CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE Bachelor thesis

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Bachelor thesis

2012 Lenka Barbora Olejníková

CHARLES UNIVERSITY IN PRAGUE

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

INSTITUTE OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

Lenka Barbora Olejníková

Democratic Peace in Theory and Practice

Bachelor thesis

Prague 2012


Author: Lenka Barbora Olejníková

Supervisor: PhDr. Jan Karlas M.A., Ph.D.

Year: 2012


Bibliographic entry

OLEJNÍKOVÁ, Lenka. Democratic Peace in Theory and Practice. Prague, 2012.

Bachelor thesis (Bc.). Charles University in Prague. Faculty of Social Sciences.

Institute of Political Science. Department of International Relations. Supervisor

PhDr. Jan Karlas M.A., Ph.D.

Abstrakt

Bakalářská práce s názvem „Demokratický mír v teorii a praxi“ usiluje o to,

představit Teorii demokratického míru jako teorii mezinárodních vztahů

s praktickým významem pro současnou politickou praxi. Teorie demokratického

míru bude nejprve analyzována jako součást širší liberální tradice v oboru Teorie

mezinárodních vztahů. Následovat bude výzkum, jakou má Teorie

Demokratického míru přesnou souvislost s používanými nástroji mezinárodní

politiky. Hlavním cílem práce je komplexní analýza povahy Teorie

Demokratického míru s důrazem na její potenciální vliv na běžnou politickou

praxi mezinárodních vztahů.

Abstract

The thesis “Democratic Peace in Theory and Practice” aims to present the

Democratic Peace Theory as an international relations theory with a practical

significance for the political practice. The Democratic Peace Theory will be first

analysed as a part of a broad liberal tradition of International Relations Theory,

and then particular ways of how the theory is empirically related to the

practices of international politics will be examined. The main objective of the

thesis is the analysis of the complex nature of the Democratic Peace Theory

with the emphasis on the potentiality of the theory to have larger political

impact.


Klíčová slova

Teorie demokratického míru, liberalismus, realismus, konstruktivismus, podporademokracie, liberální intervence, Irák.

Key words

Democratic Peace Theory, liberalism, realism, constructivism, democracypromotion, liberal interventionism, Iraq.

96 901 characters, 51 pages


Prohlášení:

Prohlašuji, že jsem předkládanou práci zpracovala samostatně a použila jen

uvedené prameny a literaturu. Dále prohlašuji, že tato práce nebyla použita pro

získání jiného titulu. Současně dávám svolení k tomu, aby tato práce byla

zpřístupněna v příslušné knihovně Univerzity Karlovy a prostřednictvím

elektronické databáze vysokoškolských kvalifikačních prací v repositáři

Univerzity Karlovy a používána ke studijním účelům v souladu s autorským

právem.

V Praze dne 18. května 2012 Lenka Barbora Olejníková


I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor PhDr. Jan Karlas

M.A., Ph.D. whose patience, advice and guidance were indispensable to

creating this bachelor thesis.-


Vymezení tématu

Základy fenoménu demokratického míru leží ještě před vznikem oboru

Mezinárodní vztahy, v politické filosofii Immanuela Kanta, konkrétně v jeho

přesvědčení, že republikánský typ vlády představuje základní podmínku pro

naplnění ideje „věčného míru“. V průběhu 70. a 80. let se tato idea

transformovala v rámci liberálního proudu do podoby relevantní teorie

mezinárodních vztahů. Existují dva základní přístupy k Teorii demokratického

míru (TDM). Monadická verze vychází z předpokladu, že demokratické režimy

jsou už ze své podstaty méně bojechtivé a tudíž vedou obecně méně válek než

režimy nedemokratické. Dyadický přístup na druhou stranu tvrdí, že nelze říci, že

by demokracie válčily obecně méně než nedemokracie, ale velmi zřídka, pokud

vůbec válčí mezi sebou (Chan 1997, 61). V následujícím desetiletí byla tato

teorie podrobena tvrdé kritice ze strany zastánců realismu a zároveň byla

důkladně testována teoretiky mezinárodních vztahů. Výsledkem tohoto

testování bylo empirické potvrzení dyadické verze TDM. Dnes je teorie

akademiky více méně uznávána a přijímána. Nadále také zůstává výrazným

tématem debaty v rámci oboru Mírová studia potažmo liberalismu v oboru

Teorie mezinárodních vztahů. Mezi nejznámější autory, zabývající se TDM, patří

například Michael W. Doyle, Steve Chan nebo Nils-Petter Gleditsch, z jejichž

výzkumných prací budu vycházet.

