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International Conference on Trends and Challenges in Concrete Structures Ghaziabad, UP, India December 19-21, 2013 Paper No. 11305 CHALLENGES OF QUALITY ASSURANCE IN NATIONAL HIGHWAY PROJECTS BEING EXECUTED ON BOT MODE UNDER DBFOT PATTERN IN INDIA S.S. Gaharwar 1 , Dr. Rajeev Goel 2 & Dr. R.K. Garg 3 1 Principal Scientist, CSIR CRRI, New Delhi, India, [email protected] 2 Principal Scientist, CSIR CRRI, New Delhi, India, [email protected] 3 Head, Bridges & Structures Division, CSIR CRRI, New Delhi, India, [email protected] ABSTRACT India has a large Road Network of approximately 33 Lakh km length. Roads carry 85 % of passenger and 70 % of freight traffic. National Highways (NH) constitute only 2 % of total road network, but carry almost 40 % of the traffic. National Highway Development Project (NHDP) is the world’s largest PPP road development programme. As per the prevailing Govt. Policies, BOT Mode is the preferred Mode of Bidding for NH Projects. In BOT NH Projects, the Concessionaire is responsible for the Design, Procurement, Finance, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Project Highway. On one hand, the Concessionaire is responsible for the Quality Assurance during the Construction Period; on the other hand, the Independent Engineer has a defined role towards the Quality Assurance as per the Model Concession Agreement (MCA). Due to the flexibility provided to the Concessionaire to use output based specifications in the technical parameters for Design and Execution of the Project Highway, serious challenges may arise towards the Quality Assurance of the Project Highway due to non-compliance by the Concessionaire to its obligations as per the MCA. Such challenges may sometimes pose serious safety concerns leading to major accidents at site. In this context, the paper presents a case study of an accident occurred on a major bridge during construction period while executing a National Highway Project on BOT (Toll) Mode under DBFOT pattern in India.
Transcript

International Conference on

Trends and Challenges in Concrete Structures Ghaziabad, UP, India December 19-21, 2013

Paper No. 11305

CHALLENGES OF QUALITY ASSURANCE IN

NATIONAL HIGHWAY PROJECTS BEING EXECUTED

ON BOT MODE UNDER DBFOT PATTERN IN INDIA

S.S. Gaharwar1, Dr. Rajeev Goel

2& Dr. R.K. Garg

3

1Principal Scientist, CSIR – CRRI, New Delhi, India, [email protected] 2Principal Scientist, CSIR – CRRI, New Delhi, India, [email protected]

3Head, Bridges & Structures Division, CSIR – CRRI, New Delhi, India, [email protected]

ABSTRACT

India has a large Road Network of approximately 33 Lakh km length. Roads carry 85 % of

passenger and 70 % of freight traffic. National Highways (NH) constitute only 2 % of total

road network, but carry almost 40 % of the traffic. National Highway Development Project

(NHDP) is the world’s largest PPP road development programme. As per the prevailing

Govt. Policies, BOT Mode is the preferred Mode of Bidding for NH Projects. In BOT NH

Projects, the Concessionaire is responsible for the Design, Procurement, Finance,

Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Project Highway. On one hand, the

Concessionaire is responsible for the Quality Assurance during the Construction Period; on

the other hand, the Independent Engineer has a defined role towards the Quality Assurance

as per the Model Concession Agreement (MCA). Due to the flexibility provided to the

Concessionaire to use output based specifications in the technical parameters for Design

and Execution of the Project Highway, serious challenges may arise towards the Quality

Assurance of the Project Highway due to non-compliance by the Concessionaire to its

obligations as per the MCA. Such challenges may sometimes pose serious safety concerns

leading to major accidents at site. In this context, the paper presents a case study of an

accident occurred on a major bridge during construction period while executing a National

Highway Project on BOT (Toll) Mode under DBFOT pattern in India.

2

Keywords: Quality Assurance, BOT NH Projects, Model Concession Agreement,

Concessionaire, Independent Engineer

INTRODUCTION

India has a large Road Network of approximately 33 Lakh km including Expressways (200

km), National Highways (NH)(70,934 km), State Highways (SH)(1,28,000 km), Major

District Roads (MDR)(4,70,000 km), Other District Roads (ODR)(26,50,000 km). Roads

carry 85 % of passenger and 70 % of freight traffic. NH constitutes only 2 % of length of

total road network, but carries almost 40 % of the traffic (NHAI, 2011).

