Chapter 8

Active Participation Despite Limited Influence:Explaining Norway’s Participation in EU’s Security Policy

Pernille Rieker

IntroductionThe aim of this chapter is to analyse Norway’s policy towards the European Un-ion’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). More precisely, it attempts to explain why various Norwegian governments of recent years have been willing to contribute to operations in an EU framework and to integrate into the EU’s evolving structures for security and defence cooperation despite their country’s limited access to the decision-making and/or decision-shaping process in this pol-icy area. Norway’s influence over these processes has decreased in parallel with the acceleration of the integration process in this particular policy area. Following the launch of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999 and later in 2009 the CSDP, Norway emphasised some important conditions that had to be met if it should continue its participation. Unsurprisingly, such conditions, set by a non-member, were not accepted by the EU. It is more surprising that this lack of real concessions did not lead to a change in Norwegian policy. Instead of becom-ing more reluctant to contribute to the CSDP, the Norwegian government showed an increased willingness to participate.1

The chapter starts with a short overview of the relationship between Norway and the EU and continues with an in-depth analysis of the development in the Norwegian policy towards Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and ESDP/CSDP. Finally, it proposes four complementary explanations for the Norwegian policy.

1 For a comprehensive review of Norway’s agreements with the EU and an analysis of the state of integration see the report by an independent expert committee commissioned by the government and delivered in 2012. Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Utenfor og innenfor. Norges avtaler med EU. NOU 2012:2 (Oslo, Government Administration Ser-vices, 2012).

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Norway and the EU – A Particularly Close Relationship Even though the Norwegian people have rejected EU membership twice, Norway has today a very close relationship with the European Union. The main framework for this relationship is the European Economic Area (EEA) Agreement that makes Norway, together with Iceland and Liechtenstein, a full participant in the EU In-ternal Market.2 But the close relationship with the EU does not end here: over the years Norwegian authorities have managed to secure cooperation agreements and arrangements in many other areas as well. In foreign and security policy, for instance, Norway has a well-established political dialogue with the EU, and has even participated in several EU-led operations. With regard to justice and internal security, Norway participates in the Schengen Area and works closely with the EU in its fight against terrorism and international crime.

This means that Norway is an active participant in most of the important policy areas in the EU. It could even be argued that it has become more integrated into the EU than some of the member countries themselves. This is especially true if we compare the position taken by Norway to that of EU members who have decided to opt out from some of these policy areas (for instance, Denmark and Britain). In this sense, Norway could be viewed as a ‘class B’ member of the EU – a country that is well integrated into most policy areas, but lacking real political influence.

Even though the EEA Agreement does not give Norway and other European Free Trade Association (EFTA) countries a direct say in EU decision-making, it provides them with an opportunity to take part in decision-shaping, which means that they can have some influence over the preparatory work undertaken by the European Commission in drawing up new legislative proposals. The Commission has the exclusive right to propose new legislation but is obliged to call on advice from external sources when doing so. The EEA Agreement contains provisions for input from the EEA/EFTA side at various stages before new legislation is adopted. Such input can take the form of participation of EEA/EFTA experts in EC com-mittees or the submission of EEA/EFTA comments, as well as the adoption of resolutions in response to initiatives from the Commission. It has been argued that the Norwegian official’s participation in this preparatory phase represents an important channel for informal influence for Norway since the national positions at this point are not yet fixed and therefore more flexible and open for change.3 According to this view, Norway, as a non-member, has a certain informal political

2 The EEA agreement was signed in 1992 and entered into force in 1994.3 Dag Harald Claes, “EØS-avtalen – Mellom Demokrati og Diplomati”, Internasjonal Poli-

tikk 61/3 (2003), p. 283. pp. 275–302.

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influence in relation to issues under the EEA agreement. Others have argued that this influence is not very significant and that it has been even further weakened following the EU’s enlargement to include Central and Eastern Europe countries.4

While Norway has at least some access to the decision-shaping process in is-sues relating to the EEA Agreement, such access is basically non-existent in re-lation to CFSP/ESDP. And yet, Norway has constantly worked to participate as much as possible in this policy area as well.

