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Question 1
Issues
In this assignment question, there are four issues.
1. Whether there is a valid offer and acceptance between Gary and Sam
in the first offer?
2. Whether Sam's disagreement of the first proposal is considered as
a rejection to Gary's
proposal?
3. Whether Gary's revocation to Sam is effective?
4. Whether there is a valid contract between Gary and his cousin?
Explanation of law
Agreement
The parties must agree on the rights and obligations created
under the contract. A process of offer and acceptance is a
fundamental part to enable an agreement to form any contract because
it requires consensus ad idem, which is the meeting of the minds of
the parties entering into the contract. It is crucial that an
agreement established a contractual relationship, which means that it
is essential for the parties to be able to define when an offer has
been made and when the offer has been accepted.
In the case Raffles v Wichelhaus (1864) EWHC Exch J19, the
parties entered into a contact to buy a cargo cotton on board a ship
called "The Peerless". Unknown to both Raffles (Plaintiff) and
Wichelhaus (Respondent), "The Peerless" had a sailing in October and
in December. Wichelhaus intended to buy the cotton arriving on the
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October sailing while the Raffles believed it was the December
sailing which had been agreed. When the cotton arrived in December,
Wichelhaus refused to accept the cotton. Raffles sued for breach of
contract. The court applied an objective test and states that a
reasonable people would not have been able to state with certainty
which sailing had been agreed. Therefore, the contract was void as
there was no consensus ad idem because both parties did not agree on
the same element in the contract.
Proposal
Based on Contract Act 1950 s.2 (a), a proposal is made "when
one person's willingness to do or to avoid from doing anything is
signified to one another, with a view to obtaining the approval of
that other to the act or avoidance." In simple word, the proposer
must have definite and certain willingness to be bound by the terms
of the proposal when accepted. Besides, in Contract Act 1950 s.2 (c),
proposer will become the promisor (or offeror) and acceptor will
become the promisee (or offeree) once the proposal is accepted.
In the case Preston Corporation Sdn. Bhd v Edward Leong & Ors
(1982) 2 MLJ 22, the Preston Corporation Sdn Bhd (Plaintiff) was a
book publisher and the Edward Leong (Respondent) was a printer firm.
Preston claimed that there was an overcharged of $500 while Edward
claimed that the ownership of film positive belonged to him due to
the contract’s express terms between them as well as a trade usage
prevalent in the printing industry. Consequently, Edward sued the
Preston. However, Preston denied that the contract contained such
2
terms which is so called trade usage. The judgment of court is in
favor of the plaintiff. The respondent’s claim was dismissed as the
extra charges of $500 were clearly erroneous. The ownership of the
reproduced film positives should not be claimed by respondents as the
terms in the quotations submitted by respondent are neither a binding
offer nor a part of contract.
In this case, the Federal Court expressed the view that an
offer is an intimation of willingness by an offeror to enter into a
legally binding contract and that its terms must either expressly or
impliedly indicate that it is to become binding upon acceptance by
the offeree.
Acceptance
(i)
Under Contract Act 1950 s.2 (b), the proposal is accepted "when
the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his approval
thereto". It implies that there must be a positive or overt act by
which the acceptor manifests his assent to the terms of the proposal
to constitute acceptance.
On the other hand, based on Contract Act 1950 s.4 (1), the
communication of a proposal is only complete when it comes to the
knowledge of the person to whom it is made. The proposer must
communicate his proposal to the acceptor to make sure the acceptor
has actual knowledge of the proposal as well as be aware of its
existence before he can be said to have accepted it. It should not be
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a coincidence between what the promisee has done and what was offered
by the proposer.
In the case R v Clarke (1927) 40 C.L.R, the Australian
Government (Respondent) offered a reward for information leading to
an arrest and conviction of persons responsible for the murder of two
police officers. X and Clarke (Plaintiff) were arrested and charged
with murder but later Clarke gave information leading to arrest of Y.
X & Y were later convicted and the plaintiff claimed for the reward.
The court held that the plaintiff failed to claim the reward as the
information he gave was to clear himself and not in reliance of the
offer to reward. In other word, the plaintiff had not intended to
accept the offer at the time the information about the murderers was
given.
Besides, in the case Taylor v Laird (1856) 25 LJ Ex 329, Taylor
(Plaintiff) resigned as a skipper of Laird's (Respondent) ship in the
middle of a voyage. Taylor however assisted to sail the ship home.
The court held the plaintiff cannot claim for fees due as he had
failed to make known his offer to sail the ship home and the
respondent had no opportunity either to accept or refuse the offer.
Thus, no contract existed.
(ii)
Furthermore, according to Contract Act 1950 s.7 (b), the
acceptance should be mentioned in some usual and reasonable manner.
It may be made in writing, orally or implied by conduct. However, if
a method of acceptance has been prescribed by the offeror, the
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acceptance must be according to the manner prescribed. If the
acceptor does not comply with the particular mode, the proposer may
disagree it and insist that offeree complies with the prescribed mode
"within a reasonable time after the acceptance is communicated to
him". If the proposer fails to object to the wrong mode that was
used, he would be considered to have accepted.
