POLICE QUARTERLY (Vol. 2, No. 2, June 1999)Archbold, Meyer / GANG SUPPRESSION UNIT
ANATOMY OF A GANG
SUPPRESSION UNIT:THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION
OF AN ORGANIZATIONAL
RESPONSE TO GANG PROBLEMS
CAROL A. ARCHBOLDUniversity of Nebraska-Omaha
MICHAEL MEYERUniversity of North Dakota
This article explores the institutional response of a midsized Midwesternpolice department to a perceived growing problem with youth gang activity.More specifically, this article analyzes both individual and organizationallevel variables that provide justification for creating and sustaining the exis-tence of a Gang Suppression Unit (GSU). The evolution of the GSU is tracedthrough both formal and informal constructions of a perceived youth gangproblem by the Cedar Springs Police Department. Data collection consistedof 250 hours of participant observation with both uniformed patrol officersand members of the GSU, as well as official memos, records, and newspaperarticles, to illustrate a historical overview of how the GSU emerged. In addi-tion, this case study also provides evidence of common conditions often foundin “moral panic” situations.
Responding to youth gang problems has become routine for many lawenforcement agencies in cities across the country. Youth gangs and gangactivity have been reported in almost all 50 states by law enforcement andmedia reports (Spergel et al., 1990). Law enforcement officials in large cit-ies, such as Los Angeles and Chicago, have implemented gang interventionstrategies, community policing, and suppression units to combat the youth
gang problem in their cities. These gang programs, although their effective-ness is limited by tight budgets and understaffing (Spergel, 1995; Jackson &McBride, 1996), are still utilized in many law enforcement agencies acrossthe country.
Today, youth gangs are no longer a social problem exclusive to large cit-ies. Midsized and even small rural towns are reported to serve as hosts to thegrowing problem of youth gangs (Barber, 1993; Beyer, 1994; Klein, 1995;Quinn & Downs, 1993; Spergel et al., 1990; Zevitz & Takata, 1992).According to Owens and Wells (1993) and Spergel et al. (1990) the shift ofyouth gangs from large cities to midsized or small cities are a result of dis-placed urban populations, high unemployment, and other social problemssuch as poverty and social isolation.
Research focused specifically on midsized and small town youth gangs isunderrepresented in the gang literature, and there is even less literatureavailable to law enforcement agencies on youth gang programs tailored spe-cifically for midsized or small cities. Most of the research that has addressedyouth gangs in midsized or small cities has been based upon the social con-ditions or gang indicators used in large cities (Maxson, Klein, & Gordon,1987; Rosenbaum & Grant, 1983; Klein, 1995). In the absence of researchon youth gangs in midsized or small cities, identification of youth gangsdrawn from urban gang indicators can make the task of gang identificationvery difficult, if not impossible. In addition, research also suggests that suchindicators may not always be applicable to smaller cities (Beyer, 1994;Huff, 1990; Tindle, 1996). So how do we know when and if youth gangsexist in small or midsized communities?
One approach to the analysis of emergent gang problems, the approachof this study, is social constructionism. “Constructionist theory describesand analyzes social problems as emerging through the efforts ofclaimsmakers who bring issues to public attention” (Best, 1995). Throughtypification, a claimsmaker characterizes or categorizes a social problemthrough the use of examples (e.g., gang indicators or gang-related events)(Best, 1995). The identification of the presence of specific characteristicsparticular to the problem of concern provides validation or justification thatthe social problem exists. After the social problem is brought to publicattention, several factors (including the media and validation of the socialproblem by authority figures such as the police) perpetuate the constructionof the social problem (Jenkins, 1994). Youth gangs are an example of asocial problem that can be socially constructed by a claimsmaker who has astake in defining the problem and its indicators.
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Once a problem is socially constructed by a claimsmaker, it is possiblethat a wide spread “moral panic” in response to that perceived social prob-lem could occur (Victor, 1998). The term moral panic was coined by Stan-ley Cohen in his book Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of Modsand Rockers in 1972. Cohen (1972) explains moral panic as a way to distin-guish a type of behavior characterized by widespread rumors or stories dis-persed by the media or other agencies, which overstates the actual threatposed by an identified deviant person, group, or behavior. Generally, moralentrepreneurs are the driving forces behind the occurrence of moral panics.Moral entrepreneurs would include politicians, media personnel, and otherauthority figures (such as the police and other criminal justice agents). Theconcept of moral panic has been applied to a wide variety of topics, includ-ing violent crimes (Weis & Chermak, 1998; Chermak, 1995; Chermak,1994; Barlow & Chircos, 1995 [AU: CHIRCOS OR CHIRICOS?]),drugs (Reinerman & Levine, 1996 [AU: REINERMAN ORREINARMAN?]; Chermak, 1997), and youth gangs (Zatz, 1987; Jackson& Rudman, 1993; McCorkle & Miethe, 1998).
According to Victor (1998), key conditions need to be present or need tooccur for a moral panic to take place. Those specific conditions wouldinclude (a) belief, (b) false accusations, (c) timing, and (d) authority. Thebelief that potential danger exists needs to emerge and spread quicklythroughout the general population or community for a moral panic to occur.This can happen through the efforts of the mass media or social controlagents (such as the police, government officials, politicians, and religiousleaders) taking action against some perceived social problem. Next, falseaccusations can be the result of “claims making” by claims makers in a soci-ety (Victor, 1998). Social control agents can make claims and also validateclaims made by others to solidify false accusations as facts in the eyes ofobservers. Without a large number of people believing false accusations asfacts, moral panics could not take place.
