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Best practice interventions: Short-term impact and long-term

outcomes

Adrian Done

1,, Chris Voss

2,4, Niels Gorm Rytter

3

1

IESE Business School

Avda. Pearson, 21

08034 Barcelona, Spain.

Telephone: +34 93 253 4200

E-mail: adone@iese.edu

2

London Business School

Regent’s Park

London

England NW1 4SA

Telephone: +44 20 7000 8812

E-mail: cvoss@london.edu

3

Department of Production, Aalborg University

Lautrupvang 15, 2750 Ballerup, Denmark

Telephone: +45 21806855

E-mail: i9nr@production. aau.dk

4

Corresponding Author

Journal of Operations Management, 2011, Journal of Operations Management 29(5):500-513.

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Best practice interventions: Short-term impact and long-term outcomes

Abstract

This paper uses empirical field research to examine whether short-term best practice

interventions (BPIs) can lead to improvements that are sustained in the long term. In addition,

this research investigates the implied conflict between striving for short-term results and

achieving long-term development of capabilities. It also examines the tension between the lack

of resources of the typical small and medium sized enterprise (SME) users of BPIs and the

time required to develop a critical mass of capability. A longitudinal case-based study of eight

SME contexts examined BPI outcomes and factors leading to short- and long-term success and

sustaining best practices. The research identifies factors related to the intervention context,

implementation and change-agent approach. The data indicate that in resource-limited SMEs

BPIs are limited in their ability to develop adequate capability for long-term change.

Keywords: Best practice, Capability development, Small & medium sized enterprises (SMEs)

1. Introduction

There is widespread use of best practice interventions (BPIs) to help small and medium

enterprises (SMEs) introduce and develop new and best practices. Such BPIs typically have

both short- and long-term objectives. Short-term objectives are usually aimed at performance

improvements and long-term objectives usually seek to embed new practices across the

organization. Evidence indicates that larger organizations are more likely to possess the

resources to implement practice improvements (Shah and Ward, 2003) and thus in the USA,

UK and other countries publicly funded intervention programs have been created specifically

to offer SMEs support in learning about and adopting best practices.

There are two important issues with such BPIs. First, there is an underlying question as to

whether a short one-off intervention can lead to sustained change in the organization’s

practices and, hence, long-term performance. Existing empirical research indicates a “loose

coupling” between the implementation of certain best practices, such as total quality

management (TQM) and plant performance, and questions the expenditure of resources with

unclear implications for performance (Choi and Eboch, 1998).

Second, there is an implied interplay and potential conflict between short- and long-term

objectives as trade-offs, diminishing returns and diminishing synergies impact the way a

company may improve towards its production frontier (Schmenner and Swink, 1998). Over-

emphasis on short-term objectives may lead to the neglect of long-term ones. On the other

hand, successful short-term outcomes may be a major contribution to the visibility and

acceptance of new practices in the long term. Introducing new ways of working and new

innovative practices is generally a difficult process. Short-term benefits must be created but it

is still mostly a long-term journey. How do companies handle this dilemma?

This paper explores these issues through case-based research. A research model is proposed

and a set of propositions concerning the impact on both short- and long-term outcomes of

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factors associated with the organizational context of the intervention, the intervention itself and

the consultants/ facilitators are proposed and tested.

2. BPIs

A BPI can be defined as an activity designed to introduce new practices through a series of

short focused activities in the organization. These interventions are typically composed of two

parts. The first part aims for dramatic improvements within a focused operational area in a very

short time. The second part focuses on the introduction of new (often seen as either “best” or

promising) practices or processes and on preparing the organization for the ‘journey’ required

for widespread adoption of these practices by transferring and building skills through action

learning and applying lessons learned in practice. BPIs typically consist of preparation

activities, one or more improvement workshops (usually less than a week), finishing events and

follow-up activities. The practical delivery of these activities depends much on the skills,

competencies and behavior of the consultants or change agents leading them. These

interventions can cover a wide range of practices in areas such as TQM, just-in-time (JIT)/lean

production, Kaizen (or continuous improvement), total productive maintenance (TPM) and six

sigma. The interventions can be part of a supplier development program (where an OEM is

seeking to transfer best practices to its suppliers), part of a governmental support program or

part of the services of consulting organizations. Those involved in BPIs must deal not only

with the demands and distractions from daily operations but also with other improvement

projects claiming attention and resources.

Whilst different BPIs (TQM, JIT, TPM etc.) consist of unique and common practice

elements, one thing they share in common is that they are directed towards improved

performance (Cua et al., 2001).The desired performance outcomes of BPIs are in two areas.

Firstly, they can be expected to influence operational performance in areas such as cost,

quality, flexibility, lead times, inventory, transport, delivery time and delivery dependability in

the short term. These, in turn, can potentially lead to improved financial performance.

Although studies have shown strong relationships between practices such as TQM and

financial outcomes (Hendricks and Singhal, 2001), this relationship is difficult to measure. The

second desired impact is concerned with the long-term embedding of the practices. If the

interventions are to make the desired impact then achieved improvements in both practice and

performance must be sustained, must spread to the whole organization and must lead to further

or future improvement in other areas. However, embedding and sustaining new practices is not

easily achieved. BPI programs often focus on the “low hanging fruit” (Upton, 1996), resulting

in quick short-term gains but in problems with sustaining any improvements. It is not

uncommon for improvements to be transient and practices to be dropped after initial

enthusiasm (Bateman, 2005). Furthermore, sustainability is fragile and decay of original gains

is common (Buchanan et al., 2005). Maintaining momentum once low hanging fruit has been

harvested is an important issue and something that Japanese companies have been observed to

do well (Brunet and New, 2003). Venkateswarlu and Nilakant (2005), in a longitudinal study,

found that only two out of the five organizations had persisted with their quality programs five

to ten years later despite initial effort and short-term benefits. Furthermore, Laraia et al. (1999,

223–224) state that in the enthusiasm for the BPI (Kaizen) process itself organizations fail to

see the deeper more fundamental changes that are needed for real sustained process

improvement to be realized. Thus, integration of immediate success with long-term objectives

is critical.

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There is thus a dilemma facing many organizations that seek to introduce new and

promising practices or those that seek to help others to do so. It has been widely argued that

this process of integrating immediate successes with long-term objectives requires longer

programs of change to introduce new practices effectively. However, many organizations find

it difficult to fund or resource long-term support. For example, unlike larger organizations,

SMEs typically have little in-house expertise and can less afford the cost of long-term support

(Shah and Ward, 2003). Government and professional bodies that promote such programs of

change also find it difficult to fund long-term support. The result has been a tendency towards

development and implementation of short programs or interventions designed both to make a

quick impact and to develop the base from which new practices can be adopted throughout the

organization in the long term. This leads to the following research questions:

1. Can BPIs lead to both short-term and long-term improvement and sustainability?

2. What factors influence short-term success and long-term sustainability of BPIs?

We address these by examining eight applications of one specific BPI focused upon JIT/lean

production.

3. Research model and propositions

Building on the earlier discussion we propose that there are three sets of factors that

potentially contribute to (or inhibit): a) short-term success and b) long-term sustainability of

BPIs. The first set of factors relates to the company context within which the intervention

occurs. The second broad set of factors is associated with the design and implementation of the

BPI itself. The final set of factors relates to the approach of the change agent or consultant. We

illustrate this in the research model shown in Figure 1. The following sections define each of

the factor terms and formulate propositions. Appendix A outlines factor operationalization and

measurement in terms of specific case evidence sought.

INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

3.1 Intervention context

3.1.1 Clearly communicated strategy and objectives for change

Previous studies have identified that a clear corporate operations strategy outlining

objectives and the role of best practices in developing competitive advantage for the company,

as well as communicating it to all corners of the organization are keys to successful BPIs and

organizational change. Failing such clarity “the initiative will fail” (Beer, 2003, 632–633). A

corporate culture consistent with the ideas and principles of the improvement philosophy must

be in place (Dale et al., 1997; Venkateswarlu and Nilakant, 2005). Furthermore, “successful

programs of improvement are held together by some unifying picture of where the operation is

going, and how it will get there. More important is the communication of that picture of the

future throughout the organization” (Upton, 1996, 222). This strategy formulation and

communication needs to occur prior to the intervention. Beer and Eisenstat (2000) identify an

unclear strategy and poor vertical communication as two of the “silent killers” representing the

barriers that block strategy implementation. We therefore propose the following:

P1: Clearly communicated strategy and objectives for change prior to the intervention will

lead to short-term improvement and long-term sustained change.

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3.1.2 Organizational readiness for change

Operational change programs will be more effective if the organization is prepared for and

committed to future changes – we define this as organizational readiness for change. Such

organizational readiness for change is exemplified by a dominant coalition of stakeholders that

are (or become) open towards and commit to future changes (Buchanan and Badham, 1999).

Much of this is dependent on leadership and the will and ability of senior managers to translate

‘crises’ into positive stakeholder attitudes and commitment towards organizational change and

BPI success (Beer and Eisenstat, 2000; Beer et al., 1990; Schaffer and McCreight, 2004).

