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Under the following conditions:
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British Army manpower crisis, 1944.
Peaty, John Robert
Download date: 24. Aug. 2022
BRITISH ARMY MANPOWER CRISIS 1944
JOHN ROBERT PEATY
FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
KING'S COLLEGE
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
2000
1 BIEL
LOAN TTIýTTV
ABSTRACT
In the autumn of 1944 the British Army, which had a
strength of two and three-quarter million men, experienced
a manpower crisis: it ran short of infantry reinforcements.
The objective of this thesis is to establish how and why
this happened. In order to achieve this, fourteen areas
have been examined. Ten of the areas examined concern the
Army's use of the manpower at its disposal: the Army's
distribution; support services and artillery; special and
elite forces; training and reinforcement; normal wastage;
discipline; battle wastage; headquarters; ad hoc units; and
forces at home. Four of the areas examined concern the
apportioning of manpower to the Army by the nation: the
conscription of manpower into the forces; the manpower
devoted to the air effort; the allocation of manpower to
the Army; and the mobilization of manpower for the war
effort. The results of the research undertaken for this
thesis show that the manpower crisis had two main causes,
one outside and one within the Army's responsibility: the
Army did not receive the quantity and quality of manpower
it needed; the Army did not make best use of the manpower
it did receive. In short, the Army did not have enough men
suitable for infantry service and, of those it did have, it
did not have enough serving in the infantry. This is a
lesson which no nation and no Army can afford to forget.
2
CONTENTS
Abstract 2
List of tables 4
Acknowledgements 5
Introduction 6
Chapter 1: Distribution 21
Chapter 2: Supporting corps and artillery 39
Chapter 3: Special and elite forces 101
Chapter 4: Training and reinforcement 154
Chapter 5: Normal wastage 180
Chapter 6: Battle wastage 213
Chapter 7: Conscription 255
Chapter 8: Requirements and allocations 288
Conclusion 323
Tables 333
Bibliography 357
3
LIST OF TABLES
I Distribution of the British Army by arm P333
II Distribution of the British Army by location P334
III Dilotribution of the British Army in the UK P335
IV Distribution of the British, American and Canadian
Armies by arm P336
V Distribution of the American and Canadian Armies in
Europe P337
VI Distribution of the British Army in NW Europe P338
VII Distribution of the British and Canadian Armies in
Italy P339
VIII Organization of British divisions in NW Europe P340
IX Establishment of British and American divisions in NW
Europe P341
X Organization of the REME in NW Europe P342
XI Training establishments and training stream in the UK
P343
XII Strength of the British Army P344
XIII Outflow from the British Army P345
XIV Medical discharges from the British Army P346
XV Desertion in Italy by operation P347
XVI Desertion in Italy by formation P348
XVII Wastage rates (1939) P349
XVIII Wastage rates (1940) P350
XIX Wastage rates (1941) P351
XX Wastage rates (1943) P352
XXI Intake into the British Army P353
XXII Medical examinations of conscripts P354
XXIII Registrations of conscripts P355
XXIV British Army requirements and allocations P356
4
ACNOWLED GEMENT S
I would like to thank my supervisor Brian Bond for his help
and guidance.
Although I received no official encouragement or assistance
with this thesis, I consider myself fortunate that for
seven years I worked at the Army Historical Branch and
next-door to the Library of the Ministry of Defence. The
Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, where I now work,
bears no responsibility for this thesis.
I would like to thank Mike Taylor, Nick Evans, Peter
Robinson, Sanders Marble and Mike Smith for their advice
and friendship.
Finally and most importantly, I would like to thank my
family for their patience and support over the seven and a
half years I have been obsessed with the subject of this
thesis. I would like to apologize to my family for the fact
that the thesis - and my career break - took a year and a
half longer than I had anticipated.
The thesis is dedicated to the memory of my uncle Arthur
Peaty, a "Poor Bloody Infantryman" who carried a rifle from
Normandy to the Baltic. The thesis is also dedicated to the
memory of my brother-in-law Gary Lillico, who died a month
after the completion of the first version, which he had
helped me to produce.
5
INTRODUCTION
In the autumn of 1944 the British Army experienced a
manpower crisis, after its divisions had been fighting in
Italy for a year and in North West Europe for a few months.
It ran short of infantry reinforcements. Because of the
shortage, drastic measures were taken to boost the supply
of, and reduce the demand for, infantry reinforcements.
Large numbers of Royal Air Force and Royal Navy personnel
were transferred to the Army; within the Army, large
numbers of Royal Artillery personnel were retrained as
infantrymen; and many infantry formations and units were
broken up and their personnel used to reinforce other
infantry formations and units.
Before D-Day it had been forecast by the War Office
that, at the end of September 1944, the Army in the field
would have an infantry deficit of 35,300 and that 5
infantry divisions (2 in NW Europe) would have to be broken
up by the end of the year'. Although a drastic step,
breaking up an infantry division would reduce demand and
quickly produce a large number of infantrymen for use as
reinforcements. In fact, at the end of September 21st Army
Group in NW Europe had an infantry shortage of 10,000:
infantry battalions understrength by 2,000 plus an empty
reinforcement pool which needed refilling to the tune of
8,0002. This shortage grew to 14,500 during October3.
Already an infantry division (the 59th) and an infantry
brigade had been or were being broken up in NW Europe;
another infantry division (the 50th) was soon to be
withdrawn and subsequently broken up. At the same time, in
1 Directorate of Staff Duties file on manpower: W032/10899.
2 Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. II, P141.
3 Home Forces file on "Overlord" reinforcements: WO199/1335.
6
Italy the equivalent of an infantry division was being
disbanded and all remaining infantry battalions reduced
from 4 to 3 companies4. In the Far East equally drastic
measures were also being taken. As it turned out, some of
these measures were excessive: the duration of the war and
the severity of the fighting, and consequently the
casualties for the remainder of the war, had been over-
estimated.
Yet, when the manpower crisis arose, and the responsible
officers of the Army declared that it would be impossible
to reinforce the infantry divisions without drastic action,
there were 2,756,889 men in the Army, of whom some
1,713,196 were overseas. Of those overseas: 714,135 were in
NW Europe; 499,207 in Italy; 242,584 in India and Burma;
192,752 in the Middle East; and 64,518 in the Colonies5.
The division is the fighting formation of all arms and
is generally the unit for strategical calculation. At the
end of September the British Army had 16 infantry divisions
in the field: 8 in NW Europe; 5 in Italy; 2 in Burma; and 1
resting in the Middle East after service in Italy6. In round
figures, each had a War Establishment i. e. authorised
strength of 18,400, of which only 7,600 was in the
division's nine infantry battalions. Therefore, at the end
of September the authorised strength of the infantry
divisions in the field was about 294,400 and the authorised
strength of their infantry battalions - for which, as it
was thought, reinforcements could not be provided - was
about 121,600. There were many more infantry battalions in
the field besides those in the infantry divisions: in
armoured divisions, in non-divisional infantry brigades and
4 Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI: Pt. II, PP371-2.
5 General Return of the Strength of the British Army for the quarter ending 30`x' September 1944, AG Stats: W073/162.
6 Ibid.
7
on their own7. However, for present purposes let us confine
discussion to the infantry divisions.
These figures mean that with 2.75 million men on its
strength, of whom 1.7 million were overseas, the Army could
not find the bodies to keep its infantry divisions -
amounting to only 121,600 infantry - up to strength and
maintain the theatre reinforcement pools.
This statement, unqualified, would imply that the Army's
organization must have been inefficient; that there were
too many men behind the fighting line and not enough in it
or available to go in it. But simple, unqualified
statements regarding complicated human activities are
seldom accurate; to determine whether the Army's
organization was inefficient, that is to say uneconomical
in manpower, will require an analysis of the many factors
which affect the distribution of manpower within a modern
army, and the supporting establishments needed to keep it
fighting for the duration of the war.
The manpower in the Army has to be divided between the
fighting corps or "teeth" arms, whose prime function is to
destroy enemy manpower and material, and the supporting
corps or "tail" arms, which exist to do work which will
enable the former to carry out their task. During the
Second World War there was a tendency common to the
British, American and Canadian Armies for the supporting
corps to increase relatively to the fighting corps. To
adapt Churchill's metaphor: the "tail" kept growing vastly,
the "teeth" little8.
The object of this thesis is to answer the question: How
and why did the British Army run short of infantry
reinforcements in the autumn of 1944?
To answer this question it will be necessary to
establish how effectively the Army utilised the manpower at
Ibid.
S Churchill to Brooke and Ismay, 13`h December 1942: Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, P914.
8
its disposal during the war; whether the ratio of fighting
to administrative and various behind-the-line troops could
have been greater; and whether there was extravagance in
the use of manpower in the Army generally.
This thesis, it is hoped, apart from being of interest
and value to historians of the British Army and of the
Second World War, will be of some benefit to those who will
have the responsibility of organizing Britain's ground
forces should another great war unfortunately occur. It
will also hopefully be of some use to those military men,
government officials and politicians who will have the
greater responsibility of allocating manpower between civil
and military employments, and between the armed forces.
The reader may well wonder whether a detailed analysis
of manpower use or misuse in the Army during the Second
World War will really be of much value to manpower planners
in the future, in view of the probability that, if there is
another great war (and at present, with the end of the Cold
War, another great war is a remote possibility), defence
and offence will be concerned primarily with weapons of
mass destruction, and that the air force will be the
predominant service. But whether faced by another great
war, or by a series of small wars, or by a long period of
comparative peace, there will still be the need to allocate
manpower to the armed forces and to ensure that the
military authorities do not waste it. I do not presume to
say that in the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force during
the Second World War there was misuse of manpower similar
to that recorded in the following pages. But I suspect that
analysis would reveal that manpower could have been more
economically used by the RN and RAF, and that
inefficiencies existed which would have been more serious,
had either of these services been as numerous as the Army.
9
So much for the purpose of the thesis and its possible
utility: the reader is now entitled to ask what methods the
author intends to use in analysing the problem.
First of all, it has to be said that there is not much
science in military organization, however much talk there
is of science in war. What textbooks there are available to
the British officer (and the Armies of the British
Empire/Commonwealth were/are organized essentially on
British lines) describe what is, rather than why it is. The
subject of organization is a dull one for most military
men; strategy and tactics, the province of the General
Staff, are more inspiring. Until the Second World War, when
a limited start was made with scientific operational
research, organization followed tradition, modified slowly
and empirically when new weapons and means of
transportation enforced change. There are no scientific
laws, no norms of military organization.
Inevitably, much of the evidence relating to manpower -
and consequently much of the evidence deployed in this
thesis - is statistical. Statistical evidence is of course
notorious for its complexities, inaccuracies and
contradictions. I have used only the most authoritative
statistical evidence and have made every effort to unravel
the complexities, uncover and correct the inaccuracies and
resolve the contradictions which even the most
authoritative statistical evidence contains. Although not
foolish enough to claim complete success, I do claim a very
high degree of success. For the convenience of the reader,
much of the statistical evidence has been put into tables.
For his further convenience, these have been placed
together at the end of the thesis rather than spread
throughout it.
To establish how and why the British Army ran short of
infantry reinforcements in the autumn of 1944, fourteen
areas will be examined. Ten areas will concern the Army's
10
use of the manpower at its disposal: the Army's
distribution; headquarters; supporting corps and artillery;
special and elite forces; ad hoc units; battle wastage;
normal wastage; discipline; training and reinforcement; and
forces at home. Four areas will concern the apportioning of
manpower to the Army by the nation: the manpower devoted to
the air effort; the manpower allotted to the Army; the
conscription of manpower into the forces; and the
mobilization of manpower for the war effort.
As it is not possible for reasons of space to devote a
separate chapter to each of these areas, eight areas will
be given their own chapter and examined at length. The
other six areas will be examined more briefly in the course
of these eight chapters: the number of operational and
administrative headquarters in the Army; the number of ad
hoc units in the Army; the quantity and quality of manpower
devoted by Britain to the air effort rather than to the
ground effort; the size, composition and role of the Army
at home after D-Day; the state of discipline in the Army;
the degree to which Britain mobilized its manpower for the
war effort. A lengthy examination of the size, composition
and role of the Army at home after D-Day will however be
found in the author's article Myth, Reality and Carlo
D'Este, published in the King's College London War Studies
Journal in spring 1996.
This thesis is concerned with just one aspect of the
huge subject of British Army manpower during the Second
World War: the manpower, specifically infantry, crisis in
the autumn of 1944. There is neither necessity nor space to
discuss, even briefly, the totality of the Army's manpower
policies and problems in 1944, let alone over the entire
course of the war. The thesis will therefore open with an
analysis of the Army's manpower distribution as it stood in
the autumn of 1944. However, the thesis will close with
analyses of, respectively, the size and quality of the
11
Army's manpower intake during the war and the scale and
nature of the Army's manpower requirements and allocations
during the second half of the war - both subjects being of
direct relevance to the manpower crisis.
The thesis will begin with, in Chapter 1, an examination
of the Army's distribution of manpower, both geographically
and functionally, to ascertain how much was at home and how
much overseas, how much was in the supporting corps and how
much in the fighting corps. This will be based on
statistics relating to the autumn of 1944. By comparison of
these statistics with statistics of manpower distribution
in the American and Canadian Armies, we will determine
whether too much manpower was devoted by the British Army
to the supporting corps and to the home base. Put another
way, we will determine whether too little manpower was in
the frontline. The British Army's manpower distribution
will be compared with that of the American and Canadian
Armies for two reasons: both Armies fought the same enemy
(the Germans) and fought over the same terrain (Italy and
NW Europe) as the British Army; both Armies, the American
much larger and the Canadian much smaller than the British,
suffered an infantry reinforcement crisis in the autumn of
1944, just like the British Army9. It is true that the
American and Canadian Armies had much longer lines of
communication between the home base and the Continent than
the British Army. However, it is also true that, unlike the
American and Canadian Armies, the British Army had to
garrison and defend a far-flung Empire. I do not believe
the fact that, such was the degree of Allied co-operation,
formations and units of one Army often served under the
command of another invalidates the comparison. No
comparison is perfect. Yet how is one to judge save by
comparison? A comparison could of course be made with the
9 Palmer et al, The Procurement and Training of Ground Combat Troops, PP3-11,18,49,66-72; Stacey, Arms, Men and Governments, PP424-82; Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, PP363-5; Stacey, The Victory Campaign, PP284-5,385-6.
12
German Army but such a comparison would be less sensible
and fair. Churchill was fond of comparing the British
Army's distribution of manpower with that of the German
Army, a comparison he considered unflattering to the
formerlo.
In Chapter 2 the quantity and quality of manpower
devoted to the Army's supporting corps - specifically its
medical, supply and transport, electrical and mechanical
engineering and ordnance services - and to the artillery -
the artillery being the largest component of the British
Army during the war - will be examined, to ascertain if it
was excessive. In judging whether surpluses existed in
these arms, comparison will be made with the American Army,
for the reasons given above.
In Chapter 3 the quantity and quality of manpower
devoted to the Army's special and elite forces will be
examined, to ascertain if it was excessive. During the war
the British Army created many special forces and several of
them grew to a considerable size, the Airborne Forces and
the "Chindits" in particular. There was also a considerable
expansion of the Army's elite forces during the war, the
Foot Guards in particular. Both developments took place
primarily at the expense of the infantry. We will judge
whether the special and elite forces repaid the investment
made in them.
In Chapter 4 the Army's training and reinforcement
machine will be examined, to ascertain if it was efficient
and economical. It is extremely difficult to plan an
organization for training recruits and producing
reinforcements for the field units, for the simple reason
that the planners never are sure how many recruits are
going to be received and how many reinforcements are going
to be required. They first have to guess how long the war
10 Churchill to Brooke, 1st Nov. 1943: Churchill, Closing the Ring, PP682-3.
13
will last. Next, they must estimate how many men over that
period will be recruited and how many killed, wounded, or
otherwise rendered ineffective, and will need replacement.
Reinforcement planning has to be done on the assumption
that certain wastage rates established from the statistics
of experience in former wars, or in the early part of the
current war, will apply for the future. We shall see, in
Chapter 6, when we examine the extent and causes of the
battle wastage suffered by the Army and the accuracy of the
wastage rates used to predict it, how difficult it was to
evaluate this factor in reinforcement planning. The other
very variable factor which confounded the reinforcement
planners was how many units had to be reinforced. Field
commanders, in the course of operations, usually find that
they ought to have more field formations than the
government has given them, or that they need troops of a
different kind. If changes are made accordingly, this
upsets the proportion of the reinforcements of the
different arms, and their total number.
As a consequence of all these factors, the reinforcement
system which should ideally be designed to produce a
certain output per month of trained soldiers in the
proportion required, always seems to turn out too few men
of one corps and too many of others. Furthermore, they are
seldom trained to the liking of the users, that is, the
field units which are to be reinforced.
After reinforcements have completed their initial
training, they often are kept for a considerable period
before they are required to take their place in a field
unit. This necessitates holding units of various sorts,
which may be described as a reservoir for reinforcement
manpower. In such units, training must be carried on, or
the skill, morale and net value of the reinforcements will
deteriorate. This means that such holding units build up an
overhead in training, as well as in administrative
14
personnel, which can be quite considerable, as we shall see
when, also in Chapter 4, we examine these functions as they
were carried out in the British Army.
In Chapter 5 we will examine the extent and causes of
the normal or non-battle wastage suffered by the Army, to
ascertain it is was excessive. Wastage occurs not only when
men are killed or taken prisoner, or so severely wounded
that they will not be of serviceable military category when
they recover. Many must be invalided out because of the
effect of diseases, and among these the most difficult to
deal with are the psycho-neurotic disorders. It is
difficult to determine when psycho-neurotic cases have
reached a stage when they are unsalvageable for military
purposes and should be discharged for the good of the
service as well as their own good. Others, a small
proportion, are discharged because they will never be
useful soldiers; because they are of low intelligence or
are "worthless and incorrigible", using the time-honoured
words of King's Regulations, or, in the modern jargon, are
psychopaths. The causes of discharge will be analysed and
discussed with a view to establishing whether the Army, or
the Royal Army Medical Corps which was the chief agent,
erred in discharging as many men as it did. A number of men
were also lost to the Army either permanently or
temporarily through desertion or absence without leave and
the extent, causes and effects of desertion and absence
without leave will be analysed and discussed as well.
In Chapter 7 we will examine the operation of
conscription in Britain during the war. We will determine
whether it was thorough enough and whether the Army got its
fair share of the nation's manpower, both quantitatively
and qualitatively.
In Chapter 8 we will examine the allocation of manpower
to the Army by the Government during the war. We will
determine if the Army received the manpower it required to
15
meet its commitments and, if not, how far short of
requirements its allocations fell.
So, in the next eight chapters, an attempt will be made
to reach conclusions as to the causes of the manpower
crisis. In the attempt, we may discover how much better
manpower might have been utilised and how much manpower
might have been saved, if the British Government and the
British Army had been gifted with unerring prophetic
vision, and had known in the days of war what we know now.
More than fifty years after the event, it must now be
impossible to write anything entirely original about the
Second World War. However, one of the main reasons for
undertaking this thesis is that there is no adequate study
of the British Army's manpower crisis in the Second World
War. The existing literature either does not address the
subject or does so inadequately.
The standard history of the British Army during the
Second World War is still And We Shall Shock Them by
General Sir David Fraser (1983). Unsurprisingly, it is
concerned much more with operational than with
administrative matters. Although Fraser served in the North
West Europe campaign, his history avowedly concentrates on
how the Army overcame the trials and tribulations of the
early years of the war.
Although it has a different focus from this thesis, no
one today can write about infantry during the Second World
War without acknowledging a debt to The Sharp End by John
Ellis (first published 1980). This seminal work remains
unsurpassed in its depiction of what life was really like
for British and American combat soldiers, especially
infantrymen, during the war.
In the course of my researches I read several as yet
unpublished but excellent studies written by other
scholars. I would like to acknowledge: Dr. G. Spillan's
study of the Army's manpower problems between the wars
16
(1985); Dr. E. Whittle's study of the effect of Western
Front casualties on the conduct of the Second World War
(1991); Dr. R. Pope's study of demobilisation at the end of
the war (1985); Dr. J. Crang's study of the Army as a
social institution during the war (1992); Dr. T. Harrison-
Place's study of infantry and armour training in the UK
during the war (1997); and Dr. S. Hart's study of 21st Army
Group and the North West Europe campaign (1995) All have
added to our understanding of the British Army during the
Second World War, the last three especially: I was glad to
have been of help to Hart and Harrison-Place in their
researches. However, this study has its own focus. Unlike
Crang's, this is not a social study. Unlike Harrison-
Place's, this is not a tactical study. Unlike Hart's, this
is not an operational study. If the reader wishes to know
about Adam and ABCA, or Paget and Battle Schools, or
Montgomery and GOODWOOD, I can heartily recommend the
studies of Crang, Harrison-Place and Hart to him. Let me
repeat: this study is concerned only with the - unsexy but
not unimportant - subject of how and why the British Army
ran short of infantry reinforcements in the autumn of 1944.
Although they are primary sources, as one has been
published and others hopefully will be, I will say
something about the War Office Monographs in this
literature survey. After the war the War Office
commissioned a series of classified Monographs from
officers distinguished in their fields to record the
experiences and distil the lessons of the war. Only two are
concerned with the "teeth" arms (Royal Artillery and
Airborne Forces) The others are concerned with the "tail"
and with administration. Researched and written with
official sanction shortly after the events with which they
are concerned, the Monographs have one great and obvious
advantage and one great and obvious disadvantage for the
historian. They are authoritative; they are restrained.
17
They have proved of great assistance and have been used
extensively in this thesis, but what they do not say is
sometimes as important as what they do. Although they have
all now been opened to inspection in the Public Record
Office (W0277), only the one concerned with Airborne Forces
has been published to date.
It is unfortunate but unsurprising that the Monograph
concerned with manpower is the one of the briefest and
blandest of the Monographs. Manpower Problems by Major-
General A. J. K. Pigott (1949) is a very short work (90
pages) about a very big subject. It was opened in the
Public Record Office in 1980 but remains unpublished. It is
very selective as to coverage and covers those topics
selected (before the war; intakes during the war; supply of
officers; supply of tradesmen; manpower from outside the
UK; drafting; wastage; demobilization) sketchily and with
few statistics.
The Official History Manpower by H. M. D. Parker (1957) is
a general survey. It is concerned with the work of the
Ministry of Labour and National Service, the operation of
the National Service Acts and the mobilisation of the
nation's manpower for the war effort. Parker concerns
himself with the apportionment of manpower between
munitions and the Services; he does not concern himself
with the problems of each Service. In other words, he gives
the context of the Army's problems but not the particulars.
When he reaches the peak of mobilisation in the autumn of
1943, he breaks the narrative. When the narrative is
resumed, the first half of 1944 is covered sketchily. For
all that, he does show the capping of Army manpower in the
spring of 1941 and the low manpower priority given to the
Army between then and the summer of 1944.
Decision in Normandy: The Unwritten Story of Montgomery
and the Allied Campaign by Colonel C. D'Este (first
published 1983) contains a chapter on "The Manpower
18
Dilemma" facing the British Army in the summer of 1944.
While D'Este is to be congratulated for addressing the
subject, unfortunately the chapter is both confused and
confusing. Although he deals interestingly and
illuminatingly with the effects of the infantry shortage,
he misunderstands and misrepresents both the causes and the
steps taken to remedy it. After pontificating about the
infantry shortage, at the end of the chapter he performs a
volte-face and declares that it was a myth. For a critique
of D'Este's view of the infantry shortage (and especially
his belief that there were plenty of infantry
reinforcements in the UK after D-Day), the reader is
referred to the author's article Myth, Reality and Carlo
D'Este, mentioned above.
The Commonwealth Armies: Manpower and organisation in
two world wars by Dr. F. W. Perry (1988) is a brilliant
work. It is very readable and makes many excellent points.
It answers obvious questions like: "Why did the Army have
only X divisions in the field? " and "How can an Army with Y
million men be short of infantry? " Inevitably, given that
he covers both World Wars and the entire Commonwealth,
Perry's approach is very broadbrush. Too broadbrush in
fact. He does not explore one country's problems in any
depth (devoting, for instance, only 29 pages to Britain in
the Second World War) - he assumes that the problems were
broadly the same. In fact there were as many differences as
similarities. Perry's main concern is the connection
between manpower and organisation: he shows that in the
World Wars Britain, New Zealand and Australia fielded too
many formations in relation to their manpower resources
while Canada, India and South Africa fielded too few.
Although Pigott, Parker and Perry have proved essential
reading and will be referred to often in this thesis, none
is an adequate study of the British Army's manpower
problems in the Second World War. Although this thesis is
19
concerned solely with the causes of the Army's manpower
crisis in the autumn of 1944, hopefully it will go some way
to filling this important gap in the historiography of both
the British Army and the Second World War.
20
CHAPTER 1. DISTRIBUTION.
In this chapter the general distribution of manpower in
the British Army, as it was in the autumn of 1944, will be
examined. It will be compared, so far as is feasible with
the available evidence, with manpower distribution in the
American and Canadian Armies.
By distribution of manpower is meant the allocation of
men to the various arms of the Army - the "teeth"
(fighting) and "tail" (supporting) - and to various
locations - the home base and the overseas theatres. Table
I shows the distribution of manpower by arm while Table II
shows the distribution of manpower by location, both as of
30th September 1944.
The date, 30th September 1944, was selected as being the
forecast peak of the crisis which afflicted the infantry
formations and units of the British Army and which resulted
in drastic remedial measures. There was no great change in
the distribution of the manpower of the Army thereafter
until the end of the war in Europe, except when the 5th
Division left Italy in early 1945 and joined the 2nd Army
in NW Europe.
The tables give actual strengths of the Army at this
date, as recorded in the contemporary returns prepared in
the War Office for its own use. The responsible staffs
(those of the Statistical Branch of the Adjutant-General's
Department, known as AG Stats) expended a great deal of
effort to make the strength statistics accurate. However,
no one will suggest that accounting for men ever reached
the precision with which a well-ordered business, or
government, accounts for money. Be that as it may, it is
believed that the figures in these tables are correct to
within less one percent, on the average, that is to say,
sufficiently correct for purposes of determining the
21
proportionate distribution of manpower, and that any
statistical error that may exist is not great enough to
affect the validity of the conclusions drawn.
The figures in the tables have been abstracted from the
printed "General Return of the Strength of the British
Army" for the quarter ending 30th September 19441. The
figures in this digest of strength statistics therefore
relate exactly to the time when the infantry crisis was
forecast to be at its peak. It will be referred to
frequently throughout this thesis, although whenever
undigested statistical data is available that will be
preferred. The following comments are explanatory of Tables
I and II.
The figures given are gross. That is, they do not
specify the fitness, rank, level of training, age or
present/planned role of personnel. They therefore do not
distinguish between "effectives" (the young, the fit and
the trained) and "ineffectives" (the very young, the old,
the unfit and the untrained). It is the number of
"effectives" - who always comprise only a proportion of any
force - that is the true guide to a force's strength. This
is an important point which should always be borne in mind
by those discussing manpower questions.
Both tables exclude those on the India Unattached List
and those reported to be Prisoners of War. The Household
Cavalry, Royal Armoured Corps, Royal Artillery, Royal
Engineers, Royal Signals, Foot Guards, Infantry and Army
Air Corps have been classed as "teeth" while all others
have been classed as "tail". The Household Cavalry was a
semi-autonomous elite Corps responsible for its own
recruitment, training etc.; during the war it fielded a
couple of armoured reconnaissance regiments. The Foot
Guards was also a semi-autonomous elite Corps responsible
for its own recruitment, training etc.; during the war it
' W073/162.
22
fielded several infantry brigades, a tank brigade and an
armoured division. Not all of the Infantry was Rifle
Infantry. A proportion was Motor or Machine Gun or Support
Infantry, which was trained and equipped differently to
Rifle Infantry. It was Rifle Infantry that was in greatest
demand and shortest supply. The Army Air Corps included
paratroopers, glider-borne infantry and glider pilots. The
General Service Corps had been created in 1942 to
rationalise the allocation of manpower to the various arms.
It acted as a sorting house; all recruits (excepting those
for the Household Cavalry and the Foot Guards) were
temporarily assigned to it and given basic training while
their strengths and weaknesses were assessed and their
final destination decided. Its work will be examined more
closely in Chapter 5. The Royal Army Service Corps included
a small number of non-combatant Expeditionary Force
Institute personnel. Extra-Regimentally Employed personnel
were those serving in an unspecified capacity, not with
their parent arm. With regard to such personnel,
conflicting figures are often given, presumably depending
on whether all are counted or just the long-term.
Looking at these tables, one can see at once that the
British Army had an impressive proportion of its manpower
in the "teeth" arms and an impressive proportion of its
manpower overseas. In both cases: 62%. Both by arm and by
location, the British Army's manpower distribution was
better than that of either the Canadian Army or the
American Army, as we shall shortly see.
It will be noted that, surprisingly, at the forecast
peak of the infantry crisis, the Army possessed over half a
million infantry. Remember, however, that not all were
rifle infantry and of those who were not all would have
been "effective". It will also be noted that there were
over 50,000 in the General Service Corps, although it would
23
of course be a very long time before these became fully
trained reinforcements and, in any case, not all would be
suitable for infantry service.
The number of men in the UK is noteworthy. Although in
relative terms not a great proportion of the Army's
manpower, the figure is so great in absolute terms as to
require further investigation. Table III is a functional
analysis of male Army personnel in the UK at the end of
September 1944. The figures come from a return produced by
AG Stats comparing actual manpower with allotted manpower2.
For some unaccountable reason, the total differs slightly
from that given in Table II.
It will be noted that only 70% of those in the UK were
available i. e. trained and in post. Of these, most were in
Empire Base Installations (i. e. base establishments such as
ammunition depots, repair workshops etc. ), Anti-Aircraft
Command, the Training Organization and the Home Field Army.
The surprisingly large number of trained and available
reinforcements (only a proportion of whom were of course
infantry) were located as follows: some were in the two
Cadre Infantry (actually "retraining" and "home defence")
Divisions of the Home Field Army; some were in the three
Reserve (actually "training") Divisions; some were in the
one Holding (actually "retraining" and "drafting")
Division; most were in the schools and units of the
Training Organization. Of the almost 30% of those in the UK
who were unavailable, most were under training, retraining,
of limited availability (i. e. on detached duty,
compassionate leave etc. ), non-available (i. e. on sick
leave, absent without leave etc. ) and on the "Y" List (i. e.
in prison, hospital, selection centre etc. ).
The numbers shown as "Under training" are those in the
training stream. That is, soldiers and officers from the
time of their enlistment or appointment and while they are
W0365/178.
24
undergoing individual training in the schools and units of
the Training organization and while they are subsequently
undergoing collective training in the Reserve Divisions.
These are all potential reinforcements, but are not
available for posting to operational formations until their
training is complete. The period required for training was
nominally from several months for "general duty" personnel,
up to a year or more for specialists and tradesmen - if one
agrees that a man can be called a tradesman who learns his
business in a year. Of the time taken for training, the
difficulties in producing a continuous flow of adequately
trained reinforcements in the numbers required by all arms,
and the manpower resources employed on training, more will
be said in Chapter 4.
The numbers shown as "Retraining" are those being
remustered to other corps, in consequence of a surplus of
reinforcements existing in their original corps, or because
of the break-up of formations and establishments no longer
required, or because of personal unsuitability in a
previous employment; as well as those undergoing refresher
training after returning to duty following long periods of
hospitalisation or leave.
What conclusions can we draw from the picture of
manpower distribution presented by these three tables?
First and foremost, we note that the bulk of the Army's
manpower was in the "teeth" arms and overseas. Therefore,
in relative terms, the Army did not have an excessive
number of personnel in the "tail" or an excessive number of
personnel in the home base.
A rough and ready means of examining the efficiency of
army organization is by dividing the total number of
personnel in the army by the number of divisions. The
product is called the "divisional slice". The fewer
personnel in the divisional slice, the more efficient the
25
organization, efficiency being defined as a higher ratio of
fighting formations to supporting services, and the
mechanism of reinforcement, and other overheads. The
British divisional slice worked out at 2,950,000 divided by
35 divisions = about 84,300. This was lower than the
Canadian divisional slice but higher than the American. The
Canadian divisional slice was 465,750 divided by 5=
93,150. The American divisional slice was 6,326,295 divided
by 89 divisions = about 71,100. We thus have a primary
indication that British organization was more economical
than Canadian but less economical than American.
The divisional slice is both a very approximate and a
very contentious measure of the fighting/supporting ratio
of armies. It is not a simple matter to decide which
formations to include and which to exclude when calculating
the slice. The calculation of the Canadian slice excludes
home defence divisions and independent armoured brigades,
on the grounds that the former were not field formations
and the latter were not really independent formations3. If
the armoured brigades were counted, the Canadian slice
would be lower than the British; if the home defence
divisions were counted as well, it would be lower than the
American. The British slice was calculated as follows. In
the autumn of 1944 the British Army had 6 armoured
divisions (including one which never fought as such but
provided units to support other formations), 2 airborne
divisions (including one which had just been destroyed), 19
infantry divisions (including one which was a deception
Regiments, 18 LAA Regiments (excluding 3 on loan to Corps)
and 1 SL Regiment. Each of the 4 Corps had a LAA Regiment
and a ATk Regiment i. e. 4 LAA Regiments (including 3 on
loan from GHQ and Army) and 4 ATk Regiments. Each of the 3
Armoured and 8 Infantry Divisions had a LAA Regiment and an
ATk Regiment i. e. 11 LAA Regiments and 11 ATk Regiments. A
84 Hastings, Overlord, P151.
85 Pemberton, PP262-73.
86 Operations in NW Europe, Supplement to the London Gazette, 3`d September 1946, P4449.
85
grand total of: 17 HAA Regiments; 33 LAA Regiments; 15 ATk
Regiments' .
As Table VIII shows, British divisions in NW Europe were
generously provided with artillery units. Each armoured
division had 2 Field Regiments, 1 ATk Regiment and 1 LAA
Regiment. Each infantry division had 3 Field Regiments, 1
ATk Regiment and 1 LAA Regiment. As Table IX shows, British
infantry divisions in NW Europe had 3,428 artillerymen.
They had 2,122 field artillerymen while American infantry
divisions had 2,111 i. e. practically the same, even though
the British infantry division had 50% more field artillery
than the American infantry division (not counting the field
artillery integral to, and manned by, the latter's infantry
regiments). However, British infantry divisions had 721
anti-tank artillerymen and 585 anti-aircraft artillerymen
whereas American infantry divisions had none (American
infantry divisions did have some anti-tank artillery, but
all of it was integral to, and manned by, their infantry
regiments and battalions). American anti-tank and
anti-aircraft units were pooled under higher formations.
Was it necessary for every division in NW Europe to have
an ATk regiment of 721 all ranks and a LAA regiment of 585
all ranks? Was it necessary for every Corps in NW Europe to
have one of each? Was it necessary for GHQ and Army Troops
in NW Europe to have dozens of LAA and HAA regiments, the
latter of about 1,000 all ranks. The number of all ranks on
the establishment of 21st Army Group's anti-tank and
anti-aircraft artillery regiments in Normandy was 15 x 721
= 10,815 and 33 x 585 + 17 x 1,000 = 36,305 respectively: a
grand total of 47,120. In round figures, the War
Establishment (excluding reinforcements) of 21st Army Group
in Normandy was 662,000, of whom 82,000 were rifle
infantry88. The 47,120 anti-aircraft and anti-tank
87 Ellis, Vol. I, App. IV: Pt. I. PP522-30.
88 W0365/129. 86
artillerymen therefore amounted to 7.1% of the total force
and to 57.5% of the infantry contingent. Thus, there was a
very important percentage of British manpower on the
Continent in these branches of the artillery which, as it
turned out, were little engaged in the function for which they were intended. Reading that part of the RA Monograph
concerning the NW Europe campaign, one finds hardly any
evidence that a corps or divisional light anti-aircraft
unit shot down an enemy aircraft or a corps or divisional
anti-tank unit killed an enemy tank89. This can scarcely be
the fact, although it does seem certain that units of this
type were not heavily engaged and did not destroy many
enemy aircraft or tanks.
The figure of 47,120 anti-tank and anti-aircraft
artillerymen in 21st Army Group is an illustrative figure.
In fact, the size and composition of LAA and ATk regiments
varied between formation and did not remain static
throughout the entire campaign. As the campaign progressed,
their composition and size were changed. This was partly
because of changes to weaponry but also partly because of
an acceptance that they were unnecessarily strong. In the
autumn of 1944 LAA regiments were reduced by a third from
54 to 36 guns. At the same time LAA regiments in infantry
divisions became like those in armoured divisions:
self-propelled. As a result of these two changes, their
strength fell considerably (to 585) . ATk regiments with
infantry divisions - apart from the two infantry divisions
which took part in the D-Day assault (a third of whose guns
were American and self-propelled) - began the campaign with
48 guns, two thirds 6-pdr and one third 17-pdr, all towed.
With the greater availability of the 17-pdr, in autumn 1944
the ratio was reversed. At the beginning of 1945 the number
of 17-pdrs was reduced by a quarter, although half the
89 Pemberton, PP205-282.
87
remaining 17-pdrs became self-propelled and the 6-pdrs were
unaffected (bringing the total down to 40 guns). The
strength of ATk regiments with infantry divisions therefore
rose in the autumn of 1944 (to 721) but then fell by a
greater amount at the beginning of 1945. ATk regiments with
armoured divisions were equipped entirely with 17-pdrs. ATk
regiments with corps were equipped entirely with 17-pdrs,
half self-propelled. Corps ATk regiments were reduced by a
quarter (to 36 guns) at the beginning of 1945. The strength
of corps ATk regiments therefore fell at the beginning of
1945.