Timing also has to be just right for a moral panic to occur. A moral panichas the best chance of catching on if the general public perceives social con-ditions as deteriorating and ultimately causing stress in a community or ifthere are other moral panics occurring at that time. An example of this waspresent in the early 1980s, when there was a panic occurring over economicconditions deteriorating in the United States. The worries over economicconditions primed the conditions for a moral panic in the form of “the waron drugs” to emerge through efforts of political leaders. It would be mucheasier to get an already frightened public even more scared if they are
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already in a state of panic over some other perceived threat. Also, Best(1990) mentions that a precipitating event timed just right could trigger thespread of a moral panic. Moral panics can be infectious in communities thatalready have a heightened fear of some deviant group or behavior.
A final component needed for a moral panic to emerge would be the pres-ence of an authority figure to build the credibility of a moral panic (Victor,1998). Authority figures and other social control groups play a big part indefining what type of people and behaviors pose a threat to the general pop-ulation. Social control agents (such as politicians, police officers, and socialactivists) are also needed to validate the existence of potential dangers thatare at the core of moral panics. Moral panics are more likely to spread acrosslarger populations and last for a longer period of time with the validation ofauthority or authority figures. For example, if a chief of police gets on tele-vision to inform his or her community that local police officers are witness-ing a surge in gang activity, a majority of the people watching and listeningwill believe the claim. However, if school children were making claims ofexisting gangs, they might be viewed as “making up stories” or even lying.
This article focuses on the identification of and response to a perceivedyouth gang problem by a midsized Midwestern police department. Itfocuses on the process by which youth gangs became defined by the policeas a problem in the community, as well as existing conditions that lead to amoral panic in the community of Cedar Springs. The site, Cedar Springs1, isa midsized (roughly 50,000 people) Midwestern city located in thenorth-central region of the country. Based on gang indicators used in largeurban cities, law enforcement officials identified a youth gang problem inthe Cedar Springs community. In response to this perceived gang problem, aGang Suppression Unit (GSU) was proposed and subsequently adopted bythe city. Using data collected through participant observation, unstructuredinterviews, and official records, this study traces the evolution of the CedarSprings GSU, as well as how individual and organizational level variableswere used to justify and sustain its existence. In addition, the necessarycomponents needed to create and perpetuate a moral panic are reported inthis case study.
METHODS
Data for this study were drawn from three sources: (a) participant obser-vation with both uniformed patrol officers and GSU members in CedarSprings, (b) unstructured interviews with both patrol officers and GSU
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members while in the field, and (c) examination of official records, memos,and newspaper articles.
More than 250 hours of participant observation were conducted betweenJune 1996 and October 1996. Observations were conducted with 29 of 34officers assigned to uniformed patrol, which included 11 of the 12 patrolofficers in their function as GSU members and both GSU supervisors.Observations with officers while on patrol occurred during all three shifts(day, afternoon, and evening). Additional observations with GSU officersalso occurred during their assigned GSU operations. Observation periodswith individual officers ranged in length from 2 to 10 hours in the field pershift.
Field notes recorded inside the patrol car were written on standard note-book paper in the presence of the GSU and patrol officers. Observations thattook place outside of the patrol car were recorded on 3 x 5 memo pads thatcould be carried in the observer’s pocket. These field notes contained thickdescriptions of all calls for service to which officers were assigned, conver-sations of the observer with the officers, conversations between officers,and the settings, time, and reactions by anyone (including officers, citizens,and the observer) observed during each shift. Detailed personal reactionsand analytical notes (in the form of mental and jotted notes) were filled intothe full set of field notes the next day.
Individual and organizational perceptions of gang activity and gang indi-cators in the community were discussed through unstructured interviewswith both patrol officers and GSU members. Individual perceptions of theexistence and severity of gang activity in the community were discussedwith all officers. In addition, GSU members were interviewed about theindicators that they used to identify gang members, perceived origins of thegangs, and the goals and activities of the GSU as a specialized police unit.
Official documents (including memos, proposals, annual reports, min-utes from Youth Task Force (YTF) meetings, and local newspaper articles)created a historical overview of how and why the GSU was established, aswell as the goals and functions of the GSU as an organized unit. Formalfunctions of the GSU were developed from gang suppression documentscollected by GSU supervisors at the 1996 Midwest Gang InvestigatorsSeminar, held in St. Paul, MN by criminal justice professionals (Youth andGang Violence Task Force, 1996). Each GSU member was given athree-inch binder of information collected by the GSU supervisors at con-ferences, and this information was used as a major component of the GSUtraining.
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When this study began, the GSU was in its early stages of operation.Observations were conducted during June of 1996 when the GSU had been“on the streets” only four times. Observations alternated between membersof the GSU and uniformed patrol officers through the end of August 1996,when the middle schools and high schools went back into session and GSUactivities began to decrease. Observations and interviews with uniformedpatrol officers and contact with GSU supervisors continued through the endof October 1996, at which time the fieldwork was completed and the GSUwas no longer active. Today, the GSU still exists as a unit within the CedarSprings Police Department, but no longer conducts surveillance or anyother activities similar to those conducted throughout the summer of 1996.
CONSTRUCTING THE PROBLEM
The topic of youth violence in Cedar Springs can be traced back to 1988in local newspaper articles. However, the topics of gangs or gang activitydid not appear until August 12, 1995 in an article titled “Gangs in theShadows.” The rise in youth violence was becoming a concern statewide,but the distinction between youth violence and gang violence had not yetbeen addressed by the media or local law enforcement officials. The con-cern or belief of the existence of gang activity by citizens statewide servedas one of four key conditions needed for a moral panic to occur.
