciousness developed by Husserl in the first edition of his Logische Untersuchungen. For Sartre, this conception is interpreted as "insisting on the cogivenness of object and consciousness." s Husserl's emphasis on the noematic

~ Without going into the matter in detail, it must be pointed out here that Sartre's treatment of Husserl's theory or intentionality is not a little barbaric: "Pour Husserl, . . . !'animation du noyau hylet:ique parlesseules intentions qui peuvent trouver leur remplissement (Erfall1mg) dans cette hyle ne samait suffire A nous faire sortir de la subjectivite. Les intentions ventablement objectivantes, ce sont Jes intentions vides, celles qui vlsent par deta !'apparition et subjective la totalite in.finie de la serle d'appa­rltion presentc et subjective la totaJite infinie de la serie d'apparitions . .• Prescntes, ces impressions - fussent-elles en nombre infini - se fondraient dans le subjectif, c'est leur absence qui lenr donne l'etre objectiL Ainsi l'etre de l'objet est un pur non-~tre." (EN, 27-28).

Among o ther things, It makes no sense, for Husserl, to speak of "empty" In tentions in this respect, just as il makes no sense to speak of "the" object as an "absence." It is Sartre's ontology which requires this interpretation. For, the object is "present," for Husserl, precisely as borizonally predelineated as the object of future perceivings, or other intendings, of it as the same object. Finally, as we saw, Sartre's treatment of "hyle" is hardly Husserl's.

2 .M. Natanson, "Phenomenology and Existentialism: Husserl and Sartre on Intentionality," The Modem Schoolmari, VoL x:s.x:vii (November, 1959), pp. 1-10.

' Ibid., p. 3. Natanson's reference is to Sartre, "A Fundamental Idea of the Phenomenology of Husserl : Intentionality," Situations, I, Gallimard (Paris, 1947), pp. 31-35.

INTRODUCTION

aspect of the intentional stream, Natanson continues, becomes transformed by Sartre into a philosophy of nihilation. For Sartre, in truth,

. . . consciousness is an irreducible fact which we can characterize only through metaphors that suggest its thrusting, volatile nature. Knowing is like exploding; mind is centrifugal; consciousness is a vortex; awareness is like a combat. Here Sartre is struggling to rid epistemology of the metaphysical incubus of knowledge as possession. For Sartre, one does not have knowledge; one bursts out in acts of knowing toward the object known. Consciousness fires itself toward its mark.1

The phenomenological theory of intentionality is to begin with, for Sartre, an existential theory; he never fustifies this, however. To say, for him, that consciousness is consciousness of something, is to say that consciousness explodes onto the world, a world which is hostile and restive to consciousness, but toward which consciousness is essentially doomed to burst. 2 Hence, when Sartre writes, in L'Etre et le Neant, that "consciousness is born carried onto a being which it is not," (EN, 28) we should think rather of Sartre's transformation of intentionality, than of Husserl's own theory. Sartre means that consciousness, in its pre-reflective, non-positional thrust outward, encounters a being which it is-not, but which it demands as its own sui:port -and this demand, for Sartre, emerges from the very essence and being of consciousness as intentive:

Absolute subjectivity can be constituted only in the face of something disclosed to it, immanence can be defined only in the seizing of something transcendent to it ... consciousness implies in its being a being which is not consciousness, a transphenomenal being.• (EN, 29)

" Being," thus, gives itself to consciousness as having already been before the burst of consciousness onto it. Accordingly, for Sartre, "consciousness is a being such that, in its being, its being is in question insofar as this being implies a being which is other than it." * (EN, 29) This is his "ontological proof," and, as is now clear, it rests on a conception of consciousness as a kind of being whose destiny is to be shot into the midst of the world - the absolute

~ Natanson, ibid. Merleau-Ponty, as well, attempts to existentialize 'Husserl's phenomenology, in much the same manner.

2 Cf. Sartre's SituaJion, I, article, pp. 32-33: "To know is to 'burst forth toward,' to wrench onescli away from the sticky gastric intimacy in order to shoot, over there, beyond the self, towards that which is not sell, over there, close by the tree and yet outside of it, for it escapes me and repulses me and I can no more lose myself in i t than it can be diluted in me . • .. " (Translat.ion by Mr. Stanley Pullberg.)

68 SARTRE

opposite of consciousness - which is the "support" for this pure thrusting outward. Thus, as it seems to me, there is a "proof" here in precisely the same sense in which we would say that a target is the mark for the arrow, and therefore this "proof" is hardly a proof at all: the necessity for a being which is abso­lutely other than consciousness, and with which consciousness can have absolutely nothing to do, is not at all demonstrated from the nature of consciousness (as intentional), but is rather already included in the very conception of intentionality which Sartre presupposes. If not a petitio principii, this argument is at least, not an argument, but a simple definition of terms: being is as Sartre describes it only if one accepts his definition of in­tentionality.

This d0es not mean that Sartre's ontology must thereby be rejected. It does mean, though, that the claim for a proof of its fundamental premises from the phenomena themselves does not stand. For, as we shall emphasize later on, if "being" is an "en soi," is "transphenomenal," then, by virtue of the very essence of intentionality, this is a noematic-objective sense, an intended status endowed on it by consciousness. Sartre, far from "correcting" phenomenology (as he claims), departs from it at the outset.

In any case, it is clear that, on the basis of his interpretation of intentionality, Sartre will not accept the Husserlian notion of phenomenological reduction: it is, Sartre believes, a violation of the principle of intentionality to make of the intended object a mere irreality. (Cf. EN, 28) This is, he states, to rob it of its being.I What we must recognize, Sartre argues, is that conscious­ness in its originary explosion onto being does not constitute it, but meets, or encounters, it, and thus, "The transphenomenal being of that which is for consciousness is itself in itself." (EN, 29) Sartre's criticism of Husserl at this point rests on the phe­nomenon of transcendence, as Sartre understands this: conscious­ness, being essentially this transcending thrust outward, cannot be submitted to a "reduction" without losing precisely that transcendence. In fact, however, what one must say regarding this criticism is that it reveals all the more Sartre's own funda­mental assumptions regarding being-in-itself. His efforts to

1 Natanson, qp. cit., pp. 6-1.

INTRODUCTION 69

"correct" Husserl, as Natanson points out, simply miscarry.I The transphenomenal being of what exists for consciousness,

says Sartre, simply is; all descriptions of it are so many meta­phors, which, like Rocquentin's descriptions of the bus-seat, in La Nausie, "refuse to go and put (themselves) on the thing." Our words hang helpless in the air: "Things," Rocquentin exclaims, "are divorced from their names. They are there, grotesque, headstrong, gigantic, and it seems ridiculous to call them seats or say anything at all about them: I am in the midst of things, nameless things."

The en-soi has neither "inside" nor "outside," but is the solid, the slimy, the packed; it has no otherness, but is full positivity; thus, all we can say is that en-soi is, and is neither possible nor impossible: "Being is. Being is in itself. Being is what it is. "2

(EN, 34)

(2) THE THEORY OF THE OTHER

We stated at the beginning of this exposition that Sartre's theory of "the look" depends upon a particular series of relations derived from his criticism and interpretation of Descartes' cogito, ergo sum. Descartes, says Sartre, included too much in this cogito, for he assumed that the "I" was on the same level as the "think." The cogito is a reflective operation, a specific consciousness of a consciousness: I now reflect on and grasp as apodictic the consciousness which thinks. But this reflection it­self is not the consciousness reflected on: "Thus the conscious­ness which says I think is precisely not the consciousness which thinks. Or rather it is not its own thought which it posits by this thetic act." a

While the certainty of the cogito is indeed absolute, there are in iact two consciousnesses involved therein: a reflective consciousness of, and a consciousness reflected on. Whereas every consciousness is a consciousness of something, it is not a thetic consciousness of itself (an explicit positing of itself), bµt rather it is at the same time a non-positional consciousness (of)

1 11'id., pp. 8-9. " ... Sartre's determination lo rescue Husserl from himsell blinds hiin to the very subjectivity existentialism seeks." (p. 9)

: It would be of great interest to compare this posillon with the ontology of Pannenides, though this is not the place for iL

3 Sartre, Transundence of the Ego, qp. cit., p. 45.

SARTRE

itself. Hence, the consciousness which thinks has no "!," but is rather the pure thrust of consciousness to its object; this consciousness, however, being a consciousness of . .. , is as well a non-positional consciousness (of) itself, and thus it is, Sartre says, a sort of cogito - it is, precisely, what he calls a "pre-j reflective cogito," 1 as we already saw.

Now, if consciousness is thus originarily this explosive upsurge toward the en-soi, it is itself a nothingness; that is, it is not a substance, but is rather a pure flux, a pure interiority whose destiny is to be locked in a continual struggle with what it is not, the en-soi. The something of which consciousness is conscious, is, "prior to all comparison, prior to all construction, that which is present to consciousness as not being consciousness." (EN, 222)

There is, to be sure, a constitutive relation between consciousness and its objects, but fundamentally this constitution takes place not as regards these objects, but as regards consciousness:

Th: original relation of presence, as the foundation of knowledge, is negative. But, as negation comes to the world by the for-itself, and as the thing is what it is (in the absolute indifference of identity), it cannot be the thing which posits itself as not being the for-itself. The negation comes from the for-itself itself ... But by the origin.al negation, it is the for-itself which constitutes itself as not being the thing.• (EN, ibid.)

Every consciousness of something presupposes this negation, but there are not here two processes. For a consciousness to be consciousness of something, it must at the same time be a pre­reflective consciousness (of) itself as being this specific conscious­ness; but this means, as I understand Sartre, that the pre­reflective consciousness (of) itself is a consciousness (of) itself as not-being the object. Thus, the consciousness is complex, but there are not two separate consciousnesses. If, then, we call the consciousness of, a "knowing" in the widest sense, we must call the consciousness (of), a relation of being: it constitutes conscious­ness as not being the object known. Hence, knowledge is not primary. Knowing, for Sartre, is intrinsically a subject-to-object relation, as we saw. We can n9w see that he means that in order for there even to be a "subject" related to an "object," the "subject" must first be constituted as not-being the "object," and only thereby can the "object" emerge as something standing before or over against the "subject."

1 Ibid., pp. S)-54.

INTRODUCTION 71

This stratum of being, Sartre argues, is the fundamental relation" of pour-soi to en-soi: the "first bond" is "a bond of being." 1 Thus, as regards the relation of ponr-soi to en-soi, pour-soi is always in the relation of "subject-to-object." Hence, pour-soi, or consciousness, is always a knowing, in ~e widest sense, of en-soi; knowing, that is to say, is for Sartre a mode of being, precisely that mode of being belonging to the pour-soi: a presence to a thing as being a consciousness of it, and thus as not being it.

This signifies that in that type of being which is called knowing, the only being which one can encounter and which is perpetually there is the known. The knower is not, he is not able to be apprehended. He is nothing othe.r than that which brings it about that there is a being-there of the known, a presence-for; of itseli the known is neither present nor absent, it simply is. But this presence of the known is presenc;e to nothing, since the knower is a pure reflection of a non-being. This presence appears, then, across the total translucency of the knower known, an absolute presence.• (EN, 226)

Beneath thls relation, as the originary bond to being, is the re­lation of non-being; thus, the originary bond to being is not positive or affirmative, but rather negative, which falls on the side of consciousness itself by virtue of its being consciousness (of) itself.2 With this brief exposition of the meaning of know­ledge for Sartre, we can now pass on to the explication of the problem of Others, which we can state only in its essentials in this study.

To understand this theory, it seems to me that two points must be kept firmly in mind. First, as N atanson has pointed out, Sartre's conception of conscience is a bottom a transformation of the early Hussetlian theory of intentionality. Second, however, to this we must add that Sartre's ontology is as well derived from his criticism and subsequent transformation of the Cartesian dualism. We have outlined his criticism of Descartes' cogito. The transformation takes place, not only with regard to the notion of the pre-reflectiye cogito (which involves the acceptance of Descartes' dualism), but also (and more importantly, for hls

1 "Le lJOur·soi est hors de lui dans !'en-sol, puisqu'il se fait defLnir par ce qu'il n'est pas; le lien premier de l'en·soi aupour·soi est done un lien d'Mre." (EN, 225)

~ Sartre departs fundamentally from Husserl at this point as well: for Kusserl the fundamental stratum of consciousness is aftimlative; negation is founded on this. Cf. Husserl, I~en zu einer rtinen Pluinomenologie und pl11inomenologischen Philcsophie, Erstes Buch, M. Niemeyer (Halle a .d.S., 1913), § 106, pp. 218-219.

72 SARTRE

theory of Others) with what we would call an intensification of the Cartesian dualism.

This intensificationhas two sides. On the one hand, by placing the cogito at the pre-reflective, the pre-cognitive, level, and. by taking this level of consciousness as the being of consciousness, a pure flux ·wJtlch explodes consciousness outward and which defines it as a nothingness, consciousness becomes conceived as an unbreakable, irreducible, impenetrable interiority - one which cannot by its very being act on anything save itselt which cannot determine anything except consciousness: '' ... consciousness is consciousness through and through. It can therefore be limited only by itseli" (EN, 22)

Even Descartes' dualism had "ideas" which bridged the gap between tile res extensa and the res cogitans - though, to be sure, only by way of God. But, ior Sartre, consciousness has no such crutch: being this intentional blast with no " within" and no "without," consciousness can become entangled with being only in a "magical" manner, that is, by not-being it. For itself, it cannot in any manner be or bec.ome en-s.oi. How such an en­counter could ever take place is, to be sure, the difficulty in Sartre's ontology - which, in the end, rests its ease whole and entire on "the prodigous power of the negative," asHegelhaclsaid. Unable to establish any sort of "external" (spatial) relations to en-soi, pour-soi encounters it only by way of an "internal" re­lation, the only .kind ofrelation possible forit (since it is, precisely a closed interiority) - the only internal relation, in turn, is negation. Hence, the immense gulf between the two is radicalized by Sartre to a point inconceivable for Descartes: the gulf is, precisely ... nothing, and this is the whole magic of being and consciousness for Sartre's ontology. Beginning from the cogito, Sartre widens the separation between being and consciousness, and by so doing reifies both.

On the other hand, by ~onceiving consciousness in this manner, con~ciousness becomes, in its being, the radical exclusion of all objectivity-for-itself: it can in no way, being essentially subject, become an object for itself:

... Even if I could attempt to make an object of myself, I would already be me at the heart 0f that object :which I am, andat the very center of that object I woula have to be the subject who regards it [a.S object] ... (But) to be object is precise1y not-to-be-me . ... • (EN, 298)

..

INTRODUCTION 73

Just in so far as I am subfect, Sartre states, I cannot be object: "subject" and "object" are radically and mutually exclusive because, before becoming poles of knowledge, they are two ontologicallty separate modes of being. And, as we have pointed out, so far as the pour-soi - en-soi relation is concerne,d, were this the only type of experience, the pour-soi would forever remain subject. For even as regards the pour-soi's reflection on itself (calling into question its own being in so far as it implies a being which it is-not), this ekstasis is by essence a failure:

The contradiction is ilagrant: in order to be able to apprehend my transcendence it wotild be n ecessary that I transcend it. However, precisely, my own transcendence can only transcend; Tam it, I cannot make use of it in order to constitute it as a transcendence transcended. 1 am condemned perpetually to bemy own nihilati0n. In a word, reflection is the reflected-on.• (EN, 359)

Pour-soi is condemned to be forever subject. Accordingly, Sartre has transformed the Cartesian cogito into a doctrine which makes Descartes' ' 'subjectivity'' seem like a naive realism: consciousness is absolute interiority, and it is this as the radical exclusion of itself as an object for itself. Whatever else being is, it is, and consciousness is-not.

It is in this no-man's land of the radical intensification and rigidification of the Cartesian dualism that Sartre places his theory of the Other. Although everything said of consciousness thus far remains true, it is m:vertheless the case, Sartre contends, that consciousness does experience itself as being-an-object. lf, nevertheless consciousness is essentially subject (pour-soi), and if being this essentially excludes its own being-an-object for itself at the same time, then the decisive question is how it is possible that consciousness can become an object, can experience itself as object. Since nothing can determine consciousness except consciousness, and since it is ontologically impossible for consciousness ever to be given to itself as an object, then it must be that another consciousness has emerged and taken this first consciousness as an object! Finally, this being the case, something momentous has happened to consciousness: still being unable to apprehend itself as object, it nevertheless happens that it has become an object for an Other consciousness. This means then that a new dimension of being bas emerged for it. Consciousness

-74 SARTRE

has ceased to be exclusively for-itself and now has become as well for-Others. This argument seems to be, so far as I can determine, not only implicitly followed by Sartre (implicitly, for he never states it as such), but more, necessitated by his very starting-point (and it is for this reason primarily that we have occupied ourselves up to now with an explication of that starting­point). Consider, for instance, the following remark:

But if, precisely, to be object is not-to-be-me, the fact of being an object for consciousness radically modifies consciousness - not in what it is for itself, but in its appearance to the Other ... In a word, the /or-itself as for itself unknowable by the Other. The object which I apprehend under the name of the Other appears to me under a radically dilf erent form. The Other ls not /or himself as he appe.ars to me; I do not appear to myself as I am /or the Other. I am as well incapable of apprehending myself for myself as I am for the Other, as of apprehending what the Other is for hi,mself beginning from the Other-object which appears to me ... It is this which w&shall call their ontological separation.• (EN, 298-99)

In other words, it is first of all due to consciousness' experiencing of itself as an object that the Other makes his appearance; for, consciousness cannot experience itself as object for itself, and it cannot be an object for another object I-therefore there must be an Other consciousness.

The problem thus becomes one of determining the nature of this modification, ho\v it arises, what it is, and how it affects the being of consciousness. With respect to the problem of the body, this discussion is decisive. For, he argues, the relation with the Other (being one which is of necessity " internal"), and the body being essentially something "external" ("in space"), the body of the Other and my own body can emerge only after comiection with the Other himself has already been established. The distinction between the Other and myself, Sartre contends against what he takes to be Husserl's position, is one

which does not come from the exteriority of our bodies, but from the simple fact that each of us exists m interiority, and that a valid knowledge of interiority can take place only in interiority - which in principle prohibits all knowledge of the Other as he knows himself, that is, as he is. (EN, 290) 2

Again, he continues,

1 " ••• I cannot be an object for an object." (EN, 314) 2 Though a thorough critical analysis of Sartre's theory of the aUer ego would take

us too far afield, it is necessary to indicate at least several points. Fir.a, Sartre's interpretation of Husserl, in addition to the obvious fact that. be does not present the

/

INTRODUCTION 75

Jn f<Ut, our experience presents us only with living and conscio~ individuals; but, fo principle it is neoessary to remark that the Other IS

object for me because he is Other and not because h~ ap~ on ~ occasion of a body-object. Otherwise, we would fall back into the spatial­izing" illusion .... " • (EN, 297) l

As Merleau-Ponty will point out, however, it is unintelligible how consciousness could ever experience anything other than itself, much less an Other's look, were it not already embodied, which means experiencing itself as embodied. Because of this, as we shall see, Merleau-Ponty justifiably rejects the Sartrean analysis.

Interiority is for Sartre primary; and extemality arises only after the fundamental encounter with the Other. Since, for him, "The Other is encountered, and not constituted," (EN, 307) and since the fundamental stratum of this encounter is being (and not knowing), then it follows that "I must, to the contrary, establish myself in -my being and posit the problem of the Other beginning from my being. In a word, the only certain point of departure is the interiority of the cogito." (EN, 300) Thus, as we have pointed out, his theory of Others rests on his implicit transformation and intensification of the Cartesian dualism.

By starting from the cogito, indeed, Sartre insists that this means "that each must be able, beginning from his own interior­ity," and not, he emphasizes, from the body,

to find the being of the Other as a transcendence which conditio~ the very being of that in teriori ty. . . The dispersion an~ struggl7 of consc1ou~ ness will remain what they are: we will have sunply discovered this foundation and genuine domain. • (EN, 300)

latter's theory of intersubjectivity in sufficient detail, suffers as well from certain misunderstandings deriving froin Sartre's own transformations of intentionality and bis intensification of the Cartesian dualism. To be sure, a full phenomenology of the phenomenon of intersubjectivity is a chapter still to be writte~; but, ev.en !he sketches of it in Husserl's work, especially in tbe last of his Cartosiat1 Meditations, hardly permits one to say, with Sartre, that the Other, for Hussccl, is constituted by means of external relations between bodies. This is far too simplistic. Again, to say that the Other is not constituted but encountered (EN, '.307) is to misunderstand the meaning of constitution; to constitute is not. to create, as Sartre seems to think, but to bestow sense upon by means of intentivo syntheses. We return to this problem in Part TII.

Second, Sartre's theory is itself guilty of ontological "optimism," in the sense in whlcb be accuses Heidegger. As Alfred Schiltz bas shown, to say that the Other emerges through my experiencing myseH as object (iri shame) is to assume beforehand that the Other is aJtu ego. Cf. Schutz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter £go," PPR, Vol. ix, No. 2 (December, 1948), pp. 184- 198.

1 Loe. cit.

SARTRE

By placing the problem at the level of interiority, that is to say, Sartre believes that we shall have discovered the true ground and foundation of this contest which is intersubjectivity.

In terms of the foregoing it is possible to determine what a valid theory of Others must accomplish. (r) There can be no question of "proving" the existence of Others, precisely because we are already always with Others. That is, we do not in our concrete experience conjecture or argue about Others' existence. Rather we encounter them, they are already there for us, and we experience onrselves as being-objects for them. "Proof" is a matter of knowledge, whereas the Other is he whom I affirm, and the theory of Other has as its task the examination of this affirmation. . . and only this. (2) The only possible point of departureforthis examination is the cogito ,for, as we know already, " ... what we call, for lack of a better way, the Cogito of the Other's existence, confounds itself with my own Cogito." (EN, 308) I find the Other at the heart of my own interiority. (3) As we emphasized, the Other, as Other conscicmsness (pour-soi), cannot be at first an "object" for my consciousness; he arises as Other only by means of his being "interested" in me, by hls making an object of me. (4) There is then a reciprocal 1iegative relation within the two-fold interiority of I and Other, such that the Other, being he who is not-me, and I being for him a "not-me," each of the two terms constitutes itself as such by actively denying itself as being the Other. Thus the multiplicitly of Others is a totality on which no "point of view" is possible; to achieve such a perspective one would have to break out of the reciprocal negations, and this, even if it were possible, would simply destroy what is to be observed. Thus, Sartre believes that there can be no question here of a phenomenological epoche (as he understands it); the problem of Others is a nonrphenome­nological one.1

With this problem thus formulated, he goes on to analyze the 'way in which the Other emerges for consciousness. Having already stated the foundations for this analysis, we need only summarize here.

Traditional theories, Sartre argues, misfired at the outset by

1 Again, Sartre's interpretation of phenomenology is highly questionable; a full demonstration of this, though, would require much more than we can here do.

, INTRODUCTION 77

taking the "subject-to-object" relation as the primary one, one established by means of the sensuous perception of the Other's body. This approach misfired, he believes, because it was not realized that sensuous perception is itself founded on a more primary relation: the "subject-to-object" relation to the Other is founded on the Other's making an object of me by way of his "Look," and this is a relation, not of knowing, but of being. If the other is he who sees, or can see, me and what I see,

my fundamental connection with the Other-subject must be able to lead me back to my permanent possibility of being-seen by the Other. It is in and by the revelation of my being-an-object for the Other that I must be able to apprehend the presence of his being-a-subject ... (For) I cannot be an object for an object ... And, moreover, my objectivity cannot itself be derived, /or me, from the objectivity of the world since, precisely, I am the one by whom there is a world ... the "being-seen-by-the-Other" is the trnth of "seeing-the-Other."* (EN, 314) 1

It is fundamentally through sharne that this being-for-Others emerges. (EN, 275-r6, 348-so) Indeed, it seems to me, this is so because of the very way in which Sartre sets up the problem, and not so much perhaps because of the nature of the pheno­mena themselves. Consciousness, being a pure interiority which is for-itself and is its own nothingness, suddenly finds its interiority compromised, disintegrated, robbed of its integrity by the Other's look. By thus causing my "being-for-Others" to emerge, the Other's look constitutes the consciousness "looked-at" to be something - viz. the object-looked-at. This is to say that the pure transcendence which pour-soi is has itself become transcended by the Others' transcendence; hence, pour-soi becomes the being who is looked-at in the mode of en-soi.:

for the Other, I am seated just like that ink-well is on the table; for.the Other, I am bent over the key-hole, just as that tree is bent by the wind. (EN, 320-21)

Losing its interiority from within by the Other's look, conscious­ness experiences itself as robbed of its own intrinsic integrity, that is to say, it experiences itself as shamed: it has fallen from its destined place.

1 This central passage demonstrates concisely our own contentions regarding the rigidifying of the objecl·subject relations and Sartre's own "optimism." Cf. above p. 74, footnote 2, and pp. 71-74, etc.

11

SARTRE

Shame is the feeling of original fall - not from the fact that I have committed such and such a sin, but simply because I have "fallen" into the world, into the midst of things, and because I need the mediation of the Other in order to be what I am. • (EN, 349)

This "fall" is precisely the fall from nothingness to being­sometbing-for-the-Other, from interiority to exteriority, to being-oneself-as-body. Thus the experience of one's ow·n body, for Sartre, is fundamentally that of nausea.

Accordingly the Other can become an object-for-me only st~bsequent to my being-an-object-for-the-Other; it is the "second moment of my relation to the Other," (EN, 347) and is experi­enced by me as pride:

In a word there are two authentic attitudes: the one by which I recog­nize the Other as the subject by whom I acquire objectity-that is shame; the other by which I apprehend myself as the free project by means of which the Other acquires his being-an-Other - that is pride or the af.fir­mation of my freedom in the face of the Other-as-object. (EN, 351)

Consciousness, forced to become what is most contrary to its inmost being, experiences itself than as ashamed. The real force of Sartre's argument, however, is that by being made an object consciousness becomes constutited as "in the world"; that is to say, this encounter causes the embodiment of consciousness to emerge: pour-soi takes on its body as that which it has-to-be-for­the-Other. This "self" which the Other's look causes to arise by bis look, in other words, is "my being-<ndside." (EN, 346) And, thus, as Sartre stated already in T he Transcendence of the Ego, my body serves as a visible and tangible symbol for the I ;l it is "the illusory fulfillment of the I-concept."2

Accordingly, the body is subsequent to the encounter with the Other. It is by means of the Other's look that I acquire spatial­ity, a an outside, or a "nature." (EN, 321) One cannot say, furthermore, that "to-be-looked-at" is to apprehend the body of the Other (e.g. his eyes),

... because his eye is not at first apprehended as a sensible organ of vision but as the support for the Look ... ill apprehend his Look, I cease t o perceive his eyes. . . The Other's Loolr hides his eyes, it seems to go before them • .. The point is that to perceive is to look-at, and to apprehend a Look is not to apprehend the Look as an object in the world ... it is to become conscious of being-looked-at.• (EN, 315-16)

i The Transc.mdence of the Ego, op. cit., p. 90. 2 Ibid., p. 91.

1 "The Look of the Other confers spatiality on me. To apprehend oneseli as looked· a t is to apprehend oneseli as a spatialiting-spatialized." (EN, 325).

INTRODUCTION 79

There thus appears to be an underlying argument to Sartre's theory, one which he does not state in so many words but which appears manifest when one reflects critically on the organization of bis study itself. We may express this argument as follows: (1) consciousness is essentially an interiority, a subject in its being­foi:-itself as regards everything else (which is thus "object"); (2) as such, consciousness can be limited only by consciousness; (3) hence, it cannot be an object for itself, nor for another object; (4) however, consciousness suddenly experiences its being-an­object; (5) since an object is possible only for a subject, since consciousness can be limited only by consciousness, and since it cannot be an object for itself nor for another object, but nevertheless experiences itself as an object - there must then be another consciousness, another subjectivity, which this first consciousness is not and for whom it is then object; (6) yet, the interiority of the pour-soi is still preserved - it cannot be an object for any consciousness, itself or another; (7) therefore, anew mode of being of consciousness must have emerged: its being-for-Others.

This new mode of being, be it noted, emerges strictly and only through consciousness' experiencing itself as an object: Here, that is to say, the "body" is simply taken for granted as spatial and external, and thus can emerge for consciousness only after the encounter with the Other. The body is the spatialization and externalization of consciousness effected by means of the Other's look. Similarly, the Other's body is his external and spatial manifestation effected by my dialectically second "look" which renders him an object.

We have already remarked that this entire argument is subject to Sartre's own charge against Husserl and Heidegger, as well as Hegel : it is itself "optimistic" in the sense that it presupposes the "Other" all along. The view of the body, on the other hand, seems lmderstandable only on the basis of the rigidification of the Cartesian dualism which Sartre effects by means of his criticism and subsequent transformation of the Cartesian cogito. This transformation, finally, is itself effected by means of the non-thematic transformation of Husserl's doctrine of intentionality.1 To be sure, as we shall shortly see,

1 Sartre's notion of "intentionality" seems closer to Bergson's notion of "action" than to Husserl's " intentionality." Cf. our general conclusions, below pp. 242-49.

Bo SARTRE

consciousness lives its body as for-itself; one mode of its being is its being-for-itself. Nevertheless, this mode of being arises only on the basis of the encounter with the Other. Accordingly, should it tum out that his notions of "intentionality" and "negation" are unjustified, the analysis of the body will be severly damaged. This is our belief, the demonstration of which must await the exposition of the Sartrean analysis of the bopy.

CHAPTER II

THE ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS OF

THE BODY

There is an initial difficulty in attempting to study the body, one which, Sartre states, arises especially for Cartesian philoso­phy. If one begins by considering the body as a certain neurolo­gical-physiological complex defined by certain physico-chemical laws - in short, as a thing on a par with any other physical thing, although perchance more complicated - and in addition by considering consciousness as an interiority, then the effort to connect these two is doomed to failure. For, it is an effort to unite my consciousness, 1tot with my body, but with the body-of­the-Other. My own body as it is for me cannot be apprehended in sensuous perception like other physical things, including the body of the Other. I do not sense my skeleton, my brain, my nerve-endings, and the like; and even coenesthetic, proprio­ceptive, and kinaesthetic data are not apprehended by me as obfects.

Of course, I come to believe that I, like Others, have the same sorts of organs and parts; reading textbooks of anatomy, observing cadavers, and the like, I conclude that I, too, have a heart like that of the Other, that my body is likewise analyzable into certain chemical compounds and elements, and so on. But, Sartre insists, it is important that we be clear as to the order of our bits of knowledge. And, it is clear I do not experience my own body as a mere thing among other things in the midst of the world. When I perchance perceive parts of my body with other parts, I am another with respect to the parts perceived. Indeed, as Van Den Berg points out, in one experiment it was shown that only one out of ten normal persons recognizes his own hands in a small series of photographs of hands - even when told that their hands would appear in e3:ch of the pictures. l

t J. H. Van Den Berg, "The Human Body and tbe Slgnificance of Human Move­ment," PPR, Vol xiii, No. z (December, 1 9~2), p. 169.

82 SARTRE

When parts of my own body are objectified by me, they seem strange, in spite of the fact that my own body is what is experi­enced by me as most my own.

My body as I live it is not a thing among other things in the world. And even when I do perceive it, I cannot touch myself touching, see myself seeing, and so on; in short, I cannot appre­hend it in the process of its revealing an aspect of the world to me. "Either it is a thing among things, or it is that by means of which things are disclosed to me. But it cannot be both at the same time." (EN, 366) We have to do here with two ontologically separate beings.

From the point of view of the body-for-me, to touch my leg is to surpass it towards my possibilities - I touch it, Sartre points out, in order to pull on my trousers, or in order to cure it, and so on; and, if I perceive it as an object, then it is no longer my body-as-lived. In so far as I objectify it, in Sartre's terms, my possibilities are no longer real, but dead-possibilities ; in other words, I no longer have to do with m.y body-for-itself. In this sense, my body presents itself as the means whereby my projects are actualized in the world; if I attend to my leg in the mode of the "in order to," it, like the board into which I drive a nail, is strictly a "pole of action." In neither case is there an "object" for which I would be "subject" in the Cartesian sense. When I do objectify my own body, then, its bei,ng is transformed; or my considering it as an object is a revelation of its being, but onby its being-for-Others (whether the Other be myself or, per­chance, a doctor).

Thus, the study of the body must conform to the order of being: being-for-itself and being-for-Others are genuinely onto­logical strata of the body and must not be confused as they were in Cartesian philosophy.

The fact is that being-for-itself must be entirely body and that it must be entirely consciousness: it cannot be united to a body. In like manner, being-for-others is entirely body; there is nothing behind the body. But the body is entirely "psychic." • (EN, 368)

In short, in so far as consciousness is for-itself it is its own body; in so far as it is for-Others it is likewise its own body but now in a different ontological dimension. Hence, consciousness is an embodied consciousness from the outset. Nevertheless, as we

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

have seen, the Other is encountered first of all in the pure cogito. (EN, 308) And, " ... my consciousness of being a consciousness, in the pure effectuation of the cogito, is not connected to my own body . ... " (EN, 336; see also, 299-300) Thus so far as the Other is grasped in a "pure monition'' (EN, 336), my body is subsequent, just as is his body, to our originary encounter through my ob­jectity, my being-an-object for the Other's look. Indeed, Sartre says explicitly that, " ... the spontaneous and unreflected consciousness is no longer a consciousness of the body." (EN, 394) The radical shock of encountering the Other is precisely the "original fall" of consciousness into its body; it can now no longer "pass by in silence" its own body-for-itself.

Thus, the study of the body is at each point founded on the encounter with the Other. Sartre delineates three "ontological dimensions" of the being of the body; we shall consider each of them in the order prescribed by Sartre himself.

(1:) THE BODY AS BEING-FOR-ITSELF: FACTICITY

Believing that the "mind is easier to know than the body," Descartes was led to distinguish in a radical manner between the domain of mind and that of body. The reflection which discovers the cogito discovers as well, of course, certain phenome­na which appear intrinsically connected with the body. These however are, within the sphere of the cogito, pure facts of consciousness like any other - they are also "ideas." With this, Sartre points out, there arises the tendency to "make sign.s of them, affections of consciousness occasioned by the body .... " (EN, 368) The consequence of this division and tendency was thatthe body asit is experienced by consciousness was suppressed, and the body was taken exclusively as a physical object, or, in Sartre's terminology, the "body-for-itself" was suppressed in favor of the "body-for-Others." Having thus separated conscious­ness and body, there arose the absurd problem of re-uniting them. In order to recover this lost dimension of the body, how­ever, one must recover consciousness in its primordial thrust, pour-soi as being-in-the-world.

The for-itself is by essence a relation to the world; by denying that it is being it makes there be a world which it is-not, and by surpassing this negation towards its own possibilities, by its

SARTRE

thrust outward, it reveals the "thises" of the world as instru­mental-things. This "world" then is essentially in a univocal relation to consciousness; an "absolute objectivity," even in physical science, is impossible. There wonld not be things, nor determinable relations among them, without consciousness; they are then relative, not to our knowledge (talcing them as such is the mistake of epistemological relativism and skepticism}, but rather " ... to our first engagement at the heart of the world ... Man and the world are relative beings, and the principle of their being is the relation." (EN, 370) Thus, the theory of relativity says Sartre refers to being, not to knowledge and thus implies no epistemological relativism.I As this relatedness is always univocal things are always "things-at-a-distance-from-me," "oriented­with-respect-to-my-place"; and thus to be engaged in the world is precisely to be-there (in that chair, at the store, and so on} - in short to be embodied as a center, "Here," around which the world and its things are uni vocally displayed. 2

However, while it is necessary that pour-soi be-there, it is contingent that it be at all. While it is necessary that it must always be at some place, that it have some point of view, it is contingent that it be "here" rather than "over there," involved in "this" point of view rather than "that" one. This two-fold contingency which Sartre brings out in connection with the body, has been emphasized by most so-called "existentialist" philoso­phy in general, at least since Pascal In his Pe1isees (No. 205}, Pascal wrote:

When I consider the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after, the little space which I fill, and even can see, engulfed in the infinite immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant, and which know me not, I am frightened, and am astonished at being here rather than there, why now rather than then. Who has put me here? By whose order and direction have this place and time been allotted to me?

And, he continued (No. 208}:

1 This seems to me a crucially important insight for the refutation of relativism and skepticism.

1 "The only concrete placement which can be disclosed to me is absolute extension -that is to say, precisely the one which is defined by my place considered as the center for which distances are accounted for absolutely, from the object to me without reciprocity. The only absolute extension is the one which is displayed beginning from a place which I am absolutely. No other point whatever could be selected as the absolute center of reference without being involved immediately in universal relativi­ty." • (EN, 571)

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 85

Why is my knowledge limited ? Why my stature? Why my life to one hundred years rather than to a thousand? What reasonhasnature had for giving me such, and for choosing this number rather than another in the infinity of those from which there is no more reason to choose one rather than another, trying nothing else?

Kierkegaard, in his Repetitions, was later to enunciate the same contingency:

One sticks one's finger into the soil to tell by the smell in what land one is: I stick my finger into e.xistence - it smells of nothing. Where am I? Who am T? How came I here? What is this thing called the world? What does this world mean ?

Who is it that lured me into the thing, and now leaves me there? Who am I? How did I come into the world? Why was I not consulted, why not made acquainted with its manners and customs ... ? And, if I am to be compelled to take part in it, where is the director? l should like to make a remark to him.

For Sartre, this two-fold contingency of my being constit utes the f acticity of the pour-soi, and sets the stage for his analysis of the body-for-itself - because, he argues, this contingency is precisely the fundamental stratum of the body-for-itself, i.e., the body as it is experienced concrete/ly. Therefore, just like the interiority of the pour-soi this contingency which is the body-for­itself cannot be made an obfect: I cannot take up a point of view on that which is my very point of view on the world unless I were to have disposal of a second body. But then, to take a point of view on it a third body would be needed. . . and so on itt

i 'nfinit11,m. I cannot take my body-for-itself as an object just because I am it. Thus my body-as-lived, in so far as it is my point of view, is always what is surpassed toward my possibilities. In so far as I am now involved in seeing my pipe on my desk I surpass my body (it is not an object for me); i.e., I do not appre­hend my body except as it is "indicated" by the seen pipe. As we shall see, finally, when I reflectively apprehend my body it is not at all my body-as-lived-by-me which is grasped but only my body in another of its dlmensions, its being-for-Others.

Being involved in the world by means of my body, this world appears as an order univocally referring back to my placement, to me as embodied here: the pipe is to m;y left, on the table, next to the ashtray, and on the tablecloth, and so on. My body then is the "referred-to" of this order, the center of this univocal relatedness. But while it is necessary that there be some order, it is again contingent that it is this rather than that one.

86 SARTRE

Precisely this order, Sartre contends, is the P<>ur-soi as body; or, it is the body in its being-for-itself. Thus, " the body could be defined as the contingent form which embraces the necessity of my contingency." (EN, 37I) The body-for-itself is therefore the order of the world revealed by its specific placement and involve­ment. If, for instance, I set out to write a letter it is only by " forgetting" ("surpassing") my hand, the pen, and so on, that I carry out my project to write a letter; these are "surpassed'' towards the writing and thus for my body all there is, is the letter­to-be-written. As Van Den Berg puts it in the article already cited, it is the physiognomy of objects which reveals the body-for­itself:

The qualities of the body, its measurements, its ability, its efficiency and v ulnerability can only become apparent when the body itseli is forgotten, eliminated, passed over in silence for the occupation .. .. for whose sake the passing is necessary.

It is only the behavior that explains the body; however long I study my hand, I shall never discover its efficiency. . . . l

Thus, Sartre argues, the body-for-itself cannot be given for knowledge; it is <>nly as su,rpassed. In this way it is the involvement of pour-soi in en-soi; it is the individualization of pour-soi.

To clarify these remarks, Sartre turns to an examination of sensuous perception, or sensuous knowledge. Traditional theories of sense-knowledge never left the domain of objects in the midst of the world. It was believed that between a certain mundane object, called a sense organ, and another mundane object, called a stimulant, a relation could be established between the Other-as­object {the one observed by the experimental psychologist) and the milieu of objectively determined and determinable stimu­lants. Through experimentation it was lea.med that by acting upon the Other's sense organs in a predetermined manner a "modification" was provoked in the Other's consciousness. This was learned through the meaningful and objective reactions of the Other:

A physical object - the excitant, a physiological object -the sense organ, a psychic object - the Other, with objective manifestations of signifi­cation - language: such are the terms of the objective relationship which we (as experimental psychologists) wanted to establish. None of these terms can be permitted to stray outside the world of objects. (EN. 373)

In such experiments (as, for example, one dealing with the visual 1 Van Den Berg, op. cit., p. 170.

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS

perception of a screen illuminated in varying degrees by the experimenter), Sartre points out that the relation sought for by the experimenter at the outset was not at all how tlte screen appeared to the one being tested, but rather a relation between two series of objects: those seen by the one being tested during the experiment and those seen by the experimenter at the same time {that is, the sense organs of the former):

The illumination of the screen belonged to my world; my eyes as objective organs to the world of the experimenter. The connection between these two series thus claims to be like a bridge between two worlds. In no case could there be a table of correspondence between the subjective and the objective. (EN, 374)

And, indeed, there is no justification at all to call the sensuous perceiving of these objects in the laboratory "subjective," nor to call the objects seen by the experimenter at the same time "ob­jective." Yet, it has been maintained by psychologists and philosophers that this objective relation between a sense organ and a stimulant of it is itself but one side of a wider relation: between the "objective" (the stimulant-sense organ) and the "subjective" (the sensation). It is claimed moreover that the "subjective" is to be defined by the action exercised by the stimulant through the sense organ. The sense organ is atf ected, modified, by the stimulant; the modifications of it thus come from "outside" the organ itself. Since the sensation is the direct consequence of this affection, sensation itself is said to "come from outside" (causally, from the stimulant). Indeed, if sensation somehow arose spontaneously it could have no relation to the sense organ. But we know that stimulating the sense organ in a certain prescribed manner "produces" a modification of the organ in a determinable and predictable way (under strong illumination, the pupil contracts), and that as a consequence what the Other experiences visually is directly connected to the objective stimulant (perhaps the eyes begin to hurt) . "We thus conceive an objective unity corresponding to the smallest and shortest of perceptible excitations, and call it sensation." (EN. 376) This sensation, being a determinable "this,•' is conceived as itself part of the external world ; being itself caused by other objects (stimulants). it becomes exterior to itself (" extbiorite ti soi­meme, "), (EN, 376) that is, its raison d'etre lies outside itself.

88 SARTRE

This sensation must, furthermore, "happen" someplace, it must "be" someplace, and this demands an environment homogeneous with it and thus exterior as well. This environment in which sensations happen we call "mind," or even "consciousness," and it is precisely my own consciousness. In this way there has been constructed a sort of internal space in which certain sensations are formed on the occasion of external stimulations; since sensations are sulfered this internal space is passive. Yet it is claimed that this mind "lives" and "experien~es" its sensations; thus life becomes a magical connection established by hypothesis "between a passive milieu and a passive mode of that milieu." (EN, 377)

Subjectivity in this view becomes conceived as F. H. Bradley once put it, on the analogy of a paper bag in which numerous peas (sensations) are dropped. It is the regularity of these sensations, finally, which, it is claimed, constitutes "objectivity;" the more regular, the more credence we give to them, or rather to the ob­jects which are said to "cause" the sensations.

Such a conception is, despite all its subtlety, a "pure fiction," says Sartre, one moreover which is a nest of absurdity. The roots for this magic are quite as apparent as they are contradictory.

(r) To establish the notion of sensations, a certain naive realism is necessary ; we assume without question that our perception as psychologists of Others is valid, as we do our perception of the Other's sense organs, his reports, and so on. Underlying this is our assumption that every term in the re­lations we seek to establish is an object, something by essence mundane, in the world like stones and figs.

(2) We thus have established that sensation itself is a kind of object, one which "happens" inside another object. However all the realism so necessary to the first step now disappears, for it is now claimed that sensation is a modification of the one who suffers it and thus is quite private ("subjective") to him, giving information only about him himself. Thus, before we can learn of this objectivity-turned-subjectivity he must speak to us and tell us of it. Others can neither live nor experience his sensations; "happening" by virtue of a passivity the Other yet is said to "experience" and "live" them, and thus "living" becomes a mode of passivity. !1

J

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 89

(3) Yet, just these " private" affairs are supposed to furnish the basis of our knowledge of the "external" world. Because of the very way in which whole procedure was set up, nevertheless, this basis could never on principle be the f <Fwndation for a real contact with things (since all one has are his own "sensations"). The objectivism which served as the starting-point falls im­mediately into the darkest subjectivism while yet desiring and claiming to be objective.

Either, Sartre argues, one gives up all such notions as "sub­jectivity," "life," " consciousness," and the like, and sticks to his objectivistic guns; or he must recognize that

No synthetic grouping whatever can confer the objective quality _on what is in principle ofthe order of the lived. If there must be perception of objects in the world it is necessary that we be •. from the moment of our very upsurge, in the presence of the world and ObJects. . .

Sensation - that hybrid notion lying between the sub1ective an.d the objective, conceived in terms of the object and subsequen~~ applied to the subject, a bastard existence of which one cannot s'.l'y if ~t is fact or principle- sensation is a pure day~ of the psycholog1s_t. It is nece~ry to reject it deliberately from every senous theory concerning the relations of consciousness and the world.• (EN, 378)

Rejecting sensation, however, what becomes of the sense organs? Even reminding ourselves that we are here at the lev:l of the body-for-itself, i.e., of the body as it is concretely expen­enced, one must still say that he sees the green of the book, touches the roughness of the stone, and so on. If I indeed see the green, and not the psychologist's "sensation," my senses still remain: What then is a sense which does not give sensation?

While the seen table is given visually as a thing of such and such color, shape, in such a position, and so on, and while seeing is a sort of knowledge of the thing, there is no such givenness nor knowing of the seeing itself. Even if we supposed a third eye suspended in front of the usual two, this would be a seeing of a visible object and not of the seeing itself. The same holds for every sense. Hence, a sense organ cannot be defined by an act of apprehension; however much I study my hand, visually or even with my other hand, my nose, and so on, I shall never discover its own intrinsic efficiency. Its efficiency is manifested only in its use - but then, it is necessarily "surprased" and not apprehended. I am unable, Sartre contends, to learn anything at all about my seeing itself, my visual point of view on the

90 SARTRE

visible world, by trying to make an object of it. More generally, my body-as-lived by me cannot become an object for me just because, so far as I live it, I am it; and, being my body, I cannot realize the "distance" necessary to make it appear as object over against me, the subject. The implicit argument here is the same as Marcel's, and as Merleau-Ponty's, as we shall see: the moment I attempt to grasp my body-as-lived (or: my seeing as seeing), the body I succeed in apprehending reflectively is no longer my body-as-lived, nor is the body I sensuously perceive with other parts of my body, my body-as-lived, but rather only my body­as-object, i.e., for Sartre, the body of the Other.

It is necessary to pause briefly in order to point out that this argument, whatever other merits it may have, iµvolves several intrinsic presuppositions which are neither justified by Sartre, nor, I hope to show later on, justifiable in principle. First, it is implicitly assumed by him that the only type of activity which could possibly suffice to make, e.g., my seeing itself, an object would be, again, another seeing; but, since I cannot see a seeing it cannot possibly be made an object. Second, the activity which does succeed in apprehending my body, reflection, suc­ceeds only in apprehending an obf ect, not my body-as-lived. Hence, the body-for-itself cannot become an object for me, the one whose body it is, if these two assumptions are correct. I t should be noted in addition that the second of these points involves what we have already pointed out before: namely, to say that all reflection succeeds in apprehending is an "object," and that this "object" is not the "lived body" (or, in the case of subjectivity, is not the "subject"), is to reify the meaning of object beyond any reasonable sense and to ignore the "objective sense" which this "object" has for me. In short, it is to confuse "objectifying" with "obfectivating": to attend to some state of affairs (whatever it may be, and whether reflectively or not) is not necessarily, as Sartre assumes, to make it into an object divorced from the subject. Merleau-Ponty, as we will see, falls into the same confusion. Marcel, on the other hand, by means of his distinction between kinds of reflection ("first ' and "second"), seems to recognize this crucial difference. We shall return to this problem in Sartre later on.

At all events, Sartre proceeds to argue that sense organs are

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 91

defineable by means of the phenomenon of "orientation" : each of the senses is orien.ted with respect to a specific system of ob­jects (sight to visible objects, touch to tangible objects, and so on), and this system is thereby ordered in terms of the sense in question. Sight, then, would be this particular system, or orderedness (orientedness), of seen objects. If we say that it is essential to the formal structure of the visual field that objects stand in the figure-ground relation, we have to notice also that "the material connection of a this such and such to the ground is at once chosen and given." (EN, 380) In so far as I look at the cup rather than the book beside it, it is chosen; but the cup is given to my visual perceiving 1in that my choice takes place in terms of an original distri~ution of "thises" which manifest the upsurge of my pour-soi in its facticity. It is necessary that the-cup appear to me as placed with respect to my body's orientation ("to my left," ' 'behind the pipe," and the like), but which place it has is contingent (since it could as well appear to my right):

It is this contingency between the necessity and freedom of my choice that we call sense. It implies that the object must always appeaY to me all at once - it is the cube, the inkwell, the cup which I see. But this appearance always takes place in a particular perspective which expresses its relations to the ground of the world and to other thises. • (EN, 380)

Hence, to be sensuously perceptive of things is, for Sartre, to be oriented to these thi1igs as "they themselves," but oriented to them by means of certain appearances (I see the cup "from this side," for instance). At the same time, they are oriented and ordered with respect to the placement of the body. These rules of ap­pearance are not, however, subjective;

they are rigorously objective and disclose the nature of things. lithe inkwell hides a part of the table from me this is indicative, not of the nature of my senses but rather of the nature of the :inkwell and of the light. (EN, 380)

If, again, an object gets smailer as it recedes into the distance this is explainable strictly by the objective laws of perspective. These laws define an objective center of convergence of these lines of perspective, e.g., of my eye. However, though this center is located in the very field oriented around it, it is not itself an object within the structure of the perceptual field in question: "we are this center." (EN, 38I) That is to say, the center of

92 SARTRE

orientation of the field it defines and orders cannot itself be an object within the same field: it is that by virtue of which there is a field.

On the other hand the very structure of the visible world demands that one cannot see without himself being visible; or more particularly, the eye cannot see unless it, too, is visible, for the structure of the world oriented around this center "refers," or "indicates," that center. Such a reference could occur only among objects of the same kind; or, as Marcel has expressed it, the body must maintain a community of nature with the objects on which it acts, or which it perceives. Sartre writes:

The intra-mundane references can be made only to objects in the world, and the seen world perpetually defines a visible object to which its perspectives and its arrangements refer. This object appears in the midst of the world and at the same time as the world. It is always given as an addition to some grouping of objects since it is defined by the orfontation of these objects; without it there would be no orientation whatever since all orientations would be equivalent.• (EN, 381)

The eye, then, as the organ of visual perception, is not only the center of the visual field but is as well, qua center, continuously referred to by the objects oriented with respect to it. Hence it is itself "in the world" and itself is the world of seen things. Thus the visual figure-ground relation requires a third structure - the eye as the center of orientation for the appearance of visual things as ordered in the figure-ground relation. But just because this center is the center, defining the visual world and thus being defined by it, it cannot itself become an object within that world. In order for this to take place it would itself have to be oriented with respect to another center. In short the eye would have to see itself seeing, and this it cannot do; if it could, it would not be the "center." The eye then is only " indicated," it is the "referred-to" of visual objects; I cannot see it, since I am it.

Therefore, Sartre emphasizes,

My being-m-the-world, by the very fact that it realizes a world, makes itself be indicated to itself as a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world by the world which it realizes ... My body is everywhere on the world ... My body is at once coextensive with the world, spread out across things, and at the same time gathered into this single point which all these things indicate and which I am without being able to know it.• (EN, 381-82)

In other words, to "be-in-a-world" and "to have a body'' are

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 93

synonymous. However, for all this remarkable description, the one crucial question remains unanalyzed by him: What is the nature of this "indicating"? More generally, Sartre leaves un­analyzed the problem of what "orientation" is, phenomeno­logically, how it operates and what its foundational conditions are.1 We shall return to this problem later on.

Following from the above Sartre is quick to point out that it is meaningless to maintain either that sensible objects are given before, or after, sense organs.2 Rather, we must say, the two "are contemporaneous with objects," (EN, 382) just as, for him, consciousness and world are given simultaneously.a The sense organs, too, are "in the world," that is, are objects. Hence no longer to see the book when I close my eyes is precisely to see my eyelids; no longer to see the table is to see the tablecloth. Thus any accident to my body (as when I cut my finger) is itself objective, a relation between objects (the knife and my finger); to be able to act on objects is to be able to be acted upon by the same objects, or, as Marcel has put it, to be manifested to the world by my body is at the same time to be exposed to its influences. Similarly Sartre notes, to lose one's eyesight is not to lose objects as visible; rather, objects are still visible, but now the visual field no longer has any outstandingnesses in it.

Thus it is the upsurge of the pour-soi into the world which at the same stroke makes the world exist as the totality of things, and the senses exist as the objective manner in which the qualities of things present them­selves.• (EN, 383)

This being the case, Sartre argues that in order to know and obfectively to define my stmse organs I must take myself as an object, and this is ta.ntamount to destroying the wordli1tess of my wor/,d. Cutting myself off from what I am, from my body-for-itself, I cut myself off from the world established by means of my body­for-itself. To objectify my visual sense organs is to cease to live my world in respect of its visual aspect, it is no longer to "surpass'

1 Jn asimilar way, we encounter this crucial problem in Merleau-Ponty's analysis. For him, the unity of the senses, as well as the unity of any one sense, takes 1Jlace by way of the objects of the sense(s} and in virtue of what he calls the "irrtentional arc;" but what precisely this "arc" is, and how this unification occurs, he simply does not state. Marcel, on the other hand, never even concerns hi.mself with this problem.

' Tt sbould be noted that Sartre uses "sense" and "sense organ" synonymously. Thus, he talks equivalently of the eye as a sense organ, and as a sense.

s Cf. above, pp. 65-69.

94 SARTRE

my eyes "in order to" (move to the door, look at the movie, and so on).

Accordingly, we can say, my body-for-itself is the total system and center of reference of things; it is "also the instrument and the goal of our actions." (EN, 383) It is necessary to be cautious in this regard, however: "my action" is not an object for me, any more than "my body"; rather, only the action-of-another can be an object for me. Hence I cannot know my own action, but only that of the Other (which I know as a "peculiar" instrument, since it is that instrument which itself handles things, uses tools, and so on). One cannot say then that I use my body.1 Since the instrument must be of the same kind and nature as what uses it (for otherwise he could not use it), and since instruments are objects-used over against a subject-user, to take my body-for­itself as something used is to make of it an object - and thus to lose its being as for-itself. Furthermore, to continue Sartre's argument, if one says "my body" is an instrument, then I, who "use" it, must be of the same community of nature as the instrument; this, though, would be to make me as psychical reality something physical, spatially located and determinable in physical terms - and this simply destroys "my body-for-it­self.'' In the end, the Cartesian dilemma is irresolvable in its own terms: it loses at the outset just what it seeks to understand.