It very quickly became apparent after D-Day that 21st
Army Group had been furnished with more anti-aircraft and
anti-tank units than it needed. There had been an
over-insurance of anti-aircraft protection because of
understandable but exaggerated fears of aircraft attacks on
the bridgehead90. Lack of such attacks led - starting in mid
July - to the increasing use of searchlights in an
offensive role, to provide artificial moonlight for
attacking infantry and armour91. As the RA Monograph states:
"After the breakout from Normandy, the overwhelming
superiority of the allied air and armoured forces left
little for the AA and anti-tank gunners to do. Both
therefore sought, and found, employment in a variety of
other tasks"92. Six months after D-Day the ATk gun was being
regularly used for the engagement of pin-point targets such
as pill-boxes, machine gun posts, snipers in houses and
observation posts, and soft-skinned vehicles or troops
behind light cover; for nuisance value harassing fire; and
for the cutting of wire obstacles. LAA guns, besides the
directional and deceptive purposes for which they had long
90 Ibid, P219.
91 Ibid, P221.
92 Ibid, P25I.
88
been used, were used effectively against enemy positions
under light cover or in woods. LAA guns were used in
conjunction with other arms in both defensive and offensive
roles. HAA guns were used as medium guns against ground
targets. However, there was considerable scepticism about
the use of HAA guns in the field role and not until the end
of 1944 was the issue of field artillery equipment to all
HAA units approved. AA Brigades were used in both defensive
roles (augmented by infantry and engineers) and offensive
roles (temporarily converted into Army Groups Royal
Artillery) 93.
As the NW Europe campaign progressed, as radar and
signalling equipment developed and Allied air superiority
reduced the need for so many anti-aircraft units, many
anti-aircraft personnel were released for other types of
artillery, for work with searchlights or as infantry94.
After the Normandy campaign, many anti-aircraft units were
either used to supplement the fire of other artillery units
against ground targets or were trained to use other
artillery equipments or were converted into infantry units:
clear proof both of their redundancy in their intended role
and of contemporary acknowledgement of the fact. As the RA
Monograph states: "By the end of 1944 the HAA gun was being
used extensively in the ground role and AA gunners were
expected to man the 7.2in how. as an alternative weapon.
The Bofors also had proved its value both for the direct
engagement of attacking infantry and for the direction - by
tracer - of our own troops in the assault; and in the later
stages of the war in NW Europe, the LAA guns played an
important part in the "pepperpot" concentrations which
achieved results as unexpected as they were remarkable i95.
93 Ibid, PP251-3.
94 Ellis, Vol. II, App. IV: Pt. II, P383.
95 Pemberton, P328.
89
Many RA personnel were re-roled as counter-mortar and added
to infantry divisions: each infantry division was given 53
such personnel in the autumn of 1944 and another 101 at the
end of the year. By the end of the war in Europe seven
infantry brigades had been formed out of ex-RA Regiments
and another one was in process of formation96. Three of the
infantry brigades plus 18 unbrigaded infantry battalions, a
total of 27 infantry battalions formed out of 27 ex-RA
Regiments, were employed in a garrison role during the last
stage of the NW Europe campaign97. Although during the
latter stages of the NW Europe campaign there was still a
substantial number of HAA, LAA and SL Regiments deployed,
several of the HAA Regiments were "Mixed" i. e. composed
mostly of ATS personnel98 and many of the HAA, LAA and SL
Regiments were being used to support ground operations.
Many but not all. The need for air defence, albeit
considerably reduced, continued until the end of the war.
Reference to the figures given above shows that in the
autumn of 1944 there were 61,997 personnel in the HAA, LAA
and SL units of 21st Army Group. The 61,997 personnel
deployed on "ack-ack" was 47% of the total personnel
(131,167) in the artillery; 58% of the 105,911 infantry;
and 154% of the 40,193 armour with 21st Army Group". Of
21st Army Group's War Establishment in autumn 1944
(excluding reinforcements), 40,868 (6%) was allotted to
"GHQ AA Troops" i. e. air defence of lines of
communicationloo. There was thus both in absolute and
relative terms a substantial number of personnel deployed
on "ack-ack" in NW Europe. Yet during the campaign the
96 Joslen, Orders of Battle.
97 Ellis, Vol. II, App. IV: Pt. I, PP369 and 380.
98 Ibid, P370.
99 W073/162.
too W0365/129.
90
"Luftwaffe" was largely (though not completely, as the
surprise attack on Allied airfields on 1st January 1945
showed) neutralised by Allied air superiority. However, it
should not be assumed that the personnel deployed on "ack-
ack" were entirely redundant in their intended role, for
the "Luftwaffe" was not the only aerial threat to the
Allied forces. It should be noted that from early September
the Germans subjected the Allied forces in NW Europe to
V-weapon attack. It should be further noted that Eisenhower
ruled that no fighters could be spared for defence against
V-weapons and that the defence had to be provided by
anti-aircraft guns. Between October 1944 and March 1945
Antwerp, the Allies' principal port and base in NW Europe,
was subjected to heavy V-weapon attacks. When the V-weapon
attacks on Antwerp began, the large number of HAA, LAA and
SL units deployed to defend it against aircraft attack was
supplemented by additional HAA and LAA units'°'.
The disbandment of RA units and the conversion of
artillerymen into infantry were not confined to NW Europe.
In the Mediterranean theatre during the last year of the
war many units, mostly anti-aircraft artillery, were
disbanded and their personnel - amounting to 21,477 -
retrained as infantrymen'02. In March 1944 the commanders in
the Mediterranean were warned by the War Office of a
forecast infantry deficit of 21,000 in the theatre at the
end of September103. Luckily, thanks to Allied air
superiority, by spring 1944 many anti-aircraft units were
no longer needed in the theatre. The Mediterranean AA
Advisory Committee was set up in April 1944 to select
anti-aircraft units for disbandment and the conversion of
their personnel to infantry. Unfortunately, the facilities
101 Ellis, Vol. II, PP149-150.
102 Molony, Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, P423.
103 Weeks (DCIGS) to Wilson (SACMED) and Paget (C-in-C MEF), 18th March 1944: CAB106/313.
91
for retraining were limited and it proved a time-consuming
procedure. When it was learned that no reinforcements other
than for the infantry would be sent from the UK for some
time to come, it was decided to convert only 7,000
anti-aircraft artillerymen into infantry instead of the
planned 15,000. To make up the shortfall, other measures
were necessary. These included the disbandment of an
anti-tank regiment and the reduction of all divisional
anti-tank and light anti-aircraft regiments by one troop
per battery. By these various measures an infantry crisis
in Italy was postponed until the autumn of 1944. It was not
averted however. This was because the conversion of units
was slower than expected; fewer men were fit for infantry
duty than expected; and many disbanded units were
understrength and therefore produced fewer men than
04 expected' . In September 1944 there was a critical shortage
of infantry in Italy, as long forecast by the War Office. A
desperate appeal for help from Alexander to Brooke met with
a firm refusallos. Although the Middle East sent some men - including 300 retrained artillerymen - to help out, it was
clear that drastic measures were required. Consequently,
many formations and units were disbanded. These included 2
Medium, 1 Field and 1 ATk regiments. The disbandment of
units and the transfer of their personnel to the infantry
was carried out with care. For reasons of discipline and
morale, men from AA units were only transferred to infantry
units from their home areaslo6. More will be said about the
converting of artillerymen into infantrymen in Chapter 4.
What conclusions can be drawn in relation to corps and
divisional LAA and ATk artillery units in NW Europe?
104 Molony, Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI: Pt. I, PP448-50.
105 Bryant, Triumph in the West, P287.
'06 Jackson, Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI: Pt. II, PP371-2.
92
It is unarguable that, as events in Normandy showed, 21st Army Group was over-endowed with LAA and ATk
artillery. It is therefore right to ask: after Normandy did
each division need a regiment of LAA and ATk guns? If so, did the regiments need to be so strong? There are no easy
answers. With the benefit of hindsight, it is possible to
argue that the regiments were completely superfluous and
should have been dispensed with entirely. Without the
benefit of hindsight, it is possible to argue that they
were a prudent precaution and necessary for morale and
should have been maintained at full strength. It is also
possible to reject both these arguments and to argue that
the regiments should have been kept but should have been
reduced in size - which is what actually happened.
The establishments of British divisions were set up in
their final form during the period when the German Armies
had destroyed the French Army, expelled one British Army
from the Continent and driven another back into Egypt, all
through greatly superior offensive power, mainly residing
in armour and tactical aircraft. The division had to be
given means to defend itself against tanks and
dive-bombers, the key components of the "Blitzkrieg". There
is no doubt that, because of the preoccupation with the air
defence of Britain and the strategic bombing of Germany and
the RAF's consequent neglect of its overseas commands and
of Army co-operation until relatively late in the war, the
Army had to furnish its forces serving or proceeding
overseas with more anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery
units than it would have liked or could afford.
Unfortunately, these anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery
units while strong defensively for their special purpose
were of limited use offensively.
However, while it is true that events in Normandy could
not have been predicted and that infantry divisions had to
be adequately defended against air and armoured attack, it
93
is not true that by D-Day infantry divisions were wholly or
largely dependent on their LAA and ATk regiments for
defence against aircraft and tanks. Quite apart from the
defence against aircraft and tanks then provided by the RAF
and the defence against tanks then provided by the RAC,
each infantry division had 62 ATk and 71 LAA guns over and
above those in its ATk and LAA regiments - not counting its
72 field guns which had a secondary anti-tank capability.
The experience of the British forces in 1944 and 1945
would seem to bear out the conclusions of the tank
theorists who used to say that the best anti-tank weapon is
another tank. The high proportion of armour in the British
Army in NW Europe - in Normandy there were 3 armoured
divisions, 1 division of specialised armour and 7
independent armoured or tank brigades to 8 infantry
divisions and 1 independent infantry brigade107 - ensured
that infantry could be closely and strongly supported by
armour in all circumstances when enemy armour could attack
in any strength. In addition, the infantry were provided
with their own anti-tank weapons: each rifle battalion had
six 6-pdrs and 23 Projector, Infantry, Anti-tank (PIAT).
It would seem, therefore, that no anti-tank artillery
needed to have been provided, for the infantry were given
suitable anti-tank weapons of their own, and the force was
supplied with ample armour to provide support for the
infantry in defence as well as attack: in Normandy a ratio
of 13 brigades of armour to 28 of infantry. The 10,815
anti-tank artillerymen in 21st Army Group could therefore
have been safely dispensed with. Many, though not all, of
these men would have been suitable for the infantry.
As for LAA, no such simple conclusions can be drawn.
Given Allied air superiority during the last part of the
war, it is possible to argue that divisional and corps LAA
regiments were as unnecessary as divisional and corps ATk
107 Ellis, Vol. 1, App. IV: Pt. I. PP521-30.
94
regiments. Indeed, given the extent of that superiority, it
is possible to argue that they were even more unnecessary.
These arguments are persuasive and it is tempting to
conclude that the 8,775 LAA artillerymen with the divisions
and corps of 21st Army Group could have been safely
dispensed with; GHQ and Army anti-aircraft artillery being
retained as a precaution (a necessary precaution, as the
threat posed by the Vl to 21st Army Group's main base on
the Continent showed). However, one must be wary of
hindsight. We had to organize our forces for the conditions
likely to be met on the Continent and we could not assume
that such conditions would include the almost complete
command of the air which the Allies actually possessed in
Italy and NW Europe in 1944-45. It was both prudent and
logical to assume that the "Luftwaffe" would pose a greater
threat to Allied forces the closer to Germany they got. It
could not be foreseen that the "Luftwaffe" would cause
little trouble, either to the forces in the field or to
their lines of communication, and that LAA would be largely
redundant. Consequently, the troops had to have the means
of defending themselves, especially while on the move,
against the attacks of ground-attack aircraft. The problem
was to provide as much protection as was essential, but not
to tie up too much manpower in a purely defensive role, and
it would only have been solved if armament capable of being
used in two roles had been developed. Detailed discussion
of what was needed "to square the circle" is beyond the
scope of this thesis, but a few words are in order.
The German 88mm. gun as an example of a weapon which
performed two roles with equal success -a gun which was
designed to shoot down aircraft but which was just as
capable of destroying tanks - will come to the mind of
every veteran of North Africa, Italy and NW Europe. The
British in fact had a gun quite similar to the 88mm. - the
95
3.7in. HAA gun. During the latter stages of the NW Europe
campaign, the 3.7in. was deployed to provide additional
fire support for ground attacks. However, it was never
deployed against tanks like the 88mm. and whether it should
have been so deployed, and whether it would have been as
effective in that role as the 88mm., are still debatedl°s
What is not debated is that neither the 88mm. nor the
3.7in. were of any use against low-flying aircraft. The use
of LAA, HAA and ATk guns in NW Europe in other than their
designed roles prompts the question: which was the more
useful, the dual purpose gun or the dual purpose gunner?
The RA Monograph is in no doubt: "For technical reasons, a
really efficient dual purpose weapon was unattainable. The
ballistic requirements of the three main types of gun -
field, anti-tank and AA - were so incompatible that any
attempt to strike a compromise would inevitably produce a
second-rate weapon. On the other hand, in the man behind
the gun there was promise of much greater degree of
adaptability. Not only was the modern soldier better
educated than his predecessor, but the service of his
weapons, instead of becoming more difficult as they became
more complex, had actually been simplified. Hence the
combination of alternative guns and dual purpose gunners
seemed to assure the more efficient and economical use of
both weapon- and man-power. There was indeed nothing new in
the idea that man is naturally more adaptable than his
tools" 109. This is a persuasive argument.
Let us now add up what might have been saved in manpower
from the establishments of the RAMC, RAOC, REME, RASC and
RA in NW Europe in 1944 if we had known everything then
that we know now. We have seen that we could have saved
2,710 all ranks by reducing establishments of field
ambulances, and that there were 8,000 hospital beds more
108 Bidwell, Gunners at War, PP181-3.
109 Pemberton, P25'.
96
than proved necessary, the establishment for which would
amount to 2,400 all ranks; so that medical establishments
could have been reduced by 5,110. By reducing all the
central ordnance depots somewhat or some of them
substantially and by replacing the advanced base workshops
with a base workshop, and by abolishing tank troops
workshops with independent armoured and tank brigades,
3,000 RAOC and 3,845 REME might have been dispensed with: a total for these two arms of 6,845 all ranks. If the scale
of supplies had been reduced, a number of RASC personnel
could have been saved: a saving of a tenth would amount to
11,000 men. If divisional and corps ATk artillery had been
eliminated, another 10,815 of establishment would have been
saved. The total for these five arms is 33,770, or 5% of
the War Establishment of 21st Army Group in autumn 1944,
excluding reinforcements"O.
This would have been quite a significant saving. As was
noted in Chapter 1, during the entire NW Europe campaign
the British Army sustained 141,646 casualties. Thus, the
suggested manpower saving of 33,770 would have been enough
to provide reinforcements to replace almost a quarter of
the casualties sustained during the campaign. Of course,
most of the casualties were sustained by the "teeth" arms
and relatively few of those employed in the "tail" were
suitable for employment in the "teeth" arms. Nevertheless,
the suggested saving gives one pause, not least because
greater savings could have been suggested - not all of them
outlandish. Such as the disbandment of divisional and corps
LAA regiments, which would have saved another 8,775: taking
the saving in gunners to 19,590. And many of these men
would have been suitable for infantry duty.
This chapter has examined the manpower allocated to
certain arms and has suggested certain ways in which their
110 W0365/129.
97
manpower might have been reduced. Other arms could have
been examined - the Royal Engineers, the Pioneer Corps, the
Royal Armoured Corps and the Royal Signals for example -
and reductions in those arms might well have been
identified. While it is true that many in the Pioneer Corps
were unsuitable for combat duty, it is also true that - as
has been alluded to - there was an abundance of RAC units.
It is not contended that all the proposed reductions would
have been painless and without risk; nor is it contended
that all the proposed reductions would have materially
benefited the infantry. Reducing the RAMC, for example,
might have lowered the morale of the "teeth" arms, not
least the infantry. Transferring men from the REME to a
non-technical arm like the infantry, to give another
example, might have provoked a second Beveridge Report into
the Army's use of skilled manpower. And it is unlikely that
many medics - as opposed to gunners - would have passed
muster as infantrymen. It would, of course, have been much
better if the RAMC, REME, RA and the others had not been
allowed to recruit so many men in the first place. However,
at the time of their recruitment, their future redundancy
could not have been easily predicted and was certainly not
obvious.
Although the "tail" contained relatively few men
suitable for service in the "teeth", the number was
certainly not inconsiderable in absolute terms. After all,
the "tail" contained almost a million other ranks in the
autumn of 1944. The assumption that, certainly by the
autumn of 1944, the "tail" contained too few men suitable
for the "teeth" arms to make an appreciable difference is a
reasonable but a mistaken one. The "tail", even as late as
the autumn of 1944, contained a considerable number of men
who were suitable for the "teeth" arms. Of British Army ORs
on 31st August 1944,69.03% were both Al i. e. of peak
98
physical fitness and aged under 41111. Yet, on this date the
"teeth" arms accounted for only 62.4% of ORs112. Assuming
that all ORs in the "teeth" were both Al and under 41
(which was certainly not the case and did not need to be
the case, especially with regard to non-field sappers,
signallers and gunners), then it follows that on 31st
August 1944 an absolute minimum of 69.03%-62.4%=6.63% of
ORs i. e. 169,172 were both Al and under 41 yet not employed in the "teeth". Put another way, an absolute minimum of 17.65% of those ORs employed in the "tail" possessed the
physical fitness and age necessary for service in the
"teeth". That the "tail" needed a certain number of fit and
young men to do its job effectively is undoubted. That many
fit and young men had been - and were being - combed out of
the "tail" is also undoubted. However, it may certainly be
doubted whether - at the end of August 1944, a time of
mounting infantry crisis - the "tail" needed 169,172 men
(at the lowest computation) of peak fitness, more than a
sixth of its strength. And let us not overlook the fact
that, even if no one in the "tail" was suitable for service
in the "teeth", surplus drivers, mechanics, medics etc.
were not cost-free. They had to be fed, clothed, trained
(intensively, because of the skilled nature of their
duties), paid (well, ditto), equipped, transported etc.
They were an extra burden on the Army and served to inflate
the "tail" even more.
The detailed analysis undertaken in this chapter has
been both absolutely necessary and extremely productive.
The evidence presented above strongly suggests that in the
autumn of 1944 the supporting corps were too large and
could have been cut whilst the artillery was still too
large and could have been cut further. It is not possible
to say with precision how many suitable men the over-
111 AG's lecture of 2 "d October 1944: AG Stats branch memorandum.
112 AG Stats analysis for August 1944.
99
expansion of the supporting corps and artillery had denied
to the infantry by the autumn of 1944, although it was
undoubtedly many and must be accounted a major cause of the
infantry crisis. It seems clear that the Army should have
been much stricter in its allocation of manpower to the
"tail" and to defensive artillery, especially after the
tide of war had turned and the nature of the war had been
transformed, developments which were both manifest well
before D-Day (if not all their implications). If it had, it
is probable that the infantry crisis would have been a lot
less severe and not inconceivable that it would have been
avoided. Some may disagree with these conclusions. However,
we may all agree that, at the very least, this chapter has
demonstrated the vital importance of keeping the
establishments of an Army, especially those of supporting
or passive units, under constant review and not allowing
them to expand beyond what is strictly necessary. As
Churchill rightly said: "It is the teeth that we always run
short of, and however good the Supply, the Signals, the
Pioneers, the R. E., and the hospitals are, there must
always somewhere up in front be a certain number of people
who actually are engaged on trying to kill the enemy with 1 13. the weapons which they hold"
113 Churchill to Brooke and Ismay, 13th December 1942: Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, P914.
100
CHAPTER 3. SPECIAL AND ELITE FORCES.
In this chapter we will examine the quantity and quality
of British Army manpower absorbed by Special Forces and by
the Guards during the war. Although Table I shows that in
the autumn of 1944 only 2.11% of the British Army's
manpower was devoted to Special Forces (the Army Air Corps)
and the Guards (the Household Cavalry and the Foot Guards),
appearances can be very deceptive. Two points need to be
appreciated. A considerable quantity of manpower in the
other arms, the Infantry especially, was in fact devoted to
Special Forces. The quality of manpower devoted to Special
Forces and the Guards was out of all proportion to the
quantity of manpower devoted.
As it was much the greater, let us first examine the
quantity and quality of British Army manpower absorbed by
Special Forces during the war. As their name implies,
Special Forces were forces trained and equipped to
undertake special tasks i. e. tasks believed to be beyond
the capability of ordinary forces. At the beginning of the
war the British Army had no Special Forces. During the war
there was a proliferation of Special Forces in the British
Army: many Special Forces were created and several grew to
a considerable size. They were responsible for absorbing a
large quantity of the high quality manpower at the British
Army's disposal. They consequently distorted the British
Army's manpower distribution and contributed to its
manpower problems - especially the shortage of infantry.
As we saw in Chapter 2, within the British Army during
the war there were many calls on manpower besides the
infantry, such as the RA, the REME, the RAC and the RE. All
were "legitimate" demands. What was "not legitimate, or
even sensible", in the view of Terraine (a view which is
shared by many soldiers and historians), was "the creaming
101
off" of good men "into various "private armies" by means of
which, it was naively supposed, set-piece battle with its
heavy loss could be avoided". These "private armies" included: the "Commandos" ("Most famous"), the Airborne
Forces ("Worst of all the "offenders", it must be said"),
the "Chindits" ("aberration"), the Long Range Desert Group,
the SAS ("though few in numbers, helped to "compound the
felony"") etc. 1.
In the latter part of WWII the British Army had either
in its Order of Battle or under its direct command a great
number and a bewildering variety of Special Forces or
"private armies". There were: 4 Special Service (later
"Commando") Brigades (the 1st, 2nd, 3rd and 4th); 2
Airborne Divisions (the 1st and 6th) and 1 Independent
Parachute Brigade (the 2nd) -a total of 2 Airlanding and 5
Parachute Brigades; 1 Mountain - later Airportable -
Division (the 52nd (Lowland) Division of 3 Brigades), which
was later converted back into an ordinary infantry
division; an eventual total of 6 "Chindit" Brigades
(properly Long Range Penetration Groups (LRPGs): originally
the 77th Indian Brigade; supplemented first by the 111th
Indian Brigade and then by the 3rd West African, the 14th,
the 16th and the 23rd Brigades); 1 Special Air Service
(SAS) Brigade, composed partly of French and Belgian units
trained and equipped in Britain; 1 Polish Parachute Brigade
(the 1st), which was trained and equipped in Britain; 2
Brigades trained and equipped for amphibious warfare (the
29th and 72nd of the British-Indian 36th Division), which
were later converted back into ordinary infantry brigades;
and 1 Indian Parachute Brigade (the 50th), which was
expanded into 44th Indian Airborne Division by the
conversion of 2 "Chindit" Brigades when the "Chindits" were
wound up.
1 Terraine, The Right of the Line, P642.
102
In mid 1944 the British Army's Order of Battle included
19 Brigades of Special Forces. There were: 3 "Chindit"
Brigades (formed by the conversion of 70th Division: 14th
and 23rd with 3rd Indian Division; 16th with Main HQ
Special Force) in India; 4 "Commando" Brigades (the ist
with 3 Army and 1 Royal Marine (RM) "Commandos" in NW
Europe; the 2nd with 2 Army and 2 RM "Commandos" in Italy;
the 3rd with 2 Army and 2 RM "Commandos" in India; the 4th
with 4 RM "Commandos" in NW Europe - plus 1 Inter-Allied
"Commando" in NW Europe); 3 Brigades (155th, 156th, 157th
with 9 battalions) in 52nd (Lowland) Division - plus 1
battalion (the Lovat Scouts) - in the mountain role in the
UK; 7 Brigades (2 Airlanding and 5 Parachute; with 21
battalions including 1 Canadian) in 1st Airborne Division
(in the UK), 6th Airborne Division (in NW Europe) and 2nd
Independent Parachute Brigade (in the Mediterranean); and 2
Amphibious Brigades (the 29th and 72nd of the British-
Indian 36th Division) in India (with 8 battalions)2. Not in
the British Army's Order of Battle but trained, equipped
and commanded by the British Army were 6 Brigades of
Special Forces: the 77th Indian, 111th Indian and 3rd West
African Brigades converted into "Chindits"; the 1st Polish
Parachute Brigade; the British-French-Belgian SAS Brigade;
and the 50th Indian Parachute Brigade. The 77th Indian,
111th Indian and 3rd West African Brigades contained
British, Gurkha, Burmese and Nigerian battalions. The 1st
Polish Parachute Brigade contained 3 Polish battalions. The
SAS Brigade contained 2 British battalions, 2 French
battalions, 1 Belgian company and 1 British squadron. The
50th Indian Parachute Brigade contained 1 Indian and 2
Gurkha battalions. A grand total of 25 Brigades of Special
Forces with 91 battalions or the equivalent: 25 "Chindit"
(17 British, 3 Nigerian, 4 Gurkha and 1 Burmese); 17
2 General Return of the Strength of the British Army for the quarter ending 30`h June 1944, AG Stats: W073/161.
103
"Commando" (7 Army, 9 RM and 1 Inter-Allied); 10 Mountain;
deficiency and manic depressive psychosis) and ulcers. In
other words, about 40% of medical discharges were due to
mental and nervous factors.
40% of 354,500, being the number of medical discharges
between the start of the war and the end of 1944, is
141,800. This could mean - assuming that each man
discharged served a year - that 141,800 man-years were lost
by enlisting men who proved to have this disability.
According to one calculation, the number of man-years
served in the British Army up to December 1944 was
12,740,0006. So the 141,800 man-years lost as above would be
just over 1% of the total Army manpower effort.
The difficulty, as already mentioned, is to detect the
disability at enlistment or in the early stages of
training. Any improvement in the effectiveness of screening
would result in a saving of manpower.
The voluntary recruiting system has a disadvantage which
becomes particularly apparent at times of relatively high
employment, or after a war has been in progress for a year
or more, and that is that recruits for the army tend to
6 AIRIO/3866: British Bombing Survey Unit, The Strategic Air War Against Germany, P38.
186
come chiefly from the unemployed or those who are not very
satisfied with their employment. Now, from time to time
many men who make good soldiers have been unemployed,
through no fault of their own, as for example, when the
principal industry in a small town is closed down by
irresistible economic pressures. The following observation
does not apply in such cases. But by and large the ranks of
the unemployed contain a large proportion of those who are
economically less capable; those who have less mental and
physical ability; less energy, stability, and other
characteristics which render them valuable to employers.
Such marginally employable men, when they come to the
recruiting office, cannot be refused enlistment, if they
can pass the medical examination. There is no way of
telling that they may not make acceptable soldiers. But
statistical averages operate, and it turns out that most of
the men who were not much good in civil life are not much
good as soldiers either. So they have to be discharged, in
the hope that someone better can be got in their place. (It
is true that throughout its history the British Army had
had to accept unpromising material - some of it "the scum
of the earth"- or go without and had managed, by the use of
firm discipline, to turn much of this material into "good"
soldiers. However, more was required of soldiers, including
infantrymen, during WWII than had been required of "the
Thin Red Line" or even "the Thin Khaki Line" and fewer
means were available to deter or punish slackness and
misconduct, as we shall see later in this chapter).
This is not the popular conception of how the voluntary
system works. The supposition is that all the best young
men, burning with patriotic ardour, rush to the defence of
the flag as soon as the call for recruits goes out. There
is enough truth in this to give colour to the popular
notion. In the early days of a war, a very considerable
proportion of those who enlist are actuated by pure
187
patriotism, and are willing to risk their lives for their
country, in accordance with the traditions in which they
had been brought up. They deserve the honour we give to the
volunteer. But the experience of WWI shows clearly that
`patriotism is not enough" to both create and maintain the
mass army necessary to fight a World War7, although it
suffices for relatively small expeditionary forces, such as
those Britain sent overseas before WWI and has sent
overseas since WWII. Hence the introduction of conscription
on the very first day of WWII, as we shall see in Chapter
7.
When, as in the World Wars, Britain was forced to create
a mass army, recruiting officers, including the medical
officers who examined recruits, had it impressed upon them
that they must not be too choosy and that they must not
nullify the efforts to multiply the size of the army by too
strict application of standards which had an element of
flexibility in them. So unsuitable men got taken in, and - in addition to causing disciplinary problems - went to
swell the discharge statistics.
We must also consider that it is frequently very
difficult for the medical officer or the lay officer to
distinguish between a real disability, or inability to
perform military duties, and unwillingness. Psychiatrists
and psychologists in their attempts to explain human
behaviour have made these distinctions far less clear,
insofar as the Army is concerned than they were, or seemed
to be, in 1914-18. At that time a man did what he was told,
encouraged by the kindly admonitions of his sergeant and
sergeant-major - or else. If he reported to the medical
officer with nothing visibly the matter with him, he was
malingering, a crime under the Army Act8.
Simkins, Kitchener's Army, PP104-62; Beckett and Simpson, A Nation in Arms, PP1-36.
8 Copp and McAndrew, Battle Exhaustion, PP67-8.
188
Psychiatrists, mulling over their 1939-45 experience,
suggest that there is a danger that the Army may be
injudicious, though well-meaning, in its application of the
information which psychiatry and psychology have unearthed
concerning human behaviour9. Some individuals, because of
congenital mental and physical characteristics and
unfortunate experiences early in life all too frequently
utilize methods of "escape" when faced with hard work or danger. In civil life this may not be of very great
consequence to society, but in military life it is more
serious. Actually, when necessary, and when he is under
proper discipline, the type of individual above described
can do a good many things, even when he wishes to do the
opposite. Therefore, the psychiatrists deduce, in the
military setting he must be forced to carry on at his
maximum potential, even if it is contrary to his desire, so
as to maintain the morale of other marginal types, who will
follow the path of least resistance if they see that other
men are escaping duty by exaggerating their inadequacies.
The Army does not wish to be brutal to such unfortunates
who have found their way into its ranks, and it is
difficult to fix the point beyond which disciplinary
measures can have no good result, either exemplary, or in
producing a reasonably useful soldier from indifferent
materiallo.
The psychologists point out, and the Army must agree,
that it is of no use training a man as an infantryman or
for one of the other more hazardous military postings if,
in the first hours of stress, in combat, his weakness of
nerve and brain will render him useless and, what is more,
a bad example for others who do not have his excuse. The
difficulty is that it seems somewhat unjust that the brave
and the steadfast must be sacrificed, while the
9 B. Shephard, Seminar on Psychiatry in the British Army, IHR, Univ. of London, 27`h Jan. 1998.
10 Copp and McAndrew, P70. 189
poor-spirited are allowed to avoid hardship and to preserve
their lives".
The problem of psychiatric casualties was acute in Italy
in early 1944. A considerable number of "S" casualties
accumulated at the base. "S" stood for stability, and was
the final factor in the PULHEMS profile of a man's physical
and mental abilities, or disabilities, used by the British
and Canadian Armies from 1943. PULHEMS was not the name of
an individual who invented the profile. P stood for
physique, U for upper limbs, L for lower limbs and
locomotion, H for hearing and ears, E for eyes, M for
mental capacity, and S for stability. Soldiers were graded
from 1 to 5 for each of these factors: 1 being fit for
service anywhere; 2 fit for anywhere except frontline
combat; 3 fit for line of communications duties; 4 fit for
home service; and 5 unfit12. "S" casualties were those who
had to be evacuated from battle owing to mental, nervous or
emotional instability and who, the doctors had concluded,
should not be sent back because they would simply break
down again. S3 was fit only for employment in the rear
areas; S4, it had been arbitrarily decided, should be
returned to the UK, while S5 was unfit for any military
employment and meant that the man should be discharged.
These men were sitting in a special group at the base;
they had no particular occupation, and it was reported that
their chief interest lay in discussion of what symptoms
they should manifest to get themselves downgraded to S4 or
S5 so that they could get out of the Army, or at least out
of Italy. A medical officer, whose duty it was to accompany
to the port of embarkation men sent home, has stated that
these men were highly interested in psychiatry in its
popular and practical aspects and used to talk among
" Ibid.
12 Ibid, P40.
190
themselves, when they thought they were not overheard,
about their success in being sent home by simulating
psychiatric symptoms. Confessing that nocturnal enuresis
had persisted into adolescence was a favourite gambit.
It was decided to form a special pioneer company, or
companies, which would be employed in labouring work, such
as road-making, and handling heavy stores at depots. This
was done, and the scheme seemed to work out relatively
well. Many of the men were benefited physically and
mentally and could be reallocated to corps and units where
they would not be in physical danger, and consequently able
to keep their emotions in control, and could carry on doing
some necessary duty.
It was felt that if the troops were allowed to believe
that evacuation because of nervous or emotional conditions
was a passport for the UK, the weak and the wavering would
he encouraged to let their pride go and take the easy way
out. Whether or not it got to be known that instead of a
ticket to Blighty, an S evacuation only meant hard labour
at the base, is not known; but it is probable that it did,
and it may have encouraged some men to hang on, who
otherwise might have given up. In any case, the front-line
men were never heard to complain that the special companies
were being treated harshly or unreasonably13.
The great disadvantage of this plan was that all these
S3 cases were counted as reinforcements; there were several
hundreds of them so they were by a no means negligible
factor. Yet to send them home, and strike them off the
reinforcement strength, would possibly have had the bad
effect of encouraging more of the same which, on balance,
seemed the worse alternative.
It would seem that widely available books like
Psychology for the Fighting Man had a lot to answer for.
13 Ibid, P71.
191
To conclude this section, let us outline the wartime
lessons drawn up by Ahrenfeldt, Deputy Assistant Director
of Army Psychiatry. First, personnel selection. It was
essential to have: a thorough medical (physical and
psychological) examination at induction; scientific
selection of those fit and their appropriate allocation;
scientific reallocation when necessary. Second, officer
selection. Scientific selection can increase the success
rate by a third. Third, mental dullness. Stable dullards
should be employed on labouring duties in the Pioneer
Corps. Unstable dullards should be discharged because it
was not cost-effective to retain them. Fourth, the
treatment and disposal of psychiatric cases. Military
psychiatric hospitals should cater for those liable to be
made fit for further service. Civil psychiatric hospitals
should cater for those not liable. Fifth, forward
psychiatry. On average, psychiatric casualties accounted
for 10% of battle casualties. The role of forward
psychiatry is to: prevent psychiatric casualties from
impeding operations and the evacuation and treatment of the
wounded; select and treat mild cases; prevent the
deterioration of bad cases; conserve manpower. By the use
of Exhaustion Centres, 56%-70% of cases were returned to
the front within a week (and only 5% broke down again
during the same battle). Psychiatric casualties are
inevitable in modern warfare. Sixth, morale and discipline.
To maintain morale it is essential to have adequate
selection and allocation, thorough training, good
leadership and attention to good welfare facilities,
regular mails and provision of frequent and adequate
information. The Army should cease to be regarded as a
penal colony for social misfits. Seventh, the
rehabilitation of repatriated POWs. Special units should be
provided. Eighth, the organization of army psychiatry at
home and overseas. It is essential to have an independent
192
central organization (Directorate of Army Psychiatry) as
part of the Army Medical Department and a separate
department in charge of personnel selection (Directorate of
Selection of Personnel) as part of the Adjutant-General's
branch of the War Office14.
While we may agree with Ahrenfeldt that the war
demonstrated the value of psychiatry to the Army, we may
also agree with 21st Army Group's Director of Medical
Services that Army psychiatrists were sometimes guilty of
zealousness or gullibility and were thus sometimes
responsible for unnecessary manpower wastage 15 .
During the war the British Army embraced Personnel
Selection (PS) and developed it considerably. The aim of PS
was to match the right man to the right job i. e. put round
pegs in round holes and make sure that round holes
contained round pegs. PS was considered necessary because
few men are good judges of their own abilities; because
jobs in modern armies are highly specialized; and because
the quality of manpower assigned to the Army left a lot to
be desired. PS tried to ensure that the right man was in
the right job i. e. that each man did a job for which he was
fitted (mentally, physically, educationally etc. ) and that
each job was done by a man who was fitted for it. It did
not succeed, but it made substantial progress.
Ungerson, the War Office's Chief Psychologist, writes
persuasively of the high quality of manpower required by
the Army during the war: "The increased demand for skilled
manpower arose primarily from mechanization and the very
great use of radio-communications. By the autumn of 1941,
there were more than 500 trades and other highly skilled
employments, in addition to a very great many extra-
regimental duties. This would not have mattered very much
if the jobs had been relatively simple, but in fact they
14 Ahrenfeldt, PP254-8.
15 Holden, Shell Shock, P94. 193
demanded a growing proportion and variety of skilled men
such as radar operators, tank crews in the greatly
expanding RAC, electrical and mechanical engineers,
paratroops, and so on. About one quarter of all troops were
employed as tradesmen, while perhaps as many more did work
which called for particular skills. Even among the
remainder there was also some marked need for skill. The
ordinary infantryman, for instance, had more elaborate
training and more weapons to master than his counterpart of 1914-1918. And over and above all this was the incessant
need for more officers. Compared with the state of affairs in the First World War, not only did the ratio of officers
to other ranks rise - from about one to twenty to about one
to twelve - but the absolute numbers rose too. Altogether,
then, the nature of the work to be done made a far fuller
and more differentiated call on abilities than had been the
case twenty years earlier" 16 .
As we shall see in Chapter 7, Ungerson writes with equal
persuasion of the mediocre quality of manpower actually
received by the Army during the war. The great disparity
between the quality of manpower needed and received by the
Army was the principal reason why it embraced Personnel
Selection during the war.
DSP was established at the War Office in June 194117. It
was Adam's first initiative upon taking up the post of
Adjutant-General, responsible for personnel matters in the
Army. In July 1942 the General Service Corps (GSC) was
created. The GSC was created to ensure that recruits were
sent to units for which they were suitable and that units
were not sent unsuitable recruits18. With the creation of
16 Ungerson, Personnel Selection, P4.
" ECAC minutes ECAC/M(41)16 of 9`h June: W0163/84; AC minutes AC/M(41)8 of 17`h June 1941: W0163/50.
18 ECAC minutes ECAC/M(42)8 of 5th May 1942: WO163/88.
194
the GSC, all recruits (except, as we have seen, those to
the Guards) were enlisted into the GSC and not, as had been
the practice for centuries, into a particular Regiment or
Corps. While in the Primary Training Centres (PTC) and
Primary Training Wings (PTW) of the GSC, recruits received
basic training and were subjected to PS tests. Only after
their strengths and weaknesses had been ascertained and
measured were they allocated to a particular Corps or
Regiment - the one considered the most suitable for them.
