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Inaugural Philosophical Dissertation On the Apathy of the Human Mind

Or the Absence of Sense and of the Faculty of Sensing in the Human Mind And the Presence of these in our Organic and Living Body

With D. Martin Gotthelf Loescher, Med. Rt. Phys. Prof. Publ. nec non Sereniss. Ducis

Saxo Vinariensis Phys. Provincial., presiding.

Publicly defended by the Author

Antonius Guilielmus Amo Guinea-Afer

Phil. et AA. LL. Magister, ER I. V. C.

In the Great Auditorium

April, 1734

Wittenberg, Schlomach

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ON THE APATHY OF THE HUMAN MIND CONSPECTUS OF THE EXPLANATIONS OF THE IDEAS, BOTH AS CONCERNS THE SUBJECT AS WELL AS THE PREDICATE OF THE THESIS AS CONCERNS THE SUBJECT What of spirit in general? C. I m. I. §. I. II. What of the human mind in particular? § 3. As concerns the Predicate

I. What of the opposite of the predicate, namely (a) what of sense, (b) what of the faculty of sensing? m II.

II. What of this predicate itself, or, apathy? ibid. m. III. III. What, finally, of this proposition itself, i.e., of this apathy of the human mind?

With these fundamental matters explained, we pass to the state of the question and to the thesis.

I. The negative thesis: the human mind does not sense material things, with proofs.

II. A second negative thesis: Nor is sensing a faculty of the human mind. III. A third, affirmative thesis: But rather it is a faculty in our organic and living

body, with proofs. CHAPTER I CONTAINING EXPLANATIONS OF THE IDEAS CONTAINED IN THE THESIS A notice concerning the title of this disputation. By ‘apathy of the human mind’ we understand: the absence of sense and of the faculty of sensing in the human mind. This is addressed in chapter II m. I. § I, etc. MEMBER I Containing explanations of the ideas of the subject, in the end concerning the human mind in general and in particular. A notice concerning the title of this member. Because the human mind is the subject of the question or thesis, the reason of the work requires that we declare what we understand by ‘human mind’, so that we may present it in clear and distinct ideas and proceed more successfully to our goal. § I. What of Spirit in General?

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The human mind in general is of the spirits. Thus we must declare what we understand by the term or denomination ‘spirit’. For us, any substance whatever is merely active, immaterial, always intelligent in itself, and operating spontaneously from its own intention, on account of an intended goal of which it is conscious. Note I. To know and to be made conscious of any thing are synonyms. Note II. By ‘intention’ we understand that operation of the spirit, by which it makes note of something to itself, by which it proceeds to its end. Note III. An end is that which, when it is gained and present, the spirit, ceasing from its former operation, comes to rest. EXPLANATIONS OF THE IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING DESCRIPTION OF SPIRIT Explanation I. I say that spirit is a merely active substance, which is to say that spirit does not admit any passion in itself. Proof of this explanation If spirit sensed, or admitted passion within itself, this should occur either by communication, or by penetration, or, finally, by contact. Note I. By ‘communication’ I understand: when the parts, properties, and effects of one entity are made present in another analogous and suitable entity by a certain mediating act. Example. How does a fire’s heat make iron glow? We see that it communicates itself. Note II. By ‘penetration’ I understand: the passage of one entity by the parts of another entity by a certain mediating act. Note III. What contact is is taught immediately by sense itself, but lest the words that are said appear to be without ideas, by ‘contact’ we understand: when two surfaces mutually touch one another in a certain physical point. APPLICATIONS I say that I. Every spirit is beyond any passion. Reason I. No parts, properties, or effects of another entity can be made present in spirit by a certain mediating act. Otherwise the spirit would contain in its essence and substance something other than what it should contain. Likewise, to contain and to be contained are material concepts, nor can they be truly predicated of spirit. Therefore spirit

