Aesthetic Experience in the Pragmatic Philosophy of William James

Jan Hlavka

Abstract:

William James did not devote a single essay or lecture solely to

the matters of aeshtetics. However, he often mentioned the

importance of „aesthetic, moral, and other interests“ as necessary

complements to the practical interest. The aim of this paper is to

offer a structural description and interpretation (based on

James's writings) of an experience in which the aesthetic aspect

is prevalent. I attempt to refute the popular notion claiming that

in James's theory, aesthetic sensitivity is fully governed by

one's temperament. Contrary, I argue that the aesthetic aspect of

experience provides James with a strong argument for his notion of

libertarian free will – a cornerstone of his philosophical crede.

Introduction

“William James, an individual of great aesthetic taste and wide culture, whosefirst career choice was painting, did very little in the way of formal theorizingin philosophical aesthetics. [...] Despite his lack of interest in writing about thephilosophy of art, James thought the aesthetic dimension of experience (itsspecific felt quality and the appeal that such quality exercised on our mindsand behavior) was extremely important.” 1

The place of aesthetic dimension of experience in the philosophyof William James and the question of his approach towardsaesthetics remains a persistent, widely recognized, but littlediscussed problem across Jamesian secondary literature. Theparadox is evident in the abovementioned quotation of R.Shusterman: We do not have enough primary sources to speak about ajamesian aesthetic theory. Yet, from the sources availiable to us,we can tell that aesthetic interest plays a crucial role inJames's thought. Pragmatic philosopher Charlene Haddock Seigfriedgoes even so far as to say about the central principle of James'spsychology that “[...] selective interest cannot be understoodwithout explaining how the practical and the aesthetic function asultimate explanatory principles, and these activating dispositionsconstitute an essential part of James's explanation of the humancondition.” Therefore, Seigfried takes up the way of hypotheticalreconstruction of James's account on aesthetics. She measures thecorrectness (or rather, utility) of her construction byapplication of her theory on various passagges from James.I am going to progress the same way – the way of hypotheticalreconstruction of James's unwritten, yet implicated account on thestructure of predominantly aesthetic experience – in the thirdpart of my essay. In the two preceding parts, I will attempt toshow that – contrary to the predominating opinion2 – James did notpropose purely psychological or physiological approach toaesthetics. He openly admits that even experiences of aestheticcharacter involve what he calls a genuine choice, and are thereforeanother case of his libertarian free will, which he describes in1 Richard Shusterman, “Aesthetics“ in A Companion to Pragmatism, ed. John R.

Shook; Joseph Margolis (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 353.2 See e.g.:

Francesca Bordegna, “The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatismin Context.“ in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 1 (2001);Richard Shusterman: “The Pragmatist Aesthetics of William James,” in British Journal of Aesthetics LI/4 (2011), 347-361.

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his well-known lecture “The Will to Believe.” Furthermore, I willtry to prove that the associative thought, which he connects with ouraesthetic interest, is a key concept for institution ofspecifically human freedom, providing rich material for both,moral and practical consideration. Only on this ground, bothrationalistic and physiological determinism can be refuted. Inother words, it is the aesthetic dimension of experience (notnecessarily limited to the contemplation of art) what reachesbeyond the limiting frame of practical, calculable purposiveness,which would otherwise become the leading principle of “vulgar”pragmatism. Aesthetic dimension of experience provides a secondaryfunction-principle, and is therefore a major tool in a higherlevel of pragmatics: Practical purposiveness that would be able toadapt and function within an incalculable, contingent world.

Temperamental determination

“The philosophy of William James” presents to us from the verybeginning a problem that needs to be cleared first. For there isnot a single philosophy of William James, but many. His work is acluster of doctrines, connected in a loose, disjunctive relation,rather than a monolithic philosophical system. James himselfadmitted this fact repeatedly. For example, in the foreword toPragmatism, he openly claims that pragmatic doctrine is ratherindependent of radical empiricism, which he introduced elsewhere.3

The editor of Essays in Radical Empiricism, Ralph Barton Perry, alsoclaims that radical empiricism is a “systematically independent,coherent, and fundamental doctrine.”4 The same independence grantsJames in Pragmatism also upon the doctrine of “The Will to Believe”5

Even James's pluralism cannot be fully integrated within the scopeof pragmatism – among other reasons for the fact that inPragmatism, James seems to subject religious faith to theprinciples of pragmatism, while in the Pluralistic Universe (andin The Varieties of Religious Experience) he takes it for man's fundamentalreaction on the universe as a whole, which in every respectexceeds the frame of pure pragmatic purposiveness.6

The number of similar discontinuities and cracks between the3 William James, Pragmatismus, (Praha: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury,

2003), ix.4 Ralph B. Perry, “Editor's preface“, in Essays in Radical Empiricism, (New York:

Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), v.5 James, Pragmatismus, 258.6 Haddock Seigfried, William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, 129-130.

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currents of James's thought, along with his unsystematical,essayistic style, cause many commentators to give up on readinglater James singularly, as a source of full-fledged thought; andrather seek the explanation of obscure passages, or arguments forthe validity of their interpretation, in James's only systematicalpiece: The Principles of Psychology.7 I object against such policy for tworeasons: First, The Principles of Psychology are James's first publishedbook, and overusing it in interpretation of thoughts from hislater writings shows the lack of concern about the dynamicdevelopment in his thought, if not a tendency towards anachronism.Second, The Principles are, as the title suggest, a psychological, nota philosophical work. We cannot put them over James'sphilosophical works for the acute danger of compromising his wholephilosophy with psychologism.This argument has been pressed against James many times. Alreadyhis student and close friend Dickinson S. Miller expressed it inhis essay “The Will to Believe and the Duty to Doubt”:

“Mr. James has a far more eager cosmical interest (of an indirect sort) than Hume, and his psychological interest is of a far different character; he loves, notto undo the joinery of consciousness, to resolve things mental into sharply distinct constituent particles, but to watch the will at work, the deep passion thrusting the lighter passion aside; he is in his first concern no analyst or atomist, but a humanist, an absorbed spectator of consciousness in its personaland dramatic meaning, fellow-being and physician to the life he observes. But, like Hume still, despite all this unlikeness, his cosmical interest is subordinate to his psychological and seldom wholly dissociated from it. The world to him, – it isthe human spirit musing on its world. Malebranche taught, in the well-known phrase, that we “see all things in God;" Mr. James, for the most part, sees all things – God and the world – in the temperament of man. The outer self-subsistent nature of things ("realistic" or "idealistic"), save as a depressing or sustaining vision to the individual conceiver, is (till he forces his thought full upon it) a cold and almost negligible "thing-in-itself." In the adjustments of theory the interests of the spirit are for him self-evidently first.”8

7 James allegedly attempted to create a philosophical system of his own in his late unfinished book Some Philosophical Problems: A Beginning of An Introduction to Philosophy.However, as the title suggests, even here his pluralism prevented him from giving a full and exclusive statement. Similarly indicative is the fact that the book ended up (according to James himself) “in the middle of the first arch.”

