AFGHANISTAN CONFLICT ASSESSMENTPROSPECTS FOR PEACE

MUNEEB ANSARITARO YAMAGATATHONG NGUYEN

Table of ContentsCOUNTRY SNAPSHOT........................................................3I. CONFLICT BACKGROUND.................................................3

II. CLIENT............................................................5III. METHODOLOGY........................................................7

IV. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS.................................................9A. STRUCTURAL CAUSES..................................................9

Ethnic Division.......................................................9Social-Economic Situation..............................................10

Weak Institutional State...............................................11B. PROXIMATE CAUSES..................................................11

Drug Trade.........................................................11Presence of Foreign Forces.............................................12

Regional Geopolitics..................................................12C. WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY...........................................13

V. ACTOR ANALYSIS....................................................13A. INTERNAL ACTORS...................................................13

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA)...............................132. TALIBAN........................................................15

3. HIZB-E ISLAMI..................................................184. CIVIL SOCIETY...................................................19

B. EXTERNAL ACTORS...................................................201. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO.......................................20

2. PAKISTAN.......................................................213. INDIA.........................................................22

4. IRAN..........................................................235. TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)..................................23

6. AL-QAEDA.......................................................24

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VI. RELEVANCE OF ACTORS AND ISSUES......................................24VII. RIPENESS.........................................................26

VIII...........................................................SCENARIOS27

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS...................................................27

EXECUTIVE SUMMARYThe conflict in Afghanistan currently stands at a stalemate.

The Taliban-led insurgency has increased its control over thecountry while the Afghan government and NATO have recentlyescalated military operations in response. With impendingwithdrawal in 2014, there are now questions about whethernegotiations should be pursued between the Taliban and the Afghangovernment. This conflict assessment seeks to answer whether theUN Mediation Support Unit should facilitate these negotiations.Using a mixed-method, question driven approach drawing uponaspects of various general methodologies from USAID and DFID, weconducted a contextual and actor analysis to answer our question:What conditions would enable a negotiated settlement to the endof the war in Afghanistan, and what issues would the talks haveto cover?

The MSU has four options: 1) UN should not facilitatenegotiations, 2) UN should wait to facilitate negotiations, 3) UNshould facilitate negotiations now, and 4) Another party shouldfacilitate negotiations. Given these options, we used contextualand actor analyses to determine what conditions would allownegotiations to take place. The MSU must consider the structuraland proximate causes that influence the interests, behavior, andcapabilities of the actors. The structural causes of the Afghanconflict are the exacerbation of ethnic divisions, weak social-economic development, and weak governance structures. Theproximate causes of the conflict are the drug trade that bothfinances insurgents and weakens state institutions throughcorruption, external actor intervention, the presence of foreigntroops, and regional geopolitics.

The actors needed to be considered analytically. We assessedthe internal actors’ unity and structure, leadership, military

2

and economic capability, political objectives, and willingness totalk. Further, the interest and influence of external actorsover internal actors needed evaluation. This detailed analysisof the actors allowed us to assess the relevance of domestic andinternational actors who would be decisive participants aroundthe negotiating table. Ripeness for negotiations depends on 1) amutually hurting stalemate and 2) the unity of each actor.Neither the Taliban nor NATO are facing a mutually hurtingstalemate. Circumstances are not ripe because the Taliban is notcoherent enough and they believe that they are winning the war.NATO countries are not ready to negotiate because they arecreating conditions in order to gain concessions from the Talibanbefore negotiations. They call for the Taliban to renounceviolence, abide by the constitution, and sever ties with al-Qaeda. The Afghan government is fragmented due to lack oflegitimacy and because there are many warlords are vying fortheir own interests.

A number of scenarios with varying probabilities could arisefrom all of the analyses. Based on the probability of scenarios,we conclude that the MSU should wait to facilitate negotiationsand in the meantime work to create the conditions that will makethe time ripe for negotiations. In order to create conditions fornegotiations, the MSU should within its limited ability:

Persuade the various parties to recognize the Taliban as alegitimate actor in Afghanistan,

Target sanctions against al-Qaeda and remove sanctions fromTaliban or Hizb-e Islami leaders to incentivize negotiation,and

Address the concerns of regional actors, particularly thesecurity threats that Pakistan perceives from India

COUNTRY SNAPSHOTAFGHANISTAN SOUTH ASIA

Population 29.8million

1567million

3

Per-CapitaIncome

310 1107

Life Expectancy(years)

44.6 64

Poverty Rate 36%(nationalpovertyline)

40.3%($1.25-a-day)

AFGHANISTAN INDICATORS Ethnic Groups Pashtun (42%), Tajik (27%), Hazara

(9%), Uzbek (9%)Number of Foreign Troops 100,000 US + 42,000 other

Size of Afghan SecurityForces

152,000 Defense Ministry + 118,800Interior Ministry

Estimated number ofanti-Governmentinsurgents

20,000-30,000

Number of CivilianDeaths (2009)

1947 (2118 in 2008)

Sources: World Bank, Century Foundation, Brookings Afghanistan Index

I. CONFLICT BACKGROUND

After the 9/11 attacks in New York, the United States

invaded Afghanistan with the stated goal to get rid of the

Taliban regime that was harboring Al Qaeda militants and to

destroy that infrastructure. Initially, the United States enjoyed

goodwill from the international community and even from the

Afghan people to establish a new regime and engage in

reconstruction as the Taliban were militarily defeated within a

4

few weeks and fled into southern Afghanistan and western

Pakistan. After the attacks, the Taliban government was

overthrown very swiftly by the superior military power of NATO,

led primarily by the United States with logistical support from

Pakistan.

The invasion caused a great movement of the Taliban, from

the ruling cadre to the infantry. The areas they fled to

represented the natural place to move to, as the people there

shared a common ethnic, tribal, and ideological background to the

Taliban1. Many Talibs had grown up here in refugee camps and/or

trained here in the madrassas and mujahedeen camps organized in

the 1980s by the Pakistani, American, and Arab governments to

fight the ‘jihad’ against the Soviet Union2. Many Pakistani

tribesmen from FATA and NWFP had also joined the Afghan jihad,

and subsequently returned to Pakistan after the Soviet

withdrawal3.

Over the next few years, US attention was diverted to Iraq

and the deposed militants eventually regrouped and started

organizing the insurgency against NATO, which has grown stronger

and stronger since 2006. The dispersed leadership re-established

5

contact with each other and organizes resistance to the American

and NATO forces4. The base of operations logically became FATA

and southern Afghanistan The organizing effort also brought an

influx of money to the region, coming from various international

sources hoping to help the resistance5. The insurgency against

NATO troops and the Afghan government has grown stronger since

2006, with many parts of the country falling under Taliban

control again. The number of attacks escalated as NATO deployed

more fighters to Afghanistan. In the 2010 summer, the number of

weekly attacks significantly jumped from 400 to 16806. NATO troop

fatalities have also followed similar trends. Faced with

increasing attacks, President Hamid Karzai established a High

Peace Council in 2010 with the aim of looking at negotiations and

reconciliation with the Taliban. The troop surge by the United

States in 2010 has also halted some of the progress of the

Taliban.