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does not sense through communication, i.e., in such a way that the parts, properties and effects of the material entity should be made present in that same certain mediating act. Reason II. No spirit per se and per accidens receives parts, properties, and material and sensible effects, indeed on the contrary it is opposed to the sensible entity, but between things that are opposed contrariwise, there is no communication. Note concerning this reason. Things opposed contrariwise are things that are thus compared, so that the absence of one brings about the presence of the other, v.c., if something is immaterial it follows that it cannot be material: they are thus opposed contrariwise, for the predicate of immateriality excludes the predicate of materiality, because the presence of immateriality is the absence of materiality. Indeed wherever spirituality occurs, materiality is absent, and vice versa. I said that spirit does not sense or undergo passion through communication. Now: I say (II): No spirit senses or undergoes passion by means of penetration, since penetration is the passage of an entity through the parts of another entity, but no spirit has constitutive parts. Thus, it is beyond all passion, to the extent that passion occurs by means of penetration, or by passage through the parts of another entity. I say (III): Neither does it sense or undergo passion through contact. For whatever touches and is touched is a body (see Descartes in Epistolis Part III. Epist. 14, § 12, with the words, ‘First, I shall say to you’, etc.)1 Indeed contact occurs when two surfaces mutually touch one another in the same physical point; neither a sensible point nor a surface can be predicated of spirit, thus not passion either, to the extent that it should arise through contact. Explanation II. All spirit always knows through itself, i.e., it is conscious to itself of itself, and of its operations, not of other things. Note. However much I should be unaware of this way by which God and other spirits beyond matter, know themselves, their operations, and other things, nevertheless it does not seem likely to me that they know them by means of ideas. This with respect to what an idea is: a momentary operation of our mind, by which it represents or sets up as present things that were previously perceived by the senses and the sensory organs. Indeed God and other spirits that are positioned beyond matter are without sensations, sensory organs, and a living and organic body. Similarly, in God there is no representation of the future, of the past, and of an absent thing. And yet, in God there is no knowledge of the past and future, nor of what is absent, but in his cognition all things are present, and thus in him there is no representation, since representation supposes the absence of the thing that is represented. It thus follows, furthermore, that God and other

                                                                                                               1 René Descartes, Renati Descartes Epistolae, Partim ab Auctore Latino sermone conscriptae, partim ex Gallico translatae, Part I, Amsterdam: Apud Danielem Elzevirium, 1668, Part III, Letter 14, § 12.

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spirits know themselves, their operations, and other things without any ideality or ideas and repeated sensations, but our mind, by contrast, knows by ideas, and knows and operates on account of the very tight bond (vinculum) and commerce it has with the body (von Berger, in Physiolog. Lib i.c.i., pgs. 1 and 5; Descartes, Epistolis., part. III, Epist. 115, part I. Epist. 29 and 36.).2 Explanation III. Every spirit operates spontaneously, i.e., intrinsically, determines its operations towards a goal that is to be pursued, and operates absolutely without any external influence. Reason. If a spirit were influenced from outside, this would arise either from another influencing spirit, or from matter. If by another spirit, then the spontaneity or free faculty of acting and reacting would remain in both of them. If the spirit is influenced by matter, this could not arise, since spirit is always active, but matter is always something passive, and receiving any action of an agent in itself. Explanation IV. Spirit operates from an intention, i.e., from a precognition of a thing that should arise, and of an end that it intends to pursue through its operation. Reason. In this indeed does the nature of an operation consist, of an entity that is operating rationally and from intelligence. Conclusion I. Every efficient cause should know itself, its operations, and the thing that should arise. Conclusion II. Every active entity, in which there is consciousness of itself, of its operations, and of other things, is a spirit. Explanation V. Spirit is immaterial, i.e., it has nothing material in its essence and its properties. Reason. The one and the other of two opposites cannot mutually contain one another, since two opposite things mutually exclude one another, the genus, the species, and its denomination. §. II. Up to this point anyhow, we are considering those things about spirit that serve the interests of our project [sequitur in sequente]. §. III.

                                                                                                               2 Johann Gottfried von Berger, Physiologia medica sive de natura humana, Wittenberg, 1702, Book I, 1, 5; Descartes, Epistolae, III, 115, 29, 36.