On September 15, 1995, the concern of youth violence in the statebecame a brutal reality. A woman was murdered in Brooks, a community 80miles from Cedar Springs, during what was first described as an attemptedrobbery. The suspect, a male teenager, was identified by Brooks police offi-cers as being affiliated with a local youth gang. However, the murder inBrooks was not reported by police officials as a gang-related crime. Rather,it was seen as a crime committed by someone who was thought to be a mem-ber of a gang. The murder not only devastated the citizens of Brooks, it alsoshocked citizens statewide.
After the murder in Brooks, gangs and gang activity became frequenttopics in the media (television and newspaper) in nearby Cedar Springs. Themurder in Brooks came to serve as the “troubling event” described by Best(1995) as is the link between a problematic pattern (such as a perceivedincrease in youth violence) and a perceived larger social problem (actualgang existence in Cedar Springs). The timing of the murder in Brooksserved as a second key condition for a moral panic to occur in the commu-nity of Cedar Springs.
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RESPONSE TO THE CONSTRUCTION
In response to media attention given to the murder in Brooks, the CedarSprings City Council requested the formation of a City Task Force toaddress the issues of youths, gang violence, and other troubling issues in thecommunity. The mayor of Cedar Springs appointed the city’s communityrelations officer as organizer/planner for the City Task Force. After a townmeeting on November 16, 1995, 36 people were chosen to be members ofthe YTF (a subcommittee of the City Task Force). The YTF was created todeal specifically with issues surrounding youth and gang violence in thecommunity. Once the problems were identified, the Task Force was to applythe appropriate remedy to the problem. The Task Force’s membership con-sisted of concerned citizens and representatives from local governmentagencies, social and human service agencies, churches, and juvenile deten-tion services.
On January 30, 1996, the YTF held its first meeting at the Cedar SpringsCity Council Chambers to discuss the YTF’s mission statement, goals andobjectives, and activities. The goals of the YTF became defined in its mis-sion statement:
To suppress and deter gang-type activities and other high risk behaviors usually asso-ciated with gangs. To effectuate these activities by mean of public information and ed-ucation; community service/voluntary organization networking; establishment ofneighborhood policing programs; supporting stiffer consequences; identifying andnetworking community resources; identification and securing of funding sources foractivities, leading to a healthier community (Youth and Gang Violence Task Force,1996).
In addition, youth and gang related material that focused on youth andgang programs implemented in major cities around the United States werepresented to members of the city council and YTFs. Two law enforcementrepresentatives, who later became GSU supervisors, presented a statisticalreport to the YTF, in which they indicated an increase in juvenile andgang-related activities in Cedar Springs (See Table 1).
According to the two Cedar Springs law enforcement representatives, thestatistical report presented in Table 1 supported the need for the implemen-tation of a GSU in the Cedar Springs area to address the youth and gangissues assigned to the YTF by the mayor. It should be noted that the crimescommitted by individuals that were 18 years old and younger were labeledgang-related behaviors by Cedar Springs law enforcement officials and
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were not officially recorded as such by police officers when they occurred.These categories do not represent the crime statistics specifically forgang-related activities in 1990 and 1994 in Cedar Springs. The assumptionmade by Cedar Springs law enforcement officials was that all assaults, autothefts, thefts, acts of criminal mischief, incidence of runaways, and reportedthreats were all gang-related behaviors because they were committed byindividuals 18 years old or younger. This assumption made by law enforce-ment officials would serve as the false accusation necessary for a moralpanic to occur, as well as the basis for the creation of a GSU in CedarSprings.
On February 15, 1996, the same two law enforcement officials presenteda proposal to the Cedar Springs chief of police requesting support for theimplementation of a GSU in the city. The proposal consisted of five costplans for implementing a GSU, the intended goals and procedures of theGSU, and possible benefits that a GSU would bring to the community. Thetwo sergeants stated that they would take responsibility for training GSUmembers and also for coordinating GSU activities. These activities wouldinclude gathering gang intelligence on the street through a variety of sur-veillance techniques, building a computer system that would network into
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TABLE 1. Percent Change in Arrests and Reported Crimes in Cedar Springs 1990 and 1994
a. Items with an asterisk next to them were labeled gang-related behaviors by the two Cedar Springs lawenforcement officials that generated and presented the statistical results to the Cedar Springs Youth TaskForce. However, these crimes were not officially recorded as gang-related crimes by Cedar Springs Po-lice Officers at the time when they occurred.
surrounding law enforcement agencies to share gang-related information;and use Internet access to obtain information on gang suppression tacticsused in other cities around the United States.
Although funding was not yet approved, the chief agreed to the proposal.On February 26, 1996, a memo was posted by the chief of police requestingvolunteers for a gang suppression assignment. The memo stated that, “onlyofficers with a sincere interest in gang suppression should apply, and shouldbe prepared to begin assignment when and if funding is approved by cityhall.” [AU: PLS. PROVIDE CITE FOR QUOTE.] The deadline forassignment was listed as March 18, 1996. Twelve patrol officers respondedto the request and, ultimately, all twelve officers were granted assignment tothe GSU. After receiving permission from the chief to implement a GSU(and eventually receiving funding), the claims made by law enforcementofficials that gangs existed in Cedar Springs had been validated by a figureof authority in the community. This “stamp of validation” would serve asanother condition needed for a moral panic to occur in Cedar Springs.