In the case Taylor v Allan (1966) I Q.B. 304, Taylor
(Plaintiff) took his car out for a drive, claiming he was covered by
an insurance company's (Respondent) temporary cover notice. The issue
is that could driving the constitute acceptance of the notice of 15
days of cover. The court held that the offer of a motor insurance was
deemed accepted by conduct when the plaintiff drove his car in
reliance on the insurance.
Next, in the case Affin Credit (Malaysia) Sdn. Bhd v Yap Yuen
Fui (1984) 1 MLJ 169, it was held that where a statutory provision
sets out a condition precedent before an offer can be accepted, non
compliance with that condition will result in no contract whatsoever.
Communication of acceptance
The general rule underneath this aspect is that acceptance of
the proposal must be communicated to the proposer. Acceptance is only
effective when it is communicated or brought to the notice of the
offeror. It applies to instantaneous communications whereby the
parties' communication is simultaneous, such as via telephone, fax,
telex. Based on Contract Act 1950 s.7 (a), the acceptance must be
absolute and unqualified for it must be the "mirror image" of the5
offer to be accepted in exactly the same terms of the proposal.
Acceptance must be made in reliance of the offer and it must be
correspond with all the terms of the offer.
If the offeree accepts the offer but then tries to impose new
terms, there is no acceptance. It is a counter proposal, whereby the
terms of the original offer are altered or modified. Thus, a counter
proposal operates as a rejection of the original proposal which
cannot be revived and subsequently accepted. A new offer is created.
As such, the original offeree who makes an offer would become the new
offeror and the original offeror becomes the new offeree who has a
right to either accept or reject the new modified offer.
In the case Hyde v Wrench (1840) 3 Beav, Wrench (Respondent)
offered to sell his farm in Luddenham to Hyde (Plaintiff) for £1200
and Hyde declined. On 6 June, Wrench made a final offer to the Hyde’s
agent offering to sell the farm for £1000. On 8 June, Wrench made a
counter-offer in writing of £950 and Hyde replied that he would
consider the offer. After examining the offer, Wrench refused to
accept and informed Hyde on 27 June. However, on 29 June, Hyde agreed
to buy the farm at £1000 but Wrench refused. Hype sued Wrench for
breach of contract. The court held that this offer was no longer
available. The plaintiff's offer to buy for £950 constituted a
counter offer and terminated the original offer of £1,000. Once
rejected, an offer cannot be revived by subsequent acceptance. Thus,
the judgement of court is favour of the respondent.
A distinction must be discerned between a counter proposal and
a request for further information. If the offeree only seek more6
information or ask if the terms could be modified, such a request
does not end the offer, which can still be accepted after the new
information has been provided.
In the case Stevenson Jacques v. McLean (1880) 5Q.B.D. 346,
Stevenson (Plaintiff) was an iron merchant. McLean (Respondent) was
the holder of warrants for quantities of iron. On Saturday, McLean
offered to sell to Stevenson a quantity of iron at a price of 40
shillings and stated that the offer would remain available until the
following Monday. On Monday, Stevenson telegraphed asking if they
could buy the iron on credit. McLean did not respond and later that
day sold all warrants to another party. Stevenson subsequently sued
McLean for non-delivery of iron warrants alleging breach of contract.
The court held that the plaintiff could still accept the respondent’s
offer even though he had telegraphed to the respondent requesting
details of possible credit terms. The telegram sent by the plaintiff
was not a rejection of the offer but a mere inquiry about whether the
terms could be modified.
Acceptance by post
The rules under acceptance by post are different with the
general rule under acceptance. The postal rule can only apply where
it is reasonable to use the post. The postal rule is not applicable
to telecommunication such as telephone, telex and telegraph.his
agent. Based on Contract Act 1950 s.4 (2)(a), the proposer is bound
by the contract at the moment the acceptor posts his letter of
acceptance irrespective of whether the proposer has knowledge of7
acceptor's actions while under Contract Act 1950 s.4(2)(b), the
acceptor will only be bound once the proposer receives and has
knowledge of the letter of acceptance.
There are illustrations under Contract Act s.4. Firstly,
illustration (a), A proposes,by letter, to sell a house to B at a
certain price. The communication of the proposal is complete when B
receives the letter. Secondly, illustration (b), B accepts A's
proposal by a letter sent by post. The communication of the
acceptance is complete- as against A, when the letter is posted; as
against B, when the letter is received by A.
In the case Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation (1955) 2
QB 327, Entores (Plaintiff) was a London-based trading company. One
day, Entores sent a telex message from England for the purchase of
100 tons of copper cathodes from Miles (Respondent) in Netherlands.
The Miles sent an acceptance by telex as well. However, the contract
was not fulfilled and so Entores attempted to sue the Miles for
damages. The court held that the contract was formed in and was
actionable in London. This is because in instantaneous communication
(telex message), the contract is complete at the moment the
acceptance is received and at the place where the acceptance is
received. Therefore, the judgment of court is favour of the
plaintiff.