It goes without saying that a much more rational allocation
of manpower was achieved as a result of PS and the GSC.
Between July 1942 and June 1945 the GSC handled 710,000
recruits. Of these: only 5.8% were assessed as being
well-educated; only 5.8% as having officer potential; and
only 5% as having a high combatant temperament. Physical
fitness was divided into five categories (A, B, C, D, E)
and several sub-categories. Only 76.2% of recruits were
assessed as being fully fit (i. e. Al). Intelligence was
divided into six grades: SG1,2,3 plus, 3 minus, 4 and 5.
Only 44.4% of recruits were assessed as having above
average intelligence (i. e. SG3 plus and above): only 10.5%
were assessed as being very intelligent (i. e. SG1)19. These
figures powerfully demonstrate both the unpromising nature
of much of the material that the Army had at its disposal
during the war and the necessity for the Army to identify
and make the very best use of what good material it had.
Naturally, besides measuring the "pegs", the "holes" had
to be measured as well. Consequently, every role in every
unit was assessed and graded by the DSP. For instance, it
laid down that 47% of the men in a rifle battalion
(excluding officers and attached personnel) had to be SG3
plus or above 20 .
19 Ungerson, PP47-8,96-7.
20 The Infantry, DSP. April 1945.
195
PS testing was not confined to army recruits. From
September 1943 to June 1944 all 21st Army Group units were
subjected to testing to ensure that those in the invasion
force were up to scratch. In the period August 1944 to June
1945 25,200 men were transferred from the RN and the RAF
and 14,000 men were released from the RAF Deferred List
(which contained men waiting to join the RAF as aircrew) to
the Army to be retrained as infantrymen. The transferred
men were transferred in two batches. The first batch were
assumed to be up to scratch and were not tested prior to
their allocation. Because many of the first batch were not
in fact up to scratch and had to be reallocated, the second
batch were tested at special centres before being accepted
for transfer: many were rejected. The transferred men were
assessed to be of mediocre quality: only 72.2% were
suitable to be posted to the infantry, which was the object
of their transfer to the Army. The men released from the
RAF Deferred List went through the PTCs and PTWs of the GSC
like ordinary army recruits. They were assessed to be of
excellent quality. They were fit, intelligent,
well-educated and had officer potential21.
From the beginning of the war, a proportion of the
officers and men had been found unsuitable for employment
in field units, and these officers and men tended to
accumulate in reinforcement holding units. During 1942 and
1943, Middle East Forces kept trying to send these
personnel back to Britain, and have them replaced with
useful reinforcements. The War Office agreed in principle,
though not very happy at the prospect of discharging, for
ill-defined causes, considerable numbers who had served for
long periods.
In 1943, during a visit to the Middle East, Adam pointed
out that the demands on the remainder of the British
manpower pool by industry and agriculture, as well as the
21 Ungerson, PP95-7.
196
armed forces, were then such that men of the top physical
category, and satisfactory in every other way were scarce.
If unsatisfactory men were sent back, they would have to be
discharged, and it was doubtful whether the replacement
would be much better. Besides, the replacement would
require training ab initio22.
A reallocation centre was authorized and set up, not
unlike the four Army Selection Centres that had just been
established in Britain (to reallocate misplaced personnel,
those medically downgraded and those whose units had been
disbanded)23. Its function was to study the cases of the
unsuitable personnel and determine whether they could not
be fitted into establishments where lower physical, mental,
and stability factors could be tolerated. The unit was
staffed by PS officers and a psychiatrist. Later,
reallocation centres were set up in Italy and NW Europe to
deal with "S" casualties and those who had been lowered in
category, whether by reason of wounds, disease or any other
cause. By the reallocation of lower category men, it was
possible to release from units with an administrative or
service function, a certain number of higher category men
to reinforce fighting or forward units.
There is little doubt that during the latter part of the
war a large number of men in the reinforcement pools in the
UK and in the overseas theatres were in fact "unfit for the
field".
If Britain is again engaged in a total war, the function
of PS will be of increased importance. If it is possible to
detect those men whose emotions and nerves will not stand
combat strain, they can be used in less dangerous
employment, and may go through the war without breakdown.
22 AG's report on his overseas tour April-May 1943 (ECAC/P(43)68): Adam papers VII/2, LHC.
23 Ungerson, P68.
197
As Crang has shown, the introduction of psychiatrists,
PULHEMS, PS and reallocation to the Army were all
initiatives taken by Adam. Churchill, who harboured deep
and not unreasonable suspicions about both psychiatrists
("'charlatanryi24) and Adam ("subversive to morale "25) , told
Adam that his first job was to reduce the Army's wastage26.
It is clear that, thanks to Adam, psychiatrists, PULHEMS,
PS and reallocation, normal wastage from the Army was
reduced during the war. However, it was still unaffordably
high during the last part of the war. We have looked at
medical discharges, let us now look at discharges to the
reserve, releases etc.
Table XIII shows that up to the end of 1944, while
354,500 men were medically discharged from the Army and
287,900 men became casualties, 259,500 men were lost to the
Army by being relegated to the reserve, released to
civilian life etc. and that such losses exceeded casualties
in all but two years. If we add up the totals of those
medically discharged and those relegated to the reserve,
released to civilian life etc., we get a total of 614,000
men lost to the Army for reasons other than casualty up to
the end of 1944. Assuming each man discharged served a
year, this would equate to a loss of 614,000 man-years or
4.8% of the Army's manpower effort in the period -a loss
it would be well worth striving to avoid another time. It
will be noted from Table XIII that non-casualty wastage
from the Army in 1944 was appreciably higher than in 1943
and only fractionally lower than in 1942.
With regard to losses of manpower for reasons other than
medical unfitness or casualty, as stated at the beginning
of this chapter, 2,300 (1,800 officers and 500 other ranks)
24 Churchill to Anderson, 19`x' December 1942: Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, P918.
25 Churchill to Grigg, 13`h March 1943: Ibid, P938.
'`' Adam papers VIII, Chapter III, P2.
198
were discharged for misconduct; 70,000 were discharged
under the "Services no longer required" clause in King's
Regulations; and 97,000 deserted. Naturally, the last
category is additional to and not included in discharges to
the reserve, releases etc.
During the war the "Services no longer required" clause
was very frequently invoked. There is no doubt that a
number of those discharged for this reason were of such
poor intelligence or such bad character as to be useless or
worse. However, there is equally no doubt that commanding
officers also used this method, quite improperly, to get
rid of lazy or troublesome characters with whom they could
not be bothered27. Commanding officers also turned many
recruits whom they considered unsuitable over to the
medical arm for discharge as of too low mental or stability
characteristics. Prior to the creation of the GSC, a
recruit's suitability or unsuitability for military service
was a matter of opinion and was not scientifically
determined.
Unfortunately, when a man was discharged because he was
"Services no longer required" or "unlikely to become an
efficient soldier", there was nothing much to stop him
travelling to the next county and enlisting again, in some
other Regiment or Corps, under another name. This practice
was considered to be prevalent, and although the Army Act
prescribed penalties for false answers on attestation, and
concealing previous enlistments, it was seldom that anyone
was punished for these offences. At any rate, the
occasional punishments were insufficiently severe to act as
effective deterrents. It was not until the system of
fingerprinting all the army personnel, and checking
newly-enlisted men, was instituted that this abuse and
waste of training effort was brought under control.
2' Pigott, P63.
199
After the war, the British Army decided that when "incorrigible soldiers" had no specific mental or nervous disease they were not to be given medical, but
administrative discharge. This resulted in a more accurate knowledge of the real dimensions of the problem of the
psychotic or psycho-neurotic soldier, but it did not solve
the problem of what should be done with the incorrigible
"bad actor" who is drawn into the forces by the operation
of national service in an emergency. It is obviously unfair
that well-behaved and valuable citizens should have to risk
their lives and submit to the restraints of life in the
forces if criminals and psychopaths are allowed to be
discharged to civil life. Furthermore, soldiers of marginal
character who are bored would be tempted to procure their
discharge by bad behaviour28.
Capital punishment for most military crimes, such as
desertion, or refusing to obey an order, or cowardice, was
abolished between the wars at the height of anti-war and
pacifist feeling. This method of deterring misbehaviour and
disposing of the corrupting influence of useless soldiers
was therefore no longer open to the British Army during
WWII, although it was available to and was extensively used
by its enemies and Russian ally. The same applies to
another device, the penal battalion, although behind the
lines there was much necessary and arduous labour to be
done.
It has been claimed that desertion was less not only in
absolute but also in relative terms during WWII, in the
absence of the death penalty, than it had been in WWI, in
the presence of the death penalty29. This claim not only
flies in the face of common sense but is also based on a
misuse of the statistical evidence (comparing desertion in
WWII with desertion and AWOL in WWI). But whether desertion
28 Copp and McAndrew, P70.
"' Ahrenfeldt, App. B, PP271-5. 200
in WWII was relatively less than in WWI or not, desertion
in WWII was certainly not insignificant.
The incidence of desertion and its less serious but more
numerous partner in crime AWOL was not spread evenly
throughout the war, throughout the theatres and throughout
the arms. If that had been the case, then there would have
been no great problem. Unfortunately, desertion and AWOL
principally affected the infantry and were at one of their
peaks in Italy in the autumn and winter of 1944. Because of
this unhappy combination of circumstances, desertion and
AWOL played a significant part in causing and exacerbating
the infantry crisis. Therefore, the subject of desertion
and AWOL from infantry units in Italy in the autumn and
winter of 1944 deserves to be examined closely.
As Adam reported to the Army Council after his overseas
tour in early 194530, desertion was a very serious problem
in Italy. "The main point raised was that of desertion,
which obsessed most Commander's minds". According to
figures produced by Adam, 8th Army's Field General
Courts-Martial convicted 4,471 men in the period 1st
January 1944 to 10th January 1945: 12 for cowardice; 60 for
mutiny; 2,237 for desertion; 840 for absence; and 1,322 for
other offences. 78th Division had 680 cases of desertion
and 249 of absence; 4th Division had 360 cases of desertion
and 74 of absence; 46th Division had 256 cases of desertion
and 22 of absence. Of course, these figures greatly
understate the problem. They naturally exclude those who
were not apprehended, who did not surrender themselves and
who were acquitted.
Although the desertion problem in Italy did not reach
crisis proportions until the autumn of 1944, it had been in
existence and a matter of concern throughout 1944. When
Eighth Army reached the River Sangro at the end of 1943,
3o Adam papers VII/4: AG's report on his overseas tour Jan. -Feb. 1945 (AC(G)(45)4).
201
its commander, many subordinate commanders and three of its
best divisions were recalled to Britain to take part in the
invasion of France. The departure of so many good officers
and formations, coupled with the confirmation their
departure provided that Italy was now a secondary theatre,
had a bad effect on the morale and discipline of those who
remained. When he succeeded Montgomery as Commander-in-Chief of Eighth Army, Leese reported to
London: "78 Div was very tired and depleted of men after
the Sangro battle, when they had 350 desertions in a fortnight"31.
The capture of Rome on 4th June 1944 was followed by a
wave of desertion. In July Sparrow - later author of the
Morale Monograph - was dispatched by London to investigate
the desertion problem in Italy. He came to the conclusion
that the chief cause was prolonged action which was greatly
increased by close contact with the enemy. He also
classified deserters and absentees into two broad
categories: the "deliberate", who preferred disgrace and
imprisonment to the continued dangers of battle; and the
"involuntary", men with nervous breakdowns who would often
welcome a second chance to prove themselves. Most deserters
belonged to the second group, Sparrow believed32. Sparrow's
findings are of interest but cannot be accepted
unreservedly. Firstly, he visited Italy in the summer
during a relatively quiet period, well before the desertion
crisis exploded in the autumn during Operation "Olive".
Secondly, he only interviewed 16 deserters awaiting trial.
Thirdly, given the inadequacies and uncertainties of
present-day psychiatric evaluations, one must be extremely
wary of placing too much faith in the psychiatric
evaluations of more than half a century ago.
31 CIGS file: W0216/168 180559.
32 AFHQ file W0204/6701 and War Office file 110/Gen/6371 (W032): 17`'' July 1944.
202
Regardless of motive, it was not easy to desert,
especially from the front. Soldiers at the front had to get
back from the line and beyond the rear area, avoid military
police patrols, and find somewhere to hide. After the war
an American officer recalled during the Third Battle of
Cassino meeting a British officer patrolling the area
immediately behind the 8th Indian Division. The British
officer had a drawn pistol and told the American he had
orders to prevent men, except the seriously wounded,
leaving the front and to shoot them if necessary33. Despite
the difficulties involved, a great many men made the
attempt and a substantial number were successful. That so
many men did successfully desert from the British Army
during WWII - especially during the Italian campaign -
testifies either to their luck or determination or
planning. Naturally, desertion was not a problem for
Fourteenth Army in Burma, because there was nowhere to
desert to. It was however very much a problem for Eighth
Army in Egypt and in Italy and for Second Army in Belgium:
the cities of Cairo, Naples, Rome and Brussels (or, more
particularly, their bars and brothels) serving both to
entice and to hide large numbers of deserters.
In his account of the Italian campaign, Morris
implicitly criticises those who, like Ahrenfeldt, seek to
minimise the problem of desertion in WWII when he makes the
point that: "Most men who deserted were fighting soldiers,
particularly infantry, so their absence was all the more
keenly felt and represented a more serious loss than when
presented as an overall percentage of the army's ration
strength" 34. The same point had been made earlier by Ellis 35 1
who has graphically shown us what it was like for the
33 Ellis, The Sharp End, P246.
34 Circles of Hell. P398.
15 Ellis, P244.
203
hard-pressed and understrength "Poor Bloody Infantry" in
WWII, and - as we shall see - by Jackson.
There is no doubt that in Italy many British (and
Allied) soldiers were pushed beyond the limits of endurance
in an arduous campaign -a campaign characterised by fierce
fighting, bad weather, mountainous terrain and a formidable
opponent - which they realised (unlike Churchill) had lost
much, arguably all, of its purpose after the simultaneous
fall of Rome and launch of D-Day. Some absconded in the
midst of battle; the majority however did not return to
their units after being sent to the rear. In Naples or Rome
a man could escape detection for weeks, months or even
years. Not every deserter was living in Naples or Rome:
many were living in the countryside. However, most of those
living in the countryside did not remain at large after the
onset of winter or the establishment of government which
brought some order out of chaos after the front line had
moved northwards. "The problems were not insuperable,
however, and quite a few hard cases managed to vanish from
the ken of authority, mainly by organising themselves into
large gangs i36. Like those gangs of British deserters
preying upon the base areas in the Middle East, with names
like the Dead End Kids and the British Free Corps, in Italy
gangs of British (and Allied) deserters took over villages
and harassed roads. A group of such brigands known as the
Free English were supposed to have deserted shortly after
Salerno37.
After mid 1943 (and its return to the Continent via
Sicily) the British Army suffered about 40,000 recorded
cases of desertion38. Of these, according to Morris, 80%
were from infantry companies and 70% were in Italy in the
36 Ibid, P385.
3' Watts, Surgeon at War, P63.
38 Ellis, P244.
204
last winter of the war. Indeed, according to Morris:
"Eighth Army experienced the highest recorded percentages
of desertion amongst the Western Armies in the Second World
War. The losses were felt all the more keenly because they
occurred in infantry companies already depleted of
manpower. The recorded figures are misleading. Such were the numbers involved, that battalions frequently chose to
deal with the problem in-house rather than through official
channels"39. One must however make the point that the
majority of infantrymen did not desert. Facing the same dangers and enduring the same hardships as those who deserted, they chose to grin and bear it. They did so for a host of reasons, which included personal and regimental
pride, but more especially because they did not want to let
their mates down. Many paid the ultimate price for their
devotion and loyalty.
Jackson confirms both the existence and the seriousness
of the desertion crisis in Italy during late 1944 and early
1945. As he says: "Most of the field commanders believed
that it had been exacerbated by the abolition of the death
sentence for desertion but appreciated that its
re-introduction was politically impracticable" 40. Wilson
(Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, based at
Allied Force Headquarters) doubted that abolition had
increased desertion, believing that most desertion was
involuntary41. However, it should be noted that Wilson was a
theatre commander, not a field commander, and was
therefore, inevitably, somewhat detached from the problem.
Moreover, whether Wilson expressed his view in early 1944 -
as Jackson says42 - or in July 1944 (to Adam) - as the
39 Morris, P399.
40 Jackson, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. VI Pt. II, P373.
" Ibid, PP373-4.
ý' Ibid, P373.
205
evidence shows43 - he expressed his view well before the
desertion crisis exploded in the autumn. If he expressed his view in July 1944, perhaps he did so under the
influence of the Sparrow report, about which reservations have been expressed above.
In June 1944 Adam corresponded with Alexander (C-in-C
Allied Armies Italy) about the desertion problem44. Grigg
was preparing a memorandum for Churchill. Grigg would not
recommend the death penalty but he would try to have the
question of a post-war amnesty for deserters dealt with firmly. Adam would try to see that service prior to
desertion would not count towards qualifying service for
demobilisation. Unfortunately, Grigg failed to get an
amnesty for deserters ruled out and Adam failed to get
service prior to desertion discounted for demobilisation
purposes.
The demobilisation scheme was presented to Parliament on
22nd September45. The presentation of the scheme, or rather
the publicity given to it - and the interpretation placed
on it - by the notorious46 Army Bureau for Current Affairs
(ABCA), produced a dramatic escalation in the desertion
crisis. McCreery (Leese's successor as C-in-C Eighth Army)
complained to Alexander about the encouragement given to
would-be deserters by ABCA's interpretation of the scheme.
An ABCA pamphlet showed that the only penalty for desertion
was the loss of time spent absent and in prison or
detention. The average deserter might drop 8 places in the
demobilisation queue but as there were 75 places the
resulting delay would be very short. Added to this was the
widespread belief that there would be an amnesty for
43 W0204/6701: Wilson/Adam, 25th July 1944.
44 Alexander papers W0214/62: Adam/Alexander, 27th June 1944.
45 Cmd. 6548.
46 Churchill to Margesson, 6`h and 17`h October 1941: The Grand Alliance, PP823 and 827; Churchill to Grigg, 17 ̀h April 1943: The Hinge of Fate, P950.
206
deserters after the war. McCreery requested that a
declaration should be made that there would be no amnesty;
that all convicted deserters should serve their sentences
(unless they had been suspended) to enable them to be sent
to the Far East; that those whose sentences had been
suspended should not be demobbed until they had earned full
remission (which they could only do in the Far East); and
that the automatic review of sentences should be stopped
and only undertaken in special cases47. Alexander supported
McCreery in a renewed approach to AFHQ at the end of
October, urging that strong action was needed at once48.
Finally, on 14th December - six weeks after Alexander's
correspondence with AFHQ and six months after his
correspondence with Adam - Churchill made a statement in
the Commons. Churchill said: "... it is not the intention to
grant any remission of sentences. Offences such as
desertion which comprise the bulk of these sentences,
involve at the best an added strain upon man-power of this
country, and at the worst forfeit the lives of other
soldiers who have filled the places of those deserters". He
added, comfortingly and misleadingly: "Such very serious
offences are happily rare". As Jackson says, although
deserters and absentees amounted to only 0.1% per month of
the one million men in Central Mediterranean Forces: "As
far as commanders were concerned the offence was certainly
not insignificant" 49. This was because the great majority of
deserters were infantrymen, the commodity in shortest
supply in the theatre. Churchill's speech had little if any
effect. The desertion crisis only abated in February 1945
when the demobilisation regulations were published,
penalising future deserters. To the surprise of many, the
47 W0204/6714: McCreery/Alexander, 22nd October 1944.
48 Ibid: Alexander/AFHQ, 30th October 1944.
49 Jackson, P376.
207
post-war Labour Government did not declare an amnesty for
deserters. An amnesty was finally declared in honour of the
Queen's Coronation in 1953, the Queen and Churchill having
overruled the objections of the Service Departments5o.
Tables XV and XVI show the extent and nature of the
desertion and AWOL problem which afflicted Eighth Army in
Italy during the autumn and winter of 1944. Table XV shows
that there were more than 900 desertion/AWOL cases a month in June 1944 and from September 1944 to January 1945. At
the peak, in December 1944, there were more than 1,200
cases. Table XVI shows that the burden of desertion/AWOL
was borne primarily by the infantry. The bulk of deserters
and absentees came from the infantry divisions. Even the
resting of such formations in the Middle East did not
reduce the problem: 78th Infantry Division had the highest
monthly figures of all divisions when it returned to the
front in October. The armoured formations were much less
affected. Judging by comparative figures produced by
Sparrow, most of the deserters and absentees from 6th
Armoured Division probably came from its infantry unit S51.
As Jackson says, as early as June 1944 desertion/AWOL
had become a serious problem. It is true that, even at the
peak, the overall desertion/AWOL rate was only 0.1% of the
total force in theatre. However, as Jackson also says, the
overall rate is misleading. Most deserters and absentees
were infantry and the desertion/AWOL rate experienced by
infantry units was much higher than the overall rate. Given
that most deserters and absentees were infantry and given
that infantry battalions had a paper strength of 845 during
the latter part of the war (of whom, it should be noted,
only 392 were riflemen or light machine-gunners), the loss
of 900-1,200 men each month through desertion/AWOL during
50 Moran, Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, PP425-6.
51 Cabinet Office: Military Narrative of the War file: CAB 106/453.
208
the autumn and winter of 1944 was clearly extremely
serious. Indeed, considered in context such a loss was
critical. It was very fortunate that the Germans remained
on the defensive in Italy and did not mount an
Ardennes-style counter-attack. All too often the desertion
crisis in Italy has been examined and pronounced upon in
isolation, without any consideration being given to the
precarious state of the British Army in Italy at the time.
As the Official History of the Italian campaign shows,
throughout the campaign the British Army in Italy suffered
from a shortage of manpower, especially infantry, and in
the autumn of 1944 the shortage was particularly bad52. Just
as the Italian campaign commenced in the autumn of 1943,
Britain's manpower reached full mobilization: it was no
longer possible to sustain, still less increase, Britain's
war effort. Starting in late 1943 Italy lost a steady
stream of veteran formations, first for Operation
"Overlord" and then for (the superfluous) Operation
"Dragoon". More went in early 1945 under Operation
"Goldflake". Long before the capture of Rome and the D-Day
landings in June 1944, Italy had ceased to be the primary
theatre. With the capture of Rome and the D-Day landings,
Eighth Army in Italy became a Forgotten Army, almost as
forgotten as Fourteenth Army in Burma. Long before its
launch, "Overlord" had priority for manpower and other
theatres were placed on a starvation diet: most available
manpower was concentrated on the NW Europe campaign. Drafts
from the UK to Italy were few and far between. Many units
had to be disbanded and many others had to be reduced in
strength because of the shortage of manpower. Battle
casualties were heavy and sick casualties were much heavier
still, largely because of malaria and venereal disease (the
large number of malaria and VD cases being the result of,
52 Molony, The Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, PP421-3; Molony, Vol. VI Part I. PP447-50;
Jackson, PP371-2.
209
and a testament to, poor discipline). In Italy in 1944 the
British Army's total casualty rate - that is, battle
casualties plus accidental casualties plus sick casualties
- was 647 per 1,000 ration strength per annum53. With a
casualty rate of this order, a unit of a thousand men would
see almost two-thirds of them become casualties in a year. Many casualties would of course recover and return to duty.
In the meantime however, given the scarcity of
reinforcements, the unit would almost certainly have to
fight on without them. Like the desertion rate, the
casualty rate was much higher for the infantry than for the
Army as a whole. Infantry units did most of the fighting
and consequently sustained most of the casualties yet they
received the fewest reinforcements. Drastic measures were
taken to reduce the demand for, and boost the supply of,
infantry reinforcements. In March 1944 the strength of
infantry battalions was temporarily reduced by a company
and it was ordained that infantry drafts from the UK would
go to where they were most needed, irrespective of their
regimental affiliation; from April 1944, as we have seen,
many anti-aircraft artillery units were disbanded and their
personnel retrained as infantrymen54. These measures were
only partially successful and in September 1944 the
strength of infantry battalions was again temporarily
reduced by a company and many formations and units were
disbanded55. Besides high casualties and few reinforcements,
the Italian campaign was increasingly beset by the problem
of home leave. Under various schemes, large numbers were
allowed to leave Italy and return to the UK for a period of
home leave (many of whom, unfortunately, never returned).
This was considered not only just to those who had been
53 Ellis, P181.
54 Molony, Vol. V, P423: Molony, Vol VI Part I. PP448-9.
55 Jackson, PP371-2.
210
serving away from home for many years but also advisable
for both morale and discipline reasons; one of its aims
(which was manifestly not achieved) was to forestall a
desertion/AWOL crisis. Those in the "teeth" arms -
especially the infantry - were favoured over those in the
"tail".
Against this background of veteran formations being
withdrawn; manpower being withheld and concentrated on NW
Europe; units being reduced in strength or disbanded; heavy
casualties being sustained; and men being withdrawn on home
leave schemes, the desertion problem that afflicted the
British Army in Italy during the autumn and winter of 1944
was of crisis proportions. Indeed, given the brilliance and
resourcefulness of German commanders and units in Italy, it
was potentially catastrophic. Seen in the context of the
time, a belief by the responsible commanders in Italy that
discipline was too lax and should have been much tougher
appears neither inexplicable nor inappropriate. Such a
belief was shared by many at the sharp end. One wrote after
the war: "Some months spent in daily contact with deserters
in Italy taught me that, although there were a few very sad
cases caused by a nervous strain or domestic troubles, the
offence was usually a carefully thought-out plan, and the
belief in a pardon after the war was widespread. Any
Infantry Officer who served there knows what a serious
problem desertion was in that campaign. It is alarming to
think what the position would be in another war if
desertion should have been proved to be a paying
proposition" 56. While causes and remedies will continue to
be debated, there can be no doubt that the desertion crisis
in Italy greatly increased both the burden on the infantry
units and the demand for infantry reinforcements in that
theatre.
56 McPherson, Discipline, PP57-8.
211
In this chapter we have examined the non-battle wastage
suffered by the British Army during the war. We have found
that such wastage was very high and, although reduced
during the war, was still unaffordably high during the last
part of the war. Two types stand out. Those who were
discharged for mental or nervous disability. Those who
deserted or went AWOL. It is clear that those responsible
for the high administration of the Army - Grigg and Adam in
particular - were, for various reasons, too ready to take a
soft line on mental or nervous disability and too reluctant
to take a tough stand against desertion and AWOL, ignoring
those in the field. While Churchill shared the reluctance
(no doubt for political reasons: although he believed in
the military death penalty57, many of those in the Coalition
Government did not58), he at least opposed the readiness.
Thanks to this readiness and this reluctance, non-battle
wastage was in 1944 a substantial drain on manpower. It
must be accounted a significant factor in causing and
exacerbating the manpower crisis which struck the British
Army in the autumn of 1944.
57 Moran, P 147.
58 McHugh, The Labour Party and the Parliamentary Campaign to Abolish the Military Death Penalty, '
Historical Journal, March 1999, PP233-49.
212
CHAPTER 6. BATTLE WASTAGE.
In this chapter we will examine in detail the battle
wastage suffered by the British Army during WWII. In
particular, we will examine in detail the wastage rates
used by the British Army in WWII to predict its battle
wastage and thus its reinforcement needs. We will ascertain
how the rates were determined and how they were reviewed,
what flaws they contained, what amendments were made to
them and how well they operated in the various theatres.
The aim being to establish whether the wastage rates were
adequate or whether, as some have asserted, they
underestimated infantry casualties - and consequently the
need for infantry reinforcements - and thus caused the
infantry shortage.
We examined normal wastage in the previous chapter, or
rather normal wastage defined as the permanent loss of
personnel from the Army for reasons other than battle.
Normal wastage can also be defined as the permanent or
temporary loss of personnel from units for reasons other
than battle and will be so defined in this chapter. Normal
wastage is more or less constant and is due to personnel
being evacuated because of disease, sickness or accidental
injury (collectively known as non-battle casualties), being
transferred, or leaving the unit for a variety of other
reasons (such as desertion). Battle wastage, on the other
hand, is intermittent and is due to personnel being killed,
evacuated wounded, taken prisoner or posted missing as the
result of enemy action (collectively known as battle
casualties).
Battle casualties are especially difficult to forecast.
Nevertheless, the provision of adequate reinforcements
depends on how accurately battle casualties have been
forecast. Which is not to say that, as noted in Chapter 4,
213
the provision of adequate reinforcements depends entirely
on the accurate forecasting of battle casualties: common
sense tells us that correct prediction of demand does not
guarantee sufficiency of supply. As we saw in Chapter 4,
the best part of a year must elapse from the time when the
recruit is enlisted until he is trained to the point where he is ready to replace a casualty. Therefore, the programme
of recruiting and training reinforcements must be planned
about a year ahead. It is very seldom that the high
authorities directing a war can say how many battles are
going to be fought in the ensuing year or how fierce these
will be. Since no one can predict the exact course of the
fighting, and its precise cost in terms of men killed,
wounded, prisoner and missing, a formula is usually sought
from the experience of previous wars to assist planners in
forecasting casualties and thus reinforcement needs.
As in earlier and later wars, in WWII wastage rates were
employed to assist planners in forecasting casualties.
Derived from past experience, wastage rates are the rates
at which officers and men of the various arms, both
fighting and support, are presumed to become "ineffective"
(i. e. lost to units because of battle, sickness etc. ) and
have to be replaced. Wastage rates are expressed in terms
of percentage of unit strength per month.
Battle casualties are especially difficult to forecast
because they are intermittent and they fluctuate greatly.
They fluctuate greatly because of the many variable factors
involved. The number of battle casualties is influenced by:
(1) ratio of enemy to own strength; (2) weapons employed
and ratio of enemy to own firepower; (3) experience and
training of troops, both in general and in particular types
of combat; (4) terrain; (5) tactical advantage and
excellence of plan, enemy and own (availability of prepared
positions; possession of terrain advantages e. g. high
ground; intelligence); (6) tactical and strategic support,
214
both air and naval; (7) logistic support; (8) climate; (9)
nature of operations (defensive; offensive)'. Because war
usually consists of long periods of inaction punctuated by
short periods of action, casualties from sickness and
accidents are usually higher than casualties from battle.
However, battle casualties are in the nature of things
usually more serious and less recoverable than non-battle
casualties.
Two points about the British Army's battle wastage and
wastage rates in WWII are worth stressing at the outset.
Firstly, the British Army's battle wastage in WWII was very
much less than it had been in WWI. It is true that, when it
embarked upon its greatest and costliest campaign of the
war in June 1944, the British Army had a million fewer men
than it had had at the end of WWI (2,720,000 instead of
3,760,000) . It is clear, however, that not only in absolute
terms but also in relative terms the battle wastage
suffered by the British Army in WWII was very much less
than it had suffered in WWI. During the six years of WWII
the British Army suffered 570,000 battle casualties while
during the four and a quarter years of WWI it suffered
2,527,000 i. e. nearly 4.5 times as many2. On the first day
of the Battle of the Somme it suffered 57,000 i. e. one
tenth of the battle casualties it suffered during the whole
of WWII. In WWII the British Army, fortunately, did not
have to bear the brunt of the fighting, as it had had to do
in WWI. There can be no doubt that for the British Army
battle wastage was of much less consequence in WWII than it
had been in WWI; it had much less impact on the strength of
the Army, particularly the infantry. Which is not of course
to say that in WWII battle wastage was unimportant, that it
had no impact on the strength of the Army, particularly the
infantry.
1 First 7 factors: Beebe and DeBakey, Battle Casualties, P 14.
2Pigott, Manpower Problems, P81.
215
Secondly and paradoxically, as will soon become
apparent, the wastage rates used by the British Army in
WWII were based mainly on its WWI experience. During WWII
the wastage rates used by the British Army were remarkably
consistent. They were only reviewed twice: in the autumn of
1939 and in the autumn of 1942. A comparison between the
rates approved, following the first review, by the War
Committee in January 1940 (during the Phoney War) and those
approved, following the second review, by the Executive
Committee of the Army Council (ECAC) in April 1943 (at the
end of the North African campaign) reveals few substantial
differences. The only substantial differences were
increased rates for artillery, armour and infantry officers
and artillery other ranks. Rates for "tail" were
substantially unchanged. While it might be thought unlikely
that the autumn 1942 review (conducted by the Research
Committee under Major-General Evetts) ignored the North
African campaign, the results of that review (the so-called
Evetts rates) indicate little if any influence on the part
of the North African campaign. Given that the autumn 1939
review had confirmed the use of the pre-war rates (albeit
in modified form), it is true to say that during WWII
wastage rates were based mainly on WWI experience. Whatever
the rights and wrongs of basing WWII rates mainly on WWI
experience, it is hard to see how rates ultimately derived
from WWI underestimated casualties - particularly infantry
casualties. Yet certain Canadian (and subsequently
American) historians have asserted precisely that.
Before we examine the development of the wastage rates
during the war, it might be helpful to explain the chain of
responsibility within the War office during the war (as
given in the "War Office List"). Both material and manpower
wastage rates - the technical name for which was Field
Force Conspectus (FFC) rates - were throughout the war the
216
responsibility of the Director of Staff Duties (DSD) DSD
was also responsible for War Establishments (WEs) and
Orders of Battle (ORBATs). Eventually, DSD had four
deputies: DDSD (A) , (B) , (C) and (D) . DSD was responsible to
the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS). The
Director of Military Operations (DMO) was responsible for
operational planning, including activity forecasts. DMO was
responsible to the Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff
(VCIGS) . Naturally, with regard to manpower wastage there
was very close liaison with the Department of the Adjutant-
General (AG), who was responsible for personnel. AG had two
deputies: DAG(A) and (B) Under them were: the Director of
Manpower Planning (DMP) (created March 1943), the Director
of Organization (D of 0), AG Co-ordination (AG Co-ord), the
Army Medical Directorate (AMD) and the Statistical Branch
of AG's Department (AG Stats). AG Stats (which was
responsible for the co-ordination and maintenance of
statistics of personnel of the military forces, namely
strengths, normal and battle wastage, intakes etc. )
produced a great number of strength, casualty and wastage
returns, forecasts and analyses during the war. Casualty
forecasts were produced on the basis of information
supplied by DSD (latest wastage rates) and by DMO (latest
activity forecasts). Naturally, from March 1943 the main
customer of AG Stats was DMP. From early 1943 DSD (Chair),
DMP and D of 0 met formally every week to discuss manpower
matters, including wastage, reinforcements, WEs. ORBATs
etc. Occasionally during the war other War Office directors
or their deputies, such as the Deputy Director of
Recruiting and Organization (DDRO) or the Director of Air
(D Air), were asked for or volunteered their opinions about
the wastage rates.
In August 1939, on the eve of war, Mobilization Secret
Instructions were issued3. An appendix contained the wastage
79/Mobn/3019: A4836: W033/1639. 217
rates. They are reproduced in Table XVII. They expressed
wastage as a percentage of unit strength per month. The
rates were divided by arm, by theatre and by rank. There
were sixteen arms divided by three theatres (the Field
Force i. e. the British Expeditionary Force preparing to
embark for France; Egypt; Palestine and Sudan) and two
ranks: Officers; Other Ranks (ORs). The rates for the Field
Force and for Egypt were identical; the rates for Palestine
and Sudan were half those for the Field Force and for
Egypt. There were flat rates (irrespective of arm or rank)
for: India; Colonial Garrisons; Air Defence, Coastal
Defence and Headquarters in the UK; Other Units and
Establishments in the UK. There was no division by
activity. However, the different rates for theatres implied
that the Field Force and Egypt would be very active,
Palestine and Sudan moderately active and other theatres
inactive.
The War Committee discussed a paper by DSD on the
calculation of personnel wastage on 5th January 19404. DSD
proposed an activity forecast for the coming year and new
rates of wastage. The forecast was approved; the rates were
also approved with a few amendments (relating to the RA, RE
and to forces in the UK) . Appended to DSD's paper were: a
table of the existing rates; a table of the proposed new
rates; a paper by AG; a paper by DDRO on infantry wastage
on the Western Front during WWI; and a proposed activity
forecast for 1940. DSD's paper said that the current
wastage rates were too high. As DDRO's paper demonstrated,
they were based on heavy casualties during major operations
on the Western Front during the last war. They did not
reflect the existing situation and made excessive demands
on manpower. DSD therefore proposed to introduce reduced
rates for "Normal" activity and very much reduced rates for
' War Committee papers January 1940: WO 163/66.
218
"No" activity: this was agreed. DSD also proposed that the
existing rates become the rates for "Intense" activity:
this was also agreed, with a couple of changes (the
Committee decided on lower rates for the RE and RA). The
introduction of rates for "Normal" and "No" activity would
more accurately reflect the existing situation (namely, the
Phoney War: the BEF in France but no fighting; Italian non-
belligerency in the Middle East; Japanese neutrality in the
Far East) and would enable manpower demands to be greatly
reduced. The resulting rates contained seventeen arms
divided by two theatres (France and Egypt; Palestine and
Sudan), sub-divided by three scales of activity (Intense;
Normal; No), sub-divided by two ranks (Officers; ORs). They
are reproduced in Table XVIII. The rates for India,
Colonial Garrisons and the UK were divided by activity but
not by arm or by rank. The existing rates for Infantry ORs
were: 20% in France and Egypt; 10% in Palestine and Sudan;
5% in India; 2.5% in Colonial Garrisons; 2% in the UK (air
defences, coast defences, HQs); 0.25% in the UK (other
forces). The new rates for Infantry ORs were: (France and
Egypt) 20% Intense, 6% Normal, 0.5% No; (Palestine and
Normal, 0.5% No; (the UK) 1% Intense, 0.25% Normal, 0.25%
No. Although DSD had proposed two rates for the forces in
the UK, as per the existing situation, the Committee
decided on one rate. The activity forecast for 1940
predicted 7 months Intense activity in NW Europe (March-
September), 4 in the Middle East (March-April and
September-October) and 2 in the UK (April-May).
