Cambridge Journal of Economics 1997, 21, 729-744 REVIEW ARTICLE Aristotle in the 21st Century Steve Fleetwood* (Reviewing: Scott Meikle, Aristotle's Economic Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995) This review focuses upon three themes from Aristotle's Economic Thought (Meikle, 1995) to reveal how (i) Aristotle's essentiaUst metaphysics can assist in clarifying contemporary issues in (ii) value theory and (iii) economics as ethics. Essentialism allows one to pose (adequately) the central question of value, namely: what is the entity that renders incommensurable commodities commensurable? Essentialism, by discouraging the elision of differences between activities with different aims, sharply differentiates between those activities which aim at use value, and those which aim at exchange value. Pursuit of the latter encourages neglect of the former, making it difficult for society to pursue ethical aims. Introduction As the year 2000 approaches and a new set of socio-economic problems appears on the horizon, is a book written about an economy existing in 300 BC of any relevance for contemporary economists? Surprisingly the answer is yes although, unsurprisingly perhaps, its relevance is more general and theoretical in nature than specific and practical—it will not supply a policy to reduce the NAIRU! In Aristotle's Economic Thought, Scott Meikle (a lecturer in philosophy at the University of Glasgow) pursues two main themes. First, as a history of economic ideas, he offers a challenging interpretation of Aristotle as an economist. Second, by focusing upon meta- physics, value and economics as ethics he illustrates how Aristotelian thought can deepen contemporary economic theory, primarily, but not exclusively, via a reappraisal of Marx. It is the second of these themes that will form the substance of this review. 1 1. Metaphysics Metaphysics is not (pace Robinson, 1964, p. 29) a term of abuse reserved for those whom one believes to be unscientific: it is a legitimate inquiry into the nature of being, into what Manuscript received 15 April 1996;finalversion received 8 January 1997. *De Montfort University, Leicester. I wish to thank two anonymous referees for their careful reading and helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review. 1 1 shall not enter debates over alleged mis-translations of words like chrda (need, utility, want, demand), not because this is unimportant, but because this is completely outside myfieldof competence. O Cambridge Political Economy Society 1997 at Bolland Library, UWE Bristol on August 27, 2012 http://cje.oxfordjournals.org/ Downloaded from
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Cambridge Journal of Economics 1997, 21 , 729-744
REVIEW ARTICLE
Aristotle in the 21st Century
Steve Fleetwood*
(Reviewing: Scott Meikle, Aristotle's Economic Thought, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995)
This review focuses upon three themes from Aristotle's Economic Thought (Meikle,1995) to reveal how (i) Aristotle's essentiaUst metaphysics can assist in clarifyingcontemporary issues in (ii) value theory and (iii) economics as ethics. Essentialismallows one to pose (adequately) the central question of value, namely: what is theentity that renders incommensurable commodities commensurable? Essentialism,by discouraging the elision of differences between activities with different aims,sharply differentiates between those activities which aim at use value, and thosewhich aim at exchange value. Pursuit of the latter encourages neglect of the former,making it difficult for society to pursue ethical aims.
Introduction
As the year 2000 approaches and a new set of socio-economic problems appears on thehorizon, is a book written about an economy existing in 300 BC of any relevance forcontemporary economists? Surprisingly the answer is yes although, unsurprisinglyperhaps, its relevance is more general and theoretical in nature than specific andpractical—it will not supply a policy to reduce the NAIRU!
In Aristotle's Economic Thought, Scott Meikle (a lecturer in philosophy at the Universityof Glasgow) pursues two main themes. First, as a history of economic ideas, he offers achallenging interpretation of Aristotle as an economist. Second, by focusing upon meta-physics, value and economics as ethics he illustrates how Aristotelian thought can deepencontemporary economic theory, primarily, but not exclusively, via a reappraisal of Marx.It is the second of these themes that will form the substance of this review.1
1. Metaphysics
Metaphysics is not (pace Robinson, 1964, p . 29) a term of abuse reserved for those whomone believes to be unscientific: it is a legitimate inquiry into the nature of being, into what
Manuscript received 15 April 1996; final version received 8 January 1997.*De Montfort University, Leicester. I wish to thank two anonymous referees for their careful reading and
helpful comments on an earlier draft of this review.11 shall not enter debates over alleged mis-translations of words like chrda (need, utility, want, demand),
not because this is unimportant, but because this is completely outside my field of competence.
kind of things exist. It is vital to note that engaging in metaphysics is non-optional. Onecannot think about anything (including economic matters) without the aid of categories,and as soon as one chooses categories one has already made metaphysical assumptions(cf. Harre, 1988, p. 16). There are (at least) two reasons why Aristotle's thought is said tobe penetrating: (a) his sensitivity towards metaphysics; and (b) the superiority of hisessentialist metaphysics. Conversely, there are (at least) two reasons why much contem-porary economic thought lacks penetration: (a) an insensitivity towards metaphysics; and(b) the inferiority of the Humean metaphysics it presupposes.
In arguing why Aristotle's essentialist metaphysics is superior to the Humean variety, Ishall restrict my comments to two issues of importance to the objective of this review: lawand teleology/ie&M.
Before doing this, however, it is incumbent upon a reviewer to alert the reader to thefact that essentialist metaphysics is not without its critics. They range from the well-known anti-essentialists like Hume, Popper and Althusser, via the less well-known (andmore recent) sceptical critics like Boylan and O'Gorman (1995), to constructive criticslike Collier (1986).
