Blowing in the Ear of Paul Viminitz

Blowing in the Ear of Paul Viminitz The Preservation of Causality through the Flux of Temporal Quantum Realities,

Steve Firth

PHILOSOPHY 4000: BEING, BECOMING, AND BEYOND

Department of Philosophy University of Lethbridge

LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA, CANADA 10TH APRIL 2010

08Fall

Blowing in the Ear of Paul Viminitz

ABSTRACT:

Investigating logical thought experiments pertaining to the maintenance of causality

within a block universe reveals that a Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum reality

allows causality to exist without engendering logical inconsistencies and temporal

paradoxes. Whilst quantum mechanics remains illogical, the Many Worlds 1

Interpretation adheres with accepted quantum idiosyncrasies and provides a more

convincing argument than the Block Universe model.

A query on the use of this word in this paper was brought to my attention during the editing of this paper: 1

Is Quantum Mechanics actually illogical, or just surprising? It seems to me there are several uses of the word ‘illogical’; I use it here in the colloquial manner to describe the unexpected or unreasonable nature of things. Smolin has detailed in some of his work how quantum particles behave unexpectedly when some of their properties become known. If one is expecting a particular result and a different result is observed or calculated, then I would argue that this is, at least in the vernacular, 'illogical'

Steven Firth, Department of Philosophy, University of Lethbridge, Canada Page of 2 29


1. INTRODUCTION – THE PROBLEM WITH CONSIDERING QUANTUM

MECHANICS

Philosophers attempt to resolve almost everything they encounter through the

application of logical thought processes — profoundly scrutinising the problem to

locate the tiniest flaw in an argument and expose the logical inconsistency or

contradiction that lies within Some Philosophers use logic to solve troubling thought 2

experiments or paradoxes and express their solutions in terms of numbers or

equations. Perhaps the application of mathematics may actually turn out to be a

fundamental flaw in resolving some irksome problems of the universe; maybe one

cannot apply logic successfully to something that do not act logically — for instance,

attempting to define entities which are non-discrete in terms of discreteness is

inherently problematic. It is possible to use a paper such as this to collate and detail

the contradictions that lie beneath still quantum waters, but such an endeavour would

be periphrastic and grandiloquent (many journals document the contumacious nature

of quantum mechanics and I have no intention to bolster swollen academic shelf space

with yet another superfluous undertaking).

I consider Mathematics to be an arbitrary, inflexible language which, however, is the best language suited 2

to describe certain things around us. Although, I consider it limited in the way natural languages are limited, it is interesting to note how readily proponents of mathematics arrogantly assume that Math is the language of the Universe. When math fails to describe something, mathematicians simply go ahead and create a different type of math to cover up the failings of the first. This is analogous to re-writing English when it fails to describe something precisely enough. It is clear to me that there is no such language of the Universe, and if there were, I am sure that humans are not responsible for its writing or discovery.


John Wheeler simply puts it “I think I can safely say nobody actually

understands Quantum Mechanics.” I doubt I could summate the confusing nature of 3

the quantum realm more eloquently — although, as I feel it pertinent to this paper, I

will elaborate on footnote 2, and endeavour to explain at least why I consider quantum

mechanics to be somewhat ‘illogical’: If we consider that, it is ‘logical’ that the natural

number 3 will follow the natural number 2 (in a certain sequence) or that night follows

day. We can reasonably assume that ‘logic’ (in the everyday sense) can be defined not 4

only by the distinct requirements of rational thought, but also by the repetition of

events which conclude or continue in the manner which they always have; that they

become expected or reasonable under the circumstances. Though this description of

logic is not that of the philosopher or mathematician, it does account for most

layperson's understanding of the term.

Many of the events that occur in the quantum realm do so with unexpected

results. Particle interactions and even particle-wave duality are illogical (in the respect

that they do not seem conform to our earlier understanding of particles or the laws of

physics). If we consider the latter, that a particle shares both wave properties and

particle properties, it seems illogical that the same entity should exhibit both or neither

(depending upon the experiment). If we consider the two-split experiment for instance,

BBC Four. "Parallel Worlds, Parallel Lives." Parallel Worlds Parallel Lives. Nationwide: BBC Four, 26 3

November 2007.

Though I am sensitive to the problem of induction.4



the firing of a single photon onto a screen to produce an image. We are able to measure

the photon at the moment before it passes through the splits, but, because of the

nature of quantum particles, we discover that it essentially disappears prior to entering

the splits, then re-appears on the other side — where it continues on its path. If we 5

attempt to determine more about the particle at this critical juncture, we discover that

we are able to discern only one element of its nature and the other goes unmeasured.

Being unable to satisfactorily explain the nature of a single photon at a particular

location is only one example of the peculiar mannerism of the quantum realm and it is

in this manner I consider quantum mechanics to defy our everyday concept of logical

behaviour.