Besides, in the case The Household Fire and Carriage Accident
Insurance Company (Limited) v Grant (1878-79) LR 4 Ex D 216, Mr Grant
(Respondent) applied for shares in the company (Plaintiff). The
company's acceptance of the offer was posted to him but was never8
received. The company went bankrupt and they asked Mr Grant for the
outstanding payments on the shares. Mr Grant refused to pay on the
ground that he did not receive an acceptance. The company sued him.
The court held that there was a valid and binding contract because
once posted, acceptance was complete. The post office was a common
agent so acceptance occurred when it reached the respondent's agent.
In the case Ignatius v Bell (1913) 2 FMSLR 115, Ignatius
(Plaintiff) sued for specific performance of an option agreement
which proposed to give him the option of purchasing Bell’s
(Respondent) right over a piece of land. This option was to be
exercised on or before the 20 August 1912. The parties had
contemplated the use of the post as a means of communication. The
plaintiff sent a notice of acceptance by registered post in Klang on
16 August 1912 but it was not delivered till the evening of 25 August
because the respondent was away. The letter remained in the post
office until it was picked up by the respondent. The Court held that
the option was duly exercised by the plaintiff when the letter was
posted on 16 August.
Moreover, in the case Henthorn v Fraser (1892) 2 Ch 27 (CA),
Henthorn (Plaintiff) lived at Birkenhead, called at the office of a
land society (Respondent) in Liverpool, to negotiate for the purchase
of some houses belonging to them. The secretary signed and handed to
him a note giving him the option of purchase for 14 days at £750. On
the next day the secretary posted to Henthorn a withdrawal of the
offer. However, before the withdrawal reached Birkenhead, Henthorn
posted to the secretary an unconditional acceptance of the offer. The
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court held that the binding contract was made on the posting of
plaintiff's acceptance. The revocation of the offer was too late.
Revocation of proposal and acceptance
Contract Act 1950 s.5 (1) and (2) state that as long as before
the communication of an acceptance is complete as against the
proposer or acceptor, a proposal may be revoked at anytime, but not
afterwards. Besides, under Contract Act 1950 s.4 (3)(a) and (b), it
provides that an agreement is regarded as complete as as against the
person who makes it or the person to whom it is made once there is
proper acceptance, it is a valid contract which cannot be revoked. It
is against proposer when it is posted and as against acceptor when it
comes to his knowledge.
In the case Byrne & Co v Leon Van Thien Hoven & Co (1880) 5 CPD
344, Van Tienhoven & Co (Respondent) posted a letter from their
office in Cardiff to Byrne & Co (Plaintiff) in New York by offering
1000 boxes of tinplates for sale on 1 October. However, on 8 October,
Tienhoven mailed a revocation of offer due to the price of tinplate
had risen 25 per cent. The revocation was not received by Byrne until
20 October. In the interim, on 11 October, Byrne received the
original offer letter and telegraphed his acceptance immediately on
the same day. He confirmed this acceptance by letter again on 15
October. Byrne sued Tienhoven for the breach of contract.
The court held that there was a binding contract between Byrne
and Tienhoven. The revocation of the offer was not effective until it
10
has been communicated to Byrne due to Section 5(1). When postal rule
is used for revocation, communication is only effect if and when it
is received by the offeree. As the revocation for this case is
happened after the acceptance, thus there was a contract formed in
this case. Therefore, the judgment of court is favour of the
plaintiff.
Consideration
To form an enforceable agreement, a proposal proposed by the
proposer must be accepted by the acceptor. In order for an agreement
to be a contract that is enforceable by law, there must be certain
essential elements, including consideration.
For aspect of consideration, Contract Act 1950 s.2 (e) states
that every promise which involves consideration for each other is
known as an agreement. An agreement which is enforceable by law is
known as a contract according to Contract Act 1950 s.2 (h) whereas an
agreement which is not enforceable by law in considered to be void as
mentioned in Contract Act 1950 s.2 (g). Contract Act 1950 s.26 states
that an agreement made without consideration is void.
For example, A has lost her cat. She promises to pay a reward
of RM200 to anyone who finds her cat and returns it safely to her. B
finds her cat. He has knowledge of the reward. B is entitled to the
reward. B's act of finding the cat and returning it to A is the
consideration for A's promise to pay RM200.
In the case K. Murugesu v. Nadarajah (1980) 2 MLJ 82, Murugesu
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(Defendant) agreed to sell his house to Nadarajah (Plaintiff). An
agreement was written on a scrap paper and says as follows, "I agree
to sell my house number (address) hold under....to Mr Nadarajah, the
present tenant of the house at$26000/- within 3 months from that
date." Murugesu later refused to sell the house and a specific
performance was ordered at the trial and the appellant took the
matter to Federal court. The appears was dismissed.
Apart from this case, there is another case, which is Wong Hon
Leong David v. Noorazman bin Adnan (1995) 3 MLJ 283, the respondent
promised that he would assist in obtaining the approval for the
application for conversion and sub division of the land from the land
administrator. In return, the appellant promised that to pay the
respondent RM268,888 for that service. The court held that even
thought the consideration is executory, was a good consideration.
Thus, there was a binding agreement between the parties.
Application of Law
1. Whether there is a valid contract between Gary and Sam in the
first offer?