Recently, many prominent policy makers have called for

negotiations with the Taliban. Many argue that the surge in NATO

troops is part of a carefully tailored counter-insurgency design.

Although the Taliban may not be defeated militarily, the

Source: Giustozzi, 2010

6

increased pressure of force may coerce some or all factions into

negotiations that would lead to a political end of the war.

However, others have argued that no negotiations can take place

because the maximalist demands of the Taliban and of NATO allies

are politically irreconcilable. An interview with Arturo Munoz,

involved in Afghanistan policymaking, reveals that the Taliban

will insist on foreign troop withdrawal before any negotiations

could take place7. NATO also demands the Taliban to extricate

affiliation from al-Qaeda so that the withdrawal would ensuring

that Afghanistan is no longer a base for militant groups

targeting the West. With such diverging recommendations for the

future policy on Afghanistan, an unambiguous answer to the basic

question of whether negotiations should take place now demands

attention.  The purpose of this conflict assessment is to give

the UN an answer.

II. CLIENT

The United Nations Mediation Support Unit (MSU) was

established in 2008, and is housed in the Department of Political

Affairs (DPA). It works with DPA’s regional divisions to plan and

support mediation efforts in the field. The MSU provides

7

advisory, financial and logistical support to peace processes;

works to strengthen the mediation capacity of regional and sub-

regional organizations; and serves as a repository of mediation

knowledge, policy and guidance, lessons learned and best

practices.

The MSU includes the United Nations Standby Team of

Mediation Experts – an "on call" group of experts established in

2008 that can be deployed individually or as a group to assist

mediators in the field. These experts have provided support in

dozens of negotiations, and hold expertise on issues including

power-sharing, natural resources and conflict, constitution-

making, cease-fires and other security arrangements, and gender

issues as they relate to conflict.

Afghanistan is not unique in its governance problems.

Determining who rules a territory is an easy matter when a group

dominates without contest.  However, when a number of groups

legitimately lay claim to the same land conflict may arise if

these groups have diverging views on the future status of their

shared territory.  The future of Afghanistan need not be so grim.

History teaches us three lessons: (1) violent conflict need not

8

result from ethnic conflict, (2) a power-sharing arrangement can

be an optimal option superior to an end-state resulting from

maximalist demands, and (3) modern power-sharing arrangements

have only been decisively successful with the assistance of

international facilitation.

Joint-administration between the Taliban and the Government

of Afghanistan can lead to a power-sharing arrangement that could

prevent violent conflict among Pashtuns, Tajiks, Uzbeks, and

Hazaras.  Such an arrangement would not be without historical

precedent.  The Netherlands, Belgium, and Switzerland, Northern

Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Macedonia, Lebanon, South Tyrol

in Italy, and the Aland Islands in Finland have successfully

implemented power-sharing arrangements.  What does success mean?

In all cases, power-sharing agreements arrived at a situation

where security was established, states did not collapse, and

civil war did not follow.  Power-sharing arrangements either

terminated or prevented large-scale violence.  The absence of

violence permitted conditions for governance and ethnic

reconciliation to emerge.  While the degree of success in terms

of governance and ethnic reconciliation has varied across cases,

9

the successful provision of security has at the very least given

each metric the possibility to succeed.   In all cases, from a

long-term perspective, there is some form of a functioning

government and administration of public services.  Further, in

all cases, reconciliation is ongoing and state institutions have

not embodied systematic discrimination. Even though groups

segregate themselves and tensions among groups may still reside

to varying degrees, ethnic groups peacefully co-exist in the same

state.

Afghanistan has never been controlled by either external or

internal forces, as seen in the failure of the Soviet invasion

during the 1980s. Highly complex ethno-religious social

structures make ruling the country extremely difficult.  Failures

of the U.S./NATO’s policies to defeat Taliban and rebuild the

state are due to the lack of legitimacy of the Afghan government.

This demonstrates that without making an inclusive political

agreement with the Taliban, any other efforts will not lead to

the stabilization of Afghanistan.  Therefore, multilateral

approaches through the UN would help to bring a power-sharing

agreement with Taliban as well as all other important key actors

10

and prevent spoilers from impeding the peace process.  The lack

of concentration of power in the central government could

necessarily lead to a power-sharing agreement with a semi-federal

system based on multiple autonomous regions in the hands of a few

powerful warlords and Taliban factions.  However, there is no

panacea for the current Afghanistan, and the U.S. and the

international community must choose more realistic approaches

than a continued pursuit of a war which is only worsening the

situation.

III. METHODOLOGY

We seek to answer the following question for the UN

Mediation Support Unit (UNMSU):  What conditions would enable a

negotiated settlement to the end of the war in Afghanistan, and

what issues would the talks have to cover?

The overarching question has driven the methodology of this

conflict assessment.  Although no general-purpose methodology can

satisfactorily answer the question, but components of existing

conflict assessment frameworks can be tailored to fit within an

ad hoc framework more suited to our purpose.  Although we use the

USAID’s causes of conflict overview and DFID’s actor analysis, we

11

have decided to contextualize these elements within a logical

model focused on answering the question.

Focusing on the question first has a number of downstream

consequences on our research design.  First, the question

determines what options UNMSU can take.  Given the options we

will need to decide on which analyses and metrics we should

focus.  These analyses will determine what negotiation issues and

actors will be relevant.  In a penultimate step, we will map

possible scenarios based on these negotiation issues and actors

to determine whether negotiations can take place and if talks are

possible then in what manner can they be held.  Finally, judging

from the probability of scenarios we can refer back to the

original options and recommend an answer to the original

question.

We modify USAID’s causes of conflict overview to identify

root and proximate causes, identify the socio-economic situation,

and windows of vulnerability.  In the Actor Analysis section, we

will use DFID’s actor analysis framework. Here, we discuss the

Structure/Unity, Leadership, Military/Economic Capability and

Willingness to Talk. Variations of Regional and Global Forces

12

and will be discussed in the actor analysis and scenario

evaluation sections.

OptionsThe MSU has four options:

OPTIONS1 UN should not facilitate negotiations

2 UN should wait to facilitatenegotiations

3 UN should facilitatenegotiations now

4 Another party shouldfacilitate negotiations

These options fall within the client’s mandate and

capabilities. If the UN decides not to negotiate, then the

organization can do nothing further than support the will of its

member states.  This could entail doing nothing or this could

entail supporting member states in pursuit of future

negotiations.  The third option of immediate negotiations may

necessitate UN implementation if the analyses and scenarios make

this option seem most plausible.  The final option could lead the

UN to decide

13

that it would not be seen as the legitimate facilitator even

though immediate negotiations are judged necessary.  An outside

representative from perhaps the Arab League or a high official

from a Muslim nation such as Indonesia could lead facilitations.