CFSP/CSDP and Norwegian Security InterestsAs one of the smaller European states, Norway has an interest in strong policy ties to the EU, not least since the decisions of the EU’s member states are often similar to Norwegian positions. The negative referendum on membership in 1994 did not result in a no to Europe as such. Indeed, shortly after the referendum, the Norwegian officials reinforced their efforts to maintain close links to the EU in policy areas that were not covered by the EEA Agreement.

In foreign and security policy, the government at the time managed to establish a ‘political dialogue’ with the EU.5 The formal format of this dialogue consisted of two meetings a year between the Norwegian Foreign Minister and the foreign ministers of the EU. In addition, there have been several meetings where sen-ior officials from Norway (as well as from Iceland and Liechtenstein) meet their counterparts in some of the many CFSP working groups set up under the Coun-cil. Since 1994, Norwegian officials have participated primarily in the working groups involved with policy areas where Norway has a special interest – such as the Balkans, Russia, the Middle East peace process, anti-terror policy, and non-proliferation. Norway is also regularly invited to align itself with EU foreign pol-icy statements, which it generally does. In fact, it has been unofficial Norwegian policy to sign on to EU statements wherever possible.6

After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in December 2009 and the estab-lishment of a European External Action Service (EEAS), it is not yet clear what

4 Ulf Sverdrup, “How enlargement challenges the institutions – or the existence – of the European Economic Area”, in Peter-Christian Müller-Graff and Eling Selvig (eds.), The European economic area enlarged, (Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag, 2006), p. 11–30.

5 Norway had already had informal contacts with the European Political Cooperation (EPC) in the form of a bilateral agreement since 1988. Soon after Norway submitted its applica-tion for membership, this contact was broadened and was later substituted with a political dialogue with the CFSP.

6 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Utenfor og innenfor, pp. 723–758.

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will become of these dialogues. In general, it seems to be more difficult to estab-lish any form of institutionalised meeting structure between third countries and the new High Representative for CFSP who is also Vice President of the Commission. In spite of this trend, the contact between the High Representative for CFSP, Cath-erine Ashton, and the two Norwegian Foreign Ministers in 2005–2013, Jonas Gahr Støre and Espen Barth Eide, was frequent. According to a Norwegian official, this was due first and foremost to a good personal chemistry and could therefore very well change with different persons in these positions.7 The right-of-centre coali-tion government that took office in Norway in October 2013 underlined its ambi-tion to lead an even more active policy towards the EU by establishing the post of a Minister for European Affairs at the Prime Minister’s office. Vidar Helgesen, who occupies this post, as well as Foreign Minister Børge Brende and Defence Minister Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide, have a reputation of being pro-European. Time will show whether this move will give Norway more visibility in Brussels and if the new foreign policy team will succeed in establishing similarly close relationships with their counterparts and with the High Representative. Given the EU’s limited interest in formalised and institutionalised contacts at the political level, prospects that Norway’s influence over the decision-shaping process (in the preparatory phase)8 in CSDP matters will improve are limited at best.

Despite these limitations, the alignment to EU foreign and security policy in general has rarely been contested by Norwegian public opinion or by the Norwegian political parties. The reason for this might be that EU policy in this area does not challenge Norwegian national interests or the country’s se-curity identity. In most cases, EU foreign policy is very much in line with the Norwegian policy.

The same cannot be said about the CSDP, however. In the early 1990s and after the Maastricht Treaty had been signed in 1992, there was clearly expressed scepti-cism in Norway towards the ambitions of some European countries to develop an independent ‘European’ (i.e. EU) security policy. The fear was that such a policy, if realised, could come to compete with NATO, and thus marginalise Norway’s posi-tion in the European security framework. In other words, this specific EU policy was perceived by some as challenging more directly important aspects of Norway’s security policy interests and identity, such as its firmly established Atlantic security

7 Information based on interviews undertaken in the ministries of foreign affairs and defence between June and September 2011 and November 2013.

8 The fact that the EU countries were seldom represented by members of their government in the political meetings with Norway indicates that the former bilateral cooperation with Norway was not a priority to the EU.

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orientation.9 The establishment of a political union with a common foreign and se-curity policy was not ignored, but was viewed as important only in the area of soft security.10 Still, the various Norwegian governments from the early 1990s have con-tinued to express their willingness to participate in this policy area as far as possible.