Gary and Sam are friends. On 1st January 2015, Gary offered to
sell his bungalow to Sam at RM 500,000 as he will move to oversea and
work over there. Sam and his wife, Samantha was a newly married
couple and they have planned to purchase a house. According to
Contract Act 1950 s.7 (b), if a method of acceptance has been
prescribed by the offeror, the acceptance must be according to the
manner prescribed. In this question, Gary specified in the proposal
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that any of Sam's acceptance has to be done by way of post. Based on
Contract Act 1950 s.2 (a), the communication of Gary’s proposal is
completed when Sam has acknowledged the offer made by Gary on 1st
January 2014. Gary is ready to be bound by the terms of the proposal
when accepted.
Besides, under Contract Act 1950 s.2 (b), the proposal is
accepted "when the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his
approval thereto". Thus, the communication of an acceptance is
completed once Gary received the acceptance. However, on 5th of
January 2014, Sam and his spouses sent a counter proposal whereby
they will only be interested to purchase the bungalow if the price is
reduced to RM 450,000. In other word, the terms of the original offer
are altered or modified. Due to the counter proposal made by Sam, the
contract between Gary and Sam is no longer effective or it is void as
the RM 450,000 was a clear rejection for the Gary’s offer of RM
500,000, which cannot be revived and subsequently accepted. This
question cannot be fall in the category of request for further
information because Sam and his wife stated that they were interested
if the price reduced to RM 450,000, rather than asking if there is
any negotiation allowed.
2. Whether Sam's disagreement of the first proposal is considered as
a rejection to Gary's proposal?
Based on Contract Act 1950 s.7 (a), the acceptance must be
absolute and unqualified for it must be correspond with all the terms
of the offer. Sam and Samantha accepted the offer but then they tried
13
to impose new terms, thus it is counted as there is no acceptance.
The letter sent by Sam and his wife, Samantha to Gary is considered
as a counter proposal. In their letter, Sam and Samantha shows no
room of discussion. They are only interested to purchase Gary's house
if only the price is reduced to RM450,000. It is a rejection to the
original proposal.
3. Whether Gary's revocation to Sam is effective?
According to Contract Act 1950 s.5 (1), a proposal may be
revoked at any time before the communication of its acceptance is
complete as against the proposer. In this question, Gary's revocation
is done after Sam's acceptance. Gary's revocation should be counted
as ineffective if a general situation is provided. This is due to
Contract Act 1950 s.4 (2)(a) states that the proposer is bound by the
contract at the moment the acceptor posts his letter of acceptance.
However, in this question, Gary's revocation is counted as effective
for Sam has rejected the original offer himself at the very first
point. Thus, there is no valid contract between them. In other word,
Gary did not even need to send a letter to Sam to revoke the offer he
made earlier for the previous offer is already of invalid.
After his first letter saying they are only interested to
purchase the house if the price is reduced, Sam then sent a second
letter saying that they agreed to purchase the house for the original
price before Gary posted his letter of revocation. In this situation,
Gary is no longer the offeror but Sam. Sam is the offeror who offered
to buy the house at RM500,000, while Gary has the right to either
14
accept or reject it. Thus, the revocation to Sam is effective as both
of them are not binding with the contract.
4. Whether there is a valid contract between Gary and his cousin?
On 8th of January, 10a.m., Gary has received an offer from his
cousin to purchase the house at the price of RM 600,000. Gary
received the counter proposal from Sam at 2.30p.m on the same day.
However, Gary had immediately sent a revocation letter to Sam as he
declined to sell it at a cheaper price, RM 450,000. The contract
between Gary and his cousin is valid because Gary has his right to
sell the bungalow to his cousin as he is not bound by the contract
with Sam.
Besides, it is essential to have element of consideration to
form an enforceable agreement. Under both Contract Act 1950 s.2 (g)
and Contract Act 1950 s.26, the laws state that an agreement made
without consideration is void. Gary wanted to sell his house to his
cousin. In return, his cousin promised to pay him RM650,000. Although
the consideration is executory, it was a good consideration. Thus,
there was a binding agreement between Gary and his cousin. In
conclusion, there is no valid contract between Gary and Sam due to
the counter proposal of RM 450,000 offered by Sam.
Conclusion
In the conclusion, there is no valid contract between Gary and
Sam due to the counter proposal of RM 450,000 offered by Sam. Sam’s
disagreement of the first proposal is considered as a rejection to
Gary’s proposal which can not be revived. Gary did not need to make
15
any compensation to Sam for there is no breach of contract.
Gary had agreed to sell his bungalow to his cousin at the price
of RM 600,000. The revocation of Gary to Sam is effective whereby
both of them are not binding with the contract. This is due to in
this second proposal, Sam becomes the offeror while Gary becomes the
offeree. Gary has the rights to either accept or reject the offer.
Thus, Gary can freely manipulate his asset. There is a valid contract
between Gary and his cousin as both of them provided proper
consideration to each other.
Gary is advised that he would be successful to deny the action
or claim brought against him from Sam for his breach of promise. Gary
is advised not to compensate or sell his bungalow to Sam.
16
Question 2
Maxim of ‘ Nemo Dat Quod Non Habet’
Title represents the certificate of ownership. A Transfer of Title
is significant as it legally shows the title of a good has been
transferred from the seller to the buyer.