LawThe essence or nature of a diing specifies what kind of thing it is. What a diing is relates towhat it can do, and that depends upon its intrinsic capacities or causal powers. One decidesthat some thing is an acid, and not alkaline, by ascertaining whether or not it has thecapacity to turn red litmus paper blue. Knowing the essence, that is, knowing what a thingis, then, depends upon knowing the capacities or causal powers it possesses.
Statements about die capacities possessed by a thing are just statements about die lawgoverning and explaining it. Although a capacity is a property a doing necessarily has, invirtue of it being diat kind of thing, there is no necessity for that capacity to be realised:countervailing capacities can and do interact, and accidents can and do happen. Thesepossibilities mean a law must be expressed transfactually, diat is, as a (potentiallyfrustratable) capacity. Acid continues to have the capacity to turn red litmus paper blueeven if some odier chemical neutralises the effect so that the event subsequendy observedis that the litmus paper remains red. For Humean metaphysics, by contrast:
there is no distinction to be drawn between a capacity and its exercise...To say that something cando something—that is, that it has a capacity to do it—is just to say that it does do it. (Meikle, 1995,p. 114)
Because of die preoccupation widi sense experience, there can be no space, as it were,between a capacity and die events it causes. If one event, (say) the immersion of red litmuspaper in a fluid, is followed by anodier event, (say) the paper turning blue, dien one mightsuspect diat the fluid is an acid. What a thing is, on diis account, is not what it has diecapacity to do, but what it is observed to do. Scientific knowledge must, therefore, be of theregular patterns or constant conjunctions, if any, diat diese events reveal. The primaryobjects of science become events, and laws result from recording dieir constant con-junctions. From the Humean perspective, a law is a statement about a constant conjunction ofevents.
There is, however, a serious problem widi this notion of law. The events diat domanifest diemselves in die social world, do not do so, typically, in the form of constantconjunctions, so tiiis version of law cannot be said to govern or explain diem. Eventsmust, therefore, eimer have no governing law and explanation, or something else must
govern and explain them. And here the superiority of Aristotle's metaphysics is evident.The most likely candidates are the intrinsic capacities and causal powers that govern andexplain the flux of events. The primary objects of science become capacities and the causalpowers they possess. From the essendalist perspective, a law is a statement about capacities andcausal powers. It is worth noting that if this metaphysical conception is correct, thenvirtually all the 'laws' of economics are misconceived.1
TeleologykelosTeleology is usually misunderstood to imply: (a) that the future (efficiently) causes thepresent; (b) functionalism; or (c) that things move towards some (mystical) pre-determined end. This is neither how Aristotle, nor modern essentdalists use the term.2
The telos of an entity is the final form, state or condition towards which it tends to developby virtue of its intrinsic capacities. The word 'tends' removes all connotations of deter-minism by recognising that accidents or countervailing forces might frustrate any suchdevelopment. Teleology is a theory of this (tendential) development.
As will become clear below, telos becomes important in understanding and explaininghuman action. Suppose one observes two people engaging in what appears to be anidentical activity. Mistaken observations aside, are they both occupied with the sameactivity? For Aristotle, only when one knows the telos to which that activity is directed canone know what kind of action it is. This is why when Aristotle considers some thing, heasks not only 'where did it come from and 'what is it doing now", but also 'where is itheading' and 'what is it likely to do'.
2. Value
One of the strengths of Aristotle's thought is that it displays an unusual sensitivity towardsmetaphysics, especially when it comes to ensuring that differences between entities oractivities are not elided. This is no less true of his work on value. According to Meikle:
His metaphysics is not prominent on the surface as he develops his argument... [on value] but as isusually the case in his inquiries, it underlies his thought and governs its direction. (Meikle, 1995,p. 13)
Let us see how metaphysics underlies and directs Aristotle's inquiry into value. The firstthing to note is diat Book V of Nicomachean Ethics (NE), and Book I of Politics (Pol), thetwo key places where Aristotle discusses 'economies', are primarily works of ethics. In Polhe is concerned with the (bad) ends to which people strive when the household's activitiesare regulated by money. In NE the problem of exchange value is discussed within acontext of various forms of justice. After discussing distributive and corrective justice,Aristode turns his attention to fairness of exchange. This ought to alert one to the fact diatexchange value is not just a matter for 'value theory" but is inextricably connected with dieethics of society. Whedier a society that pursues exchange value is one that is just andtends to pursue good ends is something Aristode is keen to pursue. He argues that should
'For a defence of Humean law, see Hume himself (1978, pp. 73-94 and 155-72). For a critical discussionof Humean law and a discussion of alternatives, see Harre and Madden (1975, pp. 1-25, 82-100, 101-6);Bhaskar (1978, chs 1, 2 and appendix); and Lawson (1994 and 1996). For contemporary developments onAristotelian-inspired conceptions of law in economics, see Cartwright (1995); Van Eeghen (1996).
2 See Clark (1983); Wieland (1975); Meikle (1985, ch. 7). For a more recent discussion in a specificallyeconomic context see CNeill (1995).
exchange not be based upon some principle of justice, then it will not 'hold the citytogether* (NE, 1132b). It is incumbent upon him, then, to consider what it is aboutexchange that might make it just and fair.
The second thing to note is that Aristotle starts from an investigation of a realphenomena in need of an explanation. From an investigation of reality, he knows thatproducts actually do exchange in some non-accidental proportion:
Let A be a house, B ten minae, C a bed. A is half of B, if the house is worth five minae or equal tothem; the bed, C, is a tenth of B; it is plain how many beds are equal to a house, viz. five. (NE,1133b)
Yet, guided by his metaphysics, he knows that such an exchange ought to be impossible,writing that 'in truth it is impossible that things differing so much should become com-mensurate' (NE, 1133b). As Meikle puts matters: 'The problem of the commensurabilityof goods in exchange presents itself acutely for Aristotle because of his theory of substanceand categories' (1995, p. 13).