Norway and the EU’s Evolving Security and Defence PolicyNorway and the WEU – A Privileged Relationship

While Norway continued to give primacy to territorial defence and NATO after the end of the Cold War, the political leadership also wanted to have a connec-tion to other European countries in security matters. When EU membership was rejected in the referendum of 1994, the Norwegian political leadership continued its integration into the Western European Union (WEU).11

Despite the expressed scepticism towards the plans of developing an independ-ent EU security and defence policy, it became important for Norway to have some kind of linkage to this process. In 1992, Norway therefore became an associate member of the WEU. The WEU was perceived as important, not as a defence organisation, but as a valuable forum for dialogue and a way of linking Norway to European integration in the area of security and defence.

As an associate member, Norway had a privileged position in the WEU. It had the right to speak and make proposals, as well as access to all relevant informa-tion and documents. Norwegian officials also took active part in all meetings, albeit without voting rights. Hence, Norway participated in the decision-shaping process – the process before the actual voting takes place. Just like the political dialogue with the CFSP, this association was seen as uncontroversial by most po-litical parties. In fact, Norwegian politicians did not believe that anything would come of the long-term objective, set out in the Maastricht Treaty, of developing an independent EU defence. Norway’s political leadership was confident that Britain, among other Atlanticists in the EU, would serve as a guarantee against such a development. Concurrently, efforts were made to preserve Norwegian national interests and avoid marginalisation in a changing European security context.12

9 Norwegian Ministry of Defence (ed.), Forsvarskommisjonen av 1990, Norges Offentlige Utredninger (NOU) 1992:12, (Oslo: 1992), p. 100.

10 Pernille Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity, (New York and London: Routledge, 2006). pp. 159.

11 Ibid. pp. 162–172.12 Pernille Rieker, “Norway and the ESDP: Explaining Norwegian participation in the EU’s

security policy”, European Security 3 (2006), pp. 281–298.

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This euro pessimism explains why the Franco-British St. Malo summit in De-cember 1998 and the subsequent EU summits in 1999, where the member states finally agreed to develop the ESDP and integrate the WEU into the EU, came as a surprise to the Norwegian political leadership. Norway woke up to a new European scenario and this led to a shift in policy. Integration efforts were stepped up. The main objective of the Norwegian government was to try to obtain the best possible formal arrangements with the new ESDP structures under development.13

Norway and ESDP –The Loss of a Privileged Relationship The first move was made in October 1999 when Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk sent a personal memorandum to all EU and NATO members in preparation for the Helsinki EU summit in December. The document underscored the need to estab-lish arrangements that could ensure satisfactory inclusion of non-EU allies in the organisation’s new structures. Vollebæk proposed that Norway and other non-EU allies should take part in day-to-day consultations and activities relating to secu-rity and defence issues, in the proposed Political and Security Committee and in subsidiary working groups, with the right to speak and make proposals, and have access to all relevant information and documents – in other words, the same status as Norway used to have in the WEU as an associate member.14

The EU countries turned down the Norwegian proposal, mainly because it was felt that it could undermine the EU’s decision-making autonomy. On the other hand, the EU members were open to creating what they termed ‘appropriate ar-rangements’ for non-EU allies in crisis operations. The specific content of these ar-rangements was to be defined at a later stage. The Norwegian political leadership spent some time reflecting on what strategy to choose to obtain the best formal arrangements.15

In March 2000, a change of government took place in Norway. A minority gov-ernment led by the Labour party focused on what Norway could offer the EU, in-stead of only demanding access to the decision-shaping processes. It sought to use Norway’s generous offer to contribute, with military and civilian capacities, as a basis for establishing the best possible association to the ESDP process. One could say that the Norwegian authorities tried to ‘trade troops for increased influence’ in

13 Pernille Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity, (New York and London: Routledge, 2006).

14 Antonio Missiroli, “EU-Nato Cooperation in Crisis Management: No Turkish Delight for ESDP”, Security Dialogue 33/1 (2002), pp. 9–26.

15 Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity. p. 163.