Význam TDM podtrhuje fakt, že byla určitým způsobem reflektována

mezinárodně politickými aktéry a stala se tak součástí zahraničně politické praxe

mnoha států. A to v podobě víry, že podpora demokratizace a šíření

demokratických norem na úrovni jednotlivých státu, povede k celkovému

upevnění spolupráce a míru v mezinárodních vztazích.

Institut Politologických Studií

Projekt bakalářské práce: Demokratický mír: teorie a praxe


Cíle práce

Tato práce je rozdělena do dvou základních tematických částí a přirozeně

tedy bude obsahovat více dílčích cílů.

Nejprve se budu zabývat samotnou TDM. Mým záměrem je nejen analyzovat

různé přístupy k demokratickému míru, ale také určit význam a místo teorie

v rámci liberalismu a poté se jí pokusit dosadit do kontextu současné debaty

v oboru Teorie mezinárodních vztahů.

V druhé části práce budu zkoumat reálné implikace TDM v mezinárodních

vztazích. Za cíl si kladu zhodnocení vlivu idejí demokratického míru na

mezinárodně politickou realitu. Takovéto zhodnocení významu TDM podle

mého názoru v odborné literatuře chybí a vidím v něm hlavní přidanou hodnotu

této práce.

Výzkumná otázka

Z důvodu několika zkoumaných oblastí považuji za nutné formulovat více

výzkumných otázek. „Jakou pozici zaujímá Teorie demokratického míru v rámci

liberálního přístupu v oboru Teorie mezinárodních vztahů?“ „Jaké jsou konkrétní

dopady TDM na mezinárodně politickou realitu?“ „Přispívá demokratická

intervence k naplnění teze demokratického míru?“

Metoda výzkumu

Jak už bylo řečeno, první část se bude soustředit na rozbor TDM. Pomocí

obsahové analýzy statí publikovaných v odborných periodikách popíši hlavní

názorové proudy a pojetí demokratického míru, a poté se zaměřím na hlavní

body kritiky této teorie z pohledu více teoretických přístupů, zejména ale

z realistického hlediska. Co se týče určení významu TDM v rámci liberalismu,


budu brát v potaz především výchozí předpoklady institucionalismu,

funkcionalismu a teorie interdependence.

Druhá část práce bude analyzovat použití tezí demokratického míru

v zahraničně politických akcích demokratických států a jejich dopad na

mezinárodní realitu v období po druhé světové válce.

Jako projev TDM v mezinárodní politice zde bude zkoumáno šíření

demokratických norem a podpora demokratických institucí uskutečňované ve

dvou rovinách. Za prvé jsou to nenásilné diplomatické akce demokratických

států na úrovni jednotlivých států a na mezinárodní úrovni, tedy na půdě

Organizace spojených národů a jiných mezinárodních organizací. Druhou rovinu

tvoří cesta násilné demokratizace v podobě vojenských intervencí vedených

liberálními státy ve jménu šíření demokracie a svobody. Gleditsch pro to užívá

termín „demokratický intervencionismus“ (Gleditsch, Nils,Håvard 2007). Cílem

zde není obsáhnout všechny případy demokratických intervencí po roce 1945.

Ale na několika případech v období před a po skončení Studené války analyzovat

následující skutečnosti: motivace intervenujícího státu/ů k intervenci (míra

zdůvodnění ozbrojeného aktu pomocí tezí TDM), charakteristika režimu

intervenovaného státu a následky intervence na něj.

Ze získaných informací se potom pokusím formulovat důsledky použití

demokratické intervence na nedemokratické režimy „přijímajících“ států a míru

uskutečnění demokratizačních motivů intervenujících států.

Výzkum bude rozdělen do dvou časových úseků, kdy hlavní dělicí čarou bude

konec Studené války z důvodu zásadní změny mezinárodní reality po rozpadu

bipolárního systému v mezinárodních vztazích.

Výsledným výstupem by mělo být obecné zhodnocení role Teorie

demokratického míru a použití jejich tezí v mezinárodních vztazích.


Předpokládaná osnova práce:

1. Cíle a použité metody práce

2. Teorie demokratického míru

2.1. Monadický demokratický mír

2.2. Dyadický demokratický mír

3. Kritika TDM

4. Liberalismus a TDM

5. TDM a jeho role v Teoriích mezinárodních vztahů

6. Ideje TDM v zahraniční politice států

6.1. Nenásilná podpora demokratizace ve světě

6.2. Demokratické intervence

7. Závěr


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Chan, Steve. 1993. "Democracy and War: Some Thoughts On Future ResearchAgenda." International Interactions 18 (3, 1993): 205-213.

Chan, Steve. 1997. “In Search Of Democratic Peace: Problems and Promise.”Mershon International Studies Review (41:1 May) 59-91.

de Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, Dosna, Georgie W.. 2006. „ Intervention andDemocracy.“ International Organization, 627-649.