At the same time, GSU supervisors were requesting funding for them-selves through the YTF to attend the annual Midwest Gang InvestigatorsSeminar in April of 1996. By attending the seminar, GSU supervisorswould gain knowledge in areas including gang suppression tactics, net-working with surrounding law enforcement officials to share knowledgeand intelligence on youth gang activity, and dealing with gang problems inthe Midwest region of the United States. Funding was also requested for twoadditional gang-training workshops in nearby cities for the 12 GSU mem-bers. Funding for the Midwest Gang Investigators Seminar, as well as theadditional funding for GSU members to attend gang-training workshopswas ultimately granted.
On April 30, 1996, the Cedar Springs Enforcement and Consequencessubcommittee presented a statement of goals, solutions, and proposed bud-get to the YTF. This subcommittee consisted of 10 YTF members, includ-ing both GSU supervisors. Three main goals were identified in thememo[AU: PLS. PROVIDE REF. FOR MEMO]:
1. Better assessment of the youth/gang problem, and intervention programs related toyouth/gang activities. Conduct research and a feasibility study to organize a PoliceYouth Bureau (cost $5,000).
2. Gather intelligence on gang activity in the Cedar Springs Area. Suppress any gang ac-tivity that emerges, and prevent it from spreading. Formation of a gang suppressionunit is a solution (cost $20,000 for 6 months).
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3. Better coordination between the Youth Task Force and the mayor’s office. An individ-ual would be hired full-time for grant writing and research purposes (cost $35,000 sal-ary, and $15,000 annual budget).
The subcommittee recommended that the YTF work to strengthen cur-few ordinances and consequences of youth/gang activity in Cedar Springs.The subcommittee also suggested that research into other curfew ordi-nances across the United States would be helpful in deciding what type ofproposal would be appropriate for the Cedar Springs community (Youthand Gang Violence Task Force, 1996).
Formal response to the perceived gang problem began with the approvalof funding for the GSU in the middle of May 1996, by the finance commit-tee for the city of Cedar Springs. At that time GSU supervisors started to or-ganize possible training for the unit. In a telephone interview, one of theGSU supervisors was asked what kind of training the GSU members had re-ceived prior to their first evening on the streets. He said that he “had giveneach member a three inch binder of information gathered by himself and theother GSU supervisor, from conferences they had attended over the pastyear or so.” He also stated that he “expected the officers to read the informa-tion, and that they could teach themselves from the material provided in thetraining binders” (Erickson, 1996). Training was also discussed with someof the GSU members through unstructured interviews:
One GSU member said that, “the GSU supervisors went to a conference and gathereda bunch of information about gangs and gang suppression, and brought it back to theofficers (GSU).” He also said that, “the GSU members had a ten hour training session
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TABLE 2. Average High and Low Temperatures (in degrees Fahrenheit) in Cedar Springs(September through April)
Source: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 1978 [AU: PLS. PROVIDE REF.].
with some guys who have dealt with gangs and gang suppression across the nation.”The officer stated that, “the training session was very helpful to the GSU because itgave them a sense of direction.” (Erickson, July 17, 1996)
Another GSU member stated that, “we learned in our training that there is no suchthing as a wannabe gang. But there is something called a peripheral gang. This is aloosely organized group that has the potential of becoming a threat to other kids andpeople in the community. The thought of acting out gang activity is enough to be con-cerned with.” (Erickson, June 21, 1996).
“We learned about some of the symbols (used in graffiti) in training sessions wehad. These gangs are loosely organized, but have the potential to become more dan-gerous. It seems to be a trend up here in the northern region of the country. If we attackthe problem now, we can prevent it from getting worse.” (Erickson, June 22, 1996).
After the GSU finished training, the unit began operation at the end ofMay 1996. For the first few weeks of patrol, GSU members were “unsure ofwhat exactly they were suppose to be doing” (Erickson, June 8, 1996). Butafter a few weeks, surveillance and logbook entries became routine activi-ties of GSU members over the course of an 8-hour shift. GSU shifts rangedfrom 8:00 p.m. through 2:00 a.m. on both Friday and Saturday nights. TheGSU would often patrol and conduct surveillance on Sunday evenings or inthe event of community social gatherings (such as street dances, fireworksdisplays, or fairs). Over the course of an evening (or the equivalence of oneshift) GSU members would conduct random patrol in areas suspected toproduce gang activity in two unmarked patrol cars. The schedule of GSUoperations was not always consistent. If no one signed up for a shift, theGSU would not operate on that particular evening. Scheduling conflictswith patrol officers’ regular schedules was a major reason that GSU shiftswere sporadic. Because all GSU members were also full-time patrol offi-cers, there were times when no officers were available to work as part of theGSU.
Over the course of the summer, the GSU participated in a variety of activ-ities. The activity most central to its functions involved conducting surveil-lance from unmarked cars for the purpose of gathering intelligence on gangmembers. Drawing on gang indicators, which was provided as part of theirtraining, GSU members would record (either verbally into a tape recorder orwritten in a memo pad) any contacts made over the course of an evening.These contacts would later be transcribed into the official GSU logbook.Names, social security numbers, license plates, and perceived gang affilia-tion were some of the items recorded.