8 Dickinson S. Miller, “'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt“, in: International Journal of Ethics 2 (1899): 176.

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For this kind of psychologism, Miller counts James among “gentlemen who regard philosophy as an opportunity to express their taste in universes.”9 And, based on this reason, he refuses totake his philosophical doctrines seriously.Today, of course, such psychologism cannot be taken as a ground for disqualifying James from the field of philosophy (indeed, the very same careful phenomenology of human consciousness granted hima distinguished position in contemporary cognitive science10). Nevertheless, in the field of speculative philosophy, it still casts a shadow of doubt upon James's thought. The deepest root of this doubt rests in James's so-called “temperamental thesis”, i.e.in conviction that the specific form of any philosophical system is not governed by universal laws of reason, but rather by personal taste, individual psychological mind-set, and physiological attributes, all included in the all-encompassing notion of temperament.The opinion that speculative philosophy cannot provide us with clear and distinct knowledge of reality; and cannot serve even as a methodology of such science, does not necessarily conclude in scepticism. Pragmatic method of understanding, prophesed and developed by Peirce and James, offers a viable alternative, as it unifies understanding with practical effects of a thing, and its value with the personal interest we take in it (in doing so, it catches other seemingly “disinterested” theories red-handed in directing our attention). But such a pragmatic philosophy is hardly a philosophy in the traditional sense of the word. Rather, it seems like a way of common-sense reasoning, or, as the subtitleof Pragmatism calls it, “a new name for some old ways of thinking.”In fact, the closer the rules of pragmatism are adhered to, the more invisible the method becomes, and the more prone it is to itsown defeat. As Frank Lentricchia remarked:

Theory – whether we call it structuralism or capitalism – is the desire which would be the "remedy" of difference. It cannot be dismissed. It can, however, be guarded against, and the method of vigilance is James's pragmatism .[...] But pragmatism (the vigilante within) is always on the verge of vanquishment, of giving belief over to theory (the totalitarian

9 Miller, “'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt“, 194.10 E.g.:

Antonio Damasio, Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain (New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010).Mark Johnson, The Meaning of the Body. Aesthetics of Human Understanding (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999).

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within).11

The key to understanding this urge of “the totalitarian within”,and hence why James seems to place psychology over philosophy,lies within the notion of temperament. James was not nearly thefirst philosopher to claim that psychological and physiologicaldispositions play an important role in the rational life ofindividual, and that they influence one's Welthilt, one'sphilosophical approach to the world. Francesca Bordegna findsnumerous similar passagges in the writings of J. G. Fichte,Wilhelm Windelband, Erich Adickes, Harald Höffding, WilhelmDilthey, and – of course – in writings of Friedrich Nietzsche.12

James studied all of these philosophers during his five yearssojourn in Germany in the second half of 1860s. Thus, heconsciously joined an existing tradition of thought and became“only” its first stern defender in the USA. In fact, Jamesconsidered the tradition so strong, he did not even feel the needto provide a definition of temperament.“The temperamental thesis” is pressed foreward in the firstchapter of Pragmatism (“The Dilemma in Philosophy”), in the firstchapter of The Pluralistic Universe (“Types of Philosophical Thought”),and in James's 1879 essay “The Sentiment of Rationality”, laterincluded within The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosophy. Iwill focus here on “The Sentiment of Rationality”, as it providesgrounds for inference of temperamental determinantion of both,philosophy and aesthetic taste. James's argument in “The Sentimentof Rationality” consists of two parts:

1. A rational grasp of the world as a whole has primarilypsychological, intrinsic value, which is: “[A] strong feelingof ease, peace, and rest. […] The transition from a state ofpuzzle and perplexity to rational comprehension is full oflively relief and pleasure. […] This feeling of thesufficiency of present moment, of its absoluteness – thisabsence of all need to explain it, account for it, or justifyit – is what I call the Sentiment of Rationality.”13

2. Because this sentiment is a psychological phenomenon par

11 Frank Lentricchia, Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, Wallace Stevens (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), 125.

12 Francesca Bordegna, “The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatismin Context.“ in Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 1 (2001): 3-25.

13 William James, “The Sentiment of Racionality“, in The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosopy (New York: Longsman, Green & Co., 1897), 317.

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excellence, the way of attaining it is overseered byindividual's emotional dispositions. Therefore, creation of aphilosophical system is governed by individual aestheticprinciples (i.e. relations between perception and emotion) asmuch as composition of a work of art: “All these passionsresemble each other in one point; they are all illustrationsof what may be called the aesthetic Principle of Ease. Ourpleasure at finding that a chaos of facts is at bottom theexpression of a single underlying fact, like the relief ofthe musician at resolving a confused mass of sound intomelodic or harmonic order.”14 And also: “But alongside of thepassion for simplification, there exists a sister passionwhich in some minds – though they perhaps form the minority –is its rival. This is the passion for distinguishing; it isthe impulse to be acquinted with the parts rather than tocomprehend the whole. Loyalty to clearness and integrity ofperception, dislike of blurred outlines, of vagueidentifications, are its characteristics.”15

The preference of the aesthetic Principle of Unity (of Ease) over thePrinciple of Manyfold (or vice versa) is dictated by one's emotionalconstitution; and although it can be shaped and mitigated byculture and education, it can never be fully reversed. One is bornan idealist (or, in James's vocabulary – a tender-mindedphilosopher), as fatally as one is born a classicist. Thetemperament weaves the web of their sensitivity, which controlsthe mechanism of selective interests; and these, in turn,constitute their Welthilt – a general grasp of reality.Despite its central role in the theory, James did not provide anydefinition of temperament. According to Francesca Bordegna, hefully accepted contemporary dichotomy between temperament (an in-born psycho-physiological constitution of an individual) andcharacter (a moral construct of upbringing, education, will, andhabits). To explain the meaning of character, James uses inPrinciples of Psychology the definition of William B. Carpenter, whichclaims that character is a sum of all habits.16 Temperament, on theother hand, is, according to James, the innate hereditarypsychological disposition, based in physiological constitution,

14 James, “The Sentiment of Racionality“, 320.15 James, “The Sentiment of Racionality“, 322.16 Bordegna, “The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatism in

Context.“, 9.