According to Aristotle, there are two kinds of things: (a) substances or individual entitiessuch as societies, houses and acids with capacities or causal powers; and (b) attributes ofsubstances such as qualities (white, just), quantities (long) heavy) and relations (north,equality). Aristotle's metaphysics strongly discourage him from 'overlooking or elidingdifferences of kind between things and their attributes' (Meikle, 1995, p. 13). It is difficultto overstate the importance of this, especially when considering value and the categoriesof quality and quantity that are necessary to understand it. A quality cannot be reducedto a quantity or to a relation any more than a number can be reduced to a house or a bed.One cannot, therefore, write 5 beds equals 1 house because, being qualitatively differentkinds of things, they cannot be brought into such a relation. And, if Aristotle cannot sayhow diverse things are commensurable, he cannot establish a relation of equality betweenthem, cannot establish the criterion by which justice and fairness in exchange is attainedand cannot say how society holds together. There is a lot at stake.
Aristotle was the first to divide what modern economists simply call value into twocategories: use value and exchange value (Pol, 1.9, 1257a). 'Use value as a collective termcollects substances as substances, that is, as the things they are by nature, and so use valueis necessarily qualitatively differentiated and heterogeneous' (Meikle, 1995, p. 17).
Exchange values are more complex. When one writes 1 hamster = 20 pencils it is notobvious what the commensurable dimension is. Such an equation is meaningless until oneknows by which property they can be rendered commensurable. Meikle introduces theissue by referring to a price list:
to teax coffee3»bedsz houses
12
10= 100
The entries in the left-hand column collea use values as qualitatively different things. Theentries in the right-hand column collect different quantities of some one substance thatappears to be differentiated only in terms of quantity. Whatever this substance is, it variesonly in magnitude. The task is to discover what this one common substance is that tea,coffee, beds and houses are quantities of.
It now appears that in addition to use and exchange value, one needs also to consider
value. Since conceptual clarity at this stage is vital, I spell out the relationships betweenthem via an analogy with length.• There is one common substance that renders all incommensurable three-dimensional
objects commensurable, namely extension in space. One refers to this substance aslength. The measure of diis substance is the metre.
• Similarly with value. There is one common substance that renders incommensurablecommodities commensurable—although Aristotle does not know what it is. Whateverit turns out to be, one refers to this substance as value. The measure of this substance isexchange value.1
Aristotle begins the search for the common substance (value) that renders incom-mensurable use values commensurable by virtue of the capacity this substance has forassigning magnitudes (exchange value) to them. Significantly his metaphysics allows theproblem to be posed correctly, even if he himself cannot solve it.
Aristotle's inquiry into exchange value is aimed at explaining a capacity: the capacity products havefor exchanging.. .Value.. .is the name of whatever it is by virtue of which products can behave in ex-change in the way that they do, that is, exchange in proportions as quantities. (Meikle, 1995, p. 113)
Recall that what a thing or substance is relates to what it can do, and that depends upon itsintrinsic capacities or causal powers. The substance that renders different goodscommensurable and thereby facilitates exchange, must possess certain properties andcapacities. The solution to the problem of commensurability, then, involves finding asubstance which has specific properties and capacities. Now, in trying to solve theproblem of commensurability Aristotle considers, and rejects: (a) money, (b) need, and(c) a combination of the two.
(a) MoneyAristode considers whether money, since it is the measure of all things, constitutes dienature of exchange value. The thinking here, according to Meikle (1995, p. 20) is that 'theexistence of a common standard of measurement itself constitutes commensurability andmakes die equalisation of goods possible.' After flirting with this idea, Aristode rejects itbecause for money to be a measure, products must already be commensurable. 'A measuredoes not create the property which it measures. Measures of length do not create spatialextension' (Meikle, 1995, pp. 22-3). It is worth putting this anodier way, because diis isan issue which still has not hit home widi many contemporary economists: 'if diere is aproblem about how steel and cloth can be commensurated, then mere is also a problemabout how steel and gold [as money] can be commensurable' (Meikle, 1997, p. 5).
(b) Need or chreia2
Aristotle dien considers whether need {chreia), since it 'holds everydiing togedier', con-stitutes die nature of exchange value.
That [chreia] holds things together as a single unit, is shown by the fact that when men do not need oneanother...they do not exchange, as we do when some one wants what one has oneself. (NE, 1133b)
Unfortunately, chreia also lacks a unit of measurement and is rejected.
1 It is worth reminding oneself that exchange value appears, and can only appear, in the form of moneyprice. Meikle takes this as read and it will be mentioned again below.
2 The term 'need' here is conceived of in Meikle's interpretation of chreia, i.e., not as demand, utility orsome such.
(c) Money and needAristotle separates money as unit of measurement from need as the dimension ofcommensurability, so that money might be the measure of need. But something that holdsneedy parties together in exchange is not the same as the dimension in which thingsexchanged are commensurable.
Eventually, Meikle argues, having run through all the possibilities, Aristotle gives up theattempt to solve the problem of commensurability, and one must conclude, therefore,that Aristotle has no theory of value at all. This has not, as Meikle is at pains to point out,prevented numerous thinkers from attempting to solve the problem of commensurabilityon Aristotle's behalf. The reason this is important, is that by showing why Aristotle wouldreject such attempts on the grounds that they would conflict with his metaphysics, one isclearly placed to see not only what is incorrect with most solutions, but also what is correctabout Marx's solution.
I have placed the imputed solutions to the problem of commensurability under threeheadings (d) to (f), although these do not exactly correspond to Meikle's order ofpresentation because he does not note anything corresponding to my heading (f).
