Conceptualising Boko Haram :is it a

Religious or Terrorist Organisation?

NAME: ABRAHAM OGUNPOLU

STUDENT NUMBER: 1051679

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Table of ContentsAbstract.....................................................3Chapter 1: Introduction......................................4Overview of the issues to be discussed.....................4Aims and Objectives........................................6Epistemology and Research Methodology......................8Significance of the Study.................................10Outline of the Study......................................11

Chapter 2: Theoretical Overview.............................14Introduction..............................................14Back to basics: Islamic fundamentalism....................14Wahhabism and Salafi Islam................................16Theories of terrorism: the terrorism of Boko Haram re-examined..................................................17The Instrumental Approach................................19The Organizational Approach..............................20

Boko Haram: the political and social dimensions of terrorism..........................................................21Ethnic and religious hostilities.........................22The failure of secularism................................22The legacy of colonialism................................23

Summary...................................................23Chapter 3: The History and Development of Boko Haram........25Introduction..............................................25Origins of Boko Haram.....................................25Internal factors – state-building and democracy in Nigeria 26Influences and links to Al-Qaeda..........................27Organisation and leadership...............................29Sources of finance........................................30

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Resort to violence and terrorist activities...............31Summary...................................................39

Chapter 4: Conclusion.......................................40Findings..................................................40Gaps and limitations......................................41Recommendations...........................................42Topics for further research...............................43

Bibliography................................................44

Abstract

In looking to conceptualise whether Boko Haram is either a

religious or terrorist organisation, this dissertation

presents a critical analysis of the development of the

organisation that is currently operating out of north-east

Nigeria. With this in mind, this study aims to critically

explore the history of Boko Haram and its development, its

structure, influences and leadership, in order to investigate

whether the organisation is religious or terrorist in nature.

In addition, the ideological fundament of the organisation was

evaluated, as well as the scope and remit of its criminal

activities. As a result, it was found that Boko Haram is an

organisation which was established as a religious sect, but

under specific social, political, and economic factors, was

transformed into a fundamentalist terrorist organisation with

clearly set political goals.

Such a view is illustrated by the discussion completed during

this study regarding the development of Boko Haram’s

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activities, their powerful social message, and their growing

role in Nigerian politics. In addition, Boko Haram has been

found to have grown significantly in strength posing a major

threat to the stability not only in Nigeria, but in

neighbouring countries. However, Boko Haram has also grown its

political and social ties internationally so it is now

impossible to recognise the organisation’s paramilitary side

separately from its political side which is seeking to

establish a separate Islamic state. Therefore, the analysis

undertaken during this dissertation shows how Boko Haram has

become a powerful terrorist AND political organisation instead

of being focussed upon anything religious.

Chapter 1: Introduction

Overview of the issues to be discussed

That there is a need to determine as to whether or not Boko

Haram is either a religious or terrorist organisation is

marked by the fact that, in modern society, there has been a

renewed focus on the role that terrorist groups (or groups4

indirectly linked to terrorism) play in the development of

global society ever since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 upon

the US (Sloan and Anderson, 2009). With this in mind, in view

of the focus of this dissertation, one of the most important

organisations to be considered in this regard is that of Boko

Haram (Sloan and Anderson, 2009). The reason why the

operations of Boko Haram are considered to be so significant

is due to the history of its development and the controversy

associated with its activities so the way in which the group

has come to be perceived for many years has effectively served

to split opinion on an international scale (Harik, 2005). This

is because, along with being a political party, Boko Haram

also has its own paramilitary wing and has been classified as

a terrorist organisation by a number of countries governments

and international bodies along with a resistance group that

supports the recognition of the rights of both Arab and Muslim

citizens (Van Engeland and Rudolph, 2013).

Boko Haram actually first originated as an organisation in

north-west Nigeria in 2002 after its establishment by Mohammed

Yusuf as a Sunni Islamic sect which actively advocated the

strict application of a Sharia law (Johnson, 2011). Such a

view is supported by the fact that, for example, the

organisation has actually been known to kill anyone who

actively undertakes ‘un-Islamic’ practices including the

consumption of alcohol (United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees, 2013). Nevertheless, despite the strict application

of this legal creed, for the first seven years of its

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existence Boko Haram looked to carry out its operations more

or less peacefully whilst also withdrawing away from the rest

of society (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). Therefore, it was not

until 2009 that Boko Haram officially became a Salafist-jihadi

group (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). This is because it was at

this time that the organisation was totally apolitical whilst

also still believing that the use of violence and terrorism

could be justified for the purpose of realising their specific

objectives (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). At the same time,

however, this development for Boko Haram was heavily

influenced by the Wahhabi movement which is an Islamic reform

movement that sought to restore ‘pure monotheistic worship’

(Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

Nevertheless, as was the case at the time of its inception,

Boko Haram still looked to establish a Nigerian Islamic state

along with opposing the country’s westernisation that had seen

Nigeria’s wealth largely rest with the country’s minority in

the form of its political elite (Bartolotta, 2011). This

opposition to western ideals on the part of Boko Haram then

escalated to such an extent that the group has even openly

declared its aim to attack prominent Western targets with a

view to asserting its own ideology (Windrem, 2014). Therefore,

it is arguably little wonder the organisation has continued to

divide international opinion since it has been constantly

linked to terrorist action not only in Nigeria but also in

other parts of Africa as well as other countries

internationally (Falk and Morgenstern, 2009).

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As a result, at the end of 2013 the United States of America’s

(US) State Department designated Boko Haram as a ‘terrorist

organisation’ (US Department of State, 2013a). That the

Department labelled the group thusly was not only due reasons

including the organisation’s apparent links with Al-Qaeda in

the Islamic Maghreb but also the “thousands of deaths in northeast and

central Nigeria over the last several years, including targeted killings of civilians”

the group had allegedly been involved with (US Department of

State, 2013a). The US State Department then went even further

in its condemnation of the Boko Haram’s activities in this

same report by stating the organisation is the most deadly

terrorist group in the world today aside from the Taliban of

Afghanistan (US Department of State, 2013a). In addition, in

May 2014 the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) declared

Boko Haram officially to be a terrorist group actively

affiliated to both Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic

Maghreb (United Nations News Online, 2014). This designation

then led to sanctions against Boko Haram internationally in

the form of asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes

among other actions at UNSC’s initiation (United Nations News

Online, 2014).

That both the US State Department and the UNSC should be able

to form such a view of Boko Haram is founded upon the fact

that, as of July 2014, in the whole world Nigeria was believed

to have had the highest number of terrorist killings in the

world in the last year with approximately 146 attacks leading

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to around 3,500 deaths (Nkala, 2014). That Boko Haram was able

to achieve such devastation in a single year was then further

marked by the fact the Borno State governor, Kashim Shettima,

expressed his view the organisation was actually “better armed and

. . . better motivated than [the country’s] own troops” so he believed it was

“absolutely impossible . . . to defeat Boko Haram” (Onuoh, 2014). Therefore,

there has clearly been some significant difficulty associating

or disassociating the organisation from terrorist activity

which has also brought about a significant amount of confusion

with regard to the exact ideology that underpins Boko Haram’s

activities – religion or terrorism.

Aims and Objectives

With a view to determining as to whether Boko Haram is a

religious or terrorist organisation it is necessary for this

dissertation to look to fulfil a number of interrelated aims

and objectives founded upon the need to explore the exact

remit of the organisation’s current activities. This is

because, as has already been recognised, there is a need for

this work to focus upon looking to critically analyse whether

the group can be viewed as religious or whether, in fact,

terrorism forms a fundamental part of its activity. Therefore,

this study looks to examine in detail the actions to have been

taken by Boko Haram in recent years by seeking to account for

the literature and research to have already been completed

that looks to deal with both its religious foundations and

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possible links to terrorism by looking to fulfil a number of

key aims.

First, there is a need for this study to assess the problems

that have been linked to the development of Boko Haram in

Nigeria as ‘cover’ for a terrorist fundamentalist organisation

in practice (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). With this in mind,

the main focus of this dissertation is upon achieving an

analysis of the group’s operation along with a critical

evaluation of its development since its inception. However, in

order to be able to lend theoretical and practical support to

the central aims of this dissertation, it is also important

for this study to consider Boko Haram’s development in the

context of the broader analysis of religious fundamentalism

and its ideological fundaments. For the purpose of achieving

this, there is a need to look to fulfil a number of specific

elements that have been taken to include:

Conducting critical observations on the theoretical

background of terrorism and religious (Islamic

fundamentalism), in relation to Boko Haram

Discussing the development of Boko Haram throughout its

history up to and including its most recent actions

Concluding upon the question of as to whether the group

can be considered a terrorist organisation or a religious

group with fundamentalist tendencies.

To achieve this, there is a need for this research to also

provide for the completion of a number of key objectives

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during the course of this study. This is because it is

believed that the fulfilment of such objectives can then serve

to help to ensure this dissertation’s analysis maintains its

focus upon the more narrow aims to have been identified in the

preceding paragraph (Denscombe, 2010). The reason for this is

that it is believed that it will then be possible to ensure a

successful return from the research study undertaken in the

form of a viable piece of material that is informative for

those coming to this area looking to further their knowledge

of Boko Haram and its status (Denscombe, 2010). At the same

time, however, this work also makes a number of suggestions

for those coming to this area in the future to undertake

research not only into the activities of Boko Haram but also

other groups who may be subject to debate with regard to if

they are religious or terrorist in nature. The dissertation

also presents a set of recommendations for curbing Boko Haram.

Nevertheless, it is also believed the completion of the

research required and its analysis for this dissertation will

further expand the knowledge of terrorist organisations

‘masked’ as religious groups more generally along with as to

how the presence of such groups within a given country’s

society could have a detrimental impact upon it (Van Engeland

and Rudolph, 2013). Therefore, it is also arguable that there

is the potential for the completion of this work to provide

recognition of as to how groups like Boko Haram can be more

effectively dealt with by national governments in countries

around the world (US Department of State, 2013). This is

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because this dissertation shows as to how the organisation

came to be the subject of such debate about whether it is

religious or terrorist (US Department of State, 2013).