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DESCRIPTION OF THE HUMAN MIND IN PARTICULAR The human mind is: a purely active and immaterial substance, having commerce with the living and organic body, having knowledge and operating from intention according to a determinate end of which it is conscious. Note I. The commerce of the body and the mind consists in this: (1) that the body is made use of on behalf of the subject inhering in it; (2) on behalf of the intstrument of its operation and the medium. Note II. The instrument and the medium differ in this, that the instrument is applied to the end practically, and the medium is deployed to pursue the end theoretically. Note III. The mind and the body are two essential parts of a human being. The mind has already been discussed. As to the body that attaches to it: it is most elegant, first made by the creator from diverse vital organs and animals, and propagated from there through generation. These are the words of Christian Vater in his Physiologia, Sect. IIX. C. III., De corpore humano, Part I.3 §. IV. CONTAINING VARIOUS DESCRIPTIONS OF SPIRITS Under the name of ‘spirits’ we have (1) matter, (2) spirit properly so called. Material spirits for the ancients natural, vital, and animal, on which see Sennert, Epitome scientiae naturalis Lib. IIX chapter II, De corpore humano, pg. m. 671.4 Spirit properly so called is any immaterial, intelligent entity that operates from intention for the sake of an end that is known to it, about which in the preceding, and Jean Le Clerc, Pneumatologia, Sect. III. C. 3. §14,5 and others choose various denominations, indeed calling spirits ‘intelligences’, ‘minds’, ‘souls’, and, by a more general term, ‘intelligent spirits’. Note I. Intelligences and minds differ per accidens, not per se, minds are said to be the spirits of human beings still in their bodies or surviving and separate from them, as the minds of the blessed and the damned are indeed said to be shadows and souls. About these Propertius writes: “Ghosts do exist. Death does not finish all” (see Mizauld, Centuriae, Aphorism 290).6

                                                                                                               3 Christian Vater, Physiologia experimentalis, Wittenberg, 1712, VIII, c. III, Part 1. 4 Daniel Sennert, Epitome scientiae naturalis, Wittenberg, 1618, Book VIII, ch. 2, 671. 5 Jean Le Clerc, Ontologia et pneumatologia, Amsterdam, Wolters, 1692, III 3, 14. 6 Antonio Mizauld (1510-1578), Centuriae XII. Memorabilium utilium, ac iucundorum in aphorismos arcanorum omnis generis locupletes, perpulchre digestae; partim ab Antonio Mizaldo Monluciano, Medico; partim ex aliis fide dignis probatisque auctoribus excerptae. Editio novissima, in decem capita, melioris ordinis gratia, distributa, Paris 1566 [Nuremberg : Impensis Johannis Zigeri, 1681], Aphorism 290.

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Note II. Nor are there lacking those who by the name ‘soul’ understand and contrive to themselves a certain essential third part of man, which is not of concern in our investigation; see S. C. Teuber’s Moderatum judicium de quaestione theologica.7 So much for the subject of the thesis. Next follows: MEMBER II. Containing declarations of ideas as concerns the predicate, and in particular. ON THE SENSE OF THE OPPOSITE PREDICATE AND ON THE FACULTY OF SENSING. Preliminary notice. As is familiar, every proposition used in the Schools is either affirmative or negative : affirmative, when the presence of the predicate in the subject is indicated ; negative, when the absence is indicated. And both are either simply or according to something : simply or being affirmed according to itself, when the presence of the entire predicate in the subject without any limitation or exception is indicated, ‘Every spirit is intelligent’. We affirm according to something, when we judge the predicate as long as a part of it is in the subject, e.g., ‘Man is mortal’, but of course only with respect to body, not with respect to mind (see Matthew 10:28). The same is the case for the reason of negating : we negate simply when we remove the entire predicate with its parts from the subject ; we negate partly or according to something, when we remove at least part of the predicated from the subject. In our thesis, we remove the entire predicate from the subject in two members, namely, sense, and the faculty of sensing. But becuase we say that something is removed from something else, that which nevertheless is not easily removed from the other subject, i.e. sense and the faculty of sensing, must be made known. §. 1. WHAT SENSE IS, EXPLAINED. Sense is, in general : of immediately present and material things, by means of sensible properties that are really conducted through the sensory organs. Note I. Sense is consdiered (1) either logically or physically. Logically, all sense is either mediate or immediate. The one is called an 'idea', the other will be explained shortly. Physically, all sense is either agreeable or disagreeable, and both of these are either internal or external, about which matters in our logic.

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          7  Samuel Christian Tauber, Moderatum judicium de quaestione theologica, an dentur tres partes hominis essentials?,  Magdeburg,  Seidel,  1708.    