(d) Value as mere relationSome commentators have followed Bailey, Jevons, Marshall and Pareto in resolving theproblem by rejecting it. Value, they argue, merely denotes the relation in which twoobjects stand to each other as exchangeable commodities.
(e) Utility as common substanceSome commentators have followed Bohm-Bawerk, Menger and Shumpeter in resolvingthe problem by arguing that the common substance is utility.'
(f) Utility and unequal exchangeSome commentators have followed Senior and Jevons in rejecting the problem by arguingthat value is an attribute of mind in the form of subjective utility. Moreover, there isnothing equal about an exchange. Agent A exchanges commodity x with agent B forcommodity .y. From the perspective of agent A, commodity y delivers greater utility thancommodity x—and vice versa for agent B. With no need for equality of proportion, there isno need for commensurability and again the problem is solved.
For economists who follow these approaches, steeped (as most of them are) in themetaphysics of Humean empiricism,2 the idea that value is a substance with attributes andcapacities able to render products commensurable is, quite literally, unthinkable.3 Meikle(1995, chs 2, 6 and 9) deploys Aristotelian metaphysics to reject these approaches,although they cannot be rehearsed here.
The discussion of neoclassical interpretations of value is, however, the weakest part ofthe book. The arguments Meikle deploys are likely to meet criticism from many
1 For an excellent rejection of the notion that utility can be the commensuraring substance of value, see Kay(1977).
2 For arguments to support the claim that most economists presuppose Humean empiricism, see Lawson(1994 and 1996). This also extends to the classical political economists I mention in the following section (g).Lawson is keen to point out that the metaphysical presuppositions held by economists strongly encourage (a)the kind of methodological approach taken, and (b) the kind of things included in, or excluded from, theories.Put starkly, choice of metaphysics restricts the choice of method and theory.
3 The exception here may be Menger. As an Aristotelian essentialist, and simultaneously a defender ofsubjective value theory, Menger appears to warrant a more careful investigation than has hitherto been thecase. Cf. Smith (1990).
economists because they fail to consider more recent neoclassical approaches to valuesuch as the shift from cardinal to ordinal utility, and to the use of indifference analysis. If aconsumer is willing to substitute x units of tea for y units of coffee, the fact that the unitsare qualitatively different is irrelevant. Having said that, Meikle can, at least partially, beexcused for deploying relatively weak arguments for two reasons. First, his book onlybrushes on neoclassical value theory where it has been used to interpret Aristotle and,second, because contemporary neoclassical theory is itself extremely confused on thenature of value and utility. Which of the above conceptualisations, (d), (e) or (f), under-pins contemporary neoclassical theory? Does indifference analysis conflict with, compli-ment, or extend these conceptualisations? It is difficult to say, because issues of value arehardly ever posed in such fundamental terms, and the metaphysics of value is neverconsidered. A critique of the metaphysics of contemporary neoclassical value theorywould be a fruitful line of inquiry.
(g) LabourThe final attempt to solve the problem of commensurability has been handed down fromthe classical political economists Smith and Ricardo to their heirs, including Sraffians andsome (formalistic/quantitative) Marxists. Unlike neoclassical economists who opt for oneof the perspectives noted above (d) to (f), classical political economists attempt to resolvethe problem of commensurability by making labour the sought-after substance.Mainwaring's introduction to Sraffian economics, for example, deals with anundifferentiated substance called 'labour". 'The labour theory of value', he writes, 'retainsthe principle of homogeneity of inputs and outputs by measuring both in terms of labourembodied' (1984, p. 22). Equal parcels, packages or quanta of this undifferentiatedsubstance, its dimension being time, are embodied in commodities during the productionprocess, conferring value upon them and rendering them commensurable. Labourappears to be & particular.
This attempt to use labour as the commensurating substance is, however, metaphysic-ally incorrect. Aristotle did not make such an attempt on account of his theory of action,whereby labours differ from each other in each having a different end aim or telos.
Labours or actions cannot therefore be added up or aggregated so they could not constitute theuniform substance of something clearly non-natural, conventional, and undifferentiated asexchange value. The feature that makes beds and houses commensurable could not, for Aristotle,have been labour, because the labours that produced these things were no more commensur-able...than the things themselves. (Meikle, 1995, p. 184)
One cannot solve the problem of incommensurable commodities by moving backwardsone stage to what are, in reality, the equally incommensurable, concrete labours thatproduced them. This simply pushes the question back one stage. Guided by his meta-physics, Aristotle did not attempt such a backward move. For him, a collective term canbe used correctly to collect things that have ends only if the ends are similar. If thecollective term 'labour' is to be used correctly it must collect labours with similar ends.But Aristotle knows full well that labours have different ends because they aim atproducing different things. If Aristotle had used labour as the sought-after commens-urating substance, he would have been inconsistent with his own metaphysics. As Meikleputs it:
Aristotle's metaphysics was a metaphysics of the solid world of use value, and because of that he wasable to frame the problem of exchange value. But he was unable to solve it for the same reasons. On
his metaphysics, the concepts needed for the solution are conceptual impossibilities. (Meikle, 1995,p. 190)
It appears that, from an Aristotelian perspective, all the above attempts to solve theproblem of commensurability, including that proffered by classical political economists,are rejected.
There might, however, be one thinker who has solved the problem of commensura-bility, and it is significant that he is a fully paid-up member of Aristotelian essentialism—Marx. While it does appear that what has just been said of classical political economyextends to Marx, so that the rejection of the classical labour theory of value is also arejection of Marx's labour theory of value, this appearance is false. Marx's solution to theproblem, while sharing some of the outward forms and terminology of classical politicaleconomy, is grounded firmly in a completely different metaphysics. Marx's theory ofvalue is fundamentally different.