The UN could delegate or defer responsibility but still offer

administrative and political support to the outside

representative.

IV. CONTEXTUAL ANALYSIS

A. STRUCTURAL CAUSES

Ethnic DivisionAfghanistan is a multi-ethnic country, with no one group in

the majority. Ethnic divisions are becoming exacerbated as many

Pashtuns see the government seen by as controlled by Tajiks and

Uzbeks. The Taliban do not usually cite ethnicity as a reason to

fight, and rarely use it explicitly in their discourse. There

were deep divisions among many Pashtuns before over supporting

the Taliban, with the Pashtun Ghilzai tribes, as well as some

Durrani tribes as the Alekozai, Eshaqzais, and Norzais supporting

them. However, most Durrani Pashtuns did not support the Taliban,

neither did some other eastern and southern Pashtun groups8.

Source: University of Texas Library, 2007

14

Tajik and Uzbek dominated groups are getting frustrated with the

increasing power of the insurgency and have started acquiring

more weapons in preparation of foreign troop withdrawal and

Taliban resurgence9.

Social-Economic Situation Although Afghanistan is still one of the poorest countries

in the world, the socio-economic situation in the country shows

significant improvement over the past few years. Nominal GDP has

consistently increased from four billion dollars in 2002/3 to a

projected $17 billion dollars in 2010/1110.  42% of the

population lives below the poverty line of $14 per month or less

and 20% above the poverty line11. Only 23% of the population has

access to safe drinking water and 12% have access to adequate

sanitation12.  In 2009, only 15% of households in urban centers

and only 6% in rural locations have access to electricity13.

These numbers are growing, but they are still low.

Afghan children are also becoming more educated.  There has

been an eight-fold increase in the number of students enrolled in

elementary and secondary education14.  These gains are not evenly

distributed geographically.  In 2009, an estimated 500,000

15

children in four southern provinces do not go to school because

of the threat of violence. This lack of development can lead to

many unemployed men joining militant groups. Joining the

insurgency is often the most profitable job in certain regions15.

The failure of the government to supply jobs has consistently

been the people’s main complaint16.

Weak Institutional StateNo government has ever established control over the whole

country and state institutions have always been weak and deferred

to tribal institutions. Political parties have been historically

marginalized or not allowed by the state, and popularly perceived

as leading to problems and factionalism. With weak parties, and

NATO supporting and arming warlords, the only way to maintain

power is through a patronage system. To assert authority in this

patronage system, each actor has incentives to employ violence17.

The Afghan state is seen as largely illegitimate among a large

number of the population. Only 66% of Afghans think that Hamid

Karzai is the legitimate President of Afghanistan 18. Afghans only

see the state courts as legitimate for approximately 50% of the

time for most legal cases19.

16

The Afghan government has seen decreasing approval ratings

in general. In particular, the government has received stagnantly

poor reviews of public service delivery in terms of jobs,

electricity, and medical care. Hamid Karzai, the Afghan

Government, and the US have seen declining performance ratings

since 2005 approval ratings at 83%, 80%, and 68% respectively to

2010 ratings of 62%, 58%, and 32%20. The public opinion over the

delivery of public services has been stagnant for at least the

past 5 years21.

B. PROXIMATE CAUSES

Drug TradeSince the early 1990s Afghanistan has become the world’s

leader in global poppy cultivation. From 2004–2009, Afghanistan

has produced approximately 90% of the world’s opium22. The drug

trade is extremely profitable and finances both anti- and pro-

government forces.

Control over drug routes and production has always been a

cause of conflict. There is thus a demand for “hired muscle” to

protect shipments travelling along these unstable routes. Drug

lords and farmers are willing to pay hefty amounts to protect

17

their cargo. Helmand dominates the country in terms of opium

cultivation. Coincidentally, it is also the area with some of the

most heavy Taliban and insurgent activity. The UNODC estimates

that approximately 80% of Afghanistan’s 8200-metric-ton yield

came from Taliban-heavy regions. The DEA estimates that opium

provides the Taliban with 70% of their financing23.

Insurgent groups operate like a mafia in the drug trade,

where they take a cut of the profits. The Taliban have been

involved both directly and indirectly in the trade. Much like

their predecessors, though, their overt role – and consequent

revenue source – in the opium supply chain remains restricted to

two key activities: taxing poppy famers and protecting drug

shipments.

Presence of Foreign ForcesHistorically, there is a very strong narrative against

foreign intervention in Afghanistan. There are 142,000 foreign

troops in Afghanistan, including 100,000 American military

troops. Many in the population equate this with the Soviet

invasion and want to see an end to what they see as an occupation

of their country. Attacks by NATO that kill civilians create

18

further resentment and grievances against foreign forces and the

government. These deaths have sparked rising support for the

Taliban, who use them in their propaganda to recruit militants.

Foreign troops are more likely to be ignorant about terrains and

local cultures, and find it difficult to communicate with the

local population.  Increasing the number of troops could increase

this driver of conflict and raise the risk of population

backlash.

Regional GeopoliticsAfghanistan has been a proxy battleground for a number of

regional and global powers for many decades. In addition to non-

regional powers such as the United States, since 2001, India,

Pakistan, and Iran have all become more heavily involved in the

country, both covertly and overtly. They have different interests

and have supported different armed groups to serve those ends.

These will be further detailed in the Actor Analysis section.

C. WINDOWS OF VULNERABILITY

19

Since Afghanistan is already heavily embroiled in conflict,

we will identify factors that might further escalate the

conflict, rather than spark one.

NATO WithdrawalNATO is scheduled to withdraw all foreign troops from

Afghanistan in 2014. The Obama Administration is hoping to begin

this withdrawal in July 2011. The withdrawal could further

escalate conflict by creating a power vacuum. The pro-government

forces, which enjoy heavy support from foreign troops might be

incapable of consolidating the power they have, and are already

preparing for eventual withdrawal. Anti-government forces might

use the troop withdrawal as an opportunity to escalate attacks

and take more control of the country.

ElectionsPresidential elections are also scheduled for 2014, and

Parliamentary elections for 2015. Recent elections have polarized

the population and created legitimacy issues of the government,

due to allegations of corruption and fraud24. The Taliban have

increased their attacks near election time and promise to attack

those who participate. Future elections could follow a similar

pattern, especially if the elections are seen as rigged. It could

20

create further resentment against the government and increase

support for the Taliban.

V. ACTOR ANALYSIS

A. INTERNAL ACTORS

1. THE GOVERNMENT OF AFGHANISTAN (GOA)

Structure and Unity of the GOA

The current Afghan government is highly fragmented and does

not possess the sufficient legitimacy to rule the country.

Although marginal balancing among different ethnic groups has

occurred, the Afghan Parliament remains composed of warlords of

the former Northern Alliance. The Taliban was originally

established in order to restore order in a state of chaos caused

by warlords who were constantly threatening the lives and

security of the population25 . As a result, the GOA lacks

legitimacy and highly fragmented among different ethnic and

warlords.