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Note II. Internal senses are the passions or feelings of the soul, about which see Descartes' Passions of the Soul. Note III. 'Sensation', 'sensing', and 'sense' are for me synonymous. §. II. THE FACULTY OF SENSING, WHAT. From these premises the faculty of sensing will be easily described. It is, namely, such a disposition of our organic and living body, by which the animal is affected by material and sensible things that are immediately present to it. Note. The ancients called this faculty of sensing the 'sensitive soul', clearly distinguished from the rational and vegetative souls, about which see Sennert, Epitome scientiae naturalis, Book IIX. c. 1., on the vegetative soul;8 also Book VI. c. 2. of the Essais de physique, Part 1, chapter IIX, on sensations, pg. m. 103: "Thus animals are composed of a body and a sensitive soul that is their form. But in human beings this sensitive soul is subordinate to the immortal soul, and, being a middle substance between the body and this immortal soul, it unites them perfectly, etc." MEMBER III. Containing a description of apathy, or of the predicate of the thesis. §. I. We are considering apathy (1) with respect to the faculty of sensing, and (2) with respect to sense itself. We will treat of the former in §. 2., and of the latter in §. 3. Note. The predicate of this thesis has two members, since it contains a double idea, the absence of the faculty of sensing and of sense in a subject that is not suited to having them. §. II. What apathy with respect to the faculty of sensing is. Apathy with respect to the faculty of sensing is the absence of such a disposition in a subject that is not suited to having it, so that the animal should be affected neither by sensible, immediately present things, nor by material things. Unique explanation. The subject is not capable or suited: an entity that does not admit the parts, properties, and effects of another entity into itself, nor is able to partake in these

                                                                                                               8  Sennert,  Epitome,  VIII,  1.    

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other entities. Such a subject is either a spirit or matter. On spirit's incapacity for sensing we have already spoken in Member I. c. 1. With its explanations and their applications. With respect to matter we must distinguish between a living body and a body that is deprived of life, the one is certainly, and the other minimally, affected by the sense that is at its disposition. §. III. Apathy with respect to sense. It follows in order that apathy with resepct to sense is the absence of the power of sense in a subject that is not suited to having it (that is non-sentient), e.g., spirit, stone, etc. §. IV. What apathy of the human mind is. With these things explained it will at last be asked what it is we understand by this thesis itself, i.e., the apathy of the human mind; it is of course: the absence of the faculty of sensing and of sensation of immediate things by the human mind. CHAPTER II. CONTAINING APPLICATIONS OF THOSE THINGS THAT WE HAVE EXTENSIVELY DEDUCED ABOVE. The state of the controversy. Human beings sense material things not with the mind but rather through the living and organic body. These things are said and defended against Descartes, and against his view in the Epistolae, Part I, Letter XXIX, where he holds: "For as there are two things in the human soul on which all cognition that we are able to have of it depends, the one of which is that it thinks, the other that, united to a body, it is able to act and to suffer with it."9 About which claim we warn and dissent; we concede that the mind acts by means of the body through a mutual union. But we deny that it is capable of suffering along with the body. Note. 'To suffer' and 'to sense' are, in living things, synonymous. In things that are deprivedof life to sense is in truth to admit within oneself changes with respect to quantity and quality that come from outside, ie., to be modified and determined from outside.

                                                                                                               9 René Descartes, Epistolae Part I, Letter 29, to Princess Elisabeth, 59.

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Remark I. But Descartes manifestly contradicts himself. Loc. cit. Part I, Letter 99, in the examiination of the preceding claim, where the nature of the soul is placed in the faculty of thinking alone, notwithstanding the fact that thinking is an action of the mind, not a passion. Against Sennert, in his Epitome scientiae naturalis, Book IIX. c. 1., on the rational soul, where [he writes]: and if in truth the human soul, with all of the faculties we have thus far attributed to the vegetative and sensitive soul, exerts power, nevertheless [there are] two, etc. See also Book VII C.I.p.m. 562, on the sensitive soul: "To sense is indeed the work of the soul." Remark II. But he establishes the contrary of his own view on dl. p.m. 563, when he says that to receive the sensible species is the work of an organ; to judge what is received is the work of the soul; to receive the sensible species is to sense; and yet this is applicable to an organ, and consequently to a body, for organs pertain not to the mind but to the body. Sennert himself distinguishes between sensing and judging, in that he attributes the one to organs, and the other to the mind. The same, against Jean Le Clerc, Book IV of the Physicae, 'On Plants and Animals' C. X., on the senses and motions of animals, §. 2.10 Remark III. But subsequently he contradicts himself at dl. §.3, where he says that three things are to be distinguished: (1) the action of the objects upon the organs, (2) the passion of the organ, and (3) he says, the mind is struck by the organ that is moved, and the mind feels that its body has been affected. If indeed the mind were to sense, he should have spoken thus: 'and the mind feels that has itself been affected'. For if the mind senses that its body has been affected, it senses, or, better, knows that it is not itself affected. But he confuses the act of knowing and the task of sensing: and it is the same as if he had said: and the mind knows its body is affected. Likewise against GEORG DANIEL COSCHWIZ, in Organismus et mechanismus in homine vivo obvius et stabilitus, S.I.C.VIII. Part 3, and against many others. The Aristotelians agree with us. See Book II of On Generation and Corruption, c.9.p.m.49, "it is characteristic of matter to suffer action, i.e. to be moved," etc. Hermann Friedrich Teichmeyer, in the Elementa philosophiae naturalis experimentalis C.III., on physical principles p.m.18, says: 'By sense we understand', etc.11 Johann Christoph