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especially in nervous system.17 Textbooks of psychology from thesecond half of the 19. century mostly agree on that. James Sully,a contemporary of W. James, claims in his Outlines of Psychology, thattemperament is “a physical substrate of individuality.”18 The samethought can be found fourty years earlier in essays of Ralph WaldoEmerson, James's godfather and mentor:

“Temperament also enters fully into the system of illusions and shuts us in aprison of glass which we cannot see. There is an optical illusion about everyperson we meet. In truth they are all creatures of given temperament, which willappear in a given character, whose boundaries they will never pass: but we lookat them, they seem alive, and we presume there is impulse in them. In themoment it seems impulse; in the year, in the lifetime, it turns out to be a certainuniform tune which the revolving barrel of the music-box must play. Men resistthe conclusion in the morning, but adopt it as the evening wears on, thattemper prevails over everything of time, place, and condition, and isinconsumable in the flames of religion. Some modifications the moral sentimentavails to impose, but the individual texture holds its dominion, if not to bias themoral judgments, yet to fix the measure of activity and of enjoyment.”19

Bordegna, in attempt to further clarify James's usage of theconcept of temperament, set down five defining characteristicsof it, and traced them all into back into James's writings.20

These characteristics are:1. Temperament is native, perhaps inherited. Character is

acquired.2. Both, character and temperament, are anchored in

physiological processes, especially in the nervous system.3. Temperament determines the excitability and reactivity of the

organism to stimuli, according to reflex-arc conception.4. Temperament is “sub-conscious.” Therefore it can't be made an

object of consciousness, and hence not examined by standardmeans of cognition.

5. Temperament is identified with emotional constitution of theindvidiual. Therefore, it is not subject to will, and

17 Bordegna, “The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatism in Context.“, 10.

18 Bordegna, “The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatism in Context.“, 10.

19 Ralph W. Emerson, „Experience“ in Essays, Second Series (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1893), 55-56.

20 Bordegna, “The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatism in Context.“, 13-15.

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intentional alterations.To these five points, two more must be added. First, despitetemperament is innate, subconscious and closed to intentionalalterations, it does not remain the same for all of theindividual's life. Its intimate relation to the physiologicalprocesses causes it to embrace all alterations stemming fromontogenetic postnatal development. And since the postnatalontogenesis is not a fully immanent process, but it is vulnerableto changes coming from environment, temperament also must admitsome alterations, indirectly caused by environing processes.Second, temperament is closely related to the conception of“stream of consciousness” – James's most important addition tomodern psychology.21 The stream of consciousness is the essentialfact, claims James: “The first and most elementary fact, everyonemust admit, is that an experience is always a portion of someconsciousness. And that this consciousness continues; one state ofmind is followed by another.”22 James characterizes this stream asinclusive (each state of mind is a part of it), ever-changing, andcontinuous. For all of these characteristics, it obviously cannotbecome an object of cognition, for the same reasons as temperamentcannot. “The attempt at introspective analysis in these cases isin fact like seizing a spinning top to catch its motion, or tryingto turn up the gas quickly enough to see how the darkness looks.”23

First and foremost, however, the stream of consciousness must be astream of consciousness of something, and of this, rather than that. Italways follows only a part of its field, it has its “focus-point”and its “fringes”. Therefore, the stream of consciousness isalways also the stream of selective interest.From this list of characteristics is evident enough that the“stream of consciousness” springs directly from temperament, whichis its deepest, basal, and “sub-conscious” layer. Temperament alsoseems to set the “felt quality” of the stream of consciousness.Hence, the aesthetic interest, as far as it is based on theselective process within the stream of consciousness, emerges also21 However, in Essays in Radical Empiricism James departs from this concept and claims

that the term “consciousness” is suspicious, as we are not able to tell its material, nor its structure, nor its function. In fact, refutation of the obscure term of “consciousness” and its replacement with the term “experience” is the first step to radical empiricism.William James, “Does 'Consciousness' exist?“, in Essays in Radical Empirism, (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), 1-39.

22 William James, Principles of Psychology, Volume I&2 (New York: Dover Publications, 1950), 225.

23 William James, Psychology (New York: Henry Holt and Comapany, 1910), 161.

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from temperament and is governed, or at least influenced, by it.However, in claiming that the stream of consciousness chooses amongits contents, as well as in calling it a stream of selectiveinterest, James indicates that there is more than just a dictateof temperament at work.

Free-will Aporia

To “the temperamental thesis”, there is an anti-thesis in James'sconception of free will. The notion of free will – of a voluntary,chance-influenced decision – is as crucial for James's philosophy,as is the conception of temperament for his psychology. Bob Doylein his essay “Jamesian Free Will, Two-Stage Model of WilliamJames”24 even ventures to claim that the two-stage model of freewill, nowadays still defended by moral philosophers like A. J.Ayer , J. J. Smart, and Robert Nozick, was for the first time inthe history of philosophy introduced by William James in hislecture “The Dilemma of Determinism”, and should be thereforerightfully called a 'jamesian model'.25

In his essays on the topic of free will, mostly collected in hisfamous book The Will to Believe. And Other Essays in Popular Philosophy, James hadalways strived to defend the independence of human decision-making, and man's active part in creation of the universe. Hence,he had to deal not only with arguments of traditionalrationalistic determinism, but also with arguments of the growingcrowd of physiological determinists, lead by “Darwin's bullpup” T.H. Huxley, and philosophers like W. K. Clifford, Herbert Spencer,and Grant Allen. In many respects (as we could have seen inprevious part), James owed to these thinkers, which made hisposition particularly difficult.Similarly to John Locke, as Doyle remarked,26 James had divided theprocess of decision-making in his theory into two stages: firstfreedom, second will. He says that chance, generally acknowledgedcondition of freedom, can never be “the first and only cause ofaction”, and must therefore never be mixed with will (which,naturally, is the first and only cause of action). “Chance is not adirect cause of action,” claims James.27 It serves only to create24 Bob Doyle, “Jamesian Free Will, The Two-Stage Model of William James“ in

William James Studies 5 (2010).25 William James, “The Dilemma of Determinism“ in: The Will to Believe and Other Essays in

Popular Philosopy (New York: Longsman, Green & Co., 1897), 145-183.26 Doyle, “Jamesian Free Will, The Two-Stage Model of William James“, 11-12.27 James, “The Dilemma of Determinism“, 150.