The exhaustive investigation into infantry wastage rates
undertaken by DDRO (completed 4th November 1939) showed
that the existing rates were based on the casualties
sustained during major operations on the Western Front
during WWI. The first mention of the existing 20% wastage
219
rate for infantry was as far back as 1926. The wastage
rates issued on ist July 1937 had included a 20% one for
infantry. Research into infantry casualties during 1916 and
1918 had shown that infantry casualties (battle and non-
battle) were an average of 12.5% per month: 20% per month
during major operations (which tended to take place in late
spring, summer and early autumn) and 5% per month at other
times (i. e. late autumn, winter and early spring). During
the Somme (July-October 1916) infantry OR battle casualties
were 17.7%; infantry Officer battle casualties were 21.72%.
In 1918 infantry OR battle casualties were between 0.89%
and 22.4% (an average of 7.78% overall; an average of 13.6%
during the heaviest months); infantry Officer battle
casualties were between 0.72% and 22.67%. DDRO's conclusion
was that during the Somme infantry OR casualties were 17.7%
while in the heaviest months of 1918 infantry OR casualties
were 13.6%. Adding a sick rate of 3% per month would give
an total rate of 20.7% and 16.6% respectively. In other
words, the existing rate (henceforth the Intense rate) was
correct for the Somme and generous for 1918. Although DDRO
showed that on the Some the infantry casualty rate for
Officers had been higher than for ORs, no suggestion was
made that the infantry wastage rate should be higher for
Officers than for ORs. This point was eventually addressed
by the autumn 1942 review.
DDRO found that the average sick rate in 1918 was 4.3%
per month for infantry Officers and 4.65% per month for
infantry ORs. As 1918 was a year of influenza epidemic, he
decided (not unreasonably) on an average sick rate of 3%
per month instead. It should be noted that this figure only
covered those sick cases evacuated to the UK for treatment.
It is curious that although the figure of 3% was decided
upon for the sick rate, the No activity rate (i. e. normal
wastage, principally sickness) was set at only 0.5% per
month (it was very slightly raised at the end of 1940 but
220
was then left unchanged by the autumn 1942 review). This
implies that when there is no fighting there is less
sickness - or that when there is no fighting there is just
as much sickness but more sick cases are treated locally.
The Normal rate proposed and approved for armour in
France and Egypt and in Palestine and Sudan was very odd: it was very low, the same as the "No" rate (0.5%). It was
obviously a misprint. It was very slightly raised later but
it was not corrected until the autumn 1942 review.
Although contemporary evidence is lacking, following
approval by the War Committee in January 1940, the wastage
rates were presumably issued shortly thereafter.
Revised wastage rates for both material and personnel
were issued in June 1941. As far as personnel wastage was
concerned, the rates issued in June 19415 were almost
identical to the rates approved in January 1940. They are
reproduced in Table XIX. The only differences were as
follows. The Pioneer Corps and Recce Corps were added. The
No activity rate was now 0.75% instead of 0.5% - it had
been raised on 11th December 1940 in fact6. "France and
Egypt" was now called "Primary" theatre (including, as of
mid 1941, the UK, Egypt and Palestine). "Palestine and
Sudan" was now called "Secondary" theatre (including, as of
mid 1941, Sudan, East Africa and the West Indies) . "India"
was now called "India and Burma" (the rates for India and
Burma were sub-divided by activity but not by rank or arm).
The rates issued in June 1941 were left substantially
unchanged by the autumn 1942 review. The rates were to be
used in conjunction with an operational activity forecast
predicting the level of activity in each theatre over the
next 12 months, as were the Evetts rates. As with the
Evetts rates, there were different rates for each arm (the
rates for "teeth" arms being higher than the rates for
5 FFC Sub 73C: A5583: W033/1687.
6 AG Stats return: WO 162/305.
221
"tail" arms) and different rates for Officers and ORs (the
rates for Officers being as high or higher than the rates for ORs). Like the Evetts rates, they gave casualties
(defined as killed, died of wounds, wounded, prisoners of
war and sick) as a percentage of unit strength per month.
Like the Evetts rates, they were gross: they made no
allowance for recovered wounded and sick returning to duty.
They had 3 scales (Intense/Normal/No): the 3 scales were
kept by Evetts but renamed more accurately
Intense/Normal/Quiet. The main difference between the rates
of June 1941 and the Evetts rates was the further division
by theatre: into Primary (areas where operations were
underway or which were liable to attack); Secondary
(colonial garrisons); India and Burma. This further
refinement was abolished by Evetts but a separate scale for
the Far East was later reintroduced in practice.
Naturally, the operational activity forecast for 1942
had to be greatly amended when Japan entered the war at the
end of 1941. The operational activity forecast for the
Western Desert for 1942 (Intense during January to April
and November to December; Normal during May and August to
October; No during June to July: a total of 6 months
Intense, 4 months Normal and 2 months No) shows the
difficulties and dangers of forecasting operations and
therefore casualties a year ahead. While you may be able to
forecast your own operations fairly accurately, you can
rarely forecast the operations of your enemy with any
accuracy. However, it is impossible to forecast casualties
without some idea of future operations and an operational
activity forecast remained an essential part of calculating
wastage post-Evetts.
The wastage rates issued in June 1941 were amended seven
times: the last amendment was in September 1942. Only the
222
fifth amendment affected the personnel rates and it was
trivial.
In the autumn of 1942 wastage rates were urgently
reviewed by the General Staff Research Committee. The main
concern of the review was to ascertain the wastage of
material so that sufficient could be ordered in the US by
Lyttelton (Minister of Production) during his forthcoming
visit (November 1942). The opportunity was taken to review
personnel wastage rates as well.
The Committee was chaired by Major-General Evetts. Its
members were Colonels Churchill and Haddock. Its secretary
was Major Goode. Evetts, Churchill and Goode were
infantrymen; Haddock was a gunner. The Committee was
assembled (or possibly reassembled) on 10th September. It
finished work on 7th December.
Evetts left papers but they do not concern the work of
the Committee7. Only Goode is still alive. He is adamant
about certain points. Namely: during WWII wastage rates
were based on WWI casualties; experience in the Desert was
disregarded as unrepresentative; RA losses in the Desert
were abnormally high; the Army had too much "tail" and not
enough "teeth"; DSD was efficient; AG's Department was
incompetent and despised (the Department was "totally
unreliable" and AG a "conceited ass"); heavy casualties
were always expected on D-Day8. While not wishing to accept
without question Goode's views over fifty years after the
event, his views are naturally entitled to very serious
consideration.
The Committee issued twelve Interim Reports, the 10th
being in the way of a summary and the last to be completed;
it was the only one to be concerned with personnel wastage9.
Evetts papers, LHC.
8 Major Francis Goode: letters to the author of 22 °d January and 4`h March 1996.
9 ECAC papers December 1942: WO163/89.
223
As soon as they had been produced, "working copies of the
Reports had been circulated to War Office branches with a
covering slip drawing attention to their tentative
character".
Although the records of its deliberations do not appear
to survive, the Committee presumably used casualty and
strength returns and analyses compiled by AG Stats to
arrive at its conclusions with regard to personnel wastage
in its 10th Report. Many of those returns and analyses
presumably related to the Western Desert: for the past year
and a half the only place where the British Army had been
in contact with the German and Italian Armies. However,
Goode says that Western Desert experience was dismissed as
unrepresentative, and the small number of major changes to
the rates made by Evetts does suggest that Western Desert
experience was very sparingly used, if at all. In 1944 the
extraordinarily productive AG Stats produced about 100
returns and analyses per month. In 1942 AG Stats was less
productive and less informative and it is possible that for
this reason its output was little used by the Committee. It
is perhaps significant that the 10th Report recommended
that AG Stats keep records to enable reviews to be made.
Although the "War Office List" places the responsibility
for wastage rates (both material and personnel) on DSD both
before and after Evetts, Evetts placed the responsibility
for personnel wastage rates on AG's Department. Paragraph
10 of the 10th Report concerned the "Responsibilities of
the AG's Branch in connection with FFC rates". It stated:
"(a) The assessment and revision as necessary of the rates
of wastage applicable to personnel. (b) The maintenance by
means of a Statistical Branch (AG Stats) of all necessary
records to enable periodical reviews and adjustments to be
made of the FFC Rates for personnel as now laid down in
1° this book". With the creation of DMP within AG's
10 Ibid. 224
Department in March 1943 (perhaps as a result of the 10th
Report), the question of responsibility was not made any
easier.
The 10th, 11th and 12th Interim Reports were submitted
to the ECAC on 18th December 1942 by the DCIGS. With regard
to the 10th Interim Report (dealing with principles,
definitions and machinery for future application, and
including the Committee's recommendations on personnel),
ECAC "approved in principle" the formulae and definitions
and agreed that they "might now be despatched outside the
War Office" but DCIGS was, in conjunction with AG, invited
to "give further consideration" to the method of computing
personnel wastagell. The 10th Interim Report was resubmitted
by DCIGS to ECAC on 16th April 1943, after four months
further examination12. DCIGS had examined the rates
recommended, the dead loss ratio proposed and their
applicability to the Far East. In his paper DCIGS
recommended that the rates be approved for issue, subject
to two minor changes, which were agreed by ECAC. The rates
were approved for issue, with the two changes proposed by
DCIGS (both indicative of a concern with future operations
in Europe). First, the Intense rate for the Pioneer Corps
was increased from 3% to 4%, because of their direct
involvement in future amphibious landings in Europe.
Second, the dead loss ratio was decreased from 55% to 50%
(the dead loss ratio of only 40% in the 6th Libyan campaign
i. e. the 2nd Battle of Alamein and the pursuit, October-
November 1942, being dismissed as untypical), because of
shorter LOC in Europe than in Africa and the Far East and
therefore speedier medical treatment. In other words, the
dead loss ratio proposed by Evetts was considered unduly
pessimistic. ECAC accepted the abolition of a special rate
" Ibid.
12 ECAC papers April 1943: WO163/90.
225
for the Far East but said that it would be reintroduced if
evidence suggested the need to do so. The 10th Interim
Report was further discussed by ECAC on 4th June and 6th
August but nothing of relevance to personnel was discussed.
After approval but before issue, three additions were
made to the Evetts rates: Support Infantry; Army Air Corps;
Glider Pilot Regiment. Also before issue, three
clarifications were made (all prompted by a desire to be on
the safe side): unit strength was WE i. e. authorised
strength not actual strength, so as not to penalise
understrength units; there was no longer a special rate for
the Far East; the Intense and Normal rates included and
were not additional to the Quiet rate i. e. normal wastage
(all three clarifications were proposed by DMP) .A proposal
by D Air that the dead loss ratio be increased to 75% for
the Parachute Regiment was rejected by DSD'3.
The Evetts rates were finally issued in late May 194314.
They are reproduced in Table XX. The rates were gross i. e.
they made no allowance for recovered wounded or sick
returning to duty. They gave wastage as a percentage of
unit strength per month. They included casualties (defined
as killed, died of wounds, wounded and POWs) and normal
wastage. They covered twenty arms (Light and Heavy Armour
combined into one; Support Infantry added to MG Infantry;
REME added to RAOC; AAC added; GPR added) , were divided by
three scales of activity (Intense, Normal, Quiet) and sub-
divided by two ranks (Officers; ORs) . The Quiet rate was
not sub-divided by rank. There was no longer any division
by theatre. In addition, a breakdown of casualties was
given: 15% would be killed; 15% would be missing and POW;
20% would be non-recoverable wounded (presumably died of
wounds and invalided); 50% would be recoverable wounded
(recoverable within 6 months) i. e. 50% of casualties would
13 DSD file on Evetts rates: W032/10201.
14 FFC Sub 73D: A6603: W033/2065.
226
be dead wastage. From the casualty breakdown given by
Evetts, the following extrapolation can be made: five
sevenths (71.4%) of the wounded would recover; two sevenths
(28.6%) of the wounded would not.
From the above three things are clear. First, the rates
were issued after the end of the North African campaign.
They had however been used on a provisional basis during
the final part of the campaign: ECAC had agreed that they
could be despatched outside the War Office on 18th December
1942; New Zealand forces in North Africa - and presumably
British forces as well - began using the new rates,
including the 55% dead loss ratio originally proposed, on
1st January 1943. Second, the rates were discussed and
examined in the period December 1942 to April 1943, when
the end of the North African campaign was clearly in sight
and when all eyes were turning towards future operations in
Europe. Third, the rates were produced by Evetts a month
after 2nd Alamein and were examined and discussed during
the Tunisian campaign i. e. the attritional phase of the
North African campaign. Therefore, if they were influenced
by the North African campaign, they were more likely to
have been influenced by the final attritional phase than by
the earlier fluid phase.
It is clear that what Evetts did was a repair and not a
rebuild. There were few substantial differences between the
rates issued in June 1941 and the rates issued in May 1943.
The main differences were: "No" activity was more
accurately renamed "Quiet"; one rate was introduced
irrespective of theatre and separate theatre rates were
abolished (although with the possibility of their
reintroduction if evidence suggested the need); a dead loss
ratio was introduced (although the concept already
existed) . Reflecting changes in the Army's organization,
Evetts combined the separate rates for Heavy and Light
227
Armour into one; added the REME to the RAOC; added the AAC;
added Support Infantry to MG Infantry; and added the GPR.
The Quiet rates were the same as the previous No rates i. e.
0.75% across the board. The Normal rates were changed
slightly (the Normal rates for Armour were corrected).
Before Evetts there was a flat Intense rate of 5% and flat
Normal rate of 2% in the Far East. After Evetts the rates
were no longer differentiated by theatre: the rates in the
Far East, North Africa and Europe were all the same. Before
Evetts there had been an Intense rate for Infantry of 20%
in a Primary Theatre and 10% in a Secondary; a Normal rate
of 6% in a Primary Theatre and 4% in a Secondary. After
Evetts there was an Intense rate for Infantry of 25% for
Officers and 20% for ORs; a Normal rate of 7% for Officers
and 6% for ORs. The post-Evetts Intense rates and the pre-
Evetts Primary Theatre Intense rates were largely the same.
The most important differences were that Evetts
substantially raised the Intense rates for Armour (Officers
only), Artillery (Officers and ORs) and Infantry (Officers
only). The rates for Infantry and Armour Officers were
raised to 25%. The rates for RA Officers and ORs were
raised to 15% and 8% respectively. One might assume that
the RA rates were raised to reflect the fact that in the
Western Desert RA casualties had been very heavy, because
many RA units had been wiped out or overrun. However, this
has been explicitly denied by Goode who insists that
Western Desert experience was for this very reason
dismissed as unrepresentative and WWI experience was used
instead15. In any case, the raising of the rates for RA
merely took them back to pretty much where they had been
prior to January 1940. Moreover, less than four months
after being issued the Evetts rates were reduced for many
RA personnel. The rates for "tail" arms were substantially
15 Letter to the author of 22 °d January 1996.
228
unchanged by Evetts, despite their heavy losses at the
hands of the "Panzers" and "Stukas" in the Western Desert.
The most important difference between the rates before
and after Evetts - and the most important change introduced
by Evetts - was the casualty breakdown and especially the
dead loss ratio. The Evetts rates laid down that 50% of
casualties would be dead loss - effectively irrecoverable.
Evetts actually proposed a dead loss ratio of 55%; it was however reduced to 50% by ECAC (on the advice of DCIGS)
prior to issue, as we have seen. Although the dead loss
ratio did not appear in the wastage rates until Evetts, the
concept was not invented by Evetts but had already existed
for sometime. Clearly, the concept must have been invented
sometime after the old rates had been issued in June 1941.
The dead loss ratio appears to have been 50% originally. In
February 1942 (immediately after the Fall of Singapore) the
dead loss ratio was increased from 50% to 75%: 15% Killed,
25% non-recoverable Wounded, 35% Missing and POW16. In June
1942 the VCIGS and AG agreed on a dead loss ratio of 45%:
25% Killed, Missing and POW, 20% non-recoverable Wounded 17 -
In July 1945 AG Stats referred to the dead loss ratio of
50% used since 1943 as "a reasonable over-insurance for
planning purposes against actual losses sustained" i. e. it
had erred on the side of caution18.
It cannot be denied that the Evetts rates were flawed.
One flaw was inherent; two flaws were omissions.
Being designed for medium-term (i. e. monthly) planning,
the rates could not predict or accommodate short-term (i. e.
weekly or daily) aberrations. It is difficult to conceive
of a system which could. Now and again very heavy losses
are sustained within a very short period of time. The
16 WO162/305.
17 Ibid.
18 AG Stats file on casualties: W032/10810.
229
opening of the Battle of the Somme (July 1916), the Dieppe
landing (August 1942), the Battle of Wadi Akarit (April
1943), for example, all saw many months infantry wastage
sustained in a single day. The use of the "Double Intense"
rate by 21st Army Group during the assault phase of
"Overlord" was a sensible (but as it turned out
unnecessary) attempt to accommodate the possibility of very
heavy losses on D-Day.
Although it was stated that the rates included normal
wastage, it was not specified what counted as normal
wastage: all absences from the unit (those on the so-called
"X" List) or just long-term absences (those on the so-
called "Y" List) . The Quiet rate of only 0.75% (which of
course Evetts had not introduced but had merely confirmed)
strongly suggests that normal wastage actually referred to
"Y" List absences only. Perhaps at the time everyone made
the same deduction. However, if (as seems likely) the rates
did not cover "X" List absences, why were they not
vehemently criticised by users and then speedily changed?
(When produced, AMD2 (Stats) had queried the Quiet rate but
AG Co-ord had confirmed it19). It is not possible to say
with certainty. Perhaps for most units most of the time the
rates were high enough to cover "X" List absences. Most
normal wastage was after all sickness, a very large
proportion of which was not serious and was quickly
recoverable. Except in the Far East, where the rates were
eventually changed.
They did not make clear that not all recoverable wounded
would be fit enough to return to front-line duty. It is
difficult to measure the practical effect of this omission,
if any. Especially as the proportion of wounded who would
recover was underestimated by Evetts and the time it would
take for them to recover and return to their units was
overestimated by Evetts. Before D-Day the recovery period
19 W032/10201.
230
for wounded was lowered (from 6 months to 4-6 months) to
reflect the fact that the wounded recovered more quickly
than Evetts had assumed. During the NW Europe campaign 79%
of wounded ORs recovered and returned to duty (i. e. did not
die; were not invalided) - instead of the proportion
(71.4%) assumed by Evetts - and this proportion was lower
than in previous campaigns because of an understandable
reluctance to keep men in harness when the end of the war
was in sight20. In North Africa no less than 83% of the
wounded had recovered and returned to duty21.
After their issue, the Evetts rates were amended, as was
the way in which they were applied. This shows that they
were in need of amendment. Equally it shows that they were
not set in stone and were capable of amendment when the
need was perceived, as intended by Evetts. A mechanism
existed whereby the rates could be amended if amendment was
thought necessary: from early 1943 a formal weekly meeting
between DSD (Chair), DMP and D of 0.
Only a matter of weeks after the issue of the Evetts
rates, at their meeting on 6th July 1943, DSD, D of 0 and
DMP agreed to reassess the rates for anti-aircraft
artillery. On 31st July 1943 DMP wrote to DSD saying that
study showed that RA losses had been less than forecast in
North Africa but he was disinclined to act. At their
meeting on 10th August 1943 DSD, D of 0 and DMP agreed to
reduce substantially the rates for anti-aircraft artillery.
On 10th September 1943 the rates were amended for the RA:
new, much lower rates for anti-aircraft and coastal
artillery (the reduction for coastal artillery having been
suggested by DDSD(B) on 20th August 1943) were introduced
to distinguish them from the rates for field artillery,
20 Franklin Mellor, Casualties and Medical Statistics, P268.
21 W032/108 10.
231
which were left untouched22. Whether the rates for field
artillery should have been lowered as well is a moot point.
What is not debatable is that the rates for a substantial
proportion of the artillery were drastically reduced well
before D-Day, just after the invasion of mainland Italy in
fact. Consequently, for many artillery units much lower
rates prevailed in the Italian and NW Europe campaigns than
had prevailed in any earlier campaign, including the North
African.
On 12th February 1944 a "Double Intense" rate was
introduced by 21st Army Group into its "Overlord" casualty
forecast.
In May 1944 AG Stats introduced an allowance for malaria
into its casualty forecasts for the Far East and Middle
East. Also in May 1944 the recovery period of wounded was
amended to reflect the fact that the wounded recovered and
returned to duty more quickly than had been assumed. Evetts
had laid down that five sevenths of the wounded would
recover and return to duty in the 6 months after being
wounded. From May 1944 it was laid down that of the wounded
who would recover, a quarter would return in 4 months; a
half in 5 months; and a quarter in 6 month S23.
On 31st August 1944 the rates were amended for the GPR.
The Intense rate was equalised i. e. decreased for Officers
and increased for ORs. This had been agreed by DSD, D of 0
and DMP at their meeting on 22nd August 194424. The
amendment, which clearly reflected operational experience
in Normandy (especially on D-Day), demonstrates that the
rates could be amended in under three months from start to
finish.
22 W032/10201.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
232
The rates for use in the Far East were amended in
October 1944 to reflect the large numbers of non-battle
casualties (principally caused by malaria) and the small
numbers of battle casualties. This amounted to a de facto
reintroduction of separate rates for the Far East theatre.
As from 16th November 1944 AG Stats casualty forecasts
reflected the fact that not all recovered wounded would be
fit for combat duty. For "teeth" arms the proportion of
recoverable wounded was lowered from 50% to 40% of
casualties (i. e. in the infantry, artillery, armour etc.
only 57.1% of the wounded would recover and be fit enough
for further duty with their old units). As the Canadians
had raised this matter with DSD just before D-Day (and had
been told just after D-Day that only 78% of recovered
wounded would be fit enough for combat i. e. only 55.7% of
the wounded would recover and be fit enough for combat), it
is difficult to understand why it was not until November
1944 that casualty forecasting at the War Office was
amended accordingly. It would appear that Canadian planners
were put in the picture but British planners were left in
the dark for another five months. There is no evidence that
the wastage rates themselves were ever amended to show that
not all recovered wounded would be fit enough to return to
combat. However, it is unlikely that this omission had much
practical effect, if any, given the generally pessimistic
nature of the rates.
In February 1945 AG Stats suggested that it would make
casualty forecasting simpler - and would not materially
affect the accuracy of casualty forecasts - if recovered
wounded were credited as returning to duty in one month
rather than phased over three as at present. This was
agreed and as from 6th June 1945 recovered wounded were
credited as returning to duty in the fourth month after
wounding25.
25 AG Stats branch memorandum. 233
Let us now look at how well the Evetts rates worked in
the various theatres in which the British Army fought.
Firstly, North Africa. From June 1940 to May 1943
British forces fought Italian and later German forces in
North Africa. It is however both inaccurate and misleading
to generalise about the campaign as a whole. In the Western
Desert warfare was mobile and fluid. German air attacks and
armoured incursions caused many casualties to the "tail"
arms. Armoured units suffered heavily at the hands of
German anti-tank guns. Artillery units were frequently
wiped out or overrun by Germans. However, as 1st Alamein
showed, by July 1942 warfare had become static and
positional. When the fighting moved from the Western Desert
and into Tunisia, warfare naturally became even more static
and positional. There were few casualties to the "tail"
arms. Because of the mountainous terrain, there was very
little scope for armour. Attacks were carried out primarily
by the infantry and infantry casualties predominated. The
fighting in Italy closely resembled the fighting in
Tunisia; the fighting in NW Europe closely resembled
neither the fighting in the Western Desert nor the fighting
in Tunisia.
AG Stats carried out three studies of wastage in the
North African campaign: December 1940 - October 1941 (29th
June 1942); November 1941 - June 1942 (8th February 1943);
July 1942 - May 1943 (3rd May 1944)26. None produced
conclusive proof that the rates needed amendment. The third
study was widely circulated. It analysed 21 operations,
including 4 where casualties were very heavy (2nd Alamein,
Metameur, Mareth/El Hamma, Wadi Akarit). It showed that the
proportion of killed was well above the 15% laid down by
Evetts; and that the officer casualty rate was nearly
always much greater than the OR casualty rate. The battles
26 Copies of last two held by Army Historical Branch.
234
of Metameur and Wadi Akarit were exceptional: they saw old-
style infantry assaults in mountainous terrain, resulting
in very heavy losses in a very short period of time (one
day). At Wadi Akarit 85% of 8th Army casualties were infantry. The study showed that if the heavy infantry
losses at Wadi Akarit were taken as the norm, the wastage
rate for infantry would have to be increased from 20%/25%
to a ridiculous 195%/282% per month. The second study
showed that the monthly casualty rate for infantry ORs
varied between 26.5% and 61%. It reminded the reader that
the Evetts rates "are purely a basis for long-term
calculations and cannot expect to apply to individual
operations lasting a matter of a few days". It concluded
that there was "little evidence to warrant any amendments
to the existing laid-down rates of wastage... that casualty
rates differ widely according to the nature of the
operation, and that wastage rates can only be based on
experience over a fairly long period".
Although Churchill is heavily criticised elsewhere in
this thesis, it is undeniable that he believed the Infantry
was the Queen of the Battlefield and that you cannot have
enough of it. He was very alert to heavy infantry losses
and to proposals to reduce the size of infantry units. He
was particularly perturbed by high infantry casualties
during the Tunisian campaign, November 1942 to May 1943
(the evidence of which was unmistakable, thanks to the
ever-industrious AG Stats). On 3rd January 1943 he had a
long conference with DCIGS and DSD. He wrote to Grigg and
Brooke the following day27. The infantry comprised only
27,000 out of the 211,000 in 1st Army (one eighth) yet the
infantry had borne one half of the casualties. The infantry
component should be strengthened. Battalions should not be
cut from 4 to 3 companies, as proposed; on the contrary,
battalions should be increased by 100 men. He remarked that
27 Churchill, The Hinge of Fate, PP925-6.
235
during the war the Army had moved a long way from the maxim "The Infantry is the Army and uses the other arms as its
assistants". He concluded by saying: "The proportion of Infantry to other arms requires to be carefully reviewed". On 9th April Churchill wrote to Grigg requesting a visit to
an infantry battalion to examine its WE28. On 3rd May he
wrote again to Brooke about infantry casualties in ist
Army: 75% of the casualties had been borne by the Guards
and rifle battalions in recent fighting, 64% over the
longer period. There was an "extraordinary disparity"
recently between the infantry losses sustained and the
infantry reinforcements sent. The "fighting troops are not being replaced effectively". He concluded: "The first duty
of the War Office is to keep up the rifle infantry
strength Y29 . What effect did Tunisian casualties and Churchill's
intervention have? The Evetts rates were not issued until
after the fall of Tunis (although they had been used on a
provisional basis since January 1943). Although issued in
May 1943, the Evetts rates were not a response to the
Tunisian fighting. The timing was coincidental: as we have
seen, they had been framed in the autumn of 1942 and their
issue had been delayed while they had been subjected to
close scrutiny. The War Office did not change the wastage
rates in response to Churchill's intervention and the
statistical evidence adduced in his minutes. Of course,
some of the wastage rates were changed in May 1943 - for
example, the rate for infantry officers was increased - but
not in response to Tunisian casualties or Churchill's
intervention. Which suggests that either the War Office was
guilty of appalling negligence or callous indifference
(which is what some have implied) or else the evidence was
28 Ibid, P945.
29 Ibid, P956.
236
not considered conclusive of long-term inaccuracy (which is
a more reasonable assumption). In fact, other measures were
taken to meet Churchill's oft-expressed concerns. At the
end of the Tunisian campaign the WE of an infantry
battalion was raised (by 39 to 845)30.
Secondly, Italy. The war in Italy was primarily an
infantry war; there was very little scope for armour in the
mountainous Italian peninsula. Infantry wastage in Italy
was accordingly high. The all-arms wastage rate in Italy in
the period September 1943 to June 1944 varied between 5.6%
and 1.5% per month. The infantry wastage rate was
occasionally 15.3% per month but was usually about half
that. However, at Anzio in February 1944, because of fierce
German counter-attacks on the cramped Allied bridgehead,
the all-arms wastage rate was 20.9% and the infantry
wastage rate was 35.4%31. In the period 3rd September 1943
to 31st March 1944,57.6% of British battle casualties in
Italy were infantry: 26,50032. Wastage at Anzio was double
that estimated33; infantry wastage at Anzio was 2.5 times
that estimated34. No doubt in response to Anzio, the
composition and location of the reinforcement pool in Italy
was changed in February 1944.
Besides battle casualties, units in Italy suffered
heavily from disease and sickness, malaria especially. The
impact of malaria was greatest in Sicily (July-August
1943). On 15th January 1944 AG Stats produced a comparison
between the Evetts rates and the actual casualties
sustained in Sicily. The comparison showed that, despite
5,000 hospital admissions per month because of sickness
30 WEII/233/2: notified by Army Council Instruction of 19th May 1943.
31 AG Stats branch memorandum.
32 Molony, Mediterranean and Middle East, Vol. V, P421.
33 Ibid, P423.
34 AFHQ file on reinforcements: W0204/6627.
237
(mostly malaria), the Evetts rates had been too
pessimistic: actual infantry casualty rates had been only 20%/14% (Officers/ORs) per month35. The figure for hospital
admissions was supplied by AMD2 (Stats). It must be said however that it does not convey the true scale of the
sickness, principally malaria, problem in Sicily36. Apart
from battle casualties, sickness and disease, during the
autumn and winter of 1944 two other forms of wastage
assumed frightening proportions in Italy: home leave (3,000
men per month from the entire theatre, of which two thirds
were from Italy itself) and desertion/AWOL (a peak of over
1,200 men per month at the end of 1944). The numbers may
not appear large but the impact of both forms fell mainly
on the "teeth" arms, the infantry especially. We discussed
desertion/AWOL in Italy in the autumn and winter of 1944 in
the previous chapter.
Thirdly, the Far East. Evetts abolished separate rates
for the Far East. After having further study carried out
and after some hesitation, ECAC approved their abolition
but held out the prospect that separate rates might be
reintroduced.
On 15th July 1944 DSD asked for a report on wastage in
the Far East. A report was produced by DMP on 23rd
September, based largely upon No. 10 Indian Operational
Research Section's study into manpower wastage in Burma
during the period 1943/44: "Investigations regarding Rates
of Wastage of Manpower (Jungle Warfare) 1944", ist July
194437. This study showed that the Far East theatre was
unique: battle casualties were much lower than elsewhere
while non-battle casualties were much greater than
elsewhere. The study identified 7 types of normal wastage
35 AG Stats branch memorandum.
36 Crew, Army Medical Services: Campaigns, Vol. III, P56.
37 W032/10201.
238
in the Far East: sick; unfit/invalided; deserters;
repatriations; occasional battle casualties e. g. patrols;
men in prison; postings, transfers, promotions. It
concluded that only sickness (due to malaria and long LOC)
and repatriations were appreciable and quantifiable. The
combined sick and repatriation rate was considerable: 1%-4%
per month. It recommended that the Intense rate be greatly
lowered and the Quiet rate be greatly raised (the Normal
rate was not actually used in the Far East). In his report,
DMP examined three aspects of wastage in the Far East:
amphibious operations; land operations; malaria. With
regard to amphibious operations, he decided not to
recommend a Double Intense rate. Instead he recommended a
flat rate of 30% for "teeth" arms and 10% for "tail" arms
for the first month of an operation. With regard to land
operations, he recommended that the Quiet rates should
henceforth be additional to and not included in the Intense
rates. He recommended that the Quiet rates should be
substantially increased (to 1%-1.5%) and the Intense rates
should be substantially decreased (halved) for "teeth" arms
(for "tail" arms the Intense rates should stay the same).
With regard to malaria, he recommended that during the
monsoon period (May to October) there should be a Quiet
rate of 3% rising monthly to 15% to cover malarial
casualties. On 10th October 1944 DSD, D of 0 and DMP agreed
to reintroduce special rates for the Far East. They also
agreed that for the proposed amphibious landing in southern
Burma, the rates should be 2 months x Intense for the
assault phase ("Double Intense" in fact though not in name)
with half x Intense for "teeth" arms and Intense for "tail"
arms thereafter38.
Not surprisingly, a vast amount of operational research
was undertaken into personnel wastage in the Far East
because of its many peculiarities: the large number of non-
38 Ibid.
239
battle casualties; the small number of battle casualties;
very long LOC; inhospitable terrain and climate; endemic
disease. As mentioned above, in 1944 No 10 Indian
Operational Research Section produced a report into rates
of manpower wastage in jungle warfare. The following year,
Operational Research Group, 14th Army under Lieutenant-
Colonel Leitch produced a detailed seven part report on
Manpower Wastage in the Far East 1944/45, examining
hospital utilisation, reinforcement procedure, unit wastage
and battle wastage39. Leitch concluded (Part VII: Summary,
May 1945) that during the period 1944/45 quiet wastage for
infantry was 0.9% for Officers and 2.3% for ORs per month
(of which 0.25% and 0.75% respectively was dead wastage);
and that battle wastage for infantry was 11.5% for Officers
and 8.5% for ORs per month (of which 10.2% and 7.5%
respectively was dead wastage). Later in 1945 Brigadier
Welch of G Research Directorate, HQ ALFSEA made a study
into casualty evacuation and the provision of
reinforcements in the Far East. Welch concluded that in
heavy fighting a force of three divisions would need to
evacuate 85 sick and 115 wounded a day (total 200) . He
estimated that 13% of the wounded and 20% of the sick could
be treated locally and would not require evacuation. He
worked on the basis that a high of 5% of officers and 9% of
ORs would be sick per month and that in heavy fighting up
to 13% of infantry officers and 11% of infantry ORs would
be wounded per month4o .
The primary cause of non-battle wastage in the Far East
was malaria. Thanks to medical advances, this was in time
brought down to manageable proportions. Hospital admissions
in Burma because of malaria declined drastically between
1943 and 1945: from 5.2% per month to 1% per month. Whereas
39 ALFSEA papers: W0203/592-7 and 702.
ao Copy held by Army Historical Branch.
240
malaria accounted for over a third of the sick rate in
Burma in 1943 (14.5%), in 1945 it accounted for less than a
sixth (6.5% ) 41.
Lastly, North West Europe. 21st Army Group issued its
long-term (6 months) and short-term (2 weeks) forecasts of
casualties during "Overlord" on 12th February 194442. They
were produced against the background of the Anzio
operation, by which they were almost certainly influenced.
In its forecasting, 21st Army Group used the Evetts rates
but introduced a new "Double Intense" rate for those
formations landing on D-Day. In the first month such
formations would lose, for example, 50% of their infantry
officers and 40% of their infantry ORs. Hastings is in
error when he says that the "Double Intense" rate was
introduced as a result of experience in Normandy43. Although
infantry (of all types, including the Guards and
"Commandos") comprised only 16% of the force, it was
forecast that they would account for 45% of casualties in
the first month, 38% in the second and 35% in the third
i. e. an average of 39% during the first three month S44. In
its detailed casualty forecasting, 21st Army Group took the
Evetts rates as the basis but introduced many refinements.
It laid down that: on D-Day 60% of those in landing craft
which were lost or damaged would become casualties; 0.17%
per day of the force ashore would be hospitalised because
of sickness or injury (i .e. 5.1% per month) ; 30% of battle
casualties would be killed, captured or missing on D-Day
and D+1 and 25% thereafter; half the wounded would be
walking wounded (i. e. not serious)45.21st Army Group also
41 Franklin Mellor, Casualties and Medical Statistics, PP105-6.
42 21st Army Group papers: W0205/152.
43 Overlord, P210.
44 W0205/152.
45 Administrative History of 21 S` Army Group, P7.
241
laid down that battle casualties would be assessed on a
daily basis. For the first two weeks of the campaign this
would be done according to the severity of the fighting
(light; severe; maximum) and to unit (regiment or brigade;
division; corps; army; LOC). The daily casualty rate up to
D+14 would vary between 25% (for a regiment on a maximum day) and 0.25% (for LOC troops on a light day) For the
rest of the campaign the daily casualty rate would be
assumed to be 0.35% from D+15 to D+29; 0.25% from D+30 to
D+59; 0.20% from D+60 to D+90; and 0.15% thereafter46.
On 8th March 1944 AG Stats drew up an "Overlord"
casualty forecast which substantially increased the figures
put forward by 21st Army Group, both all-arms and infantry.
AG Stats predicted almost 100,000 battle casualties in the
first three months (over half in the first month), of which
almost 41,000 (41%) would be rifle infantry. In the event,
between D-Day and the end of August less than 70,000 battle
casualties were sustained, of which less than 39,000 (56%)
were rifle infantry i. e. infantry casualties were far
greater in relative terms than forecast but marginally
lower in absolute terms. Heavy infantry losses (double
those forecast, in both absolute and relative terms) in the
middle of the Normandy campaign were more than balanced by
light losses in the beginning and at the end. Taking the
campaign as a whole, all-arms casualties were massively
overestimated while infantry casualties were marginally
overestimated47 . It has become fashionable in recent years to say that
for the British, American and Canadian Armies casualty
rates in NW Europe were comparable to casualty rates on the
Western Front. While agreeing wholeheartedly with Ellis
46 Cabinet Office narrative of NW Europe campaign: Section D Chapter I Plans and preparations: CAB44/242.
" Cas. returns: AG Stats file W032/11172; comparisons between forecasts and returns: AG Stats analysis W0365/46.