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the EU.16 At the capability commitment conference in November 2000, Norway proposed that a newly established task force be earmarked for international opera-tions to EU’s military headline goal. This included 3,500 troops to the European Rapid Reaction Force. In addition, Norway offered 80 civilian police for the civil-ian crisis management headline goal.17

The content of the ‘appropriate arrangements’ with third countries was made more concrete at the EU summit in Nice in December 2000. Such ‘arrangements’ came to include two meetings during each presidency, between the Political and Security Committee and the, at the time, six allied non-EU members (15+6: the EU + Norway, Turkey, Iceland, Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), two meetings that also included the candidate countries (15+15: the EU + 13 candidate countries + Norway and Iceland), of which one took place at the ministerial level, and finally the establishment of an ad hoc committee of contributors, to be set up in connection with specific operations. There were also plans for similar arrange-ments at the military level in the form of liaison officers with the EU Military Committee (EUMC) and the EU Military staff (EUMS).18

The proposed arrangements contained two obvious problems for the non-EU members. First, they did not provide them with any channel for influence before important decisions were made in the EU – in other words, no access to the deci-sion-shaping processes. In reality, the ‘appropriate arrangement’ meetings with the EU functioned as mere information meetings after the decisive meetings within the EU. Second, after the EU enlargement of May 2004, these meetings lost most of what importance they may have had. With only Norway, Iceland and Turkey as the ‘third countries’ remaining outside the EU, the arrangements became heavily asymmetrical. In addition, the EU had other concerns, not least in connection with how to handle the enlargement and include its ten new members. Thus, the EU now had less reason to maintain special arrangements with third countries.

Only a few years after these arrangements had been decided on, Norway found itself increasingly side-lined. Once again European events had changed the situ-ation, and Norway’s initial attempts to gain any influence on the ESDP process through appropriate arrangements had failed. The Norwegian government had not succeeded in getting the kind of status it had hoped for.

16 Nina Græger, “Norway and the EU’s Defence Dimension: A “Troops for Influence” Strat-egy”, in Nina Græger, et al. (eds.), The ESDP and the Nordic Countries. Four Variations on a Theme, Programme on the Northern Dimension of the CFSP (Helsinki: The Finnish Institute of International Affairs, 2002), pp. 33–89.

17 Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity. p. 166.18 Ibid. p. 163.

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In spite of the changed character of the meetings between the EU and third countries after the enlargement in 2004, the so-called appropriate arrangements were upheld until the Lisbon Treaty entered into force. In this period new third countries were added as several countries either obtained candidate status or be-came members of NATO, and the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 made it even more difficult for third countries to exert any real influence over the decision-shaping process.

The Impact of the Lisbon TreatyThe Lisbon Treaty of 2009 merged the position of High Representative for ESDP with the Vice President of the Commission, making the EU-level (represented by the Commission) far more important than before for this policy area. This was further emphasised by the fact that the High Representative should be assisted by a new European diplomatic corps (the so-called European External Action Service, EEAS). In addition, the Treaty introduced the so-called ‘Solidarity clause’ and the Permanent Structured Cooperation mechanism (PESCO) that further confirm the member states’ ambitions, in spite of the prevailing challenges in reforming the armed forces of the member states. The fact that the former ‘European Security and Defence Policy’ was renamed ‘Common Security and Defence Policy’ con-firmed these ambitions.

The Lisbon Treaty also had implications for the CSDP meeting arrange-ments between the EU and third countries. There is a certain continuity in the meetings structure at the lower levels – such as the regular meetings between the ambassadors of third countries and the Political and Security Committee (PSC), even though they now take place within one format, as a joint meeting between PSC and the representatives from both candidate countries and allied non-members. However, the parties have not agreed on a new formalised meet-ing structure at the political level between the High Representative and the third countries. A proposal by third countries to have these meetings twice a year has not been confirmed by the EU. Hence, there is no new meeting structure for third countries and Catherine Ashton has had only a few meetings with the group of seven third countries, which include five candidate countries (Croa-tia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Turkey, and Iceland) and two allied non-members (Albania and Norway).19

While one of the main priorities for the Norwegian government has been to re-place the previous information and update meetings with forums for real political

19 Information based on interviews undertaken in Brussels in November 2013.

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dialogue,20 it is too early to say if this will be the case. The fact that the High Rep-resentative has not yet decided on a regular meeting structure with third countries and that she has clearly stated that she is not willing to have bilateral arrangements with third countries indicates that the possibilities for influence will be limited.