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“ambiguous options” and “alternative futures”, from which, in thesecond step, the will chooses in such a way that it renders one ofthe possibilities into an actual past, and the others into plainimpossibility. “Of two alternative futures which we concieve, bothmay now be really possible; and the one become impossible only atthe very moment when the other excludes it by becoming realitself.”28 James explains his argument in his famous considerationwhich way to go home after the lecture:

“What is meant by saying that my choice of which way to walk home afterthe lecture is ambiguous and matter of chance as far as the presentmoment is concerned? It means that both Divinity Avenue and Oxford Streetare called ; but that only one, and that one either one, shall be chosen. Now,I ask you seriously to suppose that this ambiguity of my choice is real; andthen to make the impossible hypothesis that the choice is made twice over,and each time it falls on a different street. In other words, imagine that Ifirst walk through Divinity Avenue, and then imagine that the powersgoverning the universe annihilate ten minutes of time with all that itcontained, and set me back at the door of this hall just as I was before thechoice was made. Imagine then that, everything else being the same, I nowmake a different choice and traverse Oxford Street. You, as passivespectators, look on and see the two alternative universes, — one of themwith me walking through Divinity Avenue in it, the other with the same mewalking through Oxford Street. Now, if you are determinists you believe oneof these universes to have been from eternity impossible: you believe it tohave been impossible because of the intrinsic irrationality or accidentalitysomewhere involved in it. But looking outwardly at these universes, can yousay which is the impossible and accidental one, and which the rational andnecessary one? I doubt if the most ironclad determinist among you couldhave the slightest glimmer of light on this point.”29

This argument against rationalistic determinism is even morestrongly pressed in James's iconic lecture “The Will to Believe”.James's focus there is not on logical possibility or impossibilityof alternative futures, but rather on the proof that will – as amajor decision-making power of human mind, and the second stage ofthe free-will model – sometimes needs to overstep the boundries ofreason, for there are situations in which the indecisiveness ofreason leaves the field clear for purely voluntary decisions.These situations are called by James the moments of genuine option,

28 James, “The Dilemma of Determinism“, 150.29 James, “The Dilemma of Determinism“, 154-5.

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and all bear following characteristics:1. Genuine option is living; that means all alternative ways of

action which we are choosing from are living hypotheses. Aliving hypothesis is a hypothesis which I take into consideration,and am willing to act on its basis.

2. Genuine option is forced; that means it cannot be postponed oravoided, or that avoiding the choice is a choice of its own.It is “a dilemma based on complete logical disjunction, withno possibility of not choosing.”30

3. Genuine option is momentous; that means it is unique,irrversible and capable of changing our lives in asignificant way.

In situations of genuine option, reason usually does not haveenough time and/or material to find the optimal solution of agiven problem. Hence the decision is rather an act of “personalcourage” and “will to believe on one's own responsibility”. Noticealso that the situation cannot be determined neither by outsidecircumstances, for, as we have remarked, at least two alternativesare living, and one is willing to act on their behalf, nor bytranscendental determination of pure reason. The result and theimpact it is going to have on the universe are fully dependent onindividual's free will.31

“The state of things is evidently far from simple; and pure insight and logic ,whatever they might do ideally, are not the only things that really doproduce our creeds. Our next duty, having recognized this mixed-up state ofaffairs, is to ask whether it be simply reprehensible and pathological, orwhether, on the contrary, we must treat it as a normal element in makingup our minds. The thesis I defend is, briefly stated, this: Our passionalnature not only lawfully may, but must decide an option betweenpropositions, whenever it is a genuine option that cannot by its nature bedecided on intellectual grounds; for to say, under such circumstances, "Donot decide, but leave the question open!” is itself a passional decision, —just like deciding yes or no, — and is attended with the same risk of losing

30 James, The Will to Believe, 3.31 This, however, does not say that such a decision is wholy free of rational

consideration. In Principles of Psychology James distinguishes five sorts of decision; out of them, “purely voluntary” and “purely rational” decisions areonly the most extreme cases. Between them, there is a whole array of cases, in which rational consideration of outer and inner conditions is either frustrated, or hindered by a qualitative change in these conditions, and decision is immediatelly pressed.James, Principles of Psychology, 1136-37.

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the truth.”32

“Hard” hobbesian rationalistic determinism is thus conquered.33

However, two points of James's theory of free will revealvulnerability to arguments of physiological, temperamentaldeterminism.First, should he evade the trap of the other “hard”neurobiological determinism of T. H. Huxley, James must show thatour will not only is not determined by pure reason, but also bypure temperament. In other words, that our temperament does not governour interest by which we choose to prefer one hypothesis over another. And this isfor James – a proponent of temperamental thesis – a very demandingtask. To succeed, James must prove that there exists a qualitativedifference between temperament and the stream of consciousness,and that the basis of this difference – the consciousness – is not anepiphenomenon.Second, to avoid also the “soft” form of physiologicaldeterminism, James must show that the alternative livinghypotheses, springing up in consciousness in the moment of genuineoption, are really accidental, and not derivative of some generalpsycho- or physiological principle. Shortly, to defend his conceptof free will, James must prove not only that we are unable topredict which of possible alternatives the subject will choose,but also that we are equally unable to tell which alternatives hewill take into consideration. This subconscious selection ofconsiderable solutions to momentary situation is again closelyconnected to the problem of character, temperament and interestwhich I described in previous chapter.Vis-à-vis these two problems it seems that holding at the sametime “the temperamental thesis” and “the will to believe” leadjamesian thought straight off the road – or rather, into a swampof aporetical considerations, always turning back to the centralquestion wheteher interest (or attention) is active (and thus moreakin to will), or passive (and thus more akin to temperament).32 James, The Will to Believe, 11.33 In “The Dilemma of Determinism” James distinguishes between “hard” and “soft”