                                                                                                               10  Jean  Le  Clerc,  Physicae  Book  IV,  c.  10,  §. 2,  in  Opera  philosophica,  Leipzig,  1710.    11  Hermann  Friedrich  Teichmeyer,  Hermanni Friderici Teichmeyeri, D. Elementa philosophiae naturalis experimentalis: in quibus naturalium affectiones recensentur, earundemque causae, quantum fieri potest, deteguntur..., Jena, Bielckius, 1717, c. III, 18.  

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Sturm, in the Physica electiva sive hypothetica, Book I, or the general part, Section I.C.II. in the the fifth epilogue, as well as dl pag. III. 232, and what follows in the same place.12 THE SOLE MEMBER Thesis I: negative. The human mind is not affected by sensible things. Explanation. The thesis holds also if you say: the human mind is not affected by sensible things, however much the body in which it inheres is affected by nearby present things. But it knows the sensations that arise in the body, and it makes use of the sensations that it knows in its operations. See the Essais de physique, chapter IIX, p. 107. Note. In considering man logically, mind, an operation of the mind, idea, and immediate sense are not to be confused. Mind and its operations are immaterial, for as a substance, so the properties of the substance, and yet the mind is immaterial, according to what we said in Chapter I.m.I.§.I., etc., thus also its properties. An idea is a composite entity, namely, it is when the mind sets up a sensation that has preexisted in the body as present to itself, and it is a represented sensation. On what immediate sense is, see ChapterI.m.2.§.1.m with the associated notes. Proof of Thesis, I. Whatever senses, lives; whatever lives, is nourished; whatever lives and is nourished, grows; whatever is of this sort, is in the end resolved into its first principles; whatever is resolved into its first principles, is a being constituted from principles; every being that is constituted from principles has constitutive parts; whatever

a divisible body. Proof of Thesis, II. No spirit senses material things; and yet the human mind is a spirit; therefore, it does not sense material things. The major premise is proven at Chapter I. m.I.§.1., with the notes and applications that are included, while the minor premise does not admit of contradiction. Note I. To live and to sense are two inseparable predicates. The reason is this inversion: everything that lives necessarily senses, and everything that senses necessarily lives; thus,

Note II. To live and to exist are not synonyms. Everything that lives exists, but not everything the exists lives; indeed, a spirit and a stone exist, but are less rightly said to live; spirit indeed exists, and operates with intelligence; matter exists, and receives the action of the agent. But man and animal exist, act, live, and sense.

                                                                                                               12  Johann Christoph Sturm, Physica elective sive hypothetica, Nuremberg, 1697.  

is of this sort, is a divisible body; therefore if the human mind senses, it follows that it is

the presence of the one implies the necessary presence of the other.

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Proof of the Thesis, III. "And fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul" (Matthew 10:28); next, therefore: whatever is killed and can be killed, necessarily lives. (For to be killed is to be deprived of life by another through violence.) If therefore the body is killed and can be killed, it follows that it lives; if it lives, it senses; it follows that it takes profit of the faculty of sensing. Indeed, to live and to sense are perpetually joined in one and the same subject and principle. Note. A number of physicians and others whose opinion is that sense arises in the bodily fluid and is of a nervous nature, agree that the nervous juice is what the ancients called the 'animal spirits', see the illustrious von Berger, in his Physiologia, Book I, on human nature, c. XXI., on secretion and motion of the nervous juice, p. 277;13 also, the most excellent president of my dissertation, Martin Gotthelf Loescher, in his Physica theoretica et experimentalis compendiosa, II edition, C.V.Q.XXV,14 Essais de physique, Part I, chapter IIX, Des sensations §.5.p.102; Sennert in the Epitome scientiae naturalis, Book IIX. c.2.,p.m.671.15 Example. On this point the expression of Prince Friedrich the Wise, Elector, the most munificent founder of our academy, whose most glorious memory thrives here in Wittenberg, who, drawing the final breath of his life, was asked how he was doing. He responded that the body was suffering its pains, but that the mind was at peace ("welcher auf dem Tod-Bett gefragt wurde wie er sich befände? Antwortete er: Der Geist ist ruhig aber der Leib leydet Schmertzen." See Brückner in Sächsischen Helden-Saal (p. 532), on the life of Friedrich the Wise, the Fourth Elector of Saxony, of the Meissener line.16 §.II. Thesis II. Nor does the faculty of sensing inhere in the mind. Proof. Whatever admits of the circulation of blood admits of the principle of life; whatever admits of this, admits of the faculty of sensing. And yet the body admits of the circulation of blood and aof the principle of life (see the illustrious von Berger, dl.c.V. at the end of p. 112, also p.56;17 see also my most excellent President Loescher, cit. loc. C.V.Q.XII; Christian Vater in Physiologia S.IV.c.2,18 on life and nutrition, at the end of Part I. Likewise the holy book clearly distinguishes the soul from the breath; see Job 12:10, where the seventy men say "In whose hand is the soul of every living thing, and the breath of all mankind." Thus Martin Luther says that "in seiner Hand ist die Seele