On this basis, the research objectives that have been

identified for the purpose of fulfilling the aims set out in

this section of this chapter have been recognised as

consisting of looking to:

Provide a detailed assessment of the respective concepts

of ‘terrorism’ and ‘religion’ along with what these

respective terms involve in practice along and the

theoretical problems/issues that are associated with

their analysis

Conduct a thorough review of the existing empirical

literature in this area to ensure all information

provided is up-to-date and correct

Epistemology and Research Methodology

In order to be able to effectively undertake the analysis

required for completing this dissertation’s analysis, it is

considered necessary to utilise the approach to the research

methodology set out in this section of this chapter with a

view to achieving the necessary epistemology. This is because

epistemology is recognised as the fundamental branch of

philosophy with regard to any given subject matter such as

that which is considered in this study that is concerned with

knowledge’s nature and scope and is also referred to as the

‘theory of knowledge’s’ development (Marsh and Stoker, 2002).

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This is because, through the research methodology that is

utilised, there is a need to look to question what knowledge

is in relation to this area of research along with as to how

the knowledge that is required can be acquired in the

circumstances (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). With this in mind,

there is a clear need to provide for the collection of both

primary and secondary materials through the use of journal

article databases like Lexis Nexis Professional and Westlaw

via the Internet on computer for ease of reference and cross-

referencing in the most efficient way possible for the purpose

of then completing this dissertation (Silverman, 2011).

That such an approach is taken is because of the fact that it

believed that the use of research which provides for the

accrual of qualitative evidence will be particularly

beneficial for the completion of this paper (March and

Furlong, 2002). This is because it is thought that the

generation of qualitative evidence will mean that it is then

possible to produce a significantly more all-encompassing

study for the purpose of furthering the level of knowledge to

have already been accrued in this area with regard to the

recognition of Boko Haram’s status as a religious and/or a

terrorist organisation (Silverman, 2011). The reason for this

is that it is arguable that the accrual of qualitative

evidence will then serve to provide significantly richer,

deeper and broader information based upon the views expressed

by a few other academics and in official documents (March and

Furlong, 2002). That this has proved to be the case in

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practice is because it is believed that this type of evidence

derived from the undertaking of effective research is

considered to be valuable for describing how and why the

current debate regarding Boko Haram’s status has developed

(March and Furlong, 2002).

In order to be able to achieve the generation of the necessary

qualitative evidence for completing this dissertation, the

process of research itself that is to be undertaken is based

upon the utilisation of three specific theories of analysis in

the form of the bilateral-methods and inductive approaches

along with that of grounded theory (Berg, 2009). Starting with

the bilateral bilateral-methods approach, this theory of

research is centred upon looking to consider a combination of

primary (for example, legislation and official documents) and

secondary (for example, text books and journal articles)

materials (Berg, 2009). As has already been stated in the

preceding paragraph, there will then be a need for the

materials that are generated during the course of the research

for this dissertation to be cross-referenced for the purpose

of then developing a more effective analysis with regard to as

to whether Boko Haram is actually a religious or terrorist

organisation (Berg, 2009).

Nevertheless, it is also to be appreciated that there is a

caveat to this approach. This is because there is also a need

to recognise the fact that, with regard to the secondary

materials used for the completion of this dissertation in

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particular, a certain amount of bias is always likely to be

present in each piece of material generated by academics in

the form of text books and journal articles (Franklin, 2012).

That this has proved to be the case in practice is largely

because anyone who writes in relation to any given subject

does so with a particular agenda in mind since their own

personal opinion on that specific subject is always likely to

come through in some way (Franklin, 2012). Therefore, along

with the obvious value of academics’ opinions, it is arguable

that such a limitation may serve to detrimentally impact upon

this paper’s analysis so each piece’s value (or lack thereof)

used for completing this dissertation needs to be recognised

during the course of its completion (Franklin, 2012).

In addition, elements of the inductive approach are also to be

used for the purpose of completing the necessary research

required for the undertaking of the analysis for this

dissertation (Silverman, 2011). To achieve this there is a

need to formulate effective search terms to be looked at in

combination together founded upon the title to this work along

with the aims and objectives already to have been provided

earlier in the course of this chapter so as to include “Boko

Haram”; “Terrorist”; “Religious” and “Organisation”

(Silverman, 2011). Then, in order to complete the research

that is required for undertaking this dissertation’s analysis,

there is also a need to utilise elements of grounded theory

for the purpose of furthering this discussion (Oktay, 2012).

The reason for this is because the remit of grounded theory

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also provides for the development of a systematic methodology

to more effectively analyse the primary and secondary

materials generated from the research completed for the

purpose of advancing this study’s discussion (Oktay, 2012).

At the same time, however, there is also a need to note the

fact the use of grounded theory functions somewhat at variance

to the more traditional approaches taken to legal research for

the purpose of then completing an academic study like this one

(Oktay, 2012). That this has proved to be the case is due to

the fact it has been found that, instead of beginning with the

provision of a hypothesis regarding the subject matter at hand

(i.e. as to whether Boko Haram is a terrorist or religious

organisation), grounded theory involves beginning with the

collection of primary and secondary materials regarding the

subject matter being evaluated (Oktay, 2012). Therefore, for

the purpose of furthering this study’s analysis, grounded

theory provides the basis for either establishing a theory or

a hypothesis through what is best described as reverse

engineering of the process (Oktay, 2012).

Through the utilisation of elements of the three theories of

research methodology described in this section of the first

chapter of this study, it is believed that such an approach

will aid the undertaking of an objective analysis to the

material generated as a result (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). This

is because it is understood that the use of an objective

analysis means that it is then possible to present a clear

understanding of the position regarding Boko Haram’s current

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status and the debate with regard to as to whether it is a

political or terrorist organisation as opposed to presenting

an ‘emotional response’ that may show bias that is not

reflected in the research (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). The reason

for this is that it would have been possible to analyse the

facts and circumstances both as they stand currently along

with as to how they have developed over time with a view to

effectively making quantitative comparisons regarding the

aforementioned debate pertaining to Boko Haram’s status as an

organisation (Marsh and Stoker, 2002). That an objective

approach to analysis is favoured for completing the research

required for this paper is marked by the fact a subjective

approach to analysis would consider the ‘likes’ and ‘dislikes’

with regard to the subject-matter under consideration to be

crucial as opposed to the specific facts and circumstances

concerned with the resolution of the issue for consideration

(Marsh and Stoker, 2002).

Significance of the Study

That the study proposed for this dissertation is considered so

significant is marked by the fact that, as has already been

recognised, there is so much debate about as to whether Boko

Haram is actually a terrorist or religious organisation on the

basis of the knowledge to have accrued to date in this area.

That this has proved to be the case is supported by the fact

that, as has already been recognised in brief elsewhere in

this introductory chapter, when Boko Haram was first

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established it was actually quite peaceful in nature until its

ideology changed in 2009 when it became more violent and

terrorist in nature. At the same time, however, irrespective

of its changing ideology, it is interesting to note that Boko

Haram still looked to provide for the establishment of a

Nigerian Islamic state along with serving to oppose Nigerian

society’s westernisation that had seen the country’s wealth

largely focussed amongst a small political elite in the

country’s south.

Therefore, it is arguable that, although the organisation’s

remit may have become more radical and extreme over time in

looking to pursue their aims set out earlier in the course of

this chapter, Boko Haram still retained an underlining

political objective that it was seeking to fulfil with the

establishment of an Islamic state within the confines of its

country of origin. As a result, it is arguably because of the

conflicted nature of the organisation’s remit that there is a

need for this study to look to explore as to whether Boko

Haram is governed more by their current terrorist tendencies

or their political leanings in practice.

Outline of the Study

In view of the fact that, as has already been recognised,

there is some debate with regard to as to whether Boko Haram

is either a religious or terrorist organisation, there is a

clear need to take a carefully structured approach to the

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analysis to be undertaken with a view to completing this

paper.

With this in mind, there is also a need for this work to look

upon the wider role that Boko Haram plays in the Middle East

along with as to how the group’s influence should be assessed

by interested parties. This is because the research undertaken

for the purpose of completing this dissertation would seem to

underline the fact that Boko Haram has emerged as a powerful

organisation with significant links to Iran in particular and

the development of its paramilitary wing that has been linked

with a number of terrorist attacks in the recent past.

However, it is also arguable the organisation has been found

to have grown in strength largely due to the support given by

other Muslim fundamentalist groups in the build-up of their

arsenal and financial support witnessed particularly

dramatically in recent years with the group being found to

have taken a significantly more proactive stance in the

region. In addition, it is also recognised that such

relationships as those outlined for consideration during the

course of this chapter have been combined with the role the

organisation has undertaken in Nigerian politics.

On this basis, the decision was taken to keep the structure of

the dissertation simple so as to then aid the reader’s

understanding of the content of the work through the use of

both clear chapter and sub-headings to aid the presentation of

the analysis completed. This is because, along with this

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introductory chapter, this work is divided into three

additional chapters with a clear flow of analysis throughout

the course of each individual chapter and during the course of

the work overall.

By way of illustration, the second chapter of this

dissertation serves to present a review of the relevant

literature and theory to have arisen to date in relation to

the history and the development of Boko Haram and the

organisation’s resulting status both within and beyond its

country of origin. It will also be necessary for the second

chapter to provide an understanding of what terrorist and

religious organisations are on the basis of the opinions to

have been presented in both official documents and by

academics working in this area already. This chapter will

attempt to allocate Boko Haram in an adequate theoretical

framework, in order to understand its functionality and motifs

better. This is because it is believed that the completion of

this objective during the course of this chapter will then

serve to effectively present the knowledge to have already

been accrued in relation to the subject of this study (i.e. as

to whether Boko Haram is a religious or terrorist

organisation).