Without leadership ability and explicit efforts by company leaders to promote organizational

readiness for change, only a few plants or divisions will attempt change, and those that do will

remain isolated (Beer et al., 1990). Four of the six “silent killers” identified by Beer and

Eisenstat (2000) are related to underlying leadership differences. Also, Venkateswarlu and

Nilakant (2005, 819) identify a lack of senior management commitment as being a primary

reason why a BPI (TQM) may fail, stating that: “Most organizations underestimate the effort

required to implement TQM. Typically these managers see the implementation of TQM as

something that can, and should be delegated to others”. We therefore put forward the following

proposition:

P2: Organizational readiness for change will lead to short-term improvement and long-

term sustained change.

3.1.3 Key performance indicators (KPIs) aligned to the program of change objectives

A key leadership task is developing a culture oriented towards performance. Such

performance cultures are based upon the implementation, capture and analysis of appropriate

performance measures in order to drive behavior and commitment towards different

assignments (Melnyk et al., 2004). In the context of BPIs, these KPI metrics must be

consistent, coherent and in accordance with short- and long-term objectives in order to

motivate individuals and teams towards the desired business and operational process

improvements. We define such KPIs as being aligned to the program of change objectives.

There is a close connection between both the setting and achievement of such performance

targets in improvement activities and the effective operation of workgroups. For example,

setting KPIs at different organizational levels has been seen as a cornerstone in successful lean

implementations (Brunet and New, 2003). We therefore put forward the following proposition:

P3: KPIs aligned to the program of change objectives will lead to short-term improvement

and long-term sustained change.

3.1.4 Reward and recognition of positive short-term results

When short programs, such as the ones studied in this research, are used as a basis for long-

term change then reward and recognition of positive results achieved in the early phases may

help motivate stakeholders to be committed to the medium- and long-term transformation.

Reward and recognition can be public and more direct or silent and more indirect. In Japanese

companies, it has been reported that long-term commitment of stakeholders to improvement

initiatives may be attained through reward and recognition mechanisms in the form of security

through lifetime employment, gainsharing through the complex compensation systems and the

joint commitment to team-oriented annual targets (Brunet and New, 2003). In Western

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companies it has been argued that, in order to promote more long-term commitment from

stakeholders, there should be greater emphasis upon visible and symbolic rewards and

recognition for those involved when improvement activities are completed (Laraia et al., 1999).

Of course, rewards and recognition can only be given to those involved after short-term results

have been obtained. Hence, such post-BPI reward and recognition mechanisms are only likely

to impact further improvements and sustainability in the medium and long term. We therefore

put forward the following proposition:

P4: Reward and recognition of positive short-term results will lead to further long-term

improvement and sustained change.

3.2 Intervention design and implementation

3.2.1 Tailoring the BPI format to the specific context

The careful consideration of aims and scope alongside thorough process planning and

content preparation is a key success factor for organizational change and best practice

implementation projects (Boddy and Buchanan, 1992; Drew et al., 2004). Although BPIs tend

to be very standardized, there are strong arguments for the need to tailor the planning and

preparation of the intervention to suit the company context. Schaffer and McCreight (2004)

state that despite the complexity of transformational change, change models generally attempt

a one-size-fits-all solution without regard to the appropriateness for different firms. Whilst

Gulati et al. (1997) examine the trade-offs between customizing and applying a standardized

implementation model, Sousa and Voss (2002) show that the effective implementation of

operations best practices is contingent upon the context. Furthermore, Brunet and New (2003)

argue in favor of a tailored approach in that transformational practices should be based on

reinterpretation and reinvention in each new context. We therefore put forward the following

proposition:

P5: Tailoring the BPI format to the specific context will lead to short-term improvement

and long-term sustained change.

3.2.2 Organization and provision of intervention resources

BPIs typically compete with ongoing daily operations and other parallel projects for

stakeholder attention and limited resources. This competition for limited resources is often not

limited to financial resources but may also include, for example, a limited number of highly

skilled personnel (Bateman and Rich, 2003). Unless the BPI is well organized and given

sufficient priority over other activities, with adequate provision of resources, it is likely to

suffer both in terms of short-term outcomes and long-term sustainability of improvement. In

order to increase chances of short- and long-term success, deliberate efforts may be taken to

buffer BPIs and subsequent consolidation exercises from daily operations or other

simultaneous improvement initiatives. For example, management may send clear signals

relating to the importance of BPIs by partially stopping daily operations and, where possible,

reallocating resources for part or whole of the intervention duration (Laraia et al., 1999). This

leads us to propose that:

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P6: Organization and provision of resources for the intervention will lead to short-term

improvement and long-term sustained change.

3.2.3 Intervention implementation

BPIs can be of variable duration and can be broken down into smaller activities, which may

be paced and sequenced in different ways. Buchanan et al. (2005, 202) found that the timing,

sequencing and pacing of such events is important and can contribute to whether change is

welcomed and sustained. Thus, they recommend that care be exercised in formulating an

appropriate implementation process, stating that: “Change which is delayed may not deliver

benefits. Change which is rushed may not allow time to adapt, and create initiative fatigue,

encouraging decay” (Buchanan et al., 2005, 202). Consequently, in order to develop successful

results, a well-managed BPI implementation will unfold in a coherent planned sequence with

an appropriate duration and pace. The individual events of such a well-managed intervention

implementation are also linked together so that they appear as a coupled set of initiatives,

display continuity in discussions and actions and encourage gradual and appropriate

involvement of different stakeholder groups step-by-step in the process. Thus we propose:

P7: A well-managed intervention implementation will lead to short-term improvement and

long-term sustained change.

3.2.4 Stakeholder management

Stakeholder management: the attention to the needs of different stakeholder groups (senior

management, middle management, employees, team members and members of other impacted

functions), as well as the management of their expectations is an important aspect of managing

BPI interventions (Boddy and Buchanan, 1992). Whilst it is critical to get top management

support the role of middle management cannot be neglected, since communication across the

organization is an important part of the BPI process (Upton, 1996). Furthermore, senior

management attention and commitment is difficult to sustain in many “best practice” initiatives

given that the average tenure of senior managers is normally less than the time required to

implement major reorganizations (Buchanan and Badham, 1999, 164). The difficulty of

sustaining senior management attention, combined with the ambiguous nature of problems and

solutions, allows less central actors to move into the foreground and inject competing

definitions of the situation. In this context, the role of middle management is often critical: “It

is in the middle levels of management that real, unanticipated problems arise” (Upton, 1996,

220). Thus open and active cooperation is required between senior and middle managers and

change agents in order to manage issues such as stakeholder uncertainty, obstruction (or

resistance) and lack of willingness to change if a BPI is to succeed in the long term. We

therefore propose:

P8: Stakeholder management will lead to short-term improvement and long-term sustained

change.

3.2.5 Developing internal facilitators and change “champions”

A charismatic and driven leader can coach people and build confidence, commitment and

motivation – all of which are critical to the short- and long-term success of a BPI (Upton,

1996). Ashkenas and Schaffer (2007) state that an overall change process needs a kind of

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leadership which fosters change capacity at the grassroots’ level: “capacity-building leaders”.

Thus, the development and presence of one or more motivated internal stakeholders, or change

‘champions’, that commit to an improvement initiative and lead by example can be seen as an

important contributor to success. In many cases a change champion will be deliberately chosen

as the formal project leader or facilitator due to their innate character. Nevertheless, other

personnel from daily operations may emerge and play a significant role as they develop into

champions. Thus, we propose:

P9: Development of internal facilitators and champions will lead to short-term

improvement and long-term sustained change.

3.3 Change-agent approach

3.3.1 Change agent’s overall knowledge and competence

The outcomes of BPIs depend much on the skills, competencies and behavior of

consultants, facilitators or change agents leading them. During such interventions change

agents must work on several parallel agendas and deal with technical–rational, cultural–

political, project management and facilitation issues (Boddy and Buchanan, 1992; Rytter et al.,

2007; Schein, 1996). Ideally, BPI consultants should be both technically competent and have

the necessary facilitating skills. An ideal consultant would show self-confidence but also be

modest and listen carefully to signals of his “client” organization (Schein, 1996). Broad skills

are important at the outset of an intervention when dealing with socio-political issues such as

why and how the project has become part of the management agenda. These broad skills will

affect whether signals trigger and continue to drive the change initiative in a powerful way, or

“whether they fade away and disappear” (Boddy and Buchanan, 1992). Similarly, the success

of a BPI consultant may not only be related to specific practice-related knowledge but may also

relate to the broader business of the organization. BPI consultants/facilitators who are not only

skilled in the relevant practices but who also have broader business skills from prior industry

experience and/or similar projects are likely to increase the chances of short- and long-term

success for BPIs. Thus, we propose:

P10: A change agent with a high level of overall knowledge and competence will lead to

short-term improvement and long-term sustained change.

3.3.2 Plan for ongoing activities and consultant support

Liker (2004) and Drew et al. (2004) make clear that the process of adopting best practices

is a long journey that will most likely go well beyond the duration of a short-term BPI project.

Drew et al. (2004, 8) state that this is why the adoption of specific (lean) improvement

practices is often viewed as “a journey” requiring a “reliable map and frequent checks on

progress along the way”. Such long-term support requirements for embedding further

improvements are likely to go beyond a single “hit” short-focused BPI event and are ideally

planned at the end of the BPI event. Post-event planning for ongoing activities with the BPI

consultant can benefit from analysis of the short-term outcomes. Thus, further medium- and

long-term support can be targeted with greater accuracy. This leads to the following

proposition:

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P11: Post-BPI planning for further ongoing activities and consultant support will lead to

long-term improvement and sustained change.