242
that WWII was not a "cakewalki48 for British, American and
Canadian infantrymen, who suffered heavy casualties, it has
to be said that some historians have overstated the case -
especially with regard to the Normandy campaign. Thompson49
states that the daily casualty rate during the Normandy
campaign i. e. 2,723 was higher than that during the Third
Battle of Ypres i. e. 2,221. Thompson's point has been
quoted approvingly by Sheffield50 while Copp has made
exactly the same point, although with slightly different
figures51. However, in their attempt to emphasise the
undeniable ferocity of the "bocage" fighting, Thompson,
Sheffield and Copp have overstated the case. They are in
fact comparing apples and oranges: they are comparing
British and Canadian casualties in the period 31st July to
10th November 1917 i. e. 240,00052 with British, Canadian and
American casualties in the period 6th June to 31st August
1944 i. e. 209,672 Even then, such a simplistic comparison
takes no account of the number of casualties sustained
relative to the size of the force involved: around half a
million at the peak during Third Ypres54; around two million
at the peak in Normandy55. During the middle, attritional
phase of the Normandy campaign casualties, especially among
the infantry, were very high; however they did not surpass
in either absolute or relative terms those sustained during
the Western Front battles and any attempt to suggest
otherwise is futile. We may agree with Ellis that: "In
48 The Sharp End, P159.
a9 The Imperial War Museum Book of Victory in Europe, PPxii and 138.
50 Addison and Calder (Eds. ), Time to Kill, P35.
51 Ibid, PP 148-9.
52 Falls, The First World War, P285.
5' Ellis, Victory in the West, Vol. I, P493.
54 Mitchell and Smith, Medical History of the War, P38.
55 Ellis, Vol. I, P478.
243
terms of battle casualties the Western Front will always
remain a Golgotha of unequalled proportionsi56. As we shall
shortly see, the casualty rate during the NW Europe
campaign was in fact much less than during the Western
Front campaign.
Battle casualty rates in NW Europe (as a percentage of
troops engaged) were: 10.7 in June; 9.8 in July; 8.8 in
August; 9 in September; and 5.1 in October57. These rates
can be misleading. Fighting was fiercer and casualties were
heavier in July than in June. However, the rate is higher
in June because there were fewer troops ashore and engaged
than in July. During June and July 30% of casualties
requiring medical treatment were sick, 10% were suffering
from exhaustion or fatigue (a major problem during the
middle, attritional phase of the Normandy campaign) and 60%
were wounded or injured. Of the sick, a third were treated
locally. Of the wounded and injured: 7% died; 5% were
invalided; 7% returned to duty in a low medical category;
and 81% returned to duty in a high medical category58. There
can be no doubt that the infantry suffered most in NW
Europe. According to their published histories, during the
NW Europe campaign British infantry divisions suffered
between 9,758 and 11,870 battle casualties each i. e. an
average of between 887 and 1,141 per division per month.
Although rifle infantry comprised only two fifths of an
infantry division, most of these casualties were infantry.
Of British OR battle casualties in NW Europe, 60% were
rifle infantry, including the Guards59.
Unlike in the Far East, little operational research was
devoted to personnel wastage in NW Europe. Report 19 of No.
56 The Sharp End, P 159.
57 AG Stats branch memorandum.
58 Crew, Army Medical Services: Campaigns, Vol. IV, P619.
59 Hansard, 25`x' July 1946.
244
2 Operational Research Section 21st Army Group concerned
infantry officer casualties during the first five months of
the campaign. Its findings show clearly that being an
infantry subaltern in NW Europe was a very dangerous
occupation. Although the proportion of officer/OR
casualties varied between division (1.28-1.70), the
casualty rate was invariably higher for officers than for
ORs. Rifle platoon commanders had a casualty rate of 31.2%
per month whilst rifle company commanders had a casualty
rate of 30% per month. Half of infantry officer casualties
were due to inadequate training and tactics on the part of
the infantry while half were due to inadequate counter-
battery/mortar methods used by the supporting arms.
Consequently, the training of the infantry and counter-
battery/mortar methods should both be improved. Of company
commanders who were hit, one third were killed and two
thirds were wounded. Officer mortality rates varied between
division (24.2%-35%). Most officer casualties were caused
when attacking (69%); by artillery shells and mortars
(57%); in close proximity to the enemy (40% ) 60 .
The infantry shortage experienced by 21st Army Group in
the autumn of 1944 was not explicitly blamed on the wastage
rates. At a series of meetings held on 30th and 31st
October 1944 to discuss 21st Army Group's deficit of 14,500
infantry, DSD told the Chief of Staff of 21st Army Group
that the deficit (which the War Office had predicted before
D-Day) was somewhat greater than predicted for four
reasons. First, the War Office activity forecasts had been
based on not all divisions being in line at the same time,
which is what had actually happened. Second, the War Office
forecasts of infantry casualties had been based on the
daily casualty rate for infantry originally supplied by
21st Army Group: 220. However, 21st Army Group had
60 Army Operational Research reports: W0291/1331.
245
subsequently raised this to 350, then to 380 and finally to
500 i. e. more than double (from 6,600 to 15,000 per month).
Third, the estimate of 50% of casualties returning in 4-6
months had proved accurate but not all had been fit enough
to return to combat duty. Fourth, because there had been
fewer casualties than predicted in the first month of the
campaign, fewer than predicted wounded were now returning
to duty61. It will be noted that there was no direct
criticism of the wastage rates. The deficit was the result
of a combination of factors, the most important of which
were an inaccurate forecast of activity by the War Office
and the doubling of the daily casualty estimate for
infantry by 21st Army Group.
It has to be said that 21st Army Group's doubling of the
daily casualty rate for infantry was, although
understandable, an unnecessary overreaction to the heavy
infantry casualties sustained in the Norman "bocage". In
the event, during the last two months of 1944 its
casualties, both total and infantry, were negligible. In
November and December 1944 21st Army Group sustained only
8,800 casualties, of which only 4,600 were infantry (= 75 a
day) . Indeed, taking the period June to December 1944 as a
whole, casualties, both total and infantry, were much less
than had been forecast before the campaign. On 18th May AG
Stats had forecast that between D-Day and the end of 1944
21st Army Group would sustain 189,600 casualties, of which
76,800 (40.5%) would be infantry of the line (= 368 a day).
In the event, in the period 6th June to 31st December 1944
21st Army Group sustained only 107,600 casualties i. e.
82,000 less than forecast, of which only 61,400 (57.1%)
were infantry of the line (= 294 a day) i. e. 15,400 less
than forecast62. In other words, although infantry
61 Home Forces file on "Overlord" reinforcements: WO199/1335.
62 WO65/46.
246
casualties were much greater than forecast in relative
terms, they were much less in absolute terms.
Taking the campaign in NW Europe as a whole, battle
casualties as a proportion of force strength were 1.99% per
month and non-battle casualties were 2.37% per month. A
total of 4.36% per month. This was less than half the
casualty rate experienced by the British Army on the
Western Front. Taking the campaign on the Western Front as
a whole, battle casualties as a proportion of force
strength were 4.11% per month and non-battle casualties
were 5.39% per month. A total of 9.5% per month. Of British
Army battle casualties in NW Europe, 4% were killed,
10.4% missing and 68.2% wounded. Of the wounded, only 6.7%
died. Of the sick and injured, a mere 0.9% died63. While
Evetts had been optimistic about the proportion killed, he
had been pessimistic about the proportion missing.
The wastage rates used by the British Army during WWII
were used by the New Zealand and Canadian Armies also.
Although our concern in this chapter is with how well the
rates worked for the British, we should look briefly at how
well the rates worked for the New Zealanders and Canadians,
especially as the latter rejected the British rates after
Normandy.
Unlike the Canadians, the New Zealanders used the War
Office rates throughout the war. As from ist January 1943
New Zealand forces in North Africa used on a provisional
basis the revised wastage rates proposed by Evetts (with a
dead loss ratio of 55%). Thus in Tunisia New Zealand forces
used the Evetts rates despite the fact that they were not
issued until after the campaign. In the period 22nd
November 1942 to 13th May 1943 (i. e. the last six months of
the North African campaign), 2nd NZ Expeditionary Force had
113 Quiet days, 42 Normal days and a mere 17 Intense days.
These figures are very interesting given that New Zealand
63 Administrative History of 21" Army Group, Appendix M.
247
forces were nearly always in the van of the fighting. On
6th May 1943 HQ 2NZEF wrote to GHQ MEF "that the revised WO
Wastage tables provide a good basis for the calculation of
estimated wastage by arms and that the revisions made
appear to have taken care of the obvious defects in the old
tables (e. g, Arty 64 and Inf Officers) "" As 2NZEF was
infantry "heavy" as well as almost always in the thick of
things, this was an important compliment to the Evetts
rates. Despite this compliment, AG Stats did not relax its
vigilance for a moment. Although it could not have been of
more than academic interest, on 6th August 1943 AG Stats
brought to the attention of AG Co-ord discrepancies between
the War Office wastage rates and New Zealand casualties in
North Africa in the period June to August 1942 i. e. more
than a year before. Wastage in active periods was higher
than the Intense rates; in quiet periods it was lower than
the Normal rates. The rate for Armour was much less than
the War Office rate; rates for Infantry, Engineers and
Signals were much more than the War Office rates. The
proportion of wounded returning to duty was higher than the
. War Office estimate 65
From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1942 the
Canadians used their own wastage rates (which were slightly
different from the War office rates) before voluntarily
adopting the War Office rates. In the late summer of 1944,
after Normandy, the Canadians stopped using the War Office
rates and started using their own rates (which were very
different from the War Office rates). Since the war,
certain Canadian (and subsequently American) historians
have criticised the War Office rates as being misleading
and inadequate.
64 Copy of letter in AG Stats branch memorandum on NZ casualties.
65 AG Stats file 117.
248
Assertions by Burns66 and Stacey67 that the War Office
rates were derived from or based on North African
(specifically Western Desert) experience and thus
inapplicable to European conditions (in that they
understated infantry casualties and overstated casualties
to other arms) are false - demonstrably so, as this chapter
has shown. Stacey's assertions have been repeated verbatim
and given wide currency by D'Este68. As shown above, wastage
rates were remarkably consistent throughout the war. The
autumn 1939 review left the existing rates (which were
based on Western Front experience) substantially unchanged.
The autumn 1942 review appears to have ignored Western
Desert experience. It certainly left the existing rates
substantially unchanged. Churchill's minute of 3rd May 1943
pointing to a disparity between infantry casualties
sustained in Tunisia and infantry reinforcements sent from
the UK was quoted by Burns, who remarked that it "makes it
the less comprehensible that the War Office should have
taken so long to change its figures i69. Burns was clearly
unaware that at the end of the Tunisian campaign, the
wastage rate for infantry officers and the WE of infantry
battalions were both increased: the former coincidentally,
the result of the autumn 1942 review of rates; the latter
in response to heavy infantry casualties in Tunisia.
The Canadian all-arms wastage rate in Italy varied
between 6.2% (December 1943) and 0.3% (September 1943) per
month. The Canadian rate was sometimes higher than the
British rate because the figures were distorted by the fact
that the Canadians had less LOC troops in Italy than the
66 Manpower in the Canadian Army, P90.
67 The Victory Campaign, P284.
68 Decision in Normandy, PP255-7.
69 Burns, PP 179-80.
249
British: LOC troops not normally being subjected to attack
and therefore not normally suffering casualties70.
On 6th November 1943 the Canadian Military HQ in London
asked DSD about wastage in AA units, trying to
differentiate between those in the field and those in the
rear. DSD replied on 15th November but was unable to help.
On 23rd May 1944 CMHQ sought clarification on three points
to do with wastage (i. e. the rates include all casualties,
both battle and non-battle; 50% of casualties will recover;
recovered wounded will return in 4-6 months) and asked one
question (about the proportion of recovered wounded who
will return to combat duty). On 9th June DSD confirmed
without comment the three points raised. AMD2 (Stats) had
no figures to answer the question posed but suggested that
78% of recovered wounded would return to combat duty and
that 22% would be fit only for less strenuous duty on the
basis of WWI figures71. It is surprising that AMD2 (Stats)
had no figures to hand. It suggests that no one had raised
the matter before. Despite this correspondence, there is no
evidence that the Evetts rates were ever amended to reflect
the fact that not all recovered wounded would be fit enough
to return to combat (although, as we have seen, War Office
casualty forecasts were so amended eventually) Why not?
Some would no doubt say War Office complacency or
incompetence. The most likely explanation however is that
there was no real need, given the generally pessimistic
nature of the Evetts rates.
In both relative and absolute terms, Canadian infantry
casualties in Normandy were higher than British infantry
casualties. In Normandy only 56% of British casualties were
infantry72 compared to 76% of Canadian casualties. The
70 AG Stats branch memorandum.
71 W032/10201.
'2 W032/11172.
250
Canadian figure73 reflected the following. Much of the
Canadian Army's armour and artillery during the last and
most costly phase of the campaign was provided and manned by the British and Poles. The Canadians had a very large
"tail", which, as one might expect, was not subjected to
direct attack and suffered hardly any casualties. Canadian
infantry units were inadequately led, trained and supported by other arms. Given that much of its armour and artillery
was non-Canadian during the most costly phase of the
campaign; that it had a very large "tail"; and that its
infantry units were inadequately led, trained and
supported, it was only natural that most of the Canadian
Army's casualties in Normandy were infantry and very few
were armour, artillery or "tail". In the period 6th June to
ist October 1944 (from D-Day to the eve of the Scheldt
campaign) the two Canadian infantry divisions in NW Europe
lost 8,211 and 9,263 men whereas in the same period no
British infantry division lost more than 7,605 men74 - despite the fact that one of the Canadian divisions had
missed the first month of the campaign. While it is true
that Canadian divisions enjoyed fewer rest periods than
British divisions, Canadian divisions were given tasks no
harder and sometimes easier than British divisions and they
were frequently assisted in those tasks by British and
Polish divisions. The conclusion is inescapable that the
disparity in casualties between British and Canadian
infantry divisions reflects the fact that - despite the
many shortcomings of the British Army - British infantry
divisions were better led, trained and supported than
Canadian. The training and all-arms co-operation of the
Canadian Army in NW Europe has been criticised by many
Canadian historians of the war. As has its leadership,
although none can agree about the level at which the fault
73 Stacey, The Victory Campaign, P284.
74 Montgomery, Memoirs, PP309-10.
251
lay. Stacey blamed company and battalion commanders;
English has blamed the army commander 75 Greenhous has
blamed the corps commander76.
At the end of August the Canadians stopped using the War
Office rates and started using rates of their own devising.
Henceforth, the Intense and Normal rates for armour,
artillery and service corps used by the Canadians were much
lower than the rates used by the British; while the Intense
and Normal rates for infantry used by the Canadians were
much higher than the rates used by the British
(interestingly, the Canadians saw no need to change the
Quiet rates). The new Canadian Intense rate for infantry
(45% for Officers and 30% for ORs) was four fifths higher
for Officers and a half higher for ORs than the rate used
by the British. There was in fact no reason to change. The
Canadians overreacted to a "blip" and were soon to discover
the practical implications of taking "blips" as the norm.
The new infantry wastage rates used by the Canadians led to
a vast overestimation of infantry casualties - and
therefore of infantry reinforcements needed - and
ultimately to a conscription crisis in Canada. Taking into
account the long quiet periods as well as the short intense
periods, the infantry wastage experienced by the Canadians
in Italy and NW Europe was not very high. In fact, in NW
Europe 1944/45 Canadian infantry casualties averaged 13.64%
of infantry strength per month while in Italy 1944 they
averaged only 6.75% per month". If Canadian infantry
casualties in the three worst months of the Italian
campaign are added to Canadian infantry casualties in the
three worst months of the NW Europe campaign (not the same
months it should be noted: we are creating a hypothetical
75 English, A Study of Failure in High Command.
76 Review of Graham's The Price of Command, Canadian Defence Quarterly, Dec. 1993, P38-40.
77 Extrapolated from Burns, P163.
252
worse-case scenario), they come to 24,613: massively less
than predicted by the new Canadian rates adopted after
Normandy and only marginally more than predicted by the War
Office rates78. Even if non-battle casualties were to be
added to this figure, the picture would not be altered
significantly. As events after Normandy showed, the
Canadian rates were excessive and the rejection of the War
Office rates by the Canadians at the end of the Normandy
campaign was, although understandable, an unnecessary
overreaction.
In this chapter we have examined in detail the battle
wastage suffered by the British Army in WWII. In
particular, we have examined in detail the wastage rates
used by the British Army in WWII to predict battle wastage
and thus reinforcement needs, ascertaining how the rates
were determined and how they were reviewed, what flaws they
contained, what amendments were made to them and how well
they operated in the various theatres. What conclusions may
we draw from this examination?
WWII wastage rates were derived essentially from WWI
experience. They remained remarkably consistent, being
reviewed only twice during the war. The North African
campaign (contrary to what has been asserted) seems to have
influenced the rates marginally, if at all. The rates were
not perfect; nor were they incapable of improvement.
However, apart from some short periods of exceptionally
heavy fighting, on the whole they operated well; usually
they erred on the side of caution. Most importantly, the
wastage rates used by the British Army in the period 1943-
45 did not consistently underestimate infantry casualties
(as has been asserted). The wastage rate for infantry other
ranks in heavy fighting was not amended throughout the war,
despite the two reviews, which would be truly astonishing
78 Ibid, P91.
253
if the rate had been inaccurate. The rate was not based on
WWII experience but pre-dated the war. When it was reviewed
in the autumn of 1939, it was shown to be the same as the
casualty rate during the campaign on the Western Front
(specifically the Battle of the Somme), in which the
British Army had sustained massive infantry casualties.
When the rate was reviewed in the autumn of 1942 by Evetts,
he left it unchanged (he did however raise the rate for
infantry officers in heavy fighting). Whatever we may think
about the wisdom of basing wastage rates in one war on the
experience of a previous and very different war, we can
only conclude that, as it equalled the casualty rate on the
Somme, the wastage rate for infantrymen used by the British
Army in the period 1943-45 was not inadequate. The
explanation for the infantry shortage must lie elsewhere.
254
CHAPTER 7. CONSCRIPTION.
This chapter examines conscription, that is compulsory
military service, in Britain during the war. Conscription
was actually called National Service and conscripts were
actually called National Servicemen. Conscription was introduced on the outbreak of the war and during the war
millions of men were conscripted into the Forces.
Volunteering was still permitted, indeed it was encouraged,
but the great bulk of the intake into the Army during the
war - about three quarters, as Table XXI shows - was
conscript. In this chapter we will seek to discover the
answers to two questions: How thorough was conscription in
Britain during the war? Did the Army get its fair share of
conscripts, both qualitatively as well as quantitatively?
The answers to these questions will help us to answer the
larger question: Given that conscription was introduced on
the outbreak of war and that during the war millions of men
were conscripted into the Army, why did the Army experience
a manpower crisis in September 1944?
The introduction of conscription on the outbreak of the
Second World War was a conscious reaction to the unhappy
experience of the Great War'. Prior to the Great War, in
Britain - almost uniquely among the Great Powers -
recruitment to the Army had always been voluntary: there
had never been conscription and many were opposed to it.
Consequently, the peacetime system of voluntary recruitment
was maintained, and the introduction of conscription was
delayed, until the middle of the Great War. At first, in an
outburst of patriotic fervour, voluntary recruitment
produced too many men for the Army, far too many to train
and equip properly; later, as the war dragged on,
1 Simkins, Kitchener's Army, PP49-78,104-62; Beckett and Simpson, A Nation in Arms, PP1-36; Taylor,
English History 1914-1945, PP47-9,67,85-9; Perry, The Commonwealth Armies, PP7-19.
255
casualties mounted and a cynical reaction set in, it
produced too few men for the Army, far too few to replace
casualties; finally, in order to maintain the forces in the
field conscription was resorted to. The British experience
during the Great War was thus excessive voluntary
recruitment (which not only swamped the Army but also
crippled Munitions, many of those who rushed to join the
colours being industrial workers) followed by inadequate
voluntary recruitment followed by the introduction of
conscription.
There is no doubt that, compared to the British
experience during the Great War, in Britain during the
Second World War the mobilization of manpower for the
Forces was much more orderly. It was also much more
harmonious. Whereas conscription was a subject of
increasingly heated debate in Britain during the Great War,
during the Second World War it was an accomplished fact.
When the Army's manpower crisis arose in September 1944, as
conscription had been in force for five years, there was no
pool of "cowards" and "shirkers" at home, as there was
widely believed to be in Britain during the Great War. In
Britain during the Great War, prior to the introduction of
conscription, young men not in the Forces were regarded
initially with scorn and then with hostility. It became
common for young men not in uniform to be accosted in the
street and handed white feathers by young women. The
introduction of conscription in Britain at the beginning of
the Second World War meant that no one would have genuine
cause to call young men not in the Forces "cowards" and
"shirkers".
Conscription was actually introduced in a limited form
before the outbreak of war. Following the German occupation
of Prague in March 1939, it was belatedly accepted that
Britain would have to send an army to the Continent on the
outbreak of war, as in August 1914. Although it was
256
intended to introduce conscription on the outbreak of war,
this would not of course bear fruit for some time
afterwards. Therefore the Government decided to introduce
immediately a measure of compulsory training in the Armed
Forces. This was announced by Chamberlain in the House of
Commons on 26th April 1939 and exactly a month later the
Military Training Act became law2. The Act, which was to
continue in force for 3 years, placed a liability on all
men who were at the time between the ages of 20 and 21 and
those who subsequently reached the age of 20 to 4 years'
military service with a continuous period of 6 months full
time training with the Forces within a year of the date of
their registration. The longer the war was postponed, the
greater would be the number of trained men immediately
available for call-up on the outbreak of war3. On 3rd June
1939 the first and, as it happened, only registration of
men under the Act took place: amounting to over 240,000
men4. On 15th July the first and, as it happened, only
intake of "Militiamen", as those conscripted under the Act
were called, joined the Army: amounting to almost 35,000
men. These men were of excellent quality and many later
became officers and NCOs5.
Although superseded by the National Service Act on the
outbreak of war, the Military Training Act was of
importance in that it imposed conscription in peacetime for
the first time in Britain; provided an opportunity for
manpower planning in the allotment of intakes and exposed
the problems involved; and brought into close contact the
staffs of the War Office and the Ministry of Labour. The
Ministry of Labour was responsible for registration,
' Hansard, Vol. 346, Cols. 1150-3.
3 Parker, Manpower, P54.
' Ibid, PP55 and 488.
Pigott, Manpower Problems, PP7-8 and 10.
257
medical examination, the issue of enlistment notices and for the setting up of tribunals to deal with pleas of
conscientious objection and of hardship. Registration was
carried out at employment exchanges while medical
examinations were conducted at centres set up for the
purpose. Medical boards were appointed by the Ministry of Labour and a code of medical gradings drawn up in
consultation with the Services. The machinery set up to
administer the Military Training Act was in fact the basis
of the machinery set up to administer National Service, for
which it served as a useful trial. When the war began,
premises had been acquired, medical boards appointed and the staffs of the War Office and Ministry of Labour had got
used to working together6. The machinery therefore adapted
easily and quickly when National Service was introduced on the outbreak of war and the Ministry of Labour - renamed
the Ministry of Labour and National Service - was made
responsible for it7.
On the outbreak of war, four Acts were passed which gave
the Government control of manpower: the National Service
(Armed Forces) Act; the Military and Air Forces
(Prolongation of Service) Act; the National Registration
Act; the Armed Forces (Conditions of Service) Act.
The Military and Air Forces (Prolongation of Service)
Act laid down that all those who had entered the Services
before the war would have to continue to serve for the
duration of the war, irrespective of the terms of their
original enlistment. The Armed Forces (Conditions of
Service) Act modified peacetime conditions of service. It
permitted indefinite "emergency" enlistments instead of the
fixed "normal" enlistments laid down in the Army Act etc.
While fixed enlistments were never completely suspended,
the very great majority of voluntary enlistments during the
6 Ibid, P7.
7 Ministry of National Service Order, 1939, SR &0 1939, No. 1118.
258
war were for "the duration of the present emergency" i. e. indefinite. It also authorized compulsory transfer between
Corps, irrespective of the wishes of the individuals
concerned8. The National Registration Act established an
on-going register of all persons in the United Kingdom, an
essential prerequisite for the mobilization of the nation's
manpower.
The most significant of the Acts was the National
Service (Armed Forces) Act, which was rushed into law on 3rd September 1939, the day war was declared9. As with the
Military Training Act, the National Service Act did not
apply to Northern Ireland. Authority was given for Royal
Proclamations imposing a liability for indefinite service
with the Armed Forces on men in any age group between 18
and 41. This obligation applied generally to all male
British subjects resident in the country at the date at
which the Proclamation relating to their group was made, or
who subsequently entered the country. British subjects not
ordinarily resident in Britain were not liable to be called
up until they had been in Britain for at least 2 years and
not at all so long as they were in this country only for a
temporary purpose. Apart from ministers of religion no
classes were statutorily exempted in virtue of their
occupations, but provision was made for the registration of
conscientious objectors and the postponement of the call-up
of individiials on grounds of exceptional hardship. After
their period of service, as with the Military Training Act,
men were given the right of reinstatement with their
previous employers, who had to take back applicants unless
they could show that changed circumstances made this
unreasonable or impracticablelo.
8 Pigott, P 12.
93&4 Geo. 6, c. 22.
10 Parker, P55. 259
Although a Schedule of Reserved Occupations - specifying jobs which were considered to be of national importance and from which men would not normally be taken by the Forces in
the event of war - was already in existence, its provisions
were disregarded when men were called up under the Military
Training Act. It was apparently intended that the
provisions of the Schedule would be applied after
completion of the initial 6 month training period when Scheduled men would only be available for corresponding
trades in the Army or, perhaps, not available at all". The
early start of the war prevented this being applied.
On the same day as the National Service Act was passed,
the Schedule of Reserved Occupations came into operation.
This listed the occupations considered vital to the war
effort, primarily those involved in the manufacture of
munitions. As a rule, men of a specified age in such
occupations would be reserved i. e. retained and would not
be called up to the Forces under the National Service Act12.
The Schedule was not an Act of Parliament and could
therefore be easily amended as circumstances changed. It
was intended to prevent the indiscriminate calling up of
industrial workers whose loss would adversely affect
munitions production. The corollary to this was a careful
control of voluntary enlistment, which remained open to
those age groups not required to register by Royal
Proclamation. It would have been nonsensical to have
stopped men in a particular industry and of a particular
age from being called up to the Forces while at the same
time allowing men in the same industry but of a different
age to join the Forces voluntarily. Every application for
voluntary enlistment - except, until mid 1943, those few
' Manpower (Technical) Committee of the Cabinet NS(T)21 of 10`h May, NS(T)22 of 19`h May and NS(T) 4`h Mtg of 25`h May 1939.
12 Parker, PP55-6.
260
applications for a "normal" enlistment - was therefore
scrutinised at the recruiting centre by an official from
the Ministry of Labour and National Service who decided
whether the man might be enlisted or not, considering his
age and occupation. In certain circumstances, the Schedule
could be waived, and disputed cases could be referred to a
"Waiver Committee", whose decision was final.
The Schedule underwent many changes. In its original
form it provided for block reservations, which
automatically kept out of the Services men of certain ages
in certain occupations, irrespective of the exact work
which the individual might be doing. This had the
outstanding merit of preventing in the first days of the
war the indiscriminate loss of skilled men from industry,
but in one sense it achieved too much. Firms were therefore
divided into "protected" and "unprotected" according to the
work they were doing, and in certain trades the age of
reservation for men in "protected" firms was lower than
that for men in the "unprotected". But from the beginning
of 1942 the system of block reservation was gradually
replaced by that of individual deferment, and outside
certain special occupations more and more men became liable
to call-up by withdrawal of block reservation, unless the
employer could prove to one of the District Manpower
Boards, which were now set up, the necessity for deferment.
By reason of these changes it often happened that a man was
refused permission to enlist voluntarily and was later
called-up for service, which caused no little
heartburning'3.
In February 1941, because of considerable misgivings
about the manpower demands of the Army, the War Cabinet
invited Margesson, the Secretary of State for War, and
Bevin, the Minister of Labour and National Service, to
confer together and work out a plan for future intake into
13 Pigott, PP12-13,21.
261
the Army. But before they had gone far Churchill himself
reached the conclusion that a firm and absolute figure
should be determined within which the Army would have to
make its plans and dispositions 14. He realised that many of
the misunderstandings that had arisen about the expansion
of the Army had been due to the practice of calculating its
requirements on the basis of the number of fighting
divisions that could be put into the field, and omitting to
make provision for the numbers that would be needed for
lines of communication, training units and specialist
activities. He proposed that in future the military
authorities should be given a net entitlement for all
purposes of about 2 million men. It would then be for them
to make the best use of this material "by wise economies,
by thrifty and ingenious use of manpower, by altering
establishments to fit resources".
The new principle had two merits. It brought the future
requirements of the Army within measurable reach of current
calling-up plans, and it compelled the War Office to work
to a target.
The ceiling chosen was however far too low - as became
apparent almost immediately. Following Churchill's
directive the approved Army ceiling was fixed at
2,195,00015. While the Ministry of Labour was in progress of
making its plans for manpower distribution on this basis,
Bevin was in July 1941 compelled to agree that it should be
raised by 21,800 to 2,216,800 to meet the calls on the War
Office to find troops for fire-watching in the Western
ports and for the protection of aerodromes. Additional
items, however small, were an embarrassment to those who
were responsible for planning the distribution of manpower,
1' War Cabinet minute WM(41)20`h Mtg. Item 6 of 24`h February 1941: CAB65 and paper WP(41)69 of 26`x' March 1941: CAB66/15.
15 War Cabinet paper WP(41)69: CAB66/15.
262
and Bevin asked - and was given an assurance - that in
future he should be brought into consultation before new
manpower demands were authorised by the Government16. Hardly
had this decision been taken when Churchill was informed
that after a detailed examination of its establishments the
War Office was of the opinion that it would be unable to
carry out its full commitments without some addition to the
numbers it was authorised to recruit. He therefore invited
Anderson, the Lord President of the Council, in
consultation with the responsible Ministers to examine the
War Office's claim s7. This was for an additional 323,000 men
to be found by mid 1942. After protracted discussions and
reference to Churchill of certain undetermined issues,
general agreement was reached late in September 1941 on an
increase of 158,00018. The authorised ceiling for the Army
had thus become 2,374,800. As we shall see in Chapter 8,
the Army got the ceiling reviewed in June 1942 and it was
gradually increased thereafter.
By the spring of 1941 it was clear that the Police, Fire
and Civil Defence Services could not be sustained without
compulsion. Accordingly, in April 1941 an additional
National Service Act was passed under which men could be
conscripted into these Services. The men conscripted into
these Services were thereby denied to the Forces. Excluding
part-timers, in the autumn of 1944 there were 217,000 men
employed in these Services19. Naturally, given the demanding
16 War Cabinet paper WP(G)(41)68 of 16`x' July 1941: CAB66 and minute WM(41)71S` Mtg. Item 6 of 17`h July 1941: CAB65.
17 Manpower Priority Sub-Committee paper NS(MPP)(41)41 of 30`'' September 1941 and PM file 55
(Army - Manpower etc. June 1940-July 1945), PM's personal minute M776/1 of 270' July 1941:
PREM3/55.
18 War Cabinet paper WP(41)257 Para 9: CAB66/19 and Cabinet Office file CAB/HIST/M/117/1/2,
Army Manpower, Note by Lord President of 19`h September 1941, and Army Manpower, Note of meeting held at War Cabinet Offices on 23 ̀d September 1941.
19 CSO, Statistical Digest of the War, Tables 16-7, PP14-5.
263
nature of their duties, most of these men - in what we now
call the Emergency Services - had to be young and fit.
By the autumn of 1941 it was clear that the manpower
demands of the Armed Forces could no longer be met without
drastic changes to existing policies20. The Ministry of
Labour and National Service proposed that the scope of the
Schedule of Reserved Occupations be narrowed considerably21.
Anderson believed that if the blow were not softened in
some way such a change would have a disastrous effect on
industry. He therefore proposed that it be accompanied by a
considerable widening of the scope of National Service.
While changes to the Schedule could be done
administratively, changes to National Service required
legislation. He therefore placed a memorandum before the
War Cabinet. The memorandum proposed the call up to the
Forces of men under the age of 19; the extension of
National Service, be it in the military or in industry, to
all persons, male and female, between the ages of 18 and
60; and the conscription of women into the Auxiliary
Service S22.
Of these recommendations the most difficult proved to be
the proposed conscription of women for the Auxiliary
Services, which was strenuously opposed at first. Among the
younger classes which would be required to register there
would be many who would be quite unsuited to life in the
Services and it would be altogether wrong, it was argued,
to force them to join up. After prolonged discussion the
War Cabinet eventually agreed that there was no other
practical means of obtaining sufficient recruits for the
Women's Services and authorised the introduction of the
necessary legislation with the following safeguards.
20 Manpower Priority Sub-Committee papers NS(MPP)(41)41 of 30`h September 1941 and NS(MPP)(41)42 of 6`" October 1941.
21 Manpower Priority Sub-Committee paper NS(MPP)(41)41 of 30th September 1941.
22 War Cabinet paper WP(41)257 Paras 9 and 12 of 7`h November 1941: CAB66/19.
264
Conscription would not apply to married women; no woman
would be posted to a combatant service except as a
volunteer; and the same facilities for obtaining
postponement and deferment and for considering
conscientious objections as were available for men would
also be available for women. It was further resolved that,
when the clauses in the Bill dealing with compulsory
recruitment of women were being considered in Parliament,
it should be made clear that the present intention of the
Government was to proclaim only the age groups between 20
and 30, and that when women were called up they should be
given a choice between the Auxiliary Services, Civil
Defence and certain specified jobs in industry.
At the same time the War Cabinet accepted the other
proposals contained in the memorandum. National Service
obligations would be placed upon all men and women between
the ages of 18 and 60, although the upper age of
conscription for men for the Forces would be set at 51.
Henceforth men would be called up to the Forces at 18.5
instead of at 19. The War Cabinet also endorsed the change
proposed to the Schedule: its shelter would be withdrawn by
stages and in future deferment on the merits of the job
would be the only protection against enlistment. Lastly,
the direction of women into industry would be more
vigorously applied and a serious attempt would be made to
draw a large number of married women into work of national
importance23. These decisions of the War Cabinet were
embodied in the National Service (No. 2) Act which became
law on 18th December 194124.
Because of manpower shortages in the coalmines, from
September 1942 those registered under the National Service
23 War Cabinet Defence Committee (Supply) minute DC(S)(41) 13`x' Mtg. of 4`h November 1941, and for PM's views, War Cabinet paper WP(41)258 of 6thNovember 1941: CAB66/19, also War Cabinet minute WM(41) 110th Mtg. Item 1 of l 0thNovember 1941: CAB65.
24 5 and 6 Geo. 6, c. 4.
265
Acts were given the option of working in the mines instead
of serving in the Forces. The results were disappointing
and in late 1943 work in the mines was made compulsory.
Under the Ballot Scheme (commonly known as the "Bevin Boys'
Scheme"), which commenced in December 1943, those
registered under the National Service Acts were balloted
and the lucky or unlucky (according to viewpoint) ones were
ordered down the mines. The 21,800 fit young men ordered
down the mines under the Ballot Scheme25 were thereby denied
to the Forces during a crucial part of the war.
At this point it might be helpful to outline the
mechanism whereby men were conscripted into the Forces. It
was a three-stage process. First, all those of military age
i. e. 18 to 41 were called upon to register for military
service. This was done in groups, according to age. By the
end of 1941 all men then of military age had been
registered. At registration the man could state a
preference for a particular Service and be provisionally
registered as a conscientious objector. At registration
certain categories of men, such as cripples and merchant
seamen, were identified. Second, those who had been
registered and who it had been decided to call-up into the
Forces were sent an "order to report for medical
examination", commonly known as a call-up notice. Call-up
notices were not sent to those retained in industry or
cripples. At the medical examination postponement on the
grounds of hardship could be applied for. Three, providing
the man had been passed as fit for military service at his
medical examination, he was sent an order to report to one
of the Services, usually the one he had stated a preference
for. Figures for registrations under the Military Training
and National Service Acts in the period June 1939 to June
1945 are given in Table XXIII while figures for medical
25 Ministry of Labour and National Service Report, Cmd. 7225, P77.
266
examinations under those Acts in the period June 1939 to
July 1945 are given in Table XXII.
Despite the introduction of conscription on the outbreak
of war, during the war volunteering was permitted, indeed
encouraged. As Table XXI shows, during the war over a fifth
of the intake into the Army was volunteer: a total of 650,400 men. The peak period for volunteering was 1939-40.
Indeed, in an outburst of patriotic fervour, during the
first months of the war more men joined the Army by
volunteering than by being conscripted. Given the existence
of conscription from the first day, two questions spring to
mind: Why was volunteering permitted, indeed encouraged?
Why did so many men volunteer rather than wait to be
conscripted?
Investigation showed that during the war over 200,000
men were called to register for military service but failed
to do so because they had already joined the Forces26. It is
impossible to say how many of these men had joined the
Forces before being called to register and how many had
joined upon being called to register. All we can say is
that some anticipated their being called and decided to
volunteer themselves rather than wait to be called while
some, upon being called, decided that they would go to the
recruiting offices and inscribe themselves as volunteers.
Either way, they thus obtained, for what it was worth, the
credit of volunteering and, what was apt to be really more
valuable, a choice of the Service or Corps in which they
should serve, providing their physical and mental
endowments were adequate.
The Air Force or the Navy was the first choice of many
young men. The flying or aircrew portion of the Air Force
had a tremendous appeal to adventurous youth, and the whole
service gained prestige from the feats of the "Few" and the
"Dambusters". Airmen were generally better treated in
26 Parker, P 15 1.
267
matters of pay, clothing, accommodation and amenities than
soldiers. The airman's uniform was much more attractive than the soldier's27. Air Force operations received more
publicity and more decorations than Army operations,
relatively speaking28. The Navy was also more popular with
volunteers than the Army, and perhaps even more with young
men brought up in inland localities than those from the
coasts.
It is very probable that some of the popularity of the
Air Force and Navy with these volunteers whose patriotism had been stimulated by either the imminence or the
actuality of their being called to register was due to the
general impression that either would be better than the
Army, where there was a big chance of being drafted into
the infantry which, according to the lore passed on by
veterans of the First World War29, and in fact, suffered the
heaviest casualties and had to endure the greatest
hardships. It would not be surprising if among a generation
of young men brought up during the inter-war years when
pacifism was a ruling philosophy in certain quarters 30 f
there were a good many who decided that if their country
needed their services, and left them the choice, it would
be sensible to serve in a capacity which would give them
the best conditions, and the best chance of survival. A
reluctance to serve in the infantry was not confined to
those who volunteered for the Air Force or Navy. It was
also shared by many of those who volunteered for the Army.