1.1 Back to Thought

Being open minded to alternative possibilities of spacetime, allows us to consider

options outside of a Block Universe model of reality. Once we understand there may be

an inherent problem in attempting to describe the nature and state of the universe (or

universes) in terms of mathematics and logic, we can refrain from such endeavours, 6

and begin to consider arguments through thought experiments and the kind of

contradictions that occur from them — in other words, perhaps we don't always need

Horgan, John. Fortune City. 30 January 2002. 15 March 2010. <http://fortunecity/emachines/e1/86/qphil/5

html>.

This would be analogous of defining circular geometry in terms of its colour. While this might be 6

possible, it does not really provide an accurate description –- it merely defines an element of it.


testable theories. Indeed, it was in this way that the ancient philosophers like Zeno,

Heraclitus and Epictetus thought about the world around them, and they created an

understanding which still influences humanity today. If we now consider any of their

conclusions wrong, or primitive, it is only because they were among the first of the

great thinkers and had little else to fall upon. I wonder if science has not become too

concerned with experiments and testability. David Deutch argues that: “Being able to

predict things or to describe them, however accurately, is not at all the same as

understanding them” and, “facts cannot be understood by being summarised in a

formula, any more than being listed on paper or committed to memory.” 7

Sometimes, in order to better understand our universe, it is necessary to

postulate theories from which other insightful minds can then develop proofs or

mathematical explanations. Is it not such ‘pie in the sky’ ideas, which strain the

boundary of our understanding, and might eventually provide the foundation upon

which our comprehension of the universe and science might actually be built on?

2. ON THE BLOCK UNIVERSE AND THE MANY WORLDS INTERPRETATION

The Block Universe Theory provides comfort to deterministic philosophers; it justifies

the causality of temporal travel and exemplifies Ockham’s razor — or does it? Now

Deutch, David. The Fabric of Reality. London: Penguine Books, 1998. 67



that we have removed cumbersome math from our toolbox and we simply use 8

deductive reasoning, we discover that whilst the Block Universe Theory appears (at

first) to be the simplest answer — perhaps its simplicity comes not from its being

correct, but from the constraints it imposes. A Heinlein quote “you can’t change the

past, because you didn’t,” demonstrates how the Block Universe (BU) is restrictive 9

and inflexible. If, for instance, one permits only forward and backward spatial

movements, then describing movement in terms of direction becomes easy; by

constraining the possibilities, any model becomes more simple. Because there are

numerous interpretations of quantum mechanics, several other models have been

suggested to describe it — one of which I intend to discuss here at some length: The

Many Worlds Interpretation (MWI).

Hugh Everett created the concept of The Original Relative State Theory in

1957 (Everett) under modification from Bryce DeWitt the theory later became the 10

Many Worlds Interpretation. Without explicating the concept profoundly, Everett 11

postulates that quantum decoherence provides an explanation for the subjective

I do not profess to describe the math of quantum mechanics or relativity theory as cumbersome (from 8

what little I know I can agree that such math is widely regarded as elegant), more that I describe the use of math as cumbersome. I am attempting to suggest that we rid ourselves of any tools, which may hinder the progression of our understanding the way the universe might be, or by otherwise restricting the investigation to what is currently mathematically feasible. I paraphrase a quote that ‘physicists can mathematically prove that an elephant can hang of the edge of a cliff with its tail wrapped round a daisy –- that does not mean such a thing can actually happen’?

Brown, Bryson. "Defending Backwards Causation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1992): 429-444.9

Everett, Hugh. "Reviews of Modern Physics." 1 april 1957. APS Journals. 1 April 2010 <http://10

rmp.aps.org/abstract/AMP/v29/i3/p454_1>.

C.M.DeWitt and J.A.Wheeler, eds. 1967: Lectures in Mathematics and quantum Mechanics. New York: 11

W.A.Benjamin, inc, 1968.


experience of waveform collapse. The Interpretation suggests that every quantum 12

event stimulates many possible outcomes. For each of these possible outcomes a valid

quantum reality exists into which the world line to migrates. If I were in a world-line

with Schrodinger’s cat, the random quantum event which might lead to the poison

being released produces two possible outcomes or realities: one reality where the cat

lives because the poison is not released and one where the cat dies because the poison is

released.

Under the Everettian model the my position as observer perceives the cat is

either in one state or another. My world line at this point also splits withal; providing 13

one quantum reality in which the cat dies and one world-line in which it does not. Both

of these world-lines are complete, containing everything the previous world-line did,

but only one is ‘live’ or ‘energised’ and will become the world-line that I experience in

this reality. The MWI posits that each possible quantum reality remains valid — 14

regardless of which reality became the reality of a specific agent. Indeed, every possible

outcome from every past quantum reality has also occurred in past world-lines and is

extant in other quantum realities. The MWI alleviates inconsistencies and, therefore,

The unique experience that a particle may appear to behave like a wave but on closer examination the 12

wavefunction collapses, and the particle behaves and looks more like a particle again. Both Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle and in the principle of non-locality amongst others describe such a collapse well – this is often considered one of the fundamental elements of the Copenhagen Interpretation.

As opposed the Copenhagen interpretation, which considers the cat to be both, until observation collapses 13

the wavefunction probability into either one state or the other.