determinism: “Old-fashioned determinism was what we may call hard determinism. It did not shrink from such words as fatality, bondage of the will, necessitation, and the like. Nowadays, we have a soft determinism which abhors harsh words, and, repudiating fatality, necessity, and even prede- termination,says that its real name is freedom ; for freedom is only necessity understood, and bondage to the highest is identical with true freedom. Even a writer as little used to making capital out of soft words as Mr. Hodgson hesitates not to call himself a free-will determinist. Now, all this is a quagmire of evasion under which the real issue of fact has been entirely smothered.”James, “The Dilemma of Determinism“, 149.

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There are enough passages in James's texts in support of bothcontradictory views, though only one obviously can be true. Thishopeless situation for interpretation of James's philosophy waswell expressed by Richard M. Gale in essay “William James and theWillfulness of Belief”:

“The problem is that our choice to attend to one universe or object over itscompetitors is caused by our interest, but our interest, in turn, being anemotional state, is not subject to our wills. We can no more control at willwhat interests us than we can what we love. James seems to agree: 'Theaccommodation and the resultant feeling are the attention. We don'tbestow it, the object draws it from us. The object has the initiative, not themind.' (PP 425) This clashes with his activistic claim that attending in thecomplex case involves a 'taking possession by the mind,' a 'reactivespontaneity.' The best expression of the aporia comes from James's ownpen. In both the simple and complex cases the mind 'turns to it [the objectthat is to be attended to].. .in the interested active emotional way.' (PP948. my italics).”34

A number of authors, including Gale and Bordegna, is of theopinion that this aporetical moment in James's thought can beneither bypassed, nor left aside. The only possibility how toredeem James's theoretical worth is to choose one of theinterpretations and refuse the other. And both of the mentionedauthors lean towards the temperamental view.Gale openly admits that he takes the materialistic interpretation,in which “The agent discovers rather than creates its emotionallybased interest.”35 Bordegna claims that James's notion oftemperament does not necessarily make him a “hard” determinist,but to save him from being a “hard” one she unintentionally makeshim a “soft” one. Jamesian free-will model becomes in herinterpretation a temperamented-will model:

“Reading James’s conception of temperament in light of his evolutionaryconception of consciousness and the related notion of reflex arc shows that,according to James, intelligence, consideration, and will could also play arole in the reactions mediated by temperament. Thus, according to James,temperamental reactions would not 'fatally' follow on the sensation; on thecontrary, they would seem to result from the selection of one among several

34 Richard M. Gale, “William James and the Willfulness of Belief“ in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1999), 76.

35 Gale, “William James and the Willfulness of Belief“, 76.

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possible responses. Temperament did not associate a specific response to agiven stimulus. Rather it provided tendencies to feel and to react in certainways. It indicated certain directions, for example, by narrowing the range ofresponses that an individual could give to a certain stimulus, or by narrowingthe range of stimuli that could capture the attention of that individual.”36

In cases of both authors, our “subconscious” temperament decidesnot only whether a given situation will be treated as a moment ofgenuine option, but also (in case of genuine option) whichhypotheses will seem to us living and which dead. Our voluntarychoice would not “fatally follow”, as Bordegna mentions, buteventhough the role of will in decision-making is rendered almostinsignificant. This world of “soft” determinism resembles acomputer role-playing game: attributes of his character offer tothe player some options and bar him from others – but all of theseoptions, the actual, as well as the unavailiable – are alreadyintegral parts of the big determined (pre-programmed) world of thegame. The promethean role of human beings as co-creators of theuniverse, which James defended so vigorously, would be inevitablylost.

Aeshtetic experience as a ground of freedom

I believe that the free-will aporia can be bypassed, so that themeasures taken by Gale and Bordegna would not be necessary. And Ibelieve that the bypass is actually closely connected with therole of “aesthetic, moral, and other interests” in James'sphilosophy. To explain this connection, however, we must firstrefute the jamesian myth of accidental aesthetic pleasure, basedonly on one's temperament. This notion stems mainly from “TheSentiment of Rationality”, and is partly supported by Principles ofPsychology.37

One can only agree with James's claim that our aesthetic instereststems from our emotional nature, and that aesthetic value of eachobject rests on its capability to excite “tender emotions”.

36 Bordegna, "The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatism in Context", 17.

37 For example this passage:“Sea-sickness, ticklishness, shyness, the love of music, of the various intoxicants, nay, the entire aesthetic life of man, must be traced to this accidental origin. It would be foolish to suppose that none of the reactions called emotional could have arisen in this quasi.idealistic way. “James, Psychology, 390.

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Equally truthful is James's kantian supposition that theoccurrence of aesthetic reaction eludes conceptualization and thatthe difference between first-rate and second-rate works of art“[...] absolutely seems to escape verbal definition – it is amatter of a hair, a shade, an inward quiver of some kind – yet,what miles away in point of preciousness!.”38

However, from the testimony of our experience we know that ouraesthetic sensibility is not of the same sort as oursuspectability to sea-sickness or tickling.39 The aestheticexperience always begins with a voluntary decision. No matter howstunning sight unrolls before my eyes, I can always voluntarilydecide to avert them and act against the temptation of beauty. Nomatter how seductive melody caresses my ears, I can focus myattention elsewhere and remain deaf to it. The feat of overcomingaesthetic attraction of sight and sound by means of wit and willis in fact a central theme of many stories and fairy-tales, fromUlysses and the Sirens, or Perseus and Medusa, to Lot and hiswife, or the Beauty and the Beast.There is, however, a difference between the examples I just listedand those James has in mind; for in the case of aestheticattention similar to ticklishness and sea-sickness a simple state ofmind is being described, i.e. such a state of mind, in which astimulus immediately excites interest, the interest puts on themantle of will, and the will initiates action (or, rather,aesthetic reception in this case).40 On the other hand, the cases Ihave described are examples of a complex state of mind, in which thereis a conflict of interests going on. And obviously, only in thecomplex state of mind a voluntary choice – and thereforeintentional effort – is exercised.