As noted previously, providing they had the physical and
mental equipment required, volunteers to the Army - whether
'' Lindsay, So Few Got Through, P241.
28 Ibid, P253.
29 Meddemmen: IWM Sound Archive no. 004764/05, reel 1; Wakeling, The Lonely War, P7.
30 Howard, Studies in War and Peace, P10; Orwell, Collected Essays, Journalism and Letters, Vol. 1, P589.
268
before or after the creation of the General Service Corps
in mid 1942 - could serve in the Corps of their choice and
many chose Corps other than the infantry, for the reasons
given above. In an article sanctioned by the War Office in
late 1944, the unpopularity of the infantry on the outbreak
of war and the consequence of that unpopularity were
vividly expressed: "At that time the Infantry was the
Cinderella of the army. For twenty years a public that
remembered Passchendaele had been accustomed to think of the PBI as the victims, not the arbiters, of war; a kind of helpless sheep sent to the slaughter. This magnified the
tendency of a mechanical generation in 1939 to opt for the
RAF, the RAC or the Artillery. Walking behind the guns to
be killed was thought of as a job which any fool could do"31.
It is not possible to determine the correlation between
the calling of men to register and those who, after being
called, volunteered. That many men chose to volunteer after
being called to register, however, there is little doubt.
As Table XXI shows, 22% of the Army's intake during the
war was volunteer i. e. not conscript, not direct officer
intake. For the Royal Navy the proportion was almost double
(40%). For the Royal Air Force it was more than double
(49%). Although the total intake into the RAF was much
smaller than that into the Army, the number of volunteers
who joined the RAF was not very far short of the number of
volunteers who joined the Army. Indeed, unlike the Army and
the RN, during the war more men joined the RAF by
volunteering than by being conscripted; up to the end of
1940 substantially more joined the RAF voluntarily than
were conscripted into it32. During the war there was never a
lack of men wanting to join the RAF. The RAF had to operate
31 Bryant, The New Infantryman.
32 Parker. Table IV (Part A), P485.
269
a waiting list of those wanting to fly (the Deferred List):
which totalled 47,500 in mid 194233. In addition to the more than half a million men who joined the RAF voluntarily,
most of the almost half a million men who were conscripted into the RAF were volunteers in the sense that upon
registration they had stated a preference to join the RAF.
When a man registered for military service, he was "invited to state his preference for any one of the three
Services and he was told that, although no guarantee could be given, his choice would wherever possible be
respected//34. Note the word any. In fact, while the right to
state a preference for the Air Force or Navy was made known
to those called upon to register, the right to state a
preference for the Army was not. The leaflet issued by the
Ministry of Labour and National Service to those called
upon to register only mentioned the stating of a preference
for the Air Force or Navy: "Section 4. Preference for Naval
or Air Force Service. Men who have a preference for Naval
or Air Force Service may notify this fact when they apply
for registration i35. One can only conclude that it was
thought by the Ministry that no one, or very few, would
want to state a preference for the Army. Whatever the
thinking, it is clear that no one was invited by the
Ministry to do so.
The policy of inviting and honouring as far as possible
preferences inevitably discriminated against and worked to
the detriment of the least popular Service: the Army.
Between the wars the Army had been unpopular and
consequently had had a poor recruiting record. According to
Carver, this was because of: poor pay; pacifism and anti-
militarism; the Army's Blimpish image. "Only the Royal Air
33 Ibid, P174.
' Ibid, P151.
35 National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939: Explanatory Note: NL2.
270
Force, the Royal Tank Corps and the Royal Army Service
Corps in the army, and the Fleet Air Arm and the submarines in the navy seemed to have moved with the timesi36. Whilst
pacifism and anti-militarism disappeared almost completely
on the outbreak of war, poor pay and the Army's
unflattering image did not. The Army's performance during
the early years of the war did nothing to improve its
image.
Pigott writes persuasively of the reasons for, and the
results of, the Army's unpopularity during the war: "Throughout the war there were always more men who
preferred the Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force than
either of those Services could absorb, with the very
natural result that those Services chose the men whom they
wanted and left the rest to be turned over to the Army.
There were plenty of reasons for the Army's lack of
popularity. Up to the victory of Alamein, the Army seemed
to have failed everywhere: in Flanders, in Crete, in
Greece, in Norway, in Malaya there appeared to have been
nothing but disaster: the brilliance of Lord Wavell's
victories in Africa seemed to the public to die away in the
gloom of the fall of Tobruk and Rommel's advance into
Egypt. For a long time in the estimation of the Press and
public the Army stood far below the other Services. The
triumphs of the First and Eighth Armies in Africa and
Sicily were dimmed by the long agony of Cassino: while the
final triumph in Europe came so swiftly that there was
scarcely time for the changed attitude of the public to be
reflected in the choices of those called up. It is scarcely
to be disputed that the Army never received so large a
proportion of the highest grade men in intakes as did the
Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force. The only method of
correcting this would have been to have carried out a job
analysis of each Service, to have applied selection testing
36 Carver, The Seven Ages of the British Army, P229.
271
to intakes before allotment to the different Services, and to have distributed the various grades in each intake on a
scientific allotment between the Services, giving to no Service any opportunity of selecting its entrants. This
would in effect have abrogated all latitude of choice to
the individual. The British people are by tradition
tenacious of individual choice and perhaps scarcely yet
understand how ruthless conscription must be to achieve the
most economic results. Perhaps it is well that some liberty
of choice should remain, but it is also well to recognize
the cost of that libertyi37.
Although both the RAF and the RN were more popular with
those registering than the Army, the RAF was in a class of
its own when it came to popularity. During the war a large
proportion - often a third, sometimes more - of each group
registered expressed a preference for the RAF. For example,
in the registrations of November 1940 and January 1941
almost two fifths expressed a preference for the RAF. In
the registration of February 1941 almost half expressed a
preference for the RAF38.
The 2nd National Service Act of December 1941, while
continuing to allow conscripts to state a preference, gave
authority to the Minister of Labour and National Service to
effect the compulsory transfer of men between the Services.
This was to be of help to the Army when it ran into severe
manpower difficulties during the final year of the war, as
it enabled substantial numbers of men to be transferred
from the RN and the RAF to the Army. The transfer was of
course unpopular with the RAF and the RN as well as with
the men themselves, who disliked becoming new boys, but the
supply of manpower was so meagre that there was no other
37 Pigott, P20.
38 Parker, Table VI, PP488-90.
272
way of sustaining the Army's strength and thus its
operations on the Continent39.
There is no doubt that there were reasons (to do with morale and discipline) for allowing conscripts to state a
preference and for generally honouring those stated
preferences. However, there is also no doubt that allowing
conscripts to state a preference and generally honouring
those stated preferences discriminated against and worked to the detriment of the Army. It is not surprising that men
were reluctant to state a preference for a Service which,
rightly or wrongly, was regarded as unglamorous, disaster-prone, old-fashioned and dangerous. This was
especially unfortunate as the Army happened to be the most
manpower intensive Service and the Service which had the
highest manpower wastage. The consequences of trying to
mitigate the effects of conscription by maintaining an
element of choice are plain to see. In 1942, for example,
deducting those declaring a conscientious objection, those
expressing a preference for the RAF, or RN, or Royal
Marines, and those not available for general posting (such
as merchant seamen and cripples), out of the 399,103 men
registered only 133,536 - around 11,000 a month and only a
third of those registered - were available for general
posting, including posting to the Army40. And of these, a
proportion would be subsequently judged unfit for military
service, granted postponement of call-up etc. Fortunately
for the Army, because of its predicament, in 1944 stated
preferences were largely disregarded. Nevertheless, it is
not difficult to understand the continuation, indeed
encouragement, of volunteering by the Army.
Eloquent as these statistics are, they only tell half
the story. They indicate the quantitative impact on the
Army of allowing conscripts to express a preference and
39 Pigott, P21.
40 Parker, Table VI, PP488-90. 273
honouring those preferences i. e. the numbers of men thereby
denied to the Army. They do not indicate the qualitative
impact of such a policy i. e. the quality (in terms of
mental robustness, physical fitness, motivation, intelligence etc. ) of the men thereby denied to the Army.
As we saw in Chapter 5, when discussing Personnel
Selection, the intake into the Army during the war left a lot to be desired: almost a quarter were not fully fit and
over half were below average intelligence. These
deficiencies mattered greatly because, as we have also
seen, during the war soldiers, including even infantrymen,
required a high level of expertise and initiative -a much
higher level than that required of their forebears, recent
as well as distant.
Ungerson, who writes persuasively of the high quality of
manpower required by the Army during the war, as we have
seen, writes with equal persuasion of the mediocre quality
of manpower actually received by the Army during the war:
"The relatively poor quality of manpower allotted to the
Army was an inevitable outcome of the difficult national
situation. The Army had to share the available manpower
with industry, the civil defence forces and the other
Fighting Services, especially the vastly expanded RAF. This
was bound to limit the quality of men available to the
Army, just as it limited the quantity. This quality was
further lowered, however, by the way the share-out was
made. Broadly speaking, the governing principle was that,
except for a quota of tradesmen which met only a fraction
of the military demand, the Army's needs should be
satisfied last. Civilian reservations were fixed first. The
men then called up for the Fighting Services, and who
formed the bulk of their wartime strength, were allowed to
state a Service preference, and a large number asked to be
considered for the Royal Navy or the Royal Air Force. This
274
did not affect the Army numerically, since the other
Services could only accept quotas of the optants, but it
told qualitatively. For the Navy and the Air Force
naturally only took what seemed to them to be the best
material. Hence, the Army intakes, apart from a proportion
of volunteers and optants, consisted of men who had been
rejected by the other Services, of men who happened to be
recruited at times when the quotas for those Services had
been met, and of men who had no particular preference. It
was not surprising then, that the Army intake was only just
good enough to cope with the Army's work. This stringency
caused special difficulties at both ends of the employment
scale. The Army had to go short of recruits with experience
of mechanical trades and of leadership. At the same time,
in order to secure its numerical quota, the Army had to
accept a greater proportion than was desirable of men whose
usefulness was very doubtful"41.
It is not an exaggeration to say that during the war the
cream of Britain's manhood was taken by the RAF and the RN
and thereby denied to the Army, with predictable
consequences. This happened despite of National Service;
indeed, it happened in large part because of the way
National Service operated.
Only the following groups were exempted, excluded or
excused from being called-up under the National Service
Acts: ministers of religion, the mentally defective, the
blind, men in the Regular Forces and men in the service of
a Dominion or Colonial Government. There was however
provision for conscientious objection and the postponement
of call-up on hardship grounds42.
During the Second World War conscientious objection was
taken more seriously and handled more sympathetically than
in the Great War. Those who declared a conscientious
a' Personnel Selection, PP4-5.
42 Parker, PP 154-5.
275
objection upon registration were registered provisionally
as conscientious objectors. They were then allowed to argue
their case before Local Tribunals, from which there was a
right of appeal to an Appellate Tribunal. Given the hideous
nature of Nazism and the direct threat it posed to Britain,
very few were unwilling to take up arms. Only 59,192 men declared themselves to be conscientious objectors and of
these a mere 3,577 were registered unconditionally as such.
Of the remainder: 28,720 were registered conditionally
(i. e. prepared to do civil work); 14,691 were registered
for non-combatant duties in the Forces; and 12,204 were
rejected43. Under the National Service Act of April 1941,
conscientious objectors could be called-up for Civil
Defence. A conscientious objector who failed to comply with
the conditions on which he was registered and who was
unable to satisfy a Court that his reasons were sufficient
was liable on conviction to be fined or sent to prison44.
During the operation of the National Service Acts, on
the grounds of severe personal hardship, 317,762 first
postponements and 192,116 renewals were requested, a total
of 509,878. Of this number, 103,838 first postponements and
59,534 renewals were refused (total 163,372 or one third);
213,924 first postponements and 132,582 renewals were
granted (total 346,506 or two thirds)45. Postponements were
decided by Authorised Officers or, in disputed cases, by
Hardship Committees, from which there was a right of appeal
to an Umpire46. Although, unlike in the Great War, the
National Service Acts applied equally to single and married
men i. e. married men were not exempt from the call-up, it
is reasonable to suppose that a good many of those who were
43 Ministry of Labour and National Service Report, P25.
44 Section 5 of the National Service (Armed Forces) Acts, 1939 and 1941.
45 Ministry of Labour and National Service Report, P23.
46 Section 6 of the National Service (Armed Forces) Act, 1939.
276
granted postponement on the grounds of hardship were
married men with young children. Given the size of the
call-up during the war, the number of postponements granted
cannot be termed excessive.
No man was exempted, excused or excluded from National
Service by virtue of his occupation except clergymen.
However, as we have seen, there was during the early part
of the war a Schedule of Reserved Occupations which
automatically prevented the call-up of young men employed
on essential war work. But, as we have also seen, in the
middle of the war the automatic system of reservation was
replaced by the discretionary system of deferment, where
the onus was placed on the employer to prove that the young
man (or, following the 2nd National Service Act, young
woman) was performing work essential to the war effort.
Between January 1942 and April 1945 District Manpower
Boards dealt with 4,722,800 applications for deferment from
men and 619,400 from women. Of the applications, 4,062,400
(86%) and 364,400 (59%) were granted respectively. In other
words, 660,400 men and 255,000 women were released from the
war economy and made available for the Forces47. Given the
size of the war economy, the number of deferments granted
cannot be termed excessive.
As in the Great War, the Military Training and National
Service Acts applied only to Great Britain, not the United
Kingdom. They did not apply to the Isle of Man (although
the Isle of Man Government applied National Service of its
own volition) or to the Channel Islands (although the
Islands enforced their own version of National Service;
many serving in the Royal Jersey Militia escaped to Britain
and enlisted in the Royal Hampshire Regiment when the
Islands were invaded and occupied by the Germans, an event
47 Parker, Table IX, P497.
277
which rendered the question academic)48. Nor did they apply to Northern Ireland with its 185,000 men in their twenties
and thirties in June 193949, although many were engaged on important work like ship-building and agriculture or joined
the Forces voluntarily. The practicability of applying
conscription to Northern Ireland was considered at several Cabinet meetings. Opinion from the Northern Ireland
Government and several prominent figures in the Province
was that generally the voluntary system in use was likely
to be more effective than measures of conscription. A
committee was appointed to prepare a draft Bill but the
Cabinet deferred making a decision on the subject. The
deferment proved to be indefinite50. Undoubtedly, if
conscription had been applied to Northern Ireland, there
would have been resistance. However, it is possible that
the short-term difficulties (which were stressed) would have been outweighed by the long-term benefits (which were
not): many men from the Nationalist community, together
with many of their dependents, would have moved to Eire
(which during the war, although a member of the
Commonwealth, was neutral). As a result, Northern Ireland
would have ended the war with a much more homogeneous
population. To say this is not to deny the pro-British
feeling of many Irishmen or the fact that many Irishmen
joined the British Armed Forces or came to work in Britain.
Apart from Eire, the entire Empire entered the war on
Britain's side and each Dominion and Colony raised its own
forces to fight alongside those of the Mother Country -
with the exception of Newfoundland, which instead sent its
men to enlist in the Royal Artillery51. At first the
48 Pigott, P40.
49 CSO, Statistical Digest of the War, Table 2, P2.
50 War Cabinet papers WP(41)104-12: CAB66/16.
51 Pigott, PP40-1.
278
National Service Acts did not apply to non-resident British
subjects until they had been in Britain for at least 2
years and then only if they were not in Britain for a
temporary purpose. However, on 20th January 1944 liability
for service was extended to certain persons not ordinarily
resident in Britain, provided that they had been resident
in this country during a continuous period of 3 months52.
Liability was extended to nationals or citizens of, or
persons born or domiciled in, Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, Newfoundland, the Isle of Man, Channel Islands, or
any colony, protectorate or mandated territory of the
Crown. Liability was not extended to those from Northern
Ireland and Eire. Such persons were not called upon to
register if they had been resident in Britain for less than
2 years, or had come to this country since the outbreak of
war and were engaged on work of national importance and
intended to return home at or before the end of the war. At
first the National Service Acts did not apply to British
subjects residing overseas. Although many returned to
Britain and enlisted of their own volition, British
subjects overseas were under no legal obligation to serve
in any way. However, in August 1943 the National Service
(Foreign Countries) Act was passed, authorising the
conscription of such persons into the British Armed Forces.
In the event, the Act was only enforced against British
subjects residing in Egypt53.
Although the National Service Acts did not apply to
citizens of foreign countries living in Britain i. e.
aliens, many aliens enlisted in the British Armed Forces
during the war; and while most were volunteers, some were
compulsorily enlisted. Before the war, aliens were in
theory allowed to enlist in the Army by the Army Act,
although in practice they were not allowed to enlist by
52 Defence (National Service) Regulations, SR &0 1944, No. 67.
5' Pigott, PP47-8.
279
King's Regulations. On the outbreak of war, all barriers to
the enlistment of aliens were removed. During the war many
aliens served in the Army: many were citizens of neutral
nations (coming principally from Spain and - until December
1941 - the United States); a few were citizens of enemy
nations residing in Britain (mostly Jewish refugees); and
many were citizens of occupied allied nations residing in
Britain. While citizens of enemy and neutral nations could
not be compelled to serve in the British Armed Forces,
during the second half of the war some allied citizens were
compelled to serve. Following a test case, the Allied
Powers (War Service) Act was passed, becoming law on 6th
August 194254. Under this Act, allied citizens in Britain
could be conscripted into the British Armed Forces under
the National Service Acts if they refused to be called up
by the Forces-in-exile of their own nation i. e. allied
citizens in Britain could not escape military service
altogether. Some Poles and Czechs, refusing to serve in the
Free Polish and Czech Forces, were called up under this
Act. The Act did not apply to Frenchmen until August 1944
because of the uncertain legal status of the Free French
Forces i. e. the existence of Vichy France, which had signed
an armistice with the enemy; up to that date whether a
Frenchmen served in the Free French Forces or in the
British Armed Forces or in neither was entirely a matter
for him. The Act did not apply to Danes also because of the
uncertain legal status of Denmark i. e. occupied by the
enemy but not an allied nation; many Danes voluntarily
enlisted in the Buffs. Aliens who had served in the British
Forces during the war were, if they so wished, naturalised
as British subjects after the war55.
54 5 and 6 Geo. 6, c. 29.
SS Pigott, PP41-4.
280
Let us now look at the age limits set and the medical
standards applied during the war.
The Military Training Act of May 1939 made men aged between 20 and 21 eligible for military service. The
National Service Act of September 1939 made men aged between 18 and 41 eligible for military service. The 2nd
National Service Act of December 1941 raised the upper age limit to 51. Table XXIII shows that by June 1945 men born
between July 1900 and September 1927 i. e. aged between
forty four years and eleven months and seventeen years and
nine months had been registered.
By mid 1941, that is after exactly two years of
conscription, the great bulk of those of military age had
been registered. Twenty year olds had been registered first
and then those over twenty in ascending age order. The
first Proclamation, which was signed on 1st October 1939,
placed an obligation to apply to be registered as and when
required on men of 20 and 21 years of age, with the
exception of those twenty year olds who had already
registered under the Military Training Act of the previous
June. Subsequent proclamations extended the liability to
successive higher age groups until by June 1941 all men up
to the age of 40 had been registered. In the following
month the first registration of the 19 year olds, who had
been made liable by a Proclamation of 1st January 1940,
took place and this was followed at the end of 1941 by a
registration of men of 18.5 who had been covered by a
Proclamation of 29th January 194156. By the end of 1941
therefore all men to whom the National Service Act applied
had been called upon to register. The average yield of each
class was 306,000 and the total number registered was just
over seven million57. As shown in Table XXIII, in subsequent
years the age of registration was reduced until eventually
56 Ministry of Labour and National Service Report, PPXVI-XIX and App. I, P335.
57 Ibid, P12.
281
those aged seventeen and three quarters were registered,
taking the total registered to just over eight and a third
million.
There can be no doubt that, thanks to National Service,
a very high proportion of Britain's adult males below
middle age was brought into the Armed Forces. By late 1944,
57% of men aged 18-40 were serving or had served in the
Armed Forces58. During the entire war 60% of men born in the
years 1905-27 i. e. aged 18-40 and 70% of men born in the
years 1915-27 i. e. aged 18-30 served in the Armed Forces59.
This impressive achievement was however of rather less
practical benefit to the Army than one might think. Because
of assurances given in Parliament when the National Service
Act was passed, very young soldiers were not permitted to
serve overseas. This policy was maintained, albeit in
modified form, throughout the war. Naturally, during the
war this policy caused much upset to the men concerned and
considerably exacerbated the Army's manpower problems. In
October 1939 the minimum age for overseas service was set
at 19 for Regulars i. e. volunteers and 20 for National
Servicemen i. e. conscripts60. All those currently serving
overseas below the minimum age were thereupon removed from
their units and sent home, to the understandable dismay of
both the men themselves and their units. In February 1942
the age limit for National Servicemen was reduced to that
for Regulars i. e. the age limit was made 19 for al161. In
June 1944, because of the Army's worrying manpower
situation, it was reduced to 18.562.
58 Statistics Relating to the War Effort of the United Kingdom, Cmd. 6564, Nov. 1944, P3.
59 Strength and Casualties of the Armed Forces and Auxiliary Services of the United Kingdom 1939- 1945, Cmd. 6832, June 1946, P2.
60 Army Council Instruction 721/39 of 26`h October 1939.
61 Army Council Instruction 432/42 of 28`'' February 1942.
02 Army Council Instruction 854/44 of 10`h June 1944.
282
A proportion of those called-up was rejected for
military service on the grounds of medical unfitness.
The second stage in the call-up process, after
registration, was the order to report for a medical
examination and at the examination the men were placed in
various medical grades according to their fitness for
military service. As Table XXII shows, by July 1945
6,582,514 men had been medically examined (those revealed
at registration to be cripples and those retained in
industry, not being called-up, were not medically
examined). Grade I (4,548,682 or 69.1%) included those who,
subject only to such minor disabilities as could be
remedied or adequately compensated by artificial means,
attained the full normal standard of health and strength,
and were capable of enduring physical exertion suitable to
their age. Grade II (932,185 or 14.2%) included those who,
while suffering from disabilities disqualifying them for
Grade I, did not suffer from progressive organic disease,
had fair hearing and vision, were of moderate muscular
development, and were able to undergo a considerable amount
of physical exertion not involving severe strain. Grade III
(514,516 or 7.8%) included those who presented such marked
physical disabilities or evidence of past disease that they
were not fit for the amount of exertion required for Grade
II. Grade IV (587,131 or 8.9%) included those who suffered
from progressive organic disease or were for other reasons
permanently incapable of the kind or degree of exertion
required for Grade 11163.
In simple terms, those in Grade I could be defined as
fit; in Grade II as largely fit; in Grade III as largely
unfit; and in Grade IV as unfit. According to Parker, only
those in Grade IV were rejected as being "unfit for any
form of service, 64 i. e. 8.9% or one in eleven. According to
63 Parker, Table VIII (Explanatory Notes and Part A), PP493-5.
64 Ibid, P152. 283
Ahrenfeldt, however, those in Grades III and IV were
rejected65 i. e. 16.7% or one in six. Given the official
status of Parker's account and the evidence in the
following paragraph, Ahrenfeldt's account must be rejected.
If the authorities had been determined to put even more men into uniform, the proportion of those in the Armed Forces
could have been increased, and the proportion of those
declared unfit for any form of military service could have
been reduced. However, it is a moot point whether the
already low medical standard could have been made lower
than it was.
Given the great number of men placed in Grade I i. e.
classed as physically fit, why did the Army have a problem
manning its infantry units? Firstly, those classed as
physically fit had to be shared between the three Services.
Secondly, the Grades were imprecise, so imprecise as to be
misleading. The Army had to operate its own, much more
precise system of medical classification in order to
allocate properly the men given to it. Men were classed as:
A (any area in a theatre of war); B (lines of
communication, base or garrison service at home or abroad);
C (home service only); D (temporarily unfit); E
(permanently unfit). A and B were subdivided: A into two
(Al-2) and B into five (Bl-5). Grade I embraced Al and Bl;
Group II embraced the whole of A and B; Grade III embraced
B3-5 and C; Grade IV embraced E. Not surprisingly, with the
exception of garrison and home defence battalions,
infantrymen had to be Al i. e. the very peak of physical
fitness. A proportion of those in each of the supporting
corps (with the sole exception of the pay corps) also had
to be Al. As, of course, did a substantial proportion of
those in each of the other fighting corps: the armour,
65 Psychiatry in the British Army in the Second World War, App. C, Table I. P278.
284
artillery, engineers and signals66. As manpower grew scarce,
the Army was obliged to subdivide A and B further in order
to maximise its resources. Eventually A was subdivided into
five (Al-5) and B into seven (B1-7)67. On the eve of D-Day,
81.4% of Army other ranks were A (of whom 72.3% were Al),
14.1% were B, 4.2% were C and 0.3% were D or E68. Thirdly,
physical fitness was not the only requirement for infantry
duty: youth, mental robustness and combat motivation were
also required.
During the war over half a million cases of failure to
register for military service were investigated.
Investigation showed that a large number had already
registered or proceeded to do so, while over 200,000 had
already joined the forces or were not liable under the
National Service Acts. There were only 1,000 cases of men
being clearly liable but refusing to register. These men
were ordered to report for medical examination and
prosecuted if they did not attend69.
These figures demonstrate clearly that during the war
the call-up was well respected and that the number of men
who deliberately sought to avoid military service - let
alone the number of men who succeeded in doing so - was
completely insignificant. This can be attributed to three
factors, factors which may very well be absent in another
war: universal support for the war and for the conscription
of the nation's manpower; a system of conscription which
was both simple and fair (one that, for example,
disregarded marital status); and an efficient
administrative machine operating over an extended period of
66 Army Council Instruction 373/40 of 18`x' April 1940.
67 Army Council Instructions 702/43 and 1643/43 of Ist May and 10th November 1943.
68 Adjutant-General's lecture of 29`h May 1944: AG Stats branch memorandum.
69 Parker, P 15 1.
285
time (one that, indeed, began operating before the outbreak
of war).
We are now in a position to answer the questions posed
at the beginning of this chapter. In Britain during the war
conscription was very thorough indeed and a very high
proportion of Britain's adult males below middle age was
conscripted into the Armed Forces. However, the Army did
not - relative to its manifold tasks and heavy commitments
- get its fair share of conscripts, either quantitatively
or qualitatively. The intake into the Army was restricted
from the spring of 1941 and throughout the war the best
material was creamed off by the RAF and the RN. The
qualitative deficit was, although more difficult to
measure, probably of greater importance than the
quantitative deficit. When one takes into account the
qualitative and quantitative deficits in its intake, it is
not hard to understand why the Army experienced a manpower
crisis in September 1944 - notwithstanding the introduction
of conscription on the outbreak of war and the call up of
millions of men into the Army.
In concluding this chapter it may be stated that,
although they were not as ruthlessly applied as they could
and - from the Army perspective - should have been, the
powers under the National Service Acts to compel Britons to
serve in the Armed Forces were of immense importance in
enabling us to raise the Army we did. It is remarkable, on
looking back, that compulsion should have operated with
virtually no public opposition. We should recall that for
very many years hostility to "conscription" was a principal
theme in left-wing politics in Britain and that in certain
quarters, between the wars, pacifism as a political
doctrine seemed to have supplanted the ancient principle
that the citizen had a duty to defend the state in arms.
What is perhaps even more remarkable is that for 18
years after the war conscription was continued, with
286
virtually no public opposition. During this period, because
of the Soviet threat (Soviet Russia being - like Nazi
Germany - an expansionist, totalitarian state with massive
armed forces in the heart of Europe), all sections of the
community (apart from a few misguided individuals who thought that Soviet Russia was more benign than Nazi
Germany) were able to contemplate, without great emotion,
the idea that if, in spite of all hopes and efforts to
avert it, a Third World War did break out, to meet the
threat of enslavement or destruction the rule for all would
be service, whether armed or civilian, at the demand and
under direction by the state. In the third of a century
since the abolition of conscription, Britain has relied on
nuclear deterrence and small but professional,
all-volunteer forces for its defence. Today, following the
collapse of the Soviet threat, it is almost impossible to
envisage another great war and therefore almost impossible
to envisage the reintroduction of conscription. But one
should never say "never again".
287
CHAPTER 8. REQUIREMENTS AND ALLOCATIONS.
In this chapter we will examine the manpower required by
the Army and the manpower allocated to the Army by the
Government in 1944. No investigation into the causes of the
Army's manpower crisis in the autumn of 1944 would be
complete without such an examination.
The size of the Army's allocation determined the size of its intake (i .e. men gained by the Army), while the size of
its intake in relation to the size of its outflow (i. e. men
lost to the Army) determined whether the strength of the
Army increased, decreased or stayed the same. In short, the
Army's allocation determined its strength.
Table XII shows the strength of the Army, both male and
female, at quarterly intervals during the war. Table XXI
shows the annual intake of men into the Army during the war
while Table XIII shows the annual outflow of men from the
Army during the war. Table XXIV shows the manpower required
by, and the manpower allocated to, the Army during the
second half of the war.
It cannot be denied that the Army's strength increased
enormously during the war. But then, of course, so did its
commitments and the demands made upon it. Moreover, during
the war the increase was not consistent, neither in its
pace nor in its extent. Table XII shows that, by mid 1945,
the peacetime regular Army of less than a quarter of a
million men had grown thirteen-fold into a wartime largely-
conscript Army of almost three million men. However, as the
table shows, during the first half of the war the Army grew
by much and quickly while during the second half of the war
the Army grew by little and slowly. By the spring of 1942,
that is after two and a half years of war, the Army's
strength was about 2.5 million men and women; by the spring
of 1945, that is after another three years of war, the
288
Army's strength was about 3 million men and women - an increase of only half a million or 20%. That the Army
quickly grew to a great size but that its size was then
restricted is clear. It is equally clear that the
subsequent loosening of the restriction took place too
slowly. In mid 1944 i. e. three and a half weeks after the
commencement of the NW Europe campaign, the Army was not
appreciably larger than it had been a year earlier, when it
had not been engaged on the Continent. Yet it was
appreciably smaller than it was to be a year later, when
the war in Europe had ended.
A comparison between Tables XIII and XXI shows that
during the second half of the war intake into the Army was
very nearly cancelled out by outflow from the Army. At the
end of 1942 the Army's strength stood at 2,566,000 men.
During 1943 intake was 237,300 men while outflow was
123,500. The net increase in the male strength of the Army
during 1943 was therefore only 113,800 or 4.4. At the end
of 1943 the Army's strength stood at 2,680,000 men. During
1944 intake was 251,900 men while outflow was 172,100. The
net increase in the male strength of the Army during 1944
was therefore only 79,800 or 3%. All this increase took
place during the last nine months of the year. At the end
of 1944 the Army's strength stood at 2,760,000 men. In mid
1945 the Army's strength stood at 2,920,000 men. A net
increase in six months of 160,000 or 5.8%. However, this
increase was mainly due to prisoners being repatriated
after VE Day and taken on strength again. Table XII also
shows that the ATS reached a peak of 212,500 in the autumn
of 1943 and then went into a gradual decline. Outflow
exceeded intake during 1944 and 1945 by 11,050 and 63,130
respectively.
Table XII reveals a striking fact. In the year between
the spring of 1943 and the spring of 1944 there was hardly
any increase in the strength of the Army. In the nine-month
289
period from the end of June 1943 to the end of March 1944
the net increase in the male strength of the Army was a
mere 7,000 or a quarter of one per cent. Indeed, the male
strength of the Army barely increased during the last
quarter of 1943 and did not increase at all during the
first quarter of 1944, while the total strength of the Army
fell by 5,300 between the autumn of 1943 and the spring of 1944 because of the decline in the strength of the ATS.
Why did the number of men in the Army remain practically
the same, and why did the number of women in the Army fall,
during late 1943 and early 1944? Why was the intake of men into the Army almost cancelled out by the outflow of men
from the Army during 1944? The answer to these questions is
to be found in an examination of the Army's manpower
requirements and allocations.
Before we examine the Army's manpower requirements and
allocations in the crisis year, it is essential to provide
the background. Let us choose as our starting point June
1942, two years before D-Day and the nadir of the Army's
fortunes during the war.
As we saw in the previous chapter, a ceiling was imposed
by Churchill on the Army's manpower in the spring of 1941.
The adequacy of the current intake into the Army within the
limits of the agreed ceiling to meet new commitments was
questioned in June 19421. The general case for an increase
in the authorised strength of the Army, as presented by the
War Office in a memorandum, was that since the ceiling had
been fixed at 2,374,000 there had been substantial changes
in the strategic situation. Japan and America had entered
the war and the essential role of the British Army was no
longer mainly defensive. Additional troops had to be moved
to the Far East and units for this purpose from East Africa
would have to be replaced. Wastage and casualties among
' Cabinet Office file CAB/HIST/M/17/1/3, Army Scales - Personnel Situation, May 1942 of 3rd June 1942.
290
British personnel recruited locally in overseas areas would
also have to be made good. Three more divisions than had
been provided under the original programme were to be sent
abroad and, although complete for action in this country,
would have to be brought up to overseas strength with
additional personnel for duties behind the firing line.
Moreover, before the Army at home could be made ready to
fight on the Continent its specialist elements (engineers,
signals and pioneers etc. ) would have to be strengthened.
Lastly, there had been a shortfall of some 90,000 in the
numbers recruited for the ATS and this had delayed the
setting free of soldiers for other duties from jobs which
women could do. Put together these factors, it was
concluded, constituted a strong case for going above the
authorised ceiling.
The War Office memorandum was submitted at Churchill's
direction to a Ministerial Committee consisting of Anderson
(Lord President of the Council), Bevin (Minister of Labour
and National Service) and Grigg (Secretary of State for
War)2. After a close examination of the detailed claims it
was agreed that there was a theoretical case for raising
the ceiling by 100,000 together with such additions as
might be needed to replace wastage and casualties among
British personnel recruited locally in overseas theatres of
war. If the present authorised strength were regarded not
as a fixed but as an average target, this would give a
desirable flexibility and would enable the ceiling to be
raised at times when men were available to offset times
when the supply would run short. Bevin was hopeful that he
would be able to provide the additional numbers, but there
might be some delay. This was due to uncertainty about the
date at which hutments and airbases which were being
constructed for the American troops in the UK under the
2 Ibid, Army Scales, Record of a Meeting of Ministers held in the Lord President's Room, Great George Street, 19th June 1942, to consider WO memorandum 79/General/3365.
291
"Bolero" scheme would be completed. Some men in the
building industry had had to have their call-up deferred,
and it might be that further men due to be withdrawn from
the industry for the Forces would not be available as soon
as was expected. As to the short-fall for the ATS, which
was to some extent due to the inability of the War Office
in the early weeks of the year to accept all the women it
was offered, special efforts would be made to speed up the
rate of intake, but it seemed unlikely, Bevin added, that
the full requirement of the War Office would be met by the
end of the year.
Anderson was at the beginning of September about to
submit a full report to Churchill when a new development
occurred. The War Office had, at Churchill's request3, been
making a detailed review of what might be expected to be
the state of preparation of the Army in April 1943, and it
had come to the conclusion that an additional 250,000 men
would be needed4. Meanwhile a further complication had
arisen. Bevin's belief that he would be able to find an
additional 100,000 for the Army was on the assumption that
the RAF intake for the year would not be substantially
above the amount sanctioned. The Air Ministry had now
indicated it required a substantially increased amounts.
Churchill directed that the proposed additional intake for
the RAF should be cut in half6. However, soon afterwards the
Admiralty also put in a claim for additional men. Pending
discussion on the Ministry of Labour's autumn survey of
manpower which had just become available, in the middle of
October Anderson submitted short-term recommendations on
Prime Minister's papers: file 55 (Army - Manpower etc., June 1940-July 1945), PM's Personal Minute Serial No. M326/2,31st July 1942: PREM3/55.
4 Cabinet Office file CAB/HIST/M/17/4/2, copy of minute from Grigg to Churchill on army manpower, 2nd September 1942.
5 Ibid, minute to Churchill from Anderson, 3rd September 1942.
6 Ibid, PM's Personal Minute Serial No. M377/2,17th September 1942.
292
the scales of intake for the three Services until the end
of the year. The Army intake in November and December
should be raised by 32,000; the RN's requirements should be
met in full; and the RAF should also have an increase. The
increases for the Services could, Anderson suggested, be
met by lowering the age of call-up from 18.5 to 18; by
calling up men on deferment in the building industry; and
by drawing on the RAF Deferred List, containing men waiting
to join the RAFT . In late 1942 the Forces were asked to submit their
manpower requirements for the period from July 1942 to
December 1943. The Army submitted its manpower requirement
for this period on 10th November 19428. The Army's manpower
requirement for the eighteen-month period from mid 1942 to
the end of 1943 was 649,000 men and 160,000 women: a total
of 809,000. Its actual intake July to October 1942 and
approved intake November to December 1942 had been 208,000
men and 54,000 women. It therefore required for the period
January to December 1943 441,000 men and 106,000 women.
Because of the large gap between the amount of manpower
demanded and the amount of manpower available, Churchill
was called upon to adjudicate. He proposed that all demands
be cut. The Army's demand should be cut by 380,000 or
almost half. On 11th December 1942 the War Cabinet approved
manpower allocations for the past six months and the coming
year, although it directed that the position be reviewed in
the summer9. The Army's allocation for this period was set
at 349,000 men and 80,000 women i. e. just over half and
exactly half of what it had asked for.
The manpower allocations made by the War Cabinet at the
end of 1942 for the period July 1942 to December 1943 were,
Ibid, minute to Churchill from Anderson, 16th October 1942.