Leadership

Karzai depends heavily on external support and lacks

leverage over the government, particularly, the former Northern

Alliance warlords.  He is largely perceived by both internal and

21

external actors as a puppet of the United States26.  Therefore,

Karzai does not possess sufficient leadership to unify and lead

multiple internal actors whose agenda and interests often

collide.

Military and Economic Capability

Most people in the Afghan National Army (ANA) are either new

recruits or ex-mujahdeen who are poorly skilled in protecting and

controlling areas. Counter-insurgency experts have also been

lacking in the Afghan government. Increasing the size of the army

has taken much time. Today, the ANA has 80,000 troops, though

the size of ANA is projected to increase to 260,000 by the time

of the withdrawal of the coalition forces27. The sustainable

training of new troops may be unfeasible without continued

financial support however28. Army desertion has also limited

security.  In 2006, 13 percent of the army deserted because of

lack of funds. Building effective police forces has also been

problematic. Corrupt officers are poorly paid and are beholden to

their respective warlords in government. Many officers are

involved in the drug trafficking and take bribes rather than

serve the public. Poorly coordinated approaches by EU and US

22

security reforms delayed local ANP security build-up for COIN

operations29.  Ultimately, the lack of security and the delay of

building an effective national army and police force left

conditions conducive for the Taliban’s rise.

Willingness to talk

The Karzai government has strongly been willing to talk to

Taliban since the beginning of the conflict.  Karzai himself

negotiated with Mullah Zakir, currently the second-in-command of

the organization based on Pashto tradition of jirga, which was

subsequently blocked by the U.S.’s firm stand against war on

terrorism30. The GOA’s policy toward the peace talks is largely

dependent on the U.S. policy.

2. TALIBAN

Structure and Unity of Taliban

The Taliban is a fragmented organization with no overall

strategy, aims, or command-and-control structure. The Quetta

Shura and the Haqqani network are the two main factions of the

Taliban. Mullah Omar, the founder and leader of the Taliban’s

Quetta Shura faction, holds symbolic influence over both

fractions. First, after 2001, there was an organizational

23

decentralization after the invasion. The Taliban became a highly

decentralized organization with weak command-and-control because

of geographical separation over large areas in the Afghan south

and the east and Pakistan’s tribal areas. The Taliban recruits

geographically disparate groups of insurgents that retain a

certain degree of autonomy on the ground while under the auspices

of the Taliban brand. The Taliban relies heavily in the areas

where local strongmen are

missing.

Figure 1 shows how the

Taliban is organized.

Although Mullah Omer holds

a central relationship with

all groups, Taliban

networks are structured at various levels without a strong

command-and-control. Mullah Omer has a direct link with other

Taliban leaders in the type A groups, Quetta Shura, the Haqqani

network31. With each of these groups are three or four subunits

of commanders and combatants. Type B groups are smaller and

include only two subunits. Type C, D, and E groups illustrate

Source: Giustozzi 2010

24

relatively smaller networks of bandits, mercenaries, police, and

community militias from outside Taliban networks.  These groups

are generally not loyal to Mullah Omer but switch sides depending

on the situation.  For example, poorly trained and paid police

officers often align with the Taliban according to economic

incentives.  Finally, some independent organizations, type F

Groups, have formed alliances with the Taliban such as Hizb-i

Islami.  Although these organizations clash with the Taliban on

local issues, the Taliban maintains sufficiently stable relations

to maintain the insurgency.

 The Haqqani network, established by Jaluluddin Haqqani,

appears to have a different agenda from the Quetta Shura.

Although both factions have ties to the Pakistani government,

Haqqani is more radically opposed to coalition forces and

receives more ISI support. Mullah Omar hesitates to cooperate

with the ISI in order to minimize Pakistan’s influence on his

political agenda.32 The Haqqani network is believed to be based

in Pakistani territory in North Waziristan and launches cross-

border attacks against NATO forces mainly in the northeast of

Afghanistan, while the Quetta Shura operates mainly in the south

25

of Afghanistan.  There seems no direct operational coordination

between these two factions.33

Leadership

Mullah Omar established the Taliban in the early 1990s and

still remains at the center of the organization.  There is not

enough data to determine the degree of his influence over the

highly decentralized Taliban network, but analysts believe that

he holds some degree of influence.  Decentralized hierarchy

relies heavily on charismatic leaders at the various levels in

order to mobilize insurgents based on their reputation for

bravery and resourcefulness. Although there is some connection

between Mullah Omar and Jalaluddin Haqqani, Omer does not have

enough influence on Haqqani to change his political agenda.34

Military and economic capability

The Taliban expanded areas of presence and influence between

2002 and 2007 by adapting guerrilla warfare and rising revues

through effective facilitation. Most Western analysts estimate

that Taliban fighters range between 20,000 and 30,000.  Given the

difficulty of distinguishing fulltime and part-time fighters, the

Taliban may possess at least 15,000 full-time fighters actively

26

operating in Pakistan. In terms of financial strength, the

Taliban is estimated to raise $350 million per year through the

taxation of economic activity in their areas in Afghanistan and

Pakistan and through external revenue raised form sympathizers

and supporters among Muslim communities worldwide35.  The

Taliban’s domestic revenue has been increasing with the rise of

their influence and local poppy production.  In 2010, despite

lower production due to disease in 2009, the value of opium has

increased the total income for farmers from poppy production to

$604 million annually, which is the main source of tax revenue

for the Taliban, a 38% increase from the estimated $438 million

in 200936.  In terms of external revenue, Taliban received

approximately $100 million per year. However, there is no

concrete evidence of funding and arms supplies from states such

as Pakistan and Iran, although the both are claimed to have

provided supplies or at least to have facilitated their delivery

to Taliban.

Political objectives37

The main objectives of Taliban are to:

27

1) Overthrow the current Northern Alliance-dominated

government,

2) Force the withdrawal of all foreign troops, and

3) Establish the Islamic state governed by sharia law

Willingness to talk

The Taliban is unlikely to talk to the Government of

Afghanistan (GOA) and the US unless external events change. The

Taliban has expanded its influence and advocated political

objectives incompatible with GOA and U.S. interests. Also, the

announced deadline of withdrawal of the U.S. troops provides

incentives to the Taliban to wait and not concede.

3. HIZB-E ISLAMI

Hizb-e Islami may be a significant candidate in negotiations

after the Taliban. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of most powerful

mujahedeen leaders during the Soviet invasion, established the

insurgent organization on Islamic ideology. Hizb-e Islami has

gained rapidly growing support from the Pashtun minority outside

the Pashtun belt in the east, north, center, and west.  The group

employs guerrilla tactics.