Using the material to have already been considered with regard

to Boko Haram’s history and development, the third chapter of

this dissertation considers as to whether, in fact, the

organisation could be considered to be terrorist, religious or

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actually operates as either a hybrid between the two or even

as something else entirely. It is looking to critically

explore the development and history of Boko Haram from its

inception to these days, and to trace its transformations in

the context of events taking place in Nigerian society and

politics.

Finally, the fourth chapter of this dissertation then goes on

to conclude with a summary of the key points to have been

derived from this discussion with a view to expressing an

understanding of as to whether Boko Haram is in fact a

religious or terrorist organisation on the basis of the

analysis to have been undertaken. In addition, during the

course of this chapter it will also be necessary to look to

provide a few suggestions for as to how, by using this

dissertation as a foundation, any further research undertaken

in this area could look to advance the knowledge to have

already been shown to have been accrued in this area to date.

The last chapter also provides several recommendations for

curbing Boko Haram, taking into consideration the main

research findings from the dissertation.

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Chapter 2: Theoretical Overview

Introduction

This chapter will examine the theoretical background behind an

ideologically complex organisation such as Boko Haram.

Understanding ideology, religion, and terrorism in the case of

Boko Haram is essential for analysing their nature, and

classifying them as a religious group or a terrorist

21

organisation (or both). The chapter will critically approach

relevant theories, which shed light upon the origin and the

ideological fundament of Boko Haram, and will aim to place the

group and its existence into an adequate theoretical

framework. The chapter will first look at broader views on

Islamic fundamentalism, followed by an analysis of mainstream

theories on terrorism, and finally will focus on the

intersection of terrorism and religion, in the face of Boko

Haram. As a conclusion, gaps in existing research will be

mentioned.

Back to basics: Islamic fundamentalism

To understand the nature of Boko Haram, it is important to

briefly look at Islamic fundamentalism, its interpretations,

and variations. The reason for this is that the Boko Haram was

conceived as a religious sect, where the study of religion and

its interpretation were crucial (Crowley and Wilkinson, 2013).

Islamic fundamentalism is viewed by many as a more radical

interpretation of Islam, and as literal reading and

application of its primary sources (Fuller, 2003; Esposito,

1992). Many of the observers of fundamentalism distinguish

between Islamism and Islamic fundamentalism, because Islamic

fundamentalism relates to the return to the basics of the

doctrine of Islam, whereas Islamism has its political and

often militant, and therefore, more radical dimensions

(Lapidus, 2002; Fuller, 2003; Esposito, 1992). Distinguishing

22

between the two is important in understanding the basis of

Islamic fundamentalism and its evolution, but for the purposes

of this chapter – the choice of words is not that essential.

What is more important is to understand the functionality of

Islamic fundamentalism, and its role in Boko Haram’s

ideological foundation. Here it is interesting to note how

Western and Islamist scholars view Islamic fundamentalism.

While scholars of the West concentrate more on its

instrumental side, and political and security implications,

scholars of the Middle East such as Choueiri (2002) and Al-

Azmeh (2009) view Islamic fundamentalism in its purely

revivalist terms. Choueiri points at two important practical

characteristics of Islamic fundamentalism – migration (hijra)

and jihad (holy struggle) (Choueiri, 2002: 11) He describes

several theoretical assumptions underlying Islamic

fundamentalism and these are the return to original Islam, as

the religion of oneness and unity of god, the necessity of

fleeing the territories populated by unbelievers, and the

advocacy of independent reasoning in legal matters. Al-Azmeh

denies the historicity of fundamentalism, but turns towards

its primitivist and primevalist side, which views “the current

condition as corrupt” (2009: 150).

In this sense, Islamic fundamentalism can be viewed as a form

of reformism whose historical, rather than political

dimensions are much more evident. Islamic reformism and

Islamic revivalism were dominant at the turn of the 20th

century, when strong Islamic centres such as the Ottoman

23

Empire were destabilised (Choueiri, 2002; Lewis, 1993). Here

it is important to note that this should be observed as a

counter reaction against a historical, not a political

process, and its later interpretations by organisations such

as Boko Haram stretch far beyond the original religious

mysticism enshrined in Islamic revivalism. The traditional

fundamentalism came to exist as an opposition between

tradition and modernity, and as a return to the basics of

spirituality, society and religion. But being based on

opposition does not necessarily mean original fundamentalism

was based on hostility. In the case of Boko Haram, the

doctrine of fundamentalism was put in a very specific social

and political context, with education being the starting point

(Ross, 2014). One of the initial aims of Boko Haram was to ban

the Western style education, which was imposed in Nigeria by

the British. Boko Haram’s aim was to conclusively eradicate

secular run schools, and rid the Nigerian society of the

threats posed by the Western culture (Ross, 2014). Here we can

see how the ideological opposition between the “current

condition” and the fundament of Islam, as explained by Al-

Azmeh (2009) is extracted from its original realm and placed

in a social and political context. In this context, the Islam-

modernity (“current condition”) opposition becomes a construct

-- a projection of a particular social and political reality.

How this happens is a complex process, and requires the

understanding of social, political, and historical factors in

relation to the Nigerian state. These will be examined in the

last section of this chapter.

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Wahhabism and Salafi Islam

It is important to examine Wahhabism as Boko Haram’s

ideological fundament is related to it in particular (Crowley

and Wilkinson, 2013; Bederka, n.d.). Wahhabism is viewed as a

conservative movement within Islam, where radical and literal

interpretation of core Islamic values is fundamental (Al-

Azmeh, 2009: 158-160). It is often described as a reactionary

religious movement, which is puritan, and extremist in its

heart. It is the predominant doctrine of Boko Haram, whose

members preach the return to the Islamic values, and their

radical, reformist interpretation.

As a religious movement however, it is important to note that

historical Wahhabism is not militant or radical, unlike its

later metamorphosis in the face of the global jihad. Wahhabism

began as a reformist movement in the 17th century and similarly

to the revivalist aspirations within Islam, discussed above,

has deep historic, rather than political roots (Delong-Bas,

2004, Al-Azemeh, 2009). Here it is also important to mention

Salafism, of which Wahhabism is part (Bederka, n.d.). It is

based on the radical division between “the winners” (Wahhabis

or those who will go to heaven) and the rest such as the

Christians, the Jews and the rest of the Muslims (Bederka,

n.d.; Qamar, n.d.). Many radical Islamist organisations are

based on Salafi Islam such as the Taliban, Al-Qaeda and Al-

Shabaab (Bederka, n.d.; Qamar, n.d.). Here however it is

important to draw a distinction between the traditional

25

Wahhabism, as preached by its founder Muhammad ibn Abl al

Wahhab and the way it has been enshrined in the fundament of

an organisation such as Boko Haram. While traditional 17th

century Wahhabism was based upon the monotheistic unity of

God, the way the doctrine was later on transformed in the

teachings of Salafi Islam relates to the interpretation of the

Quran as the only source of true knowledge. In this sense it

is an iconoclast movement, as it forbids any religious symbols

associated with Islam, as all religious knowledge should come

from the Quran and the Sunnah (Bederka, n.d.; Delong-Bas,

2004; Qamar, n.d.).

As already mentioned in the previous chapter, the main aim of

Boko Haram is the creation of Islamic state on the territory

of Nigeria, where the state organisation and the legal

framework would be based on the Islamic law – the Shariah.

Boko Haram also seeks to oppose the Western influence in the

economic and social life of Nigeria. Its usage of the Wahhabi

ideology is in this sense reactionary, and at the same time –

extremist, as it relies on the primary interpretation of the

scriptures of Islam. In this sense their mission for state-

building, as bound by the ideology behind Wahhabism is

exclusionary (excluding and condemning everything which is

non-Islamic). However, that does not necessarily mean Boko

Haram should be studied simply as a religious organisation.

Its ideological nucleus is only the driving force behind its

clearly political intentions– namely, the creation of Islamic

26

state, which is bound to exist not alongside, but instead of the

current Nigerian state.

Religion and ideology are important in understanding Boko

Haram. The organisation was conceived as a religious study

group (sect), bound by Islamic fundamentalism and Wahhabism

(Salafi Islam). Although to a large extent these define the

ideological base of Boko Haram today, the way they are used as

a justification for the achievement of political aims, majorly

deviates from their theological origins.

Theories of terrorism: the terrorism of Boko Haram re-examined

After we have looked at the religious dimension of Boko Haram,

it is important to examine them from the aspect of terrorism

and militant acts. In 2013, the US Department of State has

included Boko Haram in its list of Foreign Terrorist

Organisations (FTOs) (US Department of State, 2013a). The

escalation of violence used by Boko Haram since 2009, and its

resort to more destructive methods such as suicide bombings

and kidnappings, makes it a necessary part of this chapter to

look at the organisation from the perspective of terrorism.

Firstly, however, it is important to define terrorism, and

more importantly, to find a definition, in which Boko Haram

and its activities fit.

Among hundreds of definitions of terrorism, one of the most

popular and widely cited reads: “the threat of violence and the use of

27

fear to coerce, persuade, and gain public attention” (National Advisory

Committee on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals, 1976: 7).

Although this is a good definition, it does not fully cover

the goal of the terrorist act, and more importantly – it skips

the element of surprise, which is one of the common

characteristics of terrorist organisations and will be

mentioned later. Another more detailed definition belongs to

Wardlaw (1982) and refers to political terrorism. It reads:

“Political terrorism is the use, or threat of use, of violence by an individual or group,

whether acting for or in opposition to established authority when such action is

designed to create extreme anxiety and/or fear-inducing effects in a target group

larger than the immediate victims with the purpose of coercing that group into

acceding to the political demands of the perpetrators” (Wardlaw, 1982: 18).

This definition is more detailed as to the cause of the

violence, and the target group, and it focuses on both the

means, as well as the desired outcome of the terrorist act.