National Highway Development Project (NHDP) (Fig.1), the world’s largest PPP road

development programme for improvement of National Highways in India covering a total

length of 54,454 km. It primarily involves up-gradation of existing 2 lane highways to 4/6

lane. NHDP has seven phases: Phase I (5846 km of GQ, 981 km of NS-EW Corridors, 356

km of Port Connectivity, 315 km of other NH, total 7498 km), Phase II (6161 km of NS-EW

corridor, 486 km of other NH, total 6647 km), Phase III (12109 km of NH), Phase IV (20000

km of NH as 2 lane with paved shoulders), Phase V (6 lane of 6500 km), Phase VI (1077 km

of Expressway), Phase VII (700 km of Ring Roads, Bypasses, Grade Separated Intersections,

Flyovers, Elevated Highways, ROBs, Underpasses, Service Roads) (NHAI, 2011).

As per the prevailing Govt. Policy, the order of preference for Mode of Bidding for NH

projects is: (i) BOT (Toll), (ii) BOT (Annuity), (iii) EPC, depending upon the traffic count

and financial viability of the project (B.K. Chaturvedi, 2010). In BOT projects, the

Concessionaire, at its own cost and expense, procures finance for and undertakes the design,

engineering, procurement, construction, operation and maintenance of the Project Highway

and observes, fulfils, complies with and performs all its obligations as per the Model

Concession Agreement (MCA) (Planning Commission, 2011). The technical parameters

proposed in the MCA are mainly based on output specifications. Only the core requirements

of design, construction, operation and maintenance of Project Highway are to be specified

and enough room is be left for the Concessionaire to innovate and add value. Thus, the

Concessionaire is provided the requisite flexibility in evolving and adopting cost-effective

designs without compromising on the quality of service for the road users. Cost efficiencies

could occur due to the provision of out-put based specifications in place of conventional

input-based procurement specifications, which could provide the opportunity to the private

sector to innovate and optimise designs. As per MCA, Monitoring and Supervision of

Construction, Operation, and Maintenance is proposed to be undertaken through an

Independent Engineer (IE) (a qualified firm) that is appointed by the owner agency. As per

the MCA, the IE has a defined Terms of Reference (NHAI, 2006).

3

Quality Assurance (Gaharwar, 2006) may be defined as all the planned and systematic

activities implemented within the Quality System and demonstrated as needed to provide

adequate confidence that an entity will fulfill the requirements (Neville, 1997). Due to the

provided flexibility to the Concessionaire to use output based technical parameters in design

and construction, and the time bound milestones of the construction schedule, it has been

observed that NH BOT Projects have been facing typical challenges in Quality Assurance on

account of non-compliance by the Concessionaire to its obligations as per MCA (IRC, 1998).

Such challenges may sometimes pose serious safety concern leading to major accidents

during the construction period in NH Projects (IRC, 2001), (Newmann, 2011). In this context,

the paper presents a case study of an accident occurred on a major bridge during construction

period while executing a National Highway Project on BOT (Toll) Mode under DBFOT

pattern in India (NHAI, 2010).

PREFERED MODE OF DELIVERY OF NATIONAL HIGHWAY (NH) PROJECTS

IN INDIA

As per the prevailing Govt. Policies, BOT (Toll) Mode has been the principal and preferred

mode of delivery which is evident from NHAI’s proposed Work Plan 2013-14, as given in

Table – 1 (B.K. Chaturvedi, 2010). Depending on the traffic count and financial viability of

the project, the three modes of delivery i.e. BOT (Toll), BOT (Annuity), EPC, may be

adopted concurrently rather than sequentially. In the present scenario, there are a handsome

number of NH projects which are being executed on BOT Mode.

CONCESSIONAIRE’S OBLIGATIONS TOWARDS QUALITY ASSURANCE

As per the MCA (Planning Commission, 2011), the Concessionaire has the following

obligations:

The Concessionaire shall, at its own cost and expense, procure finance for and

undertake the design, engineering, procurement, construction, operation and

maintenance of the Project Highway and observe, fulfill, comply with and perform all

its obligations as per MCA.

The Concessionaire shall ensure that the personnel engaged by it in the performance of

its obligations under the Concession Agreement are at all times properly trained for

their respective functions.

The license, right of way and right to the Site granted to the Concessionaire as per

MCA shall always be subject to the right of access of the Authority and the

Independent Engineer and their Employees and Agents for inspection, viewing and

exercise their rights and performance of their obligations under the MCA.