Unity of faction

28

At present, Hizb-e Islami has two separate fractions:

Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e Islami, in Nuristan and Kunar provinces and

the Yunus Khalis fraction.  Although Hekmatyar’s fraction allies

with Taliban, they keep some distance to maintain an autonomous

political agenda. Yunus’s fraction has effectively been

incorporated into Taliban.38

Leadership

Despite the fragmentation of the faction, Hekmatyar remains

the dominant leader of the organization.  In negotiations,

Yunus’s fraction would not have influence to disturb the talks

due to his relative small size of his fraction.

Political objectives

The major objective of Hizb-e Islami is to maintain or

expand a position to secure a political role for Hizb-e Islami in

the event of formal negotiations or in the event of state

collapse due to insurgent violence.39

Military and economic capability

Although there is little data, Hizb-e-Islami has significant

influence over the insurgency. Hekmatyar’s faction today

accounts for a quarter of all insurgents compared with one-tenth

29

of all insurgents in 2006.40 Hekmatyar has successfully been

recruiting university students and minority Pashtuns in areas

where ethnic Tajik, Uzbek and Hazara groups dominate.  Hekmatyar

has also re-mobilized inactive low level commanders and fighters

with grievances against the GOA.  Hizb-e Islami is believed to

receive support from ISI and its funding is largely based on

taxation on poppy production.41

Willingness to talk

Hizb-e Islami is unlikely to negotiate given a certain

withdrawal of foreign troops.  However, since it has considerable

but limited influence and a history of switching sides, Hizb-e-

Islami’s willingness seems more flexible than the Taliban. Its

willingness may depend on guarantees of position in the

government and Taliban’s response to the negotiation.

4. CIVIL SOCIETY

Afghanistan traditionally has not had a strong national

civil society. However, local community structures shura or jirga

(community council), religious networks, voluntary associations,

interest groups, and political parties play important roles in

stabilizing the country.

30

This diagram illustrates how civil

society’s many different actors

pursue different interests that

tilt toward different sides of the

conflict.42 Elders have an

inclination toward the

negotiations, while religious

leaders and students tend to support the insurgents. A majority

of communities depends on their benefits, particularly their own

security since the population is vulnerable to threat,

particularly in areas unprotected.

Women have benefited from the strong civil society. In 2001,

virtually no women went to school, but in 2011 three million

girls are enrolled.43  These gains are not evenly distributed

geographically. In addition to the success of girls, women have

constitutionally and in fact taken roles in government. There is

a 25% representation requirement for women to hold office in the

constitution.44

Today, there are 1650 NGOs and 2250 social organizations45.

Although the number of local NGOs and other social organizations

Source: DFID 2008

31

has rapidly increased, this increase should not be seen as an

immediate consolidation of civil society. Since civil society is

not cohesive it would be difficult to delegate a representative

to negotiations.  

B. EXTERNAL ACTORS

1. THE UNITED STATES AND NATO

The primary objective of the U.S. military intervention is

to eradicate terrorist organizations, particularly Al Qaeda and

its affiliate organizations such as Taliban.  The rise of the

insurgency, strategic stalemate, rising public opinion against

continuous military involvement in Afghanistan made the U.S.

change its previously firm policy never to negotiate with the

Taliban.  The Obama administration, the U.S. shows its interest

in negotiating with Taliban on the following conditions: 1)

immediate ceasefire, 2) compliance with the current Afghan

constitution, and 3) disengagement of terrorist groups46. Since

these pre-conditions conflict with those of the Taliban,

negotiations depend on the Americans’ military and diplomatic

capability to increase the cost and risk of the Taliban to

continue the war.  Although the U.S. and NATO have increased the

32

number of troops deployed up to 142,000 in 2011 the security

situation in rural areas does not seem to be improving, but is in

fact deteriorating47.  

2. PAKISTAN

The Pakistani military and its intelligence agency, the

Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has a huge interest and

involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan. Pakistan’s primary

concern is securing it long-term interests in Afghanistan after

NATO forces withdraw. Pakistan’s concerns stem from its rivalry

with India, and want to prevent Afghanistan falling into India’s

sphere of influence at all costs. If this were to happen,

Pakistan would be squeezed from both east and west48.

Furthermore, Afghanistan is an essential part of the military’s

long-standing ‘strategic depth’ policy against India, which is

states that if India were to gain ground on Pakistan’s eastern

borders, Pakistan could fall back into Afghanistan and be able to

use its territory to counter Indian actions49. Pakistan is also

wary of Afghan territory being used by anti-Pakistan Baluchistan

33

separatist groups, which it suspects India of supporting.

Thirdly, many people in the Pakistani establishment believe the

United States will abandon the region after withdrawal as it did

in the 1990s and Pakistan will be left to fend for itself once

again.

With a large Pashtun population as with Afghanistan,

Pakistan has historically been concerned about preventing any

Pashtun nationalist feeling spilling over into Pakistan’s Pashtun

areas and challenging the integrity of the country. As a result,

Pakistan has supported Islamist Afghan movements rather than

nationalist ones. Pakistan also has had concerns about certain

figures in the current government, as the Northern Alliance was

supported by India during the 1990s while Pakistan supported the

Taliban50.

With the help of American and Saudi Arabian funding,

Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment played a key

role in training the Afghan militants that fought against the

Soviet Union in the 1980s. After the Soviet withdrawal, much of

this apparatus was used to train militants to fight in Kashmir.

During the 1990s, Pakistan again played a key role in the rise of

34

the Taliban, and supported the movement until September 11th51.

Due to its support of the United States, many militant groups

(such as the TTP) have now turned against Pakistan and target it

explicitly as part of their campaign in Afghanistan.

As a result, Pakistan’s intelligence agencies still retain

ties to some of the militant groups operating in Afghanistan,

though most believe that they have largely lost control over

them. They have been reluctant to move against some of them, such

as the Haqqani network, as these are viewed as long-term assets

to exert influence in Afghanistan after NATO leaves52. Some also

believe that the ISI is still in touch with Mullah Omar, who has

allegedly condemned the TTP for targeting Pakistan. Many militant

groups use Pakistani territory, in FATA particularly, as their

base to plan attacks against NATO in Afghanistan53. Thus, in any

negotiations, Pakistan will need to be a key actor, in order to

facilitate long-term stability.

3. INDIA

India has always seen Afghanistan as important to its

interests and subsequently it has used it as a proxy battlefield

against Pakistan. It signed a Friendship Treaty in 1950 with the

35

then King, and even during the Soviet occupation expanded its

industrial, irrigation, and hydroelectric projects54. During the

1990s, with Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan, it supported the

Northern Alliance against the Taliban55. President Hamid Karzai

was educated in India. India is concerned of Afghanistan falling

to groups which would support militant groups in Kashmir. Many

anti-India groups found refuge in Afghanistan under the Taliban’s

rule. India’s presence in Afghanistan has been growing through

training of Afghan civilian and military personnel, development

projects, and expanded economic ties. It has spent more than $1

billion in aid since 2001 and opened four consulates56. There are

reports that it aids Baluchi separatists in Pakistan from

Afghanistan – an issue Pakistan consistently raises in

discussions. Thirdly, India is concerned that rising Islamist

militancy helps fuel Hindu-nationalist militancy at home and

destabilize it internally. More broadly, Afghanistan fits in with

India's desire to be seen as an extra-regional power moving

toward great power status by increasing its influence in its

extended strategic neighborhood57.