Finally, a more contemporary definition of terrorism, as given

by the FBI focuses on several characteristics saying what

activities can be classed as terrorism, with the most

important ones being: “to appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a

civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or

coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction,

assassination, or kidnapping”. (FBI, n.d.) This definition is

particularly good in identifying the methods used by many of

the terrorist organisations operation in the present day.

However, the phrase “to appear” implies a certain level of

interpretation, which can be subjective and leans towards the

highly elusive pre-emptive strike. Of the three definitions

28

proposed here, Wardlaw’s one seems to help us understand Boko

Haram most accurately. The main reason is that this definition

differentiates between the criminal use of terror and the use

of terror for political purposes. This is especially important

in the case of Boko Haram, who resort to violence in order to

achieve political goals – the establishment of a separate

Islamic state being the most important one. Also, importantly,

this definition differentiates between the immediate victims

and a wider group (or party), among which the terrorists are

aiming to induce fear.

In the case of Boko Haram, this other party can be the

Nigerian government or the international community (the West)

at large – members of both have been Boko Haram’s victims in

the past and present. Wardlaw’s definition is also one of the

few who points towards problems such as identification,

motive, morality, and social implications as issues which need

to be considered in the process of defining terrorism

(Wardlaw, 1982: 1-5). Some may say that the definition given

by Wardlaw is outdated as it was given long before the War on

Terror and 9/11. It is the opinion of the researcher this is

an advantage because after 9/11 terrorism was reconstructed in

popular and political discourse as necessarily coming from or

belonging to certain parts of the world. Wardlaw’s definition

does not suffer this weakness, as it was created before the

events of 9/11, which automatically makes it less politically

biased. In sum, Boko Haram fit well into Wardlaw’s definition,

although it was created exactly two decades before their

29

conception. Their actions meet the criteria set by Wardlaw –

they are structured, targeted, and aiming to induce fear, for

a clearly set political purpose. Chapter 3 will illustrate

with examples why this is the case.

Here the debate should not be focused entirely on whether Boko

Haram is a terrorist organisation – the scope and remit of its

actions, and the thousands of civilian deaths point in this

direction exactly. It is more important to find out what helps

us understand the terrorism of Boko Haram better.

Because of the limitations of this chapter, the author has

decided to look only at two theories which will help us

examine and study Boko Haram. These are the instrumental and

organizational approaches to understanding terrorism, as

explained in Martha Crenshaw’s classic study (1988). Although

her theoretical study of terrorism was published long before

the most horrific terrorist attacks and before the War on

Terror had begun, it offers a clear and very well structured

separation of the factors behind acts of terrorism. As

mentioned, the body of literature on terrorism, especially in

the aftermath of 9/11, is enormous and can hardly be fitted in

this chapter. However, most of the studies on terrorism aim to

isolate the social, economic, cultural, and political factors

which lead to the rise of terrorism and the responses of the

international community. Crenshaw offers one of the few

studies where the factors pertaining to the rise of terrorism

are classified in two separate approaches and grouped for the

30

purposes of a systematic analysis. They help us understand not

only whether a certain group is terrorist or not, but the

dynamics and the complexity of its terrorist actions.

The Instrumental Approach

According to Crenshaw, the instrumental approach is based on

the assumption that the act of terror is an intentional choice

of a political actor where the organisation, as a unit, acts

together in order to achieve a change in political or social

conditions (1988: 13). The instrumental approach to

understanding terrorism also teaches us that the reaction of

the organisation is the result of external stimuli or factors.

These could be certain social or economic policies or

political reform – elections, etc. This approach views

terrorism as a means to the achievement of particular

political goal, in which the government and the organisation

in question, are involved in an oppositional situation (the

government versus the organisation) (Crenshaw, 1988:13-14).

Within this approach, the terrorist actions may occur because

of the presence of opportunity or the presence of threat. Here

it is important to mention the element of surprise, mentioned

by Crenshaw, which is often underpinned either by the

defender’s (in this case the government) lack of preparation,

or the lack of military capabilities on behalf of the

terrorist organisation, which compensates for its incapacity

with the surprise attack (Crenshaw, 1988:13-14).

It is not difficult to fit Boko Haram’s actions into this

31

theoretical framework. As chapter 3 will show in detail, the

economic and political instability of Nigeria following its

independence, were major factors for the revival of past

hostilities and ethnic tensions. Up until 1999, the country

saw several dictatorial regimes, and its first democratic

government did not manage to provide a viable solution to its

most striking problems (Ross, 2014). Another problem was the

unequal distribution of wealth in the country, which was

centred in the rich and predominantly Christian South (Ross,

2014; Ewi, 2013). In addition, the inability and the

unpreparedness of the government to stop organisations like

Boko Haram has been another factor, which led to the formation

of several paramilitary organisations after Nigeria returned

to civil rule in 1999 (Ross, 2014; Ewi, 2013). The elements

from Crenshaw’s instrumental approach are all present in the

case of Boko Haram. We have present external factors such as

change of government and more importantly – change of

governance (Nigeria’s transition from military dictatorship to

civil rule). In addition, we need to have in mind the unequal

distribution of resources, inadequate public services,

mistrust in the security forces, and corruption present in

Nigeria in the years following 1999 (Crowley and Wilkinson,

2013). All of these act as external stimuli, which will find

manifestation in the conception of Boko Haram, and its

transformation into a terrorist organisation at a later stage.

In this sense, Boko Haram, if viewed from the perspective of

terrorism, was the result of already existing, external

factors. It was constructed as such, and its religious

32

doctrine, examined earlier, found expression in an entirely

new political context, with a clearly defined political

purpose - the creation of an Islamic state, as an alternative

to the dysfunctional, corrupt, and weak Nigerian state. The

specific socio-economic factors which shaped the formation of

Boko Haram and led to its radicalisation will be looked at in

more detail in chapter 3.

The Organizational Approach

In understanding terrorism Crenshaw also proposes the

organisational approach or organisational process theory

(1988: 19). It focuses on the internal politics of the

organisation, and terrorist behaviour represents the outcome

of the internal dynamics of the organisation, rather than the

result of carefully planned strategic action. With this

approach, the main goal is the sustainability of the

organisation, and the promotion of its values. An essential

element, as given by Crenshaw is the membership in those

organisations, where things like social status, peer

recognition, and even the belonging to a group, and

remuneration, are among the most important incentives. Whether

this approach can be used in understanding Boko Haram better

remains questionable, because very little is known about its

internal structure. Chapter 3 discusses its leadership in more

detail, but the information we have is inconsistent and mostly

revolves around the fact that Boko Haram has a decentralised

rather than hierarchical structure (Crowley and Wilkinson,

2013). Therefore the organisational approach is not entirely

33

helpful in the study of Boko Haram as a terrorist

organisation.

This section has provided some relevant theory which helps us

understand Boko Haram not only as a religious but also as a

terrorist organisation. The following section will aim to

explain the intersection between religion and terrorism, by

looking at the social and political dimensions of Boko Haram’s

terrorist activities. It will also trace how in a particular

social and political context, a religious study group

transformed itself into a terrorist organisation with a

clearly set political agenda.

Boko Haram: the political and social dimensions of terrorism

There exists a thin line between collective violence and

politics, and in the age of globalisation and changing

security challenges, one can hardly separate one from the

other. Boko Haram’s existence is by all means a product of and

at the same time an element of the global jihad movement.

However, it is the internal, not the global factors, which

deserve a mention in this analysis of the organisation.

Historical and socio-economic factors can contribute to the

rise of political violence, especially if this violence is

used by non-state actors (Simon, 2001; Murphy, 2013; Rogers,

2008). In the case of Boko Haram, Nigeria’s development

between 1960s and 1999 led to the escalation of violence into

34

what is now considered one of the most dangerous and well-

armed organisations in West Africa.

Ethnic and religious hostilities

After the end of the federalist rule, forgotten hostilities

between different ethnic groups in Nigeria resurfaced. As

observed by Ross (2014) and Ebiem (2014) the religious and

ethnic groups were long suppressed in Nigeria during the

federal military rule. In 1999 many ethnic and regional

organisations resurfaced and many of them formed paramilitary

wings, representing the three largest ethnic groups in the

country, the Yoruba, the Igbo, and the people of the North

(Ross, 2013; Ebiem, 2014). The most powerful of these was the

Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) which is similar in its

extremism to Boko Haram, and can even be suggested to be its

predecessor (Ross, 2014). It is more important to note

however, that Nigeria already had a rough history of ethnic

violence, taking place on inter-state level. In this sense the

rise of Boko Haram (first as a religious study sect, then as a

political organisation) should come as no surprise. As Simon

(2001:313) correctly observes, terrorism can be rooted into

centuries old conflicts. Although ethno-religious terrorist

groups are very different from religious ones, it will not be

exaggerated to say that already existing ethnic cleavages in

Nigeria paved the way for the formation of Boko Haram, and its

transformation from a religious into a political organisation.

35

The failure of secularism

Another thread in the study of Boko Haram is the failure of

secularism. As already mentioned 1999 saw the transition of

Nigeria from military dictatorship to civil rule. Countries in

transition tend to be more prone to internal conflicts and to

the rise of sub-state actors, because they do not have

functional institutions and their state apparatus is still in

the making. In addition, they do not have the capacity to

provide for their citizens, making religious and political

alternatives more visible for the public (Crowley and

Wilkinson, 2013). In the years after 1999 Nigeria was a

fragile democracy, without transparent institutions, permeated

by over-spreading corruption, weak military force, and with

parts of the population living in extreme poverty (Crowley and

Wilkinson, 2013). It was in this sensitive socio-economic

context that Boko Haram came to exist, starting as a religious

sect, which offered a new alternative and more fundamental

reading of Islam. Many people saw this as a solution to

poverty and social and economic inequalities, permeating their

country. This was especially the case in the Muslim North,

where the organisation gained most supporters, who saw Boko

Haram as giving a voice to their social and economic concerns

(Ebiem, 2014).