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Gleditsch, Nils Petter & Håvard Hegre, 1997. „Peace and Democracy: ThreeLevels of Analysis“,Journal of Conflict Resolution 41(2): 283–310.

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Haas, Michael. 1995. “When Democracies Fight One Another: Just What Is ThePunishment For Disobeying The Law?” Paper Presented To The Annual

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Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Margaret Hermann. 1995. “Military Intervention andThe Democratic Peace.” International Interactions (21:1) 1-21.

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Lektzian, David, Souva, Mark. 2009. „A Komparative Tudory Test of DemocraticPeace Arguments, 1946-2000.“ Journal of Peace Research (46:1), 17-37.

MacMillan, John. 2003. „Betone the Separate Democratic Peace.“ Journal OfPeace Research (40:2) 233-243.

Maoz, Zeev, and Bruce Russett. 1993. “Normative and Structural Causes Of TheDemocratic Peace, 1946-1986.” American Political Science Review (87:3September) 624-638.

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Pickering, Jeffrey, J., 1999. „The Structural Shape of Force: InterstateIntervention in the Zones of Peace and Turmoil, 1946–1996.“ InternationalInteraction 25(4): 363–391.

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Contents:

1. Introduction...............................................................................................1

2. Democratic peace in theory...................................................................... 3

2.1. The Democratic Peace Theory as a part of Liberalism........................4

2.2. Democratic peace in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy.............................8

2.3. The democratic peace proposition..................................................... 10

2.3.1. The monadic hypothesis........................................................... 12

2.3.2. The dyadic hypothesis...............................................................14

2.4. The Democratic Peace Theory and its critics...................................... 21

3. Democratic peace in practice.................................................................... 27

3.1. Implications of the democratic peace............................................... 29

3.1.1. Non-military democracy promotion............................. .......... 30

3.1.2. Military democracy promotion.............................................. 32

3.1.2.1. Humanitarian interventions - the case of Kosovo

and Libya............................................................................. 35

3.1.2.2. The invasion of Iraq....................................................... 38

3.2. Democratic peace and democracy promotion practices.................... 40

3.3. From theory to practice...................................................................... 41

4. Conclusion........................................................................................... 43

5. Bibliography......................................................................................... 46



1

1. Introduction

Since the articulation of the core assumptions in the 1980s the

Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) has become a prominent field of study

within the liberal tradition of International Relations Theory (IRT). The

emblematic statement - “Democracies do not fight each other” - has

reached almost pop-cultural popularity with the general public and

democratic policy makers.

The perception of democracies as inherently more peace-prone seems to

become firmly embedded in the political discourse, and political actions of

western democracies. The democracy promotion practices have become

common foreign policy tools of democracies, and international

organisations with explicit reference to the prospect of peace that

democratisation brings. The connection between democracy promotion and

the DPT is apparent as the former follows the inherent logic of the latter.

The DP scholarship has been predominantly concerned with establishing

and explaining peace amongst democracies. However, coercive forms of

democracy promotion, particularly military intervention has proven to be

linked to the DP research. It is the invasion in Iraq that seemed to call the

whole DP scholarship into question when the DPT was explicitly articulated

as the theoretical foundation for the justification of the invasion.

The main objective of the thesis is to present the DPT as an international

relations theory with a practical significance for the political practice. The

DPT will be first analysed as a part of a broad liberal tradition of IRT, and

then particular ways of how the DPT is empirically related to the practices of

international politics will be examined.


2

The analysis of the complex nature of the DPT with the emphasis on the

potentiality of the DPT to have larger political impact is the main

contribution of the thesis to the field of IRT.

Particular questions which my research addresses are: “How is the DPT

translated into political practice?” and “To what extent are the DP ideas

used for war-waging purposes?”

The method applied in the thesis is the analysis of the content of original

literature. The method is largely descriptive, yet necessary for the scope of

the thesis. The range of the literature used is broad; qualitative and

quantitative analyses theoretically covering the core arguments of both,

proponents, and critics of the DPT; democracy promotion practices;

democratic war involvement, case studies focused on interventions in

Kosovo, Libya, and Iraq; and relation between theory and practice.

The thesis consists of two main parts, which focuses on different sides of

the DPT – theoretical and practical.

The first part presents the theoretical underpinning of the DPT. The aim

is, however, not to give an exhaustingly thorough overview of the DP

research but rather to offer a coherent analysis of the core arguments that

constitute the DP scholarship. The essential literature of the most influential

DP theorists will be used for this purpose; e.g. Immanuel Kant (as the author

of the philosophical roots of the theory), Michael Doyle, Joseph Rummel,

Bruce Russett, and John Owen.