8 War Cabinet paper Misc 36(42)1.
9 WM(42)167th Meeting: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
293
as directed, reviewed in the summer of 1943. In the interim
the Forces had each reached the conclusion that with the
change over from a defensive to an offensive strategy (as
agreed at Casablanca in January 1943) they had under-
estimated their requirements, and with the additional demands of Combined operations and the maintenance of units
abroad at fighting strength they could not carry out their
commitments with the balance of the total allocation made to them at the end of December 1942. Consequently, they all
asked for an increment. The Army submitted its manpower
requirement for the period April to December 1943 on 26th
June 194310. It asked for an increment of 155,000 men and 29,000 women. Actual intake in the period July 1942 to
March 1943 had been 296,600 men and 69,000 women. In the
period April to December 1943 the Army was therefore due
52,400 men and 11,000, being the remainder of its
allocation made in December 1942. Adding the increment to
what it was due, the Army's requirement for the period
April to December 1943 now stood at 207,400 men and 40,000
women. Between them the RN and RAF asked for an extra
189,300 men and women, slightly more than the Army had
asked fortl.
Anderson, as usual, was asked to examine the various
manpower demands and present his recommendations to
Churchill. This time, however, he decided to present the
revised demands of the Forces to Churchill without comment.
He also invited Lyttelton (Minister of Production) to
explore with the three Supply Departments the possibility
of moderating their claims, in light of the increased
demands from the Forces. The Ministry of Aircraft
Production (MAP) was prepared to reduce its demand from
359,200 to 212,000 but no further. The Ministry of Supply
agreed to cut its workforce by another 7,000 (making a
10 WP(43)272: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
" WP(43)221 of 23`d May and WP(43)273 of 26th June 1943: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
294
total cut of 105,500) . The Admiralty asked for a modest increase: another 6,00012. Essential industries and services
also required a supplementary increase.
Anderson submitted a memorandum to Churchill on 30th
June in which he put the revised total demands of the
Forces and industry at 912, To meet this demand, the
maximum number available was 414,000; and even this was
optimistic, involving a massive cut in the less essential industries and a huge call-up of building workers. There
was thus a gap between manpower demand and supply of half a
million. In drawing up his proposals to the War Cabinet for
reducing this massive deficit to a manageable margin
Churchill adopted similar pruning methods to those which he
had used at the end of 1942. He examined the stated
requirements of the Forces and industry and assessed the
scale on which they should be met in the light of where
additional manpower might be expected to make the most
effective contribution to the planned offensive14. It was
almost self-evident, he pointed out, that more value was to
be obtained from the fulfilment of the air programme than
from such improvements in land and sea dispositions as
might be made possible if the strength of the Army and RN
could be increased. It may have been almost self-evident to
Churchill, but it is certainly not to the historian.
After consultation with his colleagues, on 19th July
Churchill reached the following conclusions15. MAP's claim
for an extra 212,000 workers should be met in full but, as
it was unlikely that this large increase could be absorbed
by the end of the year, 115,000 should be provided by then.
To meet MAP's claim, Supply should be cut by a further
12 WP(43)271 of 30'h June 1943: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
13 Ibid.
14 WP(43)295 of 6`h July 1943: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
15 WP(43)319: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
295
80,000; Civil Defence by another 15,000; and the proposed increase for the essential services should be cut back. In
view of the special demands of Combined Operations the RN
should be given largely what it had asked for. However, the
additional demands of the Army and RAF should be cut down
to little more than the balance due to them from the
allocations made at the end of 1942. In short, MAP was to
receive super-priority for manpower, at the expense of the
other sectors of the war effort.
On 22nd July 1943 the War Cabinet agreed Churchill's
plan for sharing out the available supply of manpower 16. MAP
was awarded super-priority and the Army's allocation was drastically cut. For the period April to December 1943 the
Army - which was owed 63,400 and needed an extra 184,000 (a
total of 247,400) - was awarded 145,000 (116,400 men and
29,000 women) i. e. a cut of 102,400. It was to receive just
over half and about three-quarters, respectively, of the
men and women it had asked for.
To obtain the extra 115,000 required by MAP it would be
necessary to take two steps: workers would have to be
transferred from Supply; young women who would otherwise
have gone into the Forces would have to be diverted into
MAP. To help Bevin do this, the War Cabinet authorised
extraordinary measures. Intake of women into the Forces
should be reduced to a minimum by stopping volunteering
except for some special posts, by suspending conscription
of any further age groups and by appealing to women already
accepted by the Forces to work for MAP until they were
required. At the same time registrations under the
Registration for Employment Order should be extended so as
to cover all women up to 50 and thereby facilitate the
release of younger, and particularly of mobile, women in
less essential work by the provision of older substitutes.
16 WM(43)102°d Mtg. Item 1: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
296
In order to safeguard male workers in MAP no more men
should for the time being be called up for the Forces and
MAP should be excused from having to return any more
mechanics lent from the RAF. The reduction of Supply's
workforce should be planned so that workers released, who
should be as far as possible mobile, could be re-absorbed
by MAP. Finally, Ministry of Labour regions should be
instructed to make special efforts to fill MAP vacancies
and should be furnished by MAP with monthly lists of
vacancies'' . As Parker rightly says: "By the authorisation of these
measures the Ministry of Aircraft Production was placed in
a position of unprecedented favour. Not only was it to have
the first pick of available labour coming into the market,
but it was to be exempted from any contribution to the
Armed Forces i18. There is no doubt that the War Cabinet took
the decision to award super-priority for MAP with full
knowledge. It laid down that if the supply of labour should
be inadequate to carry out the allocations it had decided,
the deficit should not fall on MAP19. Bevin was to report
monthly on progress and the position would be reviewed if
it seemed unlikely that MAP would be expanded by 115,000
workers before the end of the year without additional
measures.
As Parker says, Bevin was vehemently opposed to "Labour
Priority for MAP": "The Minister of Labour had not
concealed from his colleagues his unshaken belief that the
Ministry of Aircraft Production did not require and could
not absorb the large numbers of additional workers it was
demanding, nor had he hesitated to utter a warning of the
ill effects upon other important production of such a
17 Ibid, Item 1(6).
18 Manpower, P207.
19 WM(43)102nd Mtg., Item 1(14).
297
disproportionate allocation of labour" 20. Bevin was thinking
especially of the effect on the supply of weapons and
equipment to the Army. Having lost the argument, Bevin
implemented the War Cabinet's decisions with vigour.
Indeed, with an excess of vigour. He issued instructions
which interpreted the War Cabinet's award of super-priority
to MAP literally21. It seems that he wanted to demonstrate
one of two things: either MAP could absorb the extra
workers it had demanded and been awarded and other sectors
of the war effort would suffer as a result; or else MAP
could not absorb the extra workers it had demanded and been
awarded and as a result its demands would be shown to have
been excessive. The War Cabinet was informed of Bevin's
action22 and it decided to soften his instruction S23.
By the end of 1943 MAP had received, not the 115,000
hoped for, but 163,500 additional workers and it was forced
to admit that it could not handle any more. Clearly, both
its original claim for 359,200 and its amended claim for
212,000 had been excessive and impractical. At the end of
1943 MAP had a workforce of 1,711,600, counting part-time
women as a half24.
Despite the War Cabinet's 22nd July decisions to award
manpower priority to MAP and cut drastically the Army's
allocation, it cannot be denied that the Army received more
than a third of the manpower allocated by the War Cabinet
in the second half of 1942 and in 1943. However,
considering the manpower allocations for the Forces and
Munitions together, it is clear that the air effort
received much more manpower than the naval effort, which in
20 Manpower, P207.
21 Ministry of Labour circular 126/288 of 29`h July 1943.
22 WM(43)115`h Mtg. Item 7 of 16th August 1943: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
'' WP(43)373 of 18`x' August: War Cabinet papers: CAB66; WM(43)117`h Mtg. Item I of 19`x' August 1943: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
24 CSO, Statistical Digest of the War, Table 19, P17.
298
turn received much more manpower than the ground effort. In
the period July 1942 to December 1943 the RN was allocated 350,100. It actually received 335,800. The Admiralty was
allocated 110,500. It actually received 103,500. There was therefore a net increase of 439,300 for the naval effort.
The RAF was allocated 303,200. It actually received 300,800. MAP was allocated 258,800. It actually received 307,300. There was therefore a net increase of 608,100 for
the air effort. The Ministry of Supply suffered a cut of 186,200. The Army - which initially required, before the
change from a defensive to an offensive strategy, 809,000
men and women - was allocated 506,500 i. e. a cut of over
37%. It actually received 524,700. There was therefore a
net increase of 338,500 for the ground effort25.
The War Cabinet's 22nd July decisions were greatly
mistaken. Airpower had not yet won the war (as opposed to
avoiding defeat) and it had given no indication that it was
going to do so in the foreseeable future. With the invasion
of Sicily on 9th-10th July 1943, the Army was now engaged
in operations on the Continent of Europe. Two months before
the War Cabinet's decision, at Washington, it had been
agreed that a cross-Channel invasion of the Continent would
take place in the spring of 1944. At Quebec, a month after
the War Cabinet's decision, it was agreed that the invasion
would take place on 1st May 1944. Indeed, the very month of
the War Cabinet's decision, an expeditionary force was
formed in Britain to undertake a cross-Channel invasion26.
Let us now examine the manpower required by, and the
manpower allocated to, the Army in 1944 itself.
The Forces were asked to submit their manpower
requirements for 1944 in the autumn of 1943. The Army's
manpower requirement for 1944 was submitted by Grigg in a
25 App. 11, WP(44)159 of 16th March 1944: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
ý`' Bryant, The Turn of the Tide, P657.
299
memorandum on 20th October 194327. Grigg began by reminding
the War Cabinet of the severe cuts which the Army had
suffered in its manpower requests at the time of the last
two allocations, and of the reductions and economies which had resulted; and he went on to show that the rates of battle casualties and wastage would be much higher in 1944
than had previously been the case, owing to the nature of
the operations against Western Europe and Italy. In 1943,
planning had gone on the assumption that wastage from all
causes would not exceed 12,700 a month. In 1944, that
portion relating to normal wastage (6,700) was unlikely to
change appreciably, but it was estimated that total battle
casualties in 1944 would amount to 250,000 men, 155,000
being incurred during the first half of the year, 95,000
during the second (clearly, the War Office was assuming
that very heavy casualties would be sustained during the
first two months of "Overlord" i. e. 1st May-30th June
1944). In addition, the Army would need an intake during
the second half of 1944 to "cover estimated wastage during
the first six months of 1945 when this intake becomes
trained". The gross wastage to be met was therefore: 80,000
normal wastage and 250,000 battle casualties in 1944;
40,000 normal wastage and 78,000 battle casualties in the
first half of 1945. A total of 448,000. At the end of
December 1943, the Army would be owed 21,000 men who were
due for call-up in the period August-December; and in
addition 13,000 fully-qualified tradesmen and 26,000
labourers would be needed in connection with preparations
for D-Day. The total Army requirements in 1944 for fully-
trained men were therefore: 21,000 to meet the deficit at
the end of 1943; 448,000 to meet wastage; 13,000 tradesmen.
A gross requirement of 482,000 men. Subtracting 46,000 new
intakes July-December 1943 becoming trained in 1944 and
143,000 wounded returning to duty, January 1944-June 1945,
27 WP(43)464: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
300
left a net requirement of 293,000. Adding the special intake for unskilled labour of 26,000, produced a final
requirement for 319,000 men. In addition, Grigg asked for
24,000 women for the ATS, 1,693 nurses and 1,200 VAD (900
nursing and 300 non-nursing). The Army was therefore asking for a grand total of 345,893 more men and women. It also
wanted 50,000 civilians as clerks and "industrials".
Clearly, in the autumn of 1943, although he did not
predict a manpower crisis in the autumn of 1944, Grigg
stated in no uncertain terms the Army's need for a massive influx of manpower in the coming year, thanks largely to an
increased forecast of battle casualties. That the forecast
and therefore the need were to prove somewhat exaggerated
does not detract from the fact that the War Cabinet had
been left in no doubt about the scale of the Army's
manpower requirements in 1944.
It was of course fortunate that the British Army did not
suffer 250,000 battle casualties in 1944. However, the
autumn 1943 forecast was not grossly in error. 1944 was the
year in which the Army assaulted the Atlantic Wall; it was
the year which saw the Army fighting for the first time on
three fronts simultaneously; and it was the year in which
the Army did a great deal of fighting and suffered a great
number of casualties - and ran short of infantry
reinforcements in the process. It should be noted that in
NW Europe alone, the British Army suffered 107,600 battle
casualties in the less than seven months between D-Day and
the end of the year28 - and D-Day had been postponed by more
than a month (from 1st May to 6th June). Examination of the
surviving War Office DSD registered files and AG Stats
branch memoranda shows clearly that manpower requirements
and casualty forecasts submitted to the War Cabinet by
Grigg were made in good faith, were very carefully worked
28 AG Stats analysis: comparison of forecast and actual casualties: W0365/46.
301
out and were based on the best information available. No
one was consciously cheating; no one was deliberately
exaggerating; no one was grossly incompetent. In none of
the high-level discussions concerning manpower did those
representing the RN or RAF challenge the Army's figures or
accuse the Army of dishonesty or exaggeration or incompetence. It is not too difficult to suggest reasons
for their silence. Firstly, good manners. Secondly, fear of
retaliation. Thirdly, a guilty conscience (after all, the
RAF and RN had deprived the Army of many high-grade men).
Fourthly, acceptance that whereas the RN and RAF were
capital-intensive, the Army was labour-intensive. Fifthly,
acceptance that henceforth the Army would be doing most of
the fighting and most of the dying. Sixthly, Churchill
could usually be relied upon to act as devil's advocate.
The fact that Churchill did not question the Army's
casualty forecast and manpower demand for 1944 is
surprising, especially as there is no doubt that he
believed the Army's use of the manpower at its disposal was
erroneous29. We can only assume one of two things. Either he
accepted that the Army's forecast and demand were, although
perhaps erring on the side of caution, not disproportionate
to the scale of the ordeal that it would face in 1944. Or
he realised that the Army's demand, even much reduced,
could not be met without drastic action, action which he
was not prepared to countenance, and saw no point in
questioning it.
Two days after Grigg's paper was circulated, Bevin
issued a bleak review of the manpower situation which
stated: "By the end of this year the mobilisation of the
nation will be practically complete. The total intake from
all sources in 1944 will not be sufficient to replace
ordinary wastage and there would be a deficit of 150,000,
"' Churchill to Brooke, 1 S` November 1943: Closing the Ring, PP682-3.
302
even if no one were called up for the Services 1130 . The
Forces were however demanding over 776,000 more men and women. Bevin stated simply: "These demands cannot be met". Only 260,000 men and 40,000 women were due to be called-up to the Forces in 1944. Informed of the situation, on ist
November Churchill circulated a memorandum in which said: "... the problem is no longer one of closing a gap between
supply and requirements. Our manpower is fully mobilised for the war effort. We cannot add to the total; on the
contrary, it is already dwindling. All we can do is to make
within that total such changes as the strategy of the war demands". He suggested that one of two assumptions be made for the purposes of manpower planning: Germany would be
defeated before the end of 1944; Germany would not be
defeated before the end of 194431.
Churchill held a conference to discuss the issues
involved on 5th November, at which it was decided to set up
a Ministerial Committee chaired by Anderson (now Chancellor
of the Exchequer), along with an Official Committee to
advise it, to investigate the problem and recommend
solutions32. During the conference, it was agreed that
super-preference for MAP should end on 1st January 1944.
Grigg agreed that, if it were assumed that Germany would be
defeated by the end of 1944, the Army could exist on an
intake of 150,000, which Bevin agreed was an attainable
figure. The manpower allotment was finalised on 27th
November by the Ministerial Committee33 and approved by the
War Cabinet on ist December34. It was assumed that Germany
would be defeated before the end of 1944. Firm allocations
30 WP(43)472: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
31 WP(43)490: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
32 Cabinet Office: Manpower, GEN. 26/1st meeting.
33 WP(43)539: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
34 WM(43)164th meeting: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
303
were made for the first half of 1944 only; the situation
would be reviewed in May 1944. The Army was allotted 125,000 men for the first half of 1944 and provisionally
allotted 25,000 for the second half i. e. a total of 150,000
or less than half of what it had requested for the whole
year. It was also allotted 12,000 women for the ATS for the
first half of 1944 i. e. exactly half of what it had
requested for the whole year.
The War Cabinet's 1st December decisions to assume that
Germany would be defeated before the end of 1944 and to
halve the Army's manpower allocation for 1944 were both
greatly mistaken. Germany was not defeated before the end
of 1944 and it is extremely difficult to see how it could
have been. It is true that the peak of the mobilisation of
British manpower had been reached and that it was no longer
possible to expand one part of the war effort without
contracting another. It is also true that the combined
manpower demands of the Forces could not be met and that
they were all cut, not just the Army's. Yet the War Cabinet
did not need a crystal ball to realise that, of the Forces,
the Army would bear the brunt of the fighting and would
suffer the bulk of the casualties in 1944. As we noted
above, since Washington the Army had been committed to a
cross-Channel invasion of the Continent in the spring of
1944 and since Quebec the date of the invasion had been set
at ist May 1944, now just five months away. The decision to
make firm allocations for the first half of 1944 only and
to review the situation in May 1944 is suggestive of a
refusal to face unwelcome facts and of a desire to postpone
difficult choices. The price of the War Cabinet's mistakes,
procrastination and delay was paid by the Army, which
embarked upon the decisive campaign of the war undermanned
and with inadequate reserves.
A week before D-Day the War Cabinet was informed by
Grigg in no uncertain terms of an impending Army manpower
304
crisis, one affecting the infantry especially. On 30th May
1944 a memorandum from Grigg was presented to the War
Cabinet Manpower Committee under Attlee (Lord President of
the Council). Grigg stated: "Estimate of infantry
casualties and normal wastage needing replacement between
April and December 1944 based on latest forecasts of
operational activity, taking into account wounded returning
to duty, amounts to 102,250. Taking account of sources of
reinforcements the year end shortage 1944 will still be
30,000 with a peak period at the end of September when the
shortage may be as high as 35,000"35.
The Army's manpower requirement for the second half of
1944 was contained in a memorandum, prepared by the General
Staff, submitted by Grigg on 12th June36. A proof copy had
been sent to Churchill on 9th June37 in answer to his minute
of 6th June. In his minute to Grigg and Brooke (Chief of
the Imperial General Staff), Churchill had challenged the
proposed disbandment of 5 divisions to meet a forecast
deficit of 90,000 men, as stated by Grigg on 30th May and
brought to Churchill's notice by Cherwell (Paymaster-
General) on 2nd June. In his minute of 6th June Churchill
queried Grigg's figures, displaying an imperfect
understanding of manpower questions and a lack of
appreciation of the dilemma in which the Army now found
itself, largely as the result of Churchill's decisions in
the summer and autumn of 1943. Churchill said that the
disbandment of 5 divisions would release over 100,000 army
and corps troops, who could be retrained as infantry more
quickly than new recruits or even men transferred from the
RAF Regiment. It takes 40,000 men to form a division yet
only 18,000 men are released by its disbandment. "It is
this kind of thing which makes it so difficult for one to
help you in keeping up the Army". He pointed out that there
were over 1.6 million men in Britain and, even after the
invasion force had crossed to the Continent, "there ought to be a great many in this country from whom it ought to be
possible to find sufficient drafts to make good a shortage
of 90,000". He would not relax his pressure on the RAF
Regiment, the Royal Marines and other sources of manpower for the Army, but "to go and feed up to the Cabinet that a deficit of 90,000 men means the loss of five divisions
cannot be accepted i38.
In his memorandum of 12th June, Grigg not only spelt out
very clearly the extent and nature of the manpower crisis
facing the Army but also provided full answers to
Churchill's charges. It deserves to be studied at length.
Grigg warned of the imminent disbandment of as many as 5
divisions and 4 armoured brigades (thereby reducing the
forces in the field to 16 divisions and 15 armoured
brigades) unless drastic steps were immediately taken. It
was feared that 2 out of the 5 divisions must disappear in
any case, but it was hoped that it would be possible to
retain 3 of the divisions and 2 of the brigades at cadre
strength, with a view to subsequent rebuilding, if: "(a) A
considerable number of basically-trained men are provided
from sources outside Army control in the next three months.
(b) At least 60,000 new intakes are allotted during July
and August, which would be becoming effective in December
or early 1945". If the Army was to be maintained in 1945 at
the reduced level reached at the end of 1944, a total of
190,000 men would be needed in the second half of 1944
(including 30,000 owing from the previous allotment), which
would mean that intakes would have to continue at the rate
of 30,000 a month after the end of August. Failing the
38 Churchill, Triumph and Tragedy, PP685-6.
306
necessary intakes, the Army would be unable to perform its
tasks.
Naturally, much of the run-down suffered by the Army in
1944 had occurred among the fighting units, particularly
the infantry, and this meant that a high proportion of the
intakes during the second half of the year would have to be
of a medically high grade. In October 1943 Grigg had warned
that all fit men would have to be withdrawn from the 6 Home
Field Army divisions and that this might not be enough. The
allocation made in December 1943 had been less than half
what had been requested. The forecast that HFA divisions
would have to be reduced to a skeleton had proved correct.
The 6 Lower Establishment divisions were disappearing and
being replaced by 2 field divisions at cadre strength. The
forecast of casualties had been greatly increased: the net
estimate for the period April to December 1944 was now
200,000 or double the estimate of October 1943. This was
due to three factors: the revision of previous estimates
based on experience in Italy; the plans for operations had
been framed to produce maximum impact on the enemy; in the
case of NW Europe, the scale of the initial assault, in
which the heaviest casualties were expected, had been
increased.
Since September 1943 the Army's commitments had been
reduced by 94,400. Despite this, the Army would be short of
trained effectives by 91,000 by the end of the year. The
infantry would be 30,000 short. A shortage of 91,000
trained effectives equates to 5 infantry divisions and 4
armoured brigades. The disbandment of these formations
should in theory free up 100,000 men in the rear. However,
the numbers obtained in practice would be limited, for
three reasons: a high proportion of men in the rear are
skilled or semi-skilled or medically below standard; there
is a time lag involved because it takes time to sort and
retrain men; the more successful the Army's operations, the
307
greater its administrative commitments and the longer its
lines of communication. "The position is quite clear that during 1944 the Army must run down and nothing can stop it".
There were however five possible palliatives: casualties
were below estimates; an intake was received from Anti-
Aircraft Command as soon as possible (although the Chiefs
of Staff had forbidden further reductions because of "Overlord" and "Diver" i. e. the V1); an intake was received from the other Services (the anti-aircraft element of the
RAF Regiment was to be reviewed by the Chiefs of Staff); a further combing out of the Imperial Base and overseas
manpower was made (although gleanings would be small); a large intake was received in July and August which would
produce trained men in late 1944 and early 1945. In
addition to 190,000 men, the Army required 19,800 women for
the ATS (including 3,000 owing from the previous
allotment), 825 nurses and 600 VAD (in addition to any
short-fall) and the fulfilment of the previously approved
1944 allocation of civilians.
Given Grigg's memorandum, although both the Army's need
for manpower and forecast of battle casualties were to
prove somewhat exaggerated, it is indisputable that in the
summer of 1944 the Army issued a clear warning of a
manpower crisis in the autumn of that year.
In his response to that warning, Churchill did not
display his renowned energy. Clearly, he remained
sceptical. On 15th June Churchill asked Anderson to re-
assemble the Ministerial Committee and produce a report on
allocations for July and August only. Churchill considered
that, for the present, manpower plans would have to be
based on the continuance of the war in Europe throughout
the first half of 1945, although by the end of August we
should be in a better position to judge on this point. He
thought that a temporary increase should be made in the
308
Army intakes during July and August (say 15,000 instead of 6,000 a month), but this increase should be at the expense
of the other Services, not of the munitions and other
essential industries. The fact that "Overlord" casualties to date had been much lower than anticipated should also be
taken into account in framing the new estimates39.
The Ministerial Committee met on 26th June40 and
considered, in addition to Churchill's note, a memorandum by Bevin41. Bevin reported that, by the end of the month, the allocations of men to the Forces for the first half of the year would be fully met and that nothing would remain
to be carried over as an addition to the allocation for the
second half. In the case of women, there would be an intake
of 3,500 owing to the ATS, which would have to be absorbed
later in the year. The present allocation for the second
half of the year, therefore, including this 3,500, was for
80,000 men and 4,500 women.
Turning to the supply of manpower available, Bevin
reported that the number of men who could be made available
for the Forces in the second half of 1944 was 113,000, of
whom only 38,000 could be allocated in July and August
without undue disturbance to the calling-up arrangements.
Of these: 2,000 would have been accepted for flying duties
in the RAF; 2,500 would be Air Training Corps members; and
4,000 would be men who had joined the RN as volunteers
before their proper date of registration. This would leave
29,500, all of whom could be recruited to the Army. Of the
total of 17,500 women who would be available for calling up
in the second half of 1944,7,500 could be supplied during
July and August. After some discussion, the Ministerial
Committee decided that they should produce recommendations
39 Prime Minister's Personal Minute Serial No. M. 721/4: PREM3.
ao Ministerial Committee on Manpower: MP(44)2nd meeting.
" Ibid, MP(44)2.
309
for firm allocations for the Services for July and August,
and for provisional intakes for the Services and munition industries up to the end of the year, the whole position being subject to review at the end of August.
The next day the Committee met again42, to discuss the
estimates submitted by the General Staff. At this meeting, Bevin stated his opinion that the Army should have an intake of 50,000 in July and August: 30,000 coming from the
call-up of new intakes; 10,000 being supplied by transfers
from the RN and RAF; and 10,000 by calling up men from the
RAF Deferred List. A detailed discussion then took place on
the manpower position of the three Services. Alexander
(First Lord of the Admiralty) said that the RN preferred to
transfer only 1,200 to the Army but would let the Army have
4,800 of its new intake.
Grigg said that if the difference between the actual
casualties experienced in "Overlord" to date and the
estimates set out in his memorandum of 12th June were to be
regarded as a permanent saving, this would justify a
reduction in the Army's net demand by 13,000. In fact, it
now seemed that the heaviest casualties were likely to be
experienced in July, not in June as had been expected. As
the Army deficit was expected to reach its peak in
September 1944, it would be helpful if part of the intake
of men in July and August could be provided by transfer of
trained men from the other Services. Of the 190,000 men
required by the Army in the second half of 1944,40,000
were required to enable the period of service overseas to
be reduced to four and a half years, and to allow a quota
of 5,000 a month for leave. "At present he was only able to
bring home men who had served for more than five years
overseas and even this process involved the absence from
their units (at present without replacement) of some 14,000
men at any one time. The position was causing him anxiety
42 Ibid, MP(44)3rd meeting.
310
and he feared that, if he could not greatly improve on it,
serious trouble might arise in India and Burma at the
conclusion of hostilities in Europe".
When Bevin pointed out that there were still 35,000 men
on the RAF Deferred List, Sinclair (Secretary of State for
Air) said that only 12,000 were available for immediate
call-up. The Committee agreed to meet again when an
analysis of the Deferred List had been completed, when they
would frame their recommendations to the War Cabinet.
In the meantime, Bevin produced a memorandum dated 26th
June reviewing the entire manpower position43. This showed
that cuts in industrial manpower had been less than
authorised. If it were decided to raise the intakes into
the Forces during the second half of 1944 from 84,500
(81,000 approved in December 1943 plus 3,500 women for the
ATS owing as at the end of June) to 130,500 (113,000 men
and 17,500 women), even bigger cuts than anticipated would
have to be made in industrial manpower. The number to be
withdrawn from industry for the Forces during the year
would rise to 292,000.
Bevin's memorandum was considered by the Ministerial
Committee on 29th June44. Bevin said "that if the principle
of maximum impact in 1944 was to be maintained - and in his
view it should be - the intake into the Army would have to
be considerably increased during the second half of the
year and particularly during July and August. In his view,
it was clear that for this purpose, and for other reasons,
the cuts in the labour force of the munitions industries
would have to be far higher". Anderson was then asked to
prepare a draft report45, which was approved by the
" Ibid, MP(44)3.
44 Ibid, MP(44)5th meeting.
45lbid, MP(44)5.
311
Ministerial Committee on 4th July46 and circulated to the
War Cabinet two days later.
Anderson's report47 concluded that there was a
substantial imbalance of the manpower budget and it was
clear that even if the provisional allocations to the
Forces were to stand, there would be a considerable gap between supply and demand. However, the Service ministers
were unanimous in condemning these allocations as inadequate, largely because no provision was made for
allocations to the women's services, which would
consequently run down before the end of 1944. Although the
allocations of men to the other two Services would just
meet their requirements, the allocations to the Army were
quite inadequate. The Committee proposed to allocate to the
Army 28,300 men (plus 1,200 transfers from the RN) and
4,500 women (including 3,500 owed from the first half of
the year). With an allocation of 29,500 men, the Army would
certainly be able to save 1 division.
The Committee, however, considered that an intake of
50,000 should be provided for July and August, which would
go a long way to retaining at cadre strength 3 of the
divisions and 2 of the brigades, which would otherwise
disappear. The additional 20,000 should come from calling
up 10,000 men from the RAF Deferred List and the transfer
to the Army of 10,000 more men already serving in the RAF
and RN. As only 6,000 men could in fact be provided from
the RAF Deferred List before the end of August, it was
decided to call-up an additional 4,000 men direct to the
Army ahead of schedule, this 4,000 in turn being counted
against releases from the RAF Deferred List in September
and October. The Army allocation for July and August was
called-up from the RAF Deferred List; 4,000 call-up brought
46 Ibid, MP(44)6th meeting.
47 WP(44)375: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
312
forward; 6,200 transferred from the RN; and 5,000
transferred from the RAF. Although both the RN and the RAF
would receive intakes in July and August, because of the
transfer of men to the Army they would both suffer a net loss. "The men transferred from the Navy and RAF should be
Grade I, for it is in men of this category that the main deficiency of the Army lies. So far as is necessary,
however, compensation should be given to the Navy and RAF
by the transfer, as expeditiously as possible, of men of lower medical category from the Army".
The Ministerial Committee proceeded to recommend a
provisional allocation of 75,000 men and 10,000 women for
the Forces in the last four months of 1944. The call-up for
the second half of the year would therefore be 123,000 men
(including 10,000 from the RAF Deferred List for the Army)
and 17,500 women. This would bring the call-up for the
entire year to 294,000 men and 50,500 women: a significant
increase on the original allocation of 289,000 men and
women. "At the same time we agree that it should be
possible to take a clearer view of the position towards the
end of August, and we accordingly suggest that the
provisional intakes and allocations for the second half of
1944 recommended in this Report should be reviewed at that
date, when it should be possible to start looking ahead
into the first half of 1945. Meanwhile, however, we
consider that the Departments concerned should proceed to
take all the necessary steps to work within the provisional
allocations which we now propose".
The report was considered by the War Cabinet on 12th
July48. The firm allocations for July and August and the
provisional allocations for the whole of the second half of
the year were approved. It was also agreed that, before the
August manpower review, the Chiefs of Staff should prepare
48 WM(44)90th meeting: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
313
a new appreciation of the risk of air attack, and a scheme
drawn up for the release of Civil Defence and ADGB
personnel, to be put into effect if and when it was decided
that the risk of their disbandment could be accepted.
Churchill, in the course of the discussion which preceded
these decisions, expressed his pleasure at the Army
allocations and warned the RN to expect further cuts in its
allocations.
As the result of the month-long discussion of its
requirement for the second half of 1944, which was 190,000
men and 19,800 women for the ATS, the Army had been
allocated 49,500 men and 4,500 women for the ATS up to the
end of August. Although it had, belatedly, received
preferential treatment, it had not been given what it had
asked for: both its forecast shortage of fighting men and
its anticipated disbandment of formations were now
inevitable, although the scale of the shortage and of the
disbandments remained to be seen. Moreover, it would have
to wait until the autumn to learn what its allocation for
the remainder of the year would be.
On 11th August Anderson proposed that the forthcoming
review of allocations should be based on the assumption
that the war in Europe, although it might continue beyond
the end of 1944, would not continue beyond mid 1945. On
this basis, firm allocations should be made for the rest of
1944, and Departments could then proceed to consider their
requirements for the first half of 1945 in the light of
these decisions49. Anderson's proposals were accepted by the
War Cabinet on 14th August50 and Departments immediately
began to review their estimates.
On 21st August the Army's manpower requirement for the
period September to December 1944 was submitted51. The
49 WP(44)440: War Cabinet papers: CAB66.
50 WM(44)106th meeting: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
51 WP(44)453: War Cabinet papers: CAB66. 314
manpower allotment was finalised on 1st September by the
Ministerial Committee52 and approved by the War Cabinet on 5th September53. The Army found that the increased
allocation in July and August had had the desired result in
minimising the expected run down of the Army and the
present estimate was that by the end of 1944 there would be
a loss of the fighting elements of 2 infantry divisions and 3 armoured brigades. The Army also found that it could
reduce its demands for the last four months of the year,
"representing the numbers needed to prevent a further loss
in the first half of 1945", because casualties in the early
stages of "Overlord" had been below estimate, and because
substantial internal savings had been achieved. "The saving
in casualties is not, however, correspondingly reflected in
Armour and Infantry. In these arms the casualties after the
early stages have been above the estimates, though the
world-wide position has been partly offset by lighter
losses in Italy". If a further run down in fighting
strength during the first half of 1945 was to be avoided
the Army needed an intake in the last four months of 1944
of 25,000 fit men suitable for Infantry and Armour.
In addition, an intake of 50,000 was needed to cover the
granting of leave, which could no longer be postponed, to
men with long service, and the training of new men who
would become trained early in 1945 in readiness for the
relief of men in the Far East. The Army thus required
75,000 men for the last four months of 1944. It also
required 16,000 women for the ATS, 1,500 nurses, 620 VAD
(less any received in July and August), and 2,700 non-
industrial civilians. The Army was allotted 50,000 men: a
third less than it required but more than five and a half
times what was allotted to the RN and the RAF combined. The
52 Ibid, WP(44)487.
s' WM(44)117th meeting: War Cabinet minutes: CAB65.
315
Army was also allotted 5,000 women for the ATS: more than
two-thirds less than it required but almost one and a half
times what was allotted to the RN and the RAF combined.
The preference given to the Army in July 1944, and even
more so the preference given to it in September 1944, was
both a recognition of the seriousness of the Army's
position and an acknowledgement of inadequate provision for
the Army in the past. In the diplomatic words of Parker:
"These new proposals reflected, of course, the developments
in the strategic situation. Whereas in the earlier years of
the war the Navy and the Air Force had saved the country
from invasion and made possible the change from defensive
to offensive warfare, with the successful launching of the
assault on the Continent the land forces became the
instruments of final victory. The heavy fighting which
followed D-Day had demonstrated that the demands of the
Army for men and munitions had been in 1943 too severely
cut. Consequently, in the September plan for intake into
the Services the Army was to be the major beneficiary, and
its strength was to be further increased by transfers from
the Navy and the Air Force"54. It goes without saying that
the preference given to the Army in mid July 1944, and even
more so the preference given to it in early September 1944,
came far too late to avert its predicted manpower crisis in
late September 1944.
To summarise the Army's manpower position in 1944. There
was no growth at all in the number of men in the Army,
while the number of women actually fell, during the first
quarter of 1944. During the year the Army initially
required 319,000 men. It was eventually allotted 224,500: a
cut of almost 30%. The actual intake of men was 251,900, of
whom all but 79,800 were swallowed up by outflow. During
the year the Army initially required 24,000 women. It was
54 Manpower, PP231-2.
316
eventually allotted 21,500: a cut of over 10%. The outflow
of women exceeded actual intake by 11,050.
Because the Army was allocated much less manpower than
it required during the second half of the war, a large
number of formations had to be disbanded or reduced. As a
result of the December 1942 manpower allotment, the
Directorate of Staff Duties (DSD) at the War Office
calculated that 1 armoured division, 1 infantry division
(less 1 infantry brigade), 2 armoured brigades, 1 tank
brigade and 1 infantry brigade were disbanded. As a result
of the July 1943 manpower allotment, DSD calculated that 1
armoured division, 2 tank brigades and 3 independent
infantry brigades were disbanded while 1 field force
infantry division and 4 Home Forces infantry divisions were
reduced to Lower Establishment (LE) divisions. As a result
of the December 1943, July 1944 and September 1944 manpower
allotments, the DSD calculated that during 1944 15
formations were disbanded or reduced: 1 armoured division
(9th in UK), 2 armoured division HQs and divisional troops
(10th in Middle East, 1st in Italy), 2 infantry divisions
(59th and 50th in NW Europe), 1 armoured brigade (27th in
NW Europe), 2 tank brigades (1st in NW Europe, 25th in
Italy), 2 infantry brigades (201st Guards and 168th in
Italy) and 3 LE divisions (76th, 77th and 80th in UK) were
disbanded while 2 LE divisions (55th and 61st in UK) were
reduced to cadre55. For some reason, the DSD calculation of
formations disbanded or reduced in 1944 excludes 70th
Brigade, removed from 49th Division and disbanded in NW
Europe. Although disbanded in Italy, 201st Guards Brigade
was resurrected in the UK as a training formation.
What conclusions may we draw from this examination of
Army manpower requirements and allocations during the
second half of the war and especially in 1944?
55 DSD file on manpower: W032/10899.
317
During the second half of the war and especially in 1944
the Army's allocations, and thus its intakes, were inadequate. It is true that the Army grew enormously during
the war. But then so did the duties it was called upon to
perform and the demands made upon it. Although having
2,680,000 men at the beginning of 1944, the Army had
insufficient assets to meet its heavy commitments and carry
out its manifold tasks in that year. It did not have enough
men to maintain its cutting edge. Hence the reduction or disbandment of many formations and units. Intake into the
Army barely kept pace with outflow from the Army: the
number of men gained by the Army was almost entirely offset
by the number of men lost to the Army. The manpower
allocations made to the Army fell far short of its manpower
requirements: far fewer men were supplied to the Army than
it needed both to do its job and to offset the men lost to
it. It simply did not have enough men to fight the Germans
in Italy, fight the Japanese in Burma, garrison a global
Empire, defend the UK and liberate NW Europe. It had a lot
of men certainly and it finished 1944 slightly larger than
it had started. But quantity is not everything. Figures for
the strength of the Army and for the intake into the Army
should not be taken at face value. A large proportion of
the strength of the Army and of the intake into the Army
did not have the physical fitness, mental robustness,
motivation and youth necessary for combat duty.