In the simple case our consciousness is filled with an idea of an act sans anyother competing idea. By some preestablished neurological mechanism,this state of consciousness triggers the envisioned act. In the complex case,we are aware of conflicting ideas competing for the sole occupation of ourconsciousness, and herein there is room for an intentional action of makingan effort to attend or consent to one of these ideas to the exclusion of theothers. This effort or fiat also is phenomenologically vouchsafed. Thus, inboth the simple and complex cases, the final conscious state is the same,

38 William James, The Correspondence of William James, vol 8. (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000) 475-6.

39 See footnote 37.40 According to sciences of mind nowadays, though, the very existence of a

simple state of mind seems doubtful.

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some idea filling the mind without any competition; but in the complex casethere is an initial competition between conflicting ideas that gets resolvedby an effort to attend or consent.41

Deliberate denial of pleasures of one sort for the sake of othersplays important role in aesthetic education. And eventhough Jamesdid not think highly of contemporary aesthetic education, he wouldnot argue about its efficiency: “We are trained to seek thechoice, the rare, the exquisite exclusively, and to overlook thecommon. We are stuffed with abstract conceptions, and glib withverbalities and verbosities; and in the culture of these higherfunctions the peculiar sources of joy connected with our simplerfunctions often dry up, and we grow stone-blind and insensible tolife's more elementary and general goods and joys.”42

When in “The Will to Believe” James corrobates the validity of hisdoctrine in various fields, he lists examples from natural science(Chapter VIII), practical reasoning (Chapter IX), moral reasoning(Chapter IX), and religious belief (Chapter X). Thus, he coversalmost all the varieties of human experience; exluding – maybeintentionally – only the field of aesthetics. I presume that Jameswas only oblivious of aesthetics in this case, for there is nological reason why aesthetic decision-making should otherwise beexcluded. For at least the moment of initiation of aestheticreception (the so-called attitude shift of continental aesthetics)is always a moment of complex state of mind, which calls for avoluntary decision, and is therefore a subject of James's “will tobelieve” principle. Let's analyze this moment a little further.Let us say that I sit in a café, minding my own business. SuddenlyI realize that the radio is playing a nice song – the song hasdrawn my attention to itself. I can now either resist thetemptation, or listen to the song, hoping maybe that it willprovide some gratification in return. Clearly I cannot do both; Imust choose between these two interests, of which one ispractical, and the other aesthetic – it is a complex state of mind. Butis my option genuine?My option is genuine if it is at the same time living, forced andmomentous. In this case, my option is clearly living, because thereare two conflicting interests in my mind and I am willing to acton both. It is also forced, for I can either resist to listening to

41 Gale, “William James and the Willfulness of Belief“, 73.42 William James, “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings“, in Talks to Teachers on

Psychology: And to Students on Some of Life's Ideals (New York: Norton, 1907), 11.

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the music, or succumb to it. I cannot do both things at the sametime, nor postpone my decision for later consideration. Mark thateven if I could listen to the song later (for example because Iown a record of the song), my option is still forced: for byputting off the occasion, I put myself in danger of missing thechance altogether. And it is not a small danger, for, as Stevensonwrote, “To miss joy is to miss all.”43 The case is similar toJames's own conclusion about religious faith: “Indeed we may waitif we will, --I hope you do not think that I am denying that, --but if we do so, we do so at our peril as much as if we believed.In either case we act, taking our life in our hands.”44 As for thethird condition, my choice is also momentous, because even abriefly caught up tune can sound in my head for all the day (week,month, year) and wholly change the niveau of all upcomingexperiences. Even the smallest thing – a dust of snow, celebratedby Robert Frost – can work miraculous effects on human mind, ifexperience aesthetically:

The way a crowShook down on meA dust of snowFrom a hemlock tree

Has brought my heartA change of moodAnd saved some partOf a day I had rued.45

Hence if, sitting in a café, I am suddenly interrupted by abeautiful melody, I face a living, forced and momentous (in oneword – genuine) option. If I decide to listen for a moment, Iexpress my belief that my experience of the song might be not onlypleasant, but also meaningful: it might suggest to my attentionfacts that I have been never aware of, and thus enrich the sense Imake of the world; or it might introduce a new kind of quality tomy present state of mind, and alter it for the better. On theother hand, if I decide to suppress my perception of the music, itwill soon become only a disrupting noise at the fringes of my43 Robert L. Stevenson, Across the Plains (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903)

226.44 James, The Will to Believe, 15.45 Robert Frost, “Dust of Snow“, in The Poems of Robert Frost, (New York: Random

House, 1939), 233.

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perceptual field – and none of the previous will happen.So far, we have ignored a problem with the switching betweenaesthetic and practical interest which cannot be easily avoided.To choose a hypothesis, according to James, means to be willing toact on its basis. Decision is not a single, momentary act. It is abeginning of purposeful effort with a certain end in view. Thisimperative to act as we have decided is called by James the intensity ofexperience.However, it is one of the crucial characteristics of aestheticexperience that there is no certainity about its result. No clearend in view; no set criterion which could tell us how successfulour receptive effort was. Works of art more often fail thansucceed to fulfill our anticipations, though this truth does notseem to hinder our experience of them. Finally, there is no“correct” or “the most effective” way of appriciation ofKandinsky's Fugue or Bartok's string quartet. When a consciousmind decides to follow its aesthetic interest in these objects, ittakes up the task of maximizing its pleasure that can be had ingiven situation. Of course, it can never fully “succeed”: Mind'sselective attention is forced to choose from a number ofpossibilities that the material offers, but it is forced to chooseand to act on its choice with just a vague idea of what “good” inthis case means. Therefore the intensity of predominantly aesthetic experience israised by its lack of purpose.Rising degree of feelings of insecurity, ambiquity and “vagueness”on one hand, and pressing call of aesthetic interest on the other,signify that the driving force of temperament is dwindling.Although the aesthetic interest in an object might have sprungfrom temperamentally determined affinity towards given kind ofstimuli, once it passed through the gateway of genuine choice andbecame a conscious effort to maximize one's experiencial pleasure, itleaves its temperamental origin behind and gradually becomes afree play of imagination. Associations arising in mind arebecoming more remote, more original, more intrepid.William Joseph Gavin describes the role of “vagueness” in James'sthought in following way:

“On the one hand, conscious experience is intense because we are forced tomake decisions, to choose, to intend. But the selecting is a cumulative process.On the other hand, consciousness is far richer than we have noticed; it isunfinished and has interpenetrant substantive and transitive parts. As such itcauses us to be selective. In a word, the richness of consciousness demands its

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intensity, and vice versa. James himself found it difficult to articulate both ofthese notions with a single word. His closest attempt comes in the stream-of-consciousness chapter, where he says: 'It is, in short, the re-instatement of thevague to its proper place in our mental life which I am anxious to press on theattention.'"46

Thank to the absence of extrinsic purpose, the aestheticexperience exemplifies this natural aspect of every experience inextreme. Or, in other words, we can claim that in every experienceaesthetic aspect is involved to the degree to which it containsprocess of conscious choice, dynamic plaurality of materials, andsomewhat blurred conception of its end.

From previous paragraphs is clear that jamesian conception ofaesthetic experience would be a two-phase process, with thetransition from practical to aesthetic interest as the phase-switching point. We can describe it in following way:

1. Temperamental (pre-conscious) phase of experience: Perceptual stimuliaffect temperamental reaction in organism; pleasure is felt.Organism instinctively pays attention to the stimuli toprolong and deepen felt pleasure. Aesthetic interest arises.

2. Phase switch: Aesthetic interest is contested by other, usuallypractical interests. Both (all) interests present livinghypotheses. A genuine choice is force upon organism.

3. Receptive phase of experience: Aesthetic interest is now consciouslyand effortfully pursued, with maximum of pleasure for itsgoal. Dynamic, unended structure of consciousness accumulatesreceptive options without any criterion of practical or otherutility; all options are compared only on the basis ofanticipated pleasure. The longer the organism prolongsreceptive activity, the more the stimuli considered divergefrom the mainstream of organim's temperamental affectivity.The role of temperamental filtering of stimuli is graduallyinhibited. This process can ideally continue ad libitum.

4. The end of aesthetic recetion: The receptive activity ends alwaysmechanically – by interruption, or by cessation of the streamof perceptual stimuli (e.g. ending of a piece of music), orby exhaustion of organism.

46 William J. Gavin, William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992) 28-29.

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Described conception of aesthetic experience can help James toovercome both arguments of physiological determinism against freewill, which we found so troublesome at the end of the secondchapter. It also provides a way how to disolved the free-willaporia.The first argument of “hard” determinism refutes the role ofconsciousness, and claims that interest and will stem directlyfrom the physiological (neural) structure of organism. Thoughtsand feelings are nothing but epiphenomena of neural system, andtherefore they cannot cause any kind of behaviour.James tackles this argument in essays “Brute and Human Intellect”and “Are We Automata?”47 He defends practical utility ofconsciousness as a “second decision-making system” fromevolutionary perspective. First, claims James, we must notice thatthe more evolutionary advandced creature we are dealing with, themore unpredictable, incalculable are its reactions on externalstimulation. Growing number of neural connections, and hencehigher complexity of neural system, also means the growth ofsensitivity of the organism to unique characteristics of hismomentary situation. “They allow their possessor to adapt hisconduct to the minutest alterations in the environingcircumstances, any one of which may be for him a sign, suggestingdistant motives more powerful than any present solicitations ofsense.”48 In the mind of an organism with so developed neuralsystem that its greater part must be concentrated in cerebrum,there is always a state of unstable equilibrium, the slightest tilt ofwhich can always be a sign of upcoming danger or opportunity.However, a great number of alternative reactions on one stimulus,provided by the cerebral neural structure, is not by itself anevolutionary advantage – rahter, the contrary. If the die-throwingNature, to follow Mendel's metaphor, has more dice in its hands,its probability of throwing a lucky number in a single throw isgreater – but the chance to 'fail' any single die remains thesame. To manage complex bodily reactions and behaviour patterns,the organism needs not only a complex neural system continuallygenerating new alternatives, but also a mechanism for saving thosethat proved 'lucky'. In other words, it needs a way how to storage,compare, analyze, and evaluate experiences. And these are thefunctions of consciousness.47 William James, “Brute and Human Intellect“, in Essays in Psychology (Cambridge:

Harvard University Press, 1983), 1-37.William James, “Are We Automata?“, in Mind 4 (1879), 1-22.

48 James, “Are We Automata?“, 5.

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James further distinguishes two modes of thought: association byproximity of perceptions (which human beings share with higheranimals), and association by similarity (which is a distinctively humantrait). Associative thought based on similarity does not takeone's situation as a homogenic whole, which would become in themind related to other homogenic wholes of the past, and thus wouldcreate complex patterns of habitual behaviours, as it happens withassociations based on proximity. Rather, it divides the totalityof perception by the mechanism of selective interest into parts ofvarious value-qualities. These parts are only then conjoined amongthemselves, and with similar parts from the past, on the basis ofassociations. Because a great number of these segments ofexperience is not static, but transient, the mind can theseconjunctions (moral and aeshtetic associations playing the chiefpart) neither explain, nor justify. They are immediate products of unstableequilibrium of the mind.However, the association by similarity is considerably slower andmore complex than association by proximity. Therefore, accordingto James, both types serve complementary functions in thought: (1)fast, reflexive, predictable thought association of proximity isconnected with habits of practical intelligence; (2) slow,effortful and incalculable thought association of similarity, isessentially aesthetic; even though in short-term horizon it might seemcounter-practical, and relatively less useful than proximityassociating, in long run it appears to be an evolutionaryadvantage.Although the neuroscience of late 19th century had only limitedexplanatory potential, James tried to defeat physiologicaldeterminism on its home ground:

That consciousness should only be intense when nerve-processes are retardedor hesitant, and at its minimum when nerve-action is rapid or certain, addscolour to the view that it is efficacious. Rapid, automatic action is actionthrough thoroughly excavated nerve-tracks which have not the defect ofuncertain performance. All instincts and confirmed habits are of this sort. Butwhen action is hesitant there always seem several alternative possibilities ofnervous discharge. The feeling awakened lay the nascent excitement of eachnerve-track seems by its attractive or repulsive quality to determine whether theexcitement shall abort or shall become complete. Where indecision is great, asbefore a dangerous leap, consciousness is agonisingly intense. Feeling, fromthis point of view, may be likened to a cross-section of the chain of nervousdischarge, ascertaining the links already laid down, and groping among the