4. Methodology

4.1 Empirical case research

Empirical case research (Yin, 1994) was selected as an appropriate research methodology

given the specific context of this study and research questions to be investigated (Meredith,

1998). Case study research has been used in the operations management (OM) field in order to

test complicated issues such as strategy implementation (Boyer and McDermott, 1999;

McLachlin, 1997).

When building theory from case studies researchers normally select cases using replication

rather than sampling logic (Eisenhardt, 1989; Voss et al., 2002; Yin, 1994). This means

selecting cases that offer the best opportunities to learn and extend theory. As case study

research usually has relatively small samples attention to reliability and validity is particularly

important. Voss et al. (2002) emphasize the importance of a controlled sample. To address this,

all of the cases chosen had used the same BPI and framework delivered by the same external

organization, thus controlling for two factors which might otherwise cause variability between

the cases. We chose eight cases drawn from seven companies. Two of the cases were

interventions at different times in the same company (cases D and E). Key characteristics of

the eight cases are shown in Table 1. A detailed research protocol based on the research model

was developed following the guidelines of Yin (1994) to act as the basis for interviews and in-

company data collection. The protocol, comprising the 16 sections summarized in Appendix B,

was sent in advance to the participating organizations in order for them to identify the most

appropriate respondents and to prepare data and information. We sought both qualitative data

and objective data on performance. Interviews were conducted at least 12 months after the core

activities of the intervention and both medium and long-term outcomes were determined.

However, for 3 of the cases (C, F and G), a first interview was conducted 6 to 9 months after

the original intervention and only medium-term outcomes could be assessed. For these cases,

follow-up interviews were conducted at least 12 months after the interventions in order to

ascertain the long-term outcomes.

INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

To ensure further the reliability of the case data we used both multiple respondents and

multiple interviewers. We interviewed separately at least three people with differing

perspectives on the same events; the external consultant/facilitator, the internal facilitator and

the internal sponsor, usually from senior management. In addition, interviews were conducted

by two interviewers. As Eisenhardt (1989) points out, the use of multiple investigators can

enhance the creative potential of the teams and the convergence of observations increases

confidence in the findings. After the interviews notes could be compared and conflicting

observations could be clarified. Multiple interviewers also guard against observer bias

(Leonard-Barton, 1990). Finally, available documentation such as the external facilitators’

reports was consulted where appropriate. In our analysis we followed the guidelines of Dul

and Hak (2008) for determining necessary but not sufficient conditions.

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4.2 The intervention studied

The intervention studied was based on the introduction of ‘lean’ practices. The background to

lean production has been well described by Holweg (2007). Today’s short-term interventions

to introduce lean production practices can be traced back to the “jishuken” or “autonomous

study” workshops conducted by Taiichi Ohno and his Toyota autonomous study group. These

consisted of managers and engineers from Toyota Group companies hosting one-week long

rapid improvement activities. An early example was a “Five days and one night” workshop,

later labeled “Kaizen blitz” activity (Laraia et al., 1999). A similar approach was developed by

the UK’s Society of Motor Manufacturers and Traders (SMMT), employing Japanese master

engineers to assist automotive car and components’ manufacturers in improving their

operational processes (Industry Forum, 2010). More than 450 companies have been involved in

these or similar activities. This, in turn, was adapted into a shorter version for more general use

by the UK’s DTI as part of their Manufacturing Advisory Service (MAS). Central to this was a

best practice improvement intervention labeled “Master Class”. The eight cases studied had all

been through the Master Class intervention facilitated by consultants from a MAS program

franchisee. Each of the external consultants had received standardized training in order to

deliver these interventions and had several years experience in the role. Table 2 outlines the

five phases of the MAS Master Class interventions, at the core of which is the four-day Rapid

Improvement Workshop (RIW). Specific BPI project objectives were tailored to each company

context. The overall long-term objective was for the companies to have the knowledge and

skills to be able to subsequently roll-out the improvement process to other parts of the

organization. Table 3 gives some examples of explicit short- and long-term aims for the BPIs

studied.

INSERT TABLES 2 and 3 ABOUT HERE

5. Results

SMEs tend to collect little operational data. Our sample was somewhat typical in that all

the firms studied had little or no performance data available. In this context a simple ranking

scale was developed. Five performance levels were set to describe performance and practice

improvement achievements compared to the pre-intervention level for each case. The ranking

criteria of the five performance levels are shown in Table 4. For each case, we drew on the

written estimates of the external facilitators, our own observations and feedback from all

interviewees. Each researcher independently ranked the intervention results for performance

compared to the pre-intervention level at different points of time: “1” at the outset, “2”

immediately on completion of the BPI RIW, “3” half a year after the BPI RIW was conducted

and “4” about one year after the RIW. The rankings of the two researchers were compared and

further evidence was sought to reconcile any differences. Similarly for qualitative data, there

was continuous discussion, reviewing and comparing of the cases. Differences were reconciled

by seeking extra information from subsequent interviews. Results of our ranking of the

individual cases are presented in Figure 2.

INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE

INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

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All of the interventions delivered some short-term improvements immediately after the

BPI, though the degree of improvement varied considerably from very little improvement

(cases B and G) to satisfactory short-term performance outcomes (cases A and F). Cases A and

F were most successful overall with short-term improvements that were sustained and further

improved upon in the medium term. In the long term, however, only case F could be

considered to have achieved an excellent level of improvement. In case F, short- and medium-

term improvements were sustained in the long term and additional further significant

improvements were made in the focus area and extensively rolled-out to other parts of the

organization. Case A also evolved quite successfully in the short- and medium-term with

further good improvements in the focus area that were rolled-out, to some extent, across the

organization. Nevertheless, whilst these short- and medium-term improvements were

successfully sustained the continued improvement and roll-out process stalled in the long term.

Cases C and E developed in a similar manner to case A, though from a lower starting point.

Both cases C and E attained a satisfactory level of improvement in the medium-term with

limited deployment of improved knowledge and practices across the organization. These

improvements were sustained but no further improvement occurred in the long term. After

achieving limited operational improvements in the short- and medium-term case H never

managed to continue and spread improvements across the organization. Nevertheless, nothing

indicated that these limited accomplishments diminished within the focus area in the long term.

Case D began well, achieving some operational improvements in the focus area, but declined

rapidly in the medium-term with little or none of the original improvements being sustained in

the focus area or deployed to other areas of the company. Whilst case B started out slower, the

improvements made were seen to be somewhat more sustainable within the focus area and

some (albeit limited) improvements were spread to other areas of the company. Finally, case G

exhibited “bad” performance with very little improvement over the pre-intervention situation,

no deployment to other organizational areas and no basis for sustaining the improvements. In

fact, in case G there was even some deterioration of the few improvements accomplished

during the BPI program.

Across the cases, the observed pattern is that this specific form of BPI activities delivers a

range of positive short-term improvements (from limited to satisfactory) but an even greater

variety of long-term results (from no sustained improvements to significant and continuing

improvements with extensive organizational deployment).

In summary, one case (F) managed to implement significant improvements that were

sustained and further extended with time; five cases (A, C, E, H, B) managed to sustain any

short-/medium-term improvements made at somewhat similar levels into the long term; one

case (D) had lost most or all of the immediate improvements by the medium term; and one case

(G) never managed to make any notable short-, medium- or long-term improvements at all.

We cannot exclude the possibility of Hawthorne effects. In field research such effects may

lead to subjects modifying their behavior because they are aware they are being studied (Adair,

1984; Gillespie, 1991). Participants in activities such as BPIs may exhibit atypically high levels

of performance but performance levels drop to previous levels once an intervention is complete

(Macefield, 2007). Specifically, case D exhibited a pattern which is consistent with potential

Hawthorne effects.

We now examine the evidence from the cases with respect to each of the 11 propositions

put forward. The detailed case data are shown in Appendix C. The results are summarized in

Table 5.

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INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE

5.1 Intervention context

5.1.1 Clearly communicated strategy and objectives for change

All three cases (A, C, F) with a clear and communicated strategy for short- and long-term

change prior to the intervention had satisfactory to excellent performance in the medium and

long term. Of these, only one case (C) fell below a satisfactory performance level in the short

term. On the other hand, three of the cases (B, D, G) had only formulated short-term plans

prior the intervention, reflecting an experiment and learn approach. These were the poorest

performing cases overall and none achieved satisfactory performance in the short, medium or

long term. Cases E and H followed a similar approach before the intervention, only

formulating a strategy for change and communicating it to the rest of the organization after the

intervention. Both of these cases achieved unsatisfactory short term outcomes and mixed

medium- and long-term results. Whilst case E did achieve partially satisfactory medium and

long-term results, case H only achieved unsatisfactory medium and long term outcomes. The

results thus provide support for P1 in terms of short- and long-term success. In particular,

strategies of experimentation and learning in place of pre-intervention planning for long term

strategic objectives seem unlikely to succeed.

5.1.2 Organizational readiness for change

We characterized organizational readiness for change in terms of coalitions of senior and

middle managers, and employees committed to implementing improved practices. Such

coalitions emerge as a result of the ability of leadership to drive positive organizational change.

In these respects the most positive attitudes to change were found in five cases (A, C, E, F, H),

four of which (A, C, E, F) were the better performing cases. In these cases, as interventions

proceeded and positive results were demonstrated the coalitions grew in size and influence.