To clarify this strange state of affairs, Sartre turns to an analysis of the connections between perception and action. Objects are what they are 2 only within a nexus of actual and possible actions on them; i.e., Sartre maintains, "In this sense perception is in no way distinguished from the practical organ­ization of existents in the world." (EN, 385) The characteristics which make a hammer a hammer are disclosed, as Heidegger had seen, not in a "conceptual" consciousness, but rather in a "practical-using" consciousness (not by mere "looking," but by "using"). For only in the latter does the hammer refer to nails, to the board to be hammered into place, to the ultimate

1 As Marcel had already seen with clarity. Unfortunately, howevec, Sartre seems not to have been aware of Marcel's analysis of the body; one looks in vain for refer­ences to Marcel.

2 As Bergs~n and Marcel had already recognized, though, again, Sartre seems to be unaware of thls, or, at least, he does not acknowledge it.

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 95

pi;oject-at-hand - and only as such is the hammer a ham.mer.I Similarly, the sp~ce in which I live is not geometrical, not, as

Merleau-Ponty will say, a space of location. Rather, it is a space of situation, or, in Sartre's term, it is "lwdological" - furrowed with paths, places, by-ways, routes, locales, ways of going and coming, of using, doing, and the like. Thus, the world for pour­soi in its upsurge is constituted as a concatenated texture of instrumentalities and ways of doing things: acts refer to other acts; tools to other tools and to ways of using them, to purposes for which they were made, to other purposes which can be actu­alized (an ashtray can also serve as a paper-weight, a weapon, and the like), to Others, and so on. Nevertheless, while perception and action are thus inseparable, action pro-per is presented as transcending the perceived sinipliciter towards future efficacies, while what is perceived in the strict sense presents itself as a presence (co-presence with my body}, but one which cannot be fully apprehended "at present" and is thus "full of promises," which engages the future by predelineating future possible perceivings of it as the same. This pure presence of things, Sartre calls their "being-there."

In this way, the world is conceived as the correlate of my possible action on it, i.e., the system of possibilities which I am. As such, for Sartre, the world is the skeleton of my possible action, the outline which my actions "fill in." Hence, "Per­ception is naturally surpassed towards action; better, it can be unfolded only in and by projects of action." (EN, 386) Even though action is not itself an objectivating (is not "thetic," as Sartre puts it), this structurization of the world is objective. The world as the correlate of my actions is objectively articulated, it refers to me but also to an infinity of instrumenW complexes - to my future possible actions, my past actions, to the actions of Others, and so on. All of this complex, nevertheless, refers to a center, one which is only indicated by the complex and never itself grasped as such. Using a hammer, I do not grasp my band but only the ham.mer hammering the board to be nailed. I use

1 "Objects disclose themselves to us at the heart of a complex of ulensilify wherein they occupy a determin.ed plat:e. This place is not defined by purely spatial coordi· nates but in relation to the axes of practical reference. 'The glass i s on the self,' which means that it is necessary to take care not to upset the glass i1 one moves the shelf." (EN, 385)

96 SARTRE

the hammer to pound the nail. but I do not use my hand to hold the hammer: my hand is only indicated by the complex. I am not in the same relation to it as I am to the hammer, for I am my hand. My band, thus, vanishes in this complex of instrumental­ities and is now strictly the orientation, the order and meaning, of the complex. My body is then a tool objectively defined by the instrumental field referring to it as its own center, but a tool we cannot use,

since we would then be referred to infinity. We cannot use this instru­ment; we arc it. It is given to us in no otherwaythan by the instrumental order of the world, by hodological space ... but it cannot be given to my action. I do not have to adapt myself to it nor to adapt it to another uten­sil; rather it is my very adaptation to u.tensils, the adaptation which I am.• (EN, 388)

Or, more properly speaking, it is the inapprehe1isible given. My body is as such always the surpassed, the "passed over in silence." It is thus in the Past, the always-already-surpassed towards possibilities.1 Hence, my body-for-itself is at once a point of view and a point of departure; as such it is the condition for pour-soi to be what it is not and to not-be what it is and there­fore for action as a "gearing into the outer world." Accordingly

Birth, the past, contingency, necessity of a point of view, the factual condition of all possible action on the world - such is the body, this it is /or me . . . (It is) the necessary condition for tbe existence of a world and ... the contingent realization of this condition.• (EN. 392~3)

Furthermore, in so far as to be is to choose oneself (to choose, e.g., the way in which one constitutes his disabilities - as "un­bearable," "unfortunate," "fortunate," "to be hidden from Others,'' and so on), my inapprehensible body is the necessity that there be a choice at all -that is to say, the necessity that I do not exist all at once, but must unfold my existence by means of my body: thus, my finitude, my embodiment, is the condition of my freedom.

We can thus see that the "point of view" which is my body involves a double relation: "a relation with the things on which it is a point of view and a relation with the observer for whom it is a point of view." (EN, 394) My body is, so to speak, a "point

1 Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see, disputes this placement of the body in the past; il is rather my presmce-to·the·world, my present as embodied. See below, p. 181.

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 97

of view on a point of view," or, a "point of view on which no other point of view is possible." My body as a point of view is not, therefore, known; thereis no regress of points of view on points of view. In this sense, Sartre says, we can say that consciousness exists its boay: the relation between consciousness and its body is existential - precisely the dimension which was in principle excluded by traditional philosophy and psychology, yet the only one wherein the "mind-body" problem can be solved. Sartre means that my body as existed by my consciousness is a structure of my consciousness in its non-positional thrust at the world. In this sense my body is "the neglected, the 'passed by in silence,' and yet it is what it is: it is nothing other than body, the rest is nothingness and silence." (EN, 395) For, it is only in so far as consciousness is embodied that there is even a world.

However, the consciousness of the body is not a direct appre­hension; rather, it is, he argues, like the consciousness of a sign. The body is the "surpassed-towards-meaning," but unlike a physical sign (say, a highway marker), it cannot itself be appre­hended as such (as one can attend simply to the highway marker as a mere physical thing and ignore its being a sign). My body is only "indicated" by things in the world: visible objects "refer" to it as their center of orientation; auditory objects to the ear, visible objects to the eye, and so on. Thus there is no conscious­ness of the body as for-itself, but only a consciousness (of) the body, and this is a non-thetic consciousness of the manner in which consciousness is affected. For example, the experience of physical pain is for consciousness a question of the way in which consciousness exists its contingency (its being-open to the influ­ence of its world) spontaneously and non-thetically as a point of view on the world - being able to affect things consciousness­as-embodied is open to being affected by these same things. If, while reading a book, my eyes begin to hurt, we must say that consciousness exists its eyes as painful; the pain is not a "logical sign" but rather it is the eyes: it is the eyes-as-pain. Thus the pain-as-lived is not "in the world" but is rather the "translucent matter of consciousness," its being-there, its attachment to the world. If I now reflect on my pain and attempt to apprehend it, the pain ceases to be lived-pain, and becomes object-pain, an injury or "illness." With some knowledge of such affairs (if I

98 SARTRE

were a physician) I could constitute it as a "disease," or perhaps a " lacerated tendon."

Similarly, when I reflectively apprehend my body, it is no longer my body-as-lived, but rather my body js on a new plane of existence:

That is to say (my body as object is) the pu,re noematic correlate of a reflective consciousness. We shall call it the psychic body. It is still not known in any manner, for the reflection which seeks to apprehend the ill consciousness is still not cogintive. (EN, 403)

In so far as consciousness lives its body, then, this body-as­lived is the recapture by consciousness of the en-soi; in so far as the body is apprehended in reflection, it is projected into the en-soi. In so far as the body is psychic-body, it is the "matter", of all psychic phenomena (e.g., reflectively grasped pain, joy, sadness, and the like), and as such it determines psychic space.

Coenesthetic affectivity is thus the pure, non-positional grasp of a contingency without color, the pure apprehension of_ self as ~n . e7-istence in fact. This perpetual grasp by my pour-soi of an insipid taste - a grasping without distance - which. accompanies me even in my efforts to get away from it, and which is my taste - this is what we have elsewhere described under the name of Nausea. A dull and inescapable nausea constantly discloses my body to my consciousness .... • (EN, 404)

This nausea, Sartre goes on, mustnot be taken metaphorically ; to the contrary, it is precisely the fundamental mode of givenness of my body as it is for-itself to my consciousness. All that re­flection reveals to me is my body-as-object, the psychic body, and never my body-as-lived. Nausea over my body then is the foundation for all concrete nauseas. Such, for Sartre, is the body­for-itself.

(2) THE BODY-FOR-OTHERS

The body-for-itself, for Sartre, is a genuinely ontological dimension of the body. We have also learned that the body exists for Others. Now, for him,

To study the manner in which my body appears to the Other or the manner in which the Other's body appears to me amounts to the same thing. We have established. in fact, that the ~ctures of my being-for­the-Other are identical to those of the Other's being-for-me.• (EN, 405) 1

1 Schiltz has pointed out that this identification involves a basic "optimism," in Sartre's sense of the term. Cf. Schiltz, ''Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," PPR, vol. ix, No. 2 (December, 1948), pp. 184-98; and above, pp. 7i-75.

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 99

As we saw, the Other is not first given to me by means of his body; were this so, the I-Other relation would be merely external, Sartre argues, whereas in fact it is an internal relation - that of negation. Thus, he argues, "I must apprehend the Other first as he for whom I exist as object .... " {EN, 405)

The Other-as-object is grasped by me as a transcendence­transcended, as one among many other instrumentalities. Never­theless, I apprehend his body as a "peculiar" instrument, for it is grasped as itself a possible "center" of orientation. In so far as I apprehend the Other's body as a center, this center is itself now an object for me. In other words, whereas my body-for-itself is that "point of view" on which no other point of view is possible (for me), the Other's body is precisely that "point of view" on which I can (and do) take a point of view - just as the Other can (and does) take one on my point of view, whereas I myself cannot. Thus, in Van Den Berg's example of the mountainer, when I see him climbing, I see precisely what Jte has to "forget" for the sake of the task-at-hand: I notice his boots, his reaching hand, his face straining with effort, and so on. I see his body, and I see it precisely as the center of bis situation, around which are centered the mountain, the path, the valley below, and so on.1 In this sense, I ktww his body as he cannot know it. Since I encounter the Other first by means of my being-an-object for him, however, and thus discover his possibility of knowing me, I now see his sense organs as themselves the means by which he knows me: I know his senses as themselves means of knowing me, they are now seen as the "known-as-knowing," transcendences­transcended by my own looking at him. 2

The Other, that is to say,.is known by me through my senses: "he is the ensemble of sensible organs which disclose themselves to my sensible knowledge .... " (EN, 407) The "greatest function" of the sense organs, for Sartre, is thus to know (as opposed to what Bergson had maintained, and to what Merleau-Ponty will maintain). In so far as I apprehend the Other as an ensemble of sense organs, as a center of orientation indicated by a system of

t Cf. Van Den Berg, op. cit., p. 173. 2 Just the opposite is true for Husserl: by means of the automatic synthesis of

associative transfer of sense, apprcsentative "pairing," the Other's animate organism is constituted as the intrinsically first Object. Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., §§SI-SS·

IOO SARTRE

instrumental-things surrounding his body, "This Other's body is given to me as the pore en-soi of his being - an en-soi among other en-soi, which I surpass toward my possibilities.'' (EN, 409) His body is the pure fact of his presence in my world.

Everything said about my body-for-me applies, mutatis mutandis, to the Other's body-for-him. His body-for-itself is not for him an object; he exists his body as nauseous, and this nausea is not an object for him. But I, who am not this Other, do not grasp his nausea as it is for him; rather, I fix it, I see it, I transcend his own contingency, fixing it as a necessity which he has-to-be. The Other's body as it is for me is thus disclosed with two contingencies: {I) be could be elsewhere, the instru­mentalities could be arranged otherwise and thus indicate his body as a center in a different way; (2.) bis body is, however, here - but could be elsewhere, and being here as a particular this, he is for me something objective: a contingent objectivity. But whereas he is here and could be elsewhere, he must qua body be somewhere. "It is this which we shall call the necessity for the Other to be contingent for me." (EN, 409) Thus, while he must appear to me "here" as a body with a face, arms, legs, and so on, it is contingent that it be just this face, these arms, these legs, and the like. What for him is his insipid "taste of himself" becomes for me the Other's flesh, the pure contingency of his presence to me. As such, however, apprehending the Other's body I at the same time apprehend my body non-thematically as the center of reference indicated by the Other.

Nevertheless, one cannot perceive the Other's body as flesh, like an isolated object having purely external relations with other thises. That is so only for the cadaver. The Other's body as flesh is immediately given to me as the center of reference of a situation which is synthetically organized around it, and it is inseparable from this situation .... • (EN, 410) 1

That~ to say, the body over there, the Other's body, is appre­hended by me as body-in-situation, defined by the instrumental­ities surrounding it as their center of orientation. The Other's body then is precisely that by means of which there is a situation. "Far from the relation of the body to objects being a problem,

i Cf. the study by Ludwig Binswanger, "The Case of Ellen West: An Anthropolo­gical-CJinical Study," in: May, et al. (editors), Existence, Basic Books (New York, 1958), pp. 237-364, esp. pp. 277~0 on the body.

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS IOI

we never apprehend the body outside of this relation." (EN, 4rr) Accordingly, the body of the Other is apprehended by me as a

meaningful totaWy. "Meaning," being just a movement of transcendence (the Other's) transcended (by me), is apprehended by me in the Other's body, and thus "The body is the totality of signifying relations to the world. In this sense it is as well defined with reference to the air it breathes, the water it drinks, the food it eats." (EN, 4n)

Accordingly, the body of the Other (synonymously, my body for the Other) is a synthetic totality. (1) I always apprehend his body in terms of a total situation which indicates his body as its center, and thus I perceive his movements within spatio-temporal limits as meaningfully connected to and indicated by a complex of instrument~ties and goals. "To ·perceive the other is to make known to oneself, by means of the world, what he is." (EN, 4I2) 1 Not only do I perceive his body within a total situation (or Umwelt), I cannot perceive any member of his body except in synthetic connection to the totality of his body. Thus, my per­ception of the body of the Other is radically different from my perception of things. I never perceive an arm " alongside a body," but always "Pierre-who-raises-his-arm" (in order to ... ) ; I perceive his hand "as a temporal structure of his entire body." (EN, 412) In short, Pierre-for-me and Pierre-as-body are, says Sartre, identical:

... To be object-for-the-Other or to-be-body, these two ontological modalities are translations which are strictly equivalent to the pour-soi's being-for-the-Other. Thus, the significations do not lead back to a mysterious psychism: they are this psychism in so far as it is a transcen­dence-transcended. . . In particular. . . emotional manifestations or,. more generally, the phenomena improperly called "expression," in no way indicate to us a hidden affection lived by some psych.ism ... These frowns, this redness, this stammering, this slight trembling of the hands, these downcast looks which seem at once timid and threatening - these do not express anger; they are the anger.• (EN, 4r3)

i This insight provides perhaps the closest connections between existential philosophy and existential psychology. As Buyte.ndijk states: " ... the observable relations between the animal and his milieu are ~ver perceived as a series of processes, but always as phenomena connected in a signilicative manner to something else ... in their behavior living beings manifest themselves immedi<Uely as sul>fects. The structure of behavior, as a. relation o/ lhe subfecl lo his world, is immedi<Uely ovitk11t." Altitudes et Mouveme11Js: Elude /onclionneJk du mouvement humain, Descl~e de Brouwer (Paris, 1957), pp. 43 and 47. Cf. also Van Den Berg, The Phern>menokigical 11.f>#oad lo Psychiatry, Charles C. Thomas (SpriDgfield, i955), esp. pp. 2S-47.

102 SARTRE

But here, Sartre goes on to emphasize, we should always keep in mind that we always perceive these phenomena in situation -as a meaningful and synthetic totality referring to the world, to the past and to the future (as my reaching hand refers to the glass of wine on the table), to the person as we have known him, or to similar persons and typical situations, and so on. It is this synthetic totality which is the anger. "We cannot get away from that: the 'psychic object' is completely released to perception and is inconceivable outside of corporal structures.'' (EN, 4r3) What is " expressed" and what "expresses," as Merleau-Ponty will say, are here identically the same.

The Other's body, then, is given to me as being what he is. I apprehend Fred's body as that which Fred surpasses in his raising his glass to his lips, that is, toward the goal: imbibing. This present raising of his arm is apprehended by me as intrinsic­ally referring to the future of this person whose arm it is. Thus, this present, these movements of body-members, are never apprehended by me as they are i1i themselves except in the case of a corpse. The Other is presented to my perception then as a synthetic ensemble of meaningfully interc0nnected gestures, body-attitudes, and body-habits such that, for instance, I know what my friend "feels" like when he wrinkles up his eyes, turns up the comers of his mouth, pounds the table with his hands, and so on. Or, I know in a typical manner what this stranger's raised arm and clenched fist mean within a typically familiar situation.

In so far as his body is thus a transcendence-transcended, the Other's body is intrinsically a "pointing-beyond-itself" to its tasks-at-hand. As such, it is, he contends, the magical object par excellence, the body which is "more than body." 1 But it points back, not to a subjectivity (as it does for Husserl), but rather, for Sartre, to the Other's facticity, to his being an object for me, an en-soi: a transcend'.ente-t:r:anscended.

(3) THE THTRD ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE BODY

The first dimension of the body is the b0.dy as it is for-itself,

1 The Otber's body can be "magical" only because Sartre bas already reified "subject" and "object," making the Other's body aa apprehended "en-soi" to begiu with. This goes together with his radical Cartesianism.

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS I03

that is, as it is lived by pour-soi. The second is expressed by the fact that my body is known and utilized by the Other, it is my body-for-the-Other, or the Other's body-for-me. In so far as I am for Others, the Other is revealed to me as the subject for whom I am obfect: I exist for-myself as a body known by the Other - this is the third dimension of the body.

My body is not only lived by me, nor merely seen by the Other as an object; when the Other looks at me, I experience the revelation of my being-for-the-Other, but I cannot know this. To the extent that I experience my being-an-object for the Other, my objectity, I grasp my own facticity: "The shock of the encounter with the Other is a revelation in emptiness of the existence of my body - outside, like an en-soi for the Other." (EN, 419) ln this way, my body gains a new dimettSion to its being, a depth throughits being lived by me now as the perceptual "outside" of my intimate "inside."

In Van Den Berg's illustration,1 when the mountaineer becomes aware that I am.looking at him, he apprehends himself as an " outside," as looked-at in a way which is impossible for him to adopt. My body as a point of view becomes one on which other points of view can be brou·ght to bear, but which I can never take up as regards my own body-for-itself. My ensemble of senses is given fo me as apprehended by the Other, and this is a factual necessity (it is necessary that I appear as a body for the Other, but it is contingent that I appear in just "this" particular way -for instance, with dirty fingers at an interview). Thus, Sartre contends, the being-for-others of my body haunts my body-for­itself (how my body is apprehended by the Other creeps into the way in which I live my body), and this dimension constitutes the third ontological modality of my body:

Thus the relativity of my senses (which I cannot think abstractly without destroying my world) is continuous~y at the same time made present to me by the Other's existence. But it is <!- pure and inapprehen­sible appresentation. * (EN, 420)

In a similar way my body as the instrument which I am is revealed as one instrument among others - but I cannot grasp my bodY, as one among other instruments, just because I am it.

1 Van Den l3erg, "The Human Body and the Significance of Human :t.fovement," op. cit., pp. 174-175.

ro4 SARTRE

Thus my world collapses before the Other's look. My body becomes designated as aliena.ted: I see, perhaps, the doctor's ear, which indicates my body as what I exist (a point-of-view­without-a-point-of-view); but now, I apprehend his ear as itself listening to my heart-beat, and immediately what I live as indicated by his ear becomes designates as an outside. I experience myself as an object, hence I am alienated from myself by my own body. In this sense, as we already emphasized, it is shame which originarily disclosed the other to me: shame is my ob­jectity before the Other.I This experience is nothing but "the metaphysical and horrified apprehension of the existence of my body for the Other." {EN, 420) In terms of this ontological dimension, such phenomena as the desire to "get rid of" one's body, to "become invisible," and the like, become understandable.

The third dimension of the body is the body-for-itself, but alienated and inapprehensible. The Other, that is to say, ac­complishes for me what I cannot do for myself: he sees me as I am "outside." It is by attempting, primarily, by means of language to see myself as the Other sees me that an analogical identification, "the analogical assimilation of the Other's body and my body," takes place, and no where else.2 For such assimilation to occur, moreover, it is necessary,

that I have encountered the Other in his objectivating subjectivity since as an object it is necessary (in order for m e to judge the Other's body as an object similar to my body) that he have been given to me as an object and that my body have disclosed on its part an object-dimension. The analogy on the resemblance can never constitute first the body­object of the Other and the objectivity of my body. To the contrary, these two objectities must exist previously in order for an analogical principle to come into play. Here, then, it is language which teaches me what are the structures of my body for the Other.• (EN, 421-22)

My body-as-object for the Othedslived by me unreflectively; in reflection, I -apprehend my body, not as it is lived, but as a quasi-object , Le., as a "psychic object." 3 But, a purely cognitive knowing of the body is always a knowing from the point of view of the Other: it is never my body, but, as Marcel has said, "the,"

1 Cf. above, pp. 77-79. 2 Though Sartre does not mention it, this seems to be a polemic against Husserl's

notion of appresentalional pairing. Cf. above, p. 99, foot.note 2.

a In the Transu,.denu of t11e Ego, Sartre spoke of the Ego as merely one object among others, like a chair ; here, he seems to recognize that there are, indeed, great differences between mere things and psychie structures.

ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS 105

or "a," body which is an object and hence which is known. In the same way, when I look at, or observe, certain parts of my body as objects (touching my head, looking at my knee, and so on), I adopt the point of view of the Other and thus my body appears as the body-of-the-Other. (Cf. EN, 425-26)

These are, then, the three ontological dimensions of the body, three dimensions of its being which, Sartre concludes, are from the standpoint of awareness chronologically in the same order. In point of time, I live my body-for-itself, then it is revealed to me as for-Others, and finally I live my body's being-for-the­Other as an "outside" which I have-to-be without being it.

It is now necessary to examine Sartre's analysis in some detail.

CHAPTER III

CRITICAL REMARKS

Several of the arguments in Sartre's analysis of the body de­serve close attention. Briefly, these may be formulated as follows:

(I) The being of consciousness is not in any of its dimensions capable of being made into an object by the same consciousness. Therefore, in so far as the body-for-itself is a structure of the being of consciousness as for-itself, it cannot be made an object-by consciousness. Similarly, consciousness can only exist its being a body-for-Others, and thus it exists for itself as a body known by Others but not by itself. I do not know my body as such in its three dimensions, I am it : being it, my body can never become an object for me.

(2) My body-for-itself, and in particular its system o( sense organs, are only the "referred-to," the "indicated," of the objects "oriented" around it as their "centeL" A sense organ therefore, considered as a member of my body-for-itself, knows nothing of "sense-data" of any description; rather, it is the center of refer­ence indicated by the objects peculiar to it.

(3) When consciousness suddenly experiences its own being­an-object for the Other this shock causes a new dimension of its being to arise - its being-for-Others-and this, in tum, causes the emergence of another dimension - my body-for-Others is existed by me as a body known by Others, I experience my own being­outside for Others. Therefore what we have to do with here are genuinely ontological "dimensions" of the body.

(4) Finally, it is Sartre's belief that "To study the way in which my body appears to the Other or the way in which the Other's body appears to me amounts to the same thing." (EN, 405) This, he states, follows from the identity of my being­for-the-Other and his being-for-me.

CRITICAL REMARKS ro7

It will be necessary to consider each of these central points separately.

(1) THE APPREHENSION OF THE BODY-FOR-ITSELF

While involved in filling my pipe with tobacco, my fingers, my hand, my arm, indeed my whole body as it is " lived" by me in this concrete act, is not apprehended for itself but is rather "surpassed" toward the specific goal of my action: smoking my pipe. Were I to reflect on my body (or, were I to look at my fingers in the attitude of an observer), what I would apprehend would not be my body as existed by me (my fingers as surpassed towards the project-at-hand), but only an object, namely, my body in its being-for-Others.

We pointed out above that this argument reveals several intrinsic presuppositions which are not themselves examined by Sartre. (a) The only consciousness which could "apprehend" the body-as-lived as such would be precisely the non-thematic "living" ("existing") of the body as surpassed towards projects­at-hand; a seeing cannot be apprehended by another seeing. And this requirement, Sartre contends (Marcel and Merleau-Ponty notwithstanding), is simply impossible to fulfill. If one were to propose that my living of my body is itself a sort of apprehension or knowing of it (as does Merleau-Ponty), Sartre would insist that this "apprehension" is not really apprehension in the strict sense of cognition, a relation of knowing in which there is a si!-bf ect over against ati ob1'ect who grasps the body-for-itself in a cognitive manner. Rather, Sartre contends, there is no apprehension proper of the body-for-itself just because this dimension of the body underlies any subject-object dichotomy; it is a dimension of being, and not a relation of knowledge.

(b) The type of consciousness which does succeed in appre­hending my body, reflection, apprehends only objects. But my body-for-itself is not, and cannot become, an object in any way whatever, since it is that which is surpassed towards objects and therefore it is that in virtue of which there are objects in the first place. Thus if one were to maintain that there is a sort of re­flection which makes this dimension of my body accessible as such (as, for instance, Marcel's "Ptmsee pensante"), Sartre would merely claim that in so far as the "reflection" recovers the lived

ro8 SARTRE

unity (the body-for-itself), it is no longer reflection in the strict sense; reflection is by essense a knowing, and as such essentially involves the subject-object dichotomy. In so far as reflection involves a reflecting and a reflected-on, the latter is for the former something other than what it was before the act of re­flecting (the body-for-itself is not the b ody-for-Others, and re­flection succeeds only in apprehending the latter, never the former).

We can reduce these assumptions to one: if I cannot apprehend an activity of consciousness while it goes on and in so far as it goes on, nor a component of consciousness qua pour-soi, then I cannot apprehend it at all ! Nor, for that matter, will it be possible for me even to describe this activity as such in its own intrinsic structure. For to apprehend an activity of consciousness would mean to take it as an object, and as such it is no longer going on but has ceased in order for me to apprehendit. I cannot see my seeing, and if I reflect on my seeing I am no longer seeing but reflectively grasping an object. I cannot make my body an object just because I am it. I must cease being my body-for­itself in order to disclose it, but then I will have disclosed only its being-an-object and not its being-for-itself. To use the ex­pressions adopted by Prof. Natanson,1 all I reflectively appre­hend is the obfectity of my body and never its subfectity; its subjectity is by essence non-graspable just because it is always the grasping and never what-is-grasped.

To reflect on my body-as-lived (which is, we saw, a structure of consciousness) radicalty modifies it qua reflected-on (EN, Ig8). For , Sartre goes on,

That reflection is a cognition (knowledge) is indubitable; it is endowed with a positional characteristic, it affirms the consciousness reflected-on. But every affirmation ... is conditioned by a negation: to affirm this object is to deny simultaneously that I am this object. To lmow is ro make otieself other.• (EN, 202)

Since, however, the reflection, the reflecting consciousness, is the consciousness reflected-on, it cannot make itself wholly other, and thus the effort to know oneself "must lead to a failure, and precisely this failure is reflection." (EN, 200) Rather than being knowledge, then, reflection is a recognition, the recognition by

1 Natanson, op. cit., cf. above, pp. Io3-07.

CRITICAL REMARKS I09

the reflecting consciousness that it is one with the reflected-on in the mode of not-being it and a knowledge of the latter as a psychic object. (Cf. EN, 207-08) Hence Sartre finds it necessary to distinguish between a "pure reflection" (which is only a " quasi-connaissance" (EN, 209)) and an "impure reflection" (which is a knowledge of a psychic object). The reflection on my body-for-itself modifies it and apprehends my body on a new dimension of its being, namely, psychic body, the body-as-object, or the body-for-Others. This modification consists in my body's taking on, qua reflected-on, a sort of "outside," i.e., a kind of objectity. In this sense, my body-for-itself disappears and the psychic body appears as object of the reflecting consciousness.

Now, it seems to me that what this entire position fails to take into account is that every "object " whatever, to be an object of a consciousness and thus to be an " intended" object, is a sense­unity which as such intrinsically points back, not to a facticity (as Sartre maintains), but rather to the consciousness of it as that which bestowed this meaning (m the obf ect. Consciousness is pointed to by its objects as "sense-bestowing." i

That Sartre, in fact, never investigates objects as unities of sense, while purportedly following out the implications of the theory of intentionality, demonstrates Sartre's own departure from this doctrine. To argue that consciousness as intentive to objects (ultimately, to the world) "demands" a transphenomenal "support" (the en-soi) , is simply to fail to recognize that this "transphenomenality," even if there be such an affair, is itself a sense bestowed on objects (ultimately, the world) by the conscious­ness of them.

Similarly as regards the body, to say that reflection discloses only the body-as-object is to ignore the intrinsic characteristic of this object - that it is a sense-unity, that it has an "objective sense" which as such can not only be grasped but reflectively described and explicated as such. Moreover, to identify the body­as-object with the body-for-Others is to fail to recognize the intrinsic difference of sense between my body as seen by me and

l It is of the essence of intentionality, Husserl points out, that all objects point back to the consciousness of them. Cf. E. Husserl, Formale und Transrendentale Logik, Max Niemeyer (Hall.e, I929), § 86, p. 187, and § 99, pp. 221:-22. See also, Husserl, Cartesian Mediuuwns, op. ciJ., §§ 20-22, pp. 46-55. It is already evid~t. then, that Sartre seems to give uf> intentionality and is quite far from "correcting" it.

IIO SARTRE

my body as seen by the Other (as well as the great difference between being seen by one Other and being seen by many Others; between being seen by a total stranger, and being seen by a loved one; and so on). The explication of the reflectively apprehended body-for-itself discloses that this "object" has the sense for me, "my body-as-lived," however true it may or may not be that I do not at the same time ''live" my body.

The fact that I cannot at the same time and in the same respect act and reflect on this acting by no means signifies that the acting reflected-on is no longer the same acting which I actually performed. Similarly, while it is quite true that I cannot see my seeing, I can and do reflectively apprehend my seeing itself as a specific subjectively lived process. Were this not the case, then absolutely nothing could be said about seeing; Sartre could describe it neither as "indicated" nor as a "center." However, this reflecting by no means "alters" or "modifies" the seeing, such that "seeing as seeing" would be an "inapprehen­sible." It seems to me, in fact, that Sartre confuses obfectifying with obfectivating: to make any activity (e.g. seeing) thematic is by no means to take it as a mere object (in Sartre's sense, as a Gegenstand, something standing-over-against-me, who am sub­ject), that is, an en-soi. I may do so, asMarcel saw quite clearly; but it is not intrinsically necessary that I do so. Indeed, this discussion brings out Sartre's own bias: he simply identifies "being-an-object" with "being-in-itself"; he reifies "object" into an "en-soi"; and this reification, never questioned by him, runs throughout his work.

I may, of course, reflectively consider my body as a physico­chemical system defineable by means of physiological-neurolo­gical laws and reduceable to specific "elements" whose inter­action takes plaee in ways which are specifiable by those laws. In this sense, I would reflectively consider my body as, in Sartre's terms, "for-Others"; it would. be my body as a somatic unity like any other bodily organism. It is by no means neces­sarily the case that reflection always .has this as its object; if it were even Sartre could not describe, as he does, the body-for­itself. But even when I do so consider my body as an "object," the body-object still remains a sense-unity and its sense still remains precisely "my body," though now taken in its natural

CRITICAL REMARKS rn

aspect. Thus it is not at all the case that, for example, when I go to the doctor with a broken leg, we are both in the same-relation to my leg, i.e., that we both equally are observers and in the same sense. To be sure, I do observe my leg, and so does the doctor; but it is always "my" leg and not " his" which is oberved by us.

It seems to me that Sartre's analysis of the body, whileitis undoubtedly a subtle and penetrating study, is infected with a

- blas deriving from liis implicit acceptance of the Cartesian dualism, an acceptance moreover which does not seem to "be noticedby him. And, the prime consequence of this is the reifiCation of"object" and "subject" (it makes no difference in this sense wlietlier one speaks of rtsubjed-object" or "pour-soi - en-soi"). To be sure, consciousness for Sartre is no longer Descartes' res cogitans, nor is being the res extensa. Consciousness is not an absolute self-certainty of knowledge but is now, for Sartre, an absolute interiority of negation which exists itself as a lack of being in its temporal ekstases. Being, on the other hand, is now conceived as a primal stuff, the "viscous," the "packed." "the solid," and no longer conceived in terms of extension which is by essence determinable in mathematical formulae. Nevertheless, the essentially Cartesian position remains: pour-soi and en-soi, consciousness and world, are co-givens; they are simultaneous and absolute. For both, consciousness and world are two domains of being. But whereas Descartes maintained only that the res extensa and the .,es cogitan.s are distinct as regards their respective natures, Sartre goes much farther to maintain that pour-soi and en-soi are radically separate in their being. Pour-soi is-not en-soi; en-soi is, pour-soi is nothingness. Pour-soi's connection with the en-soi is to be understood now, not in terms of Descartes' "ideas," but in terms of Sartre's version of the intentiveness of conscious­ness, its bursting-forth onto the world as not-being the world. And thus, as we have pointed out, the intensification and reification of the dualism occurs by way of the transformation of the theory of intentionality.

This transformation of Husserl's theory of intentionality is already implicit in the very formulation of the ontological problem in the Introduction to L'Etre et le Neant. To say that consciousness is consciousness of . .. , he states there, is to say that it is either constitutive of the being of its object, or that it is

II2 SARTRE

a relation to a transcendent being. Denying the first, Sartre tries to maintain the second. l

However, it should be noticed that Sartre pre-interprets "constitution" to mean "creation"; and it is in terms of this pre­conception of the meaning of constitution that he undertakes to criticize Husserl's notion of "hyletic data," as well as to state the alternates (one of which he rejects, maintaining that conscious­ness cannot create the being of its objects). (Cf. EN, 26) It must be pointed out, however, that, although Husserl did at times use the term, "constitution," in this non-,_phenomenotogical sense, it is by no means the only, nor the most frequent, nor even the genuinely phenomenological, meaning he wished to use. 2 And, indeed, in the Formate und Transzendentale Logik,3 Husserl explicitly states that "constitution" (synonymously, "producing") does not signify "inventing" or "making" (synonymously, "creating"). To be sure, nowhere in Husserl's works do we find a formal definition of "constitution." Nevertheless, as Prof. Dorion Cairns has abundantly demonstrated, 4 it is still possible to formulate the genuinely phenomenological concept of consti­tution, and this concept is in no way Sartre's "creation." 5

In the most general sense of the term constitution signifies the synthetic structure of the total inte1itional process (the actual and potential intendings of the object in question as the same ob­ject); i.e., constitution designates a total process, a synthetic process through the multiple phases of which one and the same object is intended as self-identical. The constituting of something in this sense is, accordingly, not a putting together of elements to make up a whole, but rather a synthetic union of actual and potential processes as having a common object.6 All these pro-

i Cf. above, pp. 65-68. ' Prof. Dorion Cairns has made this unmistakably clearin a series of lectures given

from Fall Semester, 1957, through Spring Semester, r959, at the Graduate Faculty of Political and Social Science in New York City: "Husserl's Theory of Intentionality, Parts I, II, III, IV."

3 § 991 pp. 22I-22, esp. 222, lines x-xo. 4 In a special lecture-series on phenomenology, gi:ven from March to May, 1959· 6 Allred Schiltz makes a similar mistake, in "Das Problem der transzendentalen

Intersubjektlvltat bei Husserl," Philcst>f>hische Rundschau, 5. Jahrgang, Heft 2

(.1957), pp. 81- xo7, cf. esp. pp. 106-07. e Cf. Aron Gurwitsch, "On the Intentionality of Consciousness," PhilcsophiGal

Essays in Memory of Edmvnd Husserl, M. Farber (edit.or), Harvard (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 65-84, esp. 66: "To be aware of an obied means that, in the f>Tes1111t experience, one is awar" of the obiect as being the same as thaJ wmch one was aware of in the past

CRITICAL REMARKS II3

cesses are united precisely as intending the object as self-identical throughout a multiplicity of appearances of the object in question and the synthetic structure of their union is called the constitutioti of the thing pure/;y as what is intended in and by these intentive processes. This, then, determines the sense of the constituting as Leistung. There are, of course, several more narrow senses of "constitution," but we need not go into these here. All that is important for our point is that Sartre's transformation of intentionality, and subsequent criticism of Husserl in terms of this transformation, is at the outset unjustified.

In the second place, Sartre's interpretation of intentionality as a "relation" to a transcendent being is not phenomenologically accurate, nor correct as an interpretation of Husserl. To be sure, Husserl did at times speak of intentionality as a "Beziehung," but he was quick to point out, as Sartre never does, that it is not a "real" relation - like causality, succession, simultaneity, and the like. In the first place, Husserl states explicitly that

What is then to be noticed is the circumstance that here we do not speak of a relation between any sort of psychological event - called a subjectively lived experience - and another real existent - called object - nor do we speak of a psychological connection which would take- place between the one and the other in objective actualitJ). Rather we speak of subjectively lived experiences purely as regards their essence, or oi pure essenu, and of what is in&luded in the essence "a priori," in unc<mditicmed necessity.• 1

As Husserl put it in his Cartesian Meditations, in the second place, 2 intentiveness is an intrinsic characteristic or property of subjective processes (Erlelmisse), and not a relation between a consciousness and an objective world- which is, in the end, the only way one can understand Sartre's interpretation of intention­ality.

Hence, we must say, Sartre's interpretation of intentionality as a relation to a transcendent being is not only a departure from Husserl (and far from a "correction" of him, as Sartre claims), but also precludes from the beginning what he sets out to prove. To call intenti?nality a relation to a transcendent being pre-

experietice, and as the same as that which one may exfuct to be aware of in a fldtire e.xperie11ce, as the same that ••. one may be aware of in an indefinite tiumber of presentative acts ...

~ E. Husserl, ldeen •u einer reinen Ph411omenologie und phanomenolcgischen PhilosopAie, Band I, Max Niemeyer (Halle, 1913), § 36, p. 64.

! Carnsian Mtditatio11S, op. ci,,, § 14, p. 33.

SARTRE

St4'pposes tlzat the terms of this relation are given simt1ltaneoi1sly and thus Sartre's "proof" of the transphenomenality of being is quite si,perf/;ilO'tts (and merely diverts one's attention away from this presupposition).

Furthermore, cm this ass~'mption everything else in Sartre's presentation flows quite as a matter of course: consciousness cannot be "constitutive," i.e., "creative," of the being of objects but, being a pure relating-to, must be the absolute opposite of the en-soi which is a pure related-to; thus it follows also that the only possible relation to the en-soi can only be a self-negation on the part of consciousness. But all of this rests on the assumption, the unquestioned and quite unjustified presupposition, that consciousness, which is by essence intentive, is nevertheless an intending of a being (en-soi) which is transcendent to itself, which is there whether intended or not. But either, on the one hand, consciousness is genuinely intentive, through and through, and the en-soi, if transcendent, is always intended as transcendent (i.e., is a noematic-objective sense), or, if the en-soi is genuinely transphenomenal, then consciousness cannot be genuinely intentive. To try to maintain both is to be involved in a root contradiction; and just this is the case, we submit, in Sartre's analysis. Only, the contradiction is concealed by means of his presupposed transformation of the theory of intentionality and his intensification of the Cartesian dualism.

It is, in other words, only by means of the reification of "sub­ject" and "object" that Sartre can maintain that negation is the fundamental and primordial relation between pour-soi and en-soi. But if one holds fast to the intentiveness of consciousness, Husserl points out, it is evident that negation, far from being primary, is rather a modification of affinnation.1 More particu­larly, the fundamental stratum of consciousness' intentiveness is that of "simply believing," or "simply accepting," its objects (what Husserl calls proto-doxic positionality). The fundamental tendency of consciousness, that is to say, is simply to accept its objects, to believe in them simply, and it thus takes some moti­vation for it to modify this proto-doxic positionality.

Unless there is some reason for consciousness to modalize its

1 Husserl, Erfahrung und Urtei1: Untersuchungen zur Gmealogie Iler Logik, Claassen Verlag (Hamburg, 2nd Ed., 1954), § 21c, pp. 97~8.

CRITICAL REMARKS ns positionality, its tendency is simply to accept things "until further notice." Negation, then, arises only by means of a synthesis of cancellation (as when, to use Sartre's own example, walking into the cafe and expecting to find Pierre, I discover instead that Pierre is not there yet; the expecting is cancelled because it is n9t fulfilled, or, the proto-doxic intending becomes modalized, motivated by the failure to be fulfilled: here, as elsewhere, negation is a specific modification or modalization of the more fundamental tendency of consciousness). More technically, negation arises only by means of a synthesis of cancellation between a presented sense and a transferred sense, when, e.g. the horizontally predelineated presentation of a specific object (Pierre) is disconfirmed in the on-going course of the harmonious experiencing of it (walking into the cafe expecting to find him). The actualization of protentional intendings of the objects as the same enter into a synthesis of cancellation (or: negative verifi­cation) with the protentional intendings of the object in previous experience of it.

If Sartre had remained faithful to the insight of Husserl, he might have seen the absurdity of attempting to speak of a "being­in-itself" which is not i1itended as "in-itself" and relative, there­fore, to consciousness. I

Now, as regards the problem of the body, it seems evident that not only can the body-for-itself be made thematic and reflectively explicated, but also that Sartre has himself done i~t that. He does in fact, describe the body-for-itself at length; but this is possible only by means of the specific theoretical act of thematization, or objectivation, which makes the body-for-itself an "object," a "theme" for analysis. To say that my body cannot be made an "object" because I am it, simply obscures the whole problem, and derives, as I have maintained, from a reification of Cartesian dualism. Although Sartre attempts to overcome this dualism by transforming it into an ontological struggle between en-soi and pour-soi, the consequence is rather an intensification of it. And the new dualism, however much it has become transformed, is unjustifiable on phenomenological grounds. That is to say, however, that it cannot be consistently maintained along with a

1 See, on this point, Husserl, Ideen, I, § 47; Formale und TransieniUntale Logik, § 102; and Ca.rlaian Medit4'ions, § 8.

II6 SARTRE

theory of intentionali"ty. For, as Husserl has shown, every "object" of consciousness intrinsically refers back to the consciousness of it as that which bestows its sense as 'an object of this or that kind, having these and those determinations, qualities, and the like. And, Husserl points out,

It is to be emphasized that this pointing-back ... is not derived from an empirical induction on the part of psychological observer ... but is rather, as is to be demonstrated in phenomenology, an essential compo11tJt1t of intetitionality, to be disclosed from its own intrinsic intentional content in the corresponding (intentively) fulfilling productions.• 1

This being so, either one can talk of objects (ultimately, the world, or en-soi) only as intended; or else he must give up the claim to phenomenology, and expecially to the theory of in­tentionality. But if objects are thus considered strictly as in­tended, then it is not only possible but quite essential to investi­gate them as such: if the body is experienced by consciousness as for-itself, then ipso facto it is accessible to phenomenological explication.

(2) THE BODY AS A CENTER OF REFERENCE

In spite of the difficulties mentioned, Sartre gives an excellent analysis of the body-as-lived. As Alphonse de Waelhens remarks, the real difficulties with Sartre's analysis arise when one attempts to explicate his concrete analyses in terms of his fundamental ontology.2 By themselves the individual studies seem to be quite accurate ; but in the end they are irreconcilable with the onto­logical doctrines. Here, too, as regards the phenomenon of the body this is apparent; in particular, where Sartre departs from the intentiveness of consciousness in his ontological doctrines, the analysis of the body as a center of reference of objects dis­closed by means of it can only be understood as an intentional analysis. Nevertheless Sartre conducts his ing_aj_ry withoEt ~y reference to intentionality. While he thus seems to recognize this fundamental characteristi.C'" of consciousness (and of the body, in so far as it, too, is a structure of consciousness), his analysis is far from complete.

1 Formale untl Transundenlale Logik, § 86, p. r87; cf. also§ 97, p. u6. t A. de Waelhens, Une PhUost>f>hie de l'A.mbigwite, Universitaires de Louvain

{19s1J, esp. pp ... -a.

CRITICAL REMARKS II7

The body is what is "indicated" by the system of objects around it, it is that in terms of which they are ordered in specific ways. In so far as the body is thus the center of the order, it is not itself within the field; I cannot take a "point of view" on that which is my very "point of view" on things. In the same sense, Husserl speaks of the organism as the "continuous bearer of the center of orientation . ... " 1

Similarly, each of the senses, Sartre emphasizes, is oriented with respect to a specific system of objects, and this system points back to the sense organ as its center. This, for Sartre, is what it means to be sensuously perceptive of a world. A thing presents itself visually, e.g., in a harmonious system of adum­brations of itself, and this system is harmoniously ordered with other systems of adumbrations ("other things"), the total system of which refers to the visual organs as center.

The "reference back," for Sartre, is possible only because the body is itself "in the midst of things," i.e., it is a thing which is of the same type as the other things ordered around it. Thus, for the eye to see, it must itself be visible, for the hand to touch, it must itself be touchable, and so on.

But here, several difficulties arise. Following his analysis, which, be it noted, remains almost totally within the sphere of vision, one would have to say that auditory objects refer back to the ear as their orientational center, and that, for this reference to take place, the ear must itself be "in the midst of auditory things." However, unless one minces words, this "being in the midst of things" must be spelled out, as regards every sensuous dimension, as Sartre does for vision. That is to say: in order for the reference of auditory objects back to the auditory sense organ to occur, the ear must itself be "audible." Similarly, the same would have to be said of the gustatory and the olfactory sense organs - if, that is to say, this aspect of Sartre's analysis is essential

And here it seems that the principle of the analysis is inade­quate. While it might be maintained that auditory, gustatory, and olfactory objects refer to their respective senses as their centers, it seems absurd to go on to say that in order for this reference to occur, the taste-buds must be "tasteable," the ear

1 Husserl, Tdun, II, op. cit., § t8c, p. 6s.

II8 SARTRE

"bearable," the sensitive membranes of the nose "smellable." And to complicate things further, what must we say as regards the muscular-visceral sense? While this seems to be connected to the tactual sense, it does not seem to be subject to the same descriptions: is there here an orientational center? In what sense could muscular-visceral sensations (since one can hardly speak of "objects" in the sense of concrete physical things) "refer back" . . . and, to what would they refer?

To be sure, the eye as visible is not itself within the field of visible objects but is rather their center; similarly, the ear cannot hear itself hearing, the band feel itself feeling, and so on. Never­theless, Sartre's answer that the senses are each centers of their respective fields, that they are the "indicated" of each particular system objects, and that the body as a whole is the synthetic center of the concatenated systems of objects of the respective senses - this answer does not seem to be applicable to each of the senses. And, if it is not applicable to all the senses, can it be applicable to the body as a synthetic totality ? At best, we must say, Sartre's analysis is inadequate. We shall have to seek for some other principle in order to account for the body as a syn­thetic totality.

Sartre's main point, however, seems to be well-taken: the senses are each the "centers of reference'' of the systems of objects relevant to each. And in virtue of this reference the senses are each synthesized, in themselves, and in respect to each other, such that the body as a whole· becomes synthetically constitu.ted as the center "O" of a system of coordinates spreading out in space and time from it.

But what, after all, is this "refe_~ ?" How does it take place? Furthermore, how does it happen that The body as a whole becomes synthetically constituted as a totality, and that the several fields of the senses are in themselves u.nified such that one automatically sees and hears the same thing, touches the same thing he smells, and so on? To state that it happens, and to study the way in which it happens, are two very different matters ; and Sartre simply leaves us with the latter unanalyzed. Thus, for instance, to say that the eye is the center of the field of visual objects, and that the latter refers to the eye as the center, by no means tells us how it happens that the eye, and not the hand, or

CRITICAL REMARKS II9

perchance that tree over there, becomes the center of visible objects; 1 or, how it happens that in the course of my on-going experience I must learn that I cannot see sounds, touch sweetness, or hear shapes.

We do not at this point wish to suggest possible ways of ex­plicating this "reference." For one thing, Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see, takes up this problem in some detail; for another, we shall have to return to it againin our final sections in our attempt to suggest the phenomenological-constitutive analysis of the body. It is enough at this time to have pointed out that Sartre's analysis leaves this problem unasked, much less answered. We indicate it, then, as one of the basic problems in accounting for the structured-orderedness of the animate organism.

(3) THE PROBLEM OF 'ONTOLOGICAL DIMENSIONS'

Sartre's analysis of the body is conducted in terms of what he callS the ' 'ontological Winensions" of the body. To underst~d this theory, accordingly, one must ask what is meant by these "dimensions." Unfortunately, Sartre leaves this evidently important matter in almost complete obscu.rity. Beyond a few indications, his analysis simply passes it by. We must therefore attempt to interpret his meaning.

We have already seen that when the Other is originarily encountered this "shock" causes a new "dimension" of the being of consciousness to emerge - its "being-for-Others." This en­counter, again, does not in any way involve the body,2 but rather occurs within the "pure interiority" of the cogito. s As we have also seen, everythingin Sartre's theory of the Other and that of the body seems to indicate that even the body's "being-for­itself" does not emerge until after the encounter with the Other.

It would thus seem to be the case that we cannot interpret the "dimensions" of the body as being the same as the "dimensions" of the pour-soi. (Cf., e.g., EN, 405) While"it is certainly Sartre's position that, as we saw, the "dimensions" of the body do emerge

1 Piaget, e.g., bas shown that this is by no means an innate endowment , but the result of a complicated history. CL Origins of Intelligenu in Chudre11, International Universities Press (New York, 19511), pp. 62-a2.

! Contrary to Mrs. Hazel Barnes' interpretation in her " Translator's Introduction" to Being and NotMng11ess, P.hilosophical Ll'brary (New York, 1956), pp. xl-xlii.

3 Cf., e.g., EN, 290, 297, and 300.

120 SARTRE

in a chronological order, it is not at all certain that the " di­mensions" of the pour-soi are also chronological.1 Furthermore, if his statements in The Transcendence of the Ego yield any clues here, they are in support of our interpretation. There, as we have already indicated above, it is Sartre's position that the body is a "visible and tangible symbol for the I"; the ego is itself but an object for consciousness; thus, the body is doubby removed from consciousness.

Despite the lack of clarity, nevertheless, the " dimensions" of the body are in some sense at least analogous to those of the pour­soi. In neither case can the dimensions be derived from one another nor reduced to one another. (Cf. EN, 365-67) Thus we should properly say that, as regards the pour-soi, so, too, the body "must be simultaneously for-itself and for-others .... " (EN, 342) 2 The ·body, then, will simultaneously be different dimensions, though each of its dimensions emerges chronologic­ally. Again, although the dimensions of the body are not identi­cally the same as those of the pour-soi, they emerge as such only as a consequence of the encounter by pour-soi with the Other. Finally, like the dimensions of the poar-soi's being, those of the body are on " two different and incommunicable levels of being; they irreducible to one another." (EN, 367-68)

In short, it would appear to be the case for Sartre that since " the body is not what first manifests me to the Other," (EN, 405) as this would make the fundamental relation to the Other a purely external one, my being-an-object for the Other is not the same thing as my body's being-for-Others. Thus, the respective dimensions of the pour-soi and the body are not the same. The attempt to understand the meaning of the " dimensions" of the body in terms of those of the pour-soi proves to be of no avail The emergence-of the body, in the end, is but one episode in the ontologically more fundamental encounter with the Other in the negativeness of pure interiority. (EN, ibid.}

In our presentation of Marcel's conception of the body we saw that he had recognized much earlier than Sartre that "the notion

1 At best, all one can say is that Sartre's analysis of the encounter with the Other ls most confusing on th.is point. H e constantly couches it in such terms as "before," "after," and "hitherto," without ever indicating the meaning of these terms. (Cf. EN, 340-42)

2 The necessity here is a factual necessity. Cf. EN, 3.µ.

I

CRITlCAL REMARKS I2I

of the body is not at all univocal." 1 Even prior to that, Marcel had insisted that the body considered as a physical thing, and the body considered as it is lived by the one whose body it is, are two irreducibly distinct "modes of existence." 2 Later 011 he designated the'se as the mode of existence proper to obfects, and that mode proper to existents. s In general, it would seem that Sartre's distinction is, if not the same, at least quite similar: the body's being-for-Others is essentially its being-an-object, while its being-for-itself is the mode in which it is experienced by consciousness (consciousness' "being-in-the-midst-of-things'').

However that may be, it seems to us necessary to point out that though it is certainly possible for me to consider my body as an object, though my body's existence for Others is not the same thing as its existence for me, nevertheless my body is not, and cannot be, "for-Others" in the same sense in which a mere physical thing is an object, an en-soi. Throughout, in other words, each of the so-called "ontological dimensions" are es­sentially "dimensions" of one unitary thing- my body. It would be absurd to suppose that there are three bodies. But, to speak of these dimensions as being on different and separate levels of being is, if not to entertain the notion of three bodies, at least is to hypostatize the dimensions to the point where it is impossible to understand how they could be dimensions of one and the same thing, my body.

By thus reifying the "dimensions" of the body; by analyzing them as if they were different from the dimensions of the pour­soi; and by maintaining that whereas the pour-soi is the body­for-itself, it is-not the body-for-Others ; Sartre tends to obscure the phenomenologically evident circumstance that if we are entitled-to speak of "modes" or "dimensions" of being we must always recognize that they are modes, not of the body, but of the consciousness who is embodied by that specific animate organism. In short, as Stephan Strasser has emphasized

besouled matter is not at all a wall separating us, but rather a mediator between you and me ... I grasp the Other immediately ... as embodied person, because I myself am a body-soul unity ... The relationship' 'I-you" is not the absolutely first datum ... Before being able t o have a personal relationtootherhumanpersons,Imyselfmustfirstexistasembodiedperson.

1 Metaphysical journal, op. cit., 1>· 12+ (May 7, 1914). 2 Ibid., p. 19 (January r9, r94). 3 Ilnil., pp. 313- 339 ('"Existence and Objectivity").

122 SARTRE

The primordial problem is the.refore the problem of embodiment.l

To _say that the "dimensions" of the body are radically, onto­logically separate, is to lose the body as the unitary embodiment of consciousness (t?-at which is "besouled" by consciousness). To say that the bemg of the pour-soi is not connected to thE. being ~f the body of consciousness, is to raise the insuperable Cartesian problem of how the one being can ever be united with thC: ?thc:r being. And, to maintain that there is no question of a uruf1cation of the two, that consciousness is the body (in the mode of the for-itself), is simply to obscure the central phenome­non: the body is the "besouled" ("animated") embodiment of cons~ousness. Consciousness is not the body, nor is the body consciousness, from any point of view; consciousness is embodied ~y i~s body, t~e body~ "besou1ed" by consciousness, and only ~n virtue of this embodiment does the world appear to conscious­ness. "To appear" means to appear to a consciousness and means that consciousness is embodied in a world by m~ans of its body.