How does Marx succeed where classical political economists and neoclassicaleconomists fail? While this issue is in a sense interwoven throughout Meikle's 1995book (especially pp. 183—90), the most concise statement appears in his 1994 paper(pp. 927—8), and it is from this source that the following argument is lifted.
like classical political economists, Marx understands that the sought-after commen-surating substance is labour. Unlike classical political economy, he deconstructs, to coin apost-modern phrase, the category of labour into subcategories including (but notexhausting): concrete, individual, abstract and social. The kind of labour he seeks cannotbe naturally occurring, because naturally occurring labour is concrete labour which, asdemonstrated above, is incommensurable. The commensurating substance must, there-fore, be non-natural (Marx uses the term ubernaturlich) or conventional. 'It must be apeculiar kind of labour which is without species or differences of quality, like exchange valueitself (1994, p. 927). Marx calls this substance abstract labour.1 Now Marx knows thisappears to be an impossibility, as it raises a similar problem to that facing Aristotle,namely, that different commodities must, and yet cannot, be commensurable. The differ-ence is that in Marx's day, unlike Aristotle's, the bizarre workings of the market turn thisimpossibility into a possibility. Under market conditions, natural labour (concrete)doubles into a synthesis of itself and non-natural labour (abstract).
The specific properties possessed by abstract labour are the opposite of concrete labour.Unlike concrete labour, it is not denned by ends (e.g., making a shin or a table) and is not,therefore, differentiated into kinds (e.g., tailoring or carpentry). Unlike concrete labour, itis not measured in units of observable, measurable time, like hours of embodied labourtime, but rather in aliquot parts of society's total labour—or, more accurately, in aliquotparts of society's labour whose products are destined for the sphere of exchange. Abstract
1 Meikle notes, but makes nothing of, several observations about the nature of substance in Aristotle that arepertinent to Marx. Exchange value as mere quantity is 'undifFerentiated, homogeneous, and lacks species'. Itcan neither, therefore,'strictly" be a substance nor have a nature (Meikle, 1995, p. 17). Meikle suggests thatexchange value can be treated as if it were a substance and had a nature, because one can attribute per se beingto it in rather the same way as one might attribute per u being to justice. Now what is true of exchange value isalso true of value, so value is not strictly a substance either. Classical political economists treat value as a puresubstance—i.e., as the particular, concrete labour. Marx, however, treats value as a peculiar kind ofsubstance—i.e., as the universal, abstract labour. The term 'substance', however, has the unfortunate andmisleading connotation of actual, perhaps even physical or at least tangible stuff. Concrete labour embodiedhas this connotation. In fact, so tangible is this substance that one can observe and measure it. In the hands ofMarx, however, abstract labour is clearly not the same kind of tangible thing. Mirowski (1989, pp. 174-92)grasps some of the problems with treating labour as a substance with his distinction between Marx'ssubstance or crystalised labour theory, and nascent field or real-cost theory. See p. 707, n.3.
labour, then, is unobservable and immeasurable. The relation between the part and thewhole of society's total abstract labour is that of a particular to a universal. As Marx puts it:
Within the value relation... the abstractly general counts not as a property of the concrete, sensiblyreal; but on the contrary the sensibly-concrete counts as the mere form of appearance...of theabstractly general. Being human labour counts as its essence, being the labour of tailoring countsonly as the form of appearance...of this essence...This inversion by which the sensibly-concretecounts only as the form of appearance of the abstractly general and not, on the contrary, theabstractly general as property of the concrete characterises the value-expression. At the same time, itmakes understanding it difficult. (1978, p. 140)1
Marx's observation that this makes 'understanding difficult' is somewhat of an under-statement and I offer the following interpretation. Any particular labouring activity isconcrete and, because performed by an isolated producer, individual. But such particularlabouring activity is carried out with the aim or telos of producing a commodity which willbe placed on the market alongside all other commodities. When the commodity (poten-tially or actually) enters the sphere of exchange, the concrete and individual labour thatproduced it become abstract and social. Through commodities, concrete and individuallabouring activity is related and compared to all other concrete and individual labouringactivities.2 To be strictly accurate, the labour does not cease to be concrete and individual,rather it doubles into a synthesis of concrete and individual, and abstract and social. Anyparticular labour is immediately an instance of society's total labouring activity, of labourin general, of universal labour. That one cannot observe or measure this universal, doesnot make it a figment of Hegelian idealism. This universal captures the fact that as aworker applies his/her individual and concrete labour at some spatio-temporal location toproduce a commodity, s/hc forms part of a dense web or social network of thousands ofother workers in other spatio-temporal locations doing likewise. His/her particularconcrete and individual labour is also social and abstract, and so forms part of universallabour. Abstract labour is a (concrete or real) universal.
At this point, if I have interpreted Marx and Meikle correctly, one can understandMeikle's claim that labour is not measured in units of observable, measurable time, likehours of embodied labour time, but rather in aliquot parts of society's total labour. Hoursof labour embodied can only be the measure of concrete labour. The measure of abstractlabour, and this is the coup de grace, can only be money price. Any investigation of value, itappears, cannot be completed until money has been understood and introduced.3
Although sharing certain superficial similarities with the classical political economist'scategory of 'labour', Marx's category of 'labour1 is a completely different kettle of fish.And it is also completely diflFerent from the category of 'labour" used by contemporaryneoclassical economists. When labour appears in an equation as a function of some othervariable(s), its form is that of a variable: it appears as pure quantity. Yet how exactly suchan undifferentiated (homogeneous) variable can arise out of differentiated (hetero-geneous) labours is never given a second thought. Sensitivity to metaphysics wouldprevent thin illicit procedure occurring in both neoclassical economics and classical
1 See also Arthur (1979) and Rubin (1978).2 It is, of course, only at thU point, in the sphere of market exchange where labour is 'socialised', niat one
can ascertain whether the concrete labour embodied was socially necessary or not. This need not detain ushere.