The three other cases (B, D, G) were all poor performers and were characterized by lack of

leadership ability to attain stakeholder agreement or buy-in as well as the failure of leaders to

deal effectively with people actively resistant to change (“blockers”). The evidence therefore

provides support for our proposition (P2), both in the short and the long term.

It is also interesting to note that the two most profitable cases (A and F) were more ready for

change than the least profitable cases in our sample (G and H). Somewhat contrary to

expectations, therefore, no evidence was found in the most successful cases of any financial

“crisis” being required by leadership as leverage in order to create wider organizational

change, nonetheless, these profitable cases had apparently managed to develop an internal

crisis or “burning platform” (Liker, 2004; Kotter, 2008) in their adoption of new practices. The

fact that the least profitable cases were amongst the worst performers provides empirical

support for the hypothesis that financial “inadequacy” of SMEs may be a hindrance to adopting

and subsequently implementing new practices (Achanga et al., 2006).

5.1.3 KPIs aligned to the program of change objectives A striking element of almost all the cases was the lack of KPIs (including process

performance indicators). Only the most successful case (F) had a clear performance-oriented

culture based upon the implementation, capture and analysis of appropriate performance

metrics across the organization. A wide range of KPIs were already in place before the BPI

13

(e.g. productivity/ efficiency, set-up times, scrap levels, customer delivery lead time and

service level), with specific performance targets implemented at a plant and machine level

which, in turn, were linked to employee bonuses. These KPIs were aligned with the BPI

objectives for short- and long-term improvements. Cases A, C and E had no KPIs in place prior

to the BPI, but did implement specific metrics during the intervention that were aligned to the

change program outcomes sought. Case A performed as well as case F in the short term.

Similarly, cases H and D had implemented no KPIs and yet performed as well as cases C and E

in the short term. Thus, there was no clear evidence that a lack of KPIs negatively impacts

short-term performance outcomes and proposition 3 is not supported in the short term.

Nevertheless, all of the cases (B, D, G, H) that had no KPIs in place after the BPI failed to

achieve higher than an unsatisfactory rating in the medium or long term. Conversely, those

cases with aligned KPIs in place after the BPI (A, C, E, F) achieved improvement levels of

satisfactory and higher in the medium and long term. Thus, in terms of long-term sustainability

of performance improvements proposition 3 is supported.

5.1.4 Reward and recognition of positive short-term results

In all BPIs there was some short-term recognition of results in the form of end-of-BPI

celebration events. The four least successful cases (B, D, G, H) had no recognition beyond

these events. All other cases (A, C, E, F), more successful in the medium and long term, had

explicit and diverse reward and recognition programs. Case F did have KPIs in place that were

directly linked to short, medium- and long-term rewards and recognition (in addition to a

carrot–and-stick approach with “punishment” for those seen as resistant). In case A, medium-

and long-term rewards and recognition were linked to productivity/ efficiency measures

introduced as part of the BPI. Cases C and E allocated rewards and recognition on a non-

random basis using more subjective mechanisms linking promotion, increased status and

increased salary to those judged by management as playing a particularly enthusiastic or

positive role in the program of change. This was apparently successful in motivating

employees despite the subjective nature of these judgments. Each of these systems would have

had an impact after the short-term BPI activities, thus a causal relation could not be implied

with short-term performance outcomes. Therefore, proposition 4 was supported.

Other forms of intrinsic motivations were also observed. For example, in case B, company

facilitators had received little or no reward or recognition for their BPI efforts. Nevertheless,

they remained motivated by a feeling of responsibility and ambition to make the workplace

better for themselves and their colleagues. After they had shown some improvements in the

medium term they asked for certificates so they could get some credit for their part in

associated training and education. This perhaps reflected a need for some kind of formal

recognition of their efforts and results obtained.

5.2 Intervention design and implementation

5.2.1 Tailoring BPI format to the specific context

All the cases did some tailoring of the standard BPI model. Tailoring typically involved

modifying the scope of the intervention in terms of appropriate content, connected activities, a

gradual involvement of stakeholder groups, a suitable format, duration and pace, a good

location for workshops as well as other contextual aspects. The three cases (A, C, F) with

good overall tailored planning and BPI preparation were more successful in the short, medium

14

and long term. Conversely, the two cases (B, G) with clearly observed problems relating to

tailored BPI planning and preparation were amongst the worst performers (bad to

unsatisfactory) in the short, medium and long term. A particular issue with the poor performers

was poor or inappropriate scoping of the intervention. The evidence provides support for

proposition 5.

5.2.2 Organization and provision of intervention resources

Five cases (A, C, E, F, H) had evidence of well-organized interventions with clear ownership

of tasks, sufficient time, budget and resources being provided and dedicated people being

selected for well-balanced facilitator teams. In each of these cases, organization and resourcing

was jointly developed by the company sponsor and external facilitator. These cases included

the four (A, C, E, F) with the best medium- and long-term results. The other three cases (B, D,

G) all had problems in this area and were poor performers in the short, medium and long term.

The case data is thus supportive of proposition 6.

5.2.3 Intervention implementation

In four cases (A, C, E, F) the intervention went as planned with relevant BPI activities

happening in coherent and coupled sequences displaying continuity and enabling the

appropriate step-by-step involvement of different stakeholder groups. All these well-managed

BPI implementations achieved short-term improvements that were sustained and further

improved into the long term. Conversely, intervention implementation problems in the other

cases (B, D, G, H) included disconnects between phases and poor handover between the

company sponsors and internal facilitators. These cases had the worst short-, medium- and

long-term performance outcomes. Thus, proposition 7 is supported.

5.2.4 Stakeholder management

The four best performing cases (A, C, E, F) were characterized by constructive and open

dialogue regarding the needs and expectations of the different stakeholder groups. In these

cases, people resistant to change were identified and dealt with in a variety of ways. Such

constructive dialogue and identification of stakeholder management issues was missing in

other cases (B, G) resulting in negative or mixed messages which led to both confusion and a

lack of commitment. The performance outcomes for these two cases varied from bad to

unsatisfactory in the short, medium and long term. Thus, evidence from the cases supports

proposition 8. Middle managers in particular were observed to play an important role in

success or failure in this area.

5.2.5 Developing internal facilitators and change “champions”

There was clear evidence of good development of internal facilitators in five cases (A, B, C,

E, F). In these cases internal facilitators were identified, engaged and developed during the BPI

program and they subsequently evolved into change champions or “capacity-building leaders”

able to foster change in further initiatives at grassroots’ level (Ashkenas and Schaffer, 2007).

Four of these cases (A, C, E, F) had the highest short-, medium- and long-term performance

outcomes. Only two cases (D, G) clearly failed to develop effective internal facilitators and

these had the worst overall performances. Thus, the evidence supports proposition 9. An

additional insight from case analysis was the impact of change champion continuity in ensuring

15

long-term sustainability. The evidence leads to an additional proposition (P9a): Continuity of

internal facilitators and champions positively contributes to long-term success.

5.3 Change-agent approach

5.3.1 Change agent’s overall knowledge and competence

The external change agents or consultants were faced with a diverse array of situations and

challenges during the BPI programs and thus needed to call upon varied knowledge bases and

competences ranging from technical to social and political skills. We define a change agent

possessing the required technical skills, varied social and political knowledge bases and

positive attributes relating to personal approach and behavior as having a ‘high’ level of overall

knowledge and competence. In all cases, even when outcomes were poor, the companies were

very satisfied with the external consultant’s specialist lean knowledge, broader business view

and organizational skills. In five cases (A, C, E, F, H), the external change agents’ personal

approach and behavior were particularly helpful. These cases correspond to the higher

performance outcomes in the short, medium and long term. Thus, whilst the overall evidence

supports proposition 10, the limited differentiation between cases would indicate that technical

and business skills with social and political knowledge bases are a necessary but not sufficient

condition for success. This leads to a more focused proposition (P10a): Positive personal

approach and behavior can make external change agents more effective.

5.3.2 Plan for ongoing activities and consultant support

The case evidence is mixed as to whether continuing external consultant support significantly

impacts long-term performance outcomes. One objective of the BPI is to develop sufficient

capability within the firm for this to happen. Since this was in place in the best case (F) they

did not plan for or use further external support. For the other cases, there were other potentially

confounding issues such as available financing, changing external consultants and the degree to

which internal change champions were developed. Nevertheless, in cases A, C, E, F and H the

external consultant enabled a formal post-BPI session to plan further ongoing improvement

activities and potential further external consultant support. These cases outperformed in the

medium and long term those cases (B, D, G) where no such planning session occurred. Thus,

proposition 11 is supported.

6. Discussion

This paper set out to address two research questions: can BPIs lead to both short-term and

long-term improvement and sustainability? What factors influence short-term success and

long-term sustainability of BPIs? Case evidence for the propositions is summarized in Table 6.

This research makes a confirmatory contribution to existing literature by specifying an

analytical framework and identifying the importance of specific factors to short- and long-term

performance outcomes within an SME environment. The fact that several companies have not

addressed these factors indicates that this is not “common knowledge” and that academics and

practitioners could benefit from applying this framework to similar interventions.

INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE

16

The results indicate that the BPI studied delivered a range of positive short-term

improvements but an even greater variety of long-term results (See Figure 2 and Table 5).