Grigg was in no doubt that the responsibility for the
Army's manpower crisis lay not with the Army but with the
War Cabinet. As he later wrote: "... I do not remember a
single occasion when the War Cabinet allotted to the Army
more than half the number for which I had asked , 56 He
absolved the Army of responsibility: "I do not think that
it can be doubted that by and large we made the best
possible use of our manpower and that we carried out our
56 Prejudice and Judgement, P360.
318
second transformation of the Army to meet new strategy
speedily and without undue friction. But with all our
economies, the intakes we got as a result of the periodical
manpower allocations of the War Cabinet were not enough for
us to be certain of keeping up for any length of time our full number of divisions. We had to reduce our initial
contribution to "Overlord" below the Prime Minister's
desires. And it was quite inevitable that, if and when a
period of heavy casualties came, we should have to disband
even some of the formations we were able to include
in... 21st Army Group... The time arrived and we had indeed
to break up divisions and this notwithstanding that men
were transferred to us from the Navy and Air Force in a
last attempt to arrest the process of dispersali57. While,
as we have seen in previous chapters, many criticisms may
legitimately be made of the Army's use of its manpower,
there can be no underestimating the contribution that the
inadequacy of its allocations and thus intakes made to
causing the manpower crisis.
The ultimate responsibility for the direction of
Britain's war effort and the allocation of Britain's
manpower lay with the War Cabinet. In so far as the
manpower crisis was caused by the low priority (and thus
the inadequate quantity and insufficient quality of
manpower) given to the Army, responsibility for the
manpower crisis lay with the War Cabinet, as Grigg says.
However, it would be naive to deny that in practice - by
virtue of the offices he held (Prime Minister, First Lord
of the Treasury and Minister of Defence), his unrivalled
experience, the force of his personality, his mastery of
detail, his powers of expression, his phenomenal energy and
his massive prestige - Churchill dominated and bore the
prime responsibility for the direction of Britain's war
57 Ibid, PP362-3.
319
effort and the allocation of Britain's manpower. Indeed,
the documentary record shows clearly that Churchill's
interventions in the decision-making process were invariably decisive: whether placing a cap on the size of the Army (spring 1941); awarding super-priority to MAP
(summer 1943); planning on the assumption that Germany
would be defeated in 1944 (autumn 1943); or giving extra
men to the Army by means of transfers from the RAF and RN
(summer 1944).
This thesis is not a study of Churchill but given his
decisive interventions in the decision-making process a few
words about his thinking are called for. During WWII
Churchill was intent on avoiding a repetition of the
campaign on the Western Front, which had lasted four long
years and had cost three-quarters of a million British
lives, and which he had tried hard to avoid (championing
the Gallipoli campaign) and then to terminate (championing
the tank). During WWII Churchill was prepared to pursue
almost any alternative to the raising and deployment of a
large army in NW Europe and the fighting of a protracted
and bloody campaign there, as in WWI. Hence his opposition
to a cross-Channel invasion (until it became inevitable and
then, paradoxically, he wanted Britain to play as big a
part as possible) and his enthusiastic support for the
campaign in the Mediterranean and the Bomber Offensive.
Unfortunately, neither brought the quick and cheap victory
he sought. In the end, Britain had to deploy a large army
in NW Europe in order to defeat the Germans, as in WWI58.
During the second half of the war the Army was
consistently and repeatedly allotted less manpower than it
required to meet its commitments and replace its wastage.
During the second half of the war, when it was everywhere
on the offensive and was suffering heavy casualties, its
58 Taylor et al, Churchill: Four Faces and the Man, PP40-4,46,188-90,192-6; Moran, Churchill: The Struggle for Survival, PP50-1; Pitt, Churchill and the Generals, PP57,162-3,180-1.
320
commitments and wastage were great, very much greater than
it could sustain. Army manpower was capped in the spring of 1941 at Churchill's behest and, although the cap was later
raised, the Army grew slowly and modestly thereafter.
Throughout the war, the other two Services and their Supply
Departments - the RAF and MAP especially - received in
terms of both quantity and quality a disproportionate share
of the nation's manpower.
Much more could be said about the preference given to
Airpower. It is unfortunate that space prohibits the
inclusion in this thesis of a detailed analysis of the
manpower resources devoted to Airpower. Suffice it to say
that a great quantity of high quality manpower was devoted
to the RAF and MAP rather than to the Army during the war
and that this was a major cause of the Army's manpower
crisis. For a sustained and damning indictment of the high
manpower priority awarded during the war, at Churchill's
behest, to the RAF (Bomber Command in particular), to the
detriment of the Army (the infantry in particular), the
reader is referred to, ironically, Terraine's magisterial
history of the RAF during WW1159.
By the end of 1942 it was no longer realistic to believe
that Airpower was going to win the war and that the Army
would not have to once again engage in operations on the
Continent. However, the Army's demand for more manpower was
largely rejected at that time. Because of the low manpower
priority it had received, in the summer of 1943 the Army
returned to the Continent unfitted for large-scale,
prolonged and costly operations. Yet, at Churchill's
behest, at that very time the Army's demand for more
manpower was largely rejected and Airpower was given
supreme manpower priority. Manpower priority for aircraft
production continued until the first day of 1944, exactly
s9 Terraine, The Right of the Line, PP578,592-3,602-5,640-1.
321
four months before the planned date of D-Day and just over
five months before the actual.
In the autumn of 1943 Britain reached total manpower
mobilization: it was no longer possible to sustain, still
less increase, Britain's war effort. And yet the decisive
campaign of the war -a campaign in which the Army would
undoubtedly experience heavy fighting and suffer heavy
casualties - still lay ahead. Again at Churchill's behest,
in the autumn of 1943 the Army's demand for more manpower
was largely rejected. Consequently, in the summer of 1944
the Army crossed the Channel still unfitted for large-
scale, prolonged and costly operations. Belated and
inadequate transfers of men from the RAF and RN to the Army
after D-Day at Churchill's behest could not - and did not -
rectify or atone for the many years of under-resourcing he
had countenanced.
Given the great disparity between the manpower required
by the Army and the manpower allocated to the Army during
the second half of the war and especially in 1944, the year
in which it assaulted "Festung Europa", it is not that
difficult to understand why the Army experienced a manpower
crisis in the autumn of 1944.
322
CONCLUSION
The main causes of the manpower crisis, namely the
shortage of infantry reinforcements, which afflicted the
British Army in the autumn of 1944 can be simply stated.
The Army did not receive either the quantity or quality of
manpower it needed. At the same time, the Army could have
better used the manpower it did receive.
In the Second World War Britain mobilized its manpower
very thoroughly for the war effort, conscripting millions
into the forces. However, the Army was very much smaller in
the Second World War than it had been in the First. The
Army's manpower was capped as early as the spring of 1941.
Massive manpower resources were devoted to other sectors of
the war effort instead, especially the Royal Air Force and
the Ministry of Aircraft Production. The Ministry of
Aircraft Production was given manpower priority in the
summer of 1943. By the autumn of 1943 British manpower was
fully mobilised for the war effort: it was no longer
possible to increase the size of the cake, merely
distribute the slices differently. The Army's manpower
allocation for 1944 was more than halved in the autumn of
1943. The Army was given manpower priority only in the
summer of 1944: after the invasion of North West Europe and
far too late to avoid a crisis.
The manpower crisis affected the infantry principally.
This was not only because the infantry bore the brunt of
the fighting and consequently suffered most of the
casualties, but also because, as a result of the Army's low
manpower priority, only a proportion of the Army possessed
the physical fitness, mental robustness, youth and
motivation necessary for infantry duty in the field - and
only a proportion of these men were actually in the
323
infantry in the field, most being employed elsewhere in the
Army.
The strategic, operational and tactical effects of the
infantry shortage are not the concern of this thesis, which is concerned with how and why the shortage came about.
Moreover, Hart among others has discussed at length the
effects in North West Europe, the primary theatre. Suffice
it to say that the effects were considerable, inevitable
and obvious. Shortage of infantrymen compelled the British
Army to pursue a cautious approach, to rely on firepower
(artillery, armour and aircraft) and to depend on Allies.
Given his dominance, throughout this thesis I have not
hesitated to criticise Churchill personally for those
decisions by the Government which I believe caused and/or
exacerbated the manpower crisis. In this conclusion I
consider it proper to recapitulate my principal criticisms
of Churchill. It gives me no pleasure to do so. I believe,
have always believed and will always believe that Churchill
was a hero and "the saviour of his country". However, even
heroes and saviours are capable of harbouring prejudices
and making mistakes.
The size, composition and role of the British Army in
the Second World War were largely determined by Churchill.
It may fairly be called Churchill's Army. Consequently,
many of the manpower problems experienced by the British
Army in the Second World War may properly be laid at the
door of Churchill. This is especially true of the infantry
shortage, which was to a large extent both created and
exacerbated into a crisis by decisions of Churchill. Given
that Churchill - quite rightly - constantly drew attention
to and criticised the Army's declining infantry strength
and growing "tail" during the war, this is both ironic and
paradoxical. Yet it is a fact that, unwittingly but
inevitably, by his decisions he decreased the supply of
suitable personnel to, and increased the burden on, the
324
infantry. But for the preference shown to Special Forces,
the Foot Guards, the Royal Artillery, the Royal Armoured
Corps, the Royal Air Force's Bomber Command and the
Ministry of Aircraft Production; and but for the reluctance
to build a mass Army on Great War lines, to tighten Army
discipline and to halt in Italy; it is certain that the
infantry crisis would not have been as bad as it was and it
is probable that there would have been no infantry crisis
at all.
None of these decisions were taken lightly or without
reason. Many, such as the preference given to Bomber
Command and Special Forces, were actually taken with a view
to lightening the burden on the Army - the infantry
especially - and avoiding heavy Army - especially infantry
- casualties. Unfortunately, they failed. Bomber Command
and Special Forces absorbed a large number of high-grade
men and suffered heavy losses while the infantry, deprived
of those men, was still required to do a lot of fighting
and still suffered heavy losses. As Terraine has pointed
out, while Britain lost far fewer men in the Second World
War than in the Great War (thanks to Dunkirk and the Red
Army), Britain lost more of its brightest and best in the
second war than in the first (thanks to Bomber Command and
Special Forces). Such is the sometimes terrible gap between
intentions and consequences. Although dominant, Churchill
was not of course a dictator. Others - principally Grigg,
Brooke and Adam - must bear some of the responsibility for
the Army's manpower problems in general and the infantry
crisis in particular. Grigg, Brooke and Adam either agreed
with Churchill or did not disagree with him strongly enough
- and vice versa.
It is the author's prerogative not only to draw his own
conclusions but also to express those conclusions in his
own way. The author believes that a good way to highlight
the particular actions and omissions which in his judgement
325
caused and exacerbated the manpower crisis is to say
specifically what should and should not be done the next
time i. e. in the event of another great war.
It might be thought that the manpower problems of the
British Army during the Second World War are now of purely
historical interest and provide no lessons for the future.
The Army is now so small that it could fit into Wembley
Stadium; it is now entirely regular; and it now has no
enemy, either actual or potential. Nothing could be more
mistaken. Many of the problems which troubled the British
Army during the Second World War still trouble it today,
although of course in a less pressing fashion. One has only
to think of infantry over-stretch, the employment of women
and the maintenance of discipline, to name but three. There
can be no doubt that, if the British Army had to fight
another war, whether great or small, these problems would
become pressing.
What are the lessons which emerge from this examination
of the way the British Army utilized the manpower at its
disposal in the Second World War? What errors should we try
to avoid if there is a Third World War which will call for
the mobilization of maximum armed forces? At the moment
this is a highly unlikely scenario, but then so was a
Second World War in the 1920s and early 1930s.
The object is to produce the greatest effective fighting
force from the segment of the nation's manpower fit for
military service; and the suggested changes in practices
followed in the Second World War are intended to further
that object.
Command and administrative organization should be on a
simpler basis. Fighting formation headquarters should be
set up as required for the tactical handling of the forces
we put in the field, and tendencies to inflate command
echelons arising from a spirit of national exclusiveness
should be resisted.
326
Administrative headquarters should be kept to the
minimum required for fulfilling their functions, and their
size be regulated strictly by the number of troops which they are administering.
If a Third World War should have North West Europe as the theatre in which the main British land force is
engaged, its base should either move to the Continent as
soon as practicable or, providing speedy and secure
communications can be maintained, it should remain in
Britain. Duplication of the base administrative
organization should be avoided as much as possible.
The ratio of men in fighting to those in supporting
corps should be kept high. We should also avoid investing
much manpower in units or branches of corps with a purely
defensive role, as we did in the Second World War with
anti-tank and anti-aircraft artillery. In the Second World
War we had considerably more men in the supporting corps - in particular, more medical, more ordnance corps, more
electrical and mechanical engineers and more supply and
transport - than were needed.
The creation and growth of elite and special forces
should be strictly controlled. In the Second World War such
forces absorbed a large quantity of the high quality
manpower at the Army's disposal and they did not repay the
heavy investment made in them.
While the field commander should have some liberty to
organize new units or reorganize existing ones for specific
urgent requirements, the tendency to dissipate
reinforcements for the fighting troops by forming ad hoc
units should be guarded against. This tendency would be
lessened if a smaller reserve of reinforcements were kept
overseas and if better control of manpower were maintained
by the centre. Both these objects will be facilitated by a
regular system of air transport.
327
Transportation of reinforcements by air, instead of sea,
would be more reliable and economical, unless the
strategical circumstances of a future war were vastly different from the last, or from what can be envisaged.
This would enable the margin of reinforcements held
overseas to be cut substantially.
A clear decision on the eventual size of the Army,
arrived at before the outbreak of war, and without waiting
until imminent danger frightens politicians and the public
into consenting to the necessary measures, would enable
planning to be properly done, would allow a properly phased
build-up, and the development of an appropriate and
economical reinforcement induction, training, and holding
establishment.
The wastage rates upon which the calculations for
reinforcement requirements should be based should be those
deduced from British experience in the World Wars and
subsequent wars, checked against Allied experience; if
anything, there should be over-insurance in fighting
troops, especially infantry and armoured corps, and less
reserves for supporting corps.
There should be a more intensive use of the manpower
actually available. We know that men with considerable
disabilities both physical and psycho-neurotic, can do
useful work in civil life. By careful selection procedures,
in the first place, it should be possible to put men into
the employments for which their physical and mental
characteristics fit them, in which they can continue to
serve without breaking down. There should be greater
emphasis placed on training officers in their duties of
man-management and of creating the feeling among all the
men in their units that someone cares for their welfare and
that if they have troubles, they can tell them to someone
who will try to help them.
328
At the same time there should be firm and impartial
discipline to ensure that the weak and the waverers take
their share of the work and the risks. In the Second World
War discipline was more permissive than it had been in the
Great War. Indeed, it was too permissive. In the context of
a war of national survival against one of the most odious
and unscrupulous regimes in history, permissiveness was both unwise and dangerous. A less permissive approach would
have substantially reduced manpower wastage through
desertion and other indiscipline.
Forces for the defence of the British Isles should be
kept to a minimum, consistent with strategical security,
and, so far as possible, should be organized in formations
or fractions of formation which can become offensive and
mobile. Static defensive units and administrative services
should consist eventually of low category personnel. As in
the Second World War, women and those men not suitable for,
or available to, the forces should be utilised in home
defence, enabling manpower to be concentrated on defeating
the enemy.
While, during the first half of the Great War, political
considerations permitted no system of raising the Army
other than voluntary enlistment, during the Second World
War compulsory service was employed from the outset. It is
difficult to see how, if we are forced into another World
War by a powerful and dangerous aggressor, the full
strength of our nation could be mobilized for defence,
without resort to universal service. This being the case,
it is much better to introduce universal service at the
outset rather than be forced to it by the pressure of
events. Whether or not volunteering is permitted to
continue alongside conscription, the system of recruiting
men into the forces should not be allowed, as it was during
the Second World War, to favour the most popular service
329
(the Royal Air Force) at the expense of the least popular
(the Army).
I should like to set down two final conclusions.
Firstly, the necessity for a strong Army with a strong infantry arm. As the most labour intensive service as well
as the service which bears the brunt of casualties, the
Army should receive, in terms of quality as well as
quantity, the lion's share of the nation's manpower. In the
Second World War the Royal Air Force, and to a lesser
extent the Royal Navy, received an excessive share of the
nation's manpower, especially in terms of quality. As the
Second World War progressed the lesson was gradually
learned that, although command of the air and sea are
essential prerequisites for victory, neither aeroplanes nor
ships can take and hold territory, only soldiers. The price
of this learning experience was paid by the Army, which
embarked upon the decisive campaign of the war undermanned
and with inadequate reserves.
Of the Army's manpower, the infantry should receive, in
terms of quality as well as quantity, the lion's share, as
the most labour intensive arm as well as the arm which
bears the brunt of casualties. The Second World War
demonstrated, once again, that in war - however fine the
other fighting corps and the supporting corps are - it is
necessary to have plenty of good infantry. As Montgomery
said, although they were "the least spectacular arm of the
Army, yet without them you cannot win a battle. Indeed,
without them you can do nothing. Nothing at all, nothing".
As the Falklands, the Gulf and the Balkans have all
demonstrated, armies - and especially infantrymen - are
just as crucial to the ending of conflicts today as they
were more than fifty years ago.
Secondly, the importance of economy in the use of
manpower by the military. This is a lesson that must be
ground into the military officer at every stage of his
330
education, and not only by precept during his periods of formal instruction, but during all his various appointments
and commands. It must be thoroughly understood and always
remembered by every officer, that it is his prime duty to
get the best service possible out of the men for whom he is
responsible, and he must know and practice the ways to
accomplish this. He must never look on men as "expendable".
I do not mean that he must not look on them as kanonen
futter, for following the experience of the Great War no
British officer has taken the view that battle casualties
did not matter, so long as victory was won. We have seen by
the statistics assembled in this thesis that the major
waste of manpower was not in the casualties incurred in
battle (which were far fewer than in the Great War), but in
the extravagant use of men for non-essential purposes, born
of the idea that "there are plenty more where the first lot
came from". Of course there are not plenty more; a nation
can quickly come to the end of its physically fit manpower,
if proper use is not made of those who are perhaps not fit
for every kind of military service, but who, properly
handled, can do a job that does not call for a hero or
athlete. Rabelais quotes a proverb, in another connection:
"A good carpenter can make use of any kind of timber". A
good officer should be able to get useful service out of
most men, and history is full of examples that this can be
done.
Napoleon said, "God is on the side of the bigger
battalions". One of the supreme duties of the military
officer, then, is to see that the battalions are kept big.
And, to add another proverb, in manpower economy, "Take
care of the pence, and the pounds will take care of
themselves" also applies. Wastage comes from a few men
insufficiently worked or insufficiently cared for here and
there, and now and then. They are lost as fit soldiers, the
total mounts up rapidly, and presently the nation's armies
331
find themselves with no fit soldiers to replace casualties.
If this happens to us before it happens to the enemy, we
have lost the war.
332
TABLE I DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER IN THE BRITISH ARMY: BY ARM, 30TH SEPTEMBER 1944
Staff & ERE List 912 (0.04%)
Household Cavalry 3,199 (0-12%)
Royal Armoured Corps 122,770 (4.45%)
Royal Artillery 617,860 (22.41%)
Royal Engineers 254,182 (9.22%)
Royal Signals 139,097 (5.05%)
Foot Guards 38f827 (1.4%)
Infantry 526,882 (19.11%)
Army Air Corps 16,232 (0.59%)
TOTAL TEETH 1,719,961 (62.39%)
Royal Army Service Corps (including EFI) 303,862 (11.02%)
Royal Army Medical Corps 87,863 (3.19%)
Royal Army Ordnance Corps 123,679 (4.49%)
Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineers 151,706 (5.5%)
Royal Army Pay Corps 21,396 (0.78%)
Corps of Military Police 31,625 (1.15%)
Pioneer Corps 166,459 (6.04%)
Army Catering Corps 61,243 (2.22%)
General Service Corps 51,783 (1.88%)
Royal Army Chaplains Department, Royal Army Veterinary Corps, Army Dental Corps, Intelligence Corps etc. 37,312 (1.35%)
TOTAL TAIL 1,036,928 (37.61%)
GRAND TOTAL 2,756,889
Source: "General Return of the Strength of the British Army" for the quarter ending 30th September 1944, AG Stats: W073/162.
333
TABLE II DISTRIBUTION OF MANPOWER IN THE BRITISH ARMY: BY LOCATION, 30TH SEPTENBR 1944
UK
TOTAL UK (37.5%)
21st Army Group (i. e. North West Europe)
Central Mediterranean Force (i. e. Italy)
Middle East Command
India Command (including Burma)
Colonial Garrisons (e. g. Malta, Gibraltar)
TOTAL OVERSEAS (62.1%)
ERE (0.4%)
GRAND TOTAL
1,033,626
1,033,626
714,135
499,207
192,752
242,584
64,518
1,713,196
10,067
2,756,889
Source: "General Return of the Strength of the British Army" for the quarter ending 30th September 1944, AG Stats: W073/162.
334
TABLE III DISTRIBUTION OF BRITISH ARMY MANPOWER IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 30TH SEPTEMBER 1944
AVAILABLE 717,836 (70.4%)
Field Force 225,709 (31.4%)
Home Field Army 60,579 Force 135 (i. e. Liberation of Channel Islands) 6,879 Anti-Aircraft Command 158,251
Non-Field Force 492,127 (68.6%)
Training Organization & Holding Division Reserve Divisions Coastal Defence Maritime Anti-Aircraft Local Defence & Vulnerable Points Home Guard Empire Base Installations & ATS Training Seaborne
[Included in the above: 44,726 reinforcements]
UNAVAILABLE 302,296 (29.6%)
Under Training Retraining Limited availability Non-available In transit to UK "Y" List Expeditionary Force Institute
GRAND TOTAL 1,020,132
Source: AG Stats return W0365/178.
130,571 23,753 15,498 14,584 15,196
5,521 285,035
1,969
147,112 26,494 43,994 20,112
3,000 60,290
1,294
335
TABLE IV COMPARISON OF MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION: BY ARM: THE BRITISH, AMERICAN AND CANADIAN ARMIES
Sources and notes: American figures from Table 3, P203, "United States Army in World War II: The Organisation of Ground Combat Troops", Greenfield et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, 1947. Actual strengths on 31st March 1945. "Artillery" includes Coastal and Anti-Aircraft only. "Engineers" includes Chemical. "Supply & Transport" includes Quartermaster Corps and Transportation. "HQ & Overhead" includes Adjutant-General, Military Police and Miscellaneous. Canadian figures from Table II, P17, "Manpower in the Canadian Army", Maj. -Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Toronto, 1956. Establishment strengths for Italy, North West Europe and UK in November 1944;
reinforcements and ineffectives excluded. Actual strengths for Canada on 29th November 1944. British figures from "General Return of the Strength of the British Army" for the quarter ending 30th September 1944, AG Stats: W073/162. Actual strengths on 30th September 1944. "Infantry" includes Motor, Rifle and Machine Gun Infantry; Rifle and Motor Foot Guards; and AAC. "Armour" includes RAC, Household Cavalry and Armoured Foot Guards. "Medical" includes RAMC and Army Dental Corps. "Ordnance & EME" includes RAOC and REME. "Supply & Transport" includes RASC. "HQ & Overhead" includes Pioneer Corps, ACC, GSC, CMP, RAPC
etc. 336
TABLE V COMPARISON OF MANPOWER NON-DIVISIONAL: THE AMERICAN EUROPEAN THEATRE
DISTRIBUTION: DIVISIONAL AND AND CANADIAN ARMIES IN THE
CANADIAN
In divisions 32.9% Non-divisional fighting 7.2% Non-divisional supporting 23.6% HQ and overhead 13.6% Reinforcements 18.2% Hospital patients 4.5%
AMERICAN
31.1% 21.4% 32.3%
3.5% 6.9% 4.8%
Sources and notes: American figures from Table 2, P194, "United States Army in World War II: The Organisation of Ground Combat Troops", Greenfield et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, 1947. Figures as of 31st March 1945. Canadian figures from Table III, P20, "Manpower in the Canadian Army", Maj. -Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Toronto, 1956. Figures as of 2nd December 1944. "Non-divisional fighting" = Corps armoured car regiments, armoured/tank brigades, heavy and medium artillery, anti- aircraft artillery, anti-tank artillery, survey units. "Non-divisional supporting" = Corps and Army engineers, signals, medical units and hospitals, dental units, service corps, ordnance corps, provost corps.
337
TABLE VI MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION: DIVISIONAL AND DIVISIONAL: THE BRITISH ARMY IN NORTH WEST EUROPE
With units 90.04%
In Divisions 30.2% Brigades 4.08% AGRAs 3.0% GHQ AA Tps 5.5% GHQ & LOC Tps 32.0% Corps Tps 4.8% Army Tps 6.6% With SHAEF 0.8% With Canadians 2.9% Res & Misc 0.12%
In prison 0.15%
On courses 0.17%
In hospital 3.54%
Reinforcements 6.1ý
NON-
Source and notes: AG Stats return W0365/129. Actual figures for 21st Army Group on 30th September 1944. There were more reinforcements and less in units than authorised. However, the deficit in units was slightly greater than the surplus of reinforcements. "AGRAs" comprised heavy and medium artillery. "GHQ AA Tps" comprised anti-aircraft artillery. "Brigades" primarily comprised independent armoured/tank brigades. "With Canadians" refers to those British
personnel "making up the numbers" in Canadian Army Troops, Corps Troops and AGRAs.
338
TABLE VII COMPARISON OF MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION: TEETH AND TAIL: THE BRITISH AND CANADIAN ARMIES IN ITALY
HQ 1.4% 3.1% Signals 4.8% 5.0% Other overhead - 4.5%
TAIL 34.7% 46.9%
Sources: British figures from Trench-Gascoigne Prize Essay for 1949 by Lt. -Col. W. G. F. Jackson, "R. U. S. I. Journal", May 1950. Canadian figures from Table IV, P22, "Manpower in the Canadian Army", Maj. -Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Toronto, 1956.
339
TABLE VIII ORGANIZATION OF BRITISH DIVISIONS IN NORTH WEST EUROPE
Medical 1 Field Ambulance 1 Light Field Amb 1 Fd Dressg Stn 1 Field Hygiene Sect
Ordnance 1 Ordnance Field Park
Workshops 2 Bde Workshops 1 LAA Regt Workshop
12 LAD
Provost 1 Div Provo Coy
INFANTRY
3 Inf Bdes (9 Inf Bns)
1 Recce Regt
3 Field Regts 1 Anti-Tank Regt 1 LAA Regt
3 Field Coys 1 Field Park Coy 1 Bridging Plt
1 Inf Div Sigs
1 MG Bn
3 Bde Coys 1 Div Tps Coy
3 Fd Ambulances 2 Fd Dressg Stns 1 Fd Hyg Sect
1 Ord Fd Park
3 Bde Workshops 1 LAA Regt Wkshp
11 LAD
1 Div Provo Coy
Source and notes: PP534-5, Appendix IV: Part II, "Victory in the West", Vol. I, Major L. F. Ellis, HMSO, London, 1962. For the sake of simplicity various headquarters, defence
and employment platoons, field security sections and postal units have been omitted.
340
TABLE IX ESTABLISHMENT OF BRITISH AND AMERICAN INFANTRY DIVISIONS IN NORTH WEST EUROPE
BRITISH AMERICAN
Cavalry (Recce) Infantry (Rifle Fd. Artillery A. A. Artillery A. Tk. Artillery Engineers Medical Military Police Ordnance R. E. M. E. R. A. S. C. Quartermaster Signals Headquarters Misc.
Source and notes: The American figures are from Table 2, P306, "United States Army in World War II: The Organization
of Ground Combat Troops", Greenfield et al, Historical Division, Department of the Army, Washington, 1947. "Medical" includes 497 attached medics. "Headquarters" includes 166 divisional HQ, 104 divisional HQ company, 58 bandsmen and 13 attached chaplains. Regimental (i. e. brigade) HQs are included under "Infantry". Not borne on the establishment were 225 attached personnel: 136 infantrymen, 57 artillerymen, 17 engineers and 15 special troops. The British figures are actually Canadian and have been taken from Appendix A, P172, "Manpower in the Canadian Army", Maj. -Gen. E. L. M. Burns, Toronto, 1956. The Canadians
copied the establishments of British fighting formations
and units almost exactly. "Headquarters" includes divisional HQ and brigade HQs. Reinforcements are not included in either the British or American figures.
341
TABLE X ORGANIZATION OF THE R. E. M. E. IN NORTH WEST EUROPE
1st Line
LADs (A, B, regiments battalions 11).
2nd Line
C or D): 1 per most combat units, except LAA (which had their own workshops) and rifle (e. g. armoured division 12; infantry division
Infantry/Armoured/Tank Brigade Workshops: 1 per brigade (e. g. armoured division 2; infantry division 3; independent armoured/tank brigade 1) . Under Divisional command, except for Tank Brigade Workshops.
Corps Troops Workshops: 1 per corps. Under Corps command.
Army Troops Workshops: 2 per army. Under Army command.
3rd Line
Infantry/Armoured/Tank Troops Workshops: 1 per division or independent armoured/tank brigade. Under Army command.
4th Line
Advanced Base Workshops: 4. Theoretically 1 per 2 corps; actually 1 per corps. Under GHQ command.
Base Workshops: 0. Under GHQ or WO command.
Source: PP12 and 141, War Office Monograph "Royal
Electrical and Mechanical Engineers", Vol. I: "Organization
and Operations", Major-General Sir E. Bertram Rowcroft, 1951.
342
TABLE XI TRAINING ESTABLISHMENTS AND TRAINING STREAM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1944
30th June
Trainees
Recruits Under Training Retraining
TOTAL
30th Sept
131,292 147,112 26f494
-------------------------- 131,292 173,606
Reinforcements
Cadre Infantry Divisions Training Organization Holding Division Reserve Divisions Holding & Reserve Units
2,166 19,489 14,752
1,391 1,291 6,775 8,259
16,638 18,258
TOTAL 44,293 44,726
Trainers, Cadres and Administrators
Training Organization Holding Division Holding & Reserve Units Reserve Divisions ATS Training Units Cadre Infantry Divisions
82,413 ) 3,538 ) 96,270
) 6,519 14,024 15,494
191 186 22,053
TOTAL 106,685 134,003
Source: AG Stats return W0365/178.
343
TABLE XII STRENGTH OF THE BRITISH ARMY, 1939-45
MEN WOMEN TOTAL
30th September 1939 897,000 NA 31st December 1939 1,128,000 23,900 1,151,900 31st March 1940 1,361,000 NA 30th June 1940 1,650,000 31,500 1,681,500 30th September 1940 1,888,000 36,100 1,924,100 31st December 1940 2,075,000 36,400 2,111,400 31st March 1941 2,166,000 37,500 2,203,500 30th June 1941 2,221,000 42,800 2,263,800 30th September 1941 2,292,000 65,000 2,357,000 31st December 1941 2,340,000 85,100 2,425,100 31st March 1942 2,397,000 111,100 2,508,100 30th June 1942 2,453,000 140,200 2,593,200 30th September 1942 2,494,000 162,200 2,656,200 31st December 1942 2,566,000 180,700 2,746,700 31st March 1943 2,628,000 195,300 2,823,300 30th June 1943 2,673,000 210,300 2,883,300 30th September 1943 2,679,000 212,500 2,891,500 31st December 1943 2,680,000 207,500 2,887,500 31st March 1944 2,680,000 206,200 2,886,200 30th June 1944 2,720,000 199,000 2,919,000 30th September 1944 2,741,000 198,200 2,939,200 31st December 1944 2,760,000 196,400 2,956,400 31st March 1945 2,802,000 195,300 2,997,300 30th June 1945 2,920,000 190,800 3,110,800
Source and notes: Table 10, P9, "Statistical Digest of the War", Central Statistical Office, HMSO, 1951. Figures for men include those on the India Unattached List but exclude those in the British Indian Service. Men locally enlisted abroad are excluded after September 1941. Figures for women include the Auxiliary Territorial Service only and exclude nurses and schoolmistresses. Women locally enlisted abroad whose documents were maintained outside the UK are excluded; all women locally enlisted abroad are excluded after March 1944.
344
TABLE XIII OUTFLOW FROM THE BRITISH ARMY, 1939-45
Casualties Medical Transfers to TOTALS and other discharges reserve, deaths releases etc.
1939 700 5,700 26,900 33,300
1940 54,700 61,300 69,200 185,200
1941 35,100 88,400 58,700 182,200
1942 97,100 75,900 32,600 205,600
1943 32,600 55,500 35,400 123,500
1944 67,700 67,700 36,700 172,100
1945 (118,400) 103,200 756,600 741,400
------- 169,500
------- 457,700
--------- 1,016,100
--------- 1,643,300
Source and notes: Table IV, P485, "Manpower", H. M. D. Parker, HMSO, 1957. The 1945 figures were naturally distorted by the ending of the war. In 1945 transfers to the reserve, releases etc. rose massively; repatriated prisoners exceeded casualties and other deaths by 118,400;
and medical discharges rose appreciably. It is clear that only some casualties and other deaths are included by Parker. In fact, during the war the British Army suffered 569,501 battle casualties and 19,935 natural deaths ("Strength and Casualties of the Armed Forces and Auxiliary Services of the United Kingdom 1939 to 1945", PP6-7, Cmd. 6832, HMSO, June 1946)
345
TABLE XIV MEDICAL DISCHARGES FROM THE BRITISH ARMY, 1943-45
Source and notes: PP439-440,448, "Casualties and Medical Statistics", W. Franklin Mellor, HMSO, 1972. Rates per 1,000 strength. Mental disorders accounted for between 35%
and 41% of discharges due to disease. Of mental disorders:
Source and notes: Table IV (Part A), P485, "Manpower", H. M. D. Parker, HMSO, 1957. Figures for Sept-Dec 1939
exclude 485,400 reservists and territorials mobilized and embodied on the outbreak of war. The peak period for
conscripts was 1940-42 while for volunteers it was 1939-40. Conscripts always exceeded volunteers except during the first months of the war. In the period 1941-45 190,390
women (72%) joined the Auxiliary Territorial Service
voluntarily while in the period 1942-45 73,610 women (28%)
were conscripted into it: Table IV (Part B), P486.
353
TABLE XXII MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF MEN UNDER THE MILITARY TRAINING AND NATIONAL SERVICE ACTS, JUNE 1939-JULY 1945
Under 20 20-25 26-35 36 and TOTALS over
Group I 1,702,010 1,247,990 1,255,196 343,486 4,548,682 (69.1%)
Group II 193,687 218,319 343,842 176,337 932,185 (14.2%)
Group III (7.8%)
64,673 128,983 201,355 119,505 514,516
Group IV (8.9%)
TOTALS
107,546 103,442 213,319 162,824 587,131
2,067,916 1,698,734 2,013,712 802,152 6,582,514
Source and notes: Table VIII (Part A), P495, "Manpower",
H. M. D. Parker, HMSO, 1957. In simple terms Group I was defined as fit; Group II as largely fit; Group III as largely unfit; and Group IV as unfit.
354
TABLE XXIII REGISTRATIONS OF MEN UNDER THE MILITARY TRAINING AND NATIONAL SERVICE ACTS, JUNE 1939-JUNE 1945
Date of Registration
Age Group Number Registered
1939 (June, Oct, Dec)
1940 (Feb-Jul, Nov)
1941 (Jan-Feb, Apr-Jul, Sept, Dec)
1942 (Apr, Aug, Nov)
1943 (Jan, Apr, Jun, Sept, Dec)
1944 (Mar, Jun, Sept, Dec)
1945 (Mar, Jun)
TOTAL 8,356,686
Dec 1916-Dec 1919
Jan 1905-Dec 1916; Dec 1919-Nov 1920
July 1900-Dec 1904; Nov 1920-June 1923
July 1923-Sept 1924
Oct 1924-Mar 1926
Apr 1926-Mar 1927
Apr-Sept 1927
727,066
4,101,218
2,222,240
399,103
4 65,2 64
285,750
156,045
Source and notes: Table VI, PP488-490, "Manpower", H. M. D. Parker, HMSO, 1957. The male population aged 18-41 had been
registered by the end of 1941. Thereafter the only men who were registered were those who had recently reached 18 or who were approaching 18. Of those registered: a few declared themselves conscientious objectors; some were not available for general posting (e. g. merchant seamen, cripples); many expressed a preference for the RN and RM;
many expressed a preference for the RAF. Only the remainder were available for general posting, including posting to the Army.
355
TABLE XXIV BRITISH ARMY MANPOWER ALLOCATIONS, JULY 1942-JUNE 1945
PERIOD COVERED DATE OF REQUIREMENT ALLOCATION
REQUIREMENTS AND
Jul 1942-Dec 1943 Dec 1942 649,000 men 160,000 women
Apr-Dec 1943 Jul 1943 207,400 men 40,000 women
Jan-Dec 1944 Dec 1943 319,000 men 24,000 women
Jul-Dec 1944 Jul 1944 190,000 men 19,800 women
Sept-Dec 1944 Sept 1944 75,000 men 16,000 women
Jan-Jun 1945 Dec 1944 251,500 men 13,800 women
ALLOCATION
349,000 men 80,000 women
116,400 men 29,000 women
125,000 men 12,000 women
49,500 men 4,500 women
50,000 men 5,000 women
160,000 men 12,000 women
Source and notes: Directorate of Staff Duties file on manpower: W032/10899. Figures for women relate to the Auxiliary Territorial Service only. Requirement for April- December 1943 included 52,400 men and 11,000 women owed from previous allotment. Requirement for July-December 1944 included 30,000 men and 3,000 women owed from previous allotment. Allocation made in December 1943 was for the period January-June 1944 only; an additional 25,000 men were provisionally allocated for the period July-December 1944. Allocation made in July 1944 was for the period July- August 1944 only.
356
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