                                                                                                               13  Von  Berger,  Physiologia,  Book  I,  ch.  1,  277.  14  Martin  Gottfried  Loescher,  Physica  theoretica  et  experimentalis  compendiosa,  Wittenberg,  1728.  15  Sennert,  Epitome,  Book  VIII,  ch.  2,  671.  16  Siegmund  von  Birken  (incorrectly  referred  to  by  Amo  as  'Brückner'),  Chur-­‐  und  fürstlicher  sächischer  Helden-­‐Saal,  2nd  edition,  Nuremberg,  1678,  532.  17  Von  Berger,  Physiologia,  112,  56.    18  Vater,  Physiologia,  IV,  2.  

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alles des das da lebet und der Geist alles Fleisches eines ieglichen." Likewise this term psyche indicates the principle of life of animals; see Genesis 1:24, and Genesis 9:4 says "But flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall ye not eat" ("allein esset das Fleisch nicht so noch lebet in seinem Blute). Luther rendered ten psychen tou andropou as 'des Menschen Leben'. See also Proverbs 4:23, "Keep thy heart with all diligence; for out of it are the issues of life," and yet the heart with the circulation of blood, refers back to the body. Further, in Leviticus 17: all life is in the blood; but blood refers back to the body; on this see the Essais de physique, Part I, chapter IIX, on sensations, pgs. 102-103. As these things are so, it follows that it is not the mind, but the body, that admits of the principle of life together with the faculty of sensing. §.III. Thesis III. Therefore the body admits of sense and the faculty of sensing. Proof. Either the mind or the body admits of sense and the faculty of sensing, but not the mind, as has already been extensively shown. Therefore, the body, see the proofs of theses I and II. Final note. To conclude this dissertation: the contrary opinions were in chapter II, in the formation of the question. Likewise we do not confuse those things of which the body and the mind variously admit. Whatever indeed consists in the mere operation of the mind is to be attributed to the mind alone, while indeed whatever presupposes sense and the faculty of sensing, and involves a material concept is to be attributed entirely to the body. END.

To the benevolent reader, the Rector and Public Assembly of the University of Wittenberg extend a cordial welcome

In the past, the veneration given to Africa was enormous, whether for its natural genius, its appreciation for learning, or its religious organization. This continent nurtured the growth of a number of men of great value, whose genius and assiduousness have made an inestimable contribution to the knowledge of human affairs and, much more, to the knowledge of divine things. From memory, no one has ever been judged better informed in matters of daily life, nor more a man of refined manners, than Terence of Carthage. Plato himself was reborn in the Socratic interventions of Apuleius of Madaurus. His discourses were so well received in centuries past that learned men were divided into two camps: that of Apuleius contended with that of Cicero for the first prize in eloquence. And in the development of Christian doctrine, how many were its promoters who came from Africa! Only to speak of the greatest of them, let us cite Tertullian, Cyprian, Arnobius, Optatus, Augustine, whose disputed with candor across the full range of the knowledge they had acquired. Monuments, facts, martyrs, councils, all proclaim the fidelity and constancy with which these African doctors labored for the preservation of the integrity of what is sacred. In fact, to suppose that the African church only ever made concessions is to do it an injustice. Even with the Arab invasion of Africa, which brought

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about great changes, many things did not disappear with the domination of these invaders: all of the radiance of African technical and literary genius was not at all extinguished. In fact, letters were admired among these peoples, where the liberal sciences were cultivated; as the Moors coming from Africa crossed through Spain, they brought knowledge of the ancient thinkers, while also bringing much assistance to the development of letters, which were coming out of the darkness little by little.