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Table-1: NHAI’s proposed NH Development Work Plan up to 2013‐14

Mode of Delivery:

BOT (Toll)

2009-10 2010-11 2011-12 2012-13 2013-14 Total

4 lane - Ph III 4373 - - - - 4373

4 lane – Ph II 55 - - - - 55

6 lane – Ph V 2403 1200 - - 1477 5080

Expressway – Ph VI - - 436 604 1040

2 lane with Paved

Shoulders – Ph III

1977 - - - 1977

2 lane – Ph IV 4086 3075 339 7500

4 lane – Ph VII - 681 - 681

Mode of Delivery:

BOT (Annuity)

4 lane – Phase III 524 - - 524

4 lane – Ph II 380 380

J&K – Ph II 239 - - - 239

2 lane with Paved

Shoulders – Ph III

1477 - - -

2 lane – Ph IV - 4645 4000 1355 10000

4 lane – SARDP-NE 394 - - - 394

Mode of Delivery:

EPC

4 lane – SARDP - NE 330 - - - 330

2 Lane – Ph IV - 1161 1000 339 2500

2 lane with Paved

Shoulders – Ph III

500 500

Total 12,652 11,092 9,9192 2,637 1,477 37,050

On or after the Appointed Date, the Concessionaire shall undertake the construction of

Project Highway as per the various provisions of the MCA.

The Concessionaire shall prepare and submit, with reasonable promptness and in such

sequence as is consistent with the Project Completion Schedule, three copies each of

all Drawings to the Independent Engineer for their review.

By submitting the Drawings for review to the Independent Engineer, the

Concessionaire shall be deemed to have represented that it has determined and verified

that the design and engineering, including field construction criteria related thereto, are

in conformity with the Scope of the Project and the Specifications and Standards.

5

No review and/or observation of the Independent Engineer and/or its failure to review

and/or convey its observations on any Drawings shall relieve the Concessionaire of its

obligations and liabilities under the Concession Agreement in any manner nor shall

the Independent Engineer or the Authority be liable for the same in any manner.

ROLE OF INDEPENDENT ENGINEER TOWARDS QUALITY ASSURANCE

As per the MCA (NHAI, 2006), the Independent Engineer has the following obligations:

To review the Drawing and Document submitted by the Concessionaire.

To review, inspect and monitor the progress of Construction Works as per the MCA.

Conducting Tests on completion of construction and issuing Completion / Provisional

Certificate.

Undertaking all other duties and functions in accordance with the MCA.

The Independent Engineer shall discharge its duties in a fair, impartial and efficient

manner, consistent with the highest standards of professional integrity and Good

Industry Practice.

MONITORING OF CONSTRUCTION WORKS AS PER MCA

Relevant guidelines of MCA (Planning Commission, 2011) are as follows:

During the Construction Period, the Concessionaire shall, no later than seven days after

the close of each month, furnish to the Authority and the Independent Engineer a

Monthly Report on progress of the Construction Works and shall promptly give other

relevant information as may be required by the Independent Engineer.

During the Construction period, the Independent Engineer shall inspect the Project

Highway at least once in a month and make the ‘Inspection Report’ stating in

reasonable detail the defects or deficiencies, if any, with particular reference to the

Scope of the Project and Specifications and Standards. It shall send the copy of the

Inspection Report to the Authority and the Concessionaire within seven days of such

Inspection and upon receipt thereof, the Concessionaire shall rectify and remedy the

defects or deficiencies, if any, stated in the Inspection Report. Such Inspection or

submission of Inspection Report by the Independent Engineer shall not relieve or

absolve the Concessionaire of its obligations and liabilities hereunder in any manner

whatsoever.

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For determining that the Construction Works conform to the Specifications and

Standards, the Independent Engineer shall require the Concessionaire to carry out or

cause to be carried out tests, at such time and frequency and in such a manner as may

be specified by the Independent Engineer from time to time, in accordance with Good

Industry Practice for quality assurance. The size of sample for such tests shall, to the

extent possible, not exceed 10 % (ten per cent) of the quantity and / or number of tests

prescribed by IRC and / or MoRT&H for the construction works undertaken by the

Authority through their contractors. The Concessionaire shall, with due diligence, carry

out or cause to be carried out all the tests in accordance with the instructions of the

Independent Engineer and furnish the results thereof to the Independent Engineer. In

the event that results of any tests conducted establish any defects or deficiencies in the

Construction Works, the Concessionaire shall carry out remedial measures and furnish

a report to the Independent Engineer in this context. The Independent Engineer shall

require the Concessionaire to carry out or cause to be carried out tests to determine that

such remedial measures have brought the Construction Works into compliance with the

Specifications and Standards, and the procedure set forth in the MCA shall be repeated

until such Construction Works conform to the Specifications and Standards.

During the Construction Period, the Concessionaire shall provide to the Authority for

each calendar quarter, a Video Recording, which will be compiled into a three hour

compact disc or digital video disc, as the case may be, covering the status and progress

of Construction Works in that quarter.