The fact that the EU wants to have common agreements with the whole group of third countries is problematic for Norway as long as Greece continues to be reluctant to give Turkey access to forums that may be considered as being part of the decision-shaping and decision-making processes. For instance, it is a general perception that this is one of the main reasons why Norway has difficulties getting meetings with the European Defence Agency (EDA) at a political level.21

A Continued Will to Integrate Interestingly, this lack of political influence has not affected Norway’s willing-ness to obtain closest possible association with the EU’s policies for security and defence cooperation. On the contrary, the government has been focusing more on what it can offer the EU in terms of troops, rather than trying to achieve political influence in the decision-shaping process.

Despite its status as a non-member, Norway has made considerable contribu-tions to many ESDP/CSDP military and civilian operations. Norway has contrib-uted to 11 (3 military and 8 civilian) of the 30 operations undertaken by the EU thus far.22 In fact, this makes Norway the non-member that has participated in most operations. An agreement between Norway and the EU establishing a framework for Norway’s participation in EU crisis management operations entered into force on 1 December 2004.23 This agreement, stipulating the administrative guidelines

20 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Norges aktuelle forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk, Tale av forsvarsminister Grete Faremo ved stasjonsjefsmøte i UD, tirsdag 24. august 2010. 24 August 2010. http://www.regjeringen.no.

21 Interviews undertaken in the Ministry of Defence between June and September 2011.22 Norway has participated in the following operations: 3 military operations: Concordia

(Macedonia 2003), EUFOR Althea (Bosnia Herzegovina 2004–), EU NAVFOR Atalanta (Horn of Africa/Indian Ocean); and 6 civilian operations: EUPM (Bosnia Herzegovina 2003–), EUPOL Proxima (Macedonia 2003–2005), Aceh Monitoring Mission (Indonesia 2005–2006), EUPOL COPPS (Palestine 2006–), EUPOL (Afghanistan 2007–), EUPOL (RD Congo 2007–), and EULEX (Kosovo 2008–).

23 European Union and Kingdom of Norway, Agreement between The European Union and the Kingdom of Norway establishing a Framework for the Participation of the Kingdom of Norway in the European Union Crisis Management Operations, 14 March 2005. http://eur-lex.europa.eu. The agreement was signed on 13 December 2004 and entered into force on 1 January 2005.

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and procedures for Norwegian participation in such operations, was implemented for the first time in connection with the EU’s EUFOR Althea operation in Bosnia. The legal framework between Norway and the EU was further strengthened with an agreement on security procedures for the exchange of classified information, signed on 22 November 2004.24 These agreements focus on the practical and fi-nancial aspects of Norwegian participation, and nothing is therefore said about dialogues and political influence.

The Norwegian government also decided to sign an agreement to enable par-ticipation in the EU’s second headline goal – the Battlegroup Concept.25 The Swedish-led Nordic Battle Group is one of 13 groups that are on standby for six months at a time. It includes troops from Sweden, Finland, Estonia and Norway and was available to the EU in January–June 2008 and again in January–June 2011. So far Norway has contributed with 100–150 of 1,500 troops.26 The agree-ment signed by the Norwegian government ensures that the decision to participate in an operation remains under national control. It also specifies that such participa-tion is dependent on a UN mandate. In addition, the agreement refers to ‘extensive consultation arrangements’ on various levels, to be intensified in the period before the battle group goes on standby. In reality, it is Sweden, as the framework nation of the battle group, who is responsible for ensuring that Norway gets the informa-tion necessary to decide whether or not to participate in an operation. In practice it will be extremely difficult for Norway, as for all the participating countries, to decline to take part once the battle group is on standby.27

Participation in the battle group is not being given much attention in Norway. The fact that there was no debate about the potential use of it in Libya in 2011 is a clear illustration of this. During the Libya crisis, the EU considered whether it should make use of its battle groups. The Nordic and a German battle group were on standby at the time and the EU made the necessary preparations. A concept of operations was signed by the member states and an operations headquarters was established in Rome under the command of an Italian Rear Admiral as part of its

24 European Union and Kingdom of Norway, Agreement between the Kingdom of Norway and the European Union on security procedures for the exchange of classified information, 9 December 2004. http://eur-lex.europa.eu.