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Gang indicators used by GSU members included gangster attitude,dress/tattoos, hand signals, graffiti, self-reported and word-of-mouth gangaffiliation. The gang indicators used by the Cedar Springs GSU to identifyyouth gang members and gang activity were drawn from indicators listed incurrent gang literature (Evenrud, 1991; Jackson & McBride, 1996; Klein,1995) and were also gang indicators used by law enforcement officials inlarge cities. These indicators, in turn, aided in the confirmation of a gangproblem in Cedar Springs by the technique of illustrating a problem throughthe use of examples (Best, 1995). Personal testimony by law enforcementofficials describing gang indicators (including style of dress, tattoos, graf-fiti, and hand signals) were used to strengthen the construction of the prob-lem as they could be easily identified by some of the GSU members:
“Last year you could go by the colors or clothes that they wore, or the fact that theywould flash you a ‘sign’ when you would pass by.” (Erickson, June 26, 1996)
“We started to see kids dressed in a certain way (wearing baggy pants,starter jackets and certain gang colors) and those same kids could be seenthrowing ‘signs’ around in parking lots downtown. The ‘signing’ they (gangmembers) do represents their gang affiliation, and warns other rival gangs oftheir membership.” (Erickson, June 21, 1996)
“Last year the gangs started forming and were visible with their ‘flags’and signing in the parking lots, but now they have stopped making it so obvi-ous.” (Erickson, July 19, 1996)
Other gang indicators used by the Cedar Springs GSU, such as “gang-ster” attitudes, self-reported gang affiliation, and gang affiliation revealedthrough other sources (such as word-of-mouth), were not as easily identi-fied by some GSU members, but were relied upon just as heavily as visiblegang indicators. The claim of being able to distinguish a “wannabe” ornongang member from a gang member was also easier for some GSU mem-bers than for others:
“It is hard to ID people (gang members). For a while, gang members would wear col-ored hankeys (like red, blue, green, or black) and dress like a gangster. You know, thebaggy pants and shorts, hats, etc.”(Erickson, June 8, 1996)
“The ‘hard core’ gang members have an empty, cold stare, and seem to act like theydon’t care if you are the police. They just don’t care who you are. There is no humanityin their eyes.” (Erickson, July 4, 1996)
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“Most of the gangsters around here dress a certain way, and they will sometimesbrag of their affiliation with a gang. But now the trend is not saying anything about af-filiation, because it could get you in trouble with the police.” (Erickson, June 28,1996).
The use of such indicators to identify gang members is highly question-able. As noted by McCorkle and Meithe (1998), “Though they (gang indi-cators) may have originated in gangs, such dress, sobriquets, and gesturesare no longer confined to those groups” (p.59). Glamorization of the gangculture has resulted in the consequence that “the markers used to identifygang members are no longer valid” (McCorkle & Meithe, 1998, p. 59). Be-cause the Cedar Springs GSU had no other indicators to rely on to identifygang members, they used those derived from large cities such as Chicagoand Los Angeles.
Cedar Spring GSU members also gave potential locations of the originsof local gang members. Three areas of possible origins were identified: (a)children of migrant workers that moved to the Midwest from Texas, (b) kidsfrom Marshall (a small community located across the river from CedarSprings), and (c) a military base located outside of Cedar Springs. Each ofthese three areas described as possible origins of gangs by the GSU serve asa means of cultural diversity in the Cedar Springs area. A majority of the mi-grant workers from Texas are Hispanic, and several migrant families havesettled in Marshall. The military base brings in many different cultures fromacross the United States. Whether it was directly stated or implied, race andethnicity was also used by members of the GSU as indicators of possiblegang affiliation:
“We have also found that a majority of the gangs cross the river to Cedar Springs fromMarshall. They are typically Hispanic, and are usually in the age range of 13-19 yearsold.” (Erickson, June 7, 1996)
“They (gang members) are usually from broken homes, or single parent homes. Italso has to do with social status. These are usually kids from lower class homes. Butsometimes we will run into a situation where the single parent is working two or threejobs just to get by, and they tend to lose track of their kids. That is why a lot of thesekids join these gangs. They want to feel accepted somewhere, and they want to feellike they belong. A lot of the kids we run into are from Marshall, and are usually His-panic.” (Erickson, June 21, 1996)
When I asked a GSU supervisor where the gang problem stemmed from, he re-plied, “When I was organizing pictures of the kids that were gang affiliated, and thathad been in trouble with the police in the past, the stack of ‘non-white’ kids was muchhigher than the stack of white kids.” (Erickson, June 29, 1996)
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A recent increase in the region of the minority groups identified withgang affiliation by GSU officers fits a pattern identified by Liska (1992) asthe “threat hypothesis.” The threat hypothesis identifies a link between thegrowth of minority populations in an area and the expansion of social con-trol agencies. Goode and Ben-Yehuda [AU: BEN-YEHUDA ORBEN-YUDA?] (1994) in their discussion of moral panics argue that somelevel of public fear toward certain minority groups, which they call the “rawmaterial” for moral panics, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition. Thiscondition was also present in Cedar Springs. What served as the catalystwas the murder in Brooks and its association with the emerging gang prob-lem in Millbank and Falton. Comparisons between the gang problems inMillbank and Falton and the gang activity in Cedar Springs and Marshallwere frequently offered by GSU officers as part of the justification for es-tablishing the unit. Similarly, Millbank had a growing migrant population,equivalent to that of Marshall.