CASE STUDY OF AN ACCIDENT OCCURRED ON A MAJOR BRIDGE DURING

CONSTRUCTION

Description of bridge and status of work by the time accident occurred

The length of the 3 – lane then under construction major bridge on a main river is 768 m

(NHAI, 2010). The bridge has a total of 24 Spans; the c/c length of each Span is 32 m (Fig.2).

The bridge has a total of 23 Piers and 2 Abutments. The Sub-structure of Piers has a circular

type RCC Cross Section with 3 m diameter. The Pier Cap is of ‘Hammer Head’ type. The

EPC Contractor proposed the casting of Pier Cap using Support Trusses on to the Pier sub-

structure (Fig.3 to Fig.5). By the time of accident, the status of the then on-going construction

work was as follows:

Foundation raft for Piers, P4 to P10, and P14 to P23 was completed. Foundation

excavation was in progress for the Abutment, A2.

Substructure up to full height was completed for Piers, P4 to P10, P14, and P16 to P23.

Substructure’s casting was in progress for Pier, P15.

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Pier Cap’s casting was completed for Pier, P22. After de-shuttering, the same sets of

Trusses were shifted from P22 to P20. Erection of Form work at P20 was done and

reinforcement was put in place and P20 was ready for concreting.

Description of the accident

A total of 48 cum of concrete was proposed to be used in the construction of the Pier Cap of

P20. Before concreting, the reinforcement, form work bracing, support, working plate forms,

railing, were checked by the Concessionaire’s Project Management Consultant (PMC).

Concreting using Concrete Pump was started at 9.00 AM on the day of the accident from the

U/S side of the Pier Cap. Concreting on the U/S side was completed and finishing was under

progress. On the D/S side of the Pier Cap, while completing the placing of the last 6 cum of

wet concrete by Concrete Pump, the Support Trusses for the pier cap formwork sheered at the

critical points of the trusses where they were welded to the vertical strut trusses that were

bolted to the Pier. The angle beam metal sheered and the truss collapsed under the load

around 12.30 PM on the day of the accident. At the time of the accident, there were 12

persons on the top of the Pier Cap including one EPC Engineer. Out of 12 persons, 7 persons

fell on the ground and 5 persons remained at the top of the Pier Cap of P20. These 7 persons

were rushed to the hospital, out of which 3 persons died and the remaining 4 were seriously

injured.

Probable reasons for failure of the truss

Detailed investigations were got carried out through the Independent Engineer to know the

probable reasons for failure of the supporting truss. The observations of the Independent

Engineer are as follows:

The failure could have occurred due to slippage of Nuts used for fixing of Support

Truss frame to the vertical Tie Rods. Collapse of Support Truss could also have

occurred due to failure of one of the welded joints. Sudden slippage at one of these

places might have resulted in imbalance of loads on various joints of the frame on the

D/S side where work was under progress. It could be possible that due to failure at any

one location, a progressive failure might have been initiated (Fig.6 [(a), (b)]).

Although the Test blocks for the Support Truss were already prepared, but no Load

Test was carried out on the Support Truss before using it on the Pier, P22.

The detailed design calculations of the Support Truss were not submitted to the

Independent Engineer for review / approval purpose and no Request for Inspection

(RFI) before concreting of Pier Cap of P20 was received by the Independent Engineer

from the Concessionaire. The Concessionaire did not follow proper Safety Procedures

8

as per the Good Industry Practice and proceeded for concreting of the Pier Cap of P20

on their own.

The workers present at the top of the Pier Cap during concreting, were having Safety

Jackets and Helmets only and were not having Safety Belts and Safety Shoes. Further,

no Safety Nets and Safety Railings were provisioned.

There was no Gusset Plates provided between the truss and vertical member ‘A’. Truss

is supported by welding only (that too without any Inside Welding) (Fig.6 [(a), (b),

(c)]).

The load distributed for the Bracing members was not acting as a point Load. The

bracing members, 6,7,8,9,10, placed at 390 mm, 280 mm, 270 mm, 295 mm, 240 mm,

320 mm, respectively above from the bottom truss (D). also 280 mm, 285 mm, 295

mm, 200 mm, 305 mm, below the Top Truss (B). Both side welded with vertical post

1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (Fig.6(a)).

Vertical Member (A) 100*50 channel 2 nos. jointed in truss side with 10 mm thick MS

Plate 150 mm width with 06 cut pieces. Outer side welded with 2 pieces. 10 mm thick

welded with only Top portion (that too without any Inside Welding) (Fig.)).