The other reality, say with the dead cat, still continues to develop temporally, just as the world line with 14

the living cat develops in temporally. However, the observer is only aware of one world line — the world line they inhabit, the other world line develops in a separate quantum reality viewed as live by an observer in that quantum reality, existing in a state of quantum superposition with respect to all other realities.



better explains the perception of non-deterministic quantum events (whilst also

successfully merging a deterministic physical ‘universe’ with our belief that the when

the universe is viewed by an observer, it seems, in many ways, to be indeterministic).

Several MWI interpretations exist, but

… the equations of physics that model the time evolution of systems without embedded observers are sufficient for modelling systems which do not contain observers; in particular there is no observation-triggered wavefunction collapse which the Copenhagen Interpretation proposes. 15

remains a key concept in all of them. The MWI has many advantages including the

resolution of many correlation paradoxes that have plagued the Copenhagen

Interpretation — such as the EPR paradox or the Schrodinger’s cat thought

experiment.

A common retort to MWI is that it does not satisfy Ockham’s razor: namely that

“entities are not to be multiplied beyond necessity.” It is a fair reply, though, to argue 16

that when judging physical theories, “one should not multiply physical laws beyond

necessity either.” Further discussion of this doctrine continues later in this paper. 17

Weinberg, Steven. Dreams of a Final Theory. London: Hutchinson Radius, 1993. 68-6915

Vaidman, Lev. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 1 1 2002. 20 March 2010 <http://16

platao.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/£6.4>.

Ibid.17


3. AN EXPERIMENT UNDER THE BLOCK UNIVERSE

Let us pose a thought experiment: We now know (through his own admission) that

there was no lone-shooter of JFK in 1963 because, in fact, there was a second shooter

— namely, Dr. Paul Viminitz. Viminitz assures us that the fact that he was only

thirteen at the time, was nothing more than ‘the perfect cover’. Now let us consider

that, as an astute Temporal Engineer, I have developed a fully functional time 18

machine. The machine is stationary, but with the use of a badge worn on the chest, it is

possible to issue instructions into the machine which will dutifully ‘transport me’ into

any given place, at any given time — past, present or future. We shall call time

contemporaneous with the current me: ‘now’ -– that time which is simultaneous with

unfolding events of the world around me; or, in other words, ‘my present time’. The

machine is not capable of transporting me to any area of danger, nor to within any

structures or topography non-conducive to Human survival — it is, in fact, infallible. 19

There is some evidence, that the shots fired from the Grassy Knoll were the 20

ones responsible for the death of JFK, therefore, simply halting Dr. Viminitz from

taking his shots would result in JFK surviving the assassination attempt. With this in

mind, I have decided to return to Friday 22 November 1963 to attempt to interfere

We can define a temporal engineer as someone who has the understanding and skill to create a time 18

machine, and a temporal traveler or temporal agent, to be one who travels in time.

Of course, mostly because I designed and constructed it. 19

Garrison, Jim. On the Trail of Assasins: My investigation and prosecution of the Murder of President 20

Kenedy by Jim Garrison. New York: Sheridan Square Press, 1988.



with the fatal shots from the Grassy Knoll. One might consider that the ways in which

you might distract a sharpshooter in the course of his duty are many fold — and one

might be right. As such a succession of shots requires intense concentration, it is quite

feasible that you could creep up behind the offender and take a variety of measures to

prevent the shot from occurring — not the least of which, could be…. well, to blow

gently into his ear.

So let this be the case: I instruct the computer to transport me back to 12.29pm

Friday 22 November 1963, where I duly materialise on the grassy knoll. This part of my

journey seems perfectly straightforward, nor does the BU theorem contend this at any

point: when considering the action from a BU point of view, I merely stand where I was

some 46 years ago contemplating my next move. I am allowed to be there, simply 21

because back in my present time, I had already been there. However, my next move is to

approach Viminitz and blow in his ear. While this seems easy enough, the BU does not

permit such interference with the causality of time. Proponents of the BU might argue

one of two things: 22

I. That blowing in the Snipers ear is actually the cause of the shot hitting the target; and causality is therefore maintained.

There is no issue with being somewhere when I was not even born. However, there is a memory paradox 21

that occurs should I visit myself in a past temporal location. I address this issue later in the paper.

Moreover, if they want to well and truly beat home the point — both.22


II. That some devious Deux ex Machina would prevent me from actually 23

blowing in the Sharpshooters ear. Thereby failing in my attempt to alter events and again, causality is maintained.

To me, both of these two events are a little too ‘convenient’. Further more, there

are other issues with these objections. Let us suggest that I now travel back in time to

yesterday when a friend visited me. Outcome I. suggests that an event committed in

the past somehow causes events in the future to happen. But this cannot be the case

because if traveling back in time to visit myself, I became responsible for creating the

future which I traveled from, then why do I have no recollection of meeting myself

yesterday? If we argue that outcome I. of the BU argument is correct, then in order to

maintain causality I must have some memory of an event, which in my past had

actually happened. This circular causal agreement refutes Outcome I.