Thus, it seems to us, if we may speak of " dimensions" here this is. possi_ble only if we recognize they must be the specifi~ ways in wluc~i the ~tnbodi~nt of consciousness occurs; or, they are the ways in which consciousness experiences itself as embodied lJy its own specific animate <Jrganism - which is "animate" that is a Leib, and not merely a Kiirper,2 in virtue of conscio~sness's a?iimaticm of it. In this sense it becomes possible to account for the "things themselves," for the fact that these "dimensions" are dimensions of one specific animate organism: the various manners in which consciousness becomes embodied are in­ten~ively synthesized by consciousness as its own specific em­bodiment. The "dimensions," that is to say, must not be reified as strata of being, but must be seen as intentional structures implicit in embodiment. The unitary phenomenon intended intentively constituted, as having different "dimensions" i~ precisely my own organism considered as my own specific em­bodiment.

1 Strasser, 1:he ~01.Z i~ Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, Duquesne Studies (Duquesne Uwvers1ty, Pittsburg, 1957), tranSlated from the Dutch, pp. 147-48.

2 Sartre does not seem to distinguish these.

CRITICAL REMARKS I23

(4) THE PROBLEM OF THE OTHER'S BODY-FOR-ME AND MY BODY-FOR-THE-OTHER '

One of the fundamental weaknesses of Sartre's analysis lies in his 'oa:Id declaration that my body's being-for-the-Other is identical with the Other's being-for-me. To be sure, Sartre states that he has already established this identity, purportedly in the section on Others.1

However, if one returns to the section on Others, all one finds is the very explicit statement that the Other-as-object (his being­for-me), being the second moment in my relations with him, cannot be the same as my being-a11,-obfect (my being-for-Others)) for him. Indeed, the Other's being-an-object arises out of a sort of dialectical ferment implicit in my being-an-object for him, and hence the latter enjoys an ontological priority over the former. (Cf. EN, 347, 348-50) What has been established, then, is that the two are not at all -identical; his being-an-object for me is the dialectical consequence of the movement by which I non­thetically apprehend my own being-an-object for him, whereas my being-an-object for him is the root encounter with the Other . my primordial fall - and thus hardly identical with the former. Moreover the structure of my being-an-object is hardly identical with that of his being-for-me, as follows from the ontological priority of the former: it is through shame that I experience myself as being-for-him, and my only access to his being-an­object for me is through the pride of my making an object of him.

But even without the prior analysis of the Other, it is easy to see that Sartre's claim is absurd in his own terms. These two modes of being cannot be identical in the strict sense, else they would be identical, i.e., not two at all. But neither can they be identical in a very loose sense, that is, similar, such that the study of one (say, the Other's body-for-me) would suffice to understand the structures of both.2

1 Sartre does not rehearse the argument, nor even refer to the specific place where this was purportedly established. I assume be means the section on Others since this is the first place that "for-Others" Is discussed in detail. '

2 Sartre analyzes the other's body-for-me as the second dimension, and my owu body-as-known-by-tbe·Otber, as the third dimension. But, one could suggest, this way makes the identification in question superfluous, since, precisely, his body·for­me and my body-for-him have each been studied separately as different dimensions. But then there would be only two dimensions to the body, since his body-ior-me is not a structure of my body, but of his.

!

-------------------------------------l'

I24 SARTRE

It is evident that whereas I experience (or, as Sartre prefers to say, exist) my body's being-for-the-Other, in his own terms I cannot on principle experience the Other's being-for-me as he experiences it. In terms of my own experiencing of Others, in fact, my being-object is first and his being-object is second, and this is essetitial. I experience my own "being drained of my subjectivity" and then my "draining of his subjectivity"; but

_ I cannot experience his "draining of my subjectivity" any more than I can experience his "being drained of subjectivity" by my look. In order to assert the purported identity of structure and being, then, one would have to take up a point of view outside the concrete encounter of one consci0usness with another; one would have to be an observer of both at the same time. But being an observer, one would have access neither to the one nor the other consciousness in their respective for-itselfs. Hence even on this supposal, one could not assert the identity.

Yet Sartre wants to do just that. Now, this tendency in all of his analyses, to confuse levels of analysis, to write as if he had access to just that which he excludes in other places as intrinsic­ally impossible, is evident from the very beginning of his ontology in his reification of "subject" and "object." If one seeks to develop an ontology from the point of view of consciousness (as Sartre admittedly does), then it is inherently inconsistent to depart from that point of view. Yet Sartre does just that, for in no other way could he poSSl'bly maintain that "objects" are "en-soi" apart from consciousness - an assertion possible only if one supposed Sartre able to philosophize s1dJ specie aeternitatis.

Similarly, to describe the Other's body-as-object and to take this as pertaining to my body-as-object, is simply to give up the initial framework. In short, Sartre's ontology seems consistently inconsistent; it remains ignorant of its own starting-point.

In a way, it must be said, the supposed identity reveals Sartre's own "optimism": unless the Other were already Other for me there could never be any "encounter" with him, as an Other who looks at me.1 But then one would have to say that in some sense the Other is for me a subject, and neither simply an

l Cf. Sc.biltz, "Sartre's Theory of the Alter Ego," PPR, Vol. ix, No. 2 (December, 1948), pp. 184-98.

CRITICAL REMARKS 125

object nor a subject for my own being-an-object.1 Only if I experienced him as a subject, in fact, could I ever apprehend him as being a "center" of orientation for objects surrounding bim.2 Only if I apprehended him as subject, again, could I apprehend him as an "ensemble of sensuous organs which are disclosed to my sensuous lmowledge." (EN, 407) For, as he had already established in his description of the body-for-itself, it is only for a subject that objects are oriented around it; and it is only a body which is the body of a consciousness that has sense organs. Hence if I apprehend the Other as a "center" and as an ensemble of sense organs, I must have already apprehended him as a subject, as a consciousness embodied in this specific body. Otherwise the body "over there" would not be an animate body, sense organs would not be sense organs, but simply objects, like grapes and trees.

Despite these, and other, difficulties, Sartre's study of the body is an important and crucial one; it not only realizes a genuine advance over Marcel's sketchy treatment but also has proved to be enormously influential on the so-called existential psychologists and psychiatrists. For Marcel, in fact, just leaves us with the whole problem and a host of hints and suggestions; once having discovered the phenomenon, he becomes more interested in the problem of the "my" than in the structure of the "body." Sartre, on the other hand, takes up the problem in detail and attempts to explicate the structures of the body; but, and this is what we have objected to most of all, his analysis of the body is couched in terms of an unacceptable ontology. The intrinsic assumptions of that ontology slip into his otherwise excellent studies and render them unintelligible in certain parts, and simply wrong in others.

We have two problems left from .our study of Sartre: the problem of embodiment; and the problem of the synthesis of the individual senses and of the senses with each other, and finally of the whole body as asynthetictotality.Merleau-Ponty's study, as we will now see, attempts to come to terms with both of these, but with only partial success.

i Which, since thls is a status wbic.b C concretely liu4, does not satisfy Sartre's list of subject-Object alternatives: I exist mysell-for-myself-for-others, and the Other is for this dimension a for-itself! l

2 As Sartre in fact admits I do. Cf. EN, 404-07.

~ I

PART III

MERLEAU-PONTY'S THEORY OF THE BODY-PROPER

'

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Unlike Sartre's theory of the body-for-itself in his L'Etre et le Neant, it is not possible to submit Merleau-Ponty's theory of the body-proper to a straightforward exposition and interpretation, following his major work 1 step by step. Over and above the complexity of the theory itself, Merleau-Ponty's analysis pro­ceeds on a varity of levels which are not clearly distinguished by him. Moreover, when Merleau-Ponty makes use of other doctrines (as, for instance, those of Gestalt psychology,orthoseofHussetl), he has invariably transformed their meaning and reinterpreted them in terms of his own fundamental theory, but withoutletting his readers know of this in advance. In this way, certain funda­mental notions (such as "form," or "synthesis"), which have their own specific meanings in the contexts from which he takes them, are used in a quite different way by him, but with no indications that this transformation has occurred - and, indeed, within his own work itself, be does not always use the same term in the same way. The over-all result of this is an at times quite confusing amalgam of methods, analyses, and points of view.

To begin with, Merleau-Ponty prefaces his major work with an outline statement of what he takes to be the fundamental themes of Husserlian phenomenology - but it is a major task in itself to determine the implicit and (rarely) explicit criticisms and transformations of Husserl's phenomenology in which he engages. Then, the opening sections of his study of perception present an analysis and criticism of traditional psychological and physiological conceptions of the nature of sensuous perception -but, again, one can note already that the point of view which he adopts for this criticism, that of Gestalt psychology, has over-

1 Phenotmnol-Ogi~ d.e la Perception, Librairle Gallimard (Paris, 1945), 531 pp. (Here.aft.er cited textually as PP.)

130 MERLEAU-PONTY

tones which are hardly psychological in their significance. In the middle sections of the work on the body he continues to discuss, in a critical manner, traditional psychology and physiology, and even considers in great detail the important work of Gelb and Goldstein on brain-injured patients - and, by this point in his analysis it is quite evident that Merleau-Ponty has altered his entire style of analysis. The tone of the work, that is to say, becomes altered, and now takes on an ontological bearing, after the manner of Sartre and Heidegger. Yet, running throughout each of the analyses in the book are what we might with j ustifi­cation call forays into phenomenology - but in the later sections, even phenomenology comes to be given a quite different sense from the one which Husserl gave it - and it is always Husserl's phenomenology that he has in mind when he uses the term.

In short, one must say, there are throughout this work, and, to a lesser extent, in his earlier one, La Structure du Comporte­ment, i at least three distinguishable lines of analysis: I) coupled with his critical rejection of traditional psychology is an ac­ceptance of the theory and psychology of "form" (Gestalt psychology); 2) as the title of his major work shows, on the other band, Husserlian phenomenology plays a crucial role; 3) but in the end, as is particularly clear in his transformations of Husserl's work, it seems that he ultimately seeks to develop an ontology of human existence.2

It will be necessary, before giving an explication to his theory of the body, to make some preliminary remarks concerning these three lines of analysis.

(I) THE PROBLEM OF 'FORM'

Now on the one hand, the place of Gestalt psychology in his work seems to be at least definable, though it is not necessary to go into this in detail. It is the discovery of "form" which is for him of great significance. While he tends to accept the thesis that

1 Structure du Comporlemeni, P. U.F. (Paris, 3rd edition, 1:953), 248 pp. 2 A. de Waelhens, Une Philosophie de L'ambiguiU, Pub. Universitaires de Louvaln

(Louvain, I951). Here, de Waelhens makes this very clear (cf. pp. 384-398). But, like Merleau-Ponty, be does not bring out the place of phenomenology in the author's work, nor does he show the transformations and criticisms which Merleau-Ponly obviously bas performed. De Waelhens, in fact, takes it as evident that phenomeoo· logy leads to an ontology, in Heidegger's sense, but does not attempt to justify this step any more than docs Mcrleau-Ponty. (Cf. pp. 402-408).

INTROD UCTION I3I

all sensuous perception is perception of "forms" (i.e., of "wholes" which are nothing but the systematic and functional inter­relatedness of parts to parts, and to the "context" thus formed), it should nonetheless be noted that this conception is trans­formed by him in two ways. First, taking the "form" as "meaning" (sens. Cf. PP, 9), he rejects in principle the distinction which, for instance, Kohler makes, between "the thing as a physical, ol>-ject and as the experienced whole, corresponding to it, which appears in the visual iield." l Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes, agreeing with the suggestion of Kohler to drop the "constancy-hypothesis,"2 that

the psychologists who practice the description of phenomena do not ordinarily perceive the philosophical bearing of their method. They do not see that the return to perceptual experience, if this reform is consequential and radical, condemns all forms of realism ... ; that the genuine failure of intellectualism is precisely to take for granted the determined universe of science; that this objection applies a f oYtioYi to psychological. thought since it places the perceptual consciousness in the midst of an. already constituted world; and that the criticism of the constancy hypothesis, if it is carried out to the end, has the significance of a genuine "phenome­nological reduction". . . Such a psychology has never broken with naturalism. But at the same time it becomes unfaithful to its own descriptions.• (PP, 58)

Secondly, by a series of steps which we shall attempt to make explicit later, a "form" is interpreted by him, not just as a "meaning," but as a "being"; or, one can say, every perceived object, every "smsible," in so far as it is inseparably connected to my body (Cf. PP, 59), is a certain expression of what I am and bow I am. Objects reveal as their fundamental stratum a certain physiognomy. Thus, Merleau-Ponty writes that perception reveals objects as beings, beings which pose certain at first only confused "problems" to my body. They are "invitations" to my body's possible action on them: s

Without the exploration of my vision or of my hand, and before my body is synchronized with it, the sensible, what is sensed, is nothing but a vague solicitation ... Thus a sensible which is going to be sensed poses to my body a sort of confused problem .... " (PP, 248)

.L W. Kohler, Gestalt Psychology, Liverlght (New York, 1929), pp. 228-29. Q :r.rerlea:u-Ponty takes this point !rom Aron Gurwitscb, Recension du 'Nachw01't zu

meinen Idun,' de Husserl, Deutsche Llttcraturzeitung, 28 February 1932. See also, GurwitsCh La Thlorie du Champ de la Conscience, Dcsctee de Brouwer (Paris, 1957). pp. 78-82.

s As Bergson had already said: "The objecls which su"ound my body f'qled the

MERLEAV-PONTY

Every sensible quality, that is to say, "is inserted into a certain conduct," (PP, 242) and thus my body faces it as a sort of problem to be resolved by that conduct. (PP, 245)

In short, what was a "perceptual form" for Gestalt psychology becomes a mode of being: "the sensible not only has a motor and vital signification but is nothing other than a certain manner of being-to-the-world (ttre-atHnonde) . ... " (PP, 245-46) 1 Thus it soon becomes clear that Gestalt psychology (as he calls it, "psychology of 'form"') becomes transformed under the guiding, if often misleading, hand of Merleau-Ponty into an ontology of human existence. As he emphasizes in another place (PP, 250-5r), to say that I visually perceive objects, that !have a visual field, is to say I have at my disposal a system of visible beings. These visible beings, moreover, are there for me as "forms" ("meanings") in virtue of my very "opening out onto" them by means of my visual apparatus, and not, he believes, by means of any "consti­tutive operation" (in Husserl's sense), nor "sense-data" (as in traditional psychology). The implicit criticism of Husserl leads us over into our second preliminary remark. First however, since the point being made here is decisive for straightening out many of bis concrete analyses, it would be well to re-state it.

Instead of speaking of "sense perception" as an "ability," "capacity," or the like, Merleau-Ponty now speaks of a "mode of access to ... ," a "being-to ... "; rather than speaking of "sense data," "sense qualities," and the like, he now speaks of "lived unities," "beings," "meanings," and "poles of action." 2 His argument seems to be that traditional psychology and philosophy, whether "empiricist" or "rationalist," considered sense per­ception primarily as a mode of knowledge, and as such they one and all presupposed a theory of the nature of sensuous perception, an essentially objectivistic one s deriving ultimately from the

possibu actio11 of my body on them." Mali.ere et i'IUmoire, P.U.F. (Paris, 54th ed., 1953), pp. 15- 16. • 4 Cf. also, PP, 25, where Merleau-Ponty interprets the unity of the object of perception as dependent upon this vague solicitation and, corresponding to it, a vague presentiment of the immanent unity of the object by consciousness. Cf. also Husserl, Erfahrung und Urteil, Claassen Verlag (Bamburg, 1954), pp. 79-80; and below, foot­note, 2 p. 160.

1 As we shall see later, this "elre au monde" is the crucial category for his entire work.

2 Cf. de Waelhens, of>. cit., pp. 39.1-92, and402--08. a Cf. Gurwitsch's presentation of this problem, Theorie du Champ ... , op. cit.,

Parts I and 11.

INTRODUCTION I33

Lockean-Cartesian theory of ideas conceived as the bridge between the res extensa and res cogitans. That is to say, there is said to be a certain object, X, which perchance emits a certain series of "waves," perchance "picked up" by a part of the sensitive surface of another object, an organism; this objective occurrence then has certain consequences which are explainable, it is assumed, by means of the law of causality pertaining to physical objects in general. When the sensitive surface is "stimu­lated," certain "sense-data" result; corresponding in a one-to­one correlation to the "local stimulation," certain other, equally objective (physiological) events occur, transmitting the "infor­mation" to neurological centers and, ultimately, to the brain, wherein a "terminal condition" is set up. As a consequence to this whole story a certain "experience" happens: "smelling a rose." t But here a foreign agent bas slipped into the supposedly objective framework: the "sensations," supposedly provoked into being by the stimulation, are nevertheless said to be "purely private," i.e., "subjective." This "experience," while "sub­jective," is said to have been "caused" by the emission of physical waves of a certain kind; so to speak, the receiving station has translated the objective data into the data of experience, in this case, olfactory language.

The theory, however, runs aground through its own as­sumptions. Metleau-Ponty argues against such a conception that it involves an unwarranted metaphysical assumption of the first order: "Nature" is as physics of a Galilean style describes it, i.e., a system of particles in motion; "mind" or "consciousness," on the other hand, is a kind of place in which events of a certain kind, "sensations," occur - as F. H . Bradley says someplace, mind is conceived to be a kind of bag into which "data" are dropped, like beans, and which "in the beginning" is passive and receptive. To paraphrase Hume, the study of mind turns out to be a kind of internal Newtonian physics, in tenns of which the particles which are the "atoms" of the mind (impressions and ideas) are studied by means of a certain "theory" of gravity (association).

Since, however, in our concrete experience of the world dis-

1 AU of the philosophers we are studying heiein, as js now clear, share the essen­tially same critical attitude toward traditional theories of sense perception.

134 MERLEAU-PONTY

closed by means of our senses, we do not sensuously perceive these "impressions," but rather chairs, roses, other men, and the like, this psychology must necessarily develop as a "science of illusion": its effort is to explain why we do not experience what we should experience if the assumptions of the theory are correct. In the end, under the impact of Locke's theory of ideas, British empiricism comes to maintain that what is experienced in common-sense life is not at all what is "really" experienced: we naively assume, as Berkely put it, that we see chairs and tables, but what we "really" see are only our ideas. In sort, traditional thought, especially traditional psychology and its philosophical foundation, traditional empiricism, implicitly gives up the domain of experience vecue, considering this as not what "really" is (the "really" being defined by what natural science states is the case) - while yet seeking precisely to account for this experi­ence.

In all of this, furthermore, there is presupposed a theory of the nature of the body. In fact, Merleau-Ponty argues (as we shall see in more detail), every theory of sensuous perception presupposes a theory of the body. And the more one recognizes the necessity of accounting for experience vecue in its own terms, i.e., without natu.rali.zing it,1 the more central does the body become: for from the point of view of my experience of the world disclosed to me by means of my senses, to perceive something is necessarily to be related to it by means of my body. Thus, as both Scheler and Marcel had already seen, the theory of the body is the crux of the whole problem of experience vecue. The recog­nition necessitates, however, a radical change in approach: the study of the body and of sensuous perception becomes a study of the mode of being of the body-proper, and the study of "mind" or "consciousness" becomes the study of "conscience-engagee" or "conscience-incarnee." The body can no longer be taken as an exclusively physical thing; rather, it must be seen as the embodi­ment of mind or consciousness.

This new approach does not, however, relegate physiological phenomena to, so to speak, second-class citizenship. The point is

1 Cf. Husserl, "Philosophy as a Strict Science," Cross Cu"ents, Vol. vi, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 230-33.

INTRODUCTION 135

that they can no longer be considered "from outside," that is "objectively." As de Waelheos states,

We are ... confronted once more with the para.mount problem of every philosophy of embodiment: to show, not ~ causal rela~on or a paraJl~, but to the contrary how an existential attitude of consciousness constitutes the signification of a physiological fact.1

The problem, that is to say, is to determine the existential status of such phenomena, to explicate the "sense" or "meaning" which they have for conscience-engagee.2

In this fashion Merleau-Ponty's criticism and transformation of Gestalt psychology, and his critical rejection of traditional psychology and philosophy, is on its positive side, the incipient development of a concrete ontology of human existence.

(2) MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'PHENOMENOLOGY'

We have noted that Merleau-Ponty is unwilling to accept any notion of "constitution" at the level of the body-proper. Whether this is justified, or, indeed whether his attitude toward "form" is justified or justifiable, is not our problem at this point. Wewant only to attempt to lay out these various themes in his work so that our exposition of his theory of the body will be more easily accomplished.

As we shall see he denies that there is any "synthetic" activity, at either the "automatic" or "active" level in sensuous per­ception. (PP, pp. 476-80) "Constitution," as he understands it, must either be rejected (as a mere reappearance of "intellectual­isme"), or like "synthesis," understood strictly in terms of his theory of "etre-au-m01ide." But we must attempt to delineate the background for this rejection of two of Husserl's central notions.

His study of perception purports to be a "phenomenology" of perception; and as we saw, the entire work, which is much more than a mere theory of perception itself, goes under the flag of a Hussetlian phenomenology as outlined in his preface. In this latter, he engages in a brief criticism of the kind of reflection or reflective analysis practiced, in his terms, by such "intellectual­istic" philosophers as Descartes and Kant. This kind of analysis,

i. Cf. de Waelhens, <>f>. ,;t., p. 109. 2 Ibid., pp. u3-1+

MERLEA U-PONTY

he states, begins from our experience of the world, then proceeds to the subject, which it conceives to be the condition for the possibility of experience and distinct from experience, and then appeals to a "universal synthesis" as that without which there would be no experience of a world. (PP, iv) It thus, according to Merleau-Ponty, departs from experience and substitutes for it a reconstruction of experience - without realizing that, for better or for worse, such a substitution thereby must fail to account for experience itself, in its own terms and for its own sake. On the analogy of Husserl's critique of psychologism, one might say that such a reduction or substitution commits the fallacy of metapsychologism: substituting, or accounting for, the con­ditioned by the conditions.

Merleau-Ponty charges that such an analysis is, if not a complete naivete, at least an incomplete analysis, one which remains ignorant of its own beginnings. It forgets what is for him the crucial phenomenon:

The world is there before every analysis I can make of it, and it would be artificial to try to derive it from a series of syntheses which would reconnect sensations, then the perspectival aspects of the object. Both sensations and the perspectival aspects of objects are just products of analysis and must not be conceived before analysis.• (PP, iv)

What such a reflective analysis tells us about our experience, and what we concretely experience is not at all the same state of affairs. For example, l\'ferleau-Ponty will argue, all such affairs as "sense qualities," "syntheses," and so on, are not at all intrinsic to our lived experience but are rather strictly products of the analysis. Synthesis, for instance, is strictly " the counter­part of my analysis," (PP, 275) and not an intrinsic feature of perception as lived.

But now there arises for him the very thorny question: If I cannot apprehend my perceptions-as-lived, my body-as-lived, space-as-lived, and the like, by means of reflective analysis and inspection, how can I apprehend them and thus even talk of them ? Is there perhaps another access to this domain?

In the course of this study we have learned that the body is not an object simpliciter (like coins and figs), that my body-as­lived by me, whose body it is, is a phenomenon in its own right, and that it is not possible to consider it at one level only. Now

INTRODUCTION 137

Merleau-Ponty states that, since I live my body, my perception, and so on, it mt.tst be possible to explicate these as such. Re­flection must be of such a nature, he stresses, that

its object cannot escape it absolutely, since we have a notion of it only by means of reflection. It is indeed necessary ~at reflection in some m~m­ner 1 yield the unreflective, because otherwtSe we would have nothin.g to oppose to it and it would not become a. problem for us. . . ~at is given and initially true is an open reflection on the unreflective, the reflective grasp of what is not reflective .... • (PP, 412-13)

What is required, that is to say, as opposed to the predominantly "noetic" reflection of intellectualism, which attempts to make the world depend upon the synthetic activity of the subject, is a "noematic reflection," 2 "which remains in the object and explicates its primordial unity instead of engendering the object.'' (PP, iv) But in so far as my reflection is reflection on what is itself not a reflection (i.e., the "irreflichi," or what is concretely "lived"), it cannot ignore itself as being an event within the same mental life as that which is reflected on. (PP, iv)

This means, for Merleau-Ponty, that my reflection must be of such a kind that it discovers me, not as a "subject" separate from my world, nor does it discover the "world" (or more simply, the "object" of consciousness) as separated from me. Rather, it reveals me "as an inalienable fact, and it eliminates all kinds of idealism by discovering me as 'being-to-the-world'," (PP, viii) as a "subject committed to the world." (PP, v) Similarly, it discloses the world "as the permanent horizon of all my cogi­tations and as a dimension with respect to which I never cease to situate myself." (PP, vii-viii) With Sartre,3 Merleau-Ponty considers the world and consciousness as co-given, as simultaneous, for my lived experience. The task of reflection is precisely not to ignore itself as being an event in a consciousness whose being is to be-to-the-world ; it is to disclose that domain as it is in itself, or, as it is for lived experience. If we try to separate them, as Van Den Berg says succinctly, agreeing with Merleau-Ponty,

Then man ceases to be man and the world the world. The worldis no conglomeration of mere objects to be described in the language of physical

1 Just this "en quelgue manie,.e" Is the problem, as we shall see. s He thus accepts without question one of Sarti:~ansformations of Husserl.

See above, pp. 66-69. · · 3 Sartre, Situations, I , Gallimard (Paris, 1947), pp. 31-35. See above, Part 11,

Chapter I. pp. scrSo.

MERLE A U-PONTY

science. The world is our home, our habitat,l the materialization of our subjectivity. Who wants to become acquainted with man, should listen to the lan~uage spoken by the thi.!;igs in his existence [i.e., to what things mean to him]. Who wants to descnbe man should make an analysis of the "landscape" within which he demonstrates, explains, and reveals him­self. 2

But what sort of reflection is this ? It is clear what its task is· but how will this subtle and difficult task be carried out? What is required, to let Merleau-Ponty state the matter, is a kind of reflection that

apprehends its object in a nascent state such as it appears to the one who lives it. with the atmosphere of meaning in which it is enclosed, and which seeks to slip into this atmosphere in order t o relocate behind dispersed facts and symptoms. the total being of the subject (in 'the case of a normal person), or the fundamental ailment (in the case of a sick person).• s (PP, 140)

But now when we ask ourselves what sort of reflection this is how it is accomplished, what its structure is, and so on, we ar~ confronted with a serious confusion. Merleau-Ponty maintains I can comprehend the body-as-lived only "by performing it myself and in the degree to which I am a body which raises itself toward the world."* (PP, 90) It is only by experiencing my body-proper that I can apprehend it as e%perienced by me. In short, it would appear that a genuine reflective withdrawal is for Merleau-Ponty intrinsically unable to grasp my body-as-lived (as Sartre bad maintained); I know my body-proper only by living it (as Sartre would deny), and apparently in no other manner.4 Indeed, as de Waelhens points out, this constitutes one of the major diffi­culties in Merleau-Ponty's work, since it is decisive for his funda­mental effort: to write a phenomenology of perception while at the same time maintaining that one can never leave the domain of perception. And thus, de Waelhens goes on,

1 Cf. on this, PP, 491; and below, pp. 182-89. a J. H. Van Den Berg, Tl1e Phemnnenological Approad,to Psychiatry, op. cit., p. 32. 3 Compare wi th this Marcel's notion of pensee pensa11te, above, Part I, Chapter I,

PP· 9-72; 14-20. And, in PP, 253: "Radical reflection is the one which reapprehends me while I am in t lie process of forming and formulating the ideas of subject and object! it puts in~o play the source of these two ideas; it is not only an operative refleobon, but again conscious ofHself in its operation."•

4 Cf. the interpretations llferleau·Ponty gives of Husserl's theory of "phenome­nological reduction" in his essay: "Le philosophe et so11 ombre", Signes, Ubrairle Galllmard (Paris, 1960), pp. 204-209. This essay is also included in: Edmund Husserl: r859- r959, Phaenomenologica 4, Ma.rtinus N:ijhoff (Hai;ue, the Netherlands, 1959), pp. 195- 2:10).

INTRODUCTION I39

Expressed in other terms. and it is necessary to note this, the funda­mental thesis of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy: all knowledge is rooted in perception. is itself ambiguous. If it signifies that all human knowledge originates in the concrete and follows the explication of it, everything said in his work seems to be established. If on the contrary one understands by that thesis that in no way whatsoever can we ever leave the immediate and that to render this immediate concrete explicit means simply to live it, one cannot doubt that the enterprise of philosophy becomes forthwith contradictory. Now, that's an opinion to which the author seems at times to make concessions.• 1

The last statement, however, is not sufficient. For, as we shall see shortly, not only does Merleau-Ponty "make concessions" to the thesis that in no sense can we ever leave the immediate and that to explicate it means simply to live it ; not only does he adhere to it in his methodological considerations; but, in the end, it becomes a positive principle of his entire theory. The body­proper is, for him, the bearer of a "latent" knowledge; perception is a "hidden science" of the world of perceived things.2

Now, this effort to recast the task and meaning of reflection, is tantamount to the

resolution to make the world appear such as it is before every reflective return on ourselves is the ambition to make reflection equal to [the task oi explicating] the nonreflective life o{ consciousness.• (PP. xi),

This position, I submit, is necessitated by prior considerations, considerations which preinterpret the whole problem. It is, in fact, only if one maintains to begin with that reflection is not able to apprehend this experience that another mode of access to it seems necessary. Sartre, as we have seen, denies the possibility of such an access; there is no apprehension of lived experience as it is for the one who lives it (and thus the whole domain of the pour-soi is in principle closed to reflective apprehension). 3

Merleau-Ponty, on the other hand, is not only in disagreement as regards Sartre's ontology, but also as regards his rejection of the possibility of apprehension of lived experience. For Merleau-

i De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 386. 2 C.f. PP, 250-51, 268-69. And, yet, in his preface, Merleau-Ponty denies that

perception is a connaissance, it is not a "science du monde;" while, in the text, he goes right on to contend that the body is, "at least as regards the perceived world, the general instrument of my 'comprehension'." (PP, 272) We shall have to return to this problem in our conclusions, in Chapter III.

a Both Sartre and Merleau·Ponty, because of their skepticism regarding the ability of reflection, i.e., cognitive-theoretical apprehension, of the life of consciousness, easily open themselves to the charge of inationalism.

140 MERLEAU-PONTY

Ponty, there must be a means of explicating it because, he affirms, "we live it." Reflection must "in some manner" give us the unreflected.

However, this "manner" is as magical as Sartre's conception of the encounter of pour-soi with en-soi: what is to be appre­hended (e.g. the body-as-lived) is itself the apprehending (the body-as-lived). This position, however, is a nest of difficulties, and is necessitated by his presupposed commitment to the thesis that reflection, as a specific cognitive act of apprehension, is unable to apprehend lived experience. As we hope to show later on, the conception of the body as a "latent knowledge" involves a confusion between the act of apprehending and what is appre­hended and must be rejected as illegitimate.

For now, we must only point out the fact of confusion. It was necessary to do this at this point, in order to evaluate Merleau­Ponty's "phenomenology" and the impact of Husserl on his thought. We shall have good reason to question both of these, since Merleau-Ponty apparently wants to deny precisely the core of phenomenological inquiry, namely, reflective apprehension and explication of consciousness.

For Merleay-Ponty, the real significance of Husserlian phe­nomenology lies, on the one hand, in the methodological device of phenomenological epoche and reduction, and on the other, in the descriptive concept of intentionality. As regards the first, it seems strange that Merleau-Ponty wants to accept, and even to insist on, the theory of reductions. For, one might very well say, if reflection proper is ruled out as incapable of fulfilling the task at hand (explicating lived experience), then it would be absurd to adopt a theory of reduction, because, after all, the reduction is effectuated precisely to permit a reflective appre­hension, description, and explication of the domain of lived experience, consciousness as it is in itself. The phenomenologist draws back from the natural belief in, or acceptance of, the world, in order to make this "General Thesis" stand out for his reflective description and explication.l And, indeed, as Richard Schmitt has pointed out, one can with good reason "interpret the 'transcen­dental-phenomenological reduction as a phenomenological de­scription of the transition from a nonreflective to a reflective

1 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., pp. iB-:zi, 33-37; and Idun, I, p. 94.

INTRODUCTION

attitude, albeit a reflective attitude of a particular kind." J. Thus, Merleau-Ponty would seem to contradict himself, particularly in view of the circumstance that, as Husserl has emphasized, when the epoche is performed the one performing it becomes a "disinterested on-looker," he suspends the belief or interestedness which is the mark of the natural attitude. 2 It is just this com­mitment, however, which Merleau-Ponty believes cannot be suspended; if one becomes neutral towards it (and this is the phenomenological attitude), one steps outside it and therefore, for him, cannot in principle grasp it.

The contradiction disappears, nevertheless, when we take cognizance of the way Merleau-Ponty attempts to interpret the phenomenological reduction. In the first place, he insists that

it is necessary to break our familiarity with it [i.e., with the world), and that this rupture can teach us nothing but the unmotivated surging-forth of the world. The greatest lesson of the reduction is the impossibility of a complete reduction ... I1 we were the absolute mind the reduction would not be problematic. But since to the contrary we are "to-the-world," committed to it, since even our reflections take place in the temporal flux which they seek to escape (since they "flow into one another" as Husserl says), there can be no one thought which embraces all of our thought.• (PP, viii-ix)

Now, few phenomenologists would want to say that a "complete reduction" is possible, nor do any attempt to make it complete; hence, I do not see the necessity of the "great lesson." For Merleau-Ponty, however, there is a "lesson," and this is precisely that the epocbe "can teach us nothing but the unmotivated surging-forth of the world." That is to say, just because, for him, reflection is itself but one expression of my etre-au--monde, it can hardly be expected to be able to draw back in reflection from this commitment which it is: a being whose being is to-be-to-the­wotld can reflect on itself only in so far as that very being-to-the­world is itself "drawn back" with the reflective withdrawal. As Sartre had remarked, the pour-soi cannot reflect on itself qu.a pour-soi, just because it would no longer be pour-soi; being an interiority closed on itself, nothing, not even itself, can make of it an object. Similarly, for Merleau-Ponty, while denyin_g that

1 Richard Schmitt, "Husserl's Transcendental-Phenomenological Reduction," PPR, Vol. xx, No. 2 (December, 1959), p. 240.

2 Cf. Cartesian Medita.tf<>ns, op. cit., ibid., and Idun, I, op. cit., pp. 56-57.

r42 MERLEA U-PONTY

consciousness is pour-soi, by taking it as etre-au,-monde, never­theless encounters the same problem: if consciousness really could withdraw from itself reflectively, and thereby really appre­hend itself reflectively in its own lived experience, it would no longer be &re-au-ni01ule, or con.science-engagee. Or, correlatively, since every activity of consciousness is but another expression of its own etre-au-tnonde, reflection is itself such an expression; hence, consciousness cannot reflectively withdraw in order to consider itself, just because consciousness is just this reflective withdrawal.

Hence, for Merleau-Ponty, all that reflection can teach us is that we are unable to reflect on our commitment to the world just because that reflective withdrawal and apprehension is but one more expression of that self-same commitment I Thus, it is quite a matter of course that he goes on to state that the phe­nomenological reduction is in truth the formula "of an existential philosophy." (PP, ix) It would be such a formula, we must con­clude, not on any intrinsic phenomenological grounds, but because Merleau-Ponty begins with a prior commitment to an existential philosophy.

As we shall see later on in our critical conclusions, his opposing of an existential philosophy to an idealistic philosophy is ille­gitimate in so far as he interprets Husserlian phenomenology as an idealism in the traditional sense (especially Kantian). Indeed, at one point, Metleau-~onty contends that he has discovered

a new mode of analysis - existential analysis - which goes beyond the classical alternatives of empiricism and intellectualism, of explanation and reflection. (PP, 158)

But if "existential analysis" is opposed to "reflection," it is difficult to understand in what sense the phenomenological reduction could possibly be the formula for an existential phi­losophy; or, for that matter, how any mode of "analysis" could be genuine analysis without being reflective by essense.

The cards, however, are on the table: Merleau-Ponty simply rejects, without stating it, the Husserlian doctrine of epoche but not on phenomenological grounds. On the other hand, his prior commitment to existentialism, while it is evidently central to his entire work, is never itself submitted to any analysis or justifi­cation. The fact that man is, in his phrase, an etre-au-nionde is

INTRODUCTION I43

not itself made thematic. Accordingly, it will be come necessary for us to unravel the multiple meanings of this crucial concept, and then, after having explicated his theory of the body in detail, to attempt to state explicitly his conception of existentialism.

This undercurrent, moreover, shows up in the second point regarding his "phenomenology" - intentionality. The essence of consciousness is its existence, says Merleau-Ponty, i.e., its etre-au-monde. Hence, he writes, the phenomenological study of "essence" is never an end in itself, but only a means, a means of reaching lived experience however incompletely. (Cf. PP, ix) The whole effort of "phenomenology," he states, is to describe and explicate the facticity of the world and of consciousne5s - the way in which they are concretely lived and experienced.1

Similarly, to say that consciousness is intentional, for Metleau­Ponty, is to say something about the being of consciousness: consciousness is intentional, i.e., it "opens out" onto the world, and thus, "the unity of the world, before being posited by know­ledge in the act of explicit identification, is lived as 'already made' or 'already there'." (PP, xii) Whereas Husserl, within the descriptive-reductive attitude established by means of the phe­nomenological epoche and reduction, describes intentiveness as an essential property or characteristic of consciousness,2 Merleau­Ponty assumes, as a matter of course, that intentiveness is a mode of being. For Husserl, intentionality is that descriptive characteristic of any mental process whatever, in virtue of which any such process must always be described as a consciousness of . . . ; but for Merleau-Ponty it designates the being of conscious­ness, the fact that consciousness is etre-au-monde.

This brief indication of Merleau-Ponty's position as regards phenomenological reflection and the intentiveness of conscious­ness has, more recently, received even further development by Merleau-Ponty. In his important contribution to the commemo-

1 Thus, he writes, "The world is not what l think but what I live; I am open to the world ... but I do not-possess it, it is inexhaustible. 'There ls a world,' or rather, 'there is tlie world' - I can never give entirely the ground of this constant theme of =Y life. This facticity of the world is what makes the 'worldliness of the world' ... just as the facticity of the cogito ls not an imperfection lo It but to the contrary what makes me certain of my existence."• (PP, xii) Thus, for him, the intentionality of ronsciousMSs is interpreted as the being of consciousness: "je suis ouvert an monde."

a Cf. Cartesian Meditations, op. cit., p. 41.

MERLE A U-PONTY

rative volume of essays dedicated to Husserl,1 Merleau-Ponty has made it unmistakably clear that he has not departed sub­stantially from the position he took in his PM1tominologie de la perception. Indeed, he here engages in several further critical reinterpretations of Husserl's phenomenology, criticisms de­veloped by him terms of his careful reading of Husserl's until recently unpublished Ideen, II.

To cite but several instances in this connection, Merleau-Ponty calls into question not only the much-discussed issue of the phe­nomenological reduction {cf. Signes, pp. 204~9), but as well the important constitutional analyses Husserl gives to the domain of pretheoretical consciousness. The main burden of this essay is to attempt to explore, to re-think with Husserl, certain of the themes in the Ideen, II, left unexplored by Husserl, themes which remain "still-not-thought" (der Ungedachte, in Heidegger's phrase used by Merleau-Ponty) : the body-proper, and inter­subjectivity (whose fundamental ground he locates in the phe­nomenon of intercorporeity).

Without entering into the discussions with Merleau-Ponty, since this is not the place to do so, it is still well to keep them in mind here in order to draw some general conclusions for assessing the impact of Husserl on Metleau-Ponty's philosophy. Un­questionably, Merleau-Ponty, unlike many other thinkers in the phenomenological movement, was far more impressed by Hus­serl' s at the time unpublished manuscripts than he was by the more well-known works published by Husserl. In fact, if his commemorative essay to Husserl (not to mention his majqr treatise on perception) is any indication, Merlean-Ponty has developed his fundamental notions (on the body-proper, "inter­corporeity," "primordial Generality," being-to-the-world, and others which we shall presently encounter and later on criticize) essentially by means of his effort to re-think Husserl's Unge­daclite in those unpublished manuscripts. Now, while there are a great many questions which must be raised concerning Mer­leau-Ponty's extrapolations from these documents,2 several points are quite clear.

t Cf. above, footnote 41 p. 1J8; further references to this essay v.ill be cited in the text as (Signes).

t A complete exploration of this is out of the questio1there, as it would require an extensive analysis, not only of Merleau-Ponty's illterpretations, but of course of

INTRODUCTION

First, if Merleau-Ponty has transformed a number of Husserlian concepts (and I hope to show that this has indeed occurred), it isinhismindalwaysin theinterest of what he considers the best inspiration of Husserl. His explicit position is unquestionably phenomenological, but it is one which takes its point of departure from what he himself sees as implicit in Husserl's unpublished manuscripts concerning the enormously complex, and complexly interrelated, dimensions of the pretheoretical life of conscious­ness. Every concept and analysis articulated by Husserl else­where (whether it be constitution, synthesis, or intentionality) is immediately interpreted by Metleau-Ponty from this per­spective - and very often there is no indication that this sort of pre-interpretation has occurred.

In the second place, however, as I hope to show later, and de­spite his professed intentions both in his earlier and in his later writings, Merleau-Ponty's analyses ¥e informed by much more than his reading of Husserl. The final s~pe of his philosophy, if I may so express it, i.11 the result, not only of his contact with Husserlian phenomenological philosophy, but equally, and perhaps even more, oj his own commitment to an "existential ontology". Highly original and interesting as it may be, it is my conviction that this final stance is also his initial one, one to which he is at the outset committed. Thus, his reading of Husserl's I dee11t, II is in many instances charged with overtones of meaning which one scarcely, or only with great imagination, finds in Husserl's own works. One of the most striking examples of this is Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of the pretheoretical status of consciousness {the status of automaticity, or as Husserl calls it, of Passivitiit) as a "primordial Everyone" (Oti primordial, Signes, p. 221). As Sartre had spoken of the nothingness which alone separates the pour-soi from en-soi, Merleau-Ponty speaks of "the thick fog of anonymity which alone separates us from being .... " (Signes, p. 220) His interest, unlike that of Husserl, and some-

Husserl's own analyses themselves. Prof. Spiegelberg's remarks on this topic are, l think, quite accurate: Merleau-Ponty attempts "to go beyond Husserl by consciously e:ottrapolating certain lines, mostly from unpublished te.xts as far as he knows them, and by playing down others in the pnblished writings." The Phenomenc/Qgi&al Movement, Vol. ll, p. 517 (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, The Netherlands, 1960). As Spiegelberg also notes in a footnote to this passage, Merleau· Ponty very often refers to passages in the unpublished materials which, just as often, cannot be traced in the editions recently published in Hussuliana.

MERLE A U-PONTY

what similar to that of Sartre, is essentially to articulate an existential ontology, that is, a logos oi the ontos of anthropos (if you will, an onto-anthropology); it is not to develop a thorough logos of phenomena. Phenomenology in Husserl's sense of a fully developed explication of the intentiveness of consciousness, would not be the fundamental discipline at all, but would rather, for him, be founded on the theory of human-being-in-reality (cf. Signes, pp. 217-19)

But these discussions lead us too far into issues which cannot properly be engaged at this point. Suffice it to say here, that while he is obviously a very careful and original interpretor and critic of Husserl, he is not an Husserlian phenomenologist. His "phenomenology" is not so much. that of Husserl as it is peculiar­ly his own; an "existential phenomenology" whose content we shall have to explicate and criticize in the following pages.

(3) MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'EXISTENTIALISM'

What, then, does Merleau-Ponty understand by an "ex­istentialism?" As we shall have to explicate this in more detail after having dealt with this theory of the body, we shall only indicate the principle features of it here.

De Waelhens emphasizes that it is actually over against certain difficulties in the philosophies of Sartre and Heidegger that Merleau-Ponty's "philosophie de la conscience-engagee" is bom.1

As for Heidegger, de Waelhens points out that for Merleau­Ponty the most damaging criticism one can make of the early work of Heidegger (which is the only phase important for the French existentialists), that is, Sein und Zeit, is that the

reader of Heidegger perceives too late that the scrupulous acuteness displayed by him in his description of the world we pro-ject has shown on the other side a total neglect of the world which is "always-already-there" for us ... one does not find in Sein und Zeit thirty lines on the problem of perception, nor even ten lines on that of the body. 2

As for Sartre, at least two points are raised by Metleau-Ponty.

1 Cf. De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 8. It is quitemdicative that de Waelhens at no time discusses Merleau-Ponty's "phenomenology," nor his important preface to PP. It is indicative, viz., of the fact that de Waelhens himself accepts without question Merleau-Ponty's own bias. This is certainly the greatest fault in an otherwise excellent exposition.

' Ibid., p. 2.

INTRODUCTION 147

First, the conception of pour-soi as a being separated from the en-soi in the most radical fashion, as we pointed in the section on Sartre, makes it impossible for Sartre ever to account for consciousness as a being which is concretely engaged in its world as "toujours-d~ja-la." Thus, de Waelhens states quite correctly,

the dice are thrown: such a consciousness knows or does not know, but it cannot know in several manners, nor be related to the en-soi in an ambiguous fashion.1

In this respect, Merleau-Ponty's notion of "etre-au-monde" is offered as a via media, the only way in which one can account for the engagement of consciousness in the world. As de Waelhens remarks, quite correctly, &re-au-monde is precisely the unity of conscienc(}-engagee and its milieu - i.e., it is "existence." 2 Thus, Merleau-Ponty will say, ~tre-au-monde forms the matrix in which both physical-physiological, and psychical processes are concretely united, lived as a single current. (PP, 95) It is the "third term between the psychical and the physiological, between the 'for-itself' and the 'in-itself' [of Sartre] ... and that we call 'existence'." (PP, 142, footnote)

Second, as we have shown in detail in Part II, Sartre's concrete descriptions of the body and sense perception are simply in contradiction with his ontological principles. s Thus, again, the primary and decisive problem becomes that of "my body-as­lived," "my perception-as-lived," - in short, as Marcel had recognized long before, the fundamental problem is that of embodiment. 4

Merleau-Ponty, in fact, recognizes that the decisive direction of his work has always been to understand " the relations between consciousness and nature, between interiority and exteriority," (PP, 489) and thus to undercut the stalemate between idealism and realism. The way to effect this overthrowing of traditional philosophy, he believes, is by means of a sort of "'Logos of the

a Ibid., p. 4. For Merleau-Ponty, as we shall see, just this "ambiguity" becom.es central to this theory.

1 Ibid., p. 132. 2 Ibid., pp. 4-8. . s Cf. above, Paxt I, Chapter II. As we have remarked before, either Sartre and

Merleau-Ponty simply did not know of Marcel (which seems unlikely), or made it a poi.at oi honor never to refer to his analysis of Lhe body. Furthermore, even de Wael­hens seems to ignore the evident fact that neither Saxtre's nor Merleau-Pooty's theories are oomprehensi"ble apart from Marcel's seminal achievements.

MERLEA U-PONTY

esthetic world,' 1 an 'art hidden in the depths of the human soul','' (PP, 49CHJI) that is, by means of a sort of science of the lived experience of conscience engagee dans son milieu. According­ly, Merleau-Ponty affirms,

... the question is always to lmow how I can be open to phenomena which go beyond me and which nevertheless exist only to the extent that I apprehend and live them; the question is how the presence to myself (Urprasenz) which defims me and co'tlditions every alien preseme is at the same time a "dis.presentation" (Entgegenwartigung) and thusts me outside myself.• ll (PP, 417)

Accordingly, as regards each of these currents of Merleau­Ponty's work, we find the same underlying motif: the attempt to apprehend and describe the concrete existence of conscience­engagee. Or, one might say, it is the latter which unifies what would otherwise be discordant themes. We have not yet ventured to evaluate whether or not Merleau-Ponty's position as regards any of these themes is either justified by him, or justifiable in principle. This evaluation must be postponed until after we have explicated his theory of the body.

1 Merleau-Ponty refers here to Husserl's use of "aesthetic," as pertaining to sensuous experience: For-male und trans:endentale Logik, op. cit., p. 257.

' Merleau-Ponty's term is "de-Presentation," which is untranslatable in English. He seems to mean that I am a presence to myself but at the same time t am "other" to myself. In a similar way, Marcel speaks of =Y existing as involving a "borrowed otherness" (alUriU d'emfmmt). Cf. above, Part I, Chapter I. We return to this in Chapter III below.

CHAPTER II

THE THEORY OF THE BODY

As we indicated, 1 it is possible to see the centrality of the problem of the body for Merleau-Ponty in another manner. The body arises as a specific "problem" for him in the course of a critical exposition of traditional theories of sensuous perception. At every point in theories of this kind one is necessarily led. to a theory of the nature of sensuousness in general. In different terms: traditional theories of sensuous perception were mainly theories of sensuous knowledge; studies of sense perception were directed towards the solution of questions concerning the con­ditions, possibility, and "sources," of knowledge - one of these "stems" of knowledge (as, for instance, in Locke or Kant) being sensuousness (Sinnlichkeit).2 Just in so far as this was the case, however, the nature of sensuousness was simply presupposed, not itself made thematic; and the presupposition, we have seen, was that sensuousness is fundamentally passive and receptive. To sense perceive is simply to suffer, to be receptive, and thus actually to be modified by the thing perceived in some manner. And, the theories of perception built on this presupposition followed the style of it. If to perceive, sensuously to experience a state of affairs, is to be passive in respect of it, to be receptive of it, a then the theory of perception is pre-determined: in some manner the object must "come to the sensitive organism" in order for sensuous perception to occur. In this way, traditional episte­mologies developed primarily as theories of the "encapsuled mind" - mind, being unable to "get outside of itself," must admit of receptivity in order for it to "know" mundane objects, and this receptivity was in most cases conceived as a real modification

i. Cf. above, pp. r34-35. 2 See, for example, Kant's K riUk der rein.en Vernunft, Sectioax,-11, p. 33. a Thus, Kant (Ibid., idem) goes on to say lhe capacity by means of which we are

affected by objects, ie., Sinnlichkeit, ls receptivity (Reseptif/Wil).

•

•

150 MERLEAU-PONTY

of the sensuous capacity. The theory of "sense-data," or "impres­sions" and "ideas," follows of its own accord once the theory of what it means to be sensuously perceptive of something has been set down (implicitly or explicitly). And, it is worth noting, the sense-data theory of perception, in wbatever form it is adopted bas an ancient and honorable heritage, at least as old as Demo­critus and Leucippus, and certainly as old as the theory of eidolon ("images") of Lucretius.

In any case; it seems evident that a very particular conception of the body is presupposed as well: since sensuousness is always the body's sensuousness, to take the former as·passive and recep­tive presupposes that the latter is passive, receptiv~. and really modified. Of course, the body canlocomote; the point is only that, in its capacity of sensuousness, it is passive.l Even when, for. instance, I reach out and touch a table, on the view of the "sense­data" theory all I have presented to me in the strict sense are sense-data ("impressions" in the Hu.mean sense) received from the object and really modifying my body.

Thus, we may say, the theory of sense perception presupposes a theory of sensuousness, which is itself an implicit theory of the body. And, indeed, for Merleau-Ponty this is actually the case: the theory of the body, he contends, is already a theory of sensuous perception. The point is, for him, that one must begin with first things first: a theory of the body must be developed before a fully grounded theory of sense perception can be de­veloped.

When, for instance, I walk around some physical thing, I see it as identically the same object, but given to my perception in a multiplicity of appearances of it (from the left, then the right, then the other side, and so on)2. I experience it as "the same," moreover, when I see it, then touch it, smell it, and so on. This occurs, however, Merleau-Ponty contends, only because I am all along conscious non-thematically of my body and of ·its movements, "and of my body as identical throughout the phases of this movement." (PP, 235) The object is one and the same

1 Descartes bad already laid out the essential lines of this conception in his RuU.S /or the Direction of the Mind. (Cf. Rule XU)

1 Cf. Aron Gurwitsclt's excellent article, "La Conception de la conscience chez Kant et cbez Husserl," Bulletin de la Societi Fro.nfQ.ise de Philosoplsie (s4e Aonu. No. 2, Avril·Juin, 1960), pp. 65-g6, esp. pp. 76-82.

THEORY OF THE BODY rsr

object, seen through a multiplicity of appearances, or it is the same object which I see and touch, only because my body is itself one and the same throughout the perceiving of it, and it is non-thematically experienced by me as such.1 Thus, he states,

The thing and the world are given to me along with the parts of my body, not by a "natural geometry" but in a living connection comparable (or rather, identical) to the one which exists among the parts of my body itself.2

External perception and the perception of the body-proper vary together because they are two sides of the same act ... It is the replica or correlate of the synthesis of the body-proper - and it is literally the same thing to perceive a single ball and to use two fingers as a single organ.• (PP, 237)

Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty concludes, the theory of th~ body (which resolves into a theory of the corporeal scheme, as we shall see) is a theory of perception:

All external perception is immediately synonymous to a certain perception of my body, just as all perception of my bodY. is explicated in the language of external perception. If now . . . the body is not a trans-· parent object and is not given to us like the circle to the geometer (by its law of constitution); if .it is an expressive unity which one can learn to know only by performing it; then this structure imparts itself to the sensible world. The theory of the corporeal scheme is implicitly a theory of perception.• (PP, 239)

And if~ as we shall see, the body is this "expressive unity," which can be known only by "living," or performing, it, and this structure is communicated to the sensory world itself, then traditional theories of sensuousness will be shown to be false because they were misled by a fallacious assumption regarding the nature of the body and of sentir.

We shall have to restrict ourselves to the few comments already made regarding bot'li the problem of sentir and that of traditional theories - and thus must ignore much of Merleau-Ponty's

1 It might be pointed out that Mcrleau-Ponty's discussion of the unity of the per­ceived object and the unity of the body-proper (the corporeal scheme) conceals a crucial problem: be argues both that the for.mer /Upends upon the latter, and that they are but two sides of the same act. Is it the case that the perceiving of a thing as identically the same depends oo (or, is a function of) the noothematic consciousness of one's:body as identical throughout the phases of the perception? Or:is the syn.thesis of the body-proper and that of the perceived thing simultaneous? At least, we believe, this is a problem which is left unclarified by Medeau-Ponty's analysis.

s As Marcel had maintained already: objects "exist" for me only to the extent that I maintain with them {through my body) the same sort of relation I maintain with my body. (Cf. above, Part I, Chapter II, p. 42.) ·

MERLEA U-PONTY

analysis - for, what concerns us is only the theory of the body­proper.