The legacy of colonialism

36

Finally, we need to look at the legacy of the British colonial

rule in Nigeria. As already mentioned, the most important one

was the Western education system, whose destruction Boko Haram

embraced as one of their founding principles. It is not

uncommon for religious –turned-terrorist groups to rise in

post-colonial times, with post-colonialism being viewed by

some as a predicament for religion and more importantly – for

its interpretation (Winfield, 2007).

These three aspects which reflect the socio-political and

historical make up of Nigeria from the 1960s to the rise of

Boko Haram also explain how the presence of the organisation

in Africa has been instrumentalised. On one side we have the

religious foundations of the group which we already examined,

as one critical dimension. On the other side we have the

dimension of terrorism and militancy, also examined earlier

and also characteristic of Boko Haram. These two dimensions

intersect when we look at Boko Haram’s evolution from a

religious sect into a political organisation – evident in the

third section of this chapter. The existence of Boko Haram has

been the result of a long and complex process of

instrumentalisation, where the religious fundament has been

placed in a very dynamic and sensitive socio-political

context, and thus reborn as terror with a political face and a

strong social narrative.

Summary

37

This chapter has attempted to provide critical summary on the

dimensions of Boko Haram, by looking at its theoretical

background as a religious and as a terrorist organisation. The

aspects of Boko Haram’s Islamic fundamentalism have been

examined, as well as two models of terrorism which would help

us understand what Boko Haram is and what it is not, in terms

of political violence. Finally, the chapter has shown how the

mixture of religious fundament and terrorist means can be

transformed into a political entity fighting for political

authority, claiming to represent certain social and ethnic

groups, and most importantly – aspiring to establish a state

based on the readings and literal interpretation of Islam. The

review of literature and some theories in this chapter reveals

that Boko Haram, as it is known to the world and Africa today,

is not simply an organisation – it is a process, which

stretched beyond the realm of time and took place within

certain economic and social complexities. In this sense, the

formation of Boko Haram and their transition from a religious

sect into a terrorist organisation with political aims was

largely constructed and instrumentalised by external factors.

Here it is important to make some observations on the

literature examined. Publications on Islamic fundamentalism

and terrorism were vast, and going through them was a

challenge. On the other hand, literature on Boko Haram is very

limited. Except for several recent studies, media

publications, and working papers, few, if any, academic

studies on the organisation exist. In literature, Boko Haram

is often looked at as part of other studies dedicated to the

38

security challenges in West Africa, but a rich academic study

on the history, ideology and development of the organisation,

is missing. This is perhaps understandable having in mind that

the organisation only re-gained the public attention recently,

with the April 2014 kidnappings, and has not been listed as

“terrorist” until 2013. Its capacities, and the threats it

poses to regional stability in Africa are yet to be studied.

This dissertation partly attempts to fill this gap in research

by offering a detailed analytical study of Boko Haram with its

religious, military, social, and political dimensions.

39

Chapter 3: The History and Development of Boko

Haram

Introduction

This chapter will look at the history and development of Boko

Haram, in particular, its origins and functionality, in order

to assess the real nature of its acts. The chapter will first

critically analyse the origins of the group, then the internal

socio-economic factors which led to its establishment,

followed by its influences and links to other terrorist

groups, as well as structure and sources of funding. Finally,

the chapter will analyse its acts of violence, their

implications and remit, and effects on international security.

Origins of Boko Haram

As has already been recognised in the preceding chapter, Boko

Haram first originated as an organisation in northwest Nigeria

in 2002 after its establishment by Mohammed Yusuf as a Sunni-

Islamic sect with its ideology based on Sharia law’s strict

application (Johnson, 2011). The organisation was put into

place with a view to seeking an Islamic state’s establishment

in Nigeria along with serving to provide opposition to

Nigerian society’s apparent ‘Westernisation’ that has seen

most of the country’s wealth concentrated among the elite of

the country in the country’s Christian south (Bartolotta,

40

2011). That such opposition to Western ideals should develop

on the part of Boko Haram then escalated to such an extent

that the group has even openly declared its aim to attack

prominent Western targets with a view to then asserting its

own ideology (Windrem, 2014).

Here, we can see how Boko Haram evolved from a religious sect

into an organisation with clearly set political goals,

culminating in the aim for state building and internal social

and educational reform. These were initially triggered by

ideology, but in the years after Boko Haram’s establishment,

they became manifested in political, rather than religious

goals, re-affirming the already existing hostility between

Islam and the West.

Internal factors – state-building and democracy in Nigeria

In exploring the origins and establishment of Boko Haram, it

is important to note that the political situation in Nigeria

from the 1960s to late 1990s played an important role. The

political, social, and economic context in which militant

organisations come to exist is important in understanding

further their development and true character. At the time when

Boko Haram was established, Nigeria was a young democracy,

with feeble state institutions, and subject to several

dictatorial regimes in the past.

41

Interestingly, the fact that such an organisation should come

to be put into place in the first place is due to the fact

that, prior to its creation, the country was subject to the

governance of a number of different military dictatorships

from the time it became independent in 1960 until 1999 when

Nigeria finally became a democracy (Ewi, 2013). Therefore, in

the period following the country’s establishment as a

fledgling democracy, Yusuf arguably took advantage of the

country’s new approach to politics in providing for the

creation of Boko Haram in the state of Borno’s capital,

Maiduguri (Johnson, 2011). This is because he proceeded to

provide for the establishment of a complex with a religious

school that looked to attract families of Muslims not only

from Nigeria but also from other surrounding African countries

with the aim to create an Islamic state and a primary

recruiter for jihadis (Johnson, 2011). At the same time,

however, as a result of the organisation’s denouncement of

corruption by both the police and the state itself, Boko Haram

was able to attract many new followers from the current

generation in the form of unemployed youths (Chothia, 2012).

It should come as no surprise that in times when a stable

state apparatus is missing, extreme ideologies and radicalism

take prevalence. As observed earlier in the dissertation, Boko

Haram attracted poor families and opposed the Christian rich

south, where most of the wealth was accumulated at the time.

This clearly reveals the socio-economic factors which

determined the success and popularity of Boko Haram among the

42

Nigerian population, which saw it as a political alternative to an

inadequate and incapable regime, and perhaps as an opportunity

for achieving wellbeing and economic security. The fact that

the organisation was able to attract the unemployed youths

reveal the transformation and impact of Boko Haram as a

political, rather than religious organisation, which targets

certain social groups - a strategy which is typical for actors

which normally seek to obtain political power and recognition

within an already existing political system.

Influences and links to Al-Qaeda

For the purposes of this dissertation, it is important to look

at Boko Haram’s influences and connection to other terrorist

organisations such as Al-Qaeda who are by far the most popular

and violent terrorist organisation in the history of mankind.

The organisation is reported to have looked to utilise the

state of Borno’s existing infrastructure (that is actively

provided for by the Izala Society) for the purpose of

increasing its own membership prior to breaking away for the

purpose of then providing for Boko Haram’s effective

establishment as an independent organisation with its own

ideology (Kwaja, 2011). Nevertheless, it is also to be noted

that, whilst both the Izala and Yusuf’s sympathisers were

originally welcomed into the Nigerian government, both the

government and the Nigerian Television Authority were advised

by the Council of Ulama not to broadcast Yusuf's propaganda

43

and yet opted to ignore these warnings (Kwaja, 2011). As a

result, even where Yusuf was arrested for any impropriety

contrary to the country’s law he was effectively elevated to

the point that he was considered to be a ‘hero’ not only

within Nigerian society, but also throughout Africa so that,

for some at least, “Yusuf was mystified [as] a messiah” and looked to

take advantage of this recognition (Kwaja, 2011).

This ‘idealisation” of Yusuf resulted from the fact that Boko

Haram had already gained popular support, and was accepted as

an alternative to the existing government which could not

provide for its citizens. This transition was a symptom not

only of the political instability which permeated Nigeria at

the time, but also of the transformation of Boko Haram from a

religious sect, into a political organisation.

Nevertheless, it is also to be appreciated that there is still

some debate with regard to Boko Haram’s exact influences and

how they have developed over time. This is because, although

al-Qaeda was originally heavily linked with the organisation,

ties between the two were soon severed when al-Qaeda

determined Yusuf was somewhat unreliable (Kwaja, 2011).

However, despite the deterioration of the relationship with

al-Qaeda, Boko Haram’s somewhat violent approach since 2009,

in the wake of its previously peaceful inclinations since its

inception, may still be considered to be somewhat heavily

linked to the Arewa People’s Congress’ militancy in the north

of Nigeria (Ross, 2014). Nonetheless, although organisations

44

like Boko Haram and the Arewa People’s Congress have been

found to have somewhat troubling links both in the past and in

the present, Nigerian politicians may grant ‘indigeneship’ to

organisations like Boko Haram with significant consequences

for those deemed to have such a right (Adesoji, 2010). This is

because the recognition of such a right effectively means that

those that it affects may not only be able to participate in

the country’s politics but also partake in land ownership,

take gainful employment and attend school which are all

clearly significant benefits to those receiving them (Adesoji,

2010).

At the same time, however, there is still also a need to

appreciate that the granting of ‘indigeneship’ to

organisations like Boko Haram has been subject to abuse in

Nigeria (Adesoji, 2001). Indigeneship is a concept and a right

which reflects “the link between a person and a geographical

location – his ancestral home – where he traces his roots

through a blood lineage that puts him in contact with his kin”

(Rinyom, n.d.). In this sense, indigeneship is similar to

citizenship, but it also relates to the belonging to a

particular ethnic group, residing in a particular geographic

area - something of great importance in Nigeria, where the

divide among ethnic groups living in a particular region of

the country is prevalent. This right, however, has often been

exercised so as to achieve political gains along with also

proving to be a significant cause of religious and ethnic

riots in Nigeria leading to hundreds and even thousands of

45

people being killed as well as thousands more fleeing from

their homes in fear for their lives due to the extreme

reactions provoked by the rise of organisations including Boko

Haram (Adesoji, 2010). Such a view is supported by the fact

that, for example, the organisation has actually been known to

kill anyone who actively undertakes ‘un-Islamic’ practices

including the consumption of alcohol that is contrary to the

Islamic faith (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees,

2013).