A slight augmentation of this paradox can compound failing of causality under

the BU: Suppose a friend and I are discussing a temporal travel experiment. On the

coffee table, there are two batteries. We both observe the batteries and write on a piece

of paper the number of batteries that we see. The piece of paper reads: ‘There are two

batteries on the table’ with a date and time (for argument let us agree to 01:00, 1st

January 2010). I then travel back in time with my piece of paper to 12:30, 1st January

2010 and after greeting both myself and my guest, I remove one of the batteries

Presumably one of the Banana throwing variety.23



instructing myself and my friend to protect the table from interference in any way. 24

According to Outcome I., when I return to my present time from the past, there is only

one battery on the table (the other is in my hand); this is because the removal of the

battery from the past alters the future. What can be said about our paper notes though:

my paper still says there are two batteries on the table but my friend’s paper only

details one (as the block universe has presumably 'edited' the paper to maintain

causality), but it should detail two batteries. This paradox suggests an inconsistency 25

is present in my memory as well: Because of my dalliance in time, I have the distinct

memory that there were two batteries on the table, not one. The consequence of this

paradox under the BU model is that my memory of events does not match the reality of

events.

4. AGENT IMPOTENCE

One of the perennial arguments against the MWI posits that ‘the probability of

possible, available, quantum realities would approach a non-denumerable infinity for

each potential split of quantum reality.’ This may be true; but it seems to me that it

only equals the number of corrections needed for ‘time’ to somehow protect the

causality of my present time should a temporal event in the past of a BU occur. The BU

One has to assume for the purposes of the thought experiment, that my friend and I dutifully follow my 24

request in my absence – and that the BU has no way of replicating the missing battery in order to maintain causality.

And, in fact, did!25


seems to contain some sort of anthropomorphised ‘time’, which is in some

unexplained way, aware of the agent’s intentions before they have been acted upon.

Under the BU, time also seems fully able to predict when and how an agent’s actions

may alter future timelines. Upon becoming cognisant of the intended breach of

causality, ‘time’ then somehow ‘protects’ causality by invoking mechanisms that 26

prevent the agent from acting. This notion seems to engender time with cognitive

abilities and a perpetual mission to defend and maintain the causality of the future. For

the BU, then, the temporal engineer is able to return to the past — but must exist in a

type of phase invariance that prevents her from interacting with reality and preserves 27

the events of the future. “Bananas enough” — indeed! 28

If we consider that I am actually a stranger in the past and that my presence 29

there constitutes no causal link to the present that I have traveled from, then merely

More specifically – Bananas.26

This may be a complicated concept to explain. If we can agree that an agent is able to exist in a temporal 27

period, which is not their own, but is not able to interact with any matter within that temporal period — how does that agent be there, yet not be there. I coin the term ‘phase invariance’ to suggest that they occupy a temporal and physical location with everything else but are unable to interact –- that they are somehow ‘out of sync’ with that reality. Consider that our temporal agent to be an image in a mirror. Such an image is able to look and appear real to an observer looking into the mirror, but the image is unable to interact with the real world, as it is just a copy of the real world and contains no substance. Therefore, the temporal agent appears to be in the temporal and spatial location, but must have no way of interacting with that reality.

Smith, Nicolas J.J. “Bananas enough for time travel.” The British Journal of Philosophy and Science 28

(1997): 363-389.

Maybe ‘un-belonger’ would be a better term. The temporal traveler really ‘belongs’ nowhere when she is 29

away from her own present time. An un-belonger is really in a period of Temporal Flux; they are out of ‘their present time’ and really do not belong, that is, are not indigenous to, any time frame other than those simultaneous to the one which they left – even if they have traveled back to a time which they might have previously endured. We could consider their temporal travel to be a state of constant momentum in the fourth dimension; like Zeno’s arrow. Such travellers have departed ‘their present time’ and irrespective of seeming to be at rest in another time (future or past), they are in no place (or more specifically; no time) that shares a simultaneity with their present time. I call this state Temporal Flux. If they return to a ‘now’ in the MWI simultaneous with their present time, but in another quantum reality, then they cease to be in flux; having restored the simultaneity, regardless of the fact that their world line might appear very different from the one they departed.



being there must leave a butterfly effect. My feet, which depress the grass where I

stand, alter and deform the ground and by extension the atoms which make up that

grass and indeed, everything else around it. Such minor changes in that reality —

through the 'butterfly effect' or even just a random chain of events -– might even result

in differing human inter-reactions. So many corrections are required to maintain

perfect causality that they may probably be too numerous to quantify — one might say

non-denumerably infinite?! Causality is maintained, but at what cost?