Merleau-Ponty studies the corps propre in four major ways: (1) the body as object and the body as lived, (2) the spatiality of the body, (3) the synthesis of the body-proper, and (4) the body­proper as the expression of the existence of consciousness. De Waelhen's exposition follows the order of inquiry set down by Merleau-Ponty. When one reads either of these works, however, he is struck by a recurrence of certain fundamental themes, which seem, moreover, to be genuine "categories" {in the sense in which Gabriel Marcel and Maurice Natanson use this term).1 We may formulate these as follows: (1) the body-proper is "form­giving," or "sense-bestowing," and at the same time unifies itself and objects by means oJ an "intentional arc" which constitutes a "corporeal scheme," - thus, the body-proper becomes the instrument of a ge1ieralized and latent "knowledge." (2) My body­proper is most fundamentally my mode of being-to-the-world, the way in which my consciousness becomes engagee - thus, my body­proper is my etre-au-monde. (3) It is, finally, as the "expression" of my existence that the body-proper is concretely lived by me and by others - thus, my body-proper is "expression." As a theme running through each of these categories, there is the fundamental "ambiguite" of existence as such. It is of the essence of human corporeal existence, Merleau-Ponty contends, that it is funda­mentally equivocal, or ambiguous.

By means of these categories it will be possible to give a coherent and unified explication of the theory of the body.

(x) THE BODY-PROPER AS AN INSTRUMENT OF 'KNOWLEDGE'

The human organism, considered from the point of view of the one whose body it is, is not lived as a Gegen,stand (a system of particles in motion existing partes extra partes and defineable by means of physiologi(fal and chemical laws). To the contrary, it is, as it is experienced by the one whose body it is, "a decisive moment in the genesis of the objective world." (PP, 86) That is to say, it is that in virtue of which there are objects for me.

Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty insists, the relation between the body-proper and physical objects cannot be described as a causal

i Cf. Part I, Chapter I, pp. 18-20.

THEORY OF THE BODY r53

relation; if there are affairs like "sensations," these cannot be, from the perspective of experience-vecue, ·considered as "causes" of my perception of things. Rather, they are ob-jects. For the same reason, "sensations" cannot be considered as "elements" making up the "stuff" of mental life (as, for instance, Hume had done). In so far as we restrict ourselves to the sphere of lived experience (of the body-proper, and not that of the body-object), we know nothing either of "causes" or of "elements of consciousness. To make of sensations "elements," really inherent components, of perceptionis, Merleau-Ponty points out, to commit

What psychologists call the "experience error," that is to say, we suppose to be in our consciousness of things what we know to be in things .. There are two manners in which we deceive ourselves concerning quality: the one is to make of it an element of consciousness. . . the other is to think that that sense and that object, at the level of the quality, would be full and determined. And the second error, like the first, derives from the prejudice of mundaneity (prefuge du monde).l (PP, u)

In other words, the traditional way of treating "sensations" made of them really intrinsic parts of the mind; and, by so doing, the qualities or properties of tltings (red, sweet, rough, and so on) were reduced to elements ef the perception of the thing. The whiteness of a spot of paint is sensuously seen as being a quality of the spot itself, which rests on a homogeneous ground. But, more than this, the spot is perceived as having a color which is denser than that of the ground (which is seen as continuing "under" the spot and not as interrupting it). "Each part an­nounces more than it contains, and this elementary perception is therefore already charged with a meaning." (PP, 9) The perceptual "something" is not necessarily, though, given in an unequivocal fashion; the "object" is not always readily identifiable, but is most often sensuously perceived as "ambiguous."

Similarly, one cannot simply identify the milieu of behavior (as it is for lived experience) with that of the physical placement of behavior (the so-called "geographical surroundings.") The reactions of the body to its milieu are not complexes of elementary movements, each "blind" to itself and to the other movements making up the total. Rather, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes,

J By "le prej uge du monde," Merleau-Ponty means what Husserl has called the "naturalization of consciousness." C!. Husserl, "Philosophy as a Strict Science.'' Cross Currents, Vol vi, No. 3 (Summer, 1956), pp. 230-37.

154 MERLEA U-PONTY

the reactions of an organism are not configurations o{ elementary movements but gestures endowed with an internal unity. . . Experience in an organism is not the recording and fixation of certain really accom­plished movements. It emerges from aptitudes, that is the general power of responding to situations of a certain type of means of varied reactions which have only their meaning in common. Reactions are not, therefore, a succession of events; they have in themselves an "intelligibility." 1 •

This level of " intelligibility," however, is not yet that of cognition, of consciousness proper. Rather, he maintains, what the Gestalt psychologists had called "perceptual form" is in truth a perceptual "meaning" (sens) and this notion can be generalized:

there is a. signification of the perceived which is without equivalent in the universe of the understanding, a perceptual milieu which is still not the objective world, a perceptual being which is still not determined being. (PP. 58)

This level of signification, he states, is that of non-thetic ex­perience, of expbience-vecue, and it is this dimension that must be explicated in its own terms. It is now possible to turn to the detailed exposition of the several aspects of the body-proper as a m ode of knowledge.

(a) The Body-Proper as "Sense-Giving" The relation between the body-proper and objects must be

described as "form-giving;" the body "met en forme" the data given to it . This activity, he insists, is in evidence even at the physiological-neurological level.

In fact, he maintains, the great advance of modem physiolo-

1 La Structure du Comf>orleme11t, op. cit., p. 140. And PP, 59: "The movements of the body-proper are naturally invested with a certain perceptual signification. With external phenomena, they form a system so well connected that external perception "takes account" of the displacement of the perceptual organs - finds in them, if not the e~f>licit explication, at least the motif of changes occurring in the landscape, and thus it can immediately comprehend them."

Therefore, he ls convinced (PP, 17-18), "itlsinevitab1e that in its general eftort of objectification science comes to represent the human organism as a physical system confronted with stimuli themselves defined by their physico-cbemical properties. And, it seeks on that basis to reconstruct actual perception and to close the cycle of scientific knowledge by discovering the laws according to which knowledge itself ls produced - by founding an objective science of subjectivity. But it is inevitable as well that this attempt breaks down." The objectification ot subjectivity (of the body­proper, of perception, and so on) by science fails, that is to say, because i t attempts to explain concrete lived expe.rience in terms other than those of lived experience, i.e., "objectively." In other words, as Husserl emphasized, such a science "naturalizes" consciousness.

THEORY OF THE BODY 155

gy 1 is just to have surpassed the traditional conception of "constancy" (and of "local stimulation"), by recognizing that the neurological system in general functions specifically in an active manner: it differentiates and organizes sets of sensuous excitations. Thus, a lesion in the nervous tissue does not, as should be the case according to traditional theory, destroy the sensuous contents, but rather it makes the differentiation and organization of them increasingly difficult and uncertain. This activity, indeed, now appears as the essential function of the nervous system:

Thus the excitations of t he same sense differ less by the material instrument of which it makes use than by the manner in which the rudi­mentary stimuli are spontaneously organized together. And, that organi­zation is the decisive factor at the level of sensory "qualities" as it is at the level of perception. (PP, 89)

What is important, that is to say, is that we recognize a kind of "spontaneous organization" taking place even at the level of sensory excitation. Thus one can say, what occurs physiologically is not so much "another story" from what occurs within experi­ence-vecue, as it is a state of affairs to be reinterpreted from the point of view of the latter. Real processes, in this sense, become significative of something other than themselves, i.e., they are more than " purely" physiological processes.

This circumstance can be seen, Merleau-Ponty states, ~ regards the phenomenon of the "phantom-member." (PP, 90-Io5) While we need not go into bis detailed interpretation of this, it would be well to point out the essential features of it. When, for example, a patient's arm has become paralyzed or amputated, and he yet continues to "experience" pain in it, the physiological explanation of this situation is usually that there is a simple suppression or persistance of "inner stimulations" (of intero­ceptive data). Agnosia, on the other hand, is the "non-recog­nition" by the patient of the body-member as belonging to patient's body, i.e., it is the non-recognition of a fragment of the total "representation" of the body which nevertheless ought to be given (since the b ody-member corresponding to the represen­tation of it is there); and the " phantom-member" is the "recog-

l M:erleau-Ponty refers primarily to the work of]. Stein, Lhermitte, Schilder, and Menninger-Lerchenthal.

MERLEAU-PONTY

nition" by the patient of a part of the total representation which ought not to be given (since the corresponding member is not there).

Traditionally, Merleau-Ponty contends, the phantom-member was treated psychologically as a particular memory or the patient was said to "judge" positively (since the arm is ampu­tated, yet "experienced" by the person, the psychological explanation of this brought in spe<:ific non-sensuous processes -judgment, memory, association, and the like). Agnosia, on the other hand, was explained psychologically as a phenomenon of forgetting, or of "negative" judgment. Physiologically, the phantom-member was taken to be the actual presence of a representation, while agnosia was said to be the actual absence of a representation; psychologically, to the contrary, the phantom­member was assumed to be the representation of an actual presence (an experiencing of what, however, is not present), while agnosia was taken to be the representation of an actual absence (an experiencing of what, however, is present). (Cf. PP, 95-g6)

Such explanations become entangled in their own intricacies, and in the end ignore precisely what is at issue: inf act the patient whose arm is amputated is far from merely remembering or judging, just as the patient with agnosia is far from simply forgetting - and in no case is there any sort of "representation" here. The latter is a carry-over from the false theory of ideas of classical empiricism. It is not the case that the patient suffering from a "phantom-member" experiences some sort of "repre­sentation;" an absent body-member cannot cause an image of itself to arise in the mind, and the resort to memory and judgment is simply an artifice to save the representational theory, and hardly a correct description of the facts.

The patient expresses his deficiency, Merleau-Ponty contends, by remaining ambivalent towards it. He remains open, that is to say, to the types of actions for which this arm would be the key and center were it still operative. Hence, as de Waelhens points out, the phenomenon

consists in the fact that the existential pulsation which engages me towards the objects of my ordinary Umwelt continues to push me on and appeals to the body capable of conducting me there and of revealing it to me ... But I "know" beforehand - and do not want to know - that the

THEORY OF THE BODY I57

mediation cannot be effectuated, that I can no longer open myself to this world nor can this world offer itseH to me; I "use trickery," I continue to aim at this world but only in a magical manner.1 •

In this way, by "shamming," I constitute a "fictive" body, and this is precisely why the phantom-member is neither a memory nor a representation of something absent (an "image" of a nothing), but is rather a "quasi-present": it is, Metleau-Ponty states, "like the suppressed experience of a former present which decides not to become past." (PP, IOI) The so-calledinteroceptive data, then, while quite real,

have sense only through the existential thrust, concretized in the phantom-member. Inversely, the phantom-member, and the existential elan of which it is the translation in immediate experience, are real only in the experience of interoceptive excitations.I! •

Accordingly, what emerges from the perspective of the body­proper is just that physiological phenomena have meaning for the one whose body it is.

Sensuous excitations are not the "effects" of a de facto situation "outside" the organism, and which then "cause" the perception of the state of affairs. Rather, for the perceptual subject (from whom- alone we can learn about perception), Metleau-Ponty argues, such excitations reveal the mamier iti which the organism refers itself spontaneously to objects, the way it mise en fonne its data spontaneously. Thus, de Waelhe.ns quite correctly observes:

In reality the body is nothing but the manner in which. we gain access to the world, and at the same time, or correlatively, a certain mode of appearance oi the world itself ... The body is the ensemble of concrete conditions under which an existential projecta ctualizes itself and becomes, by actualizing itself, properly mine.a•

Thus Merleau-Ponty emphasizes that the organism's function, in respect of the sensuous excitations, is "to 'conceive' a certain form of excitation. The 'psychophysical event' is therefore no longer of the type of 'mundane' causality."* (PP, 89)

This neuro-physiological circwnstance has an important consequence for the conception of the body-proper. We have brought out one of the important assumptions of traditional psychology already - namely, that the body is essentially a

1 De Waelhens, op. cit., pp. n2-13. 1l Ibid., p. ll4· 9 Ibid., p. 1:09.

MERLEAU-PONTY

passivity in respect of its sensuousness to objects. Now we have an additional argument against this view: if the body-proper is "form-giving," if it endows its objects with a sens, it must be that it is fundamentally active, spontaneous. Andi£ one can speak of sen:se-data being "given" to the body, it is always necessary to recognize that these "data" are nothing outside of the sense­bestowing functions of perception. To be sure, one might point -out, it can nevertheless be quite accurately determined that certain physical events (light waves) must first occur before t,he seeing of an illuminated object, and that these waves strike the appropriate organ sensitive to them thus causing another series of events to occur (physiological events), such that only then can seeing take place. Merleau-Ponty, however, would insist that one can in no way account for "seeing", as a specific way in which conscience-engagee is related to its visible world, in such a manner. There is implicit in such a view an unnoticed and unstated movement back-and-forth between the point of view of an out­side observer and that of the experiencer himself. But if ene is consistent, even the latter must itself be "observed," and since one cannot see the seeing, the "objective" point of view collapses straight away. And if one stealthily tries to switch points of view in the middle of the argument (by trying to account for the seeing in terms of its objective eonditions), he is illegitimately using double standards.'··

Moreover, Merleau-Ponty seems to argue (though not explicit­ly), for such an ' 'explanation" sense-data are not only assumed to be the individually given (but never themselves perceived by the perceiver) but also, all these data are essentially thought to be on the same level, of the same kind - that is, there is for such an explanation no difference of any kind between a sensuous excitation which is attended to or noticed by the perceiver, and one which is either not noticed by bim, or is simply ignored in faver of other data. The actual perceptual situation, to the contrary, is enormously more complicated than such a view can in principle admit. For the perceiver, in fact, not only are there no isolated data (which remain self-identical no matter in what particular sensuous complex they happen to appear) but also

1 Sartre, we have seen, argues in much the sam.e manner: see above, Part II, pp. 81>-90. Also Marcel, above, Part I , pp. 35-38.

THEORY OF THE .BODY r59

they are not at all on the same level or of the same kind for: his experience of them: a "red" attended to has a vastly different significance than one which is either not noticed, or ignored. By the same token, a "red" whichis passed over in favor of a "purple' (but which "red" is nevertheless noticed), is intrinsically different from one which is simply not noticed at all. The "meaning" which each has is different in each case, such that one cannot consider them as being on the same level and of the same kind. Hence, to attempt to isolate a datum from its milieu is no longer to have the "same" datum or even the "same" milieu: both, by the very fact of isolation, have been essentially altered. But since fae original perceptual milieu is just what must be accounted for, and since it is the truly individually given, such an explanation miscarries from the very beginning.

In the second place, every sensible quality, he emphasizes, not only essentially exists within a specific milieu, but also it is essentially determined and defined with respect te the particular "task-at-hand" of the perceiver. What the perceptual situation is for him, depends upon what he is doing or is planning to do, i.e., what his project is.l Perception cannet be divorced from the concrete situation of the one whose perception it is: to see a red stop-light when one's wife is about to give birth, and to see the "objectively same" red stop-light at another time, is not at all the same thing. . . for the perceiver himself. Every sensible quality is wbat it is, not only in resp~ct to the particular action being performed on it, then, but also in respect to the milieu in which it occurs. And, what the milieu is itself depends upon the particular project-at-hand of the perceiver for whom the milieu is a milieu. Finally, Merleau-Ponty argues, every such sensible quality "is inserted into a certain conduct ... (Sensations) give themselves with a motor physiognomy, they are enclosed with a vital signification." {PP, 242-43)

So intimate is this relation, for him, that one can even differ­entiate various bodily postures or attitudes in relation to various sensory qualities. The corporeal attitude of the body when per­ceiving blue, rough, heavy, or sweet, thus, Merleau-Ponty

1 Cf. the treatment of "project-at-hand" by Alfred Schiltz in, e.g., "Choosing Among Projects of Action," PPR, Vol. xii, No. z (December, i:951), pp. i:61-84.

r6o MERLEAU-PONTY

contends, is decidedly different in each case, from the point of view of lived experience:

Thu~ before being an objective spectacle the quality admits being ~ecogruzed by a type of behavior which inits essence aims at it, and that is why when my body adopts the (corporeal) attitude of blue I obtain a quasi-presence of blue ... it is necessary (therefore) to relearn how to live these colors in the way our body lives them.* (PP, ~45) 1

Relearning this, finally, one begins to see that a sensory quality which is going to be sensed poses to my body a sort of problem, a vague, confused question, to which, he argues, my body is called on to respond with a specific corporeal attitude or posture in order to "solve" it.

Sensible qualities, in other words, before being actually sensed, are only "a vague solicitation ... Thus a sensible which is going to be sensed poses to my body a sort of confused problem .... " (PP, 248) 2

The fundamental phenomenon here, Merleau-Ponty believes, is this "mise en forme," which, we must say, is a sense-bestowing activity just because every quality is what it is only within a perceptual milieu determined and defined by the "tasks-at-hand" of the perceiver. We can no longer even speak of isolated qualities, of qualities in the subjunctive tense (as they "would be," "before" or "apart" from perception). Even physiologically, Merleau­Ponty contends, such qualities are "toujours-deja-13." as "formed," as "meanings." It may be legitimate to talk of them, but not where lived experience is concerned. In this sense, to talk of sensuous qualities "apart from" the concrete perceptual

1 This argument, which at Jirst sight seems rather curious and not a little far­fetched, becomes more intelligible when one realizes that it is connected with .Merleau­Ponty's contention that the body itself .is a sort of non-thematic consciousness of things. Thus, If the "project-at-hand" determines the milieu, this project is most fundamentally a corporeal project, wbich structures its milieu by means of motor projects. We return to this later.

2 Husserl, though he does not speak in terms of the body, bad described the same phenom(lllon in Erfahrung und Urltil, o-p. cit., pp. 79-80: "We say, for example, that what emerges out of the homogeneous background through its dissimilarity [with the background] 'falls out' saliently; and that means that it [i.e., the outstanclingness] displays an affective tendency on the I. The syntheses of coincidence - be it now the overlap~ing or coinciding in undifferentiatediusion, or the overlapping, in antagonism of what 1s not precisely si.m.ilar- have their affective power, solicit the Ego's attention whether or not the stimulus is followed. Ifa sensuous datum in the field is then grasped that always occurs on the ground of such an outstandingness." What Merleau-Ponty describes as a "problem" posed to the body by sensible qualities seems to be just this "solicitation" of attention. See above, p. E31.

THEORY OF THE BODY r6r

situation is only to talk of prodticts of one's analysis, but never of lived U?ities, perceptually experienced states of affairs en situation.

Thus, following and going far beyond the Gestalt psychologists, Metleau-Ponty maintains that "form" is the fundamental phenomenon in perception:

When Gestalt theory tells us that a figure on a ground is the most simple sensory datum we can obtain ... that is the very definition o1 the perceptual phenomenon, that without which a phenomenon cannot be called perception. (PP, 10)

If one attempts to abstract one of the elements of a "form," not only does he obtain a different element, but a different "form." 1

Elements are what they are only in the systematic organization in which they appear as functional components, and the "whole" is nothing but this functionally connected system of "parts;" as Aron Gurwitsch has stated:

The integration of a constituent into a whole which possesses the characteristic of a Form entails the absorption of the constituent into the structure of the organization of this whole. To be a constituent and, in this sense, a part of a Form, means to exist in a certain place within the structure of the whole; and it means to occupy a certain place in the organization of the Form, a place which can be defined only in reference to the topography of the contexture. In virtue of its absorption ... the constituent in question is endowed with a /umtio11al signification in relation to this con texture.* 2

But, Merleau-Ponty states, it would be a great mistake to believe that these "forms" exist "in themselves," so to speak "in nature." "Forms" are only "forms for perception." That is to say, he maintains, that the form

is not spread out in space, that it does not exist in the manner of a thing, that it is the idea under which what occurs in several places is gathered together and summed up. This unity is the unity of perceived objects.a

It is not the case, therefore, that Merleau-Ponty denies the existence or even the efficacy of physiological events. His point

t Cf. Structure du Co1nporlet11ent, op. cit., pp. 148-49. 2 Theorie du Cluimp de la. Co11scienco, op. cit., p. IOI. Also, p. Il4= "The constituents

are connected by the coherence of the Form ... they mutually determi11e and condition one a.nother. They derive from one another and set limits on one another in a complete reciprocity; the functional signification {of each) ... e:tists only in a system of signi· I ications .... " •

a Structure du Comporlement, pp. 155- 56. Cf. also PP, p. ~+:"The •good form' is not actualized because it would be good in itseli in a metaphysical heaven, but it is good becauseit is realized in our experie.nce."

162 MERLEA U-PONTY

rather seems to be that these events are always events within a certain milieu of bodily behavior and perceptual situations, charged with a complexity of meanings (motor, vital, existential, and perhaps even cognitive). Accordingly, even such elementary activities as motor reflexes are never merely blind reactions to a de facto physical state of affairs "outside" the organism.1

There is a remarkable parallel to Merleau-Ponty's analysis (but which is not apparently noticed by him) in that of J ean Piaget. Piaget has emphasized that every reflex activity requires two conditions for its functioning: first, the reflex tends to repeat its activity purely for its own sake (this tendency to repeat being an intrinsic characteristic of the reflex, defining it as a genuine "activity," and not a mere reaction which always remains the same - e.g., sneezing); and second, some milieu which is in some way "suitable" to this activity, which acts as an "aliment" to the activity.2 Piaget, however, seems uncertain how to understand these conditions. On the one hand, he emphasizes that every reflex "has the tendency" to assimilate "objects" to its activity - thus, not only does the sucking reflex have the tendency to repeat itself "for the sake of sucking," but by so doing, it tends t o incorporate more and more things to its activity (the coverlet, the father's thumb, its own thumb, and so on) , and as a consequence of this it tends to begin to differentiate and recognize objects as "poles of action." These "objects," that is to say, are strictly and only connected to complexes of activity and are thus experienced as poles of these complexes. s Thus Piaget could observe in his first study that even reflex activity endows its "objects" with a certain, at least minimal, m eaning.4

One would think, then, that Piaget had surmounted the difficulties of what we have called the objectivistic approach. However, he goes right on to maintain that in order for "objects" to function as aliments, some "sense-data," external to the activity, must be pre-given.s This is simply to give up, as we

I Ibid., pp. 47ff. a J ean Piaget, The Origins of lnteUigenu in Childre11, International Universities

(New York, 19~2), Chapter I. a The Cot1slr11ction of Reality fo the Child, Basic Books (New York, rg54), p. 89; also

pp. 8-g, and ro4-05. ' Origins of foltnigtnu, pp. 38-39. 6 Ibid., pp. 390 and 405. See also, Gurwitscb, TMorie du Champ de la Conscienu,

<>/J. cit., pp. 48- 50.

THEORY OF THE BODY

have seen, the first position; or, rather, it is to become locked in the irresolvable contradictions intrinsic to traditional psychology. In this situation, one cannot have it both ways: either one remains with the sphere of lived experience (in this case, with objects as they appear to the reflex activity, i.e., as "meanings" or "poles of action"), or else he drops this and adopts the objective approach-in which case, however, the reflex as sense-bestowing, as essentially an activity, remains closed to observation.

The first description by Piaget, however, is illuminating when we consider Merleau-Ponty's discussion of reflex activity:

In reality the reflexes themselves are never blind processes: they adjust themselves to a "sense" of the situation, they express our orien­tation towards a "milieu of behavior" just as much as the action of a "geographical milieu" on us. They sketch at a distance the structure of the object without waiting for points of stimulation. It is this global presence of the situation which gives a sense to partial stimuli and which makes them count, have value or exist for the organism. The reflex does not result from objective stimuli, but turns itself toward them ; it endows them with a sense or meaning which they do not have taken individually and as physical agents, but which they have only as situation. It makes them be as situation; with thetn, it is in a relation of "knowledge," that is to say, it indicates them as that which it is destined to confront.• (PP. 94)

The reflex, then, intrinsically predelineates a certain milieu of possible behavior, before any "stimulation" whatever. It "sketches beforehand" objects as being of a certain kind or type, which are "meant" ("intended") implicitly as "suitable" to its own function and purposes. In this sense, even at the reflex level of the body-proper there is an activity of sense-bestowing going on.

To say that the body-proper met for1ne, then, is to say that it bestows sense. In Piaget 's terms, to say that an "object" becomes assimilated t o a reflex activity, is to say that it becomes a "pole of action," or "meaning," for that reflex, that it receives a certain meaning by that very fact of assimilation, and that it is henceforth what it is only for the scheme of activity.

Thus, finally, the body and its milieu reciprocally relate or refer to one another. As Merleau-Ponty has maintained, the body-proper is the decisive moment in the constitution of the objective world. A serious problem remains from this analysis, however: in what sense is the body a mode of "connaissance" ? What does it mean-to suggest that even a reflex is in a "rapport

I

MERLEAU-PONTY

de 'connaissance'" with objects? Before we can answer this question, several other aspects of the body-proper must be explicated in some detail. (b) The "Corporeal Scheme"

This notion, which Merleau-Ponty takes over from psychology and transforms for his own purposes, is one of the root concepts in his theory of the body. The body-proper is the decisive moment in the constitution of the objective world; there are things for me, that is to say, only by means of my body. My body, nonetheless, as both Sartre and Marcel had emphasized, is not itself an "object" in the same sense as those things it discloses by means of its various sense organs:

In other words, I observe external objects with my body; I handle them, I inspect them., I walk around them. But as for my body, I do not observe it itself: in order to do that it would be necessary to have the disposal of a second body which itself would not be observable.• l (PP, 107)

This must not be construed to mean that I do not perceive my body, but only that it reveals its own type or manner of givenness to me, one which is peculiar to it. What is this mode of givenness, and in virtue of what is my body different from ot:..cr objects?

Classical psychology, he observes (PP, 106), had attributed to the body characteristics which are incompatible with those of an object-simpliciter, while yet taking the body as an object on the same level as these other objects. Predominantely, the body was described as that which constantly accompanies me in every per­ception; wherever I go, I go only by means of it. It never disap­pears from my sensory fields. Ii this is so then my body is not at all a mere "object among other objects": a table is always presented through certain adumbrations, whether by means of one sense or several; I always see it, touch it, smell it, and so on, from a certain perspective. It can, moreover, disappear from my field of perception; and, it stands over there, spatially located at a distance from my body, which is here. But, as Sartre had already recognized, 2 I cannot consider my body "from the outside,"

i It is a question here of the body-proper, the body-as-lived. The fact that r can observe my body Is irrelevant, since to observe it, I must make use of my body - and this is itself not observable. Marcel, we saw, first emphasized this point.

2 Cf. L'Etre td le Ntant, op. cit., p. 394. Sartre states there that the body "Is the instrument which I cannot use by means of another instrument, the point of view on which I cannot take a point of view." Marcel, we have seen, first discovered this peculiarity of "my body qua mine."

THEORY OF THE BODY 165

I cannot take up a visual perspective on my seeing, I cannot touch myself touching, and so on. And, de Waelhens points out, for Metleau-Ponty,

The permanence of the body is not that of a fixed scene presenting itself in the world; but rather its permanence is that of a sort of lateral factor whlch accompanies all points of view, yet which is incapable either of being eliminated or of being itself defiDed as a point of view.• l

It cannot itself become a mere object then, precisely because it is that by means oi which there are objects. It is neither tangible nor

visible to the extent that it is that which sees and touches. The body is not therefore a.ny external object at all, which would present only th.e particu­lar characteristic of always being "there." • 2 (PP, :i:o8)

The body's "permanence," therefore, founds the relative perma­nence of external objects. s

But, one may ask, how do "external" objects become "ex­ternal," spatially distant from the body? To be sure, as Merleau­Ponty points out, in order to "see" an object, some distance must be realized between it and my body4. Consciousness, how­ever, is literally nowhere, it is non-spatial. How then can any "distance" be established? In so far as consciousness is embodied it takes on spatial determinations. Hence, the first question to be raised concerns the spatiality of the body-proper.

The clue for solving these problems, and for clarifying the relation between conscience-engagk and its milieu, is for Metleau­Ponty the phenomenon of the "corporeal scheme." If I reach out to take up my pipe, the series of movements which take place

1 De Waelhens, op. cit., p. u9. , Merleau-Ponty refer.; here to the at that time unpublished ldeen, II, issued now

as VoL IV of Husserliana, M. Nijhoff (Haag, 1952) apparently to the following passage: "While I have the freedom over and against all other things freely to change my place in.respect to them, and thereby freely to vary the manifold appearance in which they come to be given to me, it ls not possible for me to place myself at a distance from my animate organism nor it from me. Correspondingly, the manifold appearances of my animate organism are limited: I can see certain. body-members only in a characteristically perspectival shortening, and others (for example, my bead) are generally unseeable by me. The same animate organism which serves me as the means of all my perception stands in the way o f my perceiving it itseli, and ls a remarkably, incompletely constituted thing." • (159, lines 13-25)

a This s tatement should be referred to that concerning t.he identity of the thing and the.body. Cf. above, p. 15:i:, footnote 1.

' Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., u6: "That is why man - such as we know him - is inseparable from a facticity .... " Also, PP, u: "In order lo receive into itself a signification which truly penetrates it, in order to be integrated into a 'contour' connected to the whole 'figure' and independent of the 'ground', the point of.sensation must cease to be an absolute coincidence and consequently cease to be as sensation."

r66 MERLE AU-PO NTY

are not simply juxtaposed beside one another, nor is the pipe 0nly experienced as "on" the table, "on" the pipe-stand, "next to" the book, and so on. These spatial relations include intrincisally the Teference to my body as that by means of which there are things at all, and hence that by means of which these things ar:e displayed in definite spatial relations.

Now it is not possible, by means of an "objective" or "geo­metrical" space, to account for the circumstance that when my back itches, I "know" precisely "where" the irritation is (such that, e.g., I can tell another just where to rub). Similarly I do not need to attend to every movement necessary to put on my .hat properly; and if a cigarette ash falls on my trousers, I do not hesitate a moment in knocking it off "where" it landed. The members of my body-proper reveal a spatiality which is sui ge1ieris, in terms my various movements seem to be enclosed in one ano.ther and not at all "beside" one another.I It is in virtue of the fact that my various organs and members form a system (a "corporeal scheme"), that I know at any moment of my normal experience, and know automatically, where they are, and where they are in relation to other objects around me. Quite without attending actively to him, I move out of the way of another person when we chance to meet in the street. The woman wearing a hat with a long feather in it keeps a proper distance from things which might brush it; and, as Piaget has observed, 2 the very young baby is not long in learning to tum toward the left when hisleft cheek is touched.

It is necessary then to conceive of a lived-space, one which is constituted and organized in terms of a corporeal scheme, which is itself constituted by means of bodily movements and actions in specific situations. At first inspection, this corporeal scheme seems to be a sort of "global consciousness of my posture in the inter-sensory world, a 'form' in the sense of Gestalt psychology." (PP, II6} This "form," however is not a static, but rather a dynamic, one; that is to say, the corporeal scheme of my body is a certain posture

which, in the inter-sensory woild, we ado.Pt in vie>~ of a determinate

1 This is .reminiscent of :Bergson's discu5sion of the phe.nomenon of "grace." Cf. .Essai sur les Donnles immtdiates de la Conscie11ce, op. cit., p. 9.

2 Origins of Intelligence, op. cit., e.g. pp. 25-z9.

THEORY OF THE BODY

task. The projection of this task calls forth an attitude of the entire body, one which is inscribed in it.• l

For this reason Merleau-Ponty defines corporeal spatiality, not as the space of physical location, but rather as a spatiality of situation. Itis necessary to say, then, that -

if my body can be a "form," and if there can be in front of it priv.ileged forms on neutral backgrounds, it is in so far as it.is polarized a by its tasks, in so far as it exists towards them, in so far as it gathers itself together in order to reach its goal. And, finally, the "corporeal scheme" is a way of expressing the fact that my body is "to-the-world." * 3 (PP, u7)

From this Merleau-Ponty concludes that it is by means of move­ments, body-actions, "that the spatiality of the body is es­tablished, and the analysis of movement proper should permit us to comprehend both." (PP, ng)

For this analysis he turns to the famous Gelb-Goldstein studies of brain-injured patients. We may though, for our -purposes, ignore the details of these studies and concentrate only on what Merleau-Ponty takes to he thejr central significance for the theory of the body,_

In this regard, it becomes necessary, he believes (in agreement with Goldstein), to distinguish between "abstract" and "con­crete" movements. Even jor the body, that is to say, grasping (Greifen) is different from showing, or pointing (Zeigen). A brain-injured patient is incapable of those movements which are not addressed to, and not called out from, some acftual situation; his surroundings form only a milieu of manipulanda. He is incapable of "pretending" or "visualizing" any situation which is not concretely actual. 4- It is only by breaking down an action requested by a doctor (e.g., pointing to his forehead) that he can perform it, and then the action loses all of its usual grace, its fluidity, ease and immediacy. On the other hand, when a fly lands on his forehead, the patient immediately swats it without any hesitation. "Objects," that is to say, are .not just "poles of action' ' for him, but poles of action only within a specific situation

i De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 121.

s The parallel with Piaget's analysis of "objects" as "poles of action" is worth noting;

a We_ shall returato the phenomenon_ of llre ~u monde later . • The patient is thus incapable of reali:ting .a "fictive" body, as opposed to the one

suffering from a "phantom-member," or even on.e sufferingirom agnosia.

168 MERLEAU-PONTY

which concretely calls for the particular action in question. (PP, II9-I6o)

However, as Goldstein bad shown, l it would be plain deception to believe that the normal person uses the same sorts of oper­ations as the pathological person; the normal cannot be under­stood in terms of the pathological. Rather, it is necessary to say that, having lost certain functions, the pathological person must substitute other functions. (PP, I23-Z6) H e has to make explicit to himself the movements requested by the doctor, and this is not the case as regards the normal person. 2

The normal person is able to "tum away" from the present to the virtual, from the actual to the possible (or the fictive), as regards his bodily conduct. The brain-injured patient is locked to the actual, to the "here and now," and thus must replace such otherwise immediately performed operations with a laborious process of "deciphering" and subsequent "deduction" of move­ments and objects. For instance, whereas a n ormal man can immediately distinguish a pin-prick on his elbow from one on his hand, the pathological person must undertake a step-by-step process of explicit deciphering, locating, and concluding. Thus the latter's actual field "is limited to what is encountered in an actual contact, or reconnected to these data by an explicit deduction." (PP, 127) This is to say then that he is incapable of "abstract" movement; while quite able to understand the in­structions of the doctor, they have no "motor significance" for him.

Accordingly, it can be seen that abstract movements have lost their "ground." All movements require some ground on which they "stand out" (abhebm) as these and those specific movements. The ground of "concrete" movements is just the given, actual situation along with those parts of the body-proper not directly involved in the specific movement; the movement, so to speak,

1 Goldstein, Psychologischo Aiialysen hitlnpathologiscluir Falle, Bartl1 (Leipzig; 1920), pp. 167-213. (PP, 125)

2 "We notice that the patient questioned about the position of bis body-members, or as regards the position of a tactual stimulus, seeks (by means of preparatory movements) to make of his body an object of actual perception. Questioned about the form of an object in contact with his body, he seeks to trace It by following the contour of the object. Nothing would be mare deceptive than to suppose that the normal person lJSeS the same operations, abbreviated only by habit. The patient seeks tbese explicit perceptions only in order to bring about a certain presence of his body and of the object which is given in the case of the normal person .... " • (PP, 125)

THEORY OF THE BO D Y 169

occurs within a context organized in terms of the complex: action - acted-on. That of "abstract" movements is, as we saw, the "fictive" milieu and the "fictive" body-proper which performs an "as if' ' movement or gesture on the ground of that fictive complex. (Cf. PP. 129) From this discussion, Merleau-Ponty concludes that

Movement, understood not as objective movement and displacement in space, but as a project of movement or "virtual movement," is the foun­dation of the unity of the senses ... my body is precisely an already constituted system of eq uivalences and intersensorial transpositions. The senses mutually translate one another without any need for an interpreter, mutually comprehend one another without needing to pass by way of the idea ... With the notion of corporeal scheme it is not only the unity of the body which is described in a new manner, but also through this notion the unity of the senses and the unity of the object.• (PP, 271)

The fundamental phenomenon. then, is the corporeal scheme. c;nstituted by means of th - -hand and carried out in o y movements. By means of the corporeal scheme, ~over, the body with its organs and members becomes

" unified; but as well, Merleau-Ponty contends, the senses and their objects become unified in the same way and simultaneously. When Piaget's child, Laurent, learns to differentiate the thing­heard from the thing-seen (and thus no longer for example to attempt to see sounds}, and yet sees and hears the same obfect, what has happened, Merleau-Ponty contends, is that there has appeared a certain unification of the body, the senses, and the objects thereof, and that along with this unification (as its consequence) there develops a scheme. By this, I believe, we should understand that certain types of activities become corre­lated with certain types of objects as "poles of action", and in terms of this typification at the level of the body-proper, the body itself (and with it, its objects) becomes unified as a total syst em, an organic system, i.e., an organism.

And here once again, there seems to me to b e another parallel in analysis with the work of P iaget - which , though not noted by either of them, is helpful in understanding what Merleau-Ponty states only schematically. At the psychological level Piaget has attempted to account for this process in terms of "assimilation" and "accomodation," and corresponding to these, an " internal organization" of the global complex: "actjvity - objects-acted-

170 MERLEA U-PONTY

on." From the very beginning of the child's life, Piaget believes, there is "an historical development such that each episode depends on preceding episodes and conditions those that follow in a truly organic evolution. " l This process, not simply of growth, but of progressive accumulation and augmentation of the activi­ties of the child, he descnoes as occurring by means of assimi­lation, accommodation, and internal organization.

As we have already seen, every genuine activity reveals two fundamental features: (1) it exhibits a sui generis " need" to be used in order to adapt itself and thus to become crystallized into a scheme of activity; and (2) it is capable of gradual accommo­dation to the "objects" encountered through its assimilative tendencies. 2 Thus, every activity, by the very fact that it tends to function simply for the sake of functioning, 3 reveals two further phases: it tends to incorporate an mcreasing number of objects capable of serving as aliments for its activity,4 that is, it tends to become generalized. And it tends, because of this gener­alization, to become recognitory as regards the objects capable of serving as aliments. s

These three phases of assimilation, however, are but one process, or tendency, of every activity. The reflex is one func­tioning totality, and thus it is organized progressively as it assimilates and accommodates itself to objects. An activity (whether reflex, or higher level) tends sui generis to grow and augment, and with this there goes hand in band a progressive construction of objects and a progressive separation of "subject" from "object." The "self" and the "world" are co-constituted simultaneously, in 1an historical process whose movements are described by Piaget in terms of the functional concepts of assimi­lation, accommodation, and organization.

But, as well, by means of this complex process, the various activities become crystallized into "schemes;" these "functions crystallize in sequential structures," 6 which henceforth serve

1 Origi1is o/ lntellige11ce, op. cit., p. 25. 2 Ibid., p. 29.

' Ibid., PP· 32, 42- 43. • Ibid., pp. 34- 35, 43. 5 Ibid., pp. 35-36. e Ibid., p. l3S; cf. also, p. 128.

THEORY OF THE BODY 171

to organize and give signification to the particular movements making up a total activity:

In short, the uniting of accommodation and assimilation presupposes an organization. Organi.zation exists within each schema o{ assimilation since ... each one constitutes a real whole, bestowing on each element a meaning relating to this totality. But there is above all total organization; that is to say coordination among the various schemata of assimilation.1

Thus, the various schemata themselves become coordinated with one another; and, in this manner, there arises what Merleau­Ponty has called the "corporeal scheme." For, the corporeal scheme - as that in terms of which the spatiality of the body­proper is instituted, and through this the coordination and unification of the body's senses and their respective multiple objects - is nothing other than another expression for the total organization and coordination of the organs and members of the body-proper by means of its concrete tasks and movements. In other words, I submit, what Merleau-Ponty calls the "corporeal scheme" is what Piaget describes as the " total organization" or "intercoordination" of the various schemata.

Schemes of activity, then, become constituted as "ways of doing," "modes of activity," or typical manners of conduct over against typical kinds of objects. In short, they become sedimented and the stock of this sedimentation is what Metleau-Ponty calls the "corporeal scheme."

Thus far, however, the analysis is far from complete. It is one thing to take note of the "corporeal scheme;" it is quite another to explicate the process of its formation. Piaget has attempted to do the latter by means of his functional concepts; but even so, he confesses that the most crucial phenomenon in all of his analysis, "assimilation," has not been explicated, believing that such an explication falls only within the domain of biology. 2 Merleau­Ponty, however, would hardly agree with this; for, after all, it is precisely what is most essential. The explication which he himseli gives, nevertheless, as we shall see, is still not free from diffi­culties.

1 IlJid., p. 142. There are certain problems with his analysis which we cannot show in this place.

2 Ibid., p. 46.

172 MERLEAU-PONTY

(c) Tlte "Intentional Arc" In the course of normal, harmonious experiencing of the milieu

disclosed by means of the body-proper, this milieu is experienced as the same for each of the organs of the body-proper. Similarly, the spatiality of objects disclosed by means of, e.g., visual perception {the pipe is to the left of the ashtray), is also the spatiality disclosed in tactual perception - for concrete experience. Although, to be sure, " the domain of touching is not spatial in the same way as that of seeing," (PP, 257) there is nevertheless a unification of these spaces into one lived spatiality. (PP, 260)

If the spatiality peculiar to each of the senses did not have something common in all of them, Merleau-Ponty points out, I could never reach for the pen which I now see as in the same place toward which my hand now moves. (PP, 258) This common ground, he believes, is the fact that body vision and touch (as well as the other sensory fields) are

means ef access to one and the same world; this world has the pre­predicative evide.nce of being a single world, such that the equivalence of the "organs of sense perception" and their analogy is transferred onto things and can be lived before being conceived." • (PP, 1_50)

Thus, every concrete perception and gesture is situated to the world as a world which is the same for each of the senses, for each movement, i and which was and will be the same for an indefinite number of virtual or horizontally c;oordinate gestures and perceptions:

The fact is that the normal subject has his body not only as a system of actual positions but also, and by that fact, as an open system with an infinity of equivalent positions in other orientations. What we have called the corporeal.scheme is precisely this system of equivalencies, this immediately given invarient by means of which the different motor tasks are instantly transposable. That is to say that there is not only an experi­ence of my body, but more an experience of my body in the world ..... • (EP,165)

1 lt must- be pointed out that tbis position is inconsistent with Metleau-Ponty's later statements regarding the -unification of the world (Cf. PP, ~7r, and above, pp. r50-5:i:). Here he maintains that the unification of the sensory "spaces" presupposes and iS founded on the pre-predicative unity of the world; the various spaces of tbe different senses become unified into one interc-sensory spatiality only because each of the senses is " a means of access to one and the same W01'ld • . . . " Later oo, however (Cf. above, pp. ~65-?o), he wants to say that the unification of the objects in the world are unified as identically the same by means of the c<>rporal sche.me; both the senses and their objects are unified through thls scbeme. Why the spatiality of each sense should nevertheless require a world already constitued as the same, Merlcau­Ponty does not tell us. Indeed, it seems to :me, this is a flat inconsistency in his argumeat.

THEORY OF THE BODY 173

Now, we have seen that it is by means of the motivity of the body-proper that this corporeal scheme is instituted, and that this motivity is first of all a motivjty of corporeal tasks. Thus we can say, the world evidenced by "antepredicative experience" is fundamentally the pole of actions on it by the body-proper. Every movement thus occurs within a milieu of "tools,., particu­lar " instrumental-things." (PP, 161, footnote) Similarly, the spatiality of objects is originarily a spatiality of praxis, of situation, and is thus instituted by the motivity of the body­proper: the body-proper does not live in space, but rather it lives space, i.e., "il y habiter." The corporeal scheme is then a scheme of equivalences of actions and tasks, or, as we have said earlier, the total organization and coordination of actual and possible kinds of corporeal activities.

The unity of the body-proper is a unity of a scheme, which, qua scheme, manifests a common sty.le of bodily actions (Cf. PP, I75--77): in walking, talking, eating, writing, and so on, there is manifested a certain typical style of conduct, bodily attitudes, behavior, and the like, which characterizes this body-praper as mine and not yours. This typical style olmy body-proper as such, moreover, "is transferred onto things;" that is, the milieu sur­rounding my body-proper has a certain physiognomical style which is founded on the style of my body-proper, on its habitual style and course such that my milieu (my clothes, my personal belongings, my books, furniture, rooms, and so on) reveals me.

What occurs even at the physiological level is then repeated at higher levels: the objects of my milieu are meanings; "the" world is, even. for bodily conduct, a texture and contexture of meanings. In short, Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, motivity is itself intentional. (PP, I6o) The fundamental phenomenon is inten­tionality. Beneath what Goldstein called the "categorial oper­ation"; beneath what has variously been designated as "the symbolic function,'' "projection," and so on, is a more fundamental function: a "central function," which, "before making us see or know objects makes them exist for us in a more covert manner." That is, he continues,

the life of consciousness -the life of knowing, of desire or the perceptual life - is subtended by an "intentional arc" which projects around us our past, future, our ideology, our moral situation; or r ather which effectuates

r74 MERLEA U-PONTY

our being situated under all oi these relations. I t is this intentional arc which institutes the unity of the senses, that of the senses and the intelli­gence, that of sensib ility and motivity. • l (PP, 158)

The unity of the body-proper and of its objects, which is expressed by the corporeal scheme, is, then, the consequence of a more general and more fundamental phenomenon: an "intentional arc" is responsible for all unity whatever. For Merleau-Ponty, then, there is an intentionality which is not the intentionality of an "absolute" consciousness, but rather of a non-thetic consciousness manifested concretely in the body­proper itself. 2 This intentionality is what accounts for the circum­stance that the body-proper is experienced as

the ensemble of paths already marked O'ut, of already constituted powers, the dialectically acquired ground on which a higher level mise en /ortne is performed,• 3

such that the body-proper, like the world non-thetically experi­enced by it, is an "always-already-there." That is to say, "our open and personal existence rests on a first basis of acquired and congealed existence." (PP, 493-94) And this acquired and con­gealed existence, which is the fundamental stratum of the body­proper, takes the form of an

organism considered as a pre-personal adherence to the general form of the world, as an anonymous and general existence ... (it) plays, beneath my personal life, the role of an in11ate complex.• (PP, 99)

It is a manifestation of catiscience-engagee as etre-au-?nonde. We must proceed with caution in order to unravel this extreme­

ly complex notion of the "intentional arc" since we have practi­cally no clues from Merleau-Ponty. One thing is clear: he is not arguing that in every perception there goes on a synthetic activity of consciousness; it is precisely this view that he wants to reject. It seems clear, again, that itis Husserl who is the Mte noire. Husserl had maintained that

if I take the perceiving of this die as the theme foi; my description, I see in pure reflection that "this" die is given continuously as an objective

i As this passage indicates, Merleau-Ponty places a great many tasks on this "arc;" for something so crucial, though, il is strange that.he devotes next to no analysis to it. We shall return to this phenomenon later.

2 Cf. PP, 61: we shall contest this opposition which be sets up between "absolute" and "operative."

B St,1tuure du Comportement, <>f>. cit., p. ::186.

THEORY OF THE BODY I75

unity in a multi-form and changeable multiplicity of manners oi appearing which belong determinately to it.

These, in this temporal flow, are not an incoherent sequence of sub­jective processes. Rather they flow away in the unity of a synthesis, such thatin them "one and the same" is intended as appearing.1

The unity of the changing multiplicity of appearances of an object is a

unity of synthesis . . . a C01i1U1cted11Bss that makes the unity of one conscious­tzess, in which the unity of an intentional objectivity, as "the same" objectivity belonging to multiple modes of appearance, becomes "comti­tuted." 2

Thus, Husserl concludes, "the" object of consciousness, as "the same" object experienced from a multiplicity of perceptual perspectives (and which is likewise also remembered, valued, judged about, and so on) is "an 'intentional effect' produced by the synthesis of consciousness." s Accordingly, Husserl insisted over and again that it is necessary for phenomenology to inquire into this "synthetic producing," by means of which the objects of consciousness are "built up" or constituted (aufbaut) as being identically the same objects throughout a multiplicity of ap­pearances (seeing, touching, and smelling a thing; judging that it is thus and so; liking it; and so on). The life of consciousness, Husserl emphasizes, is intentional and synthetic; objects, of whatever kind, acquire the sense for consciousness of being identically the same (and acquire a multiplicity of other senses as well: "physical thing;" "mathematical formula;" "valuable;" and so on) only by virtue of the synthetic intentionality of consciousness. More particularly, even if we consider one phase of a visual perception of a tree, here, too, "the" tree is "one and the same" tree throughout the temporal phases of the perceiving of it only in virtue of these intentional syntheses of consciousness by means of which the object of the "just past" phase, that of the "just-just-past" phase, and so on, are synthetically retained by the "now" phase as "one and the same" tree.4 This extraordi­narily complex process, found in even the simplest of sense per­ceptions, signifies for Husserl that all "objects of experience"

.L Carlesian i'l-feduations, op. cit., p. 39. 2 Ibid., pp . .µ-42. a Ibid., p . .µ. ' Formale und tra11sz:e11de11tale L4gik, <>f>. cit., p. 147.

MERLEAU-PONTY

whatever are specific "products" (Leistungen) of just such in­tentional syntheses; they are, that is to say, products of a "sense­genesis" (Sinngenesis). Finally, this "sense-genesis," according to Husserl,

This wonderful peculiarity, as productive intentionality, belongs universally to any consciousness whatever. All intentional unities derive from an intentional genesis, are "constituted" unities; and at all times one can inquire into the "completed' ' unities - into their constitution , into their entire genesis, and of course into their essential form whichis to be grasped in an eidetic manner. It is this fundamen tal fact, encompassing in its universality the whole of intentional life, which determines the genuine s1mse of intetrtional analysis as the disclcsure of infenti<mal implications -the analysis by means of which, over against the often completed sense of unities, their inexplicit sense-moments and "causal" sense-relations are made to stand out explicitly.• l

Now, it is just this view which Merleau-Ponty wants to criticize. While such "syntheses" may indeed be discovered, for Merleau­Ponty they are only and strictly products of that very analysis, phenomenological or not, and not at all intrinsic within lived experience itself. He seems to feel thatif in my on-going perception I do not have to " think" the unity of the object, his unity is already toute f ait, utie fois pour tcn-1-tes.

Similarly, all talk of " qualities," "sensations," and as regards Husserl particularly, of "hyletic data," is so much deception if one means that these are concretely lived as such. To this list, then, he now adds "synthesis" and "constitution" - they are products of analysis and nothing else.

Adopting the analytic attitude I decompose the perception into qualities and into sensations, and ... l am obliged to suppose an act of synthesis which is only the counteq>art of my analysis. My act of per­ception, considered in its naivity, does not itself effectuate this synthesis; it benefits from ati already accomplished operation, /r<>m a ge?zeral synthesis constituted once and /or all. It is that factwhlchl express when I say that I perceive with my body or with my senses - my body, my senses, being precisely this habitual knowledge of the world, this implicit or sedimented science.• (PP, 275; my emphasis)

By this he means that the body itself has its own intentionality, such that all perception presupposes as its condition a sort of "preliminary constitution" (PP, 249) by virtue of which the body is

1 Ibid., p. 185.

THEORY OF THE BODY

a synergetic system, all the functions of which are taken up again and connected in the general movement of being-to-the-world, in so far as it is the congealed form of existence.• (PP, 270)

Hence, the unity of the body and its objects is realized by means of "autochthonous organization," (PP, 270, footnote) which is the "arc intentionnel" of the body itself. The body-proper, then, is "already established" as such for all perception.1 As such every perception profits from an already accomplished synthesis, once done forever done.

The body-proper exists as an anonymous and generalized existence, a kind of sub-structure on which all personal life is built. Hence, too, the intentionality at work in it cannot be at the level of cognition, of consciousness 2:

If my consciousness actually constituted the world which it perceives there would be no distance whatever, nor any possible displacement, between them. My consciousness would penetrate the perceptual world even to its most hidden articulations ; intentionality would carry us to the heart of the object; and at the same stroke the perceived would not have the density of something present. Consciousness would not lose itself, would not become caught up, in the perceptual world.• (PP, 275)

But, in fact, we do have consciousness of an inexhaustible object, one not fully apprehended in any one or any number of perceptions (since sensuously perceivable things are always presented as "having more to them" than is. strictly presented at one time), and thus "the" object is never present "all at once." s It presents itself to the "subject of perception," which for Merleau-Ponty is the body-proper,4 as a sort of badly for­mulated question, a confused problem (PP, 248) with which, in perception proper, the body "communes," or "is synchronized." s (PP , 270, 245-246) "The" table is thus never reached by my per­ception; if it were, it would cease to be what it is, a physical thing spread out before me with its own peculiar "aseite," its own unimpeachable presence and depth. (PP, 269-'JO)

Corresponding to this aseite, to this ambiguity which is of

t De Waclhens, op. cit., p. u7. 2 We shall have to raise serious objections to this conception of "non-thematic

intentionality" as being a strictly corporeal intentiveness. ' "The" object ls just the object seen from everywhere, he contends. (PP, 83, 235-

39) • Re states explicitly that the body is "le sujet de la perception." (PP, :a6o; a.1£0

245, 248) 6 Cf., e.g., PP, 246 and 245. We return to this shortly.

MERLEAU-PONTY

the essence of the existence of the thing, there must be on the side of the perceiver a correlative aseite and ambiguite: this is the body-proper. ln so far as the body-proper is the subject of perception, its intentionality is not that of conscioisness:

It is not the epistemological subject who effects the synthesis, it is the body when it pulls itself from its dispersion, gathers itself together, carries itself with all of its means towards a single term of its movement, and when a single intention is conceived in it by the phenomenon of synergy . . . By saying that this intentionality is not a thought, we mean that it is not effectuated in the transparency of a consciousness and that it takes over as acquired all the latent lmowledge which my body has of itself. • (PP, 269)

Thus, Metleau-Ponty maintains, the body-proper itself is a "knower;" the body itself "knows" and "comprehends." (Cf. PP, 167, 270, 275) 1 The body, he argues, being "the common texture of all objects," is the instrument of knowledge of these objects. (PP, 272) And, in so far as this "knowledge" is " latent," "habi­tual," and "sedimented," perception always " takes place in an atmosphere of generality and presents itself to us as anonymous. I cannot say," he continues,

that I see the blue of the sky in the sense in which I say that I under­stand a book . .. My perception, seen even from within, expresses a given situation: I see blue because I am sensible to colors ... if I were to translate the perceptual experience exactly, I would have to say that it is perceived in me and not that I perceive .. . Betweenmy perception and me there is always the density of something originaYily acqui1'ed which prevents my experience from being clear for itself ... the I who sees or the I who hears is in some manner a specialized I, familiar with only a portion of being ... • (PP, 24g-50)

This anonymity is essential, he claims, just because every sensation, being strictly the first, last, and only one of its kind, is both a birth and a death - it is lost at the moment of its occur­rence. Correlatively, the subject who experiences it, begins and ends with it - and, as he can neither precede nor survive himself, Merleau-Ponty claims, sensation appears to him as always in a milieu of generality.2

1 CL de Waelhens, op. cit., pp. 140-41. a CL PP, 249-SO; this is almost verbatim. I must conless that this argument

escapes me. He will later contend that it is the temporality of "l'intentionnalite oi>Uant" which constitutes the continuum of experience and the identity of the selL But how generality emerges is, so far as I can see, completely obscure. We return to this in Chapter Ill, below.