That a well-designed intervention will deliver some short-term success is to be expected, yet

since a key objective of BPIs is to build a base and capabilities for wider change in the

organization, the more important outcomes are in the long term. The factors leading to

variation in short- and long-term outcomes are discussed in the next sections.

6.1 Short-term success

In the area of intervention context, the lack of a clear strategy for change and a low level of

organizational readiness for change were the clearest delineators between the poorest and the

best organizations. For our other two intervention context propositions the evidence was less

clear in the short term. First, since the reward and recognition mechanisms observed could only

have an impact after the BPI program, no causal relationship with short-term outcomes could

be implied. Second, evidence relating to the short-term impact of KPIs was mixed. Prior to the

BPI, KPIs were missing both in poorer performers and in one better performing organization.

Nevertheless, both cases with satisfactory short-term performance had effectively implemented

KPIs by the end of the BPI program. Hence, given that measures drive peoples’ behavior and

commitment (Melnyk et al., 2004) we conclude that implementing relevant KPIs before or

during the BPI could have led to better short-term outcomes in other cases as well. Thus, lack

of KPIs and resistance to their use within SMEs is an issue which needs addressing.

Absence of any intervention design and implementation factor was associated with bad or

unsatisfactory short-term outcomes. In particular, the absence of tailored planning and

preparation and adequate stakeholder management were directly associated with poor short-

term performance outcomes. The absence of either of these individual factors would probably

have led to failure even if all other factors had been present. The absence of other isolated

factors did not directly lead to poor short-term outcomes, but when absent in combination with

other factors the overall effect was to prevent success.

The data on change-agent approach were consistent with external facilitator skills being a

necessary but not sufficient condition for short-term success.

6.2 Long-term outcomes

A differentiating intervention context factor for those who progressed beyond the short

term was the presence of a clear pre-BPI strategy for long-term change, including rolling out

new practices across the organization. Organizational readiness for change was associated with

short-term success and was a necessary, but not sufficient condition for long-term success.

With visible short-term success coalitions of managers and employees enlarged and

strengthened as interventions proceeded, creating additional momentum for long-term success.

Thus, we see a positive feedback loop from readiness for change to visible success, then to

greater readiness for change in the long term (Repenning and Sterman, 2001). These results

also support the need for sustained leadership to drive positive organizational change into the

long term (Beer et al., 1990; Schaffer and McCreight, 2004). The cases also support the

importance of appropriate KPIs and a performance-oriented culture and post-BPI reward and

recognition in moving towards long-term success.

Effective implementation, organization and resourcing of the intervention, and good

stakeholder management in the short-term, were necessary precursors of long-term success.

Those cases which planned and prepared for the subsequent deployment across the

17

organization were most successful in the long term. Over the period of the BPI and follow up

we observed a changing pattern of stakeholder involvement: senior management lead at the

start; middle managers through the implementation; and supervisors and employees in the long

term (see Figure 3). Continuous involvement of middle managers (often company facilitators)

was critical for successful short- and long-term outcomes (Upton, 1996). The emergence of

change champions is a critical driver of long-term success, indicating a need to develop

grassroots’ “capacity-building leaders” to continue driving positive change (Ashkenas and

Schaffer, 2007).

A positive external change-agent approach and plan for ongoing support was associated

with improved long-term outcomes. Nevertheless, BPIs intend to build sufficient knowledge

and skills for the organization to continue making positive changes without external support.

Yet only one case attained long-term success without requiring continued support.

Despite small sample sizes it is possible to gain insights into which factors are most

important in driving short- and long-term success by analyzing the differences between the

most and the least successful performance outcomes (see Table 5). The most successful cases

(A and F) were consistent in both the short and long term, yet there was some change of the

least successful cases from short to long term. For short-term success, the following factors

were identified: clear strategy and objectives for change (P1); organizational readiness for

change (P2); tailored planning and preparation (P5); organization and provision of resources

(P6); intervention implementation (P7); stakeholder management (P8); and planning for

ongoing support (P11). For the long term, delineators between success and failure were the

same, except that tailored planning and preparation (P5) and effective stakeholder management

(P8) in the short-term are superseded by an increased importance of developing change

champions (P9) to ensure sustained leadership ability to continue driving positive long-term

change.

Best practices such as lean production are bundles of individual practices (Shah and Ward,

2003). Our data support the view that partial implementation neither leads to short-term

success nor provides a base for long-term development and diffusion across the organization.

A BPI can only be considered successful if it meets both short- and long-term objectives. Yet

only one case could be considered truly successful against these criteria and only three others

made improvements to satisfactory or good outcomes in the long term. This raises the question

as to whether BPI interventions are inherently flawed with a low chance of long-term success.

7. Conclusions

Over half of jobs in developed countries are in SMEs and fewer than 12% of firms in the

USA have more than 20 employees. Despite this there is a dearth of research dealing with

issues of particular importance to SMEs (Prater and Ghosh, 2006). Whilst many SMEs are

members of sophisticated supply chains and can gain help through OEM customers, others turn

to BPIs as a cost-effective means of improvement. Yet our data raises some serious questions

about such BPIs as only one case could be considered successful in moving beyond short-term

success without continued external support. At first sight it would seem that this was due to

this case intervention being consistent with nearly all of our propositions. However, there was

also prior capability without which this success may not have occurred. BPIs such as this have

been modeled on the original Toyota jishuken workshops. But have such BPIs been

sufficiently adapted and tailored to new contexts or uncritically copied from Toyota? Most of

the organizations studied were small, had limited resources and had almost no prior

18

capabilities. In this context, how realistic is it to expect a single BPI, unsupported in the long

term, to build sufficient capability for the organization to drive continued positive change?

Furthermore, the dual short- and long-term aims of BPIs creates a potential dilemma in SMEs:

the interventions must deliver effective training to managers and shop floor personnel with

convincing short-term outcomes; yet also provide a firm basis for long-term sustainable

business change. Can these two objectives go hand in hand or are they conflicting?

We conclude that BPIs should be seen primarily as capability building processes and their

progress should be measured in terms of the achievement, deployment and sustainability of

these capabilities (Holweg and Pil, 2008). This contrasts with the more traditional view that

BPIs are about implementation of a set of practices. Second, we conclude that the propositions

outlined in Table 6 can contribute to the success of capability building. Third, there is an

inherent tension between the lack of resources in typical SME users of BPIs and the short time

available to develop a critical mass of capability. Our findings indicate that such BPIs are

unlikely to develop sufficient capability for long-term success in SMEs without ongoing

support.

8. Limitations and future research

The research was conducted in cases using the same BPI; providing control but limiting

generalizability. Retrospective data collection risks bias and misinterpretation (Voss et al.,

2002); we sought to reduce this through multiple respondents and multiple interviewers. Also,

there are limits to the reliability of our outcome measures due to the lack of KPIs or objective

data in the cases studied. Selection only of cases with KPIs would have further risked bias.

This seems to be a generic problem with research in SMEs. In longitudinal research this could

be addressed by putting measures in place at the outset. For survey research measures and

scales could be developed that do not implicitly assume the presence of KPIs. For future

research it is important to recognize that SMEs may be different from larger firms and to

identify appropriate contextual variables.

We see a number of avenues for future research. This research could be replicated in

different contexts such as larger companies and future studies could examine different BPIs to

explore characteristics of effective BPI design. The propositions developed in this research

could be tested on a wider sample through survey research methods. Whilst we identify issues

hindering BPI outcomes in SMEs there is a need for further research on overcoming these

barriers. Further research should include framing of questions to study the phenomena in terms

of capability development. Finally, causal relationships between underlying factors could be

assessed through empirical survey methods, leading to refined understanding of their relative

importance and how this may be contingent on different contexts (Sousa and Voss, 2008).

9. Implications for practice

Short-term BPIs are a common way of operations-led improvement in organizations and

this research has important implications for those funding, designing, participating in or

delivering such programs. By their nature, BPIs are frequently aimed at organizations with

limited capability and resources. Although they can lead to visible short-term improvement this

is not enough. Rather than usually being seen as short-term exercises narrowly focussed upon

localized implementation of “best practices”, the true objective of BPI programs should be

aimed towards long-term building and deployment of capabilities across the organization.

19

We have identified a number of drivers of successful outcomes many of which should take

place prior to the BPI. In addition to planning for long-term objectives rather than a “let’s try it

and see” approach, change agents must realistically evaluate the support and resources needed.

Every intervention is different and each needs tailoring to the organizational context. In the

context of SMEs it is important to overcome resistance to the use of KPIs. Stakeholder

management and confronting potential critical issues before and after the intervention is also

crucial. As such, leadership is essential in ensuring organizational readiness for change and for

continuing to drive positive sustained change into the long term. Such implications also

potentially apply beyond SMEs to the full range of organizations using BPIs.

The findings from this study indicate that the combination of a lack of initial capability,

often difficult contexts, limited time and limited resources makes long-term BPI success very

difficult to achieve in SMEs. With these contextual challenges only one of the eight cases

studied managed to sustain the continued development and deployment of capabilities needed

for long-term positive change without continued external support. This gap must be addressed

by both funders and users of BPIs.

Acknowledgement

This research has been funded by the ESRC, grant RES-331-25-0027, through the Advanced

Institute of Management Research.