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fresh ends presented to it for the one which seems best to fit the case.49

The second argument of “soft” physiological determinism claimsthat although temperament does not always govern our decisionsdirectly, it at least informs our choice, making some hypothesesliving and others dead. If our description of the receptive phaseof aesthetic experience holds, this argument easily loses itsedge. Temperament does no longer appear to us as an exoskeleton,binding and limiting our affectivity, but rather as a skeletonbuttressing our interests and giving them a general shape, but notconstraining them in their growth and development (ordegeneration).We know the limits of our perception only in the negative way:James agrees that no human will ever be able to feel the keeninterest of a foxterrier for a heap of smelly bones; so as thefoxterrier will never fully understand the gratification hismaster gets of sitting torpid while reading a book. However, thepositive limits of perception – the experiences we can have, thepleasures we can feel – can never be known beforehand. This is thepoint of departure of James's pluralism:

“It absolutely forbids us to be forward in pronouncing on the meaninglessnessof forms of existence other than our own; and it commands us to tolerate,respect, and indulge those whom we see harmlessly interested and happy intheir own ways, however unintelligible these may be to us. Hands off: neitherthe whole of truth nor the whole of good is revealed to any single observer,although each observer gains a partial superiority of insight from the peculiarposition in which he stands. Even prisons and sick-rooms have their specialrevelations. It is enough to ask of each of us that he should be faithful to hisown opportunities and make the most of his own blessings, withoutpresuming to regulate the rest of the vast field.”50

The most poignant formulation of the free-will aporia, which thistext attempted to overcome, asked, whether interest is in James'stheory active (a function free-will), or passive (a function oftemperament). Many of Jamesian scholars leaned to the secondoption. However, their primary concern was practical interest – andas far as only the practical is concerned, they were right. In thecase of aesthetic interest, on the other hand, the reaction basedis on temperamental disposition only in its first phase. Later,

49 James, “Are We Automata?“, 16.50 James, “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings“, 13.

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due to the lack of practical end-in-view, the very perceptionbased on the temperamental disposition becomes the object ofreflection, and as such, it is probed, stretched, and finallydissolved in the free play of associative thought. This secondphase of aesthetic reception serves as a training ground offreedom of choice – an aspect which is (in a weakened, restrictedform) present to all conscious human experience.As far as aeshtetic interest is concerned, I can fully agree withSeigfried, who concludes: “What characterizes us as human,therefore, is our spontaneity rather than our receptivity, andsince spontaneity is a mark of the aesthetic, the aesthetic as adefining characteristic of the human is given an explicit priorityover the practical. This ability to associate by similarity is atthe basis of both our reflective or methodically constrainedreasoning and our intuitive and artistic activity.”51

All that I claimed in attempt to defend and explain the role ofthe aesthetic aspect in James's theory of human experience caneasily lead to its overvaluation. However, an aeshtetizinginterpretation of James's work would be as partial and short-sighted as was the opinion I tried to tackle in this essay. Tounderstand James means to devise asthetic and moral philosophy totheir rightful places: as secondary principles of a “higher”pragmatics, which prevent the base, narrow-minded pragmatism,based only on practical interests, to become too rigid, tooconfident, too arrogant. They should prevent our faith inextraneous needs and external necessity from overcoming ouradmiration of the irreducible vagueness of experience, plurality offorms of existence, and the promethean lot of human race.

51 Haddock Seigfried, William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy, 131sq.

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List of literature and sources:

BORDEGNA, Francesca. “The Psychology and Physiology of Temperament. Pragmatism in Context.“ Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 1 (2001): 3-25.DAMASIO, Antonio. Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. New York: Knopf Doubleday Publishing Group, 2010.DOYLE, Bob. “Jamesian Free Will, The Two-Stage Model of William James.“ William James Studies 5 (2010): 1-28.EMERSON, Ralph W. „Experience.“ In Essays, Second Series, 145-189. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1893.FROST, Robert. “Dust of Snow.“ In The Poems of Robert Frost, 233.New York: Random House, 1939.GALE, Richard M. “William James and the Willfulness of Belief.“ Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 1 (1999): 71-91.GAVIN, William J. William James and the Reinstatement of the Vague. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.HADDOCK SEIGFRIED, Charlene. William James's Radical Reconstruction of Philosophy. Albany: State of New York University Press, 1990.JAMES, William. „Are We Automata?“ Mind 4 (1879): 1-22.JAMES, William. „Brute and Human Intellect.“ In Essays in Psychology, 1-37. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983.JAMES, William. Essays in Radical Empirism. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912.JAMES, William. “On a Certain Blindness in Human Beings.“ InTalks to Teachers on Psychology: And to Students on Some of Life's Ideals, 1-13. New York: Norton, 1907.JAMES, William. Pragmatismus. Praha: Centrum pro studium demokracie a kultury, 2003.JAMES, William. Principles of Psychology, Volume I&2. New York: Dover Publications, 1950.JAMES, William. Psychology. New York: Henry Holt and Comapany,1910.JAMES, William. The Correspondence of William James, vol 8. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2000.

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JAMES, William. The Will to Believe and Other Essays in Popular Philosopy. New York: Longsman, Green & Co., 1897.JOHNSON, Mark. The Meaning of the Body. Aesthetics of Human Understanding. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999.LENTRICCHIA, Frank. Ariel and the Police: Michel Foucault, William James, Wallace Stevens. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988.MILLER, Dickinson S. “'The Will to Believe' and the Duty to Doubt“, in: International Journal of Ethics 2 (1899)SHUSTERMAN, Richard. “Aesthetics.“ In A Companion to Pragmatism,ed. John R. Shook; Joseph Margolis, 352-361. Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2006.Shusterman, Richard. “The Pragmatist Aesthetics of William James.” In British Journal of Aeshtetics LI/4 (2011).STEVENSON, Robert L. Across the Plains. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903.ZUSKA, Vlastimil. Estetika: Úvod do současnosti tradiční disciplíny. Praha: Triton, 2001.

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