Regardless of the response to and consequences of the granting

of “indigeneship” to Boko Haram, here it is more important to

consider the implications of this development and the ways in

which it has been abused by the organisation. Boko Haram used

this right to spread its influence in certain regions of the

country, and to channel and implement its objectives for anti-

Westernisation. The ways in which “indigeneship” has been used

by Boko Haram show its aspirations for wider political

authority. This deviates from the original conception of Boko

Haram as a religious organisation, and reveals its ambitions

to permeate the social and economic sphere of life in Nigeria,

turning gradually into a progeny of the state.

Organisation and leadership

For the purposes of this analysis it is important to look at

the organisational structure of Boko Haram.

46

There have been mixed observations and reports on how the

organisation is structured internally and how it is operating.

On one hand it is observed that Boko Haram is divided into

different cells, which operate autonomously under state or

regional level leadership (Crowley and Wilkinson, 2013: 102).

The organisation is composed of several different types of

actors such as Islamist militants, criminals and thugs – all

connected to political elites (Crowley and Wilkinson, 2013:

102).

On the other hand, the organisation, which is believed to have

several thousand members and sympathisers since its re-

emergence, is said to have no central leadership and to be a

diffuse organisation (Crowley and Wilkinson, 2013: 102). In

this sense Boko Haram is not different from other jihadist

organisations, where the members are aligned alongside

spiritual, rather than hierarchical leadership. Therefore Boko

Haram is compared to other similar organisations such as Al-

Qaeda in Iraq and AQIM, where the governance is in the hands

of the local emirs (Crowley and Wilkinson, 2013: 102). This

dislocated structure is one of the reasons why the state

authorities in Nigeria find it difficult to combat Boko Haram.

It is also important to note that the membership of the

organisation is getting increasingly international, with

recruits from neighbouring countries such as Chad, Niger, and

Mali (Crowley and Wilkinson, 2013: 102). Although this is not

47

to be perceived as a necessary sign of a territorial expansion

undertaken by Boko Haram, it still indicates that the ideology

of Boko Haram finds supporters locally and regionally.

(Crowley and Wilkinson, 2013:102).

Understanding the role of spirituality in the leadership of

Boko Haram is also important. Its current leader, Abubakar

Shekau, is considered by many a radical theologian – a fact

which affects the leadership style of the organisation (BBC

News, 2014). Since he took over in 2009, following the death

of the previous leader Mohammed Yusuf, the organisation is

observed to have resorted to more radical actions and the

number of killings and attacks for which Boko Haram is

responsible have tremendously increased under the new

leadership. Observers believe that the reason is the radical

religious stance held by Abubakar Shekau, who is often

described as “part theologian, part gangster” (BBC News, 2014)

and a fearless and radical spiritual leader, who is delivering

sermons on a regular basis (BBC News, 2014).

From the above discussion, it is not difficult to see the role

which religion and ideology play in the organisation and

structure of Boko Haram. To a large extent, religious ideology

is inherent to the structures of the organisation, in which

the emphasis is on horizontality, rather than on vertical

arrangement and clearly-defined hierarchy. In this sense, Boko

Haram resembles more of a religious organisation, whose

leadership is underpinned by religious beliefs. As the next

48

section will show, however, it is the scope and nature of its

activities, not its structure, which help us classify it as a

terrorist organisation seeking political affirmation. However,

before we move on to the terrorist activities of Boko Haram,

we will briefly discuss its sources of finance.

Sources of finance

Despite inconsistent patchy information on where the sources

of funding of Boko Haram come from, it is now certain that the

organisation is a very well-funded one (TRAC, 2014). The

government and private intelligence organisation believe that

most of the funding of Boko Haram comes from foreigners,

Nigerian ex-pats, and locals (TRAC, 2014). It has been also

indicated that the organisation has received funding from Al-

Qaeda in Saudi Arabia. In terms of channels, it has been

reported that the organisation also receives funding from

internet fraud and some charitable organisations, such as

Saudi Arabia based Islamic World Society and London based Al-

Muntada Trust Fund (TRAC, 2014). Although the exact amount of

the funding which comes from internet fraud and charitable

activities remains undetermined, another string of finance is

most definitely confirmed by security experts and it relates

to kidnapping. Boko Haram is known to have captured $ 3

million from French and Cameroonian negotiators for the

release of French family kidnapped in Cameroon earlier in 2014

(TRAC, 2014).

49

At this stage systematic information on the sources of funding

of Boko Haram is missing and their sources of finance remain

difficult to locate. What is definitely known is that the

organisation’s main portion of funds come from abroad (other

terrorist organisations and foreigners), and a significant

portion of income can be attributed to ransoms from

kidnappings.

Resort to violence and terrorist activities

As has already been noted, at least for the first seven years

of its existence, the organisation looked to carry out its

operations more or less peacefully whilst also withdrawing

away from the rest of society (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

This is because it was at this time that the organisation was

totally apolitical whilst also still believing that the use of

violence and terrorism could be justified for the purpose of

realising their specific objectives (Pérouse de Montclos,

2014). It was only in 2009 that Boko Haram officially became a

Salafist-jihadi group when reports emerged that members of the

organisation were arming themselves leading the Nigerian

authorities to launch an investigation formerly known as

‘Operation Flush’ after warnings about the true nature of Boko

Haram finally began to be heeded regarding its growing

military capabilities (Associated Press, 2009). At the same

time, however, this development for Boko Haram was heavily

influenced by the Wahhabi movement which is an Islamic reform

50

movement that sought to restore ‘pure monotheistic worship’

(Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

As a result, on the 26th July 2009 nine members of Boko Haram

were arrested and both their weapons and equipment for making

bombs were confiscated leading to a series of attacks upon the

police (Nossiter, 2009). This action ultimately culminated in

over 700 people being killed and the destruction of a number

of facilities including police stations, prisons, government

offices, schools and churches by the 30th July (Nossiter,

2009). In addition, it was at this time that Boko Haram’s

leader, Yusuf, was arrested, and killed “while trying to escape” and

succeeded by the second-in-command, Abubakar Shekau as the

Northeast of Nigeria continued to remain vulnerable to

violence and extremist attacks largely as a result of a lack

of employment opportunities and ethnic and religious tensions

amongst the people living there (BBC News, 2009). That this

proved to be the case is supported by the fact that, as of

September 2010, having regrouped under Shekau’s leadership,

Boko Haram broke a significant number of its membership out of

Maiduguri prison and then proceeded to launch attacks

throughout the north of the country as a sign of the

organisation’s move to using increasing amounts of violence to

achieve its aims (Institute for Security Studies, 2012). 

With this in mind, it is arguable that, based on the change in

approach perpetrated by Boko Haram’s leadership, the Nigerian

authorities had learnt very little from the Kano riots of 1980

with regard to their reliance upon a military strategy centred

51

upon looking to execute the leader of a militant group that so

clearly had the potential to lead to consequences beyond their

control (Institute for Security Studies, 2012). Such a view is

then only further emphasised by the fact that Shekau’s

leadership then saw Boko Haram’s capabilities operationally

continue to improve significantly over time. By way of

illustration, in the wake of the launch of a number of ‘soft

target attacks (i.e. an unarmoured/undefended target that

needs to be destroyed like an automobile, house, or assembly

of people) using Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) including

Western targets like the headquarters of the United Nations

(UN) in Abuja which saw 23 killed including 11 staff members

and warnings of further similar attacks (Institute for

Security Studies, 2012). Allied to such attacks, the group’s

increased sophistication caused many observers to believe that

Boko Haram had successfully established links with Al-Qaeda in

the Islamic Maghreb that was known to be active in and around

Nigeria’s neighbouring countries including Niger (Brock,

2012).

In the period observed above, Boko Haram resorted

tointimiation,assassination, violence and terrorism in order

to achieve its political goals.

Since 2011 Boko Haram has continued to perpetrate a number of

attacks against a broad variety of targets several times a

week on average including public facilities like schools and

media outlets as well as individuals of note within Nigerian

52

society like politicians along with the country’s security

infrastructure with suicide bombings proving particularly

favourable (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). That this proved to be

the case in Nigeria is despite the fact that such action was

previously considered to be somewhat ‘alien’ to both the

country’s authorities and the population as a whole due to the

fact that, even in Africa as a whole, suicide bombings had

previously only been used prominently in Somalia by al-Shabab

(Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). This is because Islam provides

that suicide is actually one of the greatest sins an

individual can perpetrate and is utterly detrimental to their

spiritual journey since the Quran states “do not kill yourselves; surely

God is most Merciful to you”. Therefore, the fact that members of

Boko Haram were still willing to take such extreme action in

furtherance of their aims contrary to their faith is arguably

a mark of how radical the organisation had become since its

move away from its previously peaceful approach in the summer

of 2009 (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

Such a view of the changing ideology of the organisation is

then only further emphasised by the fact that, since late

2012, Boko Haram has kidnapped a number of people so as to

then draw even more attention to both their activities and

ideology internationally (Chothia, 2012). By way of

illustration, in April 2014 members of Boko Haram proceeded to

kidnap almost 300 students (predominantly young girls) from

Chibok, Borno and, whilst over 50 escaped quickly, at the time

of writing the remainder are still being held captive with

53

Shekau openly announcing his intention to sell them into

slavery (Tadeo, 2014). As a result, this act and the resulting

fallout brought the organisation a considerable amount of

media attention not only in Nigeria and the surrounding

regions but also on a wider international basis whilst also

further highlighting the current Nigerian government’s

apparent incompetence for effectively dealing with Boko

Haram’s growing strength (Tadeo, 2014).