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Fig. 1. Research Model

*Time of Outcome Scale: 0. Before BPI Rapid Improvement Workshop (RIW), 1. Short-Term (immediately after

BPI RIW), 2. Medium-Term (1/2 year after BPI RIW), 3. Long-term (one year after BPI RIW)

Fig. 2. BPI Intervention Outcomes- Short, Medium and Long-Term

Time

Involvement

Senior management

Middle management

Employees

Fig. 3. Pattern of involvement of stakeholder groups in an intervention

0

1

2

3

4

5

0 1 2 3

Time of Outcome*

F

A

C

E

H

B

D

G Imp

rov

em

en

t L

ev

el

Case

Pre-Intervention

Situation

Short-term

Outcomes

Medium-term

Outcomes

Long-term

Outcomes

2. Intervention Design & Implementation Factors

3. Change Agent Approach Factors

1. Intervention Context Factors

23

Table 1

Characteristics of Cases Studied

*Number of Employees

Table 2

The Best Practice Intervention Studied: The MAS Master Class

Case Size* Turnover Profitable Industry Type of Process Intervention

(5-Phases)

A 200 £20 mill. Yes Fencing One-of-a kind, Batch, MTO/

MTS

Spring 2004

B 40 £2.8 mill. Yes Blinds One-of-a-kind, Batch, MTO Summer 2004

C 90 £11 mill. Yes Printing One-of-a-kind, Batch, MTO Autumn 2004-

Summer 2005

D

E

55 £4.7 mill. Yes Printing Batch, MTO D: Autumn 2003

E: Autumn 2004

F 17 £3.5 mill. Yes Tapes Batch, MTO Summer 2005

G 35 £3 mill. No Automation One-of-a-kind, MTO Autumn 2004–

Spring 2005

H 20 £3 mill. No Automation One-of-a kind, MTO Autumn 2003

Phase Event Description

1 Directors’

workshop

The objectives of this were to familiarize senior management with the concepts of

Lean; to understand the program, to gain commitment and to build relationships and

trust of others in the program.

2 Facilitator

training

Each company nominated a facilitator who will lead the program in the company.

They then went through a thorough training to understand the principles and tools of

lean manufacturing, to build skills in analyzing process and developing new and

improved operations.

3 Planning

Session

Having identified the part of the organization where the initial changes were to be

made (with the advisor/consultant) there was a planning session. This was to double-

check the assumptions as well as to plan the activities.

4 Rapid

Improvement

Workshop

(RIW)

The RIW was the core of the program. It was a four-day workshop where a particular

part of the organization is taken through the complete improvement process, where

production is stopped and all the necessary changes are made during the four-day

period. All analysis and management was done, not by the external facilitator, but by

the facilitator so as to embed the skills needed. At the end of the RIW there was

usually a celebration.

5 Review After the workshop, a review was held where the learning from the workshops was

shared to other personnel and company management.

24

Table 3

The BPI Studied: Examples of Explicit Short and Long-Term Aims

*A Lean workplace organization methodology. Translated from original Japanese the 5S’s are: Sort, Set in Order, Systematic Clean,

Standardize, Sustain

Table 4

Performance Rating Scale

Short-

Term

Aims

-To improve the flow of work with a view to eliminating waste, introducing 5S and effecting a

reduction in lead time. … and reduce non-value adding time and distance traveled by the welding

operators.

-Analyze the process of construction to achieve a balance of individual process times and change

the layout to achieve a more obvious product flow.

-Apply 5S* techniques to improve workplace organization and purchase a new crane to relieve

an existing bottleneck.

Long-

Term

Aims

-To further disseminate ‘Lean’ through the whole of the business.

-To train and develop a team of 11 Facilitators for further implementation of Lean

Manufacturing techniques ( identification of waste and the removal of non value-adding

activities) to other parts of the business.

-For these trained facilitators to be able to continue implementing further business improvements

without the future aid of third party advisors.

Scale Improvement

Level

Characteristics

0 Pre-Intervention Operational performance level observed prior to the intervention.

1 Bad Very little operational improvement over the pre-intervention level at the area

of focus (short, medium and long-term). No deployment of knowledge and

lean approaches across the organization and no basis for sustained

improvement (medium and long- term).

2 Unsatisfactory Limited operational improvement over the pre-intervention level at the area of

focus (short, medium and long-term). Little or no deployment of knowledge

and lean approaches across the organization. Limited basis for sustaining or

continuing improvement (medium and long-term).

3 Satisfactory Average operational improvement over the pre-intervention level at the area of

focus (short, medium and long-term). Average deployment of knowledge and

lean approaches across the organization. Some basis for sustaining and

continuing improvement (medium and long-term).

4 Good Good operational improvement over the pre-intervention level at the area of

focus (short, medium and long-term). Significant deployment of knowledge

and lean approaches across the organization. Significant potential for

sustaining and continuing improvement (medium and long-term).

5 Excellent Significant operational improvement over the pre-intervention level at the area

of focus (short, medium and long-term) Extensive deployment of knowledge

and lean approaches across the organization. Considerable scope for sustaining

and continuing improvement (medium and long-term).

25

Table 5

Summary of Results (ranked by case outcome)

+ indicates factor clearly present/strong - indicates factor clearly absent/weak

Table 6

Summary of support for propositions

Yes = Clear support for proposition No = Proposition not supported

* = Insufficient evidence for yes/ no; further research needed N/A = Proposition not applicable

Case

Performance Outcomes G D B H E C A F

Short-Term (immediately after BPI) 1 2 1 2 2 2 3 3

Medium-Term (½ a year after BPI) 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 4

Long-Term (1 year after BPI) 1 1 2 2 3 3 4 5

Intervention context Factors

Clearly communicated strategy and objectives for change (P1) - - - + + + Organizational readiness for change (P2) - - - + + + + + KPIs aligned to program of change objectives (P3) - - - - + Reward and recognition of positive short-term results (P4) + + + +

Intervention Design & Implementation Factors

Tailoring BPI format to specific context (P5) - - + + + Organization and provision of resources (P6) - - - + + + + + Well-managed intervention implementation (P7) - - - - + + + + Stakeholder management (P8) - - + + + + Development of internal facilitators/ champions (P9) - - + + + + +

Change Agent Approach Factors

Change agent overall knowledge and competence (P10) + + + + + Post-BPI plan for ongoing activities/ consultant support (P11) - - - + + + + +

Proposition

Short-

Term

Long-

Term

Additional Comments

Clearly communicated strategy and

objectives for change (P1)

Yes Yes Strategies of experimentation and learning

in place of planning for the long-term was

not associated with success

Organizational readiness for change (P2) Yes Yes Financial inadequacy of SMEs may hinder

readiness for change

KPIs aligned to program of change objectives

(P3)

* Yes KPIs were notable by their absence in all

but one SME

Reward and recognition of positive short-

term results (P4)

N/A Yes There was also some evidence of intrinsic

motivation

Tailoring BPI format to specific context (P5) Yes Yes Inappropriate scoping was a cause of

failure

Organization and provision of resources (P6) Yes Yes -

Well-managed implementation (P7) Yes Yes -

Stakeholder management (P8) Yes Yes Middle managers played an important role

Development of internal facilitators/

champions (P9)

Yes Yes Continuity of champions contributes to

long-term success

Change agent overall knowledge and

competence (P10)

Yes Yes Change agent technical skills are necessary,

but not sufficient condition for success

Post-BPI planning for ongoing activities and

consultant support (P11)

N/A Yes -

26

Appendix A

Factor Operationalization

Factor Operationalization/ Measurement*

1. Clearly

communicated

strategy and

objectives for

change

Was an explicit operations strategy in place? How well was it specified? Did it include the

role of best practices/ the BPI? Did it include present objectives and future targets? Was it

tailored to the company and did it match operational realities? How was it communicated –

verbally, written documentation (leaflets, posters)? Were stakeholders on all levels aware

of it? Did they understand and commit to it? Was implementation of it in progress?

2. Organizational

readiness for

change

To what degree had senior managers/ leaders ensured the organization was prepared for

and committed to company change objectives? To what degree was a dominant coalition of

stakeholders open towards and committed to the intervention? To what degree were

stakeholders at all levels in support of implied changes?

3. KPIs aligned to

program of change

objectives

Were KPIs in place at all? Which operational metrics were in place or developed (e.g. Lead

time, costs, delivery time, productivity, OEE)? Were explicit KPIs in place before, during,

after the intervention? Were these KPIs appropriate for/ aligned to short/ long-term BPI

objectives?

4. Reward and

recognition of

positive short-

term results

Were BPIs followed by rewards and recognition to intervention participants? Were any

KPIs linked to salary, bonus schemes etc.? How was reward and recognition offered –

direct/ visible (e.g. bonus)/ indirect (e.g. promotion)? Were they offered randomly, or to

specific individuals/ teams? Were reward/ recognition options introduced to participants

before/ after the BPI?

5. Tailoring BPI

format to specific

context

Was the intervention tailored to the specific company context? What was modified to fit

the specific context (scope, change ambitions, content, sequence, duration, pace of

activities/ events, applied tools/ techniques, role and choice of facilitators, BPI

organization, availability of resources, location)?

6. Organization

and provision of

resources

How much time was dedicated for personnel to be involved in the BPI? How much time

was allowed for BPI preparation, conduct and follow-up? Were workshop participants

freed from daily operations for the BPI? Did competing initiatives take resources away

from the BPI? Was there a budget allocation for BPI events and rewards?