“I think that we (Cedar Springs) are similar to Falton. The shooting incident a fewmonths ago in Brooks could have just as easily happened here. The gangs from Mill-bank come over to Falton, and that is when the trouble starts. The two communities(Falton and Cedar Springs) are very similar in that sense.” (Erickson, June 7, 1996)
“Some of the gangs in Cedar Springs claim to be connected to the gangs in Faltonand Millbank. The potential for danger is just as likely here, (Cedar Springs) as it is inFalton or Millbank.” (June 8, 1996)
“The murder case in Brooks woke a lot of people up, because it could have hap-pened in Cedar Springs just as easy.” (Erickson, June 8, 1996)
When school resumed at the end of August 1996, the GSU started patrol-ling the middle and high school grounds when school was let out for the day.A GSU member said that this activity only lasted a few weeks because “thekids figured out who we were and which cars we were driving” (Erickson,September 19, 1996). Surveillance and intelligence gathering continuedthrough the middle of October 1996. Upon asking GSU members/supervi-sors why the GSU was no longer conducting regular patrol and surveillance,several answers were given:
“It sounds like they are thinking of ending the GSU for a while. There is not that muchactivity because school is back in session.” (Erickson, October 3, 1996)
Another GSU member stated that, “The GSU is winding down, due to school start-ing. The activity is winding down too. Summertime gets busier for gang activity, andwhen school starts, they (the gangs) shut down their operations.” (Erickson, October 4,1996)
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I asked a GSU supervisor what the GSU had been up to lately. He said that, “theGSU is basically done for right now.” He said that, “they hope to have funding for theprogram next year.” He also said that they are going to try and get the GSU guys intothe grade schools to give lectures to the kids. But he said that, “the GSU will not be outpatrolling in the unmarked cars anymore this year.” The sources that the GSU supervi-sors use to find out information about the local gangs have told him that, “the gangsare still around, but are trying to keep things ‘hush-hush’ because gangs are gettingsuch a bad wrap after the murder of a woman in a neighboring town (Brooks).”(Erickson, October 23, 1996)
When the last day of fieldwork was completed on October 25, 1996, theCedar Springs GSU was retained as an organized group within the policedepartment, but was no longer active in surveillance, patrol, or any othergang suppression activities. Since cessation of GSU activities in 1996, theCedar Springs Police Department has implemented the Gang ResistanceEducation and Training program (GREAT) in the local school district andhas also established school liaison officers in the district’s middle and highschools. Concern about the possibility of an emergent gang problem is stillevident as a former GSU supervisor stated that “the GSU is still available ifthe gang problem should resurface.” [AU: PLS. CITE/PROVIDE REF.]
PRESERVING THE GSU
In the previous section, the creation and evolution of the GSU was docu-mented through several sources. The murder in Brooks and the concern ofincreasing youth violence statewide served as justifications to create a GSUand to evaluate the extent of youth and gang problems as it was understoodby law enforcement officials. After the GSU was formed and functioning asan organized unit, continued justifications for its existence were needed. Byusing gang indicators learned in GSU training, GSU members wereinstructed to record any contacts or gang activity in the GSU logbook.Recorded gang indicators in the official GSU logbook served as an impor-tant means of justification for the claims of gangs and the existence andmaintenance of the GSU. However, the reliance on these indicators couldalso prove to be problematic, and such became the case.
The absence of gang indicators would eventually undermine such justifi-cations. The identification of five distinct categories of responses to theabsence of gang indicators given by GSU members was based on the criteriathat at least five of the fourteen GSU members (including supervisors) pro-vided a similar type of response.
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Category 1: Gang Violence Could Get Worse in Cedar Springs
It was clear that GSU members and supervisors felt that gang conditions inCedar Springs could get worse. But it was also clear that each of the GSUmembers and supervisors had a different sense of severity or existence of thegang problem itself. When discussing the absence of gang activity with GSUmembers and supervisors, some of the common responses were as follows:
“These gangs are loosely organized, but have the potential to become more danger-ous. It seems to be a trend up here in the northern region of the country. If we attack theproblem now, we can prevent it from getting worse.” (Erickson, June 22, 1996)
“Some people might not believe it, but there are gangs here. I am originally fromthe Twin Cities and I worked there for a year. There is no difference between the TwinCities and what is happening here. Except we (Cedar Springs) are about 10-15 yearsbehind what is happening there (Twin Cities) now. I have received information fromcities that are geographically similar to Cedar Springs, and they said that their prob-lem just kind of exploded over night. It had been building over time, and then one dayit turned into the dangerous place that it is today. There were ‘wannabe’ gangs in theTwin Cities too, and now those gangs are the ones that are causing the trouble there to-day. This is serious business.” (Erickson, June 28, 1996)
“The GSU is like a preventative measure that the emergence of gangs will not hap-pen.” (Erickson, July 20, 1996)
The unclear definition of gangs and gang activity and the use of gang in-dicators from large cities like Los Angeles or Chicago would make the taskof the GSU in Cedar Springs very difficult. To deal with this difficulty, GSUmembers modified their behaviors and feelings to the severity of the per-ceived gang problem, in accordance to the absence of gang indicators.
Category 2: Incorporate Drugs Into Gang Surveillance
Drugs became a main focus in the surveillance that the GSU conductedthroughout the course of the summer of 1996. It was never really explainedwhy drugs played such a large role in the GSU when there was already a sep-arate Narcotics Drug Task Force in the police department. When asked howdrugs played a part in the GSU, GSU members and supervisors provided avariety of explanations:
The GSU received permission to use an empty house that was across the street from ahouse that is known for a lot of drug trafficking. The GSU members used this house tostart doing surveillance. This way they can gather information on who is coming orgoing, and if there are any visible signs of gangs around the house. I asked the GSU su-pervisor why he chose that specific house. He said that, “there are a few houses that we
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are going to be targeting.” He also mentioned that, “the Narcotics Drug Task Forcewill be working in conjunction with the GSU since some of these people (gang mem-bers) are known drug dealers.” (Erickson, July 19, 1996)
“A lot of the gang activity flowed over into the drug problems in Cedar Springs.”He (GSU member) felt that, “doing the surveillance on those specific houses would bea good idea, because a lot of the people coming and going were people that had been introuble with the law before for drugs and/or gang activity.” (Erickson, July 19, 1996)
“The kids that live in this house are known for drug dealing and also for beinggang-bangers. The high traffic in and out of that house, and how frequent these peopleare coming and going, usually leads us to believe that there are drugs involved.”(Erickson, August 3, 1996).