THEORY OF THE BODY I79

The point of this argument, it seems, is that the intentionalite opbante which forms the fundamental stratum of the body­proper as an already-acquired "complex inne,' • is strictly and exclusively a tem;poral one:

My body takes possession of time, it exists a past and a future for a present; it is not a thing; it makes time instead of undergoing it. But every act of fixation [of a segment of time] must be repeated for otherwise it falls into the unconscious ... The hold it gives us on a segment of time, the synthesis which it effectuates, are themselves temporal phenomena, themselves flow away and can subsist only as re-apprehended in new act which itself is temporal ... The one who in sensory exploration gives a past to the present and orients it to a future is not the I considered as an autonomous subject; it is me in so far as I have a body and in so far as I can "look at" something.• (PP, 277)

Because of this "temporal" synthesis, then, perception is always in the world of the "Anyone." For, he insists, just like the object of the momentary present, my consciousness of it passes away and is thus obliterated. Both are t emporal phenome­na. There is no such thing as an "absolute subject," a "pure" pour-sen ; rather, in the concreteness of perception, there is only the generality and anonymity of the body-proper synthesized by means of temporal syntheses which connect the moments of its perception and action. I

The "intentional arc," then, is a temporal synthesis. But this synthesis, he says later on, is not at all what Husserl described as "synthesis of identification." 2 For Merleau-Ponty there are no such syntheses of sensuous contents, but rather only syntheses of transition. (Cf. PP, 480, 484) Hence, as far as sensuously perceiva­ble and perceived states of affairs are concerned, all one can say is that they are, by essence, "toufours-difa-ltl." And finally, the body-proper can be "un acquis," because it is unified by means of temporal syntheses of transition taking place in a milieu of generality and anonymity, and expressable only in the imper­sonal.

Nevertheless, one must say, this "lived temporality" of the body-proper is still not the ground of its being; at the root of every-thing, for him, is ttre-au-monde. For just as the body is that

1 lfow he can then maintain that "le corps propre" is yet "le mi411," Is a problem central to this argument. We shall return to itlater.

I CL Cartesian Meditations, op. cit.,§§ x7-18.

180 MERLEAU-PONTY

which puts me to-the-world, so, too, it puts me to-~pace- and to­time. That is to say:

In so far as T have a body, and I act by means of it in the world, space and time are not f<»' me a sum of juxtaposed points, not beforehand moreover an infinity of relations whose synthesis my consciousness would perform and wherein my body would be implicated. I am not "in" space and "in" time; I am at space and at time; my body applies itself to them and embraces them. The fullness of this hold measures that of my existen­ce .... • (PP, r64)

Accordingly, it is necessary to turn now to this root .

(2) THE BODY-PROPER AS P:rRE-AU-MONDE

We have seen that each of the senses is itself a disclosure of a certain milieu of objects (Cf. PP, 250-51), and in this sense each bas its own characteristic spatiality. (PP, 255) These spatialities and these senses nevertheless present us with a single object in a single space, each opens out onto a common, intersensory world. (PP, 261, 279) This diversity and unity of the senses, however, "are truths of the same rank" (PP, 256) Accordingly, as de Waelbens states,

If my existence is by nature close beside things, it must approach them in as many ways as these things manifest themselves to my existence, and be capable oi passing entirely into each. But inversely, if these modes of presence present a single thing, it is necessary as well that these diverse modalities of apprehension lead over into one another and that existence, if it immerses itselfinto each, cannot lose itself in any one of these modes of presence of the thing.• 1

That is to say, the unity and the diversity of the senses (and thus of the body and its objects) are at the same level, just be­cause they become differentiated and unified on a common gr01.md. (Cf. PP, ISO, 26o) Each sense, then, implicates the entire body, refers simultaneously to all the other senses, and thus is intrinsically intersensory. It is only by breaking up this lived unity and simultaneous diversity that the diverse senses of one body, and correlatively diverse "sense qualities" of one object, appear - and thus these are strictly artificial, products of the analysis. (PP, 278).

There is, therefore, "an 'originary stratum' of feeling which is anterior to the division of the senses;" (PP, 262) and on this

l De Waelhens, op. cil., p. xn.

T H EORY OF THE BODY r8r

ground , the diverse senses " lead over into one another." (PP, 265) This "originary stratum" (couche originaire), the intentional arc which founds all unity, Merleau-Ponty has argued, is temporal. Indeed, he states, "subjectivity, at the level of perception, is nothing other than temporality ." (PP, 276) This is to say that the body-proper exists itself as an ek-stasis: to perceive a thing is not to perform a series of syntheses b ut rather to encounter it, to come before it by means of one's sensory fields, to manifest O"neself to it as a presence to him in virtue of his bodily presence to it - in so far as my body inhabits time (as it inhabits space and the world), it lives itself as present. " In the same way as it is necessarily 'here.' the body exists necessarily 'n ow.' It can never become 'past. '" 1 When I visually perceive a thing, as de Wael­hens puts it, " this regarding is a presence or a present because its unfolding supposes and promises the mobilization of all the potencies of the body." 2

In short, the intentionality of the body-proper is essentially its temporality; and its temporality is its being: phenomenology, as Merleau-Ponty understands it, gives way to ontology. In so far as consciousness is always and essentially conscience-engagee, its being is always and essentially etre-au-monde; and, its etre-au­monde is its engagement, its opening-out-onto-the-world, that is, its etre-corps.

My body-proper, then, manifests me to the world, puts me at the world, by m eans of my various senses - which themselves must now be conceived as modes of access to the various spheres of being accessible to them. The interiority which Descartes and others had taken as the essence of mind or consciousness, and which Sartre h ad reaffirmed in his ontology, is shown to be quite erroneous, for it fails to recognize the fundamental dimension of human-reality: its etre-au-monde. To be perceptive of a world is not only to be open to it; it is to be opened out onto it, to be at it. To act on the world is to disclose the world as a contexture of possible ways-to-be, possible ways in which consciousness is to-the­world. In this way, the body-proper becomes

1 Cf. above, p. 96: Merleau·Ponty contests Sartre's placement of the body in the past; for tbe former, the body is the fundamental locus of IJre·a.u nionda as presence.

2 De Waelbens, op. c«., p. 181.

182 MERLEA U- PONTY

a way of getting to the world and to its objects, a "practico-gnosia" ("p~aktognosie") which must be recogn~ed as original and perhaps as ongmary. My body has or comprehends 1ts world without having to pass through "representations," without being made subordinate to a "sym­bolic" or "objectivating function.' ' • (PP, r64)

If my body-proper can have before it objects as poles of action, and if it is itself polarized by its actions, this is because, Merleau­Ponty writes,

it exists toward them, because it gathers itse!I together on them in order to achieve its goal, and the "corporeal scheme" is ultimately a manner of expressing the fact that my body is to the world.• (PP, 117)

Talcing this as our clue, we shall be able to explicate the full meaning of etre-au-monde,1 the central and decisive part of Merleau-Ponty's conception of the body.

To begin with, it seems evident from what we have already explicated that the phrase must be taken in both its figurative and its literalmeanings. Figuratively, it signifies "to belong to," as when one says, "Ces livres sont a vous": "These books belong to you." Thus the phrase, "mon corps est au monde," means in this sense, "my body belongs to the world." As well, however, the phrase means literally, "to be at the world;" it is a denial of the encapsulment of the mind, either epistemologically or ontologi­cally. The latter can be understood only after the former, the figurative, sense is clearly before us. Recognizing the danger of overinterpreting Merleau-Ponty, it seems to us that each of these senses reveals three subordinate senses; by drawing out these and showing relevant textual passages we shall be able to come to an understanding of this crucial concept.

(a) The Body as "Belonging-To" the World I. IN THE FIRST PLACE, to " belong-to" the world is not to "be

possessed by" the world; the world does not have me, I have it,2 that is, I go out toward it:

I h_ave the world as an uncompleted individual by means of my body (considered as a potency of this world), and I have the position of objects by means of my body's position (or inversely the position of my body by

• 1 Characteristically, Medeau-Ponty undertakes no explication or the meaning or

his fundamental concepts: Hre-au-monde is the most glaring example, since it is the most fundamental concept of bis work.

2 It must be noted that Merleau-Ponty uses "having" in the sense in which Marcel uses "being," and vice versa. CL PP, 203, footnote.

THEORY OF TKE BODY

means of that of objects) ... in a real implication and because my body is a movement toward the world - the world, point d'appui of my body.• (PP, 402)

Thus, the relation of "having" is one of implication, in one sense of involvement: to say that "I have a world," is to say that " I really am implicated in it," that I am caught up in it by being embodied in it, that I belong to the world in the sense in which a piece of clay belongs to the movements of a sculptor's hands, or the startled expression of my friend belongs to my excited words. That is to say, "The body is our general means of having a world." (PP, 171) There would be no world, no concrete objects, if consciousness were not conscience-engagee, and to be engagee is to be conscience-incarnee. But, to be embodied, and thus to be sensuously perceptive of objects, and to be able to act on them, is to belong to the world in the sense of being engaged in a body which places me at things themselves, with no intermediary, no "representatives" or "representations" of them. There is no room here for any epistemological or ontological entrepreneur.

2. SECOND, then, being of the same community of nature as the world, the body-proper is "at home" therein, it inhabits the world, it dwells therein (y habiter). The body is the "common texture of all objects." (PP, 272) To be-to-the-world, in this sense, is to be "at home" in it, or synonymously, to be fat1iiliar with it, by means of the body-proper. Thus, he writes that sensations, or perceived objects, are at first recognized only blindly by means of my body's familiarity with them:

The sensation of blue .. . is doubtless intentionar,1 that is to say that it does not rest in itself like a thing, that it aims toward and signifies outside of itself. But the term toward which it aims is recognized only blindly by means of the familiarity of my body with it. It is not constituted in full clarity but reconstituted or reapprehended by a knowledge which remains latent and which leaves to the sensation its opacity and its ecceity.• (PP, 247)

This "familiarity" is a familiarity which derives from a "pre­liminary constitution," (PP, 249) in the sense that objects, the world, are lived by my body as "toujours-deja-Ia." This latent knowledge of the world forms the ground for all personal

l This is absurd, in the Hussetlian sense of intentionality: sensations (hyletic data) are not themselves intentive, but non-intentive; they do not intend anything. Merleau-Ponty, however, conceiving operative intentionality as corporeal intention­ality, must maintain this. We return to this at a later point.

MERLEAU-PON'FY

existence. In so far as my body is itself thus a knowledge of the world, it is "at home" in it and "familiar" withit.

Similarly, to belong to the world is to inhabit it, to dwell therein. It is only because I inhabit it, moreover, and thereby "let the world be" as a Boden, ground, that it becomes possible to trace out movements, directions, and locations in it. (Cf. PP, 49r) Again, Merleau-Ponty writes that when I perceive the blue of the sky, my regard "goes over to it and inhabits it (as) a milieu of a certain vital vibration whichmy body adopts .... " (PP, 248)

In these terms, it becomes clear why he adopts the position he does regarding the phenomenological reduction:

To see the world and to seize it as a paradox, it is necessary to break our familiarity with it, and ... this ru.pture can teach us nothing but the unmotivated surging-fo.rth of the world. The greatest lesson of the re­duction is the impossibility of a complete reduction.• 1 (PP, viii)

The reduction, as he sees it, seeks to make possible a reflection on consciousness and the world, a reflective withdrawal from the engagement and commitment to the world. Since I exist only as incarnee, however, this withdrawal is not completely possible. All it teaches us is the "unmotivated surging-forth of the world," i.e., our root "being-at-home-in," or "being-familiar-with," the world. To belong-to-the-world is to inhabit it as a being who is already familiar with it, its typical course and style, because he is embodied in a body which is "at home" therein.

3. ACCORDINGLY, to be a conscience-engagee is to "be-at" the world, "it is to communicate inwardly with the world, the body and other embodied selves - to be with them rather than to be beside them .... " • (PP, n3) To perceive the world as that which I have and in which I dwell, is to commune with it. My body­proper, as the "sujet de la sensation et perception," he maintains,

is neither a thinker who notices a quality, nor an inert milieu which would be affected or modified by the quality. My body is a potency which co-originates (co-na£t) with a certain milieu of existence, or is synchronized with it.• (PP, 245)

In this sense, Marcel -was on the right track when he wrote in his journals that sensation is a sort of "participation," that "my body is in sympathy with things," and that "things exist for me ...

1 We can now see in what his transformation of the reduction consists: it is inter­preted by way of bis ontology of etre-au-monde. Cf. above, pp. qo-43.

THEORY OF THE BODY r 85

as prolongations of my body." 1 For Merleau-Ponty, too, "sensation is literally a communion." (PP, 246) The body as the mode of my being-to-the-world participates in things by means of its various senses. In this way, to belong to the world is to have the world as a "real implication," such that the body-proper as the "subject of perception" synchronizes and co-originates with things:

If qualities [of objects] radiate around themselves a certain mode of existence ... it is because the sensing subject does not posit them as objects but sympathizes with them, makes them his own and finds in them his momentary law.• (PP, 247)

The world as the primordial unity and "point d'appui" of all our projects and perceptions is the "home'' of consciousness:

The world such as we have tried to show it ... is no longer the visible unfolding of a constituting Thought, nor is it a fortuitous assemblage of parts; nor, correctly understood, is it the operation of a directive Thought on an indifferent matter, but rather the native land of all rationality.• (PP, 492)

Thus, etre--au--monde signifies "to belong to the world" in the multiple sense that the body-proper, being of the same com­munity of nature as the world, inhabits the world, is "with" things and not alongside them, is familiar with them, and communes or sympathizes with them in the various modes of perception. It is with them because they are poles of action for it, i.e., significations: "What is sensed gives to me what I have loaned to it, it is from it that I have taken what I loan." (PP, 248) The world is my "home" just because I am embodied in a body by means of which I dwell therein.

(b) The Body as "Being-To" the World Not only does the body "belong-to" the world; it also "is to-the­

world." Here again, we can delineate several strata. r. THE BODY-PROPER, he has said, is presented as a certain

power (puissance) of this world. In other words, the system of objects in the world is oriented as a system or context for the body (as the center of this orientation as both Sartre and Husserl have said), in terms of the body's actual and possible action on

1 Metaphysical journal, op. cit., pp. 258, 274, and a8L Merleau-Ponty, however, again does not refer to Marcel.

186 MER LEA U-PONTY

these things: things are "poles of action," he states, "at my disposition," and the body is itself "polarized" by its tasks. To see a table with a chair beside it is to have these objects at the disposal of my regard (PP, 250-51), i.e., to see them as "able to be used," "able to be moved about," or even more simply, "able to be looked at," as Piaget has observed in respect of small children. Thus, Merleau-Ponty contends,

It is never our objective body that we move, but our phenomenal body -and this is not mysterious si:nce it is our body (considered as a potency of such and such regions of the world) which already raises itseli towards objects to be apprehended and which perceives them .... • l (PP, 123)

Consciousness, as embodied, is thus originarily of the order of the " I can," and not of the " I think":

Consciousness is not originarily an "I th.ink that," but an "I can" . ... (PP, 160)

Being a system of motor or perceptual potencies, our body is not an object for an "I think": it is an ensemble of lived significations. . . . (PP, 179)

Thus, to be-to-the-world by means of the body-proper is to be embodied as an " I can;" and this is so because the body-proper is itself "un puissance d 'un certain monde." The "fe peux" is essentially connected to the world by means of the "il peut" which is the body's "puissance." Tu its intimate connectedness with the world (PP, 168) then, the body-proper forms "a system open onto the world,'• and is thus the correlate of this world -but a correlate which is defined strictly in terms of acting -acted-on - such that,

The movements of the body-proper are naturally invested with a certain perceptual signification, they form with external phenomena a system so well connected that external perception "takes aocount" of the dis­placement of the perceptual organs .... (PP, 59)

Etre-au-monde is therefore a unity of consciousness as embo­.died and the milieu within which, or better, "at" which, it acts and is acted upon.2 This unity he calls "existence." (PP, 144)

1 He continues: "In concrete movement, the patie.nt has neither a thetic conscious­ness of the stimulus, nor a thetic consciousness of the reaction; simply, he is his body and his body is the potency of a certain world." (PP, 124)

In spite of this posi tion, however, be goes right on.to claim that just this "familiarity" and "communion'' with things is what has become severed in brain-injuries. (PP, 153) This seems to be quite inconsistent; for what, after all, is so-called "concrete move-

)

THEORY OF THE BODY

2 . Bur while conscience--incarnee is this system open onto the world, that by means of which there is a world at all for con­sciousness, its body-proper is not just a single entity. Or, rather, we must say that the body-proper, being itself a unity in diversity, reveals the world as a unity in diversity, reveals the world in respect of the dimensions which correspond to the variousmanners in which the body-proper manifests itself: vision discloses visual beings, touch tactual beings, and so on. Not only this, however: for, the phenomenon of synesthesis reveals the body as a synergetic system. As Merleau-Ponty points out , by virtue of the fact that each sensory field opens out onto an intersensory world (PP, 261, 279). they "commune" with one another as they do with objects:

The senses lead over int o one another by opening themselves up to the structure of the thing. One sees the rigidity and fragility of the gla.sS and when it is broken with a crystal sound, this sound is carried by the visible glass ... The form of objects is not their geometrical contour: it has a certain relation with their own nature and speaks to all of our senses at the same time as to sight. . . . In the swaying of a branch from which a bird has just flown, one reads its flexibility or its elasticity, and it is in this way that a branch of an apple tree and one of a birch tree are immedi­ately distinguished.• 1 (PP, 265)

The senses are thus modes of access to one and the same world, and the body-proper, as the synergetic unity of these senses, is a being-to-the-world disclosed by; its diverse modes of access.2 "To be a body is to be connected to a certain world ... , " (PP, IJ3) and to be connected in multiple ways at the level of the " je peux." 3

Accordingly, it is necessary to recast our usual conception of the fundamental stratum of the body. It is not the case, Merleau­Ponty argues against Husserl, that sense-contents are construed (aufgefasst) as adumbrations of objects. This notion (Auftassung, and correlatively that of A uff assungsinhalt), he argues,

ment" except this fundamental familiarity with actual milieux? e De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 132. Before this, de Waelhens points out that "being

to-the-world is above all a taking of an attitude which, measured at the level oC theoretical consciousness, remains h .eavy witb ambiguities. It is clear as well that being-to-the-world in its effective and spontaneous course implies a 'usage' of the body .... " (Ib1d., p. 125)

1 CL also de Waclhens, <>f>. cit., p. 177. 2 Cf. de Waelhens, op. ciJ.; and PP, r so, and r61: "Consciousness is a being-at-the­

thing by the intermediary of the body." a De Waelhens, p. 139.

r88 MERLEA U-PONTY

masks the organic relation of the subject and of his world, the active transcendence of consciousness, 1 the movement by means of which it thrusts itself into a thing and a world by =eans of its organs and its instruments. (PP, 178)

What we must apprehend is the body-proper as it is cencretely and actually lived by consciousness in its on-going bodily gearing into the world. To be embodied, as Marcel has emphasized,2 is in some sense to exteriorize oneself, or, as Merleau-Ponty put it, being present to myself is at the same time a "de-presentation" of oneself. (PP , 4I7) Accordingly, it is necessary to conceive the body-proper, conscience-engagee, as an etre-au-motide: conscious­ness, as embodied, is at the world, and its organs and members serve as "moyens d'access" to that world:

It is necessary for us to conceive [perceptual] perspectives and the point of view (of the body-proper] as our insertion in the individual world, s and perception, no longer as a constitution of the true object, but as our inherence to things.• (PP, 403}

3. To 'BE-To' THINGS, thus, is se ramasser toward them, to exist toward them in a manner which precedes essentially all thematization, categorization, and predication. This, we saw, is true even at the level of reflex activity; indeed, it is precisely this "pre-ob-jective view which is what we call being-to-the-world .. . . "(PP, 94)

This "vue preobjective," Merleau-Ponty emphasizes, is a kind of "opening to the world," (PP, 136) by means of which I participate in it, commune with things among which I dwell Not only, then, am I, qua embodied, with things, but also they com­mune with me, are with me - for they are precisely at once inex­hatlstible, having their own proper ecceity, and they are signifi­cations for me endowed by means of my embodied activity on and with them. Just this stratum, he believes, forms the matrix for both realism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism; and, concretely, for the physical and the psychical domains - and thus it is the solution to the Cartesian problem of the unity of

1 He later says (PP, 478) that this relation is that whieh Heidegger describes as "transcendence."

• Ct. Metaphysical ]oumal, op. cit., 258-60, and above, Part I, Chapter II, pp. 38-41, and 43.

3 Bow the world can be at one and the same time an individual and yet a milieu of anonymity and generality for my perceptual experience of it is a problem 1.ferleau­Ponty does not even pose.

THEORY OF THE BODY 189

the body and the soul. Being-to-the-world is a kind of "aire vitale," which is the domain of lived experience. The unity of body and soul is not a problem of bringing together two utterly different domains of being; rather, the unity is concretely and constantly lived. In other words,

The analysis of the body-proper and perception has disclosed to us a relation to the object, a signification more profou,nd than the former (Le., synthesis) ...

I do not actually perform the synthesis on the object, I come before it with my sense>ry fields, my perceptual field, and finally with a typical style of all possible being, a universal montage with respect to the world. At the hearl e>f the S'l'bject himself we disCQVer, therefore, the presenu of the world ... We find again under the active or thetic intentionality, and as its condition of possibility, an operative intentie>nality, already at work before every thesis or every judgment, a "Logos of the esthetic world," an "art hidden in the depths of the human soul" - and which, like all art, can be known only in its results.• (PP, 490-41, my emphasis)

To be-to-the-world is to be plunged to things by means of an "intentionnalite operante ;" to be open to things as the dwelling­places of all perception and action, and ultimately of all ration­ality; to be participant in the typical coarse and style of the world by inhabiting the world as one familiar with its ways and by-ways; to be with things as poles of action polarizing conscious­ness as their embodied correlate - to be an existent at the world:

Nothing determines me from the outside, not that nothing can solicit my attention but to the contrary because I am straight away outside of me and open to the world ... from the single i:a.ct that we are to-the-world.• (PP, 520)

(c) The Body as Temporalit6-engagee. We have seen that, for Metleau-Ponty, the unification of the

body-proper is a temporal one; temporality is fundamental both for consciousness and for the body. We can now see more clearly why this is so. Obviously, though, a full exposition of his theory of temporality is impossible here. We must, nevertheless, make it clear what he means when he writes, "My body takes possession of time." (PP, 277)

Following Husserl's explication of inner time consciousness,1

Merleau-Ponty maintains that it is in my "field of presence" that I have the originary contact with time. This "field," however, is

1 As we sballsee later, this must be qualified.

Igo MERLE A U-PONTY

meant in a broad sense: it is in the present that the past is re­tained and the future predelineated; thus the "field of presence in the broad sense" bas a double horizon (is, as William James had said, a "saddle-back") and it is only within this field, and in terms of it, that there is a consciousness of what is to come and what has passed (more specifically, what is just-to-come, and what is just-past but still remains within my grasp). I Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty states,

Everything returns me therefore to the field of presence as to the originary experie.nce wherein time and its dimensions appear "in person," without any interposed distance and with a final evidence. It is there that we see a future sliding into the present and then to the past. (PP, 475-76)

Now, this flux of lived temporality, he emphasizes, is the time in which my tasks are carried out, in which perception oecurs. But in so far as we consider the present in a narrower sense, as what is at any moment strictly "now," it is not the case that my actions and their objects are explicitly posited as "present" 2 in a series of "nows." Accordingly, the present which manifests itself in my concrete actions, or rather, my actions which manifest themselves as "present" reveal an intentionality all their own, one which goes on beneath all active, thetic intendings (as Merleau-Ponty understands this, ie., as "I-activities"):

Beneath the "active intentionality" which is the thetic consciousness of an object ... it is necessary for us to recognize an "operative" in­tentionality (/ungierende Int811tio11alitiit) which makes the former possible and which is what Heidegger calls transcendence. My present moves beyond itself towards a future and a recent past, and touches them there where they are - in the past, in the future, themselves.• (PP, .178)

It is in my "field of presence" then that all my actions take place; that is to say, however, that since my body-proper is that by means of which there is a world for me, it is that by means of which the world is "present" to me. Since consciousness is always engaged, and since this engagement is the body-proper,

There is time for me only because I am situated therein; that is to say, because I discover myself as already engaged in it; because not all being is given to me in person; and finally, beca11se only a sector of being is so

1 Merleau-Ponty refers here to the "noch-im-Griff-behalten" of Husserl: Erfahrung und Urteil, §§ 23a and 23b.

9 "The present itseli (in the narrow sense) is not posited. . . I reckon with the surroundings rather than perceive objects; I depend on my instruments, I am k> my task rather than before it." (PP, 476)

THEORY OF THE BODY IgI

close to me that it does not even form a picture before me and I cannot see it, as I cannot see my face. There is time for me because I have a present ... None of the dimensions of time can be deduced from the others. But the present (in the broad sense . .. ) has, nevertheless, a privileged status because it is the zone where being and consciousness coincide.• (PP, 484-85)

Thus, we can say, to be-to-the-world is to be present to the world, or to be a presence to the world. My presence to the world or to be a presence to the world. My presence to the world is effectuated by my body-proper; hence, the latter itself reveals its own temporality, which is precisely the flux of its own "inten­tionnalite operante." Every perception, every movement, every action, "takes account of" the flux of its own intentionality its own temporality; it is in virtue of syntheses of transition that movements and actions are "fluid." 1 In this way, the "ek-stases" of temporality, the projecting by consciousness into its own past and future, are concretely realized in a "certain existential rhythm - abduction and adduction," {PP, 247) which defines the structure and movement of perception and action. To perceive an object is to engage oneself in it (se plonger en lui) by means of his body-proper in a movement which, being an operative intentionality, goes on in a "champ de presence."

But if the body-proper thus has its own temporality it is necessary to recognize that its fundamental mode of being is that of an "acquis":

What is alone true is that our open and personal existence rests on a primary basis of acquired and congealed existence. But it co~d not be otherwise if we are temporality, since the dialectic of the acqUU"ed and of the future is constitutive of time.• (PP, 493-94)

When "I" become aware of myself and of my world, I find just this "existence acquise et figee": my body and my world are given to me as " toujours-deja-la" for me, going on before I took cognizance of them or actively attended to them.

To be-to-the-world (or: to belong-to-the-world), then, reveals

1 "Ateacbinstantof a movement, the preceding instant is not ignored but it is~ it were joined in the present, and present perception consists in sum in reapprehending (by depending on the actual position) the series of previous positions which mutually enclose one another. But the immanent position is also enclosed in the present, and by means of it those which will come up to the end of the movement." (PP, 164) As we have already had occasion to remark, Merleau-Ponty's descriptions of.movement (and especially this one) are quite close to Bergson's descriptions ot "graceful" movements.

192 MERLEAU-PONTY

itself as the absolutely fundamental stratum of consciousness; and, since consciousness is by essence engagee, an ttre-au-nionde is its etre-corps.

(3) THE BODY-PROPER AS 'EXPRESSION''

We can now see quite clearly, I believe, in what sense Merleau­Ponty means that the body-proper is the "expression" of the existence of consciousness (and thus we can be much briefer in our exposition).

(a) The B ody as Sexual Beitig Taking now as our clue the results we have achieved in our

previous explication, we can say that, like all other structures and functions of the body-proper (perceiving, moving, acting, using, and so on), sexuality is itself a mode of being of the person in question:

If the sexual history of a man provides the key to his life, this is because his manner of being as regards the world -that is to say, as regards time and other men - is projected into his sexuality. (PP, 185)

But the matter is not quite so simple; for, he asks, does all exis­tence have a sexual signification, or does every sexual phenome­non have an existential signification? A straightforward answer to either question cannot be given, for we cannot reduce one to the other.

For one thing, Merleau-Ponty points out, we cannot ignore biological structure; human existence as thus far described is never indifferent to the rhythms of biological existence. The body's "need" for ingestion, respiration, sleep, and the like; the periodical changes and transformations in body-structure, which require one to maintain his body (having haircuts, wearing glasses, using crutches, washing and grooming, and the like) -and similar necessities, all have their bearing on the structures and functions of human existence. Similarly, sexuality is inte­grated in concreto with the stream of lived experiences. As Buy­tendijk has emphasized, "it is especially important to realize that man is in this world with his body and that the body itself is a situation . . .. " 1 And, he continues, the body discloses itself as

1 F. J. ]. Buytendijk, "Femininity and E'.'Cistential Psychology," Perspectives in Pemmality (edited by David and von Bracken), New York (1957), p. 200.

T HEORY OF THE BODY 193

meaningful in its attitudes, gestures, and actions, all of which are inseparably connected to and made possible by the biological structure of the body. Thus, Buytendijk believes, one can, by studying these 'bodily attitudes and postures, come to an under­standing of the distinctively "feminine" and "masculine" Umwelten.1

Similarly, Merleau-Ponty insists that Sight, hearing, sexuality, the body are not only the passage-ways, the

instruments or manifestations of personal existence: the latter takes and gathers them into itself in their given and anonymous existence.• (PP, 186)

To be, for consciousness, as we have seen, is to be embodied.But to be embodied is to be embodied with a certain sex, and the sexuality of the body-proper manifests itself in a variety of manners. It is, we must say, one mode in which consciousness "lives" or "exists" itself concretely. Thus, in some manner at least, sexuality "expresses" one's existence, and one's existence "expresses" his sexuality.

The crucial problem is thus the manner in which the body­proper "expresses" existence. Therelation between "expression" and "what is expressed," Merleau-Ponty argues, is not like that of shoulder-braid to military rank, or that of a house-number to the house. As regards the body-proper, the thing signified is not merely indicated by a sign. In the above examples, he ~gues, the sign points to something else which is, though signified, not itself presented, but only appresented: the house is not itself "in" the sign, but only indicated by it. Whereas in the case of the body­proper's signifying existence, not only does the "sign" indicate its "signification,"

it is inhabited by its signification; in a certain manner the "si~" is what is signified, like a portrait is the quasi-presence of the absent Pierre .... •(PP, 188)

But, he goes on, we must say even more: not only is the signification embodied in the sign, but

ii the body can symbolize existence this is because the body actualizes (realiser) it and is the actuality (aclualite) of it. (PP, 191-92)

The body-proper, that is to say, is the possibility for my existence

t Tliid., pp. 204-08; cf. also Buytendt]x's work, L!Uituda eJ Mouo•menls, op. cil.

r94 MERLEAU-PONTY

to relax, become passive and anonymous (as when, for example, I pause during a busy day and close my eyes, "withdrawing," so to speak, from my engagement in the world) ; at the same time, it is the possibility for me to "eA'Pand" into life, become immersed in various activities.

The body-proper expresses my existence, then, like speech expresses thought, (PP, r93) but in an originary way:

Prior to the conventional means oi expression - which manifest my thought to others only because significations for each sign are already given to both them and we, and which in this sense do not realize a genuine communication - it is necessary indeed ... to recognize a pri­mordial operation of signification in which the expressed does not exist apart from the expression, and in which signs themselves lead outside of their meanings.• (PP, 193)

Hence, my bo<;ly is not something external to my existence, but is the concrete actualization of it; it is, then, both the "expression and the "expressed."

But existence, on this view, presupposes the body-proper, just as the body-proper presupposes existence. Similarly, sexua­lity cannot be reduced to existence, nor can existence be reduced to sexuality. This fundamental ambiguity can be illustrated in concrete cases. In the phenomena of masochism and sadism, for example,1 or of the dialectics of master and slave, the effort by the masochist is to be made an object before the eyes of the other, but also in bis own eyes; with the sadist, it is to make the other into an object, to attempt to appropriate his subjectivity and thus to master him in.his own eyes, that is, to be recognized by him as his master. Both, however, meet an impasse: for, as regards the sadist, by making the other into an object (to be controlled and manipulated at will), but who must nevertheless be a genuine subject (if the master is to gain the recognition he seeks), he will have missed precisely what he set out to gain - the moment the other is enslaved he ceases to be capable of giving the master the recognition sought for, the slave becomes one whose judgment (being a "mere slave") is unworthy. In short, the slave is no longer a free self-consciousness and it is precisely as free that he could have given the recognition.

The case is precisely analogous, Merleau-Ponty contends,

1 Our e.xpositlon of this, like Merleau-Ponty's own analysis, does not purport to be thorough.

THEORY OF THE BODY

as regards sexual desire. What one seeks to possess in sexual desire is not a mere body, but an animate organism, an embodied person. Love, desire, and the like, are understandable, he argues, only if one grasps the "metaphysical" structure of the body­proper: that it is "at once an object for others and a subject for me." (PP. r95) This peculiarity, he contends, exists at the level of lived experience and is the concrete manifestation of the essen­tial structure of all existence as such: ambigiiity. That body over there is at once a woman herself and not herself; her sex at once presents me with her, and she as embodied presents me with her sex.

To treat sexuality as a dialectic of lived experience, as "the tension of one existence toward another existence who denies the first yet without which it cannot maintain itself,"* (PP, r95) is to recognize that it is by essence equivocal, ambiguous. That is, it

hides itself from itself under a mask of generality, it attempts ceaselessly to escape from the tension and drama which it institutes ... It is constant­ly present as an atmosphere. . . Sexuality is diffused in images which retain only certain typical relations from it, only a certain effective physiognomy ... Considered as such, that is, as an ambiguous atmosphere, sexuality is coextensive with life. In other words, the equivocal is essential to human existence, and everything which we live or think always has several meanings.• (PP, 196-<)7)

Existence, being thus indeterminate in itself, at once manifests (expresses) itself in the body-proper as sexuality, and is mani­fested (expressed) by the sexuality of the body. Only because of this is it then possible for instance for my friend to be able to "tell" how I feel by looking at my gestures, postures, facial expressions, listening to the "sound" of my voice, and so on. My boredom is the weary aspect of my mouth and eyes; my arms are exasperated; my flushed face is my shame- but the "is" here is not the "is" of identity. Rather, my gest,wres embody my anger like I myself am embodied by my body-proper. Similarly, my male body is my sexuality, in the sense that it embodies my sexuality, like my body embodies, or is the actualization of, my existence. This constant "tension" between my body's being my embodiment and its being that object which manifests me to others, is. then, essential to my existence as man: to be hnman is fundamentally to be locked in an irrevocable ambiguity which

r96 MERLE A U-PONTY

has its source in the root facticity of embodiment, that is, the body-proper. I

(b) The Body as "Expression" As Scheler has shown, I do not experience another's anger

or joy, boredom or sadness, as a "psychic state" hidden behind the gestures of these, which would be only the external accompa'­niments of these states and accidental to them: "It is in the blush that we perceive shame, in the laughter joy." 2 There is no "inferring" (in the strict sense) by me from something presented (crinkled lines on an object in my visual field) to something not presented (joy of my friend); rather, the other himself is there for me, his body is already an animate organism, embodying his psychical life. As Buytendijk has pointed out, approving von. Weizsacker's assertion that "Life appears wherever something moves itself, therefore through intuited subjectivity (angeschaute Subfektivitiit)," a

It is important to note that subjectivity is "perceived." The idea commonly spread around of a subjectivity "supposed" by the analogy between the movement of another man or of the animal, and our own move~e~t, iS there~ore perfectly false. We do not only have the power of reco&111Z1llg a function, but beyond that we can apprehend it as a move~ ment proper possessing a signification (as an animal or human function)'. By that, we perceive man and animals as "subjects" or as centers of knowledge and tendencies.• 4

Unless others were already other men for my concrete experience, they would be simply physical objects, though p.erchance of a peculiar sort, and there would be no intrinsic difference between men and puppets, animals and mere things.

The fact is, Merleau-Ponty argues (in agreement with Scheler and Buytendijk), that the movements of the other's body are themselves seen by me in the first instance as gestures - which is

1 "Why is our body for us the mirror of our existence, If not because it is a natural I a .given existential current, sucb that we never know whether tJ1e forces which w~ bear belong to it or to us - or rather, because they are never entirely the body's nor ours." {PP, 199)

2 MaxScheler, The Nature of Sympathy, Yale University Press (New Haven, 1954), p. IO.

s V. von Weizsacker, Der Gestaltkreis: ThuirU einn- Einheit von Walmsehmen und Bewq,en, Leipzig, 1943, p. 167. (Quoted by Bnytendijk, AUitude$ tt Mouvmsent, Of>. eit., p. 59) .

. ' Bnytendijk, AUitutks et Mouve111ent, ofJ. ~it., p. 59. Buytendijk, it is clear, flatly rejects Sartre's position that I do not apprehend the Other as "subject."

THEORY OF THE BODY I97

to say, as meaningful, embodying significations of a determinate sort (though perhaps the specific meaning a gesture has may be difficult to grasp, or even impossible, or though he may deceive me, it is nevertheless experienced by me as endowed with meaning of some kind- else it could be neither "deceitful'' nor "difficult''). (Cf. PP, 220-2r) We experience body postures and movements as meaningful, for otherwise neither differences in specific meaning nor deceit in meaning could be possible:

The meanings of gestures is not given but understood, that is to say, apprehended by an act of the observer ... O:>mmunication or the compre­hension of gestures is obtained by means of the reciprocity of my inten­tions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and the intentions which can be read in the Other's conduct. Everything happens as if the Other's intention inhabited my body, or as if my intentions inhabited his body. The gesture which I witness delineates in outline an intentional object. This object becomes actual, and it is fully understood when the powers of my body adjust themselves to it and regrasp it.• (PP, 215-16)

In this way, my body-proper functions as a sort of implicit knowledge of the world, as we saw, and the gesture of the other is presented as a sort of question, an "invitation," to my body. Thus, once again, we discover the fundamental structure of etre-au-monde: I am brought face-to-face with my world, with others as themselves embodied, by means of my body. They are already there for me as significations which, as such, refer me back to my body as a synergetic system of "intentionnalite operante."

It is by means of my body that I comprehend the Other, as it is by means of my body that I perceive "things." The meaning of a gesture thus "understood" is not "hidden behind" it, but is fused in with the structure of the world which the gesture delineates and which 1 reappre­hend for my part; this meaning is spread out over the gesture itself ... • (PP, 216--17)

Thus, Merleau-Ponty concludes, with the appearance of man in nature, nature is forthwith transformed; it never-recovers from tbis decisive shock, man's incessant and essential activity of giving meaning to the world:

The problem of the world - and, beginning with that concerning the body-proper - consists in the fact·that everything dwells therein.•

CHAPTER III

CRITICAL REMARKS

With a theory as complex and intricate as Merleau-Ponty's, one has the feeling that any critical remarks he might venture will appear either too sweeping, or too trivial to matter much one way or the other. We have attempted thus far to brave one torrent - explicating the theory itself - only to encounter an­other, more difficult one.

For in reconsidering the course of our exposition, it seems more and more evident that Merleau-Ponty's intent is not, as one would believe both from the title of his major work and the preface to it, to develop a phenomenology of the body and perception, but rather an ontology of expbience-vic11,e, the funda­mental concept of which is etre-aUr-monde. The analysis of the body is central to this effort, and is in itself a remarkable achievement.

In spite of this accomplishment, however, I for my part rerlliun unconvinced by liiS study, not only in its details, but as re ard.S its eneratiVe conception, the grounds of his theory. Despite the abundant an g y m eres g ma ena.l which he marshals in support of and supplemation to the central thesis -that the theoretical study of perception and of the body can be conducted while yet remaining within expirience-vecue - this thesis, and the manner in which it is worked out in concepts which are not themselves made thematic and justified, is not without its serious difficulties. My critical remarks, therefore, will concern, not the specific details of his theory {though we shall have to reconsider some of these), but the basic conception itself. We must attempt to reconsider certain principal features of this theory over against the phenomena it purports to render intelligible. These criticisms fall into several clusters: the problems of methodology, those pertaining to the phenomenological themes

CRITICAL REMARKS r99

of the theory, and those relevant to his "existentialism." As regards the latter, we must attempt to state in a concise and faithful manner the positive direction and significance of his work. The first two points are mainly negative in their import.

fJ1) METHODOLOGICAL PROBLEMS ::\

I have made it a point in the introductory sections of this Part to bring out a certain confusion regarding the apprehension of the domain of lived experience, and have stated that this confusion leads to a confusion in the doctrinal content of his theory. It is now necessary to substantiate this claim further.

Merleau-Ponty claims there is a mode of analysis which cuts beneath the traditional stalemate between ob]ectivistic em­piricism and intellectualistic idealism.I This "new" mode of analysis, "existential analysis," has as its paramount task the apprehension and descriptive explication of lived experience from withi11. (the body-as-lived, perception-as-lived, lived-spatial­ity, lived-temporality, and so on). Thus it seeks to develop, at the level of theoretical thoi,ght (theoria; for, after all, a philosophi­cal work is a product of cognition) what is lived concretely at the practical-acting-existing level (that of praxis). Philosophy, for him, is experience transmuted in thought, as it is for Marcel as well as for Hegel.

We must however examine the unstated steps of his method­ology. Merleau-Ponty insists, on the one hand, that just because we actually "live" our bodies and our perception of other persons, perceived objects, and the like, it must be possible to apprehend these and state them explicitly. It must be possible for reflection to p what is not itself reflective but o y s lived - the irre ec ii. ut he con en as well thatitis one thing to live (e.g., to live oni?s perception of a chair). and quite a differ­ent thing to question oneself about this chair-perceiving. The latter however, he contends, breaks up, "pulverizes," the "natural unity" of the first; when I reflectively question myself about my lived experience, I invariably ignore its intrinsic unity.

1 Merleao-Ponty rarely discusses any specific philosophers in detail; by the first, though, he usually means British Empiricism, and especially tqe psychology founded on it and natural science; the second usually refers to Kant, and to certain aspects of Husserl. His interpretation in the latter cases are highly questionable.

200 MERLEAU-PO NTY

(PP, 261-62, e.g.) As a consequence of my reflecting, I can talk about "sensation," "sense qualities," "syntheses," and so on, but these are never lived by my perception - they are rather strictly "products of analysis." (PP, 275, and passim.)

In the face of this situation, the inevitable question arises: How can one apprehend that which must be able to be apprehended, but yet not by reflection? Merleau-Ponty would never maintain that straightforward sense perception is capable of apprehending lived experience from within. Is there perhaps another kind of reflection, as Marcel had believed ? The way in which Merleau­Ponty describes the task of "existential" analysis, one would be inclined to respond to the last question in the affirmative -and this inclination seems to be supported by his partial accep­tance of the phenomenological reducti9n. We found, however, that even though he contends that an at least incomplete re­duction is possible, his real contention is that the apprehension of li~ed-experience is not only made possible by lived experience, but is to be condttcted by means of lived experience.

His central point regarding the reduction is that all it can teach us is the "unmotivated surging-forth of the world," that " the world is there before all analysis I can make of it, " and there­fore that every effort to "derive it from a series of syntheses" 1

is doomed to miss the very phenomenon in question (since all that is acquired by such an analysis, he claims, are the conditions for the poSSl'bility of experience, but not experience itself). Let us reconsider briefly this "reduction."

In performing the phenomenologica1 reduction (we may ignore here the otherwise important distinction between psychological and transcendental-phenomenological reductions), the phenome­nologist attempts to make thematic the natural doxo-thetic positing and acceptance of the world and its objects (things, other men, institutions, oneself, and so on) by consciousness as actually existent, spatio-temporally independent and self-sub­sistent. He draws back, so to speak, from this engagement, or in Husserl's phrase, the "General Thesis ot the Natural Attitude" intrinsic to naturally living consciousness as regards its objects and itself as also actually existent in a real, common world -

l Merleau-Ponty insists without any demonstration that both Kant and Husserl indulge in this effort.

CRITICAL REMARKS 201

and with this "refraining" (epoche}, or neutralization, be attempts to explicate the multiple Erlebnisse going on in that conscious­ness as intentive processes having their own specific objects as correlates in the strict sense. The reflective attitude thus es- ,... _ J _, ~t. tablished is "radi " however and thus distinct from "merel ( ~­nafural" reflection, just be~e it no longer participates in the doxo-thetic positing and acceptance of the real world by the consciousness on which he now reflects. It is "ra.Q!__cal," because the phenomenologist seeks to make thematic what is essentially taken for granted by the natural attitude. It is "radical" because, making this "general thesis" itself thematic, he now can consid'e; the subjectively lived processes of consciousness (Bewusstseins-erlebnisse) strictly as they present themselves "in person" to reflection, as processes essentially intentive to objects of various sorts. It is "r;gdical," finally, b~se it takes these intended objects strictly as intended, intended or "meant" precisely through the processes intt:nding them straightforwardly-not as they would offer themselves to some reflective analysis. The "objects," that is, are the objects of the processes being reflected on, and not the objects of the reflective consciousness.

There is thus opened an essentially two-sided descriptive analysis: a ~c descriptive explication of ~bjects strictly as

lJ&eant jintended) 1Yy consciousness (as unities of sense for the consciousness intending them), and a noe~ description of the intentive processes themselves strictly as intentive to the objects of these processes. In every single process, moreover, there is horizonally predelineated a total background or context of all objects: the world itself, as a spatio-temporal endlessness within which these processes themselves go on as intentive to objects in the world. Thus, Husserl points out,

when the phenomenological reduction is consistently executed, there is left us, on the noetic side, the openly endless life of pure consciousness, and as its correlate, on the noematic side, the meant world, purely as meant.1

This entire procedure, it must be emphasized, has disclosed objects, and the world as such, purely as meant by the conscious­ness of them. Qua meant, qua sense unities for consciousness, these objects (and the world) can be investigated as they are for

1 Cartuia11 MeditaU<ms, op. cit., p. 37. 11

II

11

~~-----------------------------1 1

202 MERLEA U-PONTY

the consciousness which means (intends) them; that is to say, they are revealed as strict correlates of the consciousnesses of them. As such (as intended), they have as their essential character­istic a referral back (zuruckweisen) to the consciousness of them.1

Now, the phenomenologist does not adopt merely a single method, but rather he makes use of a whole battery of methods. In the _Erst place, his fundamental method is an original intu­ition, or equivalently, an original perceiving (in the broad sense). of mental life as itself presented simultaneously with the grasping thereof - that is, as "it-itself presented in person." Seeking to develop a fundamental logos of the phenome1ton, a science in the genuine sense, he must seek to bring to self-presentedness the affairs about which he phenomenologizes. R<!-ther than accept second-hand evidence for the affairs in question, that is, he seeks to "go and see for himself" - he seeks, that is to say, an original intuiting of the affairs. ~nd, his method is explicative: it is an original intuitive

explicating or unfolding of mental life in respect of its structures. In this sense he seeks to draw out or make explicit what is taken for granted by consciousness in its natural attitude.

Thir_s!,~ method is descri!tive. Exclusively on the basis of tne first and second methods, he seeks to make descriptive judgments about mental life itself, its evident structures, and interrelations. His first task, thus, is to describe mental life, to explicate its structures, and this can be done only on the basis of an original intuiting, an original self-presentedness, of mental life as it-itself.

E2.J!rth, however, this means that his method must be re­flective, or a reflective perceiving; for, the mode of givenness (Gegebenheitsweise) peculiar to mental phenomena is reflective givenness. It must be so, if the method is to be an absolutely original perceiving rather than an apperceiving of mental life.

Finally, the phenomenologist's -method is red1tetive, in a psychologico-phenomenological or transcendental sense, and on this basis the method becomes an original noetic and noematic reflective explication and description - that is, a descriptive explication of mental life in respect of its intentiveness to objects

1 Formale 1md transrende11tak Logik, op. cit., pp. 187, 22r-22; Ca~t6Sian M editaJ.ions pp. 46-sS; Idun, I, p. 94.

CRITI CAL REMARKS '203

and in respect of the really intrinsic parts, qualities, structures, and interrelations of mental life itself.

This by no means exhausts the battery of phenomenological methods (for instance, we have not even mentioned constitutional analysis and regressive inquiry) . It will permit us, however, t o evaluate Merleau-Ponty's statement of the reduction and the task of reflection.

Doing this, it becomes evident, on the_one 1;iand, that ~]!!_ fact gives ~ thetneocy of reductions, and on the other, that a serioiiS ~onfusion in his work results. First for him, the world "iS"filWays-already-there," before all analysis; analysis can only, therefore, render this explicit. However, he at no time recognizes in this regard that if the world is indeed " tout fait," the world is meant as " tout fait ." This does not mean that consciousness "creates" the world, but rather that the world has this intended status for consciousness; it is a "sense" bestowed on it by con­sciousness, and therefore must be investigated according to its sense-genesis, that is, according to its essential z1,,,ruckweisen to consciousness.

Second, Merlea~~~mUQ_~ make a _ElthE ~ez:ious confusion between the reflective co1isciousness and the conscious­ness wh'-.i'Ch is reflected-on (the one which "lives" itsobject; its body, its world, and so on). When he writes that the task of reflection is to " take its object in the nascent state, as it appears to the one who lives it, with the atmosphere of sense with which it is then enclosed, and to seek to slip into this atmosphere" ; (PP, 140) that, in addition, I can comprehend and apprehend my body-as-lived only "by executing it myself," by living my body, me, tbe one who seeks to explicate it ; (PP, 90) that, finally, only a noematic reflection, one "which remains in the object and explicates its primordial unity instead of engendering it"; (PP, iv) -with these descriptions of reflection, that is to say, Merleau-Ponty identifies the reflective consciousness with the consciousness reflected-on. Or, at the very least , to insist that reflection should itself " live" in the processes and objects re­flected on, is simply to confuse the two, and thereby to miss the true sense and task of reflection, and particularly phenomeno­logical reflection. For, as Husserl emphasizes,

204 MERLEAU-PONTY

The proper task of reflection, however, is net to rep.eat the original process but to consider it and explicate what can be found in it. . . Precisely thereby an experiential knowing (which is at first descriptive) becomes possible, that experiental knowing (Erfahrungswissen) to which we owe all conceivable cognizance (Kem1tnis) and cognition (Erkenntnis) of our intentional living.1

Furthermore, contrary to what Merleau-Ponty contends, such a reflective apprehension in no way alters ("pulverizes'') the consciousness reflected-on nor the objects of the latter conscious­ness; rather, it takes cognizance of what the latter is, as intentive to objects, and of objects as intended. It explicates what can be found in the processes reflected on in a purely descriptive manner.

Accordingly, it must be said, Merleau-Ponty simply gives up, to 'begin With, the phenomenologicartheory of"Teductions-:-His contention that the latter.isin.truth.a..formula..for...a.n...existentiar:.­ism, then, does n9t hold up simply beca~u~i! is not the phenome­n_Q!.ogical re~t.!..C!i9.!!.. th~ he is then talking about. His rejection of "n'O"etic" reflection (in favor of "noematic reflection") has a heavy price: as we shall see shortly, he can no longer consistently maintain a genuine theory of intentionality. This should indicate to us, in other words, !}lat there is a fundamental rift running throu bout his work: the effort to conduct a henomenolo "cal study of perception an at e same time to reject precisely what ~s such a study possible. (De Waelhens, as we saw in Chapter I of this Part, takes this rift as the essential problem in Merleau­Ponty's entire work.)

(2) THE THEORY OF THE BODY AS "KNOWLEDGE'

Merleau-Ponty wants to say that perceived objects are senses, meanings, and he even goes so far at one point to maintain that perceived objects are "forms" ("senses") only for our experience of them.2 However, he goes right on to maintain that these "forms," even as "poles of action," are given to my experience of them as existents (beings) which "pre-exist" my conscjousness of. them: they are, as the world itself is, " toujonrs-deja-fa," "toujours-deja-fait ." They do, of course, have a reference back

1 Carlesian. Meditatums, op. cit., p. 3-l· And ,we contend Mcrleau-Ponty sees the task of reflection as having o! necessity to repeal tlte twocess refueled on, thus confusing reflection with the process itsell.

I Cf. above, pp. r30--3S·

CRITI CAL REMARKS 205

to the activities for which they are poles. But this reference is itself a reference to another "deja-etabli": the body-proper as "un acquis," a "tout fait" which is "constitue une fois pour tontes." Hence, consciousness Jives itself as engagee in a sort of double "deja-fait" - and, apparently, this indicates for him the fundamental ambiguity to all existence. If we rehearse his argument briefly, we shall be able to see more clearly the several errors he commits.

First of all, following from his discussion of reflection, he is led of necessity (as we saw in our introduction) to seek another means than reflection for apprehending lived experience. He claims to find this new access in lived experience itself: the body-proper, perception itself, are a " latent science of the world," an "habitual knowledge" (he speaks of them as both "savoir" and "conna.is­sance"). (PP, 269, 275, and passim.) Second, he goes on, just in so far as the world, on the one hand, and the body-proper, on the other, are toufours-deja-ta, always-already-acquired struc­tures, and just in so far as the bo~y and perception are thereby an implicit knowledge of the world as itself "deja-fait," - therefore, he concludes, the basic connection between them is one of ano­nymity, generality, typicality, and implicit familiarity. The ~ody becomes this way, that is to say, becomes an already-acqurred­acquisition, by virtue of its corporeal scheme; the corporeal scheme, in tum, is realized by means of the intentional arc; and, finally, the intentional arc makes of the body "un acquis" because it is fundamentally an "intentionnalite operante'~ -:which is itself a temporal flux of syntheses of transition$.

That, in barest outline, is what he takes as the phenome­nological structure of the body as latent knowledge. Let us start from the top and work down, considering each thesis in turn.

(a) First Thesis: The Body is a Latent Knowledge Having seen that his position regarding reflection is a funda­

mental confusion of reflective consciousness with the conscious­ness reflected-on, we have at least gained some grounds for considering this thesis. He wants ta maintain that the body itself has jts awn type Qf intentionality, in virtue of which it functioD.§_ ~a.tent science'' of the world disclosed by means of the b~y

itself. Living the body, I am able tolearn what it kiiO~. .-- -

206 MERLEA U-PONTY

Now if, as we maintain is evident, reflection on my mental life as it is in itself is possible, then the thesis that my body itself provides me access to lived experience by functioning as a know­ledge is wholly unnecessary, and il true, hardly essential to the theoretical enterprise. But, is the thesis correct?

If we reflect on the phenomenon itself, attending to it purely as it gives itself to us, it is necessary to point out that Merleau­Ponty, like Bergson before him, is quite incorrect ; or, at least, he confuses two very different phenomena. As we saw, Merleau­Ponty calls the domain of lived experience that of "conscience non-thetique." 1 But, on the other hand, it is clear from his own analyses that he seeks to connect the perceived world as "lived," not with consciousness, but rather with the body, to corporeality. Thus, he maintains that the unity of material things is due to the unity of the body, established by means of the corporeal scheme; that to have a body is to have a "universal montage" of the world as an intersensory unity; that the body provides a "logic of the world"; and that the body provides the instrument for my "comprehension" and apprehension of the world.2 "L'intentionnalite operante," in fact, is for him a kind of corpore­al intentionality, completely different from what he choses to call "l'intentionnalite d'acte.''