These acts mark an obvious deviation from the organisation’s

initial conception and activities as a religious entity, and

reveal its growing belligerence, triggered by internal and

external factors. The wider publicity and international

attention that Boko Haram has gained since 2012 is another

symptom of the organisation’s transformation from a religious

sect, driven entirely by ideology, into an authority seeking

organisation, where a clearly set political agenda takes

prevalence.

It is also to be noted that the aforementioned attack on the

UN headquarters in Abuja was not the end of Boko Haram’s

activities internationally with the US Department of State’s

Bureau of Counterterrorism in particular reporting the

perpetration of a broad catalogue of incidents in its

neighbouring countries in 2013 alone (US Department of State,

2013b). By way of illustration, in February 2013 the

organisation was found to be responsible for the kidnapping of

seven French tourists in Cameroon’s far north along with that

54

of a French priest in November 2013 (US Department of State,

2013b). In addition, a number of gunmen operating under the

auspices of Boko Haram also perpetrated a series of attacks

against civilian targets in Cameroon (US Department of State,

2013b). However, the organisation’s activities internationally

were not restricted to Cameroon in 2013 as the US Department

of State’s Bureau of Counterterrorism referenced reports from

both Niger and Chad with the authorities in these countries

stating that they had reportedly partaken in a series of

skirmishes against suspected members of Boko Haram around the

borders of Nigeria (US Department of State, 2013b).

Boko Haram has been able to complete its cross-border criminal

activities because they have easily managed to avoid the

Nigerian army by withdrawing in the geographically safe and

secluded lands surrounding the border with Cameroon (Cocks,

2014). The fact that this has proved to be possible for the

organisation is in view of the fact that the Cameroon army has

proved to be largely unwilling to engage them in open combat

(Cocks, 2014). Nevertheless, in February 2012 both the

Nigerian and Cameroon governments signed an agreement for the

purpose of then establishing a Joint Trans-Border Security

Committee (Cocks, 2014). This Committee was then inaugurated

in November 2013 with the Cameroon government announcing its

plan to undertake “coordinated but separate” border patrols with the

Nigerian authorities in 2014 that have, unfortunately, not yet

proved all that successful (Cocks, 2014). Such a view is then

only further supported by the fact that the respective

55

governments have had to reconvene again to improve the

cooperation between the two countries to deal with the

problems Boko Haram were causing since the organisation has

only continued to increase its presence in Cameroon to date

(Cocks, 2014).

As a result, in May 2014 10 Chinese citizens working in the

country were abducted and in July of the same year the village

where the Vice-President was born was attacked and his wife

kidnapped as well as the Kolofata Sultan and his family whilst

a further 15 people were killed during the raid (BBC News,

2014). Then, in another further attack, a soldier and nine

passengers of a bus were shot and killed whilst a local

chief’s son was also kidnapped as young locals in their

hundreds were also suspected to have been recruited to further

the cause of Boko Haram either through indoctrination or as a

result of having been given no other choice aside from death

(BBC News, 2014). Finally, in August 2014, the organisation

proceeded to overrun Gwoza (a remote Nigerian border town) was

overrun leading the Cameroonian President to remove several of

his most senior military officials before then sending

additional reinforcements to strengthen the border areas with

Nigeria due to the lack of restrictions upon Boko Haram’s

activities in the country itself due to the Nigerian

government’s aforementioned ineptitude (BBC News, 2014).

By way of further illustration, shortly after Goodluck

Johnathan took the Presidency of Nigeria in May 2011, Boko

56

Haram proceeded to bomb Abuja, Bauchi and Zaria as a mark of

their displeasure at this appointment (Cook, 2011). The reason

for this is that the election of the President had actually

served to bring about widespread condemnation in view of the

fact that Johnathan’s appointment apparently served to breach

a tacit agreement’s terms whereby it was expected that the

Presidency was to pass to a Muslim candidate from the north of

the country (Adetayo, 2012). This is because it was believed

that such a step at government level would then provide for a

more even distribution of Nigeria’s oil wealth amongst the

nation’s people (Adetayo, 2012). That Boko Haram then proved

to be so easily able to perpetrate attacks within the country

as a result is because of the fact that, according to their

own leaders, serving members of the Nigerian army were

involved in these activities as they looked to distance

themselves from the state and show their loyalty to Boko

Haram’s cause (Adetayo, 2012). Somewhat interestingly,

although an army spokesman later refuted the organisation’s

claims to have influence within such a significant public

institution, on 8 January 2012 the Nigerian President

announced Boko Haram had actually successfully infiltrated

both the army AND the police as well as the government at

executive, parliamentary and legislative levels (Adetayo,

2012).

The observations made above illustrate the gradual, but very

steady and strategic penetration of Boko Haram into the state

structures in Nigeria and neighbouring countries. Boko Haram’s

57

very mode of action changed its direction, transcending the

boundaries of their traditional religious fundament, when they

were targeting specific social classes, and reaching the very

heart of the Nigerian state – the army and the police. The

kidnappings for which Boko Haram received international

attention and the attacks following the Presidential elections

show the growing influence and militancy of Boko Haram,

already functioning not despite the state, but inside the state.

The terrorist acts and military tactics used by Boko Haram

show not only their growing belligerence, but also their

aspirations to operate as a state within the state.

Members of Boko Haram also allegedly completed a series of

political and religious assassinations in Nigeria. By way of

illustration, the organisation took responsibility for the

killing of the younger brother of the Shehu of Borno (i.e. the

country’s second most prominent Muslim apart from the Sultan

of Sokoto) (Adetayo, 2012). With this in mind, it is arguable

that such a broad approach to violence on the part of Boko

Haram may be considered to be illustrative of a lacked of

cohesion with regard to the organisation’s ideology (Cook,

2011). This is because whilst the organisation’s leadership

claimed to be looking to correct perceived injustices

perpetrated by the state, they seemed to be doing so to

provoke a full-scale ethnic and religious civil war and there

was arguably no real justice in that in view of the many

innocent people who were suffering as a result of Boko Haram’s

activities (Cook, 2011). As a result, by the end of 2011

58

comparisons were being drawn with the oil-rich Niger Delta’s

numerous different militant factions that had motivations

which served to range between seemingly idealistic ideology

and little more than barefaced greed (Owen, 2012) The problems

experienced in this regard with the nature of Boko Haram were

then only further emphasised by the fact that, as of November

2011, it was claimed by Nigerian State Security Service that

four criminal syndicates were apparently operating under the

auspices of 'Boko Haram' so as to further challenge the

organisation’s original ideology (Herskovits, 2012).

It is also interesting to note that, arguably as a mark of

Boko Harman’s challenge to authority, a common theme emerged

in north-east Nigeria with the police being a particularly

prominent target for the organisation as they were subjected

to regular massacres at work or in drive-by shootings among

other examples (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). Nevertheless,

despite the conventional theory to have been put forward as an

explanation for such attacks, there is still some debate in

this regard due to the contradictions derived from Boko

Haram’s changing ideology over time and since 2009 in

particular (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014). That this proved to be

the case is effectively illustrated by the fact that a number

of different reasons were commonly utilised by the

organisation to explain their activities including as revenge

for Yusuf’s killing and due to their apparently representing

an illegitimate state apparatus (Pérouse de Montclos, 2014).

The illegitimacy of this state apparatus is not of such a

59

great importance for this discussion, as the fact that at that

time the organisation already had the political and military

capabilities, resembling those of a state. It was no longer

functioning separately of the Nigerian state, but infiltrated

it, strategically targeting key areas.

However, it is also to be noted that it was just as common for

no specific reason to be given by Boko Haram for their

activities as the opportunities for criminal activity

continued to flourish within the country due to the

government’s aforementioned ineptitude and the growing

influence of organisation therein (Owen, 2012). Such a view is

supported by the fact that the response taken by the

government to this apparently self-reinforcing trend towards

insecurity was not to look to provide for either the

authorities restructuring or reorientation but to instead look

to heavily invest in more security equipment spending

approximately $5.5 billion to carry out this task (Isine,

2014). This is arguably because it was believed by the

government that they would then be seen to be acting to deal

with the problem by the public even though the effectiveness

of the purchase of more bomb detection units, communications

and transport, along with a Closed-Circuit Television system

has already been called into doubt due to its apparent failure

to deal with the root of the problem (Isine, 2014).

Boko Haram’s campaign of violence in the wake of Johnathan’s

election culminated with a number of attacks being perpetrated

60

on Christmas Day throughout the country. 37 citizens were

killed by a bomb at a church in Abuja and another 43 were

killed by a car bomb in Niger State outside a church (Cook,

2011). As a result, the president declared a ‘state of

emergency’ and proceeded to close the country’s north-eastern

international border on New Year’s Day but this only served to

intensify the acts of aggression perpetrated by Boko Haram

against the state (Brock, 2012). By way of illustration, in

2011 the organisation had carried out a total of 115 attacks

leading to the deaths of some 550 people but in just the first

three weeks of 2012 alone more than half the total deaths from

2011 had already been perpetrated by members of Boko Haram

(Bartolotta, 2011). That the death tally caused by Boko Haram

should rise so sharply is marked by the fact that, within two

days of the declaration of a state of emergency, the

organisation demanded all southern Nigerians residing in the

north to leave within three days before they then began a

series of small-scale attacks on Christians and Igbo peoples

culminating on 20 January 2012 with an attack on a police

station in Kano that saw 190 people killed as a result (Brock,

2012). Nevertheless, despite the ongoing problems both at this

time and thereafter, in May 2013 the state of emergency was

actually extended with little or no real positive effect on

the problems caused by Boko Haram (US Department of State,

2013b).