4. IRAN

36

Iran also views Afghanistan as a very important to its

national security interests and has been involved in the country

since before 9/11. Due to the Taliban’s ideological anti-Shia

bent, Iran supported the Northern Alliance during the 1990s.

After 2001, it supported the Bonn Process which resulted in Hamid

Karzai becoming president. It is also expanding cultural and

economic ties58.

Iran has three main security concerns in Afghanistan. First,

Iran is heavily affected by the drug trade. Secondly, the

presence of American troops. Combined with Iraq, there are now

over 200,000 American troops on Iran’s borders, and the United

States is building permanent military bases which could threaten

Iranian security in the future. As such, Iran has been accused by

American officials of providing arms and support to the Taliban.

Thirdly, the Iranian government also sees extremist Sunni groups

such as the Taliban and Al Qaeda as direct threats to its Shia

population59. Thus, its likely long-term view does not want to

see the Taliban return to power. Therefore, its views towards

negotiations are hard to tell. There is a space for them to be

37

pro-negotiation however, if it helps resolve Iran’s broader

security concerns.

5. TEHRIK-E-TALIBAN PAKISTAN (TTP)

The TTP was formed in late 2007 as a network of militant

groups operating in FATA, Pakistan. Their main goal is to help

the Taliban remove foreign forces and the Afghan National

government from power. The TTP however, operationally targets the

Pakistani state and has so far launched attacks only in Pakistan.

It however, provides logistical support and a base for Afghan

Taliban to operate from. North and South Waziristan house many

suicide bomber-training camps whose recruits are sent to targets

in both countries60. The TTP leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, has

pledged loyalty to Mullah Omar as his leader. Many TTP leaders

fought in the anti-Soviet campaign and/or with the Taliban in

Afghanistan during the 1990s, becoming demobilized upon their

return to FATA, and forming again after the NATO invasion61.

Ideologically, they are aligned with the Afghan insurgent groups.

There is however debate within the TTP of whether their focus

should be Pakistan-only or Afghanistan and Pakistan. There is

also some reported tension about attacks on Pakistan with the

38

senior Taliban leadership who are wary of hurting their ties with

Pakistani intelligence62.

6. AL-QAEDA

Al-Qaeda would be one of greatest spoilers against the peace

process.  Al Qaeda’s political objective, is to replace the

regimes in Muslim countries with a caliphate political system.

This makes its involvement in the peace process almost

impossible.  Al Qaeda has already established strong ties with

many top Taliban leaders.  At present, the number of Al-Qaeda

members in the country is a few hundred and their influence

remains mainly for financial and strategic support.  According to

some sources, Al-Qaeda’s link with Mullah Omer has been weakened.

Although the Haqqani network maintains stronger relations with

Al-Qaeda, its current capability to influence the conflict is

questionable63.

VI. RELEVANCE OF ACTORS AND ISSUES

Based on the actor analysis, selection of participants

should consider the influence and power to affect a result of the

negotiation and the sustainability of peace.  The talks should be

limited to a limited number of decisive actors who can alter the

39

result of the talks. The more participants included, the greater

the complexity of the negotiations. Each actor brings different

demands and objectives. Failure to include these decisive actors

could turn them into spoilers.

In terms of domestic actors, the government and both the

Taliban and Hizb-e Islami have the capacity to sustain the

conflict based on their military and financial capability.

Creating greater unity among their fragmented factions is

required prior to the negotiation. Both opposition groups,

however, have charismatic leaders who maintain a certain degree

of influence over their own local leaders and commanders.

Although civil society is strong, it is not unified, vulnerable

to security threats, and has little influence over armed groups.

Therefore, it would have little influence in negotiations.

However, it is important for all actors and the mediators to

maintain contact with them in order to create a sustainable peace

agreement.

As for external actors, Pakistan, India, Iran, and the U.S.

should be included in the negotiations. Pakistan, India, and Iran

are major actors who determine the regional politics, which use

40

Afghanistan as a theater to increase their influence and pursue

national interests. The U.S. is the most influential and powerful

actor which will continue to be deeply and directly involved as

long as it believes that the collapse of the current government

would cause a potential threat to its own security. The role of

these actors would be extremely important, but secondary to the

primary internal actors mentioned above. The UN MSU should

facilitate this relationship by keeping in mind the interests and

demands of these actors in any negotiations.

The TTP and Al-Qaeda should not be included in the talks as

they have very weak influence in Afghanistan and their political

agendas are too rigid for them to consider negotiations. Their

involvement would also be unacceptable to the United States and

the regional powers.

Issues to Discuss in Negotiations    The major issues that need to be discussed by the various

actors are: foreign troop presence, foreign militant presence,

and governance structures (including power sharing and security

service structure. Given that external actors are being included,

41

it is important that the focus of the talks remain on

Afghanistan.

The presence of foreign troops is one of the main motivators

for insurgents and has consistently been an objective since 2001.

Furthermore, given the history of foreign involvement in

Afghanistan, the Afghan people will not accept a long-term

foreign troop presence. Thus, the pace and dates of withdrawal

plus limitations on their activity will be a key issue to

discuss.

    Similarly, the presence of foreign militant groups is a

concern for both the international community (particularly the

United States) as well as regional countries. Afghanistan has

served as a base to plan attacks executed around the world, and

the Taliban rely on many of these groups for ideological,

logistical, and financial support. Thus, the nature of their ties

to them in the future is an issue that will be important to

discuss as well.

The Taliban have rejected the Bonn process that led to the

current Afghan government and new constitution. The government

and its international supporters have said that the Taliban needs

42

to accept the new constitution to be seen as legitimate. The new

constitution has also made the country highly centralized, with a

great degree of control being exercised from Kabul. Given the

historical weakness of the Afghan state, and perceptions of

different ethnic groups seeking to wrest power from each other,

decentralized governance structures and power-sharing are another

important issue to agree upon to come to build a lasting stable

peace agreement. These discussions should also include how to

integrate the various militant groups into a new security service

structure in the country.

VII. RIPENESS

In order to initiate negotiation, all conflicting actors

need a certain level of willingness to talk.  The most ripe time

for conduction talks is when all conflicting actors are facing a

stalemate64. Our analysis illustrates that the Taliban and Hizb-

e Islami are not facing stalemates because:

1) They presume they are winning the war as their areas of

influence and military and financial capability grow.

2) The Taliban is not coherent under a strong leader.

43

3) They maintain their external patrons’ support, especially from

certain factions of the Pakistani security establishment.

4) Their pre-conditions to negotiate, i.e. foreign troop

withdrawal remain unchanged and are unacceptable to the U.S. and

the GOA.  