Nemo dat quod non habet is a Latin phrase literally means “no
one can give what he does not have” or “no one can give a better
title than he has himself”. This rule is found in the equivalent
Malaysian Sales of Goods Act 1957 section 27. For example, a person
sells the goods which is not belongs to him/her or who sells goods
without under owner’s authority cannot transfer ownership to the
buyers.
Normally, the transaction takes place between buyer and either
the owner of the goods or by authorized agent. However, in reality
there are still typical cases that involve two innocent parties. If
an innocent party purchased a good from a person who is not the
owner, the buyer, gets no title, whatever because this rule protects
the right of true ownership. Hence, if A steals a smartphone and
sells to B who paid value in good faith, but due to A did not have
any title, therefore B would not get ownership also. The smartphone
17
would still be owned by C and he could claim it back from B.
Therefore, this rule is able to protect the benefits of bona fide
purchaser which referred to an innocent party who does not notice
that seller has no right to claim the title of the property. The rule
can consider quite complicated because current owners need to trace
back to an ultimate root of property.
Furthermore, based on this rule, the tort of conversion is
applied if a person turning or using the goods that belonged to
another party or unlawful altering their nature. When a party takes
away or wrongfully assumes the right to goods which belonged to
another, it will in general be sufficient evidence of a conversion
but when the original taking was lawful, as when the party found the
goods, and the detention only is illegal, it is absolutely necessary
to make a demand of the goods, and there must be a refusal to deliver
them before the conversion.
Moreover, tort of conversion can be demonstrated by the
Malaysian case of Lim Chui Lai v Zeno Ltd [1964] 30 MLJ 314 . The
chairperson of the Zeno Ltd board of directors entered into an
agreement with a contractor named Ahmad. Ahmad declared to the
Petaling Jaya Authority that Zeno will supply the construction
material. When they attempted to sell the materials, they came to
know that the materials had been sold by Ahmad to Lim Chui Lai. In an
action for conversion, the court held that Ahmad was not the owner of
the property because he was merely bailee that did not have authority
to sell the property. Thus, Lim Chui Lai does not have the title upon
the materials bought from Ahmad.18
Apart from that, the rule, nemo dat quod non habet, can be
illustrated by referring to the case Greenwood v Bennet [1973] 1 QB
195 . In this case, Bennet, the original owner of a Jaguar car
entrusted it to Searle for repairs. Searle then used it for own
purpose, crashed it and sold the car to a garage proprietor, Harper
for 75 pound. Harper did not realize that the car was not belonged to
Searle and he spent 226 pound repairing it and sold it to the finance
company. The court held that the Jaguar still belonged to Bennet,
Harper could not get the car because Searle did not have the title.
Besides, the position of this rule was confirmed in case Rowland
v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500 . The claimant, a car dealer, bought a car
from defendant for £334. The car dealer painted the car and a
customer bought it with £400. Nevertheless, the car was returned to
the original owner after it was impounded by the police as stolen
car. The claimant returned the £400 to the customer and sued the
defendant under the Sale of Goods Act. The court held that the
ownership remained with the original owner because the defendant did
not have the right to sell the goods as he did not obtain good title
from the thief.
Apart from that, in the case of Ng Ngat Siang v Arab Malaysian
Finance Bhd & Anor [1988] 3 MLJ 319 which is quite similar with
Rowland v Divall, the plaintiff (P) bought a car from the second
defendant. The second defendant had to pay to MUI Finance from whom
he had earlier obtained a hire-purchase facility to affect the
transfer of title into P’s name. The second defendant retained the
registration card. The second defendant sold the car to B whose19
purchase was financed by the first defendant and cancel the
endorsement of MUI’s ownership. The first defendant endorsed its
ownership claim on the registration card. P applied to the court to
determine whether or not the first defendant had a better title to
the car. It was held that the registration card was not a document of
title and it could not be assumed that the person in possession of it
was the legal owner of the car. Hence, MUI Finance had relinquished
all right to ownership over the car.
Under the rule of nemo dat quod non habet, there are six
exceptions to be applied where the title of the goods can be
transferred to a bona fide party who had bought the goods from the
person who did not have the right to sell it provided that certain
conditions are met. The main condition highlighted in these
exceptions is the buyer who purchases the goods must act in good
faith and does not notice that the seller has no authority to sell
the goods at the time of sales. The aim of these exceptions is to
give a degree of protection to bona fide purchasers as well as the
original owners.
(1) Estoppel
Under Section 23(1) of Sales of Goods Act 1957, it states that
only the true owner of the goods can pass a good title whereas non-
owner can’t pass a good title if the owner of the goods is excluded
or estopped from denying that the seller or dealer had his
circumstances or authority to sell. Under Section 21 (1) there are
two distinct categories which are estoppel by negligence and estoppel
20
by representation. Estoppel by negligence occurs when the owner of
goods, because of his negligent or negligence failure to act, allows
the dealer of the goods to sell or offer to the buyer as having the
authority or circumstance of the true owner to sell the good.
Estoppel by representation arises when the owner of the goods has by
his conduct or words that represented to the buyer that the dealer is
the true or real owner of the goods, or has the circumstances or
authority to sell the goods.