25 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Press Release 12/2005, Agreement on establishment of ‘Nordic battlegroup’, 10 May 2005. http://www.regjeringen.no

26 Jan Joel Andersson, Armed and Ready? The EU Battlegroup Concept and the Nordic Battle-group, SIEPS Report 2, (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2006). http://www.sieps.se

27 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Utenfor og innenfor, pp. 236, 736, 742.

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plan for military deployment to Libya.28 Interestingly, the Norwegian government, the opposition and the media paid little or no attention to such participation. Ac-cording to a representative of the Ministry of Defence, the reason was that deploy-ment of the battle group was not regarded as likely.29

Another interesting example of Norway’s continued integration into the ESDP structures is the signing of a cooperation agreement on 7 March 2006 with the EDA. It replaced the WEAG (Western European Armament Group), of which Norway had been an associate member.30 In the EDA cooperation, a Consultative Committee pro-vides a forum for exchanging views and information on matters of common interest, and a point of contact has been established in the EDA staff. Norway is the only non-member to have a cooperation agreement with EDA. The agreement does not provide for consultations at the political level, but it does provide for Norwegian participation in all of the agencies’ projects and programmes. Norway is involved in several projects within all of the four directorates. The most extensive part of the cooperation is within research and development where Norway is participating in 25 different projects.31

As we have seen, the ESDP/CSDP meeting arrangement between the EU and Norway has been adapted several times since the ESDP was launched in 1998. The reason for that is that the EU has undergone important changes, such as the integration of the WEU into the EU, the enlargement of the EU in 2004, and the decision to merge the positions of the High Representative for CFSP and the Vice President of the Commission. Interestingly, the Norwegian government has met all these changes by asking for arrangements that can provide as much influence as possible for a third country. However, the gradual strengthening of the European integration in this policy area has made this increasingly difficult to obtain.

How to Explain the Norwegian Approach? Despite being a non-member, Norway’s high ambitions have led it to become more integrated into the CSDP structures than members such as Denmark, who has opted out of this policy area. At the same time, Norwegian governments have gradually lowered their ambitions when it comes to establishing channels for

28 Ibid., p. 743. See also “Libya conflict: EU awaits UN approval for deployment of ground troops”, Guardian, 18 April 2011.

29 Interviews undertaken in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence between June and September 2011.30 European Defence Agency, Letter from the EDA chairman, Document SGS6/02751, Inns-

bruck 7 March 2006. 31 Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ed.), Utenfor og innenfor, p. 736.

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consultations with the EU on these matters. While Norway started by asking for associated membership, it ended up by accepting broad participation and con-tribution without any real consultation mechanism in place. Such political non-influence has led to surprisingly little debate in Norway, and most of the political parties seem to accept this policy. Only the plans to sign a cooperation agreement with the EU concerning Norwegian participation in the EU’s new headline goal – the Battlegroup Concept – led to some internal debate.32 The debate did not have any impact, however. The government signed the agreement with the EU and has not been confronted in parliament over the issue since then.

The first part of this chapter has sketched the development of Norway’s partici-pation in the EU’s evolving security and defence policy, emphasising the extent to which Norway has taken part in ESDP and CSDP, as well as the channels for in-fluence it has obtained. The remainder of the chapter will concentrate on explain-ing Norway’s policy choices. Four possible explanations will be examined. They should be seen as complementary rather than mutually exclusive. First, the policy chosen may be seen as the best way of pursuing Norwegian national interests in a new European security context. Second, the policy may reflect what is called path dependency. Third, it may be a result of bureaucratic influence and the ‘corpora-tive interests’ of the corps diplomatique. Fourth, it could be seen as a function of a learning and Europeanisation process that has led to profound changes in Norwegian national interests and identity.

National InterestsThat Norway is so eager to participate in the CSDP structures could be under-stood as a way of preserving its national security interests, notably in order to avoid being marginalised in a new European security context, where NATO may lose its previous importance, and where transatlantic relations may increasingly be dealt with through bilateral cooperation between the EU and the United States. Although Norway’s cooperation agreements with the EU in this area have not provided Norwegian decision-makers with access to the decision-shaping process, they still offer a point of contact where Norway can air its views on various issues related to European security.