The examples above describe the terrorist activities of the

organisation, and fall within most definitions for terrorism,

61

having security implications not only locally and regionally,

but also internationally (Blanquart, n.d.). In addition, Boko

Haram’s actions were intended to induce fear, through the acts

of violence, being motivated by political, social, and

ideological objectives (Aly, 2011 cited in Blanquart, n.d.).

The organisation uses violence in order to achieve its

political objectives and its links with other militant groups

such as Shabaab and AQIM in Somalia make it an international

security threat (US House of Representatives Committee on

Counterterrorism, 2011 cited in Blanquart, n.d.). In other

words, the means deployed by Boko Haram, their ruthless,

ferocious and indiscriminate attacks, tactics and targets, and

the scope of their violent acts, make them a terrorist

organisation, where terror is used for the completion of their

political objectives.

As a result, by the end of 2013 the United States of America’s

(US) State Department had designated Boko Haram as a

‘terrorist organisation’ (US Department of State, 2013b). That

the Department labelled the group thusly was not only due to

reasons including the organisation’s apparent links with Al-

Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb but also the “thousands of deaths in

northeast and central Nigeria over the last several years, including targeted killings

of civilians” that the group had allegedly been involved with (US

Department of State, 2013b). The US State Department then went

even further in its condemnation of Boko Haram’s activities

during the course of this same report by stating the

organisation is the most deadly terrorist group in the world

62

today aside from the Taliban of Afghanistan (US Department of

State, 2013b). In addition, in May 2014 the UNSC declared Boko

Haram officially to be a terrorist group actively affiliated

to both Al-Qaeda and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (United

Nations News Online, 2014). This designation then led to

sanctions against Boko Haram internationally in the form of

asset freezes, travel bans and arms embargoes among other

actions at the UNSC’s initiation with a view to punishing the

organisations actions (United Nations News Online, 2014).

That both the US State Department and the UNSC should be able

to form such a view of Boko Haram is founded upon the fact

that, as of July 2014, in the whole world Nigeria was believed

to have had the highest number of terrorist killings in the

world in the last year with approximately 146 attacks leading

to around 3,500 deaths (Nkala, 2014). That Boko Haram was able

to achieve such devastation in a single year was then further

marked by the fact the Borno State governor, Kashim Shettima,

expressed his view that the organisation was actually “better

armed and . . . better motivated than [the country’s] own troops” so he believed

it was “absolutely impossible . . . to defeat Boko Haram” whilst the

government proved so inept at dealing with the problems in

this regard (Onuoh, 2014). This opinion of the government’s

efforts to resolve the problem is then only evidenced by the

fact that little has changed since they heavily invested in

more security equipment spending approximately $5.5 billion to

carry out this task publicly even though the effectiveness of

63

the purchase of such equipment was questionable at best

(Isine, 2014).

Therefore, there has clearly been some significant difficulty

associating or disassociating the organisation from terrorist

activity which has also brought about a significant amount of

confusion with regard to the exact ideology that underpins

Boko Haram’s activities—religion or terrorism. On this basis,

it is arguably little wonder that the organisation has

continued to divide international opinion since, as has been

shown during the course of this chapter, Boko Haram has been

constantly linked to terrorist action not only in Nigeria but

also in other parts of Africa as well as other countries

internationally (Falk and Morgenstern, 2009).

Summary

This chapter has traced the history and development of Boko

Haram, focusing on its origins and terrorist activities. The

organisation’s rise as a religious sect was underpinned by

internal factors and political instability in Nigeria, which

led to Boko Haram resting upon an ideology for radical social

and educational reform. In the following years, its strategy

led to its infiltration in the heart of the Nigerian state

(the army and the police), and gaining wider publicity

internationally. In the most recent years its resort to

terrorism, the destructive effects of its acts, and its

connections to other terrorist organisations finalised its

64

transformation from a religious sect, into a political and

terrorist organisation.

Chapter 4: ConclusionTerrorism is a controversial issue and human tolerance for one

position or the other on the issue is a matter of degree.

However if terrorism is to create fear, coerce, persuade and

gain public attention or as described by Crenshaw “an

intentional choice of a political actor where the organisation

as a unit act together in other to achieve change in political

and social condition”(Crenshaw 1998.p13), then Boko Haram with

all its barbaric and atrocious activities is a terrorist

organisation.

65

As analysed in previous chapters Boko Haram like their

extremist and fanatical counterpart the Islamic state of Iraq

and Syria(Isis)are nothing but terrorist organisation because

of their extremist ideology, sophisticated and well planned

strategies, fanatically motivated military tactics matched

with indiscriminate and ferocious attacks and assassinations

of innocent civilians to achieve their goals. Boko Haram

initial social crusade of establishing Islamic schools and

free Islamic education, free welfare services are nothing but

a camouflaged for their hidden terrorist intentions later.

In all Boko Haram is a terrorist group and not a

political ,social or religious organisation. Though their

actions are religiously motivated with political undertone,

but the method they used in achieving their goals mostly

murder, fear, violence and targeting non combatant civilians

make them tick all the right boxes for a terrorist

organization.

Findings

This dissertation has looked at the development and history of

Boko Haram, as well as the scope of its actions from their

inception to these days, and their political and economic

implications. The dissertation has also attempted to provide a

good theoretical framework in which to place Boko Haram’s

terrorist acts and to understand the connection between

66

religion as an ideological fundament, and terrorism, as an

expression of political aims and objectives. The main

conclusion of this work is that Boko Haram needs to be studied

as BOTH a religious and terrorist organisation, with clear

political aims and very strong social and economic message.

The reasons are the following:

Boko Haram has significantly evolved from its inception

as a religious study sect to an organisation with a

clearly set political agenda, such as the formation of an

Islamic state, and the removal of Western education in

Nigeria.

Its radicalisation since 2009, its growing militancy and

its reported connections with other terrorist

organisations are becoming a regional, not only a local

threat.

This work has also examined why Boko Haram has transformed

into a hybrid of religious and terrorist organisation, and it

has been found that the reasons for this amalgamation stem

from the socio-economic context, prevalent in Nigeria upon the

organisation’s conception.

As far as the aims and objectives of this dissertation are

concerned, they were addressed in the following way:

The problems inherent in Nigeria which led to the

country becoming a “cover” for a terrorist

67

fundamentalist organisation have been identified as

ethnic, economic and social.

The group’s development has been critically

analysed, marking the most important stages of its

existence, up to these days and its most recent

radical acts of violence.

Boko Haram has been placed in the wider theoretical

context of both religious fundamentalism and

terrorism, aiming to conceptualise the organisation

better.

The dissertation has explained why the organisation

needs to be considered as both a religious and

terrorist organisation, and what contributes to its

complex political and ideological make up.

Gaps and limitations

Perhaps the most obvious limitation of this work is the fact

that it relied primarily on secondary information, because of

time restraint. The study would have had more leverage and

authenticity if the researcher had the time to conduct perhaps

face-to-face or phone/Skype interviews with people from the

region where Boko Haram operates, even if they reside in the

UK at present.

Because of the word limit, many of the aspects related to Boko

Haram remained unexamined. For example, the challenges in

defining a group as terrorist or not are a vague area not only

68

for criminologists, but also for those working in the field of

international security and foreign affairs. The connections of

Boko Haram with other terrorist networks was another field

which remained only briefly touched upon, and a field which

could have shed more light on the topic of Boko Haram’s

security implications not only in Nigeria, but also in West

Africa and the Middle East. Finally, because of the time and

word constraints of this project, the role of Boko Haram in

the global jihad movement was not covered.

Recommendations

Based on the analysis conducted in this dissertation, several

policy recommendations are made. Of course, these are not

properly developed, and are by no means exclusive, but reflect

the researcher’s viewpoint on how a threat like Boko Haram can

be and should be eventually tackled:

The international community needs to look inside Nigeria in

order to tackle Boko Haram. As the dissertation has

shown, the socio-economic and political factors which led

to the existence of Boko Haram, and more importantly to

its radicalisation, stem from the internal problems which

Nigeria faces. Ethnic divisions, economic mismanagement

and political and military incapacity are all issues

which need to be addressed in the long-run in the context

of a wider and more inclusive security strategy for the

region.

69

Regional cooperation is crucial in dealing with

organisations such as Boko Haram. As the dissertation has

shown, Boko Haram is already spreading in neighbouring

countries, gradually turning into a regional threat.

Therefore cooperation between Nigeria and its neighbours

in military and intelligence terms is essential for

battling Boko Haram.

Finally, a possible way to curb Boko Haram is a partition

of Nigeria along its already existing ethnic lines.

Although it may seem radical, the multi-state solution

has been circulating in the academic discourse on Nigeria

for quite some time. It has been discovered in this

research that suggestions exist for the Muslim North

(where Boko Haram is the strongest) and the other regions

to be granted autonomy within the existing boundaries of

the country.

Of course, all of the above recommendations have their flaws

and one needs to delve deeper into their implementation as

policies in order to understand these. In addition, they are

all long-term strategies, which require cohesive multi-level

action, and will not be able to provide an immediate

antidote to Boko Haram.

Topics for further research

All of the recommendations proposed above present interesting

and challenging subjects for further research. In addition, a

70

good topic for further research would be counter-terrorism and

the response of the international community to battling

organisations such as Boko Haram. Only in 2014 did the world

turn their eyes to Boko Haram, because of the kidnappings of

the schoolgirls in April. The organisation however has been

terrorising the North-West Nigeria long before that.

Furthermore, its reported connections with other

fundamentalist organisations make it a growing regional and

probably international threat. In this aspect, one topic which

definitely needs more light is the internal structure of the

group and its sources of funding. For these, we know very

little, and little and inconsistent information is available

at present. Finally, in order to understand Boko Haram better,

it would be important to study the exact economic and

political implications of its actions for Nigeria and West

Africa – this knowledge would help in eventually devising pre-

emptive strategy for battling such organisations elsewhere, or

even for the prevention of their rise and foundation in the

first place.

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