But wait, my BU spider senses are tingling; they are picking up a counter

argument: There is nothing out of place, because I had been there, in the past of my

present time — oh, how very convenient! 30

5. ON FREE WILL AND DETERMINISM

In order to accept the temporal travel principle, we have to question the validity of our

free will in both the BU and the MWI. Are we able to have free will in the past or are 31

our actions pre-determined at any point in time — especially at a previous temporal

point. The block universe seems to become more complicated with every turn. I can

present an inconsistent triad, as paraphrased by Bryson Brown in his paper on

“Defending Backwards Causation,” which might shed some light:

I. The Laws of Physics are deterministic.

We have previously discussed how this repudiation cannot work.30

This is a very involved discussion, and I shall only treat it briefly here.31


II. We sometimes have the capacity to do other than what we actually do. III.We have no capacities whose exercise in the actual circumstances would

violate some law of physics. 32

By comparison with another triad, Brown reveals that a libertarian argues for II. and

III., concluding that I. is false. Libertarians, according to Brown, believe that

deterministic physics are consonant and rational, but argue that deterministic physics

are also incompatible with the free will that we presume we possess. 33

Though Brown’s comparison makes a reasonable point, in terms of temporal

travel, a stronger claim may now be expressed: Because classical physics are

deterministic but quantum mechanics may not be — libertarians would be still right to

reject premise III., but do so now for different reasons. The libertarian can now suggest

that because quantum mechanics is not strictly ‘physics’, but more a sub-set of it, 34 35

libertarians are now able to make a more definite claim: That our capacities are no

longer as strongly restricted under the laws of quantum mechanics as they were under

classical physics. As a result, when in a state of temporal flux, a traveler is permitted

any capacity they would have when not in a state of temporal flux. An inconsistent

triad of my own creation demonstrates this claim:

Brown, Bryson. "Defending Backwards Causation." Canadian Journal of Philosophy (1992): 429-444.32

Ibid.33

Which supports multiple quantum realities and facilitates the capacity for action whilst providing a 34

continuum where free will and causality can work independent of determinism.

In the same way that the leaves of a pineapple are not a pineapple, but are, nevertheless part of a 35

pineapple.



I. MWI permits an agent to have full capacities, as it complies with the preservation of deterministic causality by developing causality world-lines in separate quantum realities, whilst complying with the laws of quantum mechanics and deterministic Physics.

II. Temporal travellers maintain the capacities they normally have when not caught in temporal flux.

III. A temporal traveller is impotent to affect events in their future world line, by altering events in a past world line.

Investigating this triad highlights the flexibility of the MWI when it comes to matters

of free will and determinism. The determinist is now also able to reject premise III., as

both causality and capacities are maintained. A narrowing of the metaphysical gulf

between libertarian and determinist might suggest that the MWI is a more

encompassing interpretation of reality; contrarily, both the libertarian and the

determinist in a BU are unable to accept the possibility of altering the future from

anytime in the past . 36

In the BU model we uncovered:

I. Free will paradoxes, II. That the only way to circumnavigate logical inconsistencies was to deny

temporal mechanics entirely, III.That it is necessary to mute agent’s capacities in that time frame, IV. That an agent’s present time was actually caused by the agent’s actions in the

past.

Comparatively, the MWI suggests that there remains deterministic physics but that an

agent’s capacities would remain unchecked at all times; determining only that a variety

of possible new world lines exists as a consequence. We can now clearly see that

Though each for different reasons.36


Ockham’s razor no longer applies to the Block Universe Model. The simplest

interpretation now becomes that of the MWI. Regardless of the non-denumerably

infinite quantum realities, the MWI removes the issues of incompatibility, logical

inconsistency, free will paradoxes, forced deterministic causality, agent impotence and

reductio ad absurdum arguments — all of which obfuscate the BU.

6. QUESTIONING THE COPENHAGEN INTERPRETATION.

The Copenhagen Interpretation is one of three mainstream interpretations of Quantum

Mechanics. The interpretations do not lend themselves to describe reality in the MWI

due to their inherent principles, although the principles within the Copenhagen

Interpretation do seem to agree with the structure and nature of the BU. The 37

suggestion of many thought experiments to illuminate the inconsistencies within the

theorem demonstrate how and where the Interpretation breaks down. Schrodinger’s

cat, which is probably the most famous, survives investigation under both MWI and

other Decoherence Interpretations of quantum mechanics, but it does suggest a major

flaw with Bohr’s model. This mainline interpretation also stumbles with other thought

experiments including the EPR paradox, Wigner’s Friend, and others.

I have been recently made aware that the Copenhagen Interpretation has little — if nothing — to say 37

about the BU. It may indeed be the case that the Copenhagen Interpretation does not describe the concept of a BU, however, the BU does require its structure to explain many of its existence conditions.



Bohr’s Copenhagen Interpretation has its flaws. However, it also describes 38

quantum effects well, and has thus become the most popular interpretation amongst

physicists. Because of a recent surge in popularity of String Theory over the past 10 39

years, significant pioneer physicists such as Deutch, Reisler and Pugh have decided to

devote their careers to advancing the MWI. As the collaboration between M-Theory

and MWI posits an almost consummate explanation of the Universe, it may only be a

matter of time before experiments are able to support MWI claims. Planck is often 40

quoted as saying “The Old Theories only die out when the old Professors die out.” I 41

wonder how true this is? It is common knowledge that the Catholic persecution of the

scientific academics opposed to Catholic dogma may have been partially responsible for

holding back some aspects of science for 1500 years. Who is to say that repressive

dogma from the BU proponents will not do the same for our understanding of the

Universe.