Thickness of the welding was varying in the range, 1mm to 2 mm for sections

wherever welding was done.

At End portion of Plate form truss which is able to carry load up to 3.5 T, is supported

by welding only. It is not a continuous member of a truss (B) and (D). It is a separate

member (Fig.6 (c)).

Pier cap truss No. 1 and 3 supported with packing plate of 390 mm, total length of the

Bolt from the Pier is 510 mm (390 mm + 120 mm) (Fig.6(e)).

Follow-up remedial measures adopted at site

The used Support Truss was not used in further construction work.

Design of the Support Truss System was carried out afresh by removing the short falls.

The Shop Drawing was verified by the Designer of the Support Truss to conform that it

fulfilled the design requirement.

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The material used for fabrication of the Support Truss was obtained from the original

manufacturers like TATA, RINL, and SAIL. The connection details were properly

detailed in the Shop Drawings and Fabrication was carried out accordingly.

The Analysis, Design, Fabrication Drawings, and Structural Drawings, were submitted

by the Concessionaire to the Independent Engineer for Review / approval purpose and

the construction work was carried out accordingly.

All the required Safety Measures, Working Plate Form, Safety Railings, were provided

at the Site.

CONCLUSIONS

In BOT Projects, the Concessionaire is responsible for the Design, Engineering,

Procurement, Finance, Construction, Operation and Maintenance of the Project

Highway.

As per MCA, the Concessionaire has defined obligations towards the Quality

Assurance during the Construction Period.

In National Highways Projects on BOT Mode, typical challenges in Quality Assurance

may arise on account of non-compliance by the Concessionaire to its obligations as per

the MCA.

These Quality Assurance challenges may pose serious safety concern during

Construction Period leading to major accidents.

As per MCA, the Independent Engineer has a defined Role towards the Quality

assurance during the construction Period.

For ensuring proper Quality Assurance during Construction Period, the Concessionaire

and the Independent Engineer have to fulfill their defined obligations as per the MCA.

Proper Safety Measures as per the Good Industry Practice must be followed during the

Construction Period.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The Authors sincerely express their gratitude to the Director, CSIR-CRRI, and the Chairman,

NHAI, for their permission and guidance to prepare and publish this paper. The Authors also

acknowledge the assistance received directly or indirectly from the concerned Staff Members

of CSIR-CRRI for the preparation of this paper.

10

REFERENCES

1. Gaharwar, S.S., Kumar, Ram, et al (2006), ‘Quality Assurance and Health Monitoring of the

6-lane Roadway Bridge across the Palam Drain, New Delhi, Part – A: Quality Assurance’,

CRRI

2. John Newman, John and Choo, Ban Seng (2011), ‘Advance Concrete Technology: Testing

and Quality’, Elsevier

3. Monthly Progress Report (2010), NHAI

4. Neville, A.M. and Brooks, J.J. (1997), ‘Concrete Technology’, AWL

5. NHAI Works Manual (2006), NHAI (Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport & Highways)

(Dept. of Road Transport & Highways), Govt. of India

6. NHDP (2011), NHAI (Ministry of Road Transport & Highways), Govt. of India

7. Public Private Partnership in National Highways: Model Concession Agreement (2011),

Planning Commission, Govt. of India

8. Quality Assurance Manual (2006), NHAI (Ministry of Shipping, Road Transport &

Highways) (Dept. of Road Transport & Highways), Govt. of India

9. Report of B.K. Chaturvedi Committee on NHDP (2010), ‘Revised Strategy for

Implementation of the National Highways Development Project (NHDP) – Framework and

Financing’, Ministry of Road Transport & Highways, Govt. of India

10. SP 17:SOAR (1996), ‘Non-Destructive Testing Techniques for Concrete Bridges’, IRC

11. SP: 47(1998), ‘Guidelines on Quality Systems for Road Bridges (Plain, Reinforced,

Prestressed and Composite Concrete)’, IRC

12. SP: 57(2001), ‘Guidelines on Quality Systems for Roads’, IRC

11

Fig. 1: NHDP Project Fig. 2: General Arrangement of Bridge Spans

Fig. 3: Pier Cap Form work in place Fig. 4: Pier Cap Form work in place

before Concreting after Concreting

12

Fig. 5: Schematic Diagram of Pier Cap of P20 Fig. 6(a): General Arrangement of

Support Truss

Fig. 6 (b): Details of Connecting Members Fig. 6 (c): Details of Connecting Members

of Supporting Truss of Supporting Truss

13

Fig. 6 (d): Details of Connecting Members Fig. 6 (e): Details of Connecting Members

of Supporting Truss of Supporting Truss


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