An estoppel will arise when the real owner of the goods is by
preventing his conducts and leading the purchaser to deny the
unlicensed seller`s authority to sell the goods. The person who sells
the goods has his or her authority to sell and the buyer buys in
reliance on it. Title by estoppel is bound when it is against the
real owner and that privy to the conduct which the estoppel is based.
It is not applicable in respect of the strangers for the conduct. A
representation by the innocence is needed as to the authority of the
'seller' to preclude the owner for the buyer from establishing the
owner's ownership, where the owner’s conduct makes it goes on sale to
a buyer.
In case, Eastern Distributors Ltd v Goldring [1957] 2 QB 600,
the claimant wanted to purchase a car from a car seller but he did
not have enough money to pay for the deposit. Then, the seller
offered him to buy his van which he gave a suggestion that both cars
will be sold back to the defendants on the hire purchase terms.
Afterwards, the agreement formed in blank had been signed by the
claimant and forwarded it to the dealer who rejected the offer
21
before. The dealer rejected the proposal of the car but he accepted
the deal on the van. The court held that there was the effect of
estopping claimant from denying the right of the seller to sell off
the van when the claimant signed the hire purchase form in blank.
Thus, he was estopped from being forcing him to return his van.
Beside, in case Mercantile Credit Co Ltd v Hamblin [1965] 1
W.L.R 423, it is about an owner of a car who signed a form in blank
without understanding it, and believed that the car dealer will be
appeared to be respectable, to raise money for security of the car.
In fact, the dealer used the form that signed in blank to sell the
car to a finance company. There was no breach of duty because the
owner knew the dealer and believed him to be respectable. Thus, it
was held that this was not the carelessness of the owner to sign it
in blank. It was the deception of the dealer that caused the loss and
not the owner.
Furthermore, in case Farquharson Bros v Kin [1902] AC 325 which
shows the estoppel by representation, the timber merchants had their
timber in a warehouse which their employee clerks had only a very
limited authority to control it. A clerk sold timber through a false
name to innocent buyers. The timber company knew it and wanted its
timber back from the buyers. The buyers argued and the owner had
enabled the fraudulent scheme to happen by employing the clerk who
was a thief. Hence, the court held that this requires more comparable
law with simply placing someone in that position and more positive
actions are required. The company did not made any representation to
the buyers; the buyers had never heard of the timber company which
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created by the clerk so there was never any existence of offer by the
employee that he had the authority to sell the wood to the innocent
buyers.
In conclusion, in order to make estoppel an effective exception,
the owner should show his conduct to the buyer that the seller
appeared to be having the authority in selling the goods. Moreover,
as long as the buyer purchases the goods in good faith and without
any notice that the seller has no authority on the goods, the buyer
is entitled to good title of the goods by estoppel.
(2) Sale by a mercantile agent
The proviso to Section 27 of Sale of Goods Act 1957 states that
‘where a mercantile agent is, with agree of the owner, a document of
good title to the goods or in possession of the goods, any sale made
by him will be valid if he was authorized by the true owner of the
goods.’ This is provided that the buyer who acts in good faith does
not notice that the seller has no the authority to sell at the time
of the sale contract. Under Section 2, a mercantile agent can be
defined as ‘an agent who is having in the typical course of business
like an agent authority either to sell goods or to consign the goods
for purpose of sale, to raise money or to buy goods on the security
of goods. Therefore, a bailee, carrier or warehouseman are not a
mercantile agent but are the auctioneer to a broker or a dealer of
goods for getting the commission.
It is being asked, what would happen if the agent that sells the
owner’s goods is without the acknowledgement or authority of owner to
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sell? Basically, a buyer still can obtain a good title as long as he
or she satisfied the criteria. First of all, the agent must be in the
documents of tile or in possession of the goods. Next, the possession
must have the consent of the owner. The owner must agree to the agent
that either having documents of title or possession of the goods as
the agent even though it is not necessarily for the purpose of the
sale. For example, goods for display or to get offers should be done
with the agreement of the owner. When the mercantile agent is acting
in the typical course of business of a mercantile agent, the sale
must be made, which means that it is carried out within business
hours and in the typical way, there is nothing to be led by which an
agent would act. It is supposedly that anything wrong is being done,
or to give him notice that the disposition is the one where the agent
had no authority to do so. Last but not least, the buyer must have
acted in a good faith which is honestly. The buyer must have no
knowledge that the agent does not have authority to sell the goods.
In case, Oppenheimer v Attenborough & son [1908] 1 KB 221, the
defendant who is a merchant commissioned S, a diamond broker who had
diamonds to show to certain people who have the interest to
buy. S, instead of showing them, collateral them with the defendants,
a firm of lenders, who took them in good faith, took an action for
the delivery the diamonds evidence was given. The court held that it
was not a part of the diamond broker's business to pledge the
diamonds, and also the custom of the 621 diamond trade which was not
famous outside the trade agents had no authority to make.