Though Bohr is often credited with being the major developer of The Copenhagen Interpretation, this is 38

not the case. The name just honors Bohr by adopting the name of his hometown. The Interpretation is actually a conglomerate of the works of several great physicists - amongst them Bohr, Born and Heisenberg. Curiously though, Peres has commented "There seems to be at least as many different Copenhagen interpretations as people who use that term, probably there are more. For example, in two classic articles on the foundations of quantum mechanics, Ballentine (1970) and Stapp (1972) give diametrically opposite definitions of 'Copenhagen.'” A Peres, “Poppers Experiment and The Copenhagen Interpretation,” Stud.History philos. Modern Physics (2002): 6.

More specifically, the unification of the six (Greene) String Theory models under M-theory (Greene).39

Pun intended.40

Harris, Randy Allen. "A Note On Th Max Planck Effect." Rhetoric Society Quarterly 28.4 (1998): 85-89.41


7. QUANTUM POSSIBILITIES.

Quantum Mechanics posits that for any (and every) event there exists an infinite

number of possible outcomes. Brian Greene remarks, “Quantum Mechanics states that

for one event, there may exist 1000 different possibilities, one which is determined, but

as we cannot be certain which; all are therefore valid and all will happen.” This 42

observation remains absent from the Copenhagen Interpretation, whereas String

Theory, its big brother M-Theory, and the Many Worlds Interpretation seem to provide

an adequate explanation. Hugh Everett’s thesis statement: “Quantum Mechanics is

reformulated in a way which eliminates its present dependence on the special

treatment of observation of a system by an external observer,” suggests to me that 43

such an interpretation would both comply with causality while still permitting an agent

to affect the future via temporal interference and observe the fundamental laws of

Quantum Mechanics. In short, allowing us to alter the future by meddling in the past.

8. AN EXPERIMENT UNDER THE MANY WORLDS INTERPRETATION

If we now repeat my temporal dalliance, returning to 12.29pm on 22 November 1963,

we discover that I am now freely able to interact with this reality. Each successive move

I make no longer intrinsically connects to ‘my present time’ –- though my actions

continue to affect a future world-line (one of which is simultaneous with ‘my present

Greene, Brian. The Elegant Universe. New York: W.W.Norton & co, 2003.42

Everett, Hugh. 2010 43



time’ in the world-line which I have traveled from). If we consider my world-line in ‘my

present time’ to be a corridor in a University, it becomes easy to visualise how if I walk

along a corridor and take an elevator that leads to a separate floor, none of the corridors

on the other floor will connect directly with the original corridor. It is only by taking the

elevator back to my original floor, that I am once again able to access the corridor from

which I started.

Now imagine that there are a Googolplex of floors in the University and the 44

elevator is only ever able to go upwards (forwards in time). I will never be able to

access the corridor that I left in the first place, though the people who are on that floor

continue to share the same passing of time that I do on a different floor. In the same

way we can imagine that the separate world-lines which are opened with each quantum

event are like taking an elevator in reality -– once a different floor has been reached

there remains no direct access to the world-line which has continued to exist in my

absence. With each move that I make in this reality, events altering at the quantum

level instigate the creation of a quantum reality for each quantum superposition, each 45

one viable and existent on a quantum level.

Or for the die hard Pratchett Discworld fans; on oodleplex. Anyone who has no experience of his work 44

must put down this paper immediately and go and read one, if not 31, of his books…….

This is a complicated claim made in quantum mechanics that concerns the state of matter and forces in 45

the quantum realm. It posits that whilst we do not know the state of any particular object, it actually exists in all possible states simultaneously – so long as we do not attempt to observe it. This is basically one of the laws, which the Copenhagen Interpretation attempts to express and is related to the Schrodinger’s cat experiment. The MWI manipulates the superposition and addresses it with the decoherence element of the interpretation. I have been reminded that the emphasis of this interpretation must go on the possible ways that the system could evolve and until a measurement is made as the wavefunction collapses - only then can an ontological commitment to one of the possibilities be made. I am thankful to Dr. Peacock for this addendum.


If I now choose to creep up behind Paul Viminitz and blow in his ear, we find

that we have many possible outcomes, at least three of which might be:

1. Viminitz is an awful shot and pulls off a complicated and almost impossible shot because of being momentarily distracted — Killing JFK. A quantum reality, of the quantum superposition seamlessly accepts this new reality, leaving all other possible quantum realities nonexistent from the point of view of the observer in this reality.