7. Well-managed

implementation

What were main intervention events? How did events flow (logically connected/

disconnected)? Were time/ resources distributed appropriately over events? Were pace and

duration of events appropriate? Were stakeholders involved in appropriate, gradual

sequence?

8. Stakeholder

management

Was there a specific requirement for managing stakeholders’ needs, motivations and

expectations? Which stakeholders were supporting/ resisting the BPI? Were such issues

considered as an integrated part of the BPI? Was it planned from the outset or later as

conflicts and issues surfaced? Was there cooperation between senior/ middle managers and

change agents to manage stakeholders? What were outcomes of efforts to manage

stakeholders? Was it done well?

9. Development of

internal

facilitators and

champions

Did a committed and driven champion evolve with the BPI? When did s/he take the lead

(pre, during or post BPI)? Did other stakeholders also take the lead? How did leadership/

driver skills manifest themselves? Did the MAS facilitator play a role in developing the

internal facilitator? Did the internal facilitator receive support and encouragement? If so,

how did that strengthen/weaken their commitment? Did company staff respect this person?

10.Change agent

overall knowledge

and competence

Who were the change agents and what were their backgrounds? Did they demonstrate

technical knowledge (e.g. Lean)? Did they demonstrate a broader managerial and business

understanding? Did they demonstrate socio-political and communicational skills? Did they

demonstrate project management and facilitation skills? What were their own reflections

on their skills and were these validated by interviewees?

11. Post-BPI

planning for

ongoing activities

and consultant

support

Was post-BPI planning included as a part of the BPI? Were further ongoing activities

planned upon BPI completion? What characterized those activities in scope and aim? Did

the plans actually materialize? Was support and funding provided for further activities

(company/ other sources)? What role did MAS facilitators play in post-BPI planning for

ongoing activities? Was further consultant support offered/ used after the BPI?

*Specific case evidence sought (interview statements, supporting documents, plant visit observations) to indicate

presence or absence of factor.

27

Appendix B

Summary of Research Protocol

Section Information Sought

1 Introduction to the company – general information

2 Visit and plant tour – to see the facility and some of the changes since the intervention

3 Company context of the intervention – both external and internal

4 Main events before the interventions (pre-events)

5 The pre intervention situation

6 Preparation of the intervention

7 The intervention: scope, aim, activities, participants, duration etc.

8 The intervention: technical-rational issues, socio-political issues, project management and

facilitation

9 Change agent behavior and competencies during the intervention

10 Finishing of the intervention

11 The immediate post intervention situation

12 The immediate outcome of the intervention

13 Main events after the intervention (post intervention events)

14 Current post intervention situation (i.e. at time of interview)

15 Current outcome of the intervention (i.e. at time of interview)

16 Hard performance data (for retrospective within company comparison)

28

Appendix C

Case Data

P1 - Clearly communicated strategy and objectives for change

Cases A, C and F had clear and communicated operations strategies (partially written down) before initiating the interventions. These strategies specified rolling out new

practices, not only to manufacturing, but all areas of each company in subsequent programs. Based on these strategies, there were up front plans for development of Lean

initiatives for which the intervention was planned to play a major role. The plans, which reflected senior management understanding of the potential journey; were

ambitious but still carried realistic expectations for what could be achieved from implementing best practice interventions and continuing efforts. For example, in case F,

there was a coherent plan for rolling-out tailored Lean initiatives to different areas of the plant and company. The specific BPI studied was implemented in 2005 for the

first of the areas to be improved- the shop floor. A subsequent Lean office program was planned for 2006; for 2007 an ISO 9001 program and in 2008 a Six Sigma

program. In case F, managers and most employees were generally aware of and committed to these plans, as they found them relevant and useful. For cases A and C

there were similarly clear strategic plans and objectives in place. In cases B, D and G, BPI interventions were looked-upon more as a trial-and-error experiment, that it

was hoped would lead to some improvements and learning. No further operational change initiatives were planned. In cases D and G, product development and market

oriented efforts were viewed as more important to company survival. For cases E and H, a strategy for implementing change through follow-up initiatives was only

formulated and communicated to the rest of the organization after the BPI program had finished.

P2 - Organizational readiness for change

In none of the cases was every senior and middle manager and employee highly motivated and committed to implementing lean practices and embarking on change,

neither from the outset nor at the time of our final visit. Yet there were clear differences in the ability of leadership to drive positive organizational change. The most

positive overall attitudes to change were found in cases A, C, E, F and H. In these cases, the company leaders (some of them also owners) had ensured coalitions of

senior managers, middle managers and employees were committed to implementing improved practices. As interventions proceeded and positive results were

demonstrated, these coalitions grew in size and influence- paving the way for further support for change. Cases B, D and G had a distinct lack of leadership and

organizational readiness for change prior to the BPI program. In case B, the BPI was initiated by the General Manager but there was no evidence of early buy-in from

middle managers or employees, who were generally skeptical. The BPI was “pushed” through despite latent unresolved conflicts and as a result the intervention and

workshop did not deliver the short-term successes expected by the GM. Nevertheless, after concluding the BPI program, pride and continued efforts by appointed

internal company facilitators resulted in increased medium-term improvements (albeit limited) that were sustained in the long-term. In cases D and G the management

team lacked leadership and disagreed on company direction and change initiatives from the outset. There was support, optimism and motivation from certain key players

but also severe resistance, cynicism and obstruction from others; leaving several company participants hesitant and confused. In case G, people resistant to change

(frequently labeled ‘blockers’) managed to prevent any real operational improvements being made during or after the BPI. In case D, the minority enthusiasm of a few

key people during the BPI managed to implement limited short-term operational improvement within the focus area. However, these improvements suffered from

subsequent resistance to change and “after 2 weeks everything was back to normal” (Company Facilitator, Case D) – no improvements had been sustained.

P3- KPIs aligned to program of change objectives

In all the cases, the external facilitators estimated the improvements and savings achieved at the end of the intervention program. These estimations were probably

supportive of short-term intervention outcomes, by increasing participant’s awareness of results achieved during the Lean intervention. Just one of the cases, had existing

KPIs (including process performance indicators) in place for accurately measuring BPI outcomes (e.g. lead times, costs, quality, delivery time, dependability, inventory)

of Lean initiatives in the short, medium and long-term. Only case F had a clear performance-oriented culture with substantial data capture and performance measures in

place. A year before the intervention, case F personnel had started recording several KPIs for each machine on the shop floor. For example, case F personnel were able

to track general improvement in areas such as delivery dependability, which rose from 50% to 95% and had recently developed specific targets at a plant and machine

level. These targets were linked to employee bonuses. Cases C and E, both in the printing industry, had begun Overall Equipment Effectiveness (OEE) measurements on

29

expensive printing machines as part of the BPI; and about one year after the intervention had begun a process of setting company and manufacturing measures in

addition to the planned launch of bonus schemes linked to those measures. Case A had implemented productivity and efficiency measures as part of the BPI, but after a

year had hardly traced any improvements on these measures. Companies A, C and E had no KPIs in place, but did perceive the importance of implementing certain

metrics during the BPI. There was some indication in cases B, D, G, and H that lack of KPIs made it difficult to develop kaizen practices and a culture for continuous

performance improvement.

P4 - Reward and recognition of positive short-term results

For all BPIs, some form of event was held at the end of the program to celebrate improvements achieved. As well as such short-term recognition, there was evidence in

cases A, C, E and F of more significant post-BPI reward and recognition mechanisms for those taking the lead in Lean initiatives in the medium and long-term. In cases

C and E, department managers that had shown drive and skills for change were subsequently promoted to production managers with overall Lean responsibility, leading

to increased status and influence as well as a higher salary. In case A, a special agreement was made to give departmental employees a share of subsequent

improvements measured against newly implemented productivity/ efficiency measures. As previously mentioned case F had clear reward and recognition mechanisms

linked to KPI targets. All participants received recognition for their part in the improvement efforts. Those that were identified as playing a positive role were rewarded

by being allowed to further progress with improvement initiatives and with career development within the company. On the other hand, any managers and employees

seen as resistant to the process of change were ‘punished’ through immediate action to substitute or demote them. This ‘carrot and stick’ approach was chosen by the

MD to make all personnel part of a long-term change oriented culture. No clear post-BPI reward or recognition systems were in place in cases B, D, G or H. In cases D,

G and H, efforts to continue with the Lean process largely ground to a halt after the BPI and any possible benefits to Lean champions never became truly relevant

P5 - Tailoring BPI format to specific context

All of the cases sought to do some tailoring of the standard MAS intervention model to the particular needs of the organization, to varying extents and with differing

levels of success. In cases A, C and F had good and appropriate BPI planning and preparation. For example, in case A the scope (welding shop), time and duration of the

intervention (a short intensive week between other ongoing Lean activities) were each chosen so as to fit well into the overall Lean roll-out plans for the Company. Case

C saw a need for training and education activities for a large group of managers, middle managers and employees as a first step towards Lean operations, and therefore a

slower paced intervention of longer duration was conducted. The chosen scope of selected workshops fitted in to overall company Lean roll-out plans. In total the

planning and preparation of the BPI lasted 6 months, but matched the company needs well. Case F also followed careful tailored plans and prepared the intervention so

as to fit with the organizational operations strategies, best practice adoption plans and improvement objectives for the coming years. There were problems in Cases B and

G. In case G scoping was inappropriate in choosing to run a Lean office program, where a Lean shop-floor program would have been more relevant. Company

facilitators in case B felt that their intervention should have been better scoped. They had unsuccessfully proposed a different production area to that chosen by the MD

for the intervention. In both B and G, the pace and duration of workshop activities and selection of participants was not well planned or prepared.