32 Some argued that this was not in accordance with the Norwegian Constitution since it goes beyond contributions to peacekeeping operations, and that there is a problem with leader-ship of such operations by an organisation of which Norway is not a part. Others argued that a line has to be drawn for how far Norwegian participation should go as long as Norway is not a member. This was the first time there had been any real debate over Norway’s partici-pation in ESDP.

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Some would even argue that Norway has a certain influence on European security through its membership in NATO, in particular since the signing in De-cember 2002 of a cooperation agreement between the EU and NATO – the so-called Berlin Plus agreement. However, according to a Norwegian senior official in the Ministry of Defence, this agreement has not meant much for Norway’s influence in the EU. The first ‘Berlin agreement’ of 1996 – which allowed the EU countries through the WEU to use NATO assets – gave Norway more ex-tensive rights to participate, ‘Berlin Plus’ is far more restrictive. In his view, the ‘Berlin Plus has rather become a Berlin Minus for Norway’.33 Hence, it makes little sense for Norway to use its NATO membership to compensate for being outside the EU.

Nevertheless, the centre-right coalition government in office from 2001 to 2005 defended its broad participation in EU security policy and its participation in the Nordic Battle Group in particular, by referring to Norwegian interests.34 Later, this position was confirmed by two following centre-left coalition governments. The right-of-centre coalition government that took office in October 2013 has under-scored its will to continue and even strengthen this policy. In a non-paper to the EU’s 2013 summit on CSDP the government recalled that “Norway is in a strong position to provide able and deployable forces and useful capabilities to CSDP operations”.35

Path DependencyInstead of interpreting this policy as an interest-based policy choice, it could also be seen as a result of path dependency, which means that the policy choice is embedded in a certain historical, institutional and temporal context that constrains deliberate choices.36 According to this perspective, the different Norwegian gov-ernments saw no other option than to work for similar participation in the ESDP as it had in the WEU. Anything else would have required far-reaching and contro-versial decisions.

33 Information based on interviews with senior officials in the Norwegian Ministry of Defence undertaken in March 2006.

34 Kristin Krohn Devold, “EUs Sikkerhets- og Forsvarssamarbeid og Norge”, VG, 23 August 2005.35 [Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs], The European Council meeting on Security and

Defence in December 2013. A Norwegian perspective. Unpublished Non-Paper, 12 Decem-ber 2013. See also “Norge ber om å bli helt og fullt med i EU-forsvaret”, ABC Nyheter, 19 December 2013. http://www.abcnyheter.no

36 James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics (New York: Free Press, 1989).

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The Role of the Bureaucracy and the Diplomats’ Wish to be Part of the ‘EU Club’There might also be other reasons why Norwegian governments have opted for such an approach. A third explanation involves greater emphasis on the role of the bureaucracy, and especially the diplomats. As Graham T. Allison argued in his famous work on the Cuban Missile Crisis, bureaucrats play an important role in framing policy; as he pointed out: ‘where you stand depends on where you sit’.37 Interviews with officials from the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defence show that most of the senior officials working with these is-sues are convinced that Norway should become as integrated as possible into the ‘European project’, even though Norway is not a member. Being part of ‘the club’ is perceived as highly important. This is perhaps most striking in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In fact, since diplomats are normally generalists and not special-ists, these concerns are often more important to them. As Iver Neumann has ar-gued in a chapter about diplomacy, the diplomats are first and foremost members of a professional group – the so-called corps, and therefore have a tendency to be more preoccupied with these issues.38

Moreover, those interviewed are generally convinced that this is the right thing to do. Precisely because senior officials are often frustrated by the fact that Nor-way is side-lined in the European processes, they may tend to present Norway’s options in such a way as to convince the political leadership that Norway has no choice but to integrate further into the ESDP structures. In order to do that, they may very well use interest-based arguments, which were emphasised in the first explanation, because such arguments often resonate better with the political leadership. Thus we see that the two explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. They operate on different levels, or in different phases of the decision-making process.