Thus, the attempt to reconcile the identification problem created by therelative absence of gang indicators resulted in illegal drugs being incorpo-rated into the list of indicators that GSU members focused on to define thegang problem in Cedar Springs. If GSU members had no contacts organg-related activities to record in the GSU logbook, the “need” or exis-tence of the GSU could be questioned and, as a result, could be deemed anunjustifiable specialized unit in the police department. Evidence of a directlink between drug activity and gangs in the community was never provided.However, the link between gangs and illegal drugs was never challenged byanyone inside or outside of the police department. Such links have been es-tablished in other locations, and members of the GSU may simply have ac-cepted this as a natural association.
Category 3: Gang members Went“Underground” Because of New Gang Laws
Several GSU members and supervisors stated that they believed that thenew gang laws created in the state had affected visible gang indicators andgang activity in Cedar Springs. Although a few of the GSU membersseemed skeptical of the existence of gangs in Cedar Springs, none of theGSU members mentioned the fact that the absence of gang indicators couldbe the result of no gangs actually existing in Cedar Springs. The variety ofresponses in this category revolve around issues including media coverage,the murder in Brooks, and negative connotations that go along with being agang member in that state:
One GSU member stated that, “last year, yes, there were gangs in Cedar Springs. Thissummer seems to have slowed down a bit. They have went underground.” I asked himwhy he thought that they went underground, and he said that, “the whole gang issue
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has been so publicized, and these kids are seeing that it can get them in trouble so theyare laying low with their affiliation.” (Erickson, July 19, 1996).
“I have noticed a decline in the admission of gang affiliation since they enactedthat new gang law. It states that anyone caught committing a crime, and that can belinked to a gang, gets a more severe sentence.” (Erickson, June 8, 1996)
The sources used by the GSU supervisors to find out information about the localgangs have told him that the gangs are still around. “They (gang members) are tryingto keep things hush-hush because gangs are getting such a bad wrap after the murderof the woman in Brooks.” (Erickson, October 23, 1996)
Another GSU member stated that, “it could be a number of things. It could be be-cause of the gang laws that have been implemented in the state (the law states that if aperson who commits a crime is affiliated with a gang, the penalty is much more se-vere).” He also said that, “since the gang problem was emerging, it could be starting todiminish due to the GSU, lack of interest, or because it carries negative connotationswith it.” (Erickson, July 19, 1996)
Some GSU members thought that because the laws of the state hadchanged for gang members due to the implementation of new gang laws,gang members’ behaviors would change to accommodate the new set ofrules. This means of rationalizing the absence of gang indicators would al-low GSU members to continue with their gang suppression operations with-out visible gang indicators that were presented to them in their training.
Category 4: The GSU Must Be Doing Its Job
Several GSU members also believed that the gangs had disappeared be-cause the GSU had simply done its job. There is no easy way to measure theeffectiveness of the Cedar Springs GSU, but a few of the GSU members (in-cluding supervisors) felt that the GSU seemed to be fulfilling its intendedpurpose:
“The gang activity has gone down in the past few months. The little scum bags musthave figured out that we are not going to put up with their shit anymore and decided tobe secretive about it.” I asked him if he felt that gangs were a real threat to the commu-nity. He said that, “they (gang members) think they are tougher that they really are, butsome of the little assholes mean business.” (Erickson, July 20, 1996)
One of the GSU supervisors stated that he, “thought the GSU was effective so farbecause the news of the GSU spread very quickly among the kids.” He said that he,“found this out by talking to some kids and also from the intelligence agents theyhave.” (Erickson, July 17, 1996)
The other GSU supervisor mentioned that the gang activity has slowed down thissummer in comparison to last summer. I asked him why he thought that was the case,and he said that, “it could be a number of things. It could be because of the gang laws
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that have been implemented in the state (the law states that if a person who commits acrime is affiliated with a gang, the penalty is much more severe).” He also said that,“since the gang problem was emerging, it could be starting to diminish due to theGSU, lack of interest, or because it carries negative connotations with it.” (Erickson,July 19, 1996)
GSU members believed that their presence patrolling the streets of CedarSprings (in unmarked patrol cars) and making contacts with local youthswas enough to change the gang members attitudes and behaviors, thus re-sulting in an overall decrease in gang activity in the community. Several ofthe GSU members viewed the absence of gang indicators as an accomplish-ment of the GSU, thus providing justification for both its past and future ex-istence.
Category 5: Gangs Are“Seasonal” in Cedar Springs
Several GSU members also thought that weather conditions and theonset of the upcoming school year would change the behaviors of gangmembers in Cedar Springs. Cooler temperatures in the fall and freezingwinter weather would pose as a natural deterrent of gang activity in CedarSprings.