However, it is necessary to emphasize that this sort of argu­ment is an outright confusion (or, illegitimate identification) of consciousness with the body, of the body with non-thematizing consciousness. In fact, as Prof. Gurwitsch has indicated

I

~operly speaking, it is .IC.SS a question of coipOreal existence itself (as a re~1ty) than of. the spe<:ific consciousness which we have of corporeal exist~nce. Certainly, ~t consciousn~~ is not necessarily a thematizing consciou~ness - a po~1tional and expbc1t consciousness of the body - and we readily agree with M. Merleau-Ponty that "there are ... several manners for consciousness to be consciousness." (PP, 144) But it is necessary f~r.us to emphasize that a pre-predicative, pre-positional, and non-thematizmg consciousness is a consciousness all the same.• a

To speak of "experience-vecue," indeed, is to speak of the manner

1 Merleau-Ponty's use of this term is quite inaccurate, taken over from Sartre and not from Husserl. For, Husserl maintains (ldut~, I, pp. 2 13-19), every consciousness is "positional," i.e., "thetic;" only, some are "automatic" and others are "active"· non.sis "non·thetic." '

• Cf. PP, pp. 237!!, 269fl, 27S-76, 350-sx, 37~7. andpassim. s Gurwitsch, Theorie du Champ tk la C011Science, ~.cit., p. 245.

CRITI CAL REMARKS 207

in which consciousness at a certain level of its activity experiences (or, better, intends) its objects, its own body, indeed even itself, as living straightforwardly in these and those processes as directed toward their specific objects. To talk as if the body were itself a "knowled e," whether implicit or · · confuse the descriptively evi n s1 nation.

We cannot say, then, that the body "knows" anything, even ~he broadest possible sense of the term. For. in the first place, if it were a "knowledge." it would not be at the level of non­thematizing experience of the world, since "knowing" is precis~ a tli~esupposing an active attending to and explicating

--ortileQbject(s) "known," a formulating of judgments based upon the active attending and the actively attended-to objects. And all such activities (grasping, explicating, relating, even at the level of sensuous perception), as Husserl has shown, are "Ich­Akte." 1

In_ the second place, even non-thematizing consciousness is, as Gurwitsch emphasizes, "a consciousness all the same." To be sure, it is not as yet an activity in the strict sense, a process lived­in by the Ego; but this by no means suggests that the body i~f has its own peculiar brand of intentionality.

In the third place, he maintains, on the one hand, that the body is essentially that by means of which there are objects in the world, and on the other, that the body itself is a "knowing" of these same objects. But, if the first part of this claim is the case, then the body would be consciousness, since consciousness, qua intentive, is that by means of which there are objects of any sort whatever, and is at the same time that which "knows" these objects. If the latter is the case, if the body is that which knows, then consciousness, as regards the objects which the body would purportedly "know," would become superfluous.

Finally, taking the body as a "knower" necessitates taking it as a "subject," a "self," and there results, on the one hand, a doubling of "subjects" - precisely what Merleau-Ponty deplores .in traditional philosophy - and on the other, it becomes im­possible to account for the descriptively evident fact that the body has as its essential sense that it is "my" body. Descriptively

1 Cf. Er/al:Yung 1md·Urteil, op. cit.,§ 17; these are the lowest levels of ego-activity. See also Idun, I, t>f>, cit.,§ us.

208 MERLEAU-PONTY

speaking, it is "I myself" who perceive. and I do so bymeans oi__ my body; it is hardly the case that my body is a subject who perceives.:... Even grantirig that there is a difference between T see the purple cow" and "/chose to become a painter," this by no means suggests that the body is the subject of the first, and

/ "I" that of the second. The identification of conscious body, whjch is his assertion, his un1ustified claim, is descriE_tivel_y absurd and fails to account for th nomena. ·

ccordingly, this first thesis does not hold up.

(b) Second Thesis: The body is "Tout Etabli"; Therefore, Per­ception by Means of the Body-Proper Requires Neither Synthesis nor Constitution

In so far as perception is lived, he contends, it reveals no "synthesis"; it is only when I adopt an analytic attitude toward my perception that "I am obliged to suppose an act of synthesis." This synthesis, however, is only the "counterpart of my analysis," and not a really intrinsic component of my perception itself. My perception, that is, "benefits from- an already accomplished operation, from a general synthesis constituted once and for all." (PP, 275) This is so, be argues, because my body is a generalized knowledge of the world.

What is this synthesis to which Merleau-Ponty objects? An illustration will clarify the problem. Suppose I now look at the ashtray lying on my desk before me; I see it now from this side, now from that, and so on through an indefinite number of visual appearances. Although I see the ashtray from only one aspect or adumbration at any one time, "the" ashtray itself is what is presented to me. I see, that is to say, one identical ashtray from a multiplicity of perspectives on it, through a multiplicity of "adumbrations" or "appearances" of it. Or, again: seeing the ashtray, I now reach out and touch it; taking it in my hand, I strike it first with a pencil, then with a metal pen, then with my finger; I also bring it close to me and smell of it, and perchance also run my tongue over its edge. Here, again, the "it" is experi­enced as the same throughout. It is not the case that I am presented with a series of different ashtrays (one corresponding to each appearance), bnt rather "the" ashtray itself, one and identically the same, presents itself to me through a multiplicity

CRITICAL REMARKS 209

of sensuous appearances. Again, I may perchance pick up the ashtray and use it as a paper-weight; in another situation, it may serve me as a weapon; or, more usually, quite without thinking about it, I simply use it as that which it is: a receptacle for tobacco ashes. As before, nevertheless, this ashtray which I "use" is given to me as identically the same ashtray which I see, touch, smell, judge about, and so on. Finally, though much more could be said, I can call my wife over to the desk and ask her to look at the ashtray, perhaps in order to point out a chipped edge, or that it needs to be emptied, and so on. In the same way as before, this ashtray, in spite of the fact that her perception and her use of it is not and cannot be mine, is experienced by both of us as one and the same.

Now throughout all of this, there is going on, necessarily and continuously and automatically, a series of "syntheses": the object is synthesized by consciousness as one and the same object experienced through a multiplicitly of appearances of it (merely sensuous appearances, as well as instrumental ones). These syntheses, analyzed in great detail by Husserl in each of his works, are of different kinds, and go on at different-levels of my experience. Most fundamentally, however, every perception of a sensuously perceived state of affairs (and universally, every consciousness of any object whatever) takes place by means of and on the ground of what Husserl calls "syntheses of identifi­cation" - which go on automatically and continuously and without which no object of any consciousness whatever would ever be "the same" object (from perspective to perspective, from one sensuous contact to another, from one mode of consciousness to another, from one moment of consciousness to another, and so on.)1

But regarding any one mental process, it is necessary to recog­nize that there is a complexity in it, a whole series of "syntheses" going on continuously and automatically. To give an example of this complexity, not. only is the ashtray synthetically identified as "one and the same" ashtray experienced by consciousness in a variety of manners, but it is also the case that these syntheses of identification are at the same time syntheses of differentiation.

l Cf. Cartesian Meditations, pp. 4r-44, e.g.

2IO MERLEAU-PON TY

That is t@ say, "identification" does not mean here that each perception of the ashtray is in some manner constituted as one perception happening all at one time in the life of consciousness; rather, the varieus perceptions are themselves intentively retained by consciousness as different perceptions (and perhaps of different aspects of the thingL but of one and the same objeGt. They are.discrete, being constituted by consciousness as different presentations of an identical object. Thus, descriptively speaking, I can, perhaps, "return'.' to one perspective on the ashtray (say, seeing it from the bottom aspect) and notice that what I had taken as a chip in the glass was not a chip, but the way the l.jght flashed on the glass. This is possible, Husserl points eut, only because every synthesis of identification of objects is at the same time a synthesis of differentiation of the perceptions of it as discrete. ·

We have not even scratched the surface of the genuine com­plexity of any single phase of any one mental process, much less mental life as a whole~ but it is sufficient for our purposes here to have delineated syntheses of identification. Merleau-Ponty, however, denies precisely what we have described as automatic­ally going on in every perception whatever. The "unity" of the object, he argues, is realized only by means of the <::orporeal scheme of the body; once the latter is realized, all objects are forthwith experienced as unities, and there is no need to argue for any other syntheses. Perceived objects are experienced at the level of corporeality as unities; "synthesis," on the other hand, is for him an activity of consciousness proper, i.e., an "activity" in the strict sense: discrete, step-by-step syntheses effected by the ~go.

Aside from Merleau-Ponty's contention being descriptively incorrect, it seems to me evident that he makes several errors, and in general glosses over the genuine complexity of each and every concrete mental process. First, it makes no sense whatever to call synthesis a "product of analysis"; in the sense in which we have used the term, these syntheses are the very texture of the experience of consciousness, that because of which experience at any level is what it is. The difficulty, it seems te me, is that Metleau-Ponty pre-interprets intentionality as being of two distinct kinds, one an "intentionnalite operante," the other an

CRITlCAL REMARKS 2II

"intentionnalite d'acte." But, Merleau-Ponty does not stop with just this: for, he also pre-interprets the latter as "the one per­taining to our judgments and our active positings, the only one of which the Critique of Pure Reason had spoken." (PP, xiii)

"Thetic, or active, intentionality," according to Merlea:d.­Ponty, is or involves syntheses of a kind already diseovered by Kant.

"Every consciou.sness is consciousness of something," but that is not new. Kant had shown, in the "Refutation ofldealism," that internal perception is impossible without external perception. He had shown, moreover, that the world, as a connection of phenomena, is anticipated in the consciousness of my unity, is the means for me to realize myself as a conscioisness. (PP, xii)

Let us be clear about the issues. Merleau-Ponty is maintaining: ( r) that there are actually two distinct kinds of intentiveness, one being "operative" and pertaining to the body'-proper, the other "active or thetic" and pertaining to consciousness itself; and (2) that the latter type can already be found in Kant, especially in the refutation of what Kant calls "material Idealism." If we first consider the second claim, we shall be in a better position to examine the first claim.

Kant's problem in the section to which Merleau-Ponty refers is essentially to refute the problematic type of material idealism represented by Descartes (Berkeley's "dogmatic" ideal.ism having already been refuted, Kant believes, in his Transcendental Aesthetic). This idealism claims that the existence of objects in space is doubtful and indemonstrable. The refutation must therefore consist in showing, Kant states (B 275), " ... that we have experience, and not merely imagination, of outer things; and this ~ot be achieved otherwise than by demonstrating that even om inner experience (the Cartesian indubitable), is possible only on the assumption of outer experience.'' The question for us here is not whether Kant's position involves any inconsistencies, not whether be succeeds, or not, but whether one can say with justification that this position approaches the Husserlian conception of active, intentive syntheses.

Kant's refutation consists in showing that the consciousness of my own determination in time (my existence as determined in time) is possible only mediatety; that is, it is only through a

2I2 MERLEAU-PONTY

consciousness of "outer objects" that I can obtain a conscious­ness of the determination of my existence in time. (B 276-277) I cannot have a consciousness of my existence itself, but only a representation of it. And, he goes on, in order for there to be even this inner experience, "in addition to the thought of something existing, we Iequire also intuition, and in. this case inner intu­ition, in respect of which, that is to say, of time, the subject must be determined, for which determination outer objects are indis­pensable .... " (B 277) Thus, since all representations (including those of my own determination in time) require something permanent distinct from them and in relation to which these representations may be determined, Kant concludes that the condition for the possibility of inner sense is the actual existence of external things themselves, and not mere representations of them.

Restricting ourselves to our particular problem, it is first of all necessary to point out th~t Merleau-Ponty at no time tries to support his claim that Kant already had discovered the intentionality of consciousness. Certainly it would be quite hopeless to attempt any simple and direct comparison of Kant with Husserl, for though they both often use the same terms they do not, as Professor Gurwitsch has clearly shown,1 speak of the same things. Nevertheless, a brief examination of both is here necessary in order to demonstrate that Merleau-Ponty's claim is quite unjustifiable.

When Kant speaks of "outer intuition" of externally existing things as the condition for the possibility of "inner intuition," he is by no means saying that (in the oversimplified formula which Merleau-Ponty uses) "every consciousness is a consciousness of something." For Kant, it must be remembered, all sense per­ception is essentially passive receptivity: sensibility (Sinnlich­keit) has the faculty of receptivity, specifically, the faculty to be receptive to the action of objects, the result of which is called sensation. To this extent, Kant shares the same conception of

1 Aron Gurwitsch, '~a Conception de la conscience cbe Kant et chez. Husserl," Bulletm de la Societe francaise de Philosophic, 54e Annee, No. 2 (Avril-Juin, 1960; Seance du 25 Avril 1959), -pp. 66-96; see especially pp. 70-74 . .Professor Gurwitsch's analysis here shows unmistakably that Kant, like Hume and Descartes ;has a certain. "nostalgia" for phenomenology, but by no means did he actually disco'ver intention­ality.

CRITICAL REMARKS 213

sense perception (which to Husserl was an unjustifiable bias l) as Descartes and Locke. To perceive a so-called "external" thing (that things should be designated as either "outer' ' or "inner" is itself a consequence of this theory of ideas, and not phenome­nological inspection of things themselves) is first of all passively to receive sensations from it. The thing itself is not given as a sense datum; rather, the very notion of externally existing things is a notion which must be supplied, not by sense, but by thought. When Kant says that inner intuition is possible only by means ot outer intuition, he is saying that the condition for my consciousness of my existence as determined in time is that I, threugh my outer receptivity, have received sense data whose very existence makes necessary the assumption of a "thing in itself" of which my intuitions are mere representations. In ·no case, then, is he saying that my consciousness of an object is a consciousness of that object iii itself, precisely and only in so far as it presents itself to my consciousness. In short, the profound difference between Kant and Husserl is the theory of intention­ality. While Kant may have had certain foreshadowings of this theory, one can claim that he actually discovered and developed it only at the expense of ignoring the Kantian development of the "theory of ideas" in his Transcendental Aesthetic.

By the same token, the theory of intentionality - the full explication of which is phenomenology, for Husserl - is the decisive difference between the two philosophers on the question of "synthesis." As Professor Gurwitsch has emphasized in the same article, the point to be realized here is not merely that while Kant discusses (in connection with the objectification of sensory data) but one synthesis (the synthesis of pure transcen­dental apperception), Husserl analyzes essentially two kinds (the passive - a better term is "automatic" - and the active). Beyond that, what Kant himself meant by the synthesis of pure transcendental apperception is fundamentally different from what Husserl meant by synthesis, whether active or passive. For Kant, sense data are received under the conditions of the pure forms of sensibility, space and time. The activity which the understanding performs on these data (or more exactly,

i See H. Spiegelberg, The Phe1wmenolcgical Movem11nJ: A Historical Introduction, Martinus Nijhofi (The Hague, Netherlands), Volume I, p. z84.

MERLEAU-PONTY

which it performs on the temporal relations between and among these data) is a unification. This synthetic unification of data received ·simultaneously or in succession consists in ratifying or confirming (or not) their temporal relations, of certifying them under the heading of law; and then, the relations become ob­jective.1

For Husserl, to the contrary, consciousness does not "con­struct" or "unify" (in the sense of "put together") sense data. Consciousness does not manufacture anything, nor does it impose a priori forms on materials provided by passive reception of sense data.2 Expressed most briefly, "synthesis" for Husserl is always and necessarily intentive synthesis. To say that an object, for example, a physical thing, is "constituted" as being such and such, is to say that it is presented to consciousness in a series of acts or mental processes as having a certain noematic-obfective sense (say, "red, round and hard"), a sense which it acquires for consciousness due to the synthetic organization of these acts through which the object is presented. To synthesize is to actu­alize a certain sense; acts of consciousness become synthesized together in systematically organized groups and concatenations, and through these organized groups of acts the object in question is presented to consciousness as being thus and so - that is, as having a certain noematic sense. Consciousness and noematic sense are thus inseparable: "there is no act of consciousness which would not be the actualization of a sense.'' a Thus, the Husserlian theory of intentionality is a correlational theory of consciousness.

The Kantian synthesis, to the contrary (whether it be the synthesis of imagination, apprehension, or transcendental apperception), can-in no way be considered as "sense-bestowing." It unifies, puts together, confirms and certifies; it even, for that matter, adds something to perception which can never in principle be experienced: the Ding an sich. The Kantian theory of consciousness, therefore, as Professor Gurwitsch insists, is essentially functionalistic or activistic: "the life of the under­standing consists in an action, a single action, always the same.

1 Gurwitscb, ibid., pp. 75, 87. 2 Spiegelberg, <>f>. cit., p. tu. s Gutwitscb, op. cit., p. 87.

CRITICAL REMARKS 215

The pure transcendental apperception fuses with its action, it is only its articulated action." 1 And, that action is, not to bestow sense, but rather to unify, confirm and certify the sense data received in temporal relations.

In sum, the Kantian notion of synthesis is made necessary by his conception of the nature of intuition, for only if one assumes that intuition is the passive reception of dispersed and scattered sensations does it become necessary to conceive of a way to unify and organize these data in order to construct an _objective world. The Husserlian notion of synthesis does not begin with that theory of perception (indeed, the development of intentionality has the effect of undermining it), it is not to be understood in the context of a functionalistic conception of consciousness, but to the contrary is irrevocably bound up with the theory of intentionality. Thus, while it would certainly be too much to say that Kant's philosophy is totally opposed to that of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty's contention must be rejected.

But, this assumption regarding '1'intentionnalite d'acte" has its serious consequences for his conception of the other kind of intentionality. In the first place, he does not anywhere attempt to establish that there are two kinds of .intentionality. But even assuming that there are for the moment, and making certain assumptions regarding the "active" one, he makes certain other assumptions regarding the other, that of the body. We have already pointed out in this respect that he conceives this in­tentionality, illegitimately, as corporeal. Doing this, he glosses over the crucial fact that though all consciousness is intentive, it is not at alt the case that all consciousness is "active." Similarly, to say that some consciousnesses go on automatically in no way argues for an absence of syntheses.

If, in fact, I reflect on any on phase of mental life, attempting to disclose its complexity (and not, of course, attempting to substitute the "conditions" for the "conditioned," as Merleau­Ponty would have it), I see straight away, in part, that there are many processes going on in which the ego (me, this person; not me, the reflective observer, who in any case does not live in the processes being observed, but, precisely, observes them) does not engage itself, in which he does not at the moment live, whose

1 Gurwitscb, ibid., pp. 75-76.

2I6 MERLEA U-PONTY

objects do not occupy him. I can see, moreover, that there are some processes in which he as ego ca1inot live. For instance, as Husserl points out,l the consciousness of inner time (of the Ertebnisstrom} is in principle an automatic consciousness; the automatic retention of past phases of the same mental life always goes on, even during the phases of an active recollecting, just as the automatic protention of future _phases of the same mental life goes on even during the phases of an active expecting. Thus, for instance, while I was a moment ago busied with the ashtray (perceivingly, actionally, or however), there was going on a number of other intentional processes as well, in which I was not engaged: a consciousness of the floor beneath my feet; an audi­tory consciousness of the radio program, and at the same, perhaps, a disliking of it, or a willitlg to stop work for a time in order to attend to it. Before I actively advert and attend to a headache, there was going on all along an automatic awareness of it, with, perhaps, an automatic disliking of it - and so on throughout the whole range of mental life. In fact, moreover, all my active consciousnesses stand out from a background of such automatic processes, and are made possible by them : it is only because the headache was automatically intended as "bother­some," "irritating," and so on, that I now can and do advert to it, perhaps dislikingly. As Husserl emphasizes,

anything built by activity necessarily presupposes, as the lowest level, a passivity that gives something beforehand; and, when we trace anything built actively, we run into constitution by passive generation . . . in the synthesis of passive experience.a

All activity, all active processes in. the strict sense, presuppose automatic processes, which "give beforehand" (vorgeben) s the object or objects in question.

Accordingly, Merleau-Ponty is quite wrong to maintain that "synthesis" and "constitution" are "products of analysis," just as he is wrong to contend that " constitutive consciousness" is purely active. That the body, and that sensuously perceived states of affairs in general, are concretely experienced by con-

' Cf. Formal# u11d transze11de11tale Logik, §§ 3-4. We shall return to this phenomenon later on.

2 Cartesian M editalwns, op. cit., p. 78. a Erfaltrung und Urteil, op. cit., §§IHI, and 63.

CRITICAL REMARKS 2I7

sciousness as "toujours-deja-la," is quite true; but that this argues for the absence of syntheses (and the presence of a "generalized and anonymous knowledge" of the world by the body-proper) is quite wrong. If, in fact, the body is constituted as a "sy:nergetic system," unified by means of a "corporeal scheme," the fundamental problem is to trace out the ways in which this unification occurs, and then to study the way in which it is concretely experienced by consciousness. As Aron Gurwitsch has emphasized,

The problems of constitution arise not only as regards the simple material things in Nature, cultural objects, ideal objects of every sort (such as numbers) ... but also as regards our own body and own corporeal existence. In holding to the principles established by Husserl regarding these, we maintain that constitutional problems must be formulated and treated exclusively in terms of consciousness, be it positional or be it pre-positional.• l

Merleau-Ponty, in sum, does not see that there are certain characteristics of consciousness which are descriptively universal, which pertain to any consciousness whatever. We have tried to place in evidence only a slight sampling of these (specifically, those discussed or implied through Merleau-Ponty's analysis), and have seen that at least these are disclosed in any conscious­ness whatever. Thus, for instance, in the automatic conscious­ness of the headache, it is clear that, even though I, the person whose headache it is, am not aware of it right now, in order for there even to be a "this headache," there must be going on automatically a series of syntheses of identification and differ­entiation. While busied with the ashtray, the automatic conscious­ness of the radio program to which I am not attending right now is nevertheless automatically constituted for my active ad­vertance to it as one and identically the same radio program throughout the duration of the automatic consciousness of it; and, indeed, should I advert to it, it has the sense for me of being the same program now as it was before I actively adverted to it.

Accordingly, we must say, Merleau-Ponty, by assuming without question that (r) there are two kinds of intentionality, (2) that these are essentially different in kind, (3) that "l'in­tentionnalite d'acte" is Kantian, and (4) that "l'intentionnalite

1 Tlseorie du Champ de la Conscimce, op. cit., p. 245. In our general conclusions, we shall attempt to outline this constitution.

218 MERLEAU-PONTY

operante" is without syntheses - by assuming these, he has simply given up the essential features of the intentionality of consciousness. But it is not a mere matter of his disagreeing with the Husserlian description of intentiveness; rather, as we have tried to point out, his own conception is, when confronted with the phenomena to be described, quite in error, and his assumptions unwarranted.

There are, however, several other problems intrinsic to his theory of the body-proper.

(c) Third Thesis: Tlte Body as an Ambiguity. Perception Takes Place in a Milieu of Generality and Anonymity; Tltis Expresses the Ambiguity Which is of the Essence of Existence in General

All perception, he contends, "takes place in an atmosphere of generality and is given to us as anonymous," (PP, 249) just because it is by means of my body that all perception occurs. I perceive with my senses, i.e., with my body-proper, and my body-proper exists as a "deja etabli" in virtue of the fact that it manifests its own specific kind of intentionality. Being realized as something already established once and for all, he argues, it is established as anonymous, generalized, and my body's con­nection with its world is likewise realized as anonymous and generalized. Thus, he argues, in a passage which is central for his position,

I cannot say that I see the blue of the sky in the sense in which I say that I understand a book ... My perception, viewed even from within, expresses a given situation. . . Such that if I want to translate the per­ceptual experience exactly I must say that "it is perceived in me" and not that "I perceive". . . I have no more consciousness of being the true subject of my sensation than of my birth. or my death ... I know that one is born and one dies, but I cannot know my birth and my death. Every sensation, being strictly the first, the last and the only one of its kind, is a birth and a death. The subject who experiences it begins and ends with i.t; and as it can neither precede nor survive itself, the sensation necessarily appears to itself in a milieu of generality. Sensation comes .from outside of myself, it emerges from a sensibility which has preceded and which will survive it - like my birth and my death belong to an anonymous nativity and mortality.• (PP, 249-50)

There is, he continues in the same vein, a "life'• of my eyes, a "life" of my hands, of my body-proper itself, and each of these is a sort of "natural 'I'." Each perception interests and occupies,

CRITICAL REMARKS 2I9

not me myself, the "I" who chooses, thinks, wills, values, and so on, but "un autre moi qui a deja pris parti pour le monde" -this "other 'I'," my body-proper, is thus a sort of "acquis origi­naire" interposed between me and sensations, and because of this. I am, as embodied, locked in an irrevocable ambiguity, anonymity, and generality as regards my own existence and the world disclosed to me by means of my body. This, in other words, is the facticity of the subject.

Such is Merleau-Ponty's position. In the first place, to argue that each sensation is unique and non-repeatable is one thing. But to go on and claim that "the subject" who senses this sen­sation is born and dies with it, and that therefore, since the sen­sation is (if it is) immersed in a "milieu de generalite," so is the subject - to argue in this fashion is simply to beg the question. Whether or not a sensation is anonymous in no way implies that the subject who perceives that sensation is for that reason anonymous as well. Whether or not the sensation appearing to the "subject" appears in a "milieu de generalite," in ·no way means that this subject begins and ends with that sensation. Merleau-Ponty concludes that the subject of perception is anony­mous (begins and ends with the sensed sensation) from .the premise that the subject begins and ends with the sensed sen­sation (is anonymous).

Now, in the second place, as has been pointed out, the device resorted to by him to account for this facticity - intentionality conceived as corporeal - is completely unacceptable. The body is not an animate organism because it is itself an intentionality (or even a "natural 'I '"), but rather because it is the body of a specific consciousness. To take it as somehow an existence all on its own, is simply to gloss over this, that consciousness, at whatever level, is consciousness all the same, and that it itself intends its own animate organism as its own, and not at all as being a "natural 'I'." No matter how many quotation-marks one places around the "I," one can never make the body a subject in the strict sense. Several other difficulties emerge from these con­siderations.

Why is it the case that I cannot say that "I see the blue of the sky," but only that 11 it is seen in me," or that "one sees it?" Who does the seeing? For Merleau-Ponty, it is a "Moi nature!,"

~·--------------------------'--------------------------......11

220 MERLEA U-PONTY

namely, my eyes; more correctly, not "my," but rather "one's," eyes, the eyes belonging to the body-proper: it sees the sky, since, he argues, it is the "sujet de la perception." This being the case, how does it happen that this seeing, when reflectively apprehend­ed, discloses the sense that it is "my seeing?" How does "my" perception, and more importantly, "my" body, become "mine?" If the existence of the body-properis truly anonymous, then why is not my body experienced by me as yours? If perception is truly generalized, then how does it happen that every perception is nevertheless necessarily unique, individual? What makes my body mine, experienced as mine? In virtue of what do I experi­ence my perceivings and activities as mine? - If, that is to say, the body-proper is truly both anonymous and generalized? For whom, in truth, is the body-proper anonymous?

To put the problem positively, Metleau-Ponty, by assuming that the body has its own type of intentionality, is of necessity led to posit that the body is itself a self, that it is itself a "sujet." The very problem, however, is in what sense the body can experi­ence anything, in the strict sense of being self-aware of itself as experiencing this or that, much less itself. And, if the body is thus a self, rather, a whole series of selves, then Merleau-Ponty must account for a whole series of syntheses! First, it must be shown how all these selves become unified as belonging intrinsic­ally to one "self," the body-proper. Second, and equally difficult, it must be shown how this synthetically unified "self" becomes experienced by consciousness as belonging to that consciousness. Over and above these syntheses, it must be shown how the various sensory fields, sensory organs, body-members, and so on, are synthetically unified into a specific corporeal scheme which expresses my own peculiar habits and typicalities. Since the synthesis of the body into a specific organic system, an animate organism, is hardly the same thing as the synthesis of a series of "subjects" (being a subject is not the same thing as being an animate organism), Merleau-Ponty has doubled the problems. But, on top of all of this, 11e has nothing to say as regards these various unifications, except what we have been able to draw out regarding the intentional arc.

Merleau-Ponty has not attended to his own argument, it seems to me. If we were to assume that the body has its own

CRITICAL REMARKS 22I

intentiveness, and that it is a "self," then how in the world could it ever be "anonymous?" The very self-reflexiveness of the intentional relation would make it absurd to maintain that the body-proper is anonymous. But, and this shows his point, he argues that the body is anonymous for me, this person who chooses, decides, and the like; I experience my body as anony­mous. If this is so, however, then there seems to me to be no grounds whatever to argue that my body is mine, since, qua anonymous, it might just as well be yours, or more correctly, it could be anyone's. This being so, I can no more talk of this body as mine than I could say that it is a body-proper; to call it a "body-proper" means that it is the body-as-lived, or as-experi­enced, and this means, experienced by me. But, if the body-proper is experienced by me, is that which places me "at" the world, then it must be experienced by me as mine.

On the other hand, as we have seen, it is not the case that the body-proper has its own intentionality. By assuming that it does, Merleau-Ponty glosses over a highly important point: the body itself discloses itself to my experience as to my reflection as being mine, belonging (in some sense) to me, the one who "lives" it. It discloses itself as such, as Marcel has seen, in virtue of certain phenomenologically describable processes going on continuously and without which it would cease to be experienced by me as mine. Thus, by assuming illegitimately that the body is a self, Merleau-Ponty not only begs the question, but creates an absurd problem, which moreover he does not even attempt to answer. Contrary to de Waelhens' remark,1 I submit that Merleau-Ponty has not at all clearly recognized the problems involved in the phenomenon, "my body qua mine," but has rather begged the entire question with his conception of the body as "anonymous" and "generalized."

'What both Merleau-Ponty (PP, 175- 77) and de Waelhens point out, that in all corporeal attitudes and activities there is manifested a common style which makes my actions recognizable as mine - this is quite correct. But, the typicality of this style is hardly an anonymity, any more than it is a generality: the

i Cf. de Waelhens, op. cit., pp. 8, and 109-10. The remark is to the effect that Merleaa-Ponty, as opposed to Sartre (Marcel is not even mentioned), accounts for tbe body qua mine.

222 MERLE A U-PONTY

typical is not yet the general, and certainly not the anonymous. From this quite correct recognition, then, to Merleau-Ponty's final position, is a leap concealing a nest of irresovable difficulties.

Over and above these, there is another difficulty immlved in this thesis. Why should it "necessarily" be the case that per­ception takes place in a milieu of generality? Even if it were true that, like each sensation, the subject who experiences it begins and ends with it, can neither precede nor survive it -even if this were the case (and this is highly questionable), does it follow that perception of sensations must occur in a milieu of generality? What permits such a conclusion? The 0bvfous problem is that the meaning of "generality" is left completely vague, unanalyzed and unclarified as to its meaning.

And, I must confess, his argument escapes me. It may be, on the one hand, that his point is that, by means of the temporal flux of all perception and of all corporeal activity in general (in virtue of which they become sedimented as typicalities), the body-proper becomes constituted .,une fois pour toutes" as a complex of habits, typicalities, in the sense of acquiring typiGal and usual ways of doing, seeing, touching, assuming postures, and so on. Again, however, the typical is not the same thing as the general. Moreover, how this complex sedimentation can occur by means of temporal flux which, for him, is essentially a series of syntheses of transition, Merleau-Ponty simply does not tell us. Over and above these, however, supposing that sedi:mentati0n does occur, and ignoring for the moment how it occurs, does it follow from this, i.e., from the fact of crystallization·of corporeal activities into schemes of activity, that perception goes on in a milieu of generality? An habitually familiar milieu is not the same thing as a generalized milieu.

In short, that "generality" means "typicality," or that "anonymity" signifies "habitual," is not true. And, that the evident process of sedimentation signifies that consciousness, as habituated to certain corporeal ty_piealities (of posture, conduct, perception, and the like), is anonymous and given to itself as generalized, is, I submit, but another ingenious way to smuggle in by the backdoor what evident inspection of the matters them­selves will not admit by the front. That, on my first reflection on myself, I find myself as "ilready living," as embodied in a body

CRITIC.AL REMARKS 223

which has already developed habits, and so on, may be quite true; but that this signifies that these typicalities are anony­mities for me, generalities, or even ambiguities, is but another hidden assumption to be discarded straight off. It seems to me, in fact, that this argument is motivated, not from phenome­nologically evident grounds, but rather by an already fashioned cloak of theory in terms of which objects are called in, in absentia, for an at best partial fitting, then announced as evident. As we shall see later on, in fact, his starting-point predetermines every­thing else he discusses.

Another possible interpretation of "generality" presents itself. When, in a concrete sensuous perception of a state of affairs, I visually perceive the blue sky, what I normally experience is not at all "this" unique, individual blue, but rather "blue of a certain kind." That is to say, instead of maintaining that Mer­leau-Ponty c0nfuses "generality" with ''typicality," it may well be that he means by the former what we understand by the latter. Even so, however, it by no means follows that all perception is perception of "types." As Alfred Schutz has emphasized, follow­ing Husserl, in my everyday living I usually experience objects as more or less determinate types, against a background or horizon of equally typically ancihabitually familiar objects. They stand out from this ilnquestioned (but always questionable) background for my activities as "what they are," in terms of my particular pro1'ects-at-hand, more particularly in terms of my particular relevancies prevailing a~ the time. Thus, the back­ground from which they stand out is structured in terms of these same relevancies - the background is "backgr0und" because it is at the moment irrelevant to my prevailing project-at-hand.

l3ut this is by no means always or necessarily the case:

I may take the typically apperceived object as an exemplar of the g~neral type and allow myself to be led to this concept of the type, but I do not need by any means to think of the concrete dog as an exemplar of the general concept of "dog." 1

i A. Schiltz, "Common-Sense and Sdentilic Interpretation of Human Action," PPR, Vol. xiv, No. I (September, 1953), p. 5; also, pp. 3-6. Cf. also his excellent article, "Symbol, Reality and Society," s,,mbols and Society (edited by Lyman Bcysan t:t al), 14.th Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York, •955), pp. :i5:z-54. And, "Type and Eidos in Husserl's Late Philosophy," PPR, Vol. xx, No. 2 (December, x959), pp. i:47-65.

··----------------------------------------·' ............... ____________________________ ~

224 MERLEAU-PONTY

I may be interested, that is to say, only in this dog, Rover, for his own sake. In my concrete experience, thus, it is my particular " interests," what is relevant to me at the time, which determines what objects shall be individual and which shall be typical in any one situation.

If by a "milieu of generality," then, Merleau-Ponty means that objects disclosed by means of sensuous perception are experienced as "objects of certain types," we must agree with him. But, this by no means signifies either that all perception occurs in such a milieu, nor that no perception can be called an "I perceive." As Husserl has shown, in fact, not all sensuous perception is at the same level: it is JlOssible to ignore some object ~hich sollicits at~ention to itself; or, one can advert to it, grasp ~t, and then explicate and relate it as regards other objects, all ID a sensuous manner. These, however, are necessarily "IcJv-Akte" - the lowest levels of ego-activity, to be sure, but still not explicit predicative activity. And, as Schutz emphasizes, what specific objects, or ~hat spec~c determinations or qualities of objects, I attend to ID any particular perceptual situation, depends upon what my interests are, on what is relevant to my project-at­band. Hence, it is sometimes necessary to say, "ie percois"; and, therefore, it is not the case that all perception occurs in terms of typicalities - even if this is what Metleau-Ponty means by "generality and anonymity."

(d) Fou,rth Thesis: The Body-Proper Becomes "deja etabli" by Means of a Corporeal Scheme Constituted "wne /ois pour toittes" by Means of an Intentional Arc, That is, by Means of tlie Temporal Flux of Operative Intentionality

It is primarily by means of the body's motivity, we saw, that the corporeal scheme is constituted. This motivity, moreover, does this because it is intentional; it reveals an operative in­tentionality which, by means of the intentional arc, effects a sedimentation of corporeal activities, crystallizing them into "schemes," and generally, into a corporeal scheme. Once consti­tuted, it is always constituted.

Now the fundamental question throughout this theory is: How does such a corporeal scheme become constituted for conscious­ness? The fundamental question, that is, concerns the ultimate

CRITICAL REMARKS 225

meaning of this "operative intentionality," how it effects a sedimentation leading to the body's being experienced as a "synergetic system."

The flux of intentional processes is a temporal flow or move­ment. As Merleau-Ponty contends, if we consider any moment, "A," it is, as present, a "field" ; i.e., it discloses itself as retentive of phases of the same flux "before" ("past") the present phase, and as protentive to phases still to come. We can diagram this complexity, ignoring the objects of these temporal phases for the moment, according to Husserl's time-lectures:

ERRATA

p. 225, line-block 1, for Husserl read Husserl; as expanded by D. Cairns.

ibidem, line 18, for a11tomatic read acti1•e.

RICHARD M. ZANER

The Problem of Embodimetll (Phaenomenologica 17)

The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964

1 r -

a "synthesis of transition." For, the former, he believes (quite wrongly, as we saw), is strictly "automatic.''

In order to have the problem clearly before us, it will be helpful to outline a few points in Husserl's analysis of inner­time consciousness. First, though, we should reemphasize the

224 MERLEA U-PONTY

I .may be interested, that is to say, only in this dog, Rover, for his own sake. In my concrete experience, thus, it is my particular "interests,'' what is relevant tome at the time, which determines what objects shall be individual and which shall be typical in any one situation.

If by a "milieu of generality," then, Merleau-Ponty means that ~bjects disclosed by means of sensuous perception are ~penenced ~ "objects of certain types," we must agree with him. But, this by no means signifies either that au perception occurs in such a milieu, nor that no perceotion can be called an

::iouuucu~c1.uvu u1 CU.LIJVre-dl acuv1ut::s, 1.:ry:stCl.l.llZmg mem mi:o "schemes," and generally, into a corporeal scheme. Once consti­tuted, it is always constituted.

Now the fundamental question throughout this theory is: How does such a corporeal scheme become constituted for conscious­ness? The fundamental question, that is, concerns the ultimate

CRITICAL REMARKS 225

meaning of this "operative intentionality," how it effects a sedimentation leading to the body's being experienced as a "synergetic system."

The flux of intentional processes is a temporal flow or move­ment. As Merleau-Ponty contends, if we consider any moment, "A," it is, as present, a "field"; i.e., it discloses itself as retentive of phases of the same flux "before" ("past") the present phase, and as protentive to phases still to come. We can diagram this complexity, ignoring the objects of these temporal phases for the moment, according to Husserl's time-lectures:

J:.

protentional

... ', c-1

(Husserl)

impressional Etc.

retentional

A B C 2.

(Merleau-Ponty)

Reproducing this (No. 2) quite inaccurately, Merleau-Ponty states that when we move from t1 (A) to t2 (B), at which time (a "now-phase" occurring after that at ti) A is retained now as a former "now-phase," the fact that A' (A as retained at B, i.e., t 2) is retained now as the same A as before (only now retained as past) is not due to a "synthesis of identification," but rather to a "synthesis of transition." For, the former, he believes (quite wrongly, as we saw), is strictly "automatic."

In order to have the problem clearly before us, it will be helpful to outline a few points in Husserl's analysis of inner­time consciousness. First, though, we should reemphasize the

226 MERLEAU-PONTY

fact that Merleau-Ponty's use of "intentional synthesis," and especially "synthesis of identification," is unjustifiably narrow, and clearly incorrect as regards Husserl's own analyses. What Merleau-Ponty understands by "synthesis of identification," in fact, is only one kind of identification, namely, the explicit, active objectivating identification, i.e., the "I identify" (the cat I now see with the cat I saw yesterday, for instance).

Husserl has established, to the contrary, that the syntheses occurring in the temporal flux of consciousness, those which account for the retentiveness and protentiveness of the phases of this flux, are of necessity automatic. In any now-phase of the Erlebnisstrom, there is an automatic retentive intending of phases past of itself, and an automatic protentive intending of phases future to itself. If we refer to Husserl's own diagram of internal time, this complexity stands out clearly:

Considering phase B at t2 as the "now-phase," it is clear that it is at once "impressional," "retentional," .and "protentional." The j~t-past phase, A (t1) is retained automatically at phase B as a. pha~e ~hich .was an impressional consciousness with its own complexity: 1_t is retamed "now" as a phase which was itself retentional and protentional; among the phases protended at A is the present phase, B, which was protended (B- 1) as a phase which will be retentive of A. Similarly, at phase B, ~e just-just-past phase, Z (to) is now retained directly (Z2) as a phase which was itself similarly complex and which pretended future phases, among them the present phase B (B-2) and the just-past phase A (A-1) which is also retained at B (Al). Moreover, since phase A is also retained at B, and since phase A is retained as itseliretentive to Z (Zl), phase Z is retained at B both directly (Z2) and by means of phase A (Zl through Al from A).

Now, phase Z is retained at B as being the same phase Z which is directly retained and which is retained through retained phase A. There are not, i.e., two "Z's," but rather only one. At the same time, however, phases A and Z are retained at B, not as constituting a single whole, but rather as dilferent phases of the samemental life.

In short, at any phase of the temporal flux, we have an identi/yi11g and diflerentiating sy1lthesis which goes on automatically and continuously: each phase is identified_ with itself and at the same time differentiated from all other phases of itself as different. Hence, each phase is auto­matically retained with its own specific complexity, as itself retentively and protentively intentive to other phases of the same temporal flux; and thus, among those phases protended by the past phase is the pres7nt phase, and the past phase is now retained as a phase which was protentive to the present phase as a phase which will have been retentive to it. The same complexity pertains as well to all protentive intending.

We have, of course, simplified enormously; specifically, we have

CRITICAL REMARKS 227

completely ignored the fact that every temporal phase of consciousness is a consciousness of objects, and that, in addition to the complex retentive-protentive-impressional structure of the temporal flux, the objects of each of these phases are them­selves synthetically identified with themselves and differentiated from one another as objects of the respective phases. Moreover, we have ignored the even more complicated time-structure of active consciousness (e.g., explicit recollection). Our brief indi­cation, though, is sufficient for us to establish several crucial points regarding Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of internal time.

At any now-phase, Merleau-Ponty contends, referring to his own diagram (which is quite different from Husserl's),

What is given to me is A seen transparently through A', then this ensemble through A" and so on, just as I see the pebble itself through t he depths of water which flow over it. (PP, 478)

This a travers de, or "transparence," he believes, is effected by means of a "synthesis of transition." (PP, 480) In other words, the consciousness of internal time is not a consciousness of a discrete appearance of a particular phase, A, but rather

a single phenomenon of flow. Time is the unique movement which expresses itself in all of its parts like a gesture encompasses all the muscu­lar contractions necessary for it to be realized.• (PP, 479)

Now, what Merleau-Ponty describes as the synthesis of transition, it seems to me, is an attempt to describe the noetic aspect of inner-time consciousness, that is, the characteristic of the temporal flux as being a temporal continuum taking place within the same mental life.1 Consciousness experiences itself as a unitarily enduring flux, then, if our interpretation of Merleau­Ponty is correct, by virtue of the fact that the particular phases of this flux flow into one another like the various components of a gesture flow int9 one another constituting a whole; or, con­versely, the flux of inner time is a single movement which takes into itself its various components. In other words, it seems to me evident that what Merleau-Ponty describes as the consciousness of inner time is precisely what Bergson had called a "qualitative multiplicity."

i It should be noted that here Merleau-Ponty goes counter to his own expressed intentions, viz. to give a noematic description of lived experience.

~CT ____________________________ ... a ..... _.._._ ____________________ _.

228 MERLE A U-P 0 NTY

But if we are correct in this interpretation, it must be pointed out that the notion of "synthesis of transition" conceals more than it reveals. If it is a description of the constitution of the flux-character of the internal time of mental life, then this synthesis is not at all single, but multiple ; or, perhaps better, the synthesis of transition by virtue of which the various phases of mental life are connected to form a temporal continuum pre­supposes two more fundamental syntheses.

If, in fact, each phase of the flux were not simultaneously retentively and protentively intentive to phases other than itself as identical with themselves and dilf erent from the present one, there could not be any transition from one phase to another phase, since unless each phase were intentively consituted as self-identical and as different from all other phases of the same mental life, there would be no "one" nor "another" phase much less a " transition" from "one" to "another." But this means that syntheses of identification and differentiation are essential to inner time, for without them there would be neither a transition nor, for that matter, any "flux."

To call the stream of consciousness a "stream," or " flux," is to say much more than that there occur a multiplicitly of transitions: in the first place, it is to say that the phases of this stream are related to one another as "earlier" and "later". In the second place, it is to say that these temporal determinations are constant, that is, that if a phase occurs "before" another, the relation of "earlier" is maintained no matter how "past" the phases become: if A happens before B, it will always be "earlier" than B. In the third place, it is to say that every phase maintains a constantly changing relation to the present phase, becoming present, then just-past, then further past, and so on. And, thus, it is clear that syntheses of identification and differentiation are essential to inner time: Merleau-Ponty's "synthesis of tran­sition," even if one interprets it as noetic, presupposes these two more fundamental automatic syntheses.

There is a second difficulty with Merleau-Ponty's description of inner time, one which quite possible may have been based on his inaccurate reproduction of tbe time diagram. At any one phase, he contends, what is immediately given is not A", which I would then take as an adumbration of A', and this in tum as an

CRITICAL REMARKS 229

adumbration of A itself; that is, I do not move from adumbration to the thing itself (A). Rather, at C, I have A itself, seen through the adumbrations A' and A" which A itself casts off:

If the adumbrations (A.bschattungen) A' and A" appear to me as adum­brations of A, this is not because they all participate in an ideal unity which would be their common ground (raison). It is because I have, through or by means of them, the point A itself, in its unimpeachable incliviclnality, founded once and for all by its passage into the present and because I see the adumbrations A', A" , spring up from it .... • (PP, 478)

Now, on the one hand, if this were a correct account, then, once A were past, I could never remember A itself apart from any Abschattungen of it. And this, it seems to me, entails a re­appearance of the old, unwarranted Vorstellungstheorie which Merleau-Ponty quite justifiably criticizes elsewhere: the A itself is past and all that is present are a series of Abshattungen by means of which A itself is given to me. To be sure, he contends that I have A itself by means of its adumbrations; but never­theless, instead of describing this "having of A" as a retentional consciousness of A, he states that there are "in" the present certain adumbrations of A. Notwithstanding his claim to have A itself, then, his theory entails a form of the "theory of ideas." On the other hand, he does not at all give an account of the very point at issue: in virtue of what does it happen that at CI can remember not only A, but also A', and yet there are not two A's, but only one?

The difficulty with Merleau-Ponty's substitute theory is that he insists on talking of Abschattu1igen here, when this is quite out of place. It is not that A' and A" are Absckattu1igen of A, lmt rather that they are all A itself, ln1.t seen at different times. Or more correctly, when A itself was present, there was an impressional consciousness of it, but as it recedes into the past it is retained in each succeeding phase, not by means of adumbrations "in" the present phase, but is retained strictly as it itself, but now re­tentively modified. Thus, for instance, when I saw the chair yesterday, and then look at it again today, my present perception of it is not an Abschattwng of the chair I saw yesterday; rather, my impressional consciousness of the chair now is at the same time a retentional consciousness of the same chair as I saw it yesterday, as well as a simultaneous protentive intending. of

230 MERLEAU-PONTY

future possible perceivings of the chair as the same chair now seen and retained ... and much more, which we ignore here.

If my perception of the chair were really analogous to a per­ceiving of a rock at the bottom of a pool, then "the" chair would never be seen except in the past; my present perception of it would be only a perception of one of the "waves" in the pool adumbra~ the chair, but not thechairitself: I cannot, tempo­rally, swim to the bottom of the pool. And, I submit, this is absurd.

What there is in the present phase of a consciousness of the chair now-perceived, is not an "adumbration" of a past seen chair, but rather a retentive intending of it as seen before, and a synthesis of identification of the chair as seen before and now retained as seen before, and the chair as now seen - and simul­taneously, a synthesis of differentiation of the two perceivings of the same object as different, or as occurring in different phases of the temporal flux.

Finally, Merleau-Ponty can in no way account for the process of se~entation by means of "synthesis of transition." Simple transition cannot account for progressive accumulation. For the latter to occur, in fact, not only must the flux be transitional but there must be a consciousness of t he flux in all its full com~ plexity, as we have outlined it above. By failing to notice that the synthesis of transition presupposes syntheses of identification and differentiation at the automatic level, Merleau-Ponty is in no position to notice another fundamental type of synthesis.

If these syntheses of identification and differentiation go on automatically throughout the course of mental life, there then occurs as well what Husserl calls a " universal transference of

,, al th sense, or, we can so say, e "synthesisof associativepairing."1 Without being able here to enter into all the details of this

synthesis (which, like those of identification and differentiation constitutes a universal principle of all mental life as such), we ca~ nevertheless indicate it by means of an example. Suppose I now have in my visual field two Abgeliobenheiten, a black spherical­like thing and a black square-like thing. I begin by perceiving the first, then move my regard over to the other:

1 Cartesian Mul.ita.tions, op. cit.,§§ 39 and 5L

CRIT I CAL REMARKS 23r

E- ---- ---- Jll>

(2) y (l)

Automatically, and universally throughout the range of mental life, there occurs a transference of sense: looking at the black circle before looking at the black square, consciousness auto­matically and immediately transfers the sense of the first to the second. But, in this example, the transferred sense ("black, spherical-like, visually perceived thing") is not completely harmonious with the now-presented sense " (black, square-like, visually perceived thing"). If they were, a synthesis of identifi­cation would automatically occur (with, of course, a synthesis of differentiation at the same time). But, part of the transferred sense conflicts with the presented sense, while another component transfers readily (they are both "black" and "visually perceived things"). Thus, there occurs a certain "overlaying" of sense, constituting the two as a "pair"; and, Husserl points out,

As the result of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer of sense - that is to say: an apperception of each accor­ding to the sense of the other, so far as moments of sense actualized in what is experienced do not annul this transfer, with the consciousness of "different." 1

Moreover, with the annulment of the sense "circle," when transferred to the "square," and with the annulment of the sense "square" when transferred back to the "circle," there is forth­with constituted a new sense for each: the "circle" now acquires the sense, "not-square," and the "square" acquires the sense, "not-circular. " Only in this way, which Husserl calls the transfer of sense with the consciousness of "different," are the two consti­tuted as a "pair" of a particular kind.

What Husserl has discovered, it seems to me, is precisely the way in which sedimentation occurs, first automatically and then

1 Ibid., p. n:3.

232 MERLEAU-PONTY

actively. Suppose there goes on, now, in the mental life of a very young infant, a global perceiving of a rattle. As Piaget 1 has pointed out, the infant at first seeks not simply to see the rattle, but to see its noise, to grasp the noise and perchance the color. In Husserlian terms, once a particular process with its object occurs, henceforth every other process and object acquires the sense of the first (by way of transfer of sense). As Piaget expressed it, the tendency of reflex and other activity is to assimilate the whole universe to its activity. But it cannot; hence, it must accommo­date itself to it; and this double process involves of necessity a process of internal organization. In Husserlian terms, which, of course, are not precisely equivalent to Piaget's, the transferred sense, "seeable" (as regards the noise) conflicts with the presented sense; and, as a consequence, in the on-going course of the infant's experience the two eventually become constituted as "different" (but "similar," precisely in respect to their seeming to occur "at the same place and time," being sensuous qualities, and so on).

There thus occurs, after a series of failures to transfer sense, a synthesis of dissimilarity in respect of the qualities in question (what is "seeable" and what is "audible"). In virtue of this, these consequences of the transfer of sense (whatever harmoni­ously carries over and whatever is annaled, in respect of sense), is automaticalby carried over into subsequent experience. For instance, when the infant sees "red" at one time and touches the "object" which is red, henceforth all "red" objects acquire the sense, "touchable". He then, suppose, sees the red of an electric heater and reaches out to touch it. . . and gets burned: here the transferred sense, "touchable" (like all other such reds pefore this), is abruptly annuled. Henceforth, "red" objects will, at least, be approached with a good deal of caution in respect of the sense, "touchable." Or, in a reverse case: there can occur transfers of sense in the past, such that past perceived objects can undergo an alteratipn in sense for consciousness: when the infant touches the "red" heater, other "red" objects can acquire the sense, "don't touch," even those seen and touched in.the past. There is a sense, then, in which the past has its own style

1 There is here a close parallel lo Husserl which should be can:ied further, though we cannot do it here.

CR ITI CAL REMARKS 233

of change: e.g., finding a quicker way to do some task, past attempts to do it acquire the sense, " I could have done it quicker if .... "

Now, although we have not fully circumscribed this universal principle, it is clear, I think, that just this automatic synthesis of associative pairing accounts for the phenomenon of sedi­mentation - if we remember that it is founded on the more fundamental syntheses of identification and differentiation. And, just because Merleau-Ponty completely ignores, nor does not see it, he in no way can account for what even he takes as essential to all consciousness. His effort to account for sedime~tation by means of "syntheses of transition" is not so much a complete failure (since, in a sense such syntheses do occur), as it is wholly inadequate, presupposing just those syntheses which fully and descriptively give this account.

It now remains, after our critical appraisal of the central theses of his theory, to attempt to state what, fundamentally, Merleau-Ponty has attempted to achieve.

(3) THE MEANING OF MERLEAU-PONTY'S 'EXISTENTIALISM'

Throughout the course of this exposition and criticism, we have maintained that Merleau-Ponty has "prior commitments" which to a considerable extent color his theory, particularly in respect of bis interpretations and practice of phenomenonlogy. We have not yet engaged in an explicit discussion of this problem. It is proper to do so now, in this concluding section.

The genuine force, I submit, as well as the fundamental di­rection, of his theory of the body (and, indeed, of his whole philosophy), lies in his effort to present a concrete ontology of human existence - an "existentialism." It would seem that he would agree with de Waelhens, when the latter writes,

But beyond phenomenology's disclosure and analysis of the structures furnished by perception, one can and must inquire into the mode of being of these structures, of the beings which embody them, and of the being (man) who lives them. Phenomenological reflection reaches its completion in ontology .1

i De Waelhens, op. cit., p. 391. If this means that the mode of being of some phenomenon can be investigated "in itself", apart from its being inJendeil, then pbenomenology is simply discarded, not completed, by ontology. If intentionality is still maintained, then ontology can only be phenomenological ontology. In both cases, de Waelhens is wrong.

234 MERLEAU-PONTY

As regards the problem of the body, we have seen how he accomplishes this transition. Nevertheless, I submit, for Merleau­Ponty the transition is not at all from phenomenology to onto­logy; rather, he begins and ends witlt an onrology, and everything else is seen from this perspective.l

We can state with some justification that the genuine "ex­istential" problem in his work is the following: having seen that all "existence personnelle" is founded on a stratum of "e:icistence figee et pre-personnelle," how am I, this individual person or self, related to this stratum and to the world disclosed by means of it? His fundamental quest, that is, seems to me to concern the significances which "my body," "my perception," "my life," " my existence," and so on, hold for me, what they signify as regards my-Self, my experience of and relation to myself. We must seek to justify this claim.