Although the United States faces domestic pressure to

disengage from Afghanistan and increasing attacks from the

Taliban, it is not yet facing a stalemate. The U.S. maintains its

previous position on negotiations and continues military

operations and building up the Afghan government security forces.

Though Hamid Karzai has publicly supported negotiations, the

Afghan Government maintains support from NATO, and its

willingness to negotiate is tempered by the high level of

dependence on external support.

VIII. SCENARIOS

At present, conditions for negotiations are not ripe and we

recommend that the UN MSU should help create the conditions for

ripeness by advocating certain actions and policies by the

various involved actors.

SCENARIO PROBABILITY

44

1 UN cannot facilitate negotiations Possible

2 UN can wait to facilitatenegotiations

Probable

3 UN can facilitate negotiationsnow

Improbable

4 Another party can facilitatenegotiations now

Improbable

IX. RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the mandate and capacity of the MSU, a number of

actions are proposed given the probability of the different

scenarios. The MSU has a large group of experts on facilitating

negotiations through their Standby Team, who can be used in

pursuing these recommendations. Since we judge scenarios three

and four improbable, we will discuss the first two scenarios.

SCENARIO 1: UN CANNOT FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS - POSSIBLEGiven that the conflict is not ripe for negotiations and

does not seem to be heading towards ripeness, it is possible that

no successful negotiations, facilitated by an outside actor, can

happen.

SCENARIO 2: UN CAN WAIT TO FACILITATE NEGOTIATIONS - PROBABLEOfficial recognition of Taliban as a legitimate actor

Since the beginning of the war, Taliban’s stance has been

clear: Taliban is willing to negotiate with the Afghan government

only on the conditions that they are recognized and all foreign

45

forces are withdrawn. The international community, including the

United Nations has seen them as illegitimate, imposed sanctions

on their leadership, and put them on its blacklist. In order to

make the Taliban more willing to talk, they need to be recognized

as a legitimate actor in the conflict.

Targeted Use and Removal of Sanctions to Incentivize NegotiationAs of May 2011, there are 137 individuals on the

Consolidated List of the Security Council Committee pursuant to

resolution 1267 concerning the Taliban. The MSU should push the

Committee to review this list upon certain conditions. These

conditions could include pursuing those Taliban or Hizb-e Islami

leaders who are more willing to talk. They could be given the

incentive of removal from the list if they are willing to

negotiate. Given the fragmentation of the Taliban, this is

possible.

The MSU should not however make any push towards removing Al

Qaeda members from the list, or removing sanctions them. These

sanctions help cripple Al Qaeda’s operational and financial

capabilities to support violence in Afghanistan. This approach

46

will help further disconnect Al Qaeda and the Taliban, which is a

condition of the United States in being willing to talk.

Contribute to Confidence-building between India and PakistanBoth India and Pakistan need to be involved in any

negotiation about peace in Afghanistan. Without reducing

Pakistan’s threat perceptions, it would be difficult to pressure

Taliban and Hizb-e Islami to be willing to talk. There is a

growing space within India and Pakistan to resume the peace

process after the hiatus since 2008. Bilateral talks have thus

been slow and faced hurdles. The MSU could use its expertise to

facilitate these talks with the two respective governments. It

has the credibility and mandate to be seen as a neutral party.

Low-level talks can be hosted by the MSU, even as part of multi-

lateral talks on the region, reducing the domestic pressures the

Indian and Pakistani governments might face from hardline

elements.

47

48

APPENDIX

49

TRENDS TOWARD SUCCESS

QUANTITATIVE IMPROVEMENTSNumber ofTroopsDeployed65

2003 ~ 15,000 Increase2011 ~ 140,000

Total NATO-ISAFManpower byRegionalCommand66

North,Capitaland West

2011 ~10,000

IncreaseEast 2006 ~10,000

2011 ~38,000South 2006 ~10,000

2011 ~75,000PrivateSecurityContractors67

(mostlylocalnationals)