5 This might be an explanation of why Marx himself spends the first thret chapters of Capital, Volume Idiscussing money. He knows the expenditure of labour power can only be reflected in the money price of thecommodity produced. This also hints at why the transformation 'problem' is misconceived, although I cannotelaborate here. See p. 706, n. 1.
political economy. Recalling Section 1 above where the metaphysics of law was discussed,one can now grasp what Marx means (and does not mean) by the law of value.• A law is a statement about what a thing has the (transfactual) power or capacity to do.
The law of value is a statement about a substance, abstract labour, and the capacity thissubstance has for rendering incommensurable commodities commensurable.
• A law is not a statement about what a thing is empirically observed to do. For example,the law of value is not a statement of how far the concrete labour time actuallyembodied in a commodity (which can be observed and measured) diverges from theabstract labour time reflected in its money price (which cannot).1
• A law is not a statement about what a thing would do under certain conditions, usuallyspecified as assumptions—assumptions which are, typically, necessary only formathematical tractability. The law of value cannot be translated into a formal statementabout the amount of concrete labour time necessary for the production of a commodity.For example, the law of value is not a statement to the effect that 'the labour value ofone unit of corn [denoted x] is the sum of all labour inputs [where a denotes units ofseed corn and b units of labour] in the (infinite) past: x = b + ab + a2b...' (Elster, 1987,p. 129).
Attempts to treat the law of value in this and other similar ways (such as empiricallyestimating labour values) suggest a complete misunderstanding of Marx's essentdalistmetaphysics. If Meikle's book does nothing else, it ought to serve as a valuable lessonagainst this kind of'value theory'.
3. Economics as ethics, and the ethics of market economies
The section on metaphysics noted the primacy Aristotle gives to the end, aim, or telos ofthings. In his investigation of use and exchange value, he inquires into the end of each,and finds they are different. He then sets out to assess the compatibility of each of theseends with what the proper end of society ought to be, namely the good life for its citizens.
In Politics Book I, Aristotle discusses oikonomike, the art of household management,which today would be called something like the theory of production. One central aspectof oikonomike is chrematistike, the art of wealth getting, and this in turn consists of twodifferent kinds.
(i) Natural or good chrematistikeNatural chrematistike relates to getting true wealth, which according to Aristotle 'consistsof using things rather than owning them' (Meikle, 1995, p. 48). True wealth comes in theform of tools and useful tilings. These things are 'limited in size and number by the endsdiey serve, with the consequence that the good life and its constitutive ends set thestandard for deciding how much wealth is enough' (Meikle, 1995, p. 45). Notice thatnatural chrematistike refers to the acquisition of use values: the aim of acquiring and using usevalues is to pursue the good life.
It is impossible to discuss at length what constitutes the good life here, other than tonote that if it is to be attained, citizens must not only live, but live well. Citizens live byhaving access to the material necessities of life such as unadulterated food, shelter and ahealthy, safe environment. Citizens live well by flourishing. Just as plants need water andsunlight if they are to flourish, so humans need conditions under which the capacities and
1 Such a statement is, in fact, quite meaningless. It compares the incomparable.
powers they have, in virtue of them being the kind of thing they are, can flourish ratherthan be frustrated or constrained. Flourishing, for Aristotle, centres around having timeto enjoy leisure, aesthetic and physical pursuits and to engage in the political activity of acitizen. Of significance is the limit placed upon economic activity. As Booth (1993, p. 45)'puts it:
Once a level of wealth had been achieved which would make possible such a life of leisure or politicalactivity, the goal seems to have been to withdraw from the economy rather then to reinvest.
This notion of engaging in economic activity until one has enough wealth, thenwithdrawing to flourish as a human, will be returned to in a moment.
(ii) Unnatural or bad chrematistikeUnnatural chrematistike relates to getting spurious wealth in the form of money. It will benoticed that unnatural chrematistike refers to the acquisition of exchange values: the aim ofacquiring exchange values is to acquire money.
Actions are denned by their aims, and since the aims of these two arts are quitedifferent, they are quite different undertakings. Meikle employs Marx's notation toillustrate the difference between these two arts, and their link with use and exchangevalues. Aristotle is aware of: exchange via direct barter (C-C); exchange mediated bymoney C-M-Q exchange for the purpose of acquiring money M-C-M'.
C-C is concerned with natural chrematistike and acquiring true wealth.C-M-C is a little more complicated as it does involve money (Meikle, 1995, pp. 54-6),
but for the purposes of this paper the complications can be ignored. Transactions of theform C-M-C bring together a specific use value and a need. Because the end is good, theuse of the product is good, as is the use made of the money. C-M-C is, therefore,concerned with natural chrematistike and acquiring true wealth.