The best clue for our interpretation is given in the concluding pages of the section, in his major work, on "Autrni et le Monde Humain," where he writes,

The problem concerning the existential modality of the social here rejoins all the problems of transcendance. "Whether it is a matter concer­ning my body, the natural world, the past, birth or death, the question is always to know how I can be open to phenomena which go beyond me and which nevertheless exist only to the extent that I apprehend and live them; the question is how the preseme to nvyself (Urpriisenz) which defines me atul conditions every alien presence is at the same time a "dis-presentation" (Etitgegenwiirligtmg) a1ul thrusts me outside myself. (PP, •P 7)

Merleau-Ponty at his best never speaks of "consciousness," but of me-myself, my experience. The "existential" problem, that is to say, is for Merleau-Ponty preeminently that of developing an anthropology, a logos of man; but not "man" in the abstract, defined either siib specie aeternitatis or by means of species and genera. Man, for Merleau-Ponty and the rest of the existentialists, must be investigated according to his essence, according to what it means to be mcµi, to be human. But man, being that peciluar etant who is simultaneously an object in the world among other objects (some of which are also "other men"), and a subject for whom the world is the world; and, being that etant who at the same time (being a "subject" for whom there is a world at all) is

1 Se~ the author's, "Existentialism as a Logos of Man: The case of Merleau-Ponty," Memornu (XIII International Congress of Philosophy, Universidad Autonoma de Mexico, 1963), La Probkma tkl Hombre, Vol Ill.

C RITICAL REMARKS 235

aware of himself as both object and subject in the world - as such, man is an unimpeachably unique, individual, historical etant. Namely, he is himself, he is "this" man, he is individual and historical by essence. Accordingly, the logos of man, existential­ism, seeks to disclose the essence of man in his own "concreteness, as an individual, historical etant, whose essence is· his existence.

For Merleau-Ponty, in fact , The central phenomenon, which founds at once my subjectivity and

my transoendance .. . , consists in the circumstance that I am given to myself. I am given, that is to say that I find myself already situated and engaged in a ph]'Sical and social world - I am given to myself, that is to say that this situation is never concealed from me; it is never around me as a necessity which is strange and alien to me; and, I am never effectively closed within it like an object in a bottle.• (PP, 413)

Here, Merleau-Ponty re-emphasizes his rejection of the tra­ditional theory of the mind as a closed interiority, and also, it should be noted, his rejection of Sartre's conception of pour-soi as an absolute interiority. I am, that is to say, a being who is, in his being, thrust into a world which is for me "toujours-deja­la" because I am a being who is incarne by a body which is like­wise "toujours-deja-la" for me, this person. My being, thus. is to be-to-the-world, being-to-the-world by means of a structured organism (my body) which, being of the same kind as the world, engages me in the very stuff, the very texture of the world; which places me "at" the world, dans le milieu des choses. My being, therefore, is to be-embodied-to-the-world and, by experi­encing this fundamental thrust, to be a presense-a-moi.-minie. To be engage presupposes a consciousness of that engagement: I am a presence-to-the-world ("dis-presentation") by means of being a presence-to-myself (Urprasenz), for if I were unaware of my engagement, it would not be for me. In other words, I am at once "to-myself" and "to-the-world."

This reflexiveness of my relation to myself and to the world, to my body and to the things disclosed by means of it, derives from the fundamental essence of my subjectivity itself: temporal­i ty. In virtue of the fact that the Erlebnisstr6m is itself reflexive, that is, is a "champ de presence" which fixes itself as present because it retentively intends a past as protentive of itself and protentively intends a future as retentive of itself - in virtue of this complex self-intentiveness,

MERLEA U-PONTY

It is essential to time to be not only effective time or time which flow or u~ol~. but also time which knows itself (se satt), because the explosio: or spbtting apart (dihiscence) of the present toward a future is the arche­type of the 1'elati<>n of the self to itself and outlines an interiority or an ipseity (Selbstheit). • (PP. 487)

But, this very reflexiveness, he contends, can be understood only if we dismiss all notions of subjectivity as a sort of primal "stuff" or "substance," of the subject as a mere a priori condition of possibility. And, indeed, the peculiar self-reflexiveness of temporality . (its self-intentiveness) discloses to us that no non­egological theory of consciousness can be correct.1 Rather, he maintains, it is necessary to say that

, Time is s~eone, ti;iat is to say, th.e temporal dimensions ... all express a smgle bursting ~r a smgle ~rust which is subjectivity itself. It is necessary to understand time as sub1ect and the subject time.• (PP, 482-83)

This self-reflexive intentiveness of temporality, being consti­tutive of a cham,p de presence, moreover, is a sort of "bursting" ("eclatement") or "thrust" ("poussee"). That is to say, the fundamental being of subjectivity is that it is an "ekstasis," a standing-out-from--itself-to . .. , a "de-presentation" of itself while at the same time being a presence to itself. Thus, he argues,

We are thus always led to a conception of the subject as an ek-stasis and to a relation .o~ active transcendance between the subject and th~ ~otld. _The world JS mseparable from the subject, but from a subject who IS nothing other than a project to the world. And, the subject is inseparable ~om the world, but from a world which he himself projects. Tlie subject IS-to-the-world, and the world remains "subjective" since its texture and its articulations are sketched out by the subject's movement of transcen­dance. • (PP, 491-92)

Accordingly, because of the self-reflexiveness of the temporally "ek-sisting" subject, "We hold time entirely, and we are present to ourselves because we are present to the world." (PP, 485)

As we have seen, to complete this interpretation, this tempo­rality is itself possible only because, he contends, the subject is engage, because he is an etre-att-monde; that is, because he is to­the-world by being embodied therein. The body-as-lived by this

l This is one of the much-debated topics in phenomenology. Cf. Sartre's The Transc~ndence of the Ego, op. cit., directed against Husserl; Gurwitscb, "A Non­Egologtcal ~onceptlo~ ~f Consciousness," PPR, Veil. I (March, 1941), pp. 325- 38; and Natans~n, The Empmcal and Transcendental Ego," in: For Roman Ingarden: Nine E1says 1n Phenomenology, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, :i960, pp. '42-S3, esp. 48-50.

CRITICAL REMARKS 237

consci1mce-e-ngagee. then. becomes the decisive moment in the constitution of the objective world, just because there would be no world, no being, if he were not embodied by a body which discloses the world because it inhabits the world. Etre-au-monde, therefore, necessitates etre--iticarne; or, etre-incarne makes etre­au-monde possible. In short, the self-reflexiveness of the temporally ek-sisting subject is a projecting, a trans-cending, to the world only because he is an embodied being who as such "belongs" to the world because he "dwells therein."

In this manner, I believe, it is possible to see quite clearly the justification for my contention that Merleau-Ponty's funda­mental position and starting-point, his "prior commitment," is an "existentialism" of the style just outlined. This position lies at the root of his entire study, and it forms the texture and framework within which all of his interpretations of phenome­nology, of traditional psychology, and of Gestalt psychology are woven. As well, it is the fundamental setting for all his concrete analyses of perception, of the body, space, time, Others, and so on. For him, one might say, a problem is philosophical only in so far as it in some way involves the question concerning man - just as, for Marcel, anthropology forms the fundamental task of philosophy. In short, phenomenology, Gestalt-psychology, and the rest, are not so much seen as genuine disciplines in their own right and in their own terms, but rather as a collection of tools for carrying out a preconceived existentialism; phenome­nology, in the end, is a crutch which is soon discarded.

It is unfortunately the case, nevertheless,· that despite the preeminence of this style of existentialism, Merleau-Ponty rarely engages in an explicit discussion and formulation of it, for purposes of clarification, much less justification. It is evident, I believe, that this is the point towards which everything else leads and derives its significance. Indeed, I am convinced that the clarification of the themes entangled in his works, and their root in his existentialism, is crucial enough to stand by itself, apart from our criticisms.

We can now see with full clarity, however, the really central difficulty in his entire study. What justifies this existentialism itself? What justifies, moreover, the interpretation of phenome­nological principles and methods, concepts and terms, in this

MERLEAU-PONTY

"existential" manner? As regards the body, what justifies the interpretation of phenomenologically explicated structures as revelations of "being?" What, in the end, justifies the attempt to maintain the theory of intentionality while at the same time maintaining that "being" can be considered apart from "being intended?"

With Merleau-Ponty, it is clear, not only are such questions not answered, they are not even raised. And, I submit, the "raison" for this fundamental oversight is also understandable, if not justifiable: far from going to an existential ontology from phenomenology, as de Waelhens suggests, Merleau-Ponty begins and ends with his existentialism. It is, so to speak, constantly in his back-pocket, constantly present without being made overt; its principles are the gloves with which he shakes hands, the colored glasses through which the world is viewed. And, just in so far as he never raises up these principles themselves and submits them to inspection, he violates his own statement of the essential nature of philosophy, that the philosopher is always "un commen~ant perpetuel."

EPILOGUE

(1) The decision to treat the theories of the body presented by Marcel, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty was neither hasty nor arbi­trary. For, despite the many important differences among their respective theories (and even more, in their philosophies), it has become apparent that there are several striking, indeed -funda­mental, similarities among them. To preface our concluding remarks, then, it seems advisable to state explicitly these common grounds before we attempt to delineate the significance and direction of our study as a whole.

To begin with, it seems to be characteristic of each of these philosophers that they are at war with certain predominant trends of traditional philosophy. More particularly, one of the basic roots of most modern philosophy, the dualisms of mind and body and between appearance and reality, is subjected to a wholesale rejection - or, at the very least, to critical re-evaluation. To a considerable extent, the effort to overcome, or perhaps to undercut, these dualisms is the motive force behind their various works. And, although I have tried to show that Sartre's dualism, the dialectics of en-soi and pour-soi, is but a neo-Cartesianism, it must nevertheless be acknowledged that his work is an explicit attempt to surmount the Cartesian dualism while still retaining the genuine insights which led to that opposition between mind and body in the first place.

Each of the theories we have studied marshals essentially the same arguments against the "message-theory" of sense­perception; each, again, critically rejects the traditional theory of sense-data; each, finally, rejects the implicit conception of the body as a passivity or a receptivity, and tries to establish the body as fundamentally active. Expressed in different terms, each of these philosophers seeks to establish the phenomenal experi-

EPILOGUE

ence of the animate organism as a legitimate, and indeed a decisive, philosophical issue. This attempt to view the body­proper as a phenomenon - precisely and only as it presents itself to the one whose body-proper it is - necessitates re-conceiving the so-called mind-body problem in new terms.

This new framework, I have suggested, is that of the body-as­experienced, or more correctly, the phenomenon of embodiment (etre-incarne). In this sense, one might well suggest that each of these thinkers is not so much rejecting Descartes' meditations on the problem as he is addressing himself to what Descartes himself had recognized: the peculiar circumstance that, though my mind is not like my body, nor my body like my mind, nevertheless I am not "in" my body like a boatman is "in" his boat. Each thinker, that is to say, is actively accepting Descartes' invitation, enunciated in his Preface to the Meditations, to mediate along with Descartes in his effort to establish a foun­dational certitude.

Over and above a shared discontent with traditional philoso­phy, however, each bas recognized and focused on the phenome­non of the animate organism as a genuinely unique and philo­sophically crucial one. The body-proper is the matrix of concrete human existence ; it is the "center of action," that which places me "at" or "in" the midst of things; it is that "by means of which" there is a "world" at all for me; it is that which at once is my presence to the world, and is the world's presence to me. As such, my body-proper at once ex-poses me to my UmweU and opens up my UmweU to me as a complex concatenation of possible ways of acting, doing, and being. In short, "objects" in the world - whether they be simple objects of perceiving or objects of a more complex sort - are discovered as "poles of action," correlates of my bodily activity on them, as Piaget had emphasized. Objects in the world, in so far as they are for me only in virtue of my being embodied in the midst of them by my body-proper, are thus disclosed as essentially connected to my possible bodily action on and with them. If my body-proper is my means of having a world and of acting within it, on objects, and with objects, "the" world and its objects are, then, strictly the correlates of that consciousness of them.

This common style of analysis reveals yet another basic

EPILOGUE

characteristic. Focusing upon the body-proper, these thinkers have each claimed to have discovered, or at least to have re­discovered amidst the debris of traditional philosophy and with the radically new perspective on the animate organism, the core phenomenon of philosophy as such: la condition humaine, human subjectivity, or perhaps best expressed, man's being-in­reality. The concrete analysis of the body-proper, in other words, opens up the possibility of investigating human being as such -not, perhaps, for the first time, but at least in a distinctively new fashion, disclosing new dimensions to man's concrete being -and thus makes it possible to comprehend the human condition in its actual concreteness and existential complexity. From this perspective, it becomes apparent that the human condition is fundamentally an ontological phenomenon, a phenomenon of being. And thus, as Merleau-Ponty has seen, all the various "aspects" or "activities" of man (that he is a perceiving, knowing, acting being; that he is a social, biological, economic creature; and so on) must now of essential necessity be conceived as moments of his being: "knowing," as Sartre has put it, is a mode of being of pour-soi; "perceiving," as Merleau-Ponty expressed it, is a mode of man's being-to-the-world.

In this respect, each of these thinkers is concerned with the discovery and explication of man's being-in-reality and, as Maurice N atanson bas emphasized, it is this fundamental direction more than anything else which permits us to treat each of these :thinkers within the covers of a single work. If, that is to say, it is still legitimate to speak of "existentialism" it is because of this fundamental concern and orientation toward being-in­reality .J. In an even wider sense, so as not to distort Sartre's stated :intention to write a phenomenological ontology, they each seek to gain access to the foundational relatedness of man's being to other beings and to Being as such.

This quest, then, in each of their works turns toward sub­jectivity, or consciousness, or, as with Marcel, the human self. And here we have seen that each of them is struck by a peculiar

~ CL M. Natanson, "Existential Categories in Contemporary Literature," Carolina Quarterly (i:959), pp. x7-30, esp. p. r9: "What I take to ·be.central and decisive for all existentialist philosophy is a concern for what I wish to call man's being in reality." Cf. also bis article, "Being-ln·Reallty," PPR, vol. xx, no. 2 (Dec., i:959), pp. 23r--i37.

EPILOGUE

characteristic of human being, one so fundamental that for each it is considered as the very essence of human-reality: for man, to be is always and essentially to be aware of him.self as such, to be able to withdraw into himself and put himself into question.! Or, as Marcel has expressed it, man is that being whose being is to be in quest of itself: man is homo vial.or. Without any doubt, it seems to me, this is the core meaning of such basic concepts as Marcel's "mystery," Sartre's "pour-soi," and Merleau-Ponty's "etre-au-monde." To be man is to be at once an object in a world among other objects (some of which are other men, and other animate creatures as well} ; a sub-ject with respect to which the world and its objects are objects and world; and, as subject, to be reflexively self-cognizant of himself as both object and subject in a world wherein there are other beings who are themselves subjects and objects in precisely the same sense (i.e., alter egos).

On the grounds of this compounded reflexivity of the prime "subject-matter" of philosophy, philosophy becomes "experience transmuted in thought." It itself becomes revealed as a self­reflexive enterprise, seeking to disclose its own roots, its own essence, its own justification. The philosopher, as Merleau-Ponty states, must be a "perpetual beginner." Thus, philosophy faces the unique situation of being a self-reflexive inquiry into a self­reflexive being, man: hence, the often rather disconcerting dialectical tangles so characteristic of these thinkers' works. Kierkegaard's remarkable foresight proves to be the fountain­head of existential philosophy: Truth is Subjectivity and Sub­jectivity is Truth.

(2) These remarks indicate several other points which we cannot fully explore in this work, but which unquestionably deserve careful attention. In the first place, whereas we have pointed out the indebtedness of Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's theories to the work of Husserl (as well as their abuses of Hus­serl's work), it remains for us to explore the possibilities of con­structing a phenomenology of the animate organism on the

1 Ortega y Gasset agrees with this as well, which he calls man's eii.simismamie11to, literally, "within-one's-selfness." Cf. Man and People, W. W. Norton (New York, 1957). pp. 16-18.

EPILOGUE 243

basis of our critical examination of these theories. Before I at­tempt to outline this possibility, however, it seems to me ad­visable to point out another direction in which our study is necessarily led: to the early, quite remarkable, work of Henri Bergson.

Although neither Marcel, Sartre nor Merleau-Ponty has apparently noted this, it was Bergson who first saw, with great insight, the genuine significance and peculiarity of the body, and the necessity of re-formulating the question of the relations between mind and body in terms of an analysis of the human body.

It is well known that Bergson himself was already becoming aware of the deep-rooted and antagonistic dualism of traditional philosophy. Indeed, in his Essai sur les Donnees immediates de la Conscience (published in I888}, it would seem that he was already cognizant to some extent of the difficulties implicit in the Carte­sian dualism of substances, the res extensa and the res cogitans. Once one accepts such a dualism, be is faced with the insoluable problem of establishing the principle of connection between these two essentially different substances, and he must either reduce mind to matter, or matter to mind, in order to solve this insoluable _problem:

... It could be asked whether the insurmountable difficulties which certain philosophical problems raise do not come from the attempt to juxtapose in space the phenomena which in no way occupy space ... When an illegitimate translation from the unextended to the extended, from quality into quantity, has inserted the contradiction at the very heart of the question posed, ·is it astonishing that the contradiction is follDd in the solutions which one gives? (Essai, vii)

This dualism is in reality, as Bergson studies it, an entire series of dualisms, between quality and quantity, time and space, the "deep self" and the "outer self," freedom and determinism. Fundamentally, however, they are all but different expressions of that between exteriority and interiority - that is, the Cartesian dualism. Though he is aware of the many difficulties implicit in this dualism, Bergson (in the Essai) nevertheless seems to accept it as valid, and goes on to conceive exteriority and interiority as in combat with one another. And even more, from the side of interiority it has historically been a losing battle: exteriority

EPILOGUE

usurps interiority, space usurps time (which then becomes "spatialized time"), and so on. Idealists and realists, materialists and spiritualists, rationalists and empiricists - all, Bergson believes, have in fact been guilty of identically the same error: externalizing interiority, quantifying quality, objectifying the non-objectifiable, in an interminable antagonism.

In his Essai, nevertheless, Bergson does not attempt to deny or reject the dualism, but rather to rediscover the side of sub­jectivity for its own sake. The psychical, or subjectivity, he maintains, is in essence one heterogeneous, qualitative multiplici­ty, each component of which is essentially unique, non-repeatable, and, being a component in such a flux or duree, has its own essential functional place within that "whole," interpenetrating other components, being interpenetrated by them together and individually, and all of them constituting the whole. In short, Bergson here discovers, although in terms of the very framework he seeks to overcome, the phenomenon of context, or, as the Gestalt psychologists were to say later, of /orm.

In his second, genuinely decisive work, Matiere et Memoire,1 Bergson seeks to overcome this antagonism of his Essai. Through a remarkably conceived theory of matter and of memory, he seeks to find a "mi-<:hemin" between idealism and realism, admitting on the first page that he now explicitly accepts that dualism which he never questioned in his Essai. However, it is in a secondary thesis in the first chapter of M at-iere et M emoire that we find an argument which is crucial for the three philosophers of this study. We will ignore, then, the otherwise novel theses of the book in order to concentrate on this other thesis concerning the body.

With what one might call a rather desparate effort to undercut the traditional dualism between idealism and realism, while yet keeping its framework of analysis, Bergson, wanting to affu"m "the reality of mind, the reality of matter, and attempt to deter­mine the relation between them," (MM, r) develops a concepti0n of "matter" as

an ensemble of "images." And, by "image," we understand a certain ex­istence which is more than what the idealist calls a representation, but less

1 Afatj~,, et Memoire, Presses Univeisitairesde France (Paris, Cinquante·quatrieme Edition, 1953), hereafter cited in the text as MM.

EPILOGUE 245

than what the realist calls a thing - an existence situated midway be­tween the "thing" and the "representation." (MM, I)

This conception, he believes, coincides with what commonsense implicitly takes to be the case:

For commonsense, the object exists in itself and, oil the other hand the object is in itself pictured as we perceive it : it is an image, but an ~e which exists in itself. (MM, 2)

With this conception, which we need not consider for its own sake here,1 Bergson attempts to cut away with one stroke the underbrush of confusion and excess within the idealist-realist feud, and to re-establish the relations between l' esprit and la matiere. In thP course of his inquiry, however, he encounters a peculiarity - precisely the one which henceforth plays such an important role in the discussions of the body after him. If, he argues, all matter whatever consists in an ensemble of images then

there is one such image which cuts across all others in that I know it not only from without by means of perceptions, but also from within by affections: tbisis my body. (MM, n)

This "image" has peculiar characteristics. On the one hand it seems capable, not simply of 1'eactions to stimuli, but of genuine actions, that is to say, of a certain spontaneity as regards objects. It acts in the face of what could hardly be simply called "sen­sations;" rather, it acts on and reacts to full-bodied objects, to objects as "dangerous" or "promising," "suspicious" or "bene­ficial," and SO OD.

At least this "image," "my body," then, is singled out from the universe of "images" as that by means of which something new is added to the universe, something not merely the result of a causal chain - i.e., the spontaneously articulated actions of my body. (MM, I2, 57, 66) On the other hand, though, and in spite of its focal position in the universe of matter, the body, he believes, is itself only a part of the universe. Thus, he argues against former psychology and physiology, "It is the brain which

1 :;:ter. se~~g up this terminology, ho~ever, Bergson then goes on to use "l'image" and ~ ob3et mterchangeably. In a way, it might be suggested, bad be not insisted on speaking of "l'image" as "une existence," and bad he taken it instead as "un sens" his descriptions of things as images would have been quite close to Husserl's meani~g of "pbenomenon."

EPILOGUE

is part of the material world; the material world is not part of the brain." (MM, 13) Indeed, if one made the brain (or the body itself) the condition of the "image totale," he would be involved in an absurdity, just because of that part-whole relation. - "But if," Bergson continues, "my body is an object capable of exercising a real and new action on the objects which surround it, it must occupy in respect of them a privileged situation." (MM, 14- 15) In that my body is a "centre d'action" for objects, changing their mutual relations, working on them, and so on, these objects must themselves be what Merleau-Ponty later will call "poles of action." That is to say, by being able "to exercise a real influence on other images, and thus to be able to choose between several materially possible steps," Bergson concludes, in a way strikingly similar to what Merleau-Ponty argues later, that

It is indeed necessary that these images in some manner outline (on the side which they tum toward my body) the part which my body can taJi:e from them ... (the objects) are organized according to the increasmg or decreasing powers of my body. The objects which sHrround my body reflect the possible action of my body on them.• (MM, 15-16)

Hence, while matter is the ensemble of images, the perception of matter becomes, for Bergson, precisely " these same images related to the possible action of a certain determinate image, my body." • (MM, 17)

With this new perspective, Bergson returns to his criticism of traditional philosophy, charging that for both realism and idea­lism, "to perceive signifies above all to know." (MM, 21) Against this assumption, Bergson now contends, as will each of the philosophers we have studied, that perception is tiot in the service of knowledge (or even, more generally, it does not merely or primarily yield information about the world's material structure); rather, it is in the service of action. That is to say, perceived objects are what the body does or can do to them, just because the body itself is "un centre d' action'':

... we have considered the body as a kind of center from which the action that surrounding objects exercise on it is reflected on these same ob­jects: external perception is just this reflection ... Perception ... measures our possible action on things and by that, inversely, the possible action of things on us.• (MM, 51; also, 35, 74-75, ~99)

Hence, the greater the body's potential action, the larger will be the field which perception includes, and thus objects in the field of

EPILOGUE 247

perception are experienced as "dangerous" or "beneficial" inversely to what we might call their actional distance from the body: the closer the objects the greater the danger or promise which they present to the body, and thus the body's virtual action tends more to be actualized in real action. (MM, 57) As he emphasizes, "The acti4ality of our perception therefore consists in its activity." (MM, 71)

Now, despite the rather surprising absence of reference to Bergson's analyses of the body,1 even by Marcel who in other respects seems to admire Bergson, it seems to me that the very least which must be said is that Bergson's theory, while obviously sketchy, is a decisive precursor of these later theories. While it seems obvious that Bergson couched his conception of the body in the very framework he had set out to destroy (the dualism), while he tries to base his analysis on a dated, though for all. that quite novel, physiology, and while he sets his problems in contexts which do more to conceal than to reveal his meaning - despite these circumstances, he nevertheless acµieved genuinely original and profound insights which cannot but have left their mark on subsequent philosophy, especially in France.

On the one hand, it was Bergson whose work was one of the first to come to grips with the insuperable difficulties of previous thought. It was Bergson who called attention to the "privileged situation" of the body as regards the concrete relations of consciousness to objects. But beyond that, Bergson leaves little room for doubt as regards his fundamental point: the "privilege" which the body enjoys in a consequence of its "peculiarity" as one "image" among others, that is, that it is concretely experienced in a double manner by the one whose body it is, "externally" and " internally." As we shall see, Husserl's own analyses as well take this double manner of givenness of the animate organism as decisive. This circumstance, however, Bergson is quick to recog­nize, is unique. Considering this peculiarity, and recognizing that my own body is capable of exerting a "real influence" on objects in the world, Bergson recognizes immediately what Marcel,

1 The only exception, to my knowledge, is Merleau-Ponty's rather cryptic footnote to the effect that "the body remains for him {Bergson) what we have called the ob· jective body ... " (PP, 93) Such a view, unsupported by Merleau-Ponty, is indeed unsupportable. What Bergson analyzes Is precisely, I submit, what Merleau-Ponty calls the "body-proper."

EPILOGUE

Sartre and Metleau-Ponty were later to stress as central: my body can effect this influence on objects only in so far as it can be influenced by them. From this insight, Bergson quite correctly generalizes (again foreshadowing a basic point in these later theories): the fundamental relations between my body and surrounding objects is to be conceived in terms of my body's actual and possible action on them and their action on my body. Thus perception as well, being a "power" of my body, one of the modes of my body's action in and on surrounding objects, must be conceived as fundamentally what I would call actional: to perceive is to act, not in the sense of effecting a real alteration on objects (though perception is a necessary condition even for that), but in the sense that to perceive is to reflect the possible action of objects on my body and conversely the possible action of my body on them. Objects are not fu:st of all complexes of physical entities called atoms, nor is perception the reception of sense­data caused by the physical motions of these affairs. Objects, for my experience of them by means of my body, are essentially connected to my body's action on them, they are "poles of action."

Nevertheless, Bergson did not fully recognize the real signifi­cance of his analysis. For, with this conception he has already in fact undermined the dualism be sought to overcome: to consider objects as strict poles of action, and my body as actional, is tantamount to maintaining that objects in the world and consciousness as embodied are inseparable, that they are strict correlates of one another, and that, therefore, one must always consider objects strictly as correlates of the consciousness of them, and consciousness as the strict correlate to its objects. This then implies that objects are strictly "meant," or "intended" as such by consciousness. In other words, bad Bergson pressed the point to the utmost, it seems to me that his argument is tanta­mount to the effectuation of a phenomenological reduction - in a sense precisely analogous to what Aron Gurwitsch argued regar­ding Kohler's rejection of the constancy-hypothesis.1

A more complete analysis must obviously be undertaken in order to determine more accurately the bearing of Bergson's work on later philosophy, especially on subsequent theories of

1 See above, Part ill, Chapter I, footnote 2, p. 131.

EPILOGUE 249

the body like those studied herein. Without being able to do that here, I hope only to have initiated such a study, to have es­tablished the necessity and the justification for it.

(3) It now remains for us to show in what sense it is possible to outline the principle steps in a systematic phenomenology of the animate organism - perhaps the decisive direction in which our study leads.

Viewing our study as a whole, several positive insights into the phenomenon seems to have been achieved. In the first place it is clear that the object of study is an extremely co~x on~, for what we must focus upon here is the concrete experience by consciousness of its own animate organism. In other words, we have as our phenomenon a continuously on-going act, that of embodiment. It is not the case that embodiment is something which is "once done, forever done." Rather, the animate organism, in so far as it is experienced concretely by consciousness, is the continuously on-going embodying of the flux of mental life: In this sense, the organism can at times (for instance, in moments of clumsiness, or when one is sleepy or anesthetized) fail to embody consciousness more or less; at other times (as in moments of "well­being," when one has "control" over his body, and so forth), it seems to be my body, more fully actualizing my fundamental " I can." One specific "object" is in the on-going course of experience uniquely singled out for consciousness (and at higher levels, for me, this man) as having thenoematic-objective sense, "my body." In order to account for ~ experiencing of this organism as, in Bergson's terms, "privileged" and "peculiar," it is necessary to explicate phenomenologically this process of "singling out" which gives to that organism its sense of being the embodiment of that consciousness whose organism it is. In this sense, to speak of "my body qua mine" (Marcel), the "body-for-itself" (Sartre), or the "body-proper" (Merleau-Ponty), is to speak of the pheno­menon of embodiment.

Second, as each of these thinkers have seen, this "singling out" oc~rimarily on the basis of some kind of "feeling" (sentir). To "feel" objects in the world, or more generally, in order to perceive them at all, I must qua perceiver "feel" my own body. This feeling, in turn, as Merleau-Ponty states the matter, is a

EPILOGUE

function of the motivity of the body-proper; or, to use Marcel's terms, my body is mine only in so far as it is "me-as-acting."

Third, the disclosure of the motivity of the body-proper reveals that the body-proper is a certain ensemble of "powers" or "potencies" (p0tJ.voirs, frtlissances). In this sense, my body is for me the most immediate actualization of my " I can" (more fundamentally, of the automatic strivings of consciousness).

Fourth, my body is the primal condition for the existence of the objective, physico-cultural world (it is, as Marcel says, the "landmark" of all existence), in the sense that it is the "that by means of which" there is a world and objects in the first place. My body, as Sartre stresses, is the orientational center, o: in terms of which the world and its multiple objects are structured and organized. _

Finally, my body-proper is a synthetically organized system of organs, having multiple fields of sensation (visual, tactual, auditory, and so forth) each of which has its own intrinsic organization and its own specific functional place in the total system of the body-proper.

To develop a systematic phenomenology of the animate or­ganism, however, it is obviously not sufficient merely to enumer­ate characteristics. It is necessary as well to determine the relations among the component senses of this complex phenome­non. Specifically, it must be established which of these com­ponents are more fundamental ("founding") and which are higher level components ("founded"). I shall attempt only to outline such an analysis, to suggest the principle components of the phenomenon in question, following the brief and scattered analyses given by Husserl.

Without claiming to be exhaustive, it seems to me that we may distinguish four moments of the complex noematic-objective sense, "animate organism": 1 it is, as Husserl expresses it, the bearer of the orientational point, 0, with respect to which other objects are organized in the spatio-temporal surrounding world; the body is as well a certain "organ of perception" (Walmieh­mungsorgan); it is, in the third place, that on and in which my fields of sensation are spread out (Sinnesorgan); and, finally, it is that which most immediately actualizes the automatic

l Cf. Cartesian MuWaticms, op. cU., p. 97.

EPILOGUE

strivings of consciousness, and at higher levels, that which actualizes my willings (Willensorgan).

My body-proper acquires these senses for consciousness on the basis of a complex process which continuously and auto­matically goes on throughout the life of consciousness: that of embodiment. As such this "sense-constitution" is not, contrary to Merleau-Ponty, something "once done, forever done." Rather, as we have seen, my body-proper can and sometimes does fail to embody consciousness. Thus, the crucial phenomenon for us to trace out systematically is that process of "singling out" in virtue of which, in the normal constitution of the body-proper, this animate organism is experienced as the embodiment of my consciousness.

The problem as posed, then, reveals the way in which a solution must be sought. If, as is experientially evident (evident, that is to say, on the basis of reflectively observing the phenome­non itself, as it-itself "in person''),1 thi$ organism presents itself to me as my animate organism, then we must take this noemati­obj ective sense as our "clue" (Leitfaden) to those Bewusstseinser­lebnisse in virtue of which the phenomenon is experienced origi­na/,iter:

Necessarily the point of departure is the object given "straight­forwardly" at the particular time. From it reflection 2 goes back to the mode of consciousness at that time and to the potential modes of con­sciousness includedhorizonally in that mode, then to those in which the object might be otherwise intended as the same, within the unity (ulti­mately) o[ a possible conscious life, all the possibilities of which are included in the "ego." 3

As regards the phenomenon of my animate organism, however, we face a peculiar difficulty, only hinted at in our discussion of Marcel. Here we do not have an object-simpliciter. Rather, as Husserl indicates in one place, when I, the phenomenological observer, objectivate (for my descriptive purposes) the pheno­menon in question I see straightaway that my animate organism is

l CL Cartesian Meditati<ms, op. cit., pp. n-18, for the systematic treatment of Evidem.

I Always, we must i:emember, such reflection is reflection within the phenomeno· logical reduction.

a Ibid., p. 50; cf. also, pp. 51-53.

252 EPILOGUE

reflexively related to itself. That becomes possible because I "can" perceive one hand "by means of" the other, an eye by means of a hand, and so forth - a procedure in which the functioning organ mt~t become a11 Object and tlie Object a fwnctio11i11g organ. And it is the same in the case of my generally possible original dealing-with Nature and with my animate organism - which therefore is reflexively related to itself also in j>Tactice.1

In short, this phenomenon is unusual just because, not only is it experienced by consciousness as its own animate organism, but in that very experiencing itself it is intended as being reflexively related to itself in a double manner: sense-perceptively, and in practice and action.

This, then, is the clue which must be investigated both as regards its own intrinsic structure (statically) and as regards its own sense-genesis (genetically, in the phenomenological sense.2) The static analysis would reveal the relations of foundedness (Fundierwng) which obtain among the multiple strata of the objective sense which the animate organism has for consciousness. The genetic analysis, on the other hand, has for its task the descriptive explication of those synthetic processes of conscious­ness (identifying, differentiating, and associative transfers of sense) a which "motivate" consciousness' experience of its animate organism as uniquely its own organism.

We have already initiated a static analysis by distinguishing among the four primary strata of sense belonging to the animate organism. We must now attempt to explicate the founding and founded strata. Before undertaking such an analysis, however, we must point out that we here are ignoring the higher levels of sense of the organism: first, the sense it has as a cultural object of a complex kind (with its complexity of sense, as, for instance, a coordinated organ in athletic contests, as an object which can serve as the subject-matt er of sculpture, painting, photography, and so on, i.e., as an art object), and second, its sense as an intersubjective object (or, in Sartre's terms, the body as being­for-others, and one's experience of his own body-proper as it is experienced by others - shyness, pride, masochism, as disgusting, pleasing, and the like).4

I Ibid., p. 97. s Cf. Cartesian M ediiations, pp. 77-80. a Cf. above, Part 111 , Chapter ill, pp. 204~33. 4 Cf. Cartesian Meditations, Meditations lV and V.

EP ILOGUE 253

If we now abstractively isolate these strata of sense, the animate organism still has a complex objective sense for conscious­ness - namely, those strata we have already delineated above. The problem now is to determine which of the remaining strata are founded and which are founding. The organism, that is to say, even when one abstractively isolates the cultural and intersubjec­tive senses, still has the sense of being a synthetically constituted system of organs by means of which objects in the surrounding field are given to the correlatively abstractively isolated noetic stratum of consciousness.

In the on-going course of its harmonious experiencing of the world at this level, which has the sense for it, "spatio-temporally existent world," consciousness intends its own organism as that by means of which there are sensuously perceivable and practico­instrumental things within that world. More particularly, by means of its own organism, consciousness experiences some particular milieu as struct ured in terms of its own particular projects-at-hand which are actualized by means of its bodily activities, and as organized around and oriented to its own organism as the "center" of this milieu. Not only do "actions" (in the broad sense) issue from "here and now," but also the per­ceived things are oriented, and refer back, to this same "here and now" which is the animate organism embodying the conscious­ness for whom the milieu is milieu. Thus, my animate organism has the sense of being the bearer of an orientational point, "O," from which spatio-temporal coordinates organize and structure the milieu.

This sense becomes constituted on the basis of a number of processes whose exact nature is extremely difficult to describe. In the first place, my animate organism functions as this single Null-point only as the consequence of a continuously on-going series of automatic syntheses in virtue of which it is continuously experienced as a corporeal system of body-members,-components, and-organs, each of which can also function as a relative null­point for specific purposes and with regard to specific objects. My hand, with which I grasp and feel within my "manipulatory sphere" 1 is itself an orientational point relative to that which is

1 We borrow this apt phrase from Alfred Sch(itz, "Symbol, Reality and Society," in: L. l3ryson, et al (editors), Symbols and Society, 14th Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion, Harper Bros. (New York, t955), pp. :xs4--s6.

254 EPILOGUE

grasped and handled. Similarly, my eyes are experienced by me as the zero-point for the visual field. My head itself functions as a zeropoint, not only for the visual, but for auditory and gustatory data as well (I tum my head "in order to" hear the music more clearly), and so forth. Each of these, however, are themselves relative to a fundamental ground or zero-point (a Boden or Urpunkt), which is my body-proper - which itself seems to be relativized as a Boden with respect to an Urboden, namely, the Earth, or at least, some place on which the body-proper stands or rests (the floor of an aircraft, the basket of a helium-filled balloon, or perchance, the Moon). There is thus constituted with respect to the constitution of my animate organism as my absolute "here," a "near-sphere," and, "over there," beyond my immediate manipulatory reach, a "far-sphere," and so on into overlapping zones of actual, potential, and restorable reach.1

In order, however, for an organ to function as a zero-point (or, in order for the body-proper to function as a systematically interrelated context of zero-points whose totality is itself a zero­point), it must be constituted first as an organ, as a perceptual organ. The eye is, as Sartre expresses it, the center of the visual field only in so far as the eye is sensuously perceptive of visual objects which are then organized around it as their center. Thus, the body-proper as the bearer of the orientational point, 0, is a stratum of sense which is founded on the stratum, body­proper as my organ of perception (Wahmehmtmgsorgan). Certain kinds of sensuous data, moreover, can occur only at very restricted places on my body-proper: visual data are sensuously perceived only by the eye, auditory data by the ear, and so forth. Whereas, the tactual-muscular-visceral organs are literally spread out over the entire body-proper. Yet, in spite of this multiplicity of data, the variation of localization of these data, and the multiplicity of zero-points, this animate organism is experienced as one synthetic corporeal system and "center," as a sort of "synergetic" system in virtue of which data of the most diverse kinds are synthetically unified and intended by consciousness as pertaining, or belonging, to one identical. state of affairs: I see a red ball, touch it, taste it, smell it, strike it and hear it- the "it" being intended through-

1 Ibid., Idem.

EPILOGUE 255

out as one and the same object, by means of one and the same organism. In this sense, my organism is automatically constituted as one, single W ahrnehmungsorgan, by means of continuously on-going but automatic syntheses of corporeal unification, which, moreover, are of different kinds: identification, differentiation, and associative sense-transfer. And, it is by means of these syntheses that objects can beintendedasself-identicalthrougbout a multiplicity of changes of appearance.

Tu order to trace back the constitution of this Leibk6rper as a W alirtieltmungsorgan, it would be necessary to take it as the clue pointing back to those syntheses which unify it, which connect the various sensuous organs and members into one corporeal system. This task calls for an abstractive is0lation of each of these fields as to their respective sense-strata, for only thereby would it be possible to see how, from the sense-strata of each field, the occurs a synthesis of unification, itself made up of more fundamental syntheses.

Once this abstractive isolation has been effectuated, it be­comes possible, first of all, to show how each field is constituted in itself as a self-identical sensuous field functioning as a center, 0, for a milieu of data disclosed by means of it, and second, to show how the several fields become constituted by consciousness as one corporeal system.

In this manner, the organism acquires the sense of being a Sinnesorgan: that "on" and "in" which the various fields of sensation are "spread out." My animate organism, that is to say, becomes singled out from all other objects in the surrounding world

namely as the only one of them that is not just a body but precisely an animate organism: the sole Object ... to which, in accordance with experience, I ascribe fields of sensation (belonging to it, however, in different manners - a field o! tactual sensations, a field o! warmth and coldness, and so forth) .. . . l

My org-an.ism is thus constituted, Husserl points out, as the "bearer of locaUzed sensations":

All the sensations which are bro~ht about have their localization, that is to say they are distinguished by means of their respective places on the animate organism on which they appear, and they belong to it phenome-

EPILOGUE

nally. The organism is thus originarily constituted in .a double manner: on the one hand, it is a physical thing, matter, having its extension in which its real properties adhere (color, smoothness, roughness, warmth and other such material properties); on the other hand, I find on it, and I sense "on" and "in" it: warmth on the back of my hand, cold in my foot, touch-sensations on my fingertips. I sense spread out over wider expanses of my organism's flesh the push and pull of clothes .... • 1

These "Empfindwngen" are by no means what traditional philosophy and psychology understood by "sense-data." Rather, Husserl points out, they are "live-bodily events" (Leibesv01'­kommnisse} and not "physical events" (physisches V orkommnisse}. They are events which occur as components within a specific context of bodily activity, and thus (as we shall see shortly} are always functionally correlated to specific types of bodily feelings of motion (kinaesthesias,Husserl calls them). Thus, for instance, laying my hand on the table I tactually sense a certain rigidness, coldness, roughness, and so on, but only as one com­ponent of a total context of bodily activity; these "data" occur as functionally correlated with the kinaesthesias in play here (called, "moving my hand across the table"}. All "sensations" of that kind are Liebesvorkommnisse, and occur in functional correlation with bodily activity (as both Metleau-Ponty and Marcel emphasize}. And, which is the point here, these sensations of objects are presented as localized "in" and "on" my organism (in our example, my hand - and not " in" my neck, "on" my knee, and so forth}. In other words, Husserl continues,

The localized sensations are not properties of the animate organism as physical thing, but on the other hand are the properties of the thing "animate organism" - more particularly, actional properties, properties of the organism's activity. They appear if the organism is touched, pressed, burned, and so forth, and they appear there where it is and in the time when it is. They continue to occur only under circumstances, so long as the contact lasts.• 1

My organism, then, is constituted for my experience as that "on" and "in" which fields of sensation are spread out, as the bearer of localized fields of sensation. As such, it is a corporeal system or context of localized fields. The animate organism in this sense is a Sinnesorgan, a sensuous organ. As with its other two component senses thus far indicated, so, too, a further task is

1 Ideen, 11, op. cit., pp. 145-46. 2 Ibid., p. 146.

EPILOGUE 257

here predelineated: the effort to describe and explicate the intentional unification of the various localized fields into the one, contextually unified Sinnesorgan, my animate organism.

Perhaps the most crucial phenomenon which appears after these abstractive isolations is that of the functional correlation of certain sensuous data (which Husserl calls "hyletic" data) and the kinaesthetic data already mentioned. Each sensory field reveals itself as complex, and in a double manner. On the one hand, every sensuous content whatever is given as functionally correlated with certain typical patterns of kinaesthetic data -that is, it reveals a certain "if/then" style. " If" I set in motion certain kinds of kinaesthesias (say, "opening my mouth," along with other types, "raising my hand," and so on, moreover in a very particular manner and order), "then" certain sensuous contents will be actualized (say, tasting sweetness, pulpiness, and the like, correlated with "apples"}. But, on the other hand, and just because of this functional correlation, the organism is itself co-experienced (co-intended} simultaneously with the sensuous perception of a content: every sensuous perception, to speak at a higher level, necessarily involves a co-perception of the organism itself as that with which I perceive and that by means of which what is perceived is perceived.

Now, at the most fundamental level of this constitution, that is to say, at the deepest level of foundedness, it seems to me that the phenomenon of embodiment takes place by means of these kinaesthetic flow-patterns. The temporal flux of consciousness, that is to say, is actualized fundamentally by means of these flow-patterns; inversely, they are the most immediate actuali­zation of the temporal flux - the actualization, that is to say, of the flux of consciousness in its animate organism. And here, it seems to me, furthermore, this organism by which this flux is embodied, actualized in a "here and now," is uniquely singled out as the most immediate field of the actualization of aut0matic volitional processes, automatic strivings or tendencies.I And it is in virtue of this that my animate organism acquires the sense of being a "Wi'llensorgan." 2

1 Cf. Erfahrung und. Urleil, <>f>. cit.,§§ t7-2t. 2 Perhaps the best illustrations of tbis automaticity of actualized strivings are

to be found in the minute observatioos of infants by Piaget, though they are made by

EPILOGUE

On this ground, several decisive constitutions take place. These kinaesthetic flow-patterns are "freie Bewegimgen," that is to say, on-going automatic actualizations of automatic strivings on the part of the consciousness whose organism it is. And, thus, the organism becomes constituted as a Witlensorgan.

In the second place, this one organism is uniquely singled out for consciousness as that "on" and "in" which fields of sensation are spread out and synthetically unified in functional correlation to patterns of kinaesthetic flows.1 Thus, this animate organismis constituted for consciousness as being the condition, the "that by means of which" sensuous contents are disclosed; the organism acquires the sense of being that by means of which the conscious­ness whose organism it is, is "in" a world. This animate organism is that which effectuates the self-mundanization of conscious­ness. 2

On the basis of this complex sense-bestowing, this animate organism enters into certain types of relations with its milieu, relations of succession, simultaneity, and more important, of causality.a Put most generally, the de facto regularities in_

appearances of things in the milieu constituted as "the same" for each sensuous field (by means of the automatic syntheses already mentioned), these regularities of appearance become constituted as regularities of self-identical things, happening "under circum­stances" (Umstiinde) which are essentiilly connected to this ani­mate organism's actual and potential action "on" or " to" these things. Already at the automatic levels, "things" are experienced by consciousness, not as isolated fragments unrelated to one another, but rather as self-identical unities happening in a regu­lar fashion, undergoing change and alteration, and maintaining regularities with other unities and with the organism itself. Thus, for instance, the visual perceiving of a variation in color in the

him with other purposes in mind, and thus he does not mention this point. His observations, in addition, point up in an empirical manner remarkably parallel to Husserl's eidetic analyses, the fact that this, and every other, sense which this organism has for me is in truth an acquisition, a genesis, and not at all "given" to begin with.

1 Cf. Carlesia1iJ\feditations, p. 97i and Idem, II, <>f>. cit., p. 56. 2 Idun, II, p. 65. a But not causality in the sense used by natural science; cf. Maurice Natanson,

"Causality as a Structure of the Ube1isUJelt," journal of E:rme•uial Psychiatry, Vol. I, No. 3 (Fall, 1960), pp. 346-66. [t Is a question of "lived causality," the way in which the regularities.of the world, the body, and objects are concretely lived.

EPILOGU E

visual field is constituted as "happening under circumstances": perhance the light in my room grows dim, the sun goes behind a cloud, or another object casts its shadow over the thing in question. All along, the thing which varies in respect of its color­moment is given in a series of color-appearances which, at this level, are construed (aufgefasst) by consciousness as variations of one identical thing whose appearances are functionally correlated with the organism as the "center'' of the visual field.1 Thus throughout all thing-variations, the organism is itself co-intended as self-identical:

The system of causality in which the animate organism is involved in normal apperception is of such a kind that the organism still Yemains in the frame of a typical <identity throughout all the alterations which it experiences. The alterations of the organism as a system of perceptual org~ are free bodily movements, and the organs can voluntarily return agam to the same fundamental position. They do not alter in such a way that. their. s~nsibility i~ tfl?ically .modified: they can always perform preclSely similar a.Iterations m precisely similar ways, namely, as regards the constitution of outer experiences .... • 2

Having thus acquired the complex sense of being the "Trager der Orientierungsptmkte Null," a Wahrnehtnwngsorgan, a Sinnes­orgatt as the system of sensory fields (and thereby the "center" as well for all relations to sensuous things), and a Willensorgan actualizing the free strivings which set in motion the kinaesthe­sias with which the appearances of things are functionally correlated - this animate organism becomes constituted as "unigue" among all other bodies and organisms in its milieu:

One animate organism is thereby -uniquely singled out for me in a remarkable manner, and therewith one animate creature, and especially one ~· before all others. It is my animate organism, and accordingly I am smgled out for myself before all other objeets of experience; "I," in the usual empirical sense of the term, i.e., "I, this man to whom this organism, my organism, belongs." My organism is the oxtly one in which I experience in an absolutely immediate manner, the embodiment of a psychic life (viz., a sensing, objectivating, feeling, and so forth, which is my own life, or which is "expressed" in corporeal form, in changing corporeal, animate events). This occurs in such a way that I at once perceive not only the thing, animate organism, and its corporeal conduct,

1 Cf. ldeen, II, pp. 62-63. 1 Ibid., p. 68. And, .he continues, '"Sensibility• here however has a relation to what

is Objective: I must be able to experience, precisely in a noan~ manner stillness as stillness, what is unaltered as -unaltered, and therein all the senses m~t tunction han:noniously together." • CL also, itnd., pp. 74-75.

26o EP ILOGUE

but also at the same time my psychic life; and, finally, both of these at once: the self-embodying of the latter (the psychic life} in the former (my organism), and the self-exJ>ressing of the one in the other.• 1

Thus, on the basis of this double constitution, or better, of the constitution of this animate organism as reflexively related to itself, this organism embodies and thereby "expresses" the consciousness whose organism it is. Hence, all my bodily move­ments (leiblichen B ewegungen) are experienced by me as at once rorporeal (and thus corporeally determinate and determi­nable by means of physiological laws) and as a subjectively lived "!ch bewege," which itself embodies (beseelt) this corporeal movement.2

The animate organism appearing to me presents itself uninterruptedly­and the change of its modes of appearance presents itself - as bearing concealedly s in itself this or that Psyche, as an exteriority which here has within it originaliter the interiority which "expresses" itself therein. Both present themselves inseparably in coincidence .... • 4

.::t<: In brief, this animate organism becomes constituted for me as mine in such a way that, as Metleau-Ponty had seen, it at once is me, and expresses me: it is at once the self-embodiment of my psychic life, and the self-expressiveness of my psychic life. Thus, we can say, the problem of the experience of the body is the problem of embodiment, and this problem, as Stephan Strasser emphasizes, is fundamentat.° From the lowest levels of inner­time consciousness, consciousness is embodied: first of all, by its kinaesthetic flow-patterns, then, bythe syntheses of identification, differentiation, and transfer of sense and unification, which constitute the various sensory fields as self-identical and different from one another, and then constitute this organism as one single orientational point, . . . and so on. The phenomenology of the animate organism is, accordingly, the descriptive-explicative analysis of the contin~ously on-going a11,tomatic embodiment of

l Husserl, E rste Philosophi6 (I9a3/:z4) 1 Zweiter Tell, Martinus Nijhoff, Husserliana Band Vill (Haag, 1959), pp: 60-61.

a Formale ~nd tra1is1mulentale Logik, op. cit., p. 213. ' There seems to me to be some question here, whether one can speak of the psychic

life embodied by an organism as "concealed" (geborgen ). ' Ers~ Philosophie, II, op. cit., p. 61. "So," he continues, "in einem erfahrenden

Blick die Hand und in ihrcr Bewegung die doppelseitige psycboph ysische Bewegmig die spezifisch letl>liche Bewegung." (loc. cit.) •

5 The Soul in Metaphysical and Empirical Psychology, Duquesne University (Pitts· burgh, 1957), pp. 142-50.

EPILOGUE 261

conscicnmiess by one organism singled out as peculiarly "its" own, and, at higher levels, graspable by me as "my own."

As Husserl bad seen as early as Id~en, I, if we attempt to make clear to ourselves how consciousness, which is itself abso­lute in respect to the world, can take on the character of trans­cendence, can become mundane,

We see, accordingly, that it can do so by means of a certain partici­pation in transcendence in the first, originary sense - which is manifestly the transcendence of material Nature. Only by means of the experimental relation t o the animate organism does consciousness become actually human and animal, and only thereby does it acquire a place in the space of Nature and in the time of Nature . . .. • t

Precisely this "Erlahrungsbeziehung zum Leibe" is the entire problem of this study.

1 Idun, I, op. cit., p. 103. The significance of the relation of the body to the consti­tution of Others and thereby to the common social world is also indicated here.

APPENDIX

Following are the important quotations which have been translated into English in the text of this work.

Page

4

4

5

9

IO

Re/eYence PA, 54

PA, 54

PA, 56--57

PA, 62

RI, 26

L'~tre est-ii? qu'est-ce que l 'etre? Mais sur ces problemes je ne puis porter ma reflexion sans voir se creuser sous mes pas un nouvel abime: moi qui interroge sur l'etre, puis-je etre assure que je suis? Qui suis-je, moi qui questionne sur l'etre ? Quelle qualite ai-je pour proc6der ~ ces investigations? Si je ne suis pas, comment esperai-je les vois aboutir? En admettant meme que je sois, comment puis-je etre assure que je suis? On pourrait dire en un langage inevitable­ment approximatif que mon interrogation sur l'etre presuppose une affirmation oi:l je serais en quelque maniere passif, et dont fe seYais le siege plut-Ot que fe n' en serais le S1tjet. Mais cecin'est qu'une limite, et que je ne puis realiser sans contradiction. Je m'oriente done vers la position ou la reconnaissance d'une participation qui possMe une realite de sujet; cette participation ne peut, par definition meme, etre objet de pensee; elle ne saurait faire fonction de solution, mais figure au dela. du monde des problemes: elle est meta-problematique. penser OU plus exactement affirmer le meta­problematique, c'est l'affirmer comme in­dubitablement reel, comme quel<:J.ue chose dont je ne puis douter sans contradiction. Nous sommes ici dans une zone ou ii n'est plus possible de dissocier l'idee elle-meme et la certitude ou l'indice de certitude qui l'affecte. Car cette idee est certitude, elle est assurance de soi, elle est dans cette mesure autre chose et plus qu'une idee. ie pense, non pas meme fe vis, mais i'~f>Youve,

Page Re/eYence

II RI, 27

I8 EA, 181

I8 RI, 40

19 ME, I, 49

2I EA, 15

APPENDIX

et i1 nous faut prendre ici ce mot dans son indetermination maxima. La langue alle­mande est ici beaucoup plus adequate que la nOtre: ich eYlebe .. . a un point oil ce Ich erlebe ne se distingue pas de Es erlebt in mir . . . . Lorsque je dis: j'existe, je vise incontes­tablement quelque chose de plus; je vise obscurement ce fait que je ne suis pas seulement pour moi, mais que je me mani­feste - il vaudrait mieux dire que je suis maniieste; le prefixe ex, dans exister, en tant qu'il traduit un mouvement vers l'e>..-terieur, et comme une tendance centri­fuge, est ici de la plus grande importance. ]'existe: cela veut dire j'ai de quoi nie faire connattre ou reconnaitre soit par autrui, soit par moi-m~me en tant que j'affecte pour moi une alterite d'emprunt. ... 11 est de !'essence de la liberte de pouvoir s'e.xercer en se trahissant. Rien d'exterieur a nous ne peut fermer la porte au desespoir. Lavoie est ouverte; on peut encore dire que la structure du monde est telle que 1e deses­poir absolu y paratt possible. peut-etre dans le mesure ou je prends conscience de cet a,ppel en tant gu'appel, suis­je amene a reconnaltre que cet appel n'est possible que parce qu'au fond de moi il y a quelque chose de plus interieur a moi-meme que moi-meme - et du meme coup l'appel change de signe. mais elle a l'avantage de mettre en lumiere cette verite essentielle que le progres philo­sopb.ique consiste dans l'ensemble des dem.arches successives par lesquelles une liberte, qui se saisit d'abord comme simple pouvoir du oui et du non, s'incame, ou, si l'on veut, se constitue comme puissance reelle en se conferant a elle-meme un contenu au sein duquel elle se decouvre et se recon­nait. invariablement ... a remonter de la vie vers la pensee et ulterieurement a Jfedescendre de la pensee vers la vie pour tenter d 'eclairer celle-ci. Rompre, par consequent, une fois pour toutes avec les metaphores qui representent la conscience comme un cercle lumineux a.utour duquel il n'y aurait pour elle que t enebres. C'est, au contraire, l'ombre qui est au centre.