In conclusion, to make this exception to be effectively applied,
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there are few conditions to be fulfilled. Firstly, the mercantile
agent must be in the documents of the titles to goods or the
possession of the goods. Besides, the possession of goods must be
agreed by the owner even though it is not for sale purpose. Thirdly,
the sales should be made when the mercantile agent acts in the
ordinary course of business. Lastly, the buyer must act in good faith
and does not have knowledge that the agent is not authorized to sell
the goods.
(3) Sales by one of joint-owners
Under Section 28 of Sale of Goods 1957, it states that if one of
the joint owners of goods has the possession of them by the
permission of the co-owners, the property of the goods is passed to
any person who bought it. These joint owners must be in good faith
and have not noticed that the dealer has no authority to sell at the
time of the sale contract. It contain two element which is one of the
owner has the sole possession of the goods by the permission of the
co-owners. Second, the buyers who acted in good faith and don’t have
the knowledge of the dealer`s lack of authority to sell.
For illustration, A, B and C jointly owned a juice blender. A
was allowed to keep it and use it since B and C did not know how to
make juice. However, A sold the juice blender to D without permission
from B and C and D also did not notice that A was lacking of
authority in selling the juice blender. It was held that D would
acquire a good title to the juice blender since he bought it in the
good faith.
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In conclusion, in order to make this exception to be applied
effectively, there are three elements that should be emphasized.
Firstly, the goods must be owned by several persons since it is an
exception related to joint owners. Next, one of the joint-owners must
have the sole possession with the permission of the co-owners.
Lastly, the buyer must have no knowledge that the dealer has no
authority power to sell the goods and therefore the buyer purchases
the goods in good faith which makes the buyer acquires good title to
the goods.
(4) Sale by person in possession under a voidable contract
Section 29 of Sale of Goods Act 1957 states that when the seller
of goods has obtained possession from the original owner under
voidable contract; however the contract has not been avoided at the
time of sale, the buyer gets good title to the goods if he acts in
good faith and does not have knowledge about the defect of title by
seller. Voidable contract is provided under Section 19 or 20 of
Contract Act 1950 that an agreement is voidable due to the free
consent of a party is affected by coercion, undue influence, fraud,
misrepresentation or mistakes. Subsequently, the party has the option
to choose either continue the contract with the defaulted party or to
terminate the contract.
Moreover, in order to ensure that the contract is successfully
rescinded by the owner, the court must be able to distinguish the
intention of the original owner to rescind the contract and that the
intention must be made before the resale takes place. With this, it
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can be claimed that the seller does not have a valid title to the
goods and thus he is not allowed to transfer the goods to any third
party. For illustration, A obtains goods from B by fraud and sells
them to C who is an innocent party. When C buys the goods, B has not
rescinded the contract made with A. Hence, C as the third party
obtains good title to the goods provided that C does not notice that
the seller, A has no ownership over the goods.
In case, Car & Universal Credit v Caldwell [1964] 2 WLR 600 , Caldwell
sold his Jaguar car to Norris, who had paid £10 cash deposit and a
cheque for £965. Besides, Norris left another car as security.
Nevertheless, the following day Caldwell discovered the cheque was
fraudulent and the car left as deposit is a stolen car. He reported
this incident to the police and also contacted the Automobile
Association to try to locate the car. Norris subsequently sold the
car to an innocent third party. The court held that because by this
time the title had been avoided by the seller, the innocent third
party acquired no title under section 29. Even if the owner had
avoided the contract before the resale, title will pass if the seller
was a buyer in possession and the sale had been made in the ordinary
course of business of a mercantile agent, that is, at a market for
used cars.
In conclusion, there are three major elements that must be
concerned to make this exception effective. The first one is the
seller get the possession of the goods under voidable contract. Next,
the voidable contract is not been rescinded by owner before the
resale. The last one is the buyer has acted in good faith and without
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knowledge of the fact that the seller has no good title to the goods.
(5) Sales by a seller in possession after sale
In Section 30 (1) of Sales of Goods Act 1957, it provides that
when the seller of the goods is still having the possession in hands
or the documents of the title to the goods after he or she sold the
goods to the first buyer, the seller is allowed to transfer the goods
to the second buyer too given that the buyer can get a good title to
the goods by acting in good faith and without notice of the previous
sales between the seller and the first buyer. When the title or
possession of the goods is passed to the second buyer who is the
third party, the only action can be taken by the first buyer against
the seller is the breach of contract, for example, claim of damages
from the seller. The second buyer is not facing any action from first
buyer as he or she does not have any knowledge about the transaction
between seller and first buyer. Besides, by just having the second
sales between the seller and second buyer, the second buyer cannot
get a good title to the goods unless the possession or document of
title to the goods is passed to the second buyer by the seller in the
transaction.
According to case, Michael Gerson Leasing Ltd v Wilkinson
[2000] All ER (D) 1140, in Gerson, Emshelf sold industrial equipment
to Gerson which is a financing company under the sales and leaseback
agreement. After that, Emshelf sold the part of this equipment to
another financing company again which is State Securities Ltd who
bought it in good faith. When Emshelf failed to pay the amount due on
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lease, Gerson terminated the agreement and subsequently sold the
goods to Sagebush Ltd without knowledge of the second sale between
Emshelf and State. Again, Sagebush sold the goods to Wilkinson. Since
Gerson never received payment from Sagebush, he claimed the ownership
of all equipment and take action against Wilkinson and State for the
goods. Thus, the court held that the buyer is not authorised to have
ownership of the goods if he have not pay the full amount of purchase
price yet. Thus, Sagebush cannot transfer the ownership of goods to
Wilkinson since he does not pay the full amount and does not hold the
ownership.