P6 – Organization and provision of resources

Cases A, C, E, F, and H all demonstrated positive actions in this area. For example, in cases A and F, provision was made for production to be stopped within the focus

areas during improvement workshops. In cases C and E production continued but was run by non-BPI participant personnel. In case H, despite emergency orders to be

taken care of, the intervention remained well organized and BPI resources were maintained according to plan. For the five cases, internal facilitators were well selected,

and for cases C and E, employee personality screening (Belbin tests) was carried out to establish the BPI workshop teams. Examples of poor organizing and resourcing

were found in the other cases. In case B, production was not stopped and internal and external facilitators felt that too few operational resources were released for the

BPI to have any significant impact. In cases D and G there was poor organization and lack of adequate resources for the interventions. The internal and external

facilitators did not feel they had the right people in their teams. In case G, the responsibility for the BPI outcome was unclear. The company sponsor (Senior Manager)

was away on a business trip and no internal facilitator had been identified to conduct the BPI workshops. Also the company facilitator was not seen as strong and

recently hired employees and personnel lacking required skills and dedication were selected for the Lean office program. The external facilitator felt that these issues

30

limited his ability to facilitate change in case G.

P7 - Well-managed intervention implementation

The interventions were well executed according to plan in cases A, C, E and F. Although pace and duration varied across all these four cases, they were appropriate for

the respective cases. In these cases, the relevant BPI activities happened in coherent and coupled sequences, displaying continuity, and enabling the gradual and

appropriate involvement of different stakeholder groups step-by-step in the process. Cases B and H followed the original plans less well, with disconnects between the

different intervention phases or steps. In addition, in these cases the handovers between the company sponsors and the facilitators were not perceived as being smooth.

The company facilitators felt responsibility for the Lean intervention events and follow-up initiatives had been delegated to them as a surprise and not according to the

coherent BPI model presented by the MAS consultants. As cases D and G were poorly organized, the implementation of the interventions did not go well either. For

example, in case G the company sponsor provided no direction or guidance for the company facilitator and workshop participants – not even informing them of

agreements made with the external facilitator.

P8 - Stakeholder management

In Cases A, C, E, and F, from the intervention outset, there was a constructive and open dialogue between the external facilitator and company sponsor about the nature

of and potential issues with stakeholders. Open minded owners and managers sponsoring and backing up initiatives facilitated the dialogue and stakeholder management.

It made it possible to deal in a proactive way with people that were potentially resistant to change (’blockers’). In case A, the external facilitator and company facilitator

worked intensively to ensure that employees in the BPI focus area (welding) would commit to required changes. This was similar in case C. Cases D and E were run in

the same company but stakeholder management was conducted differently in each. In contrast to case D, the case E team carried out necessary actions to deal with main

blockers of further progress: The operations manager and a middle manager who were actively resistant to lean initiatives were respectively demoted and fired. In case F,

the company sponsor and the external facilitator had been aware of negative attitudes amongst certain employees (including the operations manager) before BPI

commenced and had devised counter-resistance plans. Thus when these employees tried to obstruct or boycott BPI events they were dealt with as felt appropriate by

senior management. In cases B and G this constructive dialogue between external facilitator and company sponsor was missing. In case B, the intervention sponsor was

the MD towards whom there was general lack of respect for his managerial abilities as well as skepticism of his ability to carry through any real improvements. In

addition, the MD was absent from the company when the BPI events took place. As a result, the external consultant had trouble developing the required enthusiasm

amongst company facilitators and participants during the BPI. The external consultant felt the senior manager lacked the dedication and required abilities to run such

projects, but recognized that there were strong middle managers who were trying to lead improvements with their own agenda. As mentioned earlier, case B did develop

limited positive results in the medium-term due to the persistence of the company facilitators. In case G, the company sponsor was the production manager who failed to

inform the external facilitator about his serious disagreements with two other managers. The company sponsor/ production manager was probably the only senior

manager that really believed in the benefits of Lean initiatives and this lack of senior managerial consensus spread to middle managers. As a result, people on the shop

floor received mixed signals from management, were confused and thus refrained from engaging in further improvements. In particular, the critical role of middle

managers was noted as a distinguishing factor between good and poor short and long-term intervention outcomes.

P9 - Development of internal facilitators and champions

An important aim was to select, train and develop internal facilitators, potential leaders and change ‘champions’ at an early stage in the intervention process. This was

done well in cases A, B, C, E and F; the facilitators were both motivated and provided leadership. In these cases, internal facilitators were identified, engaged and

developed during the BPI program and they subsequently evolved into change champions to take the lead of further initiatives. Even when time and resources given to

the facilitators was felt to be inadequate, as in case B, they still took the lead in making further improvements. In certain cases, the senior management company

sponsors became the internal facilitators. For example, in case F the MD, who was already familiar with Lean approaches, was a clear change champion leading changes,

along with his management team, even before the intervention. Only cases D and G failed to develop effective internal facilitators or champions. In these cases the

company sponsors were ready to take the lead, but they were too distant or busy to fulfill the required role. Continuity of facilitators between the short and long-term was

31

observed in cases A, B, C and F. Cases D and E also experienced similar continuity but with the problem that there was also continuity of some key stakeholders who

sought to obstruct any progress. In case H one internal facilitator left the company, and the other found himself with too many other activities due to the company’s poor

competitive situation. The loss of key internal facilitators or potential change champions apparently influenced the company’s ability to continue implementing Lean

practices in the medium and long-term.

P10 - Change agent overall knowledge and competence

We sought to gain a broad appreciation as to the extent of the change agent’s overall knowledge and competence across three dimensions relating to the consultant’s

specialist Lean skills, their approach and behavior, and their broader business view and organizational skills. In all cases, the companies were very satisfied with the

external consultant’s specialist Lean skills. This was also true even when the short-term outcomes were not so satisfactory. For example, in case G, even though the BPI

results were recognized as poor, the company did not blame the external facilitators’ technical skills for this. The MD even considered bringing the external consultant

back again. In terms of their approach and behavior, consultants were universally seen to have demonstrated adequate professionalism, social skills and personal

flexibility towards setting up the intervention so that companies could benefit from them. In cases A, C, E, F and H the external consultant’s personal approach and

behavior were judged to be particularly positive and helpful. Only in case B were there somewhat mixed views expressed relating to the inter-personal skills of the

external facilitator. In terms of broader business view and organizational skills, in all cases the change agent’s were also judged positively. All external facilitators had a

solid industrial experience, not only as Lean specialists, and possessing organizational understanding. All consultants had been involved previously in a range of

different BPI assignments of varying technical, cultural and political complexity. Each of the external facilitators interviewed were actually more personally satisfied

when contracted as a general business consultant rather than just a Lean specialist. In several instances, at early stages of the BPI programs the consultant was able to

identify broader organizational issues that would enable or inhibit progress and long-term sustainability. Despite identifying broader organizational inhibiting factors in

cases, B, D, E, G and H, the consultants were unable to deal with them as their role was restricted specifically to the transfer of Lean skills. Remarks made during the

interviews for cases A, C, E, F and H stood out in terms of the excellent approach and personal style of the consultants involved. This was the only distinguishing

dimension between the cases

P11 - Post-BPI planning for ongoing activities and consultant support

The adoption and embedding of best practices entailed a journey beyond the short-term BPI, involving ongoing post-BPI activities and potential further consultant

support. After the BPI all case companies, to varying degrees, expressed interest in maintaining contact with the external facilitator in order to provide a reliable

“roadmap” of ongoing activities, checks on future progress and possible further support. Such ongoing activities are ideally planned at the end of the BPI event, in order

to benefit from analysis of short-term results, and in conjunction with the external consultant to enable specific targeting of potential further support. Yet not all

interventions finished with such an explicit planning session. Whilst in cases A, C, E, F and H the external consultant held formal discussions in order to plan how best

to proceed with follow-up activities, no such post-BPI planning occurred in cases B, D and G.

In several cases ongoing external consultant support did take place. Companies A, C, D and E ran additional lean initiatives after the first intervention, and the external

facilitators were called upon again to guide company sponsors and facilitators and run further activities. Companies A and C maintained contact with consultants without

external financial support. For company D and E such financing was claimed to be a prerequisite for continued collaboration. In case B further Lean related initiatives

were organized, but support for these was not provided by the original BPI consultants, but alternative providers of similar services bringing public funding with them.

Case F had an impressive overall long-term plan for roll out of Lean and six sigma initiatives. The post-BPI planning for follow-up activities formed part of this long-

term plan and was carried-out with the external consultant. Nevertheless, in case F the decision was taken that extensive ongoing external consultant support would not

be necessary as internal change champions were sufficiently developed to fulfill much of this role. Whilst soliciting limited support, case F did however maintain a good

relationship with the MAS consultants, who conducted subsequent visits to follow their results progress. Cases G and H also considered using the external facilitators for

further initiatives, but in the time period studied, failed to secure the external financial support needed for this to happen.