Several GSU members believed that because gangs in Cedar Springs are“seasonal,” there would be no reason to have a GSU during the school yearor, more specifically, in the winter months. “Mother Nature” would take theplace of the GSU as a gang deterrent from September through April in Ce-dar Springs:
“We run into kids on the weekends, and whenever it is nice enough outside for them toget out and about. No one in their right mind would walk around outside when it is 40degrees below zero! Shit, I don’t walk around outside when it is 40 degrees belowzero! I do notice an increase when the weather gets nicer, and when school is out. Nowis the prime time for things to start happening.” (Erickson, June 7, 1996)
“The GSU is winding down due to school starting.” He said that, “the activity iswinding down too. Summertime gets busier for the gang activity, and when schoolstarts, they shut down their operations.” (Erickson, October 4, 1996)
A GSU member mentioned that he was surprised that the GSU has not run into asmuch gang activity this summer as they had anticipated. There were a few incidentsthat happened, but the GSU had anticipated that this summer would be pretty wildsince last summer, and the end of this last school year was just nuts. He said that, “itseemed like they were seeing the same kids over and over again, but for different gangrelated stuff (like vandalism, theft and assault on other kids).” (Erickson, July 13,1996)
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The five categories of GSU responses to the absence of gang indicatorsdescribed in this section illustrate how difficult gang suppression can bewhen using indicators from a large city in a midsized Midwestern city.However, the absence of gang indicators was always justified by some re-sponse given by GSU members. Although not all justifications could be cat-egorized by the commonalties described above, the possibility of youthgangs being nonexistent in Cedar Springs was never mentioned as an alter-native definition of the problem.
CONCLUSION
In this study we have traced the development of a police GSU as aresponse to a perceived gang problem in a midsized Midwestern commu-nity. From the analysis presented, it would be reasonable to conclude thatthis potential was overstated, a conclusion consistent with those of theauthors. Through the use of the social constructionist perspective andmethod, we were able to identify how this problem evolved, as well as thecity’s response to the problem. It would be easy to draw from the data, a con-clusion that the identification of the problem and the subsequent responseresulted from the creation of a moral panic in the community by the policeand the media. Again, this would be a reasonable conclusion. However, todo so would miss an important point.
There is no evidence to conclude that the identification of a gang problemand the response of creating a GSU to address the problem were the result ofany disingenuous or cynical act by the parties involved. Concern about themurder in Brooks (and the imputed gang membership of the primary sus-pect), a second homicide/robbery committed by two teenage youths inanother community 90 miles from Cedar Springs, and a third homicidecommitted by another two youths in a third city in the same state, drew con-cern in a state where the annual number of homicides varies between 15 to20 per year. In addition, these were “stranger” homicides, also a significantvariation from the usual domestic homicides that dominate this crime cate-gory. Certainly in the face of an objective gang problem, it would have beenirresponsible for the city (police department) not to respond. What led to theincongruence between the subjective and objective definition of a gangproblem? We have identified the reliance on gang indicators and responsesdeveloped by and for large cities as the primary difficulty.
Two problems resulted from the use of the large city gang indicators: (a) aheightened sense of fear in the community when gang indicators were
Archbold, Meyer / GANG SUPPRESSION UNIT 203
misidentified or overemphasized, which in turn led to a wide-spread moralpanic of gangs and gang activity in Cedar Springs, and (b) themarginalization of nongang-related youth groups in the Cedar Springs com-munity (more specifically, members of racial minority groups in CedarSprings and the neighboring community of Marshall).
Differentiating between gang and nongang youth groups was even moredifficult when the problem was redefined by adding new indicators and jus-tifications supporting and sustaining the use of the GSU. Reliance on gangindicators such as style of dress led to unnecessary labeling of nongangrelated youth groups. Some youth groups adopt fashions that are influencedby their perception of gangs, leading to the potential of gang identification:“The adoption of the gang ‘look’ offers identifiable proof for those seekingevidence of a gang presence in their neighborhood or city, and concern overgangs begins to rise” (Tindle, 1996, p. 14). After the police begin toacknowledge and verify the possibility of gang problems in a community,“police are more likely to identify any problematic group as a ‘gang’”(Quinn & Downs, 1993, p. 221) even if there is no justification for doing so.Therefore, nongang related youth groups end up being marginalized and/ormisidentified as gang members by law enforcement officials.
When police become concerned about emerging gangs in a community,media attention is likely to perpetuate the concern. Tindle (1996) stated that,“The gang issue is one that makes for good social problems coverage” (p. 5).After members of a community see the rising concern of gangs in the mediaon a constant basis, they tend to believe that what the media says is true.Reinforcement by the media to the concern of gang problems as understoodby the police can and does result in the fear of a largely nonexistent problemor a moral panic.
The case study of Cedar Springs presented in this article illustrates someof the problems experienced by a police department in a midsized cityattempting to deal with a gang problem using indicators and suppressiontechniques adopted from large cities. It is our position that the determina-tion of an actual gang presence in Cedar Springs should have been verifiedby establishing the existence of social and organizational attributes ofknown gang characteristics. Absent of establishing the existence of a socialgroup (gang), the symbols relied on by the Cedar Springs Police Depart-ment were too easily associated with nongang members and activities, lead-ing to the organizational response of creating the GSU and then resulting ina community-wide moral panic. Other midsized cities across the country
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similar to Cedar Springs could be using the same techniques and are likelyproducing comparable results. The results of this study identifies the needfor more reliable gang indicators and suppression techniques applicable tomidsized cities across the country before conclusions about the presence ofurban gang influences are considered to exist.
NOTE
1. Cedar Springs, Falton, Millbank, Brooks, and Marshall are all pseudonyms for the cit-ies used in this article.
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