In this case, it is provided that the delivery of goods can be
in actual delivery or constructive delivery. Basically, constructive
delivery happens when a seller who has sold the goods is still
holding the possession of goods but he recognizes that the buyer is
entitled to the possession of the goods.
Apart from that, in case, Motor Credits (Hire Finance) Ltd v
Pacific Motor Auction Pty Ltd [1965] 2 All ER 105 , under a display
agreement, Motor Credits Ltd (MCL) who was a dealer in vehicles sold
a number of vehicles to the Plaintiff (P), in which Motor Credits
remained in possession of the cars for display in their showrooms.
MCL were paid 90% of the price and were authorized to sell the
vehicles as agent for P. P revoked MCL’s authority to sell the
vehicles when MCL had financial difficulties. However, MCL had sold
numbers of the cars to D who was bona fide buyer (third party).
Hence, it was held that D obtained a good title since he acted in
good faith and without notice of the transaction between MCL and P.
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For MCL, he is to be treated as continuing in possession and is able
to pass a good title under Section 30. Furthermore, in case,
Worcester Works Finance Ltd v Cooden Engineering [1972] 1 QB 210, as
long as the seller who has sold the goods to the buyer (third party)
still remains continuously in his possession of goods, it does not
matter if his possession is not in any capacity or even unlawful.
In conclusion, there are three conditions that must be fulfilled
so that this exception can take place. Firstly, the seller must
remain in the possession of the goods or documents of title to the
goods after selling the goods. Secondly, the seller or any mercantile
agent who acts for him must sell or transfer the goods or title to
the buyer. Lastly, the second buyer (third party) must act in good
faith and does not have the knowledge of fact about the previous sale
occurred between the seller and first buyer.
(6) Sales by a buyer in possession after sale
Section 30 (2) states that when a buyer has made a purchase or
agreed to make purchase and obtain possession of the goods or the
document of titles to the goods with the consent of the seller, the
buyer can sell the goods to another buyer who acts in good faith and
have no knowledge about any lien or the original seller’s rights or
interests in respect of the goods, the second buyer can get good
title to the goods. This exception is also applicable for the
situation where the first buyer does not obtained a good title to the
goods under the first transaction. Besides, in order to make this
exception effective, the buyer must make sure that the original sales
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contract is a valid contract and is not obtained under any hire-
purchase or sales-or-return contract or bailment. Furthermore, it is
not necessary that the person who transfers the title of the goods to
the second buyer must be the first buyer, for example, a mercantile
agent is authorized to deliver the title of the goods to the second
buyer as long as the agent has the possession of the goods or the
document of title to the goods with the consent of the seller.
For an illustration to this exception, a buyer B has agreed to
buy goods from seller A and thus he takes the possession of the
goods. Nevertheless, buyer B has not yet acquired title to the goods
due to the retention of title clause stated in the contract. Although
buyer B does not have ownership of the goods, he still sells the
goods to buyer C. It is held that buyer C can obtain good title to
the goods too provided that he acts in good faith and does not notice
the transaction between seller A and buyer B. Whereas for seller A,
the action that he can take towards buyer B is to terminate the
contract between both of them.
Apart from that, another example is a buyer B bought a car by
giving a worthless cheque to seller A. Subsequently, the buyer B had
sold the car in Warren Street (an established street market) to buyer
C, an innocent third party, before the police could trace him. The
court held the third party acquired a good title as he purchases in
good faith. Since buyer B sold the car in the market where all
dealers commonly sold cars, it is claimed that the buyer B
transferred the goods in a way where a mercantile agent acting in the
ordinary course of business of a mercantile agent would have sold it.
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In case, Newtons of Wembley Ltd v Williams [1965] 1 QB 560 ,
Plaintiff (P) sold a car to A and received a cheque from him. Once
the cheque was proved to be honoured, the title of the car will be
passed to A. A was given possession of the car but later on, the
cheque was dishonoured. P then rescinded the contract with A.
Nevertheless, A had sold the car to B before that who bought it
without knowledge of the previous transaction between P and A.
Moreover, B had resold it to the defendant (D). Hence, P tried to
take back the car from him. The court held that A, the first buyer,
was in possession of the car with the consent of the owner.
Therefore, he is authorized to pass the car to B with a good title
where B in turn transferred it to D. Thus, D had a good title to the
car too and entitled to own the car since he bought the car in good
faith.
In conclusion, the three main elements of this exception are
required in order to make it applicable. First of all, the buyer
having brought or agreed to buy goods must get possession of the
goods or the document of title to the goods with the consent of the
seller. Secondly, the buyer or mercantile agent who is acting for him
should sell or transfer the goods to the subsequent buyer who is the
third party. Thirdly, the subsequent buyer must buy in good faith and
without notice of the rights of original seller towards the goods so
that he is entitled to the good title of the goods.
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