African learning thus had, in the most ancient times, something to be well received. This is no less true for us, to whom it is reported that that part of the earth has at its disposition other things richer still than the wealth of books and the applications of the technical arts, as is attested by the example given by the Master in philosophy and in the liberal arts, the very brilliant Anton Wilhelm AMO, an African from Guinea. He first saw the light of day in the most distant region of West Africa, and came to Europe as a small boy. He was introduced to sacred things at Halae Juliae. The most serene princes, dukes of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, August Wilhelm and Ludwig Rudolph, deployed their goodness so that he should not suffer, in his education, from the absence of a father's assistance. After having demonstrated his genius, he was brought to Halle in Saxony: there he was initiated into diverse sciences, after which he came to us. As he showed an equal spirit [in philosophy], he rallied the entire department in his favor, and all of his masters unanimously accorded to him the degree of Doctor in Philosophy.

These encomia took on greater weight still, from the praises he received thanks to his genius, to his rank, and to his admirable sense of honor; to his industry, to the knowledge he demonstrated on the occasion of public or private performances. In conducting himself thus, he brought upon himself the affection of the best men, and of the most learned, surpassing others of his generation by a head. Strengthened by the fascination that he inspired in them, he was at home in explaining philosophy to a number of them, commenting on the positions of the ancients as well as of the moderns, always choosing the clearest explanation and giving the reasons for this choice swiftly and with precision. In so doing, he clearly demonstrated his ability to understand and to teach, indicating by this that he had everything needed to obtain, soon, a post in a university, and also that this would be in line with his natural penchant. It being understood that he has not disappointed us, this is why we cannot refrain from according to him the public judgment that he is right to hope for our appreciation. We place much hope in him, and we are convinced that he is worthy of the Prince whom he piously venerates, and whom he praises in all of his statements. We pray to God to pemit him to benefit for a long time from such happiness as this, and for him to achieve his goals for the glory of the very good and mighty PRINCE LUDWIG RUDOLPH.

We pray to God for the propserity of the whole House of Braunschweig-Wolfenbüttel, so reputed in all of Germany in view of its great merits.

Written publicly and marked with the seal of the University, this 24th of May, 1733

Johannes Gottfried Kraus, current Rector of the University

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**

The President solemnly salutes the brilliant author of this thesis

We publicly declare that Africa, and Guinea, one of its countries, so far from us, are your homeland. In view of its reserves of gold, this Guinea was previously called Côte d'Or by the Europeans, and was justly celebrated like a mother who bears natural goods and treasures in her womb, as also, still more, men of very great genius and of very great inventiveness. You count among these latter, very noble and very renowned Sir, with your badge of talent, of which fecundity and merit, as well as vigor and elegance, stand out among your intellectual attainments. All this led to your promotion in our university, with the unanimous applause of men of quality. No less, this thesis is today proof of all this. Because you have elegantly and knowledgeably composed it, I return it to you in its entirety and without any modifications, so tha your genius will radiate from it with that much more force. To conclude, I congratulate you with all my heart for this measure of the excellence of your erudition, but know that my esteem is still more affectionate than the words with which I express it. Permit me to sollicit, humbly and with all of my devotion, the grace of God and of the very great and very good prince, LUDWIG RUDOLPH, for whose salvation I shall never tire of calling upon Divine Majesty.

Composed at Wittenberg in Saxony, April, the year of our Lord 1734.

     List  of  Authors  and  Works  Cited      Johann  Gottfried  von  Berger  (1659-­‐1736),  Physiologia  medica  sive  de  natura  humana,  Wittenberg,  1702.    Siegmund  von  Birken  (1626-­‐1681,  incorrectly  referred  to  by  Amo  as  'Brückner'),  Chur-­‐  und  fürstlicher  sächischer  Helden-­‐Saal,  2nd  edition,  Nuremberg,  1678.      Georg  Daniel  C.  Coschwiz  (1679-­‐1729),  Organismus  et  mechanismus  in  homine  vivo  obvius  et  stabilitus,  Leipzig,  1725.      René  Descartes  (1596-­‐1650),  Renati  Descartes  Epistolae,  Partim  ab  Auctore  Latino  sermone  conscriptae,  partim  ex  Gallico  translatae,  Part  I,  Amsterdam:  Apud  Danielem  Elzevirium,  1668.      Jean  Le  Clerc  (1657-­‐1736),  Ontologia  et  pneumatologia,  Amsterdam,  Wolters,  1692.    -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐  -­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐.  Physicae,  in  Opera  philosophica,  Leipzig,  1710.    Martin  Gottfried  Loescher,  Physica  theoretica  et  experimentalis  compendiosa,  Wittenberg,  1728.  