2009 ~4,000 Increase2010 ~18,000

QUALITATIVE IMPROVEMENTS

Size ofAfghanSecurityForces68

Total 2003 ~6,000

Increase

2011 ~270,800Ministryof DefenseForces

2003 ~6,000

2011 ~152,000

MinistryofInteriorForces

2003 0

2011 ~119,000

Number ofAfghan ArmyUnitsPartneredwith NATOunits69

2007 0%Increase

2010 70%

Attrition70

Total 2 - 4%

Increase

ANCOP(AfghanNationalCivilOrderPolice

Nov2009 12%

Dec2010 3-6%

50

ANA – AfghanArmy LeaderTraining71

Officercoursegraduates

2009 2010

Increase

2010 ~4800

Noncommissioned officergraduates

2009

2010 ~18,000

ANA ForceStructureGrowth72

Command,maneuver,and combatservicesupport

Ontrack/improved Increas

e

Combatsupport No growth

Number ofInsurgentsKilled orCaptured73

Summer2010

Leaders ~235

N/ARank ~2750

TRENDS TOWARD FAILURE

QUANTITATIVE DECLINESInsurgentAttacks74

2008 ~ 100/week Increase2011 ~ 600/week

MaximumNumber ofAttacks inSummer75

Mostfightinghappens insummermonths

Summer2008 ~400/week

IncreaseSummer

2010 ~1680/week

Maximum USSoldiersWounded76

Summer2003 ~10 Increas

eSummer2010 ~645

Maximum USandCoalitionTroopDeaths77

Summer2002 ~10

IncreaseSummer

2010 ~104

CivilianDeaths78

2006 ~900 Increase2010 ~2,750

51

ContractorDeaths79

2003 0 Increase2010 425

Number ofInsurgents80

2008 ~3,000 Increase2011 ~30,000

Number ofAssassinations AroundKandahar81

2009 ~1/monthIncrease2011 ~10/month

Number ofInternallyDisplacedPersons82

2008 ~150,000Increase2010 ~352,000

52

ENDNOTES

53

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62 Franco 200963 Rashid 200864 Zartman, William, “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments,” The Global Review of Ethnopolics I (I), September 2001, p.8.65 Hannah Fairfield and Kevin Quealy, “Troop Levels in Afghanistan Since 2001,” New York Times, October 1, 2009. Accessed at: http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2009/10/01/world/middleeast/afghanistan-policy.html. Institute for the Study of War, “Afghanistan Order of Battle”, November 2009. Accessed at: http://www.understandingwar.org/files/AfghanistanORBAT.pdf. February 2010 figures: David Petraeus, Meet the Press, February 21, 2010, accessed at www.msnbc.com. “US weighs more troops for north Afghanistan: official”, Agence France Presse, March 19, 2010. John J. Kruzel, “Special Forces in Iraq to Remain through Drawdown”, American Forces Press Service, April 1, 2010. Anne Gearan, “More US troops in Afghanistan than Iraq, a first”, Associated Press, May 24, 2010. Luis Martinez, “Gates, Mullen & Clinton React to McChrystal”, Abc News, June 24, 2010. Robert Reid, “US casualties in Afghanistan soar to record highs”, The Associated Press, July 31, 2010. Robert Reid, "5 More American Troops Die in Afghan Fighting", Associated Press, August 31,2010. Robert Burns and Julie Pace, "With Afghan control by 2014, Obama sees combat end", Associated Press, November 21, 2010.66 “ISAF Troops Placemat”, NATO-ISAF website. Accessed at: http://www.isaf.nato.int/en/isaf-placemat-archives.html67 Moshe Schwartz, "Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan: Background and Analysis", Congressional Research Service, December 14, 2009. Accessed at:http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf. Matt Kelley, “Afghanistan Becomes More Dangerous For Contractors”, USA Today, April 22, 2010. Moshe Schwartz, “Department of Defense Contractors in Iraq”, Congressional Research Service, July 2, 2010. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R40764.pdf. Moshe Schwartz, "The Departmentof Defense's Use of Private Security Contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq: Background, Analysis, and Options for Congress", February 21, 2011, p. 8. Accessed at: http://www.scribd.com/doc/49497821/CRS-report-on-PSCs-in- Afghanistan-and-Iraq-02232011.68 U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability inAfghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, June 2008, p. 22. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/Report_on_Progress_toward_Security_and_Stability_in_Afghanistan_1230.pdf GAO-08-661, “Afghanistan Security: Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and SustainCapable Afghan National Security Forces”, Government Accountability Office, June 2008, p. 33. Accessed at: http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08661.pdf Major General Robert Cone,Press Conference from Afghanistan, November 12, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4314 “ISAF Troops Placemat”, NATO-ISAF website. Accessed at: http://www.nato.int/ISAF/docu/epub/pdf/isaf_placemat.pdf. Special Inspector Generalfor Afghanistan Reconstruction, “Quarterly Report to the United States Congress”, January 30, 2010, p. 60. Accessed at: http://www.sigar.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/jan2010/pdf/SIGAR_Jan2010.pdf. ISAF, “Metrics Brief May 2010”, unclassified briefing slides. David Gollust, "US Envoy

Reports Progress on Afghan Security", Voice of America, December 21, 2004. CarolineWadhams, "Afghanistan: Four Years After the Invasion", Center for American Progress, October 2005, p. 5. Accessed at: http://www.americanprogress.org/kf/afghanistan.pdf. Anthony Cordesman, "Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat", Center for Strategic and InternationalStudies, December 12, 2006, p. 65. Accessed at: http://www.comw.org/warreport/fulltext/0612cordesman.pdf. CJ Radin, "Afghan National Security Forces Order of Battle", The Long War Journal, January 2008. Accessed at: http://www.longwarjournal.org/multimedia/ANSF%20OOBpage%206-%20ANP%20(2008.01.11%20cjr).pdf. ISAF, “Metrics Brief February 2011”, unclassified briefing slides.69 M. O’Hanlon, I. Livingston and H. Messera, “States of Conflict: An Update”, The New York Times, December 27, 2010. 70 Ibid. Department of Defense, “DOD News Briefing with Lt. Gen. Caldwell via Teleconference from Afghanistan”, August 23, 2010. ISAF, “Metrics Brief September 2010”, unclassified briefing slides. ISAF, “Metrics Brief October 2010”, unclassified briefing slides. ISAF, “Metrics Brief January 2011”, unclassified briefing slides71 ISAF, “Metrics Brief May 2010”, unclassified briefing slides72 ISAF, “Metrics Brief September 2010”, unclassified briefing slides.73 Petraeus: ‘We’re doing everything we can to achieve progress”, Washingtonpost.com, August 15, 2010. Accessed at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/08/15/AR2010081501515.html. Kimberly Dozier, “Petraeus Highlights Special Ops Successes In Afghanistan”, Associated Press, September 4, 2010.74 Strategic Advisory Group Headquarters ISAF, “Security Metrics: March 2009”, prepared April 16, 2009 (and subsequent updates)75 Ibid.76 U.S. Department of Defense Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty page. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf Historical data accessed at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm77 U.S. Department of Defense Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty page. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf Historical data accessed at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm Icasualties.org OperationEnduring Freedom Casualty Count website. Accessed at: http://icasualties.org/oef/byNationality.aspx?hndQry=US78 David Wood, “Afghan Air War Grows in Intensity”, Baltimore Sun, July 28, 2008. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Humanitarian Factsheet”, June 29, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.unama-afg.org/docs/_UN-Docs/_fact-sheets/2008/08June29-Humanitarian-fact-sheet-English.pdf United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Armed conflict and Civilian Casualties, Trends and Developments 01 January-31 August, 2008” Accessed at: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2008.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-7JJMA8-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf UN Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Protection of Civilians”, January 5, 2009. UN Office of the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), “Monthly Humanitarian Update for Afghanistan”, January2009 (and subsequent monthly reports). U.S. Department of Defense, “Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan”, Report to Congress in Accordance with the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act, April 2010, Accessed at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/Report_Final_SecDef_04_26_10.pdf. United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan, “Mid Year Report on Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict”, August 2010. Accessed at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c6120382.html.79 U.S. Department of Defense Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom Casualty page. Accessed at: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf Historical data accessed at: http://siadapp.dmdc.osd.mil/personnel/CASUALTY/castop.htm43. Office of Workers Compensation Programs, “Defense Base Act Case Summary by Nation”, United States Department of Labor, March 31, 2010. Accessed at: http://www.dol.gov/owcp/dlhwc/dbaallnation.htm, “Valerie Bailey Grasso, Baird Webeland Scott Szymendera, “The Defense Act (DBA): The Federally Mandated Workers’ Compensation System for Overseas Government Contractors, April 9, 2010. Accessed at: http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34670.pdf80 David E. Sander and Mark Mazzetti, “New Estimate of Strength of Al Qaeda is Offered”, New York Times, July 1, 2010. Michael O’Hanlon and Ian Livingston, “Prime Numbers: A Tale of Two Armies”, Foreign Policy, March/April 2011.81 Joshua Partlow, "In Kandahar, the Taliban targets and assassinates those who support U.S. efforts", The Washington Post, May 22, 2010. ISAF, “Metrics Brief March 2011”, unclassified briefing slides.82 United Nations High Commission on Refugees, “First Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Convoy leaves Heart for Badghis”, UNHCR Kabul Press Information, May 5, 2008. Accessed at: http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/afghan?page=kabul&id=481f2a6d2.United Nations Report of the Secretary General, “The situation in Afghanistan and its implications for international peace and security”, December 28, 2009. Accessedat: http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2009.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/EGUA-7ZDSWZ-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf. Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, "Global statistics: IDP country figures". Accessed at: http://www.internal-displacement.org/8025708F004CE90B/(httpCountries)/DFADB5842F9262BF802570A7004BA6F0?OpenDocument.