M-C-M', by contrast, is concerned with unnatural chrematistike and acquiringspurious wealth. In the pursuit of this art, Aristotle sees a violation of the proper aim ofsociety. What is it about the nature of the transactions involved in M-C-M that leadsAristotle to this conclusion? Apparently, this form of exchange:
is only concerned with getting a fund of money, and that only by the method of conducting theexchange of commodities...[C]urrency is the starting-point, as it is also the goal... [T]he wealthproduced by this form of the art of acquisition is unlimited. (Politics, 1257b)
The aim of unnatural chrematistike is merely the expansion of spurious wealth, viz. a sumof money. Since there is no qualitative difference between one sum of money and another,only a quantitative one, the only aim of this form of transaction is the expansion of money.Moreover, there is no limit or terminus to this process: if M can be advanced to becomeM', then this can be advanced to become M", ad infinitum.2
The individual cannot pursue the good life for a number of reasons, although thecentral one is probably that the continual drive to accumulate more wealth than is needed,denies leisure time. Moreover, the community cannot pursue the good life either, againfor a number of reasons, the essential one being that the economy is directed towards anunnatural aim. What this means can be illustrated by considering two examples: theDelphic knife and the Sophists.
The Delphic knife appears to be a cheap, crude, tool made for many uses when,
1 Fora fuller exposition, see Booth (1993, pp. 34-55).2 Compare this with Boom's comments (above) about the withdrawal from the economic sphere.
according to Aristotle, 'every instrument is best made when intended for one and not formany uses' (Pol, 1252b).1 His criticism is aimed not at the poor workmanship of theproducer, but at the fact that 'the use value has been compromised and diminished bydesign out of considerations of exchange value' (Meikle, 1995, p. 56). The Delphic knifepossesses the shortcomings it does because M is the maker's aim.
Aristode criticises the Sophists for similar reasons. The Sophist, declares Aristotle, 'isone who makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom' (Meikle, 1995, p. 70).Sophistry is money making, not philosophy. Sophistry appears to be similar to philosophybecause it turns on the same class of things as philosophy, but Sophistry and philosophydiffer in respect of their aims. The same sort of argument can be extended to anyprofessional activity (e.g., medical, military) which is capable of being used for the pursuitof money or 'making a living', as Aristotle puts it.
Activities such as production and the provision of services appear to be similar whethertheir aim is natural or unnatural chrematistike. Observing them, one would not perceivethe difference. But when activities previously aimed at natural chrematistike becomeentangled with activities aimed at unnatural chrematistike, men the two aims may conflict.
What does all this mean for the ediics of a market economy? Meikle does not pursue thepoint directly in the book, but by combining comments from two of his other papers, one canat least attempt an answer to the question. First, however, one needs a definition of ethics:
If [end] A is a good end and B a bad one, then the point will be to get people to stop pursuing B in thefalse hope that they are pursuing A, and this is ethics. (Meikle, 1994, p. 933)
On this definition, then, ethics is about identifying ends that ensure the good life, and(minimally) suggesting that people initiate action to bring this end about. Let us now applythe points raised in this paper to an investigation of the ethics of contemporary capitalism.
As the realised capacities of two different substances, namely concrete and abstractlabour, use and exchange value are the outcomes of pursuing two different ends although,importantly, they reside in the same body—i.e., the commodity. When individuals initiateactions involving commodities, they are led to quite different kinds of behaviourdepending upon which of the ends is pursued.• If use value is pursued, some human agency must employ the knowledge of what is
needed, then, subsequendy, deploy society's productive capacities to meet these needs.Products will be made with one and only one end: to meet their intended purpose.
• If, however, exchange value is pursued, productive capacities are not deployed to meetpredetermined needs, but rather to satisfy a different end: the expansion of value. Thisalien objective of our productive efforts decides for us which capacities are developedand whether or not they are deployed, and which needs are met and how satisfactorily.(Meikle, 1991, p. 315)
In other words, when the two ends become entangled, which diey inevitably must in aworld of commodities, then the two aims may conflict and, if so, something has to give.The result is, like the Delphic knife and the practice of Sophistry, that the nature of usevalue can be 'compromised, subordinated, or, in the worst case, entirely replaced by theend of getting money' (Meikle, 1995, p. 71).
When exchange value latches onto othei activities...its own particular aim is transferred to them.The trouble is that each of these activities, from sport to education, already has an aim or point of itsown. (1995, p. 199)
11 thank Scott Meikle for this translation, obtained in private correspondence.
Because commodities are not made as use values per se but as means to attaining exchangevalue form, they are made to the extent that they satisfy, and in a form most conducive tomeeting, the end of exchange value. Making commodities deliberately badly, or notmaking some commodities for which there is an overwhelming need, become possibleaims for society. Hence one sees things like deliberate adulteration; planned obsoles-cence; inability to supply use values such as good-quality housing and health care toincreasingly large sections of society in the First World; inability to meet basic needs ofThird World peoples, and so on.1 Moreover, because there is no limit to the M-C-Mprocess, there is no limit to accumulation and the pressure for continual expansion ofeconomic output, with disastrous consequences for leisure time and the environment.The perversion that results from the pursuit of exchange value does not go unnoticed byMeikle:
Such things arc said to be efficient, and they are if efficiency is denned as whatever producesexchange value. They are not efficient as use values: The system of value as a whole is not efficient atsatisfying human need, which remains unmet on a vast scale everywhere. (Meikle, 1991, p. 315)
Once one understands that use and exchange values aim at different things, one is able tosee that any inquiry into a system based upon exchange value is simultaneously an inquiryinto the ethics of that society. Meikle, closely following Aristotle, argues that a societybased upon exchange value cannot be one that identifies needs and sets about deployingcapacities to meet them for the purpose of bringing about the good life.2 Put this way, theargument that a system based upon exchange value cannot bring about the good life is, Isubmit, spectacularly obvious—although this does not make it correct. But because it isnever put this way, the obviousness remains hidden from view. Why, then, is theargument never put this way? Three reasons seem to be buried within Meikle's book.