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 Antonio  Mizauld  (1510-­‐1578),  Centuriae  XII.  Memorabilium  utilium,  ac  iucundorum  in  aphorismos  arcanorum  omnis  generis  locupletes,  perpulchre  digestae;  partim  ab  Antonio  Mizaldo  Monluciano,  Medico;  partim  ex  aliis  fide  dignis  probatisque  auctoribus  excerptae.  Editio  novissima,  in  decem  capita,  melioris  ordinis  gratia,  distributa,  Paris  1566  [Nuremberg  :  Impensis  Johannis  Zigeri,  1681].    Daniel  Sennert  (1572-­‐1637),  Epitome scientiae naturalis, Wittenberg, 1618. Johann Christoph Sturm (1635-1703), Physica elective sive hypothetica, Nuremberg, 1697. Hermann Friedrich Teichmeyer (1685-1744), Institutiones philosophiae naturalis experimentalis, Jena, 1712. ---- ---- ---- ----. Hermanni Friderici Teichmeyeri, D. Elementa philosophiae naturalis experimentalis: in quibus naturalium affectiones recensentur, earundemque causae, quantum fieri potest, deteguntur..., Jena, Bielckius, 1717. Samuel Christian Tauber (1671-1739), Moderatum judicium de quaestione theologica, an dentur tres partes hominis essentials?,  Magdeburg,  Seidel,  1708.    Christian  Vater  (1651-­‐1732),  Physiologia  experimentalis,  Wittenberg,  1712.                                                  

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Please cite as:

Amo, A. G. (2012). On the Apathy of the Human Mind Or the Absence of Sense and of the Faculty of Sensing in the Human Mind And the Presence of these in our Organic and Living Body . (Doctoral thesis) (J. E. H. Smith, Trans.), University of Wittenberg, Germany (Original work written in 1734).

An Amo ChronologyAdapted from Burchard Brentjes, Anton Wilhelm Amo: Der schwarze

Philosoph in Halle, Leipzig, Koehler & Amelang, 1977, and other sources.

c. 1703. Amo is born, most likely in Axim, a village located in present-day

Ghana.

29 July, 1707. Notice of Amo's baptism in the church register of the Saltzthal

chapel, Wolfenbüttel.

9 June, 1727. Notice of matriculation at the University of Halle.

28 November, 1729. Amo participates in a disputation on his thesis, De iure

Maurorum in Europa [On the Right of Moors in Europe].

2 September, 1730. Notice of matriculation at the University of Wittenberg.

17 October, 1730. Amo obtains the degree of Magister of Philosophy and the

Liberal Arts.

April, 1734. Amo completes his inaugural dissertation, De Humanae mentis

apatheia [On the Absence of Sensation in the Human Mind].

16 April, 1734. Notice in the decanal register at the University of Wittenberg

that Amo has been retained as a Magister legens.

29 April, 1734. Amo participates as praeses in the disputation of Johannes

Theodosius Meiner's thesis, Idearum distinctam eorum quae competunt vel

menti vel corpori nostro vivo et organico.

21 July, 1736. Notice in the records of the Philosophy Faculty of the University

of Halle that Amo has been retained as a Dozent.

1736. Amo participates in a disputation with J. C. Petsche in Halle.

1737. Amo composes a poem in honor of Abraham Wolff.

1738. Amo completes the Tractatus de arte sobrie et accurate

philosophandi [Treatise on the Art of Soberly and Correctly Philosophizing], in

Halle.

27 June, 1739. Notice of Amo's 'nostrification' (i.e., hiring) at the University of

Jena.

17 July, 1739. Announcement of Amo's lecture program at Jena.

October, 1747. Johann Ernst Phillipi's satirical screed against Amo is

published.

c. 1748. Amo flees Germany and returns to West Africa.

1752. David-Henri Gallandat meets Amo in Axim, in West Africa.

c. 1753. Amo dies.

Source: http://www.theamoproject.org/amo-biography/