2. Viminitz is an excellent shot, but due to being momentarily distracted fails to make that shot. A quantum reality, of the quantum superposition seamlessly accepts this new reality, leaving all other possible quantum realities nonexistent from the point of view of the observer in this reality. JFK survives the assassination attempt and the world-line of this reality is forever altered; all the possible futures for this reality are ‘energised,’ and in my present 46

time (though not the same world-line) the world is now a very different 47

There are many who consider that too many footnotes express a lack of clarity of thought. There are 46

others who consider that a large number of footnotes define an acute mind – one that wishes to be clear on each and every point. Whatever the opinion, too many footnotes distract from the body of the txt and can disorient the reader. When one tackles a paper of this sort, it is difficult not to use footnotes to define terms that are the playground of the author and it is in this respect I hope that I clarify many of the ambiguous semantics abundant within this paper. I am aware of no other word that will accurately describe the phenomenon described in the body of the text. As the present in 1963 is altered (with respect to our version of events in 2010), there falls a cascade of realities from that distinct point in time. The new realities are instantly specified at the precise moment of change and the world-line events determine the outcomes of each quantum state. Because the isolation of which particular quantum reality the world-line migrates into, is unclear and depends upon events in that reality, I can only think to suggest that each quantum reality that is available for the world-line to migrate into is somehow ‘live’ from the point of view of the observer in that reality. The etymology of ‘energise’ seems to accurately define this new ‘live’ nature of that particular reality. In our case, in a time simultaneous with 1963 there exists many realties, which result from the change in events on the knoll. However, in a temporal period simultaneous with 2010, a great many realities have been energised for the changed world-line to migrate into and the present reality simultaneous with 2010 is a very different place from that 2010 which I left.

It might be necessary to point out here that the word ‘world’ does not simply refer to the earth, but a 47

more general interpretation. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy considers an acceptable definition to the word ‘world’ to be: “A world is the totality of (macroscopic) objects: stars, cities, people, grains of sand, etc. in a definite classically described state.” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#6.4) But it also comments that when regarding the MWI, we should consider the definition to be unsuitable and should consider something like: “The connection between macroscopic objects defined according to our experience, and microscopic objects defined in a physical theory that aims to explain our experience, is more subtle.” and that “The definition of a world in the MWI involves only concepts related to our experience. A layman believes that our present world has a unique past and future. According to the MWI, a world defined at some moment of time corresponds to a unique world at a time in the past, but to a multitude of worlds at a time in the future.” (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/qm-manyworlds/#6.4) For a more descriptive explanation, the whole of section 2.1 provides an excellent description.



place based upon the succession of quantum realities that have followed like a domino rally. 48

3. Before I am able to blow in Viminitz’s ear, a Deux ex Machina banana appears from nowhere and lands on top of the rifle cartridge chamber. A cascade quantum reaction from the banana causes the cartridge, upon which gravity is tugging, to instantly quantum tunnel through the chamber and fall on the floor just before Viminitz pulls the trigger. A quantum reality, prepared for the quantum superposition seamlessly accepts this new reality, leaving all other possible quantum realities empty from the point of view of the observer in this reality. (After all, this is also a viable quantum probability state — and therefore, a viable alternative whose world line must exist.)

The MWI of this temporal excursion has some ramifications in my present time: we

know already that as soon as I began to alter events in the past my present time was

lost forever. The quantum reality that existed in my present time, that once defined my

world-line, still exists but is no longer accessible to me. This closed world-line does 49

not mean that the other quantum realities do not exist; it just means that access to

such a world line is theoretically possible, but would be very complicated to achieve.

Hypothetically, such a device would need to be able to form a rift in quantum reality,

select between different world-lines and be capable of locating a stable temporal

simultaneity to transport to — a challenging task for even such an accomplished

temporal engineer as myself!

Interestingly though, according to the MWI and several other interpretations of quantum mechanics, 48

outcome II. also occurs, but is not real from the point of view of the observer in the reality of outcome II..

Interestingly the Star Trek TNG episode ‘Parallels’ details a quantum singularity, where a member of the 49

Enterprise crew unknowingly passes through into another quantum reality. The episode concludes with that area of space steadily filling up with the Enterprise’s from all other quantum realities. Through some nifty warp field work, they are able to seal the rift and return the respective Enterprise’s to their own Quantum realities. The interesting part was the use of past story lines to predict different outcomes of particular events to produce different realties for each of the different Enterprise’s from each of the different quantum realities. Much like our new world with JFK remaining president - my present now, intrinsically alters due to the opening of all the possible world lines, from which this particular world derives.


We discover that as time has continued since 1963, a great number of possible

outcomes have come and gone. ‘My present time’ (by that I mean the temporal location

that I have traveled from) is still simultaneous with the world line I left. However each

‘present moment’ (the present in 1963 that I experience) that follows from each

different split of the quantum reality determines a sequential sequence that defines a

very different ‘my present time’ should I return to a simultaneity with April 2010. We

can arbitrarily adopt a temporal location in 2010 regardless of differing realities (i.e. in

my original world-line, the time I left could be, lets say, noon March 23rd 2010).

Though events have changed in my new world-line where my proper time (an

individual time from the perspective as me as an observer –- imagine my wearing a

watch that tells the time relative to where I came from ) has been warped by the 50

duration in proper time of my temporal dalliance, I could nevertheless return to a time

simultaneous with noon March 23rd 2010.