First, Adam Smith recognises that M-C-M' characterises the aim of individual businesspeople. However, he considers that the overall result of individuals having this aim is thatC-M-C characterises the aims of society as a whole. From a Smithian perspective, diepursuit of exchange value, despite misleading appearances, really serves the end of usevalue. Neoclassical economic theory, notorious in taking its cue from carefully selectedaspects of Smith's work, turns the idea that ' [i] t is not from the benevolence of the butcher,the brewer, or the baker that we expect our dinner, but from regard to their own interest*(Smith, 1979, p. 119) into an unquestionable and unquestioned dogma. As a conse-quence, even the possibility that die dominance of exchange over use value might lead toan unethical economic system becomes, quite literally, unthinkable.3
1 A De Montfort University supplement to the University newsletter 'Foursite' (March, 1996, no. 2)'outlines some of the activities staff might find useful in helping to "convert" initial enquiries into firmchoices'—i.e., recruit students. Activity no. 10 reads: 'Remember to sell your courses—give reasons why astudent should definitely stick with the special attributes of your course'. Is it not revealing that I wasreminded of this when considering Aristotle's view of the Sophists?
2 For a slightly longer discussion of ethics, utilitarianism and economics, see Meikle (1997).3 As one anonymous referee pointed out, there is a seeming paradox here; a paradox which strengthens the
Smithian defence of the status quo. Capitalist societies, where the lofty ideals of the good life/use value are notpursued, might actually be better able to achieve these ideals than societies that do, in the sense of their abilityto generate fantastic levels of wealth. However, as noted above, die good life is not simply about tiving, butalso about living well, and here capitalism falls down. As Marx put it: 'In bourgeois economics—and in theepoch of production to which it corresponds—this complete working out of the human content appears as acomplete emptying out...as total alienation and the tearing down of all limited, one sided aims as sacrifice ofthe human end-in-itself to an entirely external end.' Antiquity delivers 'satisfaction from a limited standpoint;while the modem [epoch] gives no satisfaction; or where it appears satisfied with itself, it is vulgar' (1973,p. 488).
Second, as capitalism establishes itself, not just individuals, but society as a wholebecomes organised via decision-making centred upon the pursuit of exchange value. Thisreal, historic development has profound effects upon the conception of ethics and itsrelation to economics. Economics becomes the science of exchange value, its magnitudes,movements and the pursuit of its ends. The place of use value shifts from end to means asusefulness becomes merely a means to meet the new end of exchange value. Real ethicalquestions about ends are expunged from economic theory only to be replaced byutilitarianism.
Utilitarianism, unsurprisingly, fits the requirements of economics...because it had been designedfor this supporting and subordinate role in the first place.. .There is only one end, pleasure or utility,and all actions are means to it. They are therefore to be judged only on their efiBcacy in promotingthat end, so that only the consequences of actions are significant, not the actions themselves.(Meikle, 1995, p. 107)
Utilitarianism collapses the twin ends of use and exchange value into the single end ofutility, where there is no analytical space, as it were, to conceive the possibility of a contra-diction or evaluate different forms of human action. Actions, from this perspective, differnot by their real ends, but by their efficacy in promoting the pseudo end of utility. If amarket in orphans were permitted, it would not only produce the exchange value of anorphan, as Meikle observes (1995, p. 196), but this state of affairs would be judged solelyon this market's efficacy in increasing utility.
Third, the empiricist metaphysics, typically adopted by neoclassical economics, isnecessarily concerned with surface appearances, and while it may probe beneath thesurface to some extent, what it cannot do is entertain an essentialist metaphysics ofcapacities. If there is no distinction to be drawn between a capacity and its exercise, thento say that something can do something is just to say that it does do it. This metaphysicscannot, therefore, entertain the notion of telos, end or aim, and so cannot maintain a(genuine) distinction between use and exchange value. Utilitarianism complements thismetaphysics, by offering a consistent ethics whereby actions differ not by their real ends,but by their efficacy in promoting the pseudo end of utility.
This discussion of economics as ethics results in Meikle making two correct (in myopinion) claims, but then drawing a conclusion that seems to me incorrect. First, he claimsthat the theory of ethics employed by neoclassical economics is inadequate. In fact, hegoes further and claims that 'ethics and economics are competitors over the same ground'(1995, p. 109). Second, he claims that 'Aristotle's inquiries are therefore ethical and meta-physical, not economic' {ibid., p. 198). He then concludes that the analysis of exchangevalue is not a matter for economics, but for metaphysics or social philosophy (ibid., p. 200).
There are, however, two response to the claim that the analysis of exchange value is partof philosophy, not economics. First, it begs the question of which economics? Althoughhegemonic, neoclassical economics does not exhaust the subject. Marxist 'economies',because it is partly 'the metaphysics of exchange' (1995, p. 197, m. 31) appears to be onealternative to neoclassical economics mat can accommodate an adequate metaphysics:Menger's economics might be another. If so, then there are other (adequate) branches ofeconomics that can accomodate real metaphysics, and this leads to the second response.An either/or approach to economics and philosophy is unlikely to be fruitful. Surely whatis required is a totalising subject: a syndiesis of (adequate) economics and philosophy thatdoes not fracture precisely at the joints where maximum strength is required. Meikle'sown comments notwithstanding, this is the lesson I draw from his book.
As the year 2000 approaches and a new set of socio-economic problems appears on thehorizon, contemporary theory seems increasingly unable even to frame the problemscorrectly, never mind solve them.1 Meikle's book puts Aristotelian metaphysics back onthe agenda for anyone who is seriously concerned to understand the fundamental issues ofthe nature of value and its correlative, the (un)ethical nature of contemporary capitalism.There are very few issues that are more fundamental and more relevant than these.
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