A Result of Learning and Europeanisation It may be argued, as a fourth possible explanation, that Norwegian senior officials who work with these issues have undergone a process of learning – a ‘process of Europeanisation’. Given the fact that higher civil servants can influence the

37 Graham T. Allison, “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American Po-litical Science Review LXIII/3 (1969), p. 711.

38 Iver B. Neumann, “Departemental Identitet: Det Norske Utenriksdepartement”, Inter-nasjonal Politikk 56/1 (1998), pp. 100–101; Iver B. Neumann, “The Foreign Ministry of Norway”, in Brian Hocking (ed.), Foreign Ministries in a Time of Change, (London: Mac-millan, 1999), pp. 152–169.

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priorities of the political leadership, this may in turn impact Norwegian interests and policy. From such a perspective, continued integration is perceived as the only right thing to do – after all, there is no substantial difference between the interests of the European Union and Norway. Consequently, lack of formal political influ-ence becomes less important.

I have shown previously that European integration has played a significant role in changing Norway’s security orientation.39 There seem to be three such changes. First, we have witnessed a gradual acceptance of the value of the EU as a security actor. Second, European integration has contributed to accelerating the transition process in the Norwegian armed forces from traditional territorial defence to international peace support operations. Finally, it has led to heightened focus on comprehensive security, which is the main focus of the European Security Strategy. This means that Norwegian policy has gradually become more in line with the EU’s approach.

The Norwegian strategic concept for the national defence forces, published in 2004, clearly shows that this change of focus is a trend that was confirmed in 2009.40 With the European Security Strategy and the Battlegroup Concept, the EU focused on multilateralism and closer cooperation with the UN. Initially, the bat-tle groups were intended to contribute to the strengthening of the UN’s capability to handle crises in Africa, modelled on the Artemis operation in Congo. This in-creased focus on UN cooperation was very much in line with the views held by the former centre-left government coalitions in Norway, which emphasised the need to step up Norwegian participation in the UN.41 The right-of-centre government of 2013 gives unequivocal priority to NATO, but is also eager to strengthen coopera-tion with the EU.42 The fact that the EU continues to struggle in its ambition to become a fully-fledged security actor, and that the financial crises have worsened its prospects in this area, does not seem to deter the Norwegian government from aiming for more participation.

39 Rieker, Europeanization of National Security Identity; Pernille Rieker, “The Nordic Coun-tries and EU Security Policy: Divergent or Convergent Agendas?” in Alyson J.K. Bailes, Gunilla Herolf, and Bengt Sundelius (eds.), The Nordic Countries and the European Security and Defence Policy, (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 301–314.

40 Norwegian Ministry of Defence, Styrke Og Relevans. Strategisk konsept for Forsvaret (Oslo: 2004); Norwegian Ministry of Defence. Evne til innsats. Strategisk konsept for For-svaret (Oslo: 2009).

41 Prime Minister’s Office, Political platform as basis for the government’s work (2009–2013). 7 October 2009. http://www.regjeringen.no.

42 Prime Ministers’s Office, Political platform for a government formed by the Conservative Party and the Progress Party, Sundvolden, 7 October 2013. http://www.regjeringen.no.

182 Pernille Rieker

ConclusionThis chapter has dealt with Norway’s policy towards the EU in the area of secu-rity and defence. We have presented four different explanations why the various governments since the early 1990s have underlined the importance of Norwegian participation and strived for integration into the ESDP structures, despite the per-sisting lack of political influence. The explanations are not mutually exclusive; a mix of them probably provides the most accurate explanation. We have pointed out that the policy chosen may be seen as the best way of pursuing Norwegian national interests in a new European security context, but also that policy choices are constrained by historical and institutional factors, and hence shaped by path dependency. Moreover, national interests are not fixed, but moulded through a process of learning and socialisation. In line with the logic of learning and social-ising, one may also emphasise the role of the bureaucracy, and especially the dip-lomats, in framing policy. Senior officials and members of the higher civil service are the first to be convinced of the appropriateness of EU policies in this area, and they will work hard to convince the political leadership. This may explain why all Norwegian governments – regardless of whether they have favoured or opposed EU membership – have willingly participated to the extent possible in the Com-mon Security and Defence Policy even though Norway has been admitted little political influence.