9. CONCLUSION

When we consider the limitations of the BU against the simplicity of the MWI, it is

clear that from one simple thought experiment, we are able to discern how temporal

travel is permitted under the BU, but the agent remains impotent (being constrained to

do only the things which he has already done). An agent in the MWI maintains full

More accurately, when I came from!50



capacities whilst still complying with causality and satisfying a deterministic universe.

A new paradox or thought inconsistency develops for each and every turn in a

BU, creating issues of causality and a cognitive ‘time’, reducing the BU from the most

simple paradigm to the most convoluted. The MWI simplifies all of the inconsistencies,

quantum paradoxes, causality issues and addresses all of the Copenhagen

interpretation glitches, whilst combing it neatly with an interpretation of M-theory 51

that together supply a consummate explanation of the universe.

It is reasonable that Ockham’s razor should apply to both the BU and the MWI,

but after investigation we discover that it is more applicable to the MWI than it is to

the BU. One has only to watch “Back to the Future” to see how much less complicated

a MWI of time travel is compared to Heinlein’s All you Zombies. Both are works of

fiction, but one is less complicated than the other is. An opponent’s argument may

posit that “Back to the Future” is somewhat less consistent than All You Zombies and

that is true — unless we consider the universe from an MWI perspective. Reiterating

my point, once a MWI interpretation is accepted, it is a significantly less cumbersome

model and actively reduces the complexities inherent within temporal travel thought

experiments.

Both Greene’s Elegant Universe and Deutch’s The Fabric of Reality both do a reasonable job of 51

interpreting the ideologies of the theory without touching too much on Everett’s and Dewitt’s math. I have been playfully jibed that a full explication of the unification of M-Theory and MWI could best be provided with the complex math that describes them both – I am sure that is correct, and though it will describe them delightfully, I doubt that it would better explain them.


The primary boundary to accepting the clarity of the MWI or similar models is

letting go of the BU model and looking ‘outside the box’. If one considers both of these

works from a BU perspective, it remains clear that Zemeckis’s work is plagued with

inconsistencies. However, if you address Heinlein’s book from the point of view of the

MWI it is still an acceptable story. From this further demonstration, we are able to see

that both examples work under the MWI but only one works under the BU. This might

suggest the inflexibility, and ultimately the unsuitability, of the BU to any ‘best fit’

model of the universe.

We examined, through a thought experiment, how the MWI provides a more

continuous and free flowing interpretation of time travel and addresses how it also

preserves the laws of Physics. It is possible to consider that revolutionary ideas are

often not embraced, especially in science, due in part to the resistance from well-

respected pioneers of their fields. It is notable that Einstein refuted some of Newton’s

work, and that he himself never really embraced quantum mechanics, yet now we

consider quantum mechanics to be the very heart of Physics.

The world is full of experts, who are mostly only experts until they die, or some

other new fangled discovery reduces their work from intrinsic to irrelevant. In such a

time we find ourselves today, where our ability to experimentally prove or deny a

postulation relies upon the development of new technologies. Instead of considering

interpretations which do not follow accepted paradigms, we prefer to regard them as



preposterous — simply because we do not have the foresight or the ability to

comprehend the consequences of the theories. I suggest that one reason that MWI and

M-theory are so often penalised (above the fact that there are no available methods of

experimentation ) is not because of the inherent lack of logic or clarity of thought, not 52

even that the math that supports the theory is redundant or incorrect; but more that

the arrogance of Humanity prefers to reject what is beyond current technology’s 53

ability to prove (or disprove).

At the beginning of the paper, I discussed the removal of testing and experimentation from the thought 52

processes that may provide a better explanation of the Universe. There are a great many reasons which physicist use to reject MWI, M-Theory and other similar ideologies; many of them do address the ‘improvability’ of the theories or the insecurities about the math that goes with them. Nevertheless, I am not yet convinced that a significant portion of their reluctance actually stems from Bells’s “ . . . It pains me to say” scenario which describes physicist’s abhorrence of issues that break boundaries of accepted science. There are often many ways to reject something one is unsure about and in the world of science where more and more evidence is required to confirm theories, this is becoming easier and easier to do. Dr Naylor mentioned in a lecture in the spring semester of 2010, that with regard to space missions a grading of 1 to 10 was given to various ‘achievability’ of designs and that the biggest single set back was the lack of technology available to produce the designs. That said every year there are new advances which enable previously shelved projects to rise like a phoenix from the ashes of purgatory. Likewise, I fully believe that humanity will eventually discover the science needed to enable scientist’s to prove or disprove wild theories such as M-Theory and the MWI.

It is ironic to remark with best intentions and describe ‘Humanity’ as a good thing. It seems evident to 53

note that the only species with such an awful blasé attitude toward the planet and all other species that inhabit it - are the Humans.


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—- Time Enough for Love: The Lives of Lazarus Long. New York: Berkley Books, 1973.

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Smith, Nicolas J.J. “Bananas enough for time travel.” The British Journal of Philosophy and Science (1997): 363-389.

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Blowing in the Ear of Paul Viminitz

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