Page 25

26

28

33

33

Reference EA, 23y

EA, 231

EA, 231

EA, 234

EA, 236-37

ME, I, n3

ME, I, II6

APPENDIX

Toute affu:mation portant sur un avoir semble bien etre batie en q11elque sorte sur le modele d'une sorte de position prototype oil le qui n'est auire que tnoi-meme. Il semble bien que l'avoir ne soit senti dans sa force, qu'il ne prenne sa valeur qu'a l'interieur du j'ai. Si uniu as OUllD il a est possible, ce n'est qu'en vertu d'une sorte de transfert qui d'ailleurs ne peut jamais s'effectuer sans une certaine deperdition. Ceci s'eclaire dans une certaine mesure si l'on songe a la relation qui unit manifeste­ment l'avoir au pouvoir, tout au moins la ou la possession est effective et litterale. Le pouvoir est quelque chose que j 'eprouve en l'exeryant ou en y resistant, ce qui apres tout revient au mE!me. et ceci est capital, que le contenu lui-mE!me ne se laisse pas definir en termes de pure spatialite. II me parait qu'il implique tourjours l'idee d'une potentialite; contenir, c'est enclore; mais enclore c'est emp&:her, c'est resister, c'est s'opposer ace que quelque chose se repande, se deverse, s'echappe, etc. En tant que je me conyois moi-meme comme a.yant en moi OU plus precisement a moi certains caracteres, certains apanages, je me considere du point du vue d'un autre auquel je ne m'oppose qu'a condition de m'etre d'abord implicitement identifie a lui .... Sans doute il ya dans l'avoir une double per­manence: permanence du qui, permanence du q"id; mais cette permanence est par essence menacee; elle se veut, ou du moins elle se voudrait; et elle s'echa.ppe a elle-meme. Et cette menace, c'est la prise de l'autre en tant qu'autre, l'autre qlli peut etre le monde en lui-meme, et en face duquel je me sens si douloureusement moi; je serre contre moi cette chose qui va m'etre arracMe peut-etre, je tente desesperement de me l'incorporer, de former avec elle un complexe unique, indecomposable. Desesperement, vaine­ment .... Le verite est bien plutOt qu'a l'interieur de toute possession, de tout mode de possession i1 y a comme un noya11 senti, et ce noyau n'est autre que !'experience, en elle-meme non intellectualisable, du lien par lequel mon corps est mien. Mon corps est mien pour autant que je ne le

Page Ref ere11ce

36 RI, 37

39 RI, 122-23

39 RI, 120

52 ldeen II, 152

APPENDIX

regarde pas, que je ne mets pas entre lui et moi d 'intervalle ou encore pour autant qu'il n'est pas objet pour moi, mais que je suis mon corps. . . Dire je suis mon corps c'est supprimer l'intervalle que je retablis au contraire si je dis que mon corps est mon instr1Jment. Quand nous employons les tennes recepteur, emetteur, etc., nous assimilons l'organism.e a un poste auquel parvient uncertain messa­ge. Plus exactement, ce qui est capte par ce poste, ce n 'est pas le message lui-meme, c'est un ensemble de donnees transcriptfbles a la faveur d 'un certain code. Le message au sens strict implique meme une double trans­mission, le premiere operation se produisant au depart, la seconde a l'arrivee; peu importe d'ailleurs les modalitees materielles infiniment variables qu'elle comporte. nous sommes dupes d'une illusion lorsque nous imaginons confusement que la con­science receptive vient traduire en sensation quelque chose qui lui est donne initialement comme phenomene physique, comme ebran­lement par exemple. Q'est-ce en effet que traduire? c'est dans tousles cas substituer un groupe de donnees a un autre groupe de donnees. Mais ce terme de donnees demande a !tre pris ici a la rigueur. Le choc eprouve par l'organisme ou par telle de ses parties n'est aucunement donne; ou plus exactement il est une donnee pour l'observateur qlli le peryoit d'une certaine maniere, non pour l 'organisme qui le subit. Recevoir, c'est admettre chez soi quelqu'un du dehors, c'est l'introduire ... sentir, c'est recevoir; rnais il faudra aussitOt specifier que recevoir, ici, c'est m'ouvrir, et par conse~ quent me donner, bien plut6t que ce n'est subir une action exterieure. par rapport a un soi qui peut d'ailleurs etre le soi d'autrui et j'entends par soi quelqu'un qui dit ou qui est au moins cense pouvoir dire moi, se poser au etre pose comme moi • .. Encore faut-il - et c'estm6me ici l'essentiel -que ce soi eprouve comme sien un certain domaine. efosige Objekt, das fur den Willen meines reinen Ich unmittelbar spontan beweglich ist und Mittel, um eine mittelbare sponta.ne Bewegung anderer Dinge zu erzeugen ...

266

Page Reference

56 ldeen II, 144

59 EN, 336

60 EN, 330

60 EN, 329

61 EN, 15

62 EN, 16

APPENDlX

(Das Ich) hat das "Vermogen" ("ich kann") diesen Leib, bzw. die Organe, in die er sich gliedert, frei zu bewegen, und mittels ihrer eine Aussenwelt wahrzuriehmen. bei aller Erfabrung von ranmdinglichen Objekten der Leib als Wah.mehmungsorgan des erlahrenden Subjektes "mit dabei ist" . .. Si done l'etre-regarde, degage dans toute sa purete, n'est lie au corps d'autrui plus que ma conscience d'6tre conscience, dans la pure realisation du cogito, n'est liee a mon propre corps, il faut considerer l'apparition de certains objets dans le champ demon experi­ence, en particulier la confergence des yeux d'autrui dans ma direction, comme une pure monition, comme l'occasion pure de realiser mon etre-regardi .... Si l'on me regarde, en effet, j'ai conscience d'etre objet. Mais cette conscience ne peut se produire que dans et par l'existence de l'autre. En cela Hegel avait raison. Setilement, cette autre conscience et cette autre h'berte ne me sont jamais donnks, puisque, si elles l'etaient, elles seraient connues, done objets et que je cesserais d'etre objet. Et lorsque je pose natvement qu'il est possi­ble que je sois, sans m'en rendre compte, un etre objectif, je suppose implicitement par Ia meme !'existence d'autrui, car comment serais-je obj et si ce n 'est pour un sujet? Ainsi autrui est d' abord pour moi l'etre pour qui je suis objet, c'est-a-dire l'etre par qui je gagne mon objectite. L'existant est phenomene, c'est-a-dire qu'il se designe lui-meme comme ensemble organi­sl! de qualites ... L'etre est simplement la condition de tout dl!voilement: il est etre­pour-devoiler et non etre devoile .... ... l'etre du phenomene, quoique coextensif au phenomene, doit l!chapper a la condition pbl!noml!nale - qui est de n'exister que pour autant qu'on se revele - et que, par conse­quent, il deborde et Ionde la connaissance qu'on en prend. la condition necessaire et suffisante pour qu'une conscience soit oonnaissante de son objet, c'est qu'elle soit conscience d'elle­m6me comme etant cette connais.sance. C'est une condition necessaire: si ma conscience n'etait pas conscience d'etre conscience de table, elle serait done conscience de cette

Page Reference

65 EN, 26

67 EN, 29

70 EN, 222

7i E N, 226

73 EN, 359

APPENDIX

table sans avoir conscience de l'etre ou, si l'on veut, une conscience qui s'ignorerait soi­m6me, u.ne conscience inconsciente - ce qui est absurde. C'est une condition suffisante: il suffit qui j'aie conscience d 'avoir conscience de cette table pour que j'en aie en effet conscience. Cela ne suffir certes pas pour me permettre d'affirmer que cette table existe e11

soi - mais bien qu'elle existe pour moi. tout activite, toute spontaneite. C'est precise­ment parce qu'elle est spontanl!ite pure, parce que rien ne peut mordre sur elle, que la conscience ne peut agir sur rien. La subjectivite absolue ne peut se constituer qu'en face d'un revele, l'immanence ne peut se deiinir que dans la saisie d'un transcen­dant ... la conscience implique da.ns son etre un etre non conscient et transphenomenal. la conscience est un ttre pour lequel il est dans son Atre question de son ttre en tant que cet Atre impliqtte tm itre a1dre que lui. Le rapport originel de presence, comme fondement de la connaissance, est negatif. Mais comme la negation vient au monde par le pour-soi et que la chose est ce qu'elle est, dans !'indifference absolue de l'identite, ce ne peut etre la chose qui se pose comme n'etant pas le pour-soi. La negation vient du pour-soi lui-meme. . . Mais par la negation originelle, c'est le pour-soi qui se constitue comme n'etant pas la chose. Ce qui signifie que dans ce type d'etre qu'on appelle le connaitre, le seul ttre qu'on puisse rencontrer et qui est perpetuellement la, c'est le connu. Le connaissant n'est pas, il n'est pas saisissable. II n'est rien d'autre que ce qui fait qu'il y a un etre-la du connu, une presence - car de 1ui-meme le connu n'est ni present ni absent, il est simplement. Mais cette p resence du connu est presence a rien, pu:isque le connaissant est pur reflet d 'un n'etre pas, elle para.it done, a travers la translucidite total edu connaissant connu, presence absolue. ... si meme je :pouvais tenter de me faire objet, deja je serais moi au coeurdecetobjet que je suis et du centre meme de cet objet j'aurais a etre le sujet qui le regarde ... (Mais) precisement etre objet c'est n'etre-pas­moi .... La contradiction est ilagrante: pour pouvoir

270

Page Reference

92 EN, 38x

92 EN, 381-82

96 EN, 388

96 EN. 392-g3

APPENDIX

spective particuliere qui traduise ses relations au fond de monde et aux autres ceci. Les references intra-mondaines ne peuvent se faire qu'a des objets du monde et le monde vu definit perpetuellement un objet visible auquel renvoient ses perspectives et ses dispositions. Cet objet apparalt au milieu de monde et en meme temps que le monde; il est toujours donne par surcrolt avec n'ilnpor­te quel groupement d'objets, puisqu'il est defini par l'orientation de ces objets: sans lui, il n'y anrait aucune orientation, puisque toutes les orientations seraient equivalentes. mon etre-dans-le•monde, par le seul fait qu'il realise un monde, se fait indiquer a lui­meme comme un etre-au-m.ilieu-du-monde par le monde qu'il realise ... mon corps est partout sur le monde ... Mon corps est a la fois coextensif au monde, epandu tout a travers les choses et, a la fois, ramasse en ce seul point qu'elles indiquent toutes et que je suis, sans pouvoir le connattre. Ainsi, c'est le surgissement du pour-soi dans le monde qui fait exister du meme coup le monde com.me totalite des choses et les sens com.me la maniere objective dont les qualites des choses se presentent. puisque nous serions renvoyes a l'infini. Cet instrument, nous ne l'employons pas, nous le sommes. Il ne nous est pas donne autre­ment que par l'ordre utensile du monde, par l'espace hodologique ... mais il ne saurait etre donne a mon action: je n'ai pas a m'y adapter Di a y adapter un autre outil, mais il est mon adaptation roeme aux outils, !'adaptation que je suis. Naissance, passe, contingence, necessite d'un point de vue, condition de fait de toute action possible sur le monde; tel est Je c()f'ps, tel il est pour moi ... (C'est) condition neces­saire de !'existence d'un monde et. .. realisa­tion contingente de cette condition. L'affectivite coenesthesique est alors pm:e saisie non-positionnelle d'une contingence sans couleur, pure apprehension de soi com.me existence de fait. Cette saisie perpetuelle par mon pour-soi d'un gollt fade et sans distance qui m'accompagne jusque dans mes efforts pour m'en delivrer et qui est mon goiit, c'est ce que nous avons decnt ailleurs sous le nom de Nausk. Une nausee discrete et insuimon-

Page Refereme

98 EN. 405

IOO EN, 410

IOI EN. 413

io3 EN, 4 20

104 EN, 421- 22

APPENDIX 27I

table reve!e perpetuellement mon corps a ma conscience .... ,11 revient au meme d'etudier la fayon dont m(m corps apparait a autrui OU celle dont le corps d'autrui m'apparait. Nous avons etabli, en effet, que les structures de mon etre-pom:-autrui sont identiques a celles de l'etre d'autru.i pour moi. Mais, de meme, on ne sau.rait percevoir le corps d'autrui comme chair a titre d 'objet isole ayant avec les autres ceci de pures relations d'exteriorite. Ceci n'est vrai que pour le cadavre. Le corps d'autrui com.me chair m'est immediatement donne com.me centre de reference d'une situation qui s'or­ganise synthetiquement autour de lui etil est inseparable de cette situation .... ... etre objet-pour-autrui OU etre-corps, ces deuxmodalites ontologiques sont traductions rigoureusement equivalentes de l'etre-pour­autrui du pour-soi. Ainsi, les significations ne renvoient-elles pas a un psychisme mysterieux: elles sont ce psychisme, en tant qu'il est transcendance-transcendee ... En particulier ... manifestations emotionnelles ou, d'une fayon plus generale, les phenomenes improprement appeles d'expression ne nous indiquent nullement une affection cachee et vecue par quelque psychisme ... ces fronce­ments de sourcils, cette rougeur, ce begaie­ment, ce leger tremblement des mains, ces regards en dessous qui semblent a la fois timides et menayants n 'expriment pas la cole­re, ils sont la colere. Ainsi, la relativite de mes sens, que je ne puis penser abstraitement sans detruire m(m monde, est en meme temps perpetuellement presentifiee a moi par }'existence de l'autre; mais c'est une pure et insaisissable appresen­tation. que j 'aie rencontre autrui dans sa subjectivite objectivante, puis comme objet; il faut, pour que je juge le corps d'autrui com.me objet semblable a mon corps, qu'il m'ait ete donne comme objet et que mon corps m'ait devoile de son cote une dimension-objet. J amais l'analogie ou la ressemblance ne peut constituer d'abord l'objet-corps d'autrui et l'objectivite de mon corps; mais au contraire, ces deux objectites doivent exister prealable­ment pour qu'un principe analogique puisse

272

Page

I08

Il3

II6

Refereme

EN, 202

Ideen zu einer rei­nen Phanomenclo­gie und phiinomeno­logischen Ph11oso­phie, Band I, 64

Formate und trans­zendentale Logjk, 187

PP, 58

PP, iv

APPENDIX

j oner. lei donc;c' est le la.ngage qui m 'apprend les structu11es pour autrui de mon corps. La reflexion est une conncµssance, ce}a n'est pas douteux, elle est pourvue d'un caFactere positionnel; elle a.ff:inne la conscience refte­cllie. Mais toute affirmation ... est condition­-nee par une negation: affirmer cet objet, c'est nier simultanement que je sois cet objet. Connaitre, c'est se faire autre. Wohl zu beachten ist dabei, dass hier nicht die Rede ist von einer Be,eiehung zwischen. irgendeinem psychologischen V orkommnis -genannt Erlebnis - und einem anderen realen Dasein - genannt Gegenstand - oder von einer psychologischen Verkniip/ung, die in obf ektiver Wirklichkeit zwischen dem einen und a.nderen statthli.tte. Vielmehr ist von fulebnissen rein ihrem Wesen nach, bzw. von rein.en Wesen die Rede und von dem, was in den Wesen, " a priori," in unbedingter N otwendigkeit be­schlossen ist. Es ist zu betonen, dass clieses Zuriickverwei­sen nicht abgeleitet ist aus eine.r indi4ctiven EmpiYie des psychologischen Beobachters ... sondern. es ist, wie in der Phanomenologie zu zeigen ist, ein W esensbestand deY Intentionali­tat; aus ihremeigenenintentionalen Gehaltin den entsprechenden Erftillungsleistungen zu enthiillen. les psycbologues qui pratiquent la description des phenomenes n 'aper9oivent pas d 'ordinajre la -portee philosophique de leur methode. DS ne voient pas que le retour a l'expenence perceptive, si cette reforme est consequente et radicale, condamne toutes les form.es de realisme ... que le veritable defaut de l'intel­lectualisme est justement de prendre pour donne l'univers determine de la science, que ce reproche s'applique a fortiori a la pensee psychologique, puisqu'elle place la consGience perceptive au :milieu d 'un monde tout iait, et que la critique de l'hypothese de constance si elle est conduite jusqu'au bout, prend la valeur d 'une veritable "reduction phenome­nologique" ... elle n 'a jamais rompu avec le naturalisme. Mais du meme coup elle devient infidele a ses propre descriptions. Le monde est Ia avant toute analyse que je puisse en faire et il serait artificiel de l~ faire deriver d'une serie de syntheses qui relieraien't les sensations, puis les aspects

Page

137

139

I39

Reference

PP, 412-I3

PP, 253

PP,90

Une philosophie de l' ambigu'ite, 386

PP, xi

PP, viii-ix

APPENDIX 273

perspectifs de l'objet, alors que les unes et les autres sont justement des produits de l'analyse et ne doivent}las etre realises avant elle. son objet ne peut pas lui echapper absolument puisque nous n'en avons ,notion que par elle. 11 faut bien que la reflexion donne en quelque maniere l'irreflechi, car, autrement, nous n ' aurions rien a lui opposer et elle ne devien­drait pas probleme pour nous ... Ce qui est donne et vrai initialement, c'est une reflexion ouverte sur l'irreflechi, le reprise reflexive de l' irreflechi .... prend son objet a l'etat naissa.nt, tel qu'il apparait a celui qui le vit, avec !'atmosphere de sens dont il est alors enveloppe, et qui cherche a se glisser dans cette atmosphere, pour retrouver, demere les faits et les sympte>mes disperses, l'etre total du sujet, s'il s'agit d'un normal, le trouble fondamen­tal, s'il s'agit d'un malade. La reflexion radicale est celle qui me ressaisit pendant que je suis en train de former et de formuler l'idee du sujet et oelle de l'objet, elle met au jour la source de ces deux idees, elle est reflexion non seulement opera.nte, mais encore consciente d'elle-meme clans son. operation. en l'accomplissant moi-meme et clans la mesure ou je suis un corps qui se leve vers le monde. Autrement dit, el it fallait s'y attendre, la these fondamentale de la philosophie de Medeau-Ponty: toute connaissance s'enra­cine dans Ja perception, est elle-meme ambi­gue. Si elle signifie que toute connaissance liwnaine s'origine clans le concret et en poursuit l'explicatition, tout ce qui a ete dit dans ce livre nous parait l'etablir. Si, au contraire, on veut entendre par la qu'en aucun sens nous ne sortons jamais de l'imme­diat et qu'expliciter cet immecliat revient simplement a le vivre, on ne peut douter que l'entreprise du philosophe ne devienne aussi­t6t contradictoire. Or c'est une opinion a laquelle l'auteur semble parfois faire des concessions. resolution de faire apparaitre le monde tel qu'il est avant tout retom: sur nous-memes, c'est !'ambition d'egaler la reflexion a la vie irreflechie de la conscience. il faut rompre notre familiarite avec lui

274

Page RtJ/erence

143 PP, xii

PP, 417

151 PP, 237

PP, 239

APPENDIX

[i.e., wifu the world], et que cette rupture ne peut rien nous apprendre que le jaillisse­ment immotive du monde. Le plus grand enseignement de la reduction est l'impos­sibilite d'une reduction complete ... Si nous etions l'esprit absolu, la reduction ne se.rait pas problematique. Mais puisque au contraire nous som.mes au monde, puisque meme nos reflexions prennent place dans le flux tempo rel qu' elles cherchent a capter (puisqu, -elles sich einstr6men com.me dit Husserl), il n'y a pas de pensee qui embrasse toute notre pensee. Le monde est non pas ce que je pense, mais ce que je vis, je suis ouvert au monde ... mais je ne le possede pas. il est inepuisable. "Il ya ~n monde," ou plut6t "ii ya lemon­de," de cette these constante de ma vie je ne puis jamais rendre entierement raison. Cette facticite du monde est ce qui fait la W eltlich­keit der Welt .. . com.me la factiticite du cogito n'est pas une imperfection en Jui, mais au contraire ce qui me rend certain de mon existence . . . . la question est toujou.rs de savoir com­ment je peu:x etre ouv-ert a des phenomenes qui me depassent et qui, cependant, n'exis­tent que dans la mesure ou je les reprends et les vis, comment la presence a moi-mlme (Urprii.senz) qui me de/init et c01ulitionne tortte presence etrangere est en mhne temps de-pre­set1tation (Entgegenwartigtmg) et me jette liars de tnoi. La chose et le monde me sont donnes avec !es parties de mon corps. non par un "geometrie naturelle," mais dans une connexion vivante comparable OU plutQt identique a Celle qui existe entre les parties de mon corps lui-me­me. La perception exterieure et la perception du corps propre varient ensemble parce qu'elles sontles deuxiaces d'un meme acte ... La synthese du corps propre, elle en est la replique OU: le COITelatif et c'est ti. la lettre la meme ch0se de percevoir une seule bille et de disposer des deux doigts comme d'un organe unique. Toute perception exterieure est immediate­ment synonyme d'une certaine perception de mon_ corps comme toute perception de mon corps s'explicite dans la langage de la per-

i54

157

157

157

160

La structure du comporteme11t, 140

Une philoso-phie de l'ambiguiee, n2-13

Une philoso-phie de l' ambiguite, 114

U11.e philoso-phie de l'ambiguite, 109

PP, 89

PP, 245

APPENDIX 275

ception exteneure. Si maintenant, ... le corps n'est pas un objet transparent et ne nous est pas donne comme le cercle au geometre par sa loi de constitution, s'il est u:ne unite ex­pressive qu'on ne peut apprendre a connaitre qu'en l'assumant, cette structure va se com­muniquer au monde seilSl"ble. La theorie du schema corporel est implicitement une theo.rie de la perception. !es reactions d'un organisme ne sont pas des edifices de mouvements elementaires, mais des gestes doues d'une unite interieure ... L'experience dans un organisme n'est pas l'enregistrement et la fixation de certains mouvements reellement accomplis: elle monte des aptitudes, c'est-a-dire le pouvoir general de repondre a des situations d'un certain type par des reactions variees qui n'ont de commun que le sens. Les reactions ne sontdonc ;pas une suite d'evenements, elles portent en elles-memes une "intelligibilite." consiste en ceci qie la pulsation existentielle qui m 'engage vers Jes objets de mon Um­welt orclinaire, continue de me pousser et fait appel au corps susceptible de m'y conduire et de me le reveler. . . Mais comme je "sais" desormais - et ne veux pas savoir - que la mediation ne pourra plus s'effectuer, que je ne puis plus m'ouvrir ace monde nice monde s'offrir a moi, je "ruse," je continue de le vise.r mais seulement de maniere magique. n'ont de sens que par la pulsionexistentielle, concretisee dans le membre-fantOme. Inver­sement le membre-fantOme et l'elan existen­tiel dont il est la traduction dans l'experience immediate, ne puisent de realite que dans l'epreuve des excitations interoceptives. En realite, le corps n'est rien d'autre que le maniere m!me dont nous accedons aumonde, et, en m~me temps ou correlativement, un certain mode d'apparition du monde lui-me­me ... Le corps est ]'ensemble des conditions concretes sous lesquelles un projet existentiel s'actualise et defient, en s'actualisent, proprement mien. de "concevoir" une certaine forme d'excita­tion. L'"evenement psychophysique" n'est done plus du type de la causalite "mondaine." Ainsi avant d'etre un spectacle objectif la qualite se laisse reconnaitre par un type de comportement qui la vise clans son essence

161

161

Refet-ence

APPENDIX

et c'est J>Ou:rquoi des que mon corps adopte !'attitude du bleu j'obtiens une quasi-pr~n­ce du bleu ... il faut (done) r~pprendre a vivre ces couleurs comme les vit notre corps.

Thiorie du champ L'integration d 'un constituant dans une de la conscience, 101 totalite qui poss~de la caractere d'une Fonne,

entraine l'absorption du constituant dans la structure de l'organisation de cette totalite. Etre un constituant et. dans ce sens, une partie d'une Forme, signifie exister a une certain place 3.l'interieur de la structure de la totalite, et occuper un certain lieu dans l'organisation de la Forme, un lieu qui ne peut etre defini qu'en reference avec la topographie de la contexture. En vertu de son absorption_ ... le constituant en question est doue d'une signification fonctionnelle par rapport a cette contexture.

TMorie du champ Les constituants sont lies par la coherence de la conscience, u4 de Forme ... ils se aeterminenl et se conditi011r

nent mutuellement. Ils derivent les uns des aut-res et s'assignent les uns aiu~ aufres, dans 1'™ reciprociti complete, la signification fonctionnelle .. . chacun n'existe que dans un syst~me de significations . ...

PP, 94 En r~te les r6flexes ewc-m6mes oe sont jamais des processus aveugles: ils s'ajustent a un "sens" de 1a situation, ils expriment notre orientation vers un "milieu de comporte­ment" tout autant que J'action du "milieu geographique" sur nous. Ils dessinent a dis­tance 1a strncture de l'objet sans en attendre les stimulations ponctuelles. C'est cette presence globale de la situation qui donne un sens aux stimuli partiels et qui les fait compter, valoir ou exister pour l'organisme. Le r6flexe ne resulte pas des stimuli objectifs, il se retoume vers eux, il les investit d'un sens qu'ils n 'oat pas pris un a un et comme agents physiques, qu'ils ont seulement comme situation. Il les fait 6tre comme situation, il est avec eux dans un rapport de "connaissance," c'est-a-dire qu'il les indique comme ce qu'ilest destine a affronter.

PP, 107 En d'autre termes, j'observe les objets ext6rieurs avec mon corps, je !es manie, je les .inspecte, j'en fais le tour, mais quant a mon corps je ne !'observe pas lui-m6me: il faudrait, pour pouvoir le faire, disposer d'un second corps qui lui-m6me ne serait pas ob­servable.

Page 165

i66

~68

Reference Une philosophie de l'ambiguite, u9

PP, 108

Ideen, II, 159

Une pliilosophie de l'ambiguiU, 121

PP, II7

PP, 125

APPENDIX 277

la permanence du corps n'est pas celle d'un spectacle immuable s'offrant dans le monde, mais celle d'une sorte de facteur lateral qui accompagne tousles points de vue, san etre capable ni de s'6liminer ni de se de:finir soi­meme comme point de vue. .. . c'est qu'il est ce par quoiil ya des objets. Il n'est ni tangible ni visible dans 1a :mesure ou il est ce qui voit et ce qui touche. Le corps n'est done pas l'un quelconque des objets ext6rieurs, qui offrirait seulement cette particularit~ d'6tre toujours Ia. Wahrend ich alien anderen Dingen gegeniiber die Freiheit habe, meine Stellung zu ihnen beliebig zu wechseln und damit zugleich die Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten, in denen sie mir zur Gegebenheit kommen, peliebig zu variieren, habe ich nicht die Moglichkeit, mich von meinem Leibe oder ihn von mir zu entfernen, und dem entsprechend s.ind die Erscheinungsmannigfaltigkeiten des Leibes in bestimmter Weise beschriinkt: gewisse K~rperteile kann ich nur in eigentiimlichen perspektivischen Verkiirzung sehen, und andere (z.B. der Kopf) sind iiberhaupt fiir mich unsichtbar. Derselbe Leib, der mir als Mittel aller Wahmehmung dient, steht mir bei der Wahrnehmung seiner selbst im Wege und ist ein merkwiirdig unvollkommen konstitniertes Ding. qoe, dans le monde intersensoriel, nous prenons en vue d'une tache determinee. Le projet de cette tiche suscite une attitude d'ensemble du corps, attitude qui s'inscrit en lui. si mon corps peut etre une "forme" et s'il peut y avoir devant lui des figures privile­giees sur des fonds indifferents, c'est en tant qu'il est polarise par ses tiches, qu'il existe vers elles, qu 'ii se ramasse sur lui-meme pour atteindre son but, et le "schema corpore1" est finalement une maniere d'exprimer que mon corps est au monde. Nous constatons que le malade interroge sur la position de ses membres ou sur celle d'un stimulus tactile cberche, par des mouvements preparatoires, a faire de son corps un objet de perception actuelle; interroge sur la fonne d'un objet au contact de son corps, ii cherche a la tracer lui-meme en suivant le contour de l'objet. Rien ne serait plus trompeur que de

Page

1 74

Reference

PP, 271

PP, 150

PP, 165

PP, 158

La structure de com­porteme11t, 286

APPENDIX

supposer chezle-normalles memes operations, abregres seulementpar l'habitnde. Le malade ne recherche ces perceptions explicites que pour suppleer une certain presence du corps et de l 'objet qui est donnee chez le normal .... Le mouvement, compris non pas comme mouvement objectii et deplacement dans l'espace, mais comme projet de mouvement ou "mouvement v:irluel" est le fondement de l'unite des sens ... mon corps est justeme.nt un systeme tout 1ait d'equivalences et de transpositions intersensorielles. Les sens se traduisent l'un l'antre sans avoir besoin d'un interprete, se comprennent l'un l'autre sans avoir a passer par l'idee ... Avec le notion de schema corporel, ce n'est pas seulement ] 'unite du corps qui est decrite d'une maniere neuve, c'est aussi, a travers elle, l'unite des sens et !'unite de l'objet. moyend'acces a unm6me rmmde, c'est qu'il a l'evidence antepredicative d'un monde uni que, de sorte que !'equivalence des "organes des sens" et leur analogie se lit sur Jes choses et peutetrevecue avant d'6tre con~e. C'est que le sujet normal a son corps non seulement comme systeme de positions actuelles, mais encore et par 13. meme comme systeme ouvert d'une infinite de positions equivalentes dans d'autre orientations. Ce que nous avons appele le schema corporel est justement ce systeme d'equivalences, cet invariant immediatement donne par lequel les diHerentes taches matrices sont instanta­nement transposables. C'est dire qu'il n'est pas seulement une experience de mon corps mais encore une experience de mon corps dans le monde .... la vie de la conscience - vie connaissante, vie du desir ou vie perceptive - est sous­tendue par un "arc intentionnel" qui projette autour de nous notre passe, notre avenir, notre milieu humain, notre situation physi­que, notre situation ideologique, notre situation morale, ou plutflt qui fait que nous soyons situes sous tous ces rapports. C'est cet arc intentionnel qui fait !'unite des sens, celle des sens et de !'intelligence, celle de la sensibilite et de la motricite. !'ensemble de chem.ins deja traces, de pouvoirs deja constitues, le sol dialectique

Page

174

..

Reference

PP,99

Formale und trans­zendenlale Logik, l:85

PP, 275

PP, 270

PP, 275

APPENDIX 279

acquis sur lequel s'opere une mise en fonne superieure, organisme, comme adhesion prepersonelle a la forme generale du monde, comme existence anonyme et generale ... (il) joue, au-dessous de ma vie personnelle, le role d'un c6mplexe inni. Diese wundersame Eigenheit gehort zur Universalitii.t des Bewusstseins iiberhaupt als leistender Intentionalitii.t. Alie intentio­nalen Einheiten sind aus einer intentionalen Genesis, sind "konstituierte" Einheiten, und liberal! ka.nn man die "fertigen" Einheiten nach ihrer Konstitution, nachihrer gesamten Genesis befragen und zwar nach deren eidetisch zu iassender Wesensform. Diese fundamentale Tatsache, in ihrer Universali­ti:it das gesamte intentionale Leben umspan­nend, ist es, die den eigentlichen Sinn der fotentionalen Analyse bestimmt als E nthullung der intmtionalen Implikationen, mit denen, gegeniiber dem offen fertigen Sinn der Ein­beiten, ihre verborgenen Sinnesmomente und "kausalen" Sinnesbeziehungen hervortreten. Prenant !'attitude analytique, je decompose la perception en qualites et en sensations et ... je suis oblige de supposer un acte de synthese qui n'est que la contre-partie de mon analyse. Mon acte de perception, pris dans sa naivete, n'effectue pas lui-meme cette synthese, il profite d'un travail deja fai t, d'tme synthese genirale ccmstituu une f ois p<nt1' toi'­tes, c'est ce que j'exprime en disant que je perc;ois avec mon corps ou avec mes sens, mon corps, mes sens etant justement ce savoir habituel du monde, cette science implicite OU sed.imentee. (my emphasis) un systeme synergique dont toutes les fonctions soot reprises et liees dans le mouvement general de l'etre au monde, en tant qu'il est la figure figee de l'e.xistence. Si ma conscience constituait actuellement le monde qu'elle perc;oit, il n'y aurait d'elle a lui aucune distance et entre eux aucun decalage possible, elle le penetrerait jusque dans ses articulations les plus secretes, l'intentionnalite nous transporte.rait au coeur de l'objet, et du meme coup le per-;:u n 'aurait pas l'epaisseur d'un present, la conscience ne se perdrait pas, ne s'engluerait pas en tuL

280

179

180

Reference PP, 269

PP, 249-50

PP, 277

APPENDIX

Ce n'est pas le sujet epistemologique qui effectue la synthese, c'est le corps quaod il s'anache a sa dispersion, se rassemble. se porte par tous les moyens vers un terme unique de son mouvement, et quaod une intention unique se con~it en lui par le pbenomene de synergie. . . En disant que cette intentionnalite n'est pas une pensee, nous voulons dire qu'elle ne s'effectue pas dans la transparence d'une conscience et qu'elle p rend pour acquis tout le savoir latent qu'a mon corps de lui-meme. que je vois le bleu du ciel au sens oil je dis que je comprends unlivre .... Ma perception, meme vue del'interieur, exprime unesituation donnee : je vois du bleu parce que j e suis sensi­ble aux couleurs ... si je voulais traduire exac­tement l'experience perceptive, je devrais dire qu'on perc;:oit en moi et non pas que je per~is . . . Entre ma sensation et moi, il y a toujoursl'epaisseur d'un acq"is originafre qui empeche mon experience d'etre claire pour elle-meme ... le moi qui voit ou le moi qui entend est en quelque sorte un moi specialise, familier d'un seul secteur de l'etre .... Mon corps prend possession du temps, il fait exister un passe etun avenir pour un present, il n'est pas une chose, il fait le temps au lieu. de la subir. Mais tout acte de fixation doit etre renouvele, sans quoi il tombe a l'inconscience ... La prise qu'il nous donne sur un segment de temps, la synthese qu'il effectue soot elles-memes des phenomenes temporels, s'ecoulent et ne peuvent subsister que ressaisies dans un nouvel acte lui-meme temporel. . . Celui qui, dans l'exploration sensorielle, donne un passe au present et l'oriente vers un avenir, ce n'est pas moi co=e sujet autonome, c'est moi en tant qu j'ai uncorps et que je sais "regarder." En tant que j'ai un corps et que j'agis a travers lui dans le monde, l'espace et le temps ne soot pas pour moi une sornme de points juxtaposes, pas davaotage d'ai~eurs une infinite de relations dont ma conscience opererait la syntMse et ou elle impliquerait mon corps; je ne suis pas dans l'espace et le temps; je suis a l'espace et au temps, mon corps s'applique a eux et Jes embrasse. L 'ampleur de cette prise mesure celle demon existence . ...

Page 1 80

1Bz

Re/erena Une philosophie de l'ambiguite, n9

PP, u7

PP, 402

PP, 247

PP, viii

PP, II3

PP, 245

APPENDIX 28I

Si mon existence est par nature aupres des choses, elle doit les approcher d'autant de manieres que celles-ci se manifestent a elle et etre capable de passer tout entiere en chacu­ne. Mais, inversement, si ces modes de pre­sence ofirent une chose unique, il faut aussi que ces diverses modalites d'apprehension communiquent entre elles et que !'existence, si elle se plonge en chacune, ne se noie pourtant en aucune. une maniere d'acceder au monde et a l'objet, une "praktognosie" qui doit etre reconnu comme originale et peut-etre comme origi­naire. Mon corps a son monde ou comprend son monde sans avoir a passer par des "representations." sans se subordooner a une "Ionction symbolique" ou "objectivante." il existe vers elles, qu'il se ramasse sur lui­meme pour atteindre son but, et le "schema corporel" est finalement une maniere d'ex­primer que mon corps est au monde. ]' ai le monde comme individu inacheve a tra vers mon corps com.me puissance de ce monde, et j'ai la position des objets par celle de mon corps ou inversement la posi­tion de mon corps par celle des objets ... dans une implication reelle, et parce qae mon corps est mouvement vers le monde, le monde, point d'appui demon corps. La sensation de bleu ... est sans doute intentionnelle, c'est-a-dire qn'elle ne r epose pas en soi com.me une chose, qu'elle vise et signifie au-dela d'elle meme. Mais le terme qu'elle vise n'est reconnu qu'aveuglement par la familiarite de mon corps avec lui, il n'est pas constitue en pleine clarte, il est reconstitue ou repris par un savoir qui reste latent et qui lui laisse son opacite et son ecceite. pour voir le monde et le saisir comme paradoxe, i1 faut rompre notre fa.miliarite avec lui, et ... cette rupture ne peut rien nous appreodre que le jaillissementimmotive du monde. Le plus grand enseignement de la reduction est l'impossibilite d' une reduction complete. c'est communiquer interieurement avec le monde, le corps et les autres, etre avec eux au lieu d'etre a cOte d'eux .... n'est ni un penseur qui note une qualite, ni un milieu inerte qui seraJt affecte on modiiie

Page Re/erence

185 PP, 247

185 PP, 492

186 PP, IZ3

187 PP, 265

188 PP, 403

189 PP, 49o--g1

APPENDIX

par elle, il est une puissance qui co-natt a uncertain milieu d'existence ou se synchro­nise a vec lui Si les qualit~ rayonnent autour d'elles un certain mode d'existence ... c'est parce que le sujet sentant ne les pose pas comme des objets, mais sympathise avec elles, les fait siennes et trouve en elles sa loi momentanee. Le monde tel que nous avons essaye de le montrer ... n 'est plus le deploiement visible d'une Pensee constituante, ni un assemblage fortuit de parties, ni, bien entendu, !'ope­ration d'une Fensee directrice sur une ma­tiere indifferente, mais la patrie de toute rationn.alite. Ce n'est jamais notre corps objectif que n0us mouvons, mais notre corps phenomenal, et cela sans mystere, puisque c'est not;re corps deja, comme puissance de telles et telles regions du monde, qui se levait vers les objets a saisir et qui les percevait .... Les sens communiquent entre ewe en s'ou­vrant a la structure de la chose. On voit la rigidite et la fragilite du verre et, quand il se brise avec un son cristallin, ce son est por­te par le verre visible ... La forme des objets n'en est pas le contour geometrique: elle a un certain rapport avec leur nature propre et parle a tous nos sens en meme temps qu'a la vue ... Dans le mouvement de la branche qu'un oiseau vient de quitter, on lit sa flexibilite ou son elasticite, et c'est ainsi qu' une branche de pommier et une brancbe de bouleau se distinguent immediatement. n nous faut concevoir les perspectives et le point de vue comme notre insertion dans le monde-individu, et la perception, non plus com.me une constitution de l'objet vrai, ma.is comme notre inherence aux choses. L'analyse du corps propre et de la percep­tion nous a revele un rapport a l'objet, une signification plus profonde que celle-la (i.e. syntbese) ... je n'en opere pas actuellement la syn.these, je viens au-devant d' elle avec mes champs sensoriels, mon champ percepti/, et /inalement avec tme typique de tout l' €Ire pos­sible, tin montage universel a Z'egard du monde. Ai' creux du sufet lui-meme, nous decoiwrions done la presence du monde . .. Nous retrou­vions sous l'inteutionnalite d'acte 011 the­tique, et comme sa condition de possibilite,

Page Re/ereme

189 PP, 520

Y91 PP, 493-94

193 PP, 186

193 PP, 188

194 PP, 193

APPENDIX

une i'nUntionnaliti opbante, deja a l'reuvre avant toute these ou tont jugement, un "Logos du monde esthetiqne," un "art cache dans !es profoodeurs de l'ame hu­maine," et qui, comme tout art, ne se con­nait que dans ses r~tats. (my emphasis) Rien ne me determine du dehors, non que rien oe me sollicite, mais au contra.ire parce que je suis d 'embleehorsde moi et ouvert au moode. . . de seul fait que nous sommes au monde. ... au-d.essous de l'"inteotionnalite d'acte" qui est la conscience thetique d'un objet ... il nous faut reconnaitre une intentionnalite "operante" (/ungierende l'nUntionaliti.it), qui rend possible la premiere et qui est ce que Heidegger appelle transcendance. Mon pre­sent se depasse vers un aveoir et vers un passe prochains et les touche Ia ou ils soot, dans le passe, dans l'avenir eux-memes. D n'y a de temps pour moi que parce que j'y suis situe, c'est-a-dire parce que je m'y decouvre deja engage, qui tout l'etre ne m'est pas donne en personne, 'et enfin. parce qu'un secteur de l'Mre m'est si proche qu'il ne fait pas meme tableau devant moi et que je ne pewc pas le voir, comme je ne peux pas voir moo visage. D y a du temps pour moi parce que j'ai un pr~ent ... Aucune des di­mensions du temps ne pent etre deduite des autres. Mais le present (au sens large ... ) a cependant un privilege parce qu'il est la zone ou l'etre et la conscience coincident. Ce qui est vrai seulement, c'est qne notre existence ouverte et personnelle repose sur une premiere assise d'existence acquise et figee . Mais il ne saurait en etre autrement si nous somme temporalite, puisque la dialec­tique de l'acquis et de l'avenir est constitu­tive du temps. la vue, l'ouie, la sexualite, le corps ne sont pas seulement les points de passage, les in­struments ou les manifestations de !'exis­tence personnelle: elle reprend et recueille en elle leur existence donnee et anonyme. il est habite par elle, il est d'une certaine maniere ce qu'il signifie, comme un p9rtrait est la quasi presence de Pierre absent ... En de¢ des moyens d'expression conven­tionnels, qui ne manifestent a autrui ma pensee que parce que deja chez moi comme

Page

195

195

197

Reference

PP, 195

PP, 196-97

Attitudes et mouve­ment, 59

PP, 215-16

APPENDIX

chez lui sont donnres, pour chaque signe, des significations, et qui en ce sens ne realisent pas une communication veritable, il faut bien. . . reconnattre une operation primor­diale de signification ou l'exprime n'existe pas a part !'expression et OU les signes eux­memes induisent au dehors leurs sens. la tension d 'une existence vers une autre existence qui 1a nie et sans laquelle pourtant elle ne se soutient pas. se cache a elle-meme sous un masque de generalite, elle tente sans cesse d'echapper a la tension et au drame qu'elle institue ... Elle y est consta.mment presents comme une atmosphere. . . La sexualite se diffuse en images quine retiennent d'elle que certaines relations typiques, qu'une certaine physio­nomie affective. . . Prise ainsi, c' est-a-dire comme atmosphere am:bigue, la sexualite est coextensive a la vie. Autrement dit, l'equivoque est essentielle a !'existence hu­maine, et tout ce que nous vivons ou pen­sons a toujours plusieurs sens. Il est important de noter que la subjectivite est "perirue." L'idee communement repan­due d'une subjectivite "supposee" par l'ana­logie entre le mouvement d'autrui ou de !'animal et notre propre mouvement est done parfaitement fausse. Nous n'avons pas seulement le pouvoir de reconnattre une fonction, nous pouvons en outre la saisir comme un mouvement propre ayant une signification (com.me fonction animate ou humaine). Par la nous pere4Vons Jes hommes et les animaux com.me des "sujets" ou com­me des centres de connaissanoes et de ten­dances. Le sens des gestes n'est pas donne ma.is compris, c'est-a-dire ressaisi par un acte du spectateur. . . La commup.ication ou la comprehension des gestes s'obtient par la reciprocite de mes intentions et des gestes d'autrui, de mes gestes et des intentions li­sibles dans la conduite d'autrui. Tout se passe comme si l'intention d'autrui babitait mon corps ou comme si mes intentions habi­taient le sien. Le geste dont je suis la temoin dessine en pointille un objet intentionnel. Cet objet devient actuel et il est pleinement compris lorsque les pouvoirs de mon corps s'ajustent a lui et le recouvrent.

Page Reference r97 'PP, 215-16

197 PP, 216-17

206 Thiorie du champ de la conscience, 245

2II PP, xii

2 r7 Theorie du champ de la conscience, 245

218 PP, 24g-50

APPENDIX 285

C'est par mon corps que je comprends autrui, comme c'est par mon corps que je peryois des "choses." Le sens du geste ainsi "compris" n'est pas derriere lui, il se oonfond avec la structure du monde que la geste dessine et que je reprends a mon compte, il s'etale sur le geste lui-meme ... Le probleme du monde, et pour commencer celui du corps propre, consiste en ceci que tout y demeure. A l)roprement parler, il s'agit moins de !'existence corporelle elle-meme en tant que une realite, que de la conscience specifique que nous en avons. Certes, cette conscience n'est pas necessairement une conscience thematisante, positionnelle, et explicite; et nous convenons tres volontiers avec M. Merleay-Ponty de ce qu'"il ya ... plusieurs manieres pour la conscience d'~tre cons­science." (PP, 144) Mais il nous faut souligner qu'une conscience ante-preclicative, prepositionnelle, et non­thllmatisante, est u1ie conscience tout de nifime. "Toute conscience est conscience de quelque chose," cela n'est pas nouveau. Kant a montre, clans le Refutation de l'Idialisme, que la perception interieure est impossible sans perception exterieure, que le monde, comme connexion des phenomenes, est anti­cipe clans la conscience de mon unite, est le moyen pour moi de me realiser comme conscience. les problemes de constitution se posent non seulement a propos des simples choses ma­terielles de la nature, des objets culturels, des objets ideaux de toute sorte, tels que les nombres, . . . mais aussi a propos de notre corps propre et de notre existence cotporelle. En nous en tenant aux principes etablis par Husserl, nous soutenons que Jes problemes constitutifs doivent ~tre formuMs et traites exclusivement en terme de copscience, soit positioneUe, soit pre-positionnelle. Jene peux pas dire que je vois le bleu du ciel au sens oil je clis que je comprends un li­vre. . . Ma perception, m~me vue de l'inte­rieur, exprime une situation donnee ... De sorte que, s.i je voulais traduire exacte­ment !'experience perceptive, je devrais dire qu'on peryoit en moi et non pas que je per-

286

Page

227 PP, 479

zz9 PP, 478

z35 PP, 413

APPENDIX

90is ... je n'ai pas plus conscience d'~tre le vrai sujet de nia sensation que de ma nais­sance ou de ma mort ... je sais qu'on natt et qu'on meurt, je ne puis connattre ma nais­sanc.e et ma mort. Chaque sensation, etant a la riguem: la premiere, le derniere et la seule de son espece, est one naissance et une mort. Le sujet qui en a l'experienc.e com­mence et finit avec elle, et com.me il ne peut se preceder ni se survivre, la sensation s 'apparait n~airement a elle-meme dans un milieu de genera.lite, elle vient d'en det;a de moi-meme, elle releve d'une sensibilite qui l'a precedee et qui lui survivra, com.me ma naissance et ma mort appartiennent a une natalite et a une mortalite anonymes. un seul phenomene d'ecoulement. Le temps est l'unique mouvement qui convient a soi­mi!me dans toutes ses parties, com.me un geste enveloppe toutes les contractions musculaires qui sont necessaires pour Le rea­liser. Siles Abschattungen A' et A" m'apparaissent comme Abschattrmgen de A, ce n'est pas parce qu'elles participent toutes a une unite ideale qui serait leur raison commune. C'est parce que j'ai a travers elles le point A lui­meme dans son individualite irrecusable, fondee une fois pour toutes par son passage clans le present, et que je vois jaillir de lui les Abschatfangen A', A", ... Le pMnomene central, qui fonde a la fois ma subjectivite et ma transcendance ... , consiste en ceci que je suis donne a moi­meme. ]e s1tis don11e, c'est-a-dire que je me trouve deja situe et engage dans un monde physique et social - f e suis donne a moi-mlme, c'est-a-dire que cette situation ne m'est ja­mais dissumulee, elle n'est jamais autour de moicomme une necessite etrangere, et je n'y suis jamais effectivement enferme comme un objet dans une boite. il est essentiel au temps de n'i!tre pas seule­ment temp effectif ou qui s'ecoule, mais en­core temps qui se sait, car l'explosion ou la dehiscence du present vers un avenir est l'arcMtype du rapport de soi a soi et dessine une intenorite ou une ipseite (Selbstheit). le temps est quelqu'un, c'est-a-dire que !es dimensions temporelles . . . expriment toutes un seul eclatement ou une seule poussee qui

Page Reference

APPENDIX

est la subjectivite elle-meme. II 1aut com­prende le temps comme sujet et le sujet comme temps.

236 PP, 491-<)2 nous sommes ainsi toujour.; amenes a une conception du sujet comme ek-stase et a un rapport de transcendance active entre le sajet et le monde. Le monde est .inseparable du sujet, mais d'un sujet qui n'est Iien que pro jet du monde, et le sujet est .inseparable du monde, mais d'un monde qu'il projette lui-meme. Le sujet est etre-au-monde et le monde reste "subjectif" puisque sa texture et ses articulations sont dessinees par le mouvement de transcendance du sujet.

246 .MM, 15-16 ii taut bien que ces images dessinent en quel­que maniere, sur la face qu'elles tournent vers mon corps, le parti que mon corps pour­rait tirer d'elles ... (Les objets) s'ordonnent selon les paissances croissantes ou decrois­santes de mon corps. Les objets qui entourent mon corps reflichissent l' action possible de mon corps sur eux.

246 MM. 17 CIJS mimes images rapportees a l'aclion pos­sible d'une certaine image determinee, mon corps.

246 MM, 57 ... nous avons consider~ le corps comme une espece de c.entre d 'ou se reflechit, sur les ob­jets environnants, !'action que ces objets exercent sur lui: en cette reflexion consiste la perception e:rleneure. . . La percep­tion . . . mesure notre action possible sur les choses et par la, inversement, l'action pos­sible des choses sur nous.

255 ldeen, II, 145-146 Alie die bewirkten Empfindungen haben ihre Lokalisati<m, d.h. sie unterscheiden sich durch die Stellen der erscheinenden Leib­lichkeit und gehOren pb.anomenal zu ihr. Der Leib konstituiert sich also urspriinglich auf doppelte Weise: einerseits ist er phy­sisches Ding, Materie, er hat seine Exten­sion, in die seine realen Eigenschaften, die Farbigkeit, Glatte, Ha.rte, Wanne und was dergleichen materielle Eigenschaften mehr sind, eingehen; andererseits finde ich auf ihm, und empfinde ich "auf" ihm und "in" ihm: die Wanne auf dem Handriicken, die Kalte in den Ftissen, die Beriihrungsempfin­dungen an den Fingerspitzen. Im empfinde ausgebreitet tiber die Flii.chen weiter Leibes­strecken den Druck und Zug der Kleider ...

256 Ideen, II, 146 Die lokalisierten Empfindungen sind nicht

288

F'age l?e/erence

259 ldeen, II, 68

259 ldeen, II, 68

259 Erste F'hilosophie, 6o-6I

APPENDIX

Eigenschaften des Leibes als physischen Dinges, aber andererseits sind sie Eigen­schaften des Dinges Leib, und zwar Wir­Jrungseigenschaften. Sie treten auf, wenn der Leib beriih:rt, gedriickt, gestochen, etc. wird, und treten da auf, wo er es wi.rd, und in der Zeit, wanner es wi.rd; sie dauern nur unter Umstanden noch lange nach der Beriih­rung fort. Das System der Kausalitat, in welches der Leib in der normalen Apperzeption ver­flochten ist, ist von einer Art, dass der Leib bei alien Veriinderungen, die er erfii.hrt, doch im Rahmen einer typischen Identitat verbleibt. Die Veranderungen des Leibes als eines Systems von Wahrnehmungsorganen sind /reie Leibesbewegungen, und die Or­gane konnen willkiirlich wieder in dieselbe Grundstellung zuriickkehren ; sie andern sich dabei nicht so, dass die Empfindlichkeit sich typisch moclifiziert: sie kt)nnen immer des Gleiche leisten, immer in gleicher Weise namlich fiir die Konstitution von ausseren Erfahrungen ... "Empfindlichkeit" bat hier aber Beziehung auf Objektives: ich muss eben in normaler Weise Ruhe als Ruhe, Unveriinderung als Unveranderung erfassen konnen, und darin miissen alle Sinne zusammenstjmmen. Ein Leib ist dabei in merkwiirdiger Weise fiir mich bevorzugt, und somit ein animali­sches Wesen, und speziell ein Mensch, vor allen anderen. Es ist mein Leib, und dem­gemass bin ich fiir mich vor allen Erfah­rungsgegenstanden ausgezeichnet, Ich im gewohnlichen empirischen Wortsinn, d.h. Ich dieser Mensch, dem dieser Leib, mein Leib, zugehOrt. Mein Leib ist der einzige, an dem ich die Verleiblichung eines Seelens­lebens, namlich eines Empfindens, Vorstel­lens, Fiihlens, usw., das mein eigenes Leben ist, oder das sich in leiblicher Gestalt, in wechselnden leiblichdinglicben Vorkomm­nissen "ausdriickt," in absolut unmittel­bai:er Weise erfahre, derart dass icb in eins nicht nur das Ding Leib und sein dinglicbes Gebaben wahrnehme, sondern zugleich mein psychisches Leben, und endlich beides eben in eins: das Sich-verleiblichen des letzteren im ersteren, das Sich-aosdriicken des einen im anderen.

F'age 26o

Reference Erste Philosophie, II, 61

ldeen, I, 103

APPENDIX 289

Zug um Zug gibt sich der mir erscheinende Leib - und gibt sich der Wandel seiner Er­scheinungsweisen - als dieses oder jenes Psychische in sich geborgen tragend, als Ausserlichkeit, die hier noch die Innerlich­keit, die sich darin "ausdriickt," originaliter in sich hat. Beides gibt sich ungetrennt, in Deckung ... Wir seben sogleich, dass es das nur kann durch eine gewisse Teilnahme an der Tran­szendenz im ersten, originaren Sinn, und das ist offenbar die Transzendenz der =ateriel­len Natur. Nur durch die Erfahrungsbezie­hung zum Leibe wi.rd Bewusstsein zum real menschlichen und tierischen, und nur da­durch gewinnt es Stellung i.m Raum der Na­tur und in der Zeit der Natur .•..