Furthermore, the main critical arguments will be presented, originating

from other IRT approaches – realism, and social constructivism.

After setting the theoretical grounds of the DPT, the focus will be shifted

to the second part of the thesis; analysing the practical political significance

of the theory. The link between the DPT and the democracy promotion

practices will be explicated by further analysing the types of practices’. The


3

democracy promotion practices are divided into two categories; non-

military, and military practices. Special attention is dedicated to the latter,

examining the use of military interventions in the name of liberal aims,

including democratisation.

Two cases of humanitarian interventions, only in a general overview, will

then be presented in order to demonstrate democratisation as part of post-

conflict reconstruction within the invaded country. The intervention in Iraq

will be presented separately as a single case of democratic intervention with

the main goal to impose democratic regime by force through the misuse of

the assumptions of the DP research.

The second chapter ends with an analysis of the theoretical debate

among the DP scholars over the general implications of the IR theories for

political practice.

2. Democratic peace in theory

Michael W. Doyle states that “liberal states are different. They are

indeed peaceful” (Doyle 1986, 1151). It was he who drew the most

attention to formulating of the democratic peace proposition in the early

1980s. His articles “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” (1983) and

“Liberalism and the World Politics” (1986) are regarded as the seminal

works for the newly established Democratic Peace Theory that became one

of the most dynamic, tested, supported and criticised strands of liberal

international theory in the post war era. Bruce Russett claims that “this is

one of the strongest nontrivial and nontautological generalizations that can

be made about international relations” (Russett 1990, 123).

In this chapter I trace the emergence of the Democratic Peace Theory

within the realm of Liberalism, analyze its key features and assumptions and


4

outline the main arguments that have been made by realist and other

opponents of the theory.

2.1. The Democratic Peace Theory as a part of Liberalism

Liberalism1 represents, besides Realism and Marxism, one of the

dominant traditions in political thought and international relations theory.

There is a literature, commonly associated with Liberalism, that covers over

three centuries whose authors had been mainly political philosophers,

thinkers and political economists. After the First World War and the

emergence of the discipline of International Relations2, International

Relations Theory (IRT) as a separate academic field of study began to take

shape. Emphasis was placed on formulating an autonomous theory of

international politics by drawing a distinction between the international and

other realms of social reality (Smith 1995, 9).

Liberalism does not provide any single theory; it is rather regarded as

multifaceted and complex. However, by following the literature it is possible

to identify the core assumptions about international reality; the individual

as the main actor, possibility of international cooperation and belief in

progress in international relations.

Liberalism considers individuals as the relevant and fundamental actors

of politics (Keohane 1990, 174, Moravcsik 1992, 6, Zacher and Matthew

1995, 118). Society comes prior to politics and the state since individuals

having their own interests and identities form social groups and

organisations to pursue their social and political goals (Moravcsik 1992, 7).

Interactions of such social aggregations determine state policies and the

1 Liberalism is used in terms of liberal international theory and it does not refer to liberalpolitical thinking before establishing of the discipline of International Relations.2 The formal establishment of International relations is usually dated back to the foundation ofthe first Department of International Politics – the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth in1919, followed by the London School of Economics in 1923 andinstitutions like Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs in London or Council on Foreign Relations inNew York.


5

state is perceived as a collective actor. World politics from the liberal point

of view is a conjunction of domestic and transnational activities of non-state

actors along with actions of states (Keohane 1990, 174).

Interest in explanations of international cooperation is often taken as a

distinctive characteristic of liberals. Cooperation among states is most

desirable as it maximises the benefits of international interactions and

increases economic efficiency. It is driven by states’ mutual interests that

are derived from interests of individuals and then shaped by international

system (Zacher and Matthew 1995, 109-110, 117). Factors facilitating the

possibility of international cooperation such as international trade and

commerce, international law, international institutions, or shared political

norms and institutions can be recognised as objects of study.

Liberals believe “in at least the possibility of cumulative progress”

(Keohane 1990, 174) towards greater human freedom in terms of general

improvement of the conditions of humankind. It is not just international

relations that are progressing over time. Interests of states are changing as

interests and relations between individuals and aggregations of individuals

evolve. The driving force of international progress is the process of

modernisation that began with the scientific and liberal intellectual

revolution in the eighteenth century. Various aspects of modernisation -

liberal democracy, commercial and military international

interdependencies, cognitive progress, international sociological

integration, and international institutions - are the driving forces of

transformation of international relations. Liberal scholars differ in what

element of modernisation they stress the importance of in terms of the

extent of the effect on international relations (Zacher and Matthew 1995,

110, 116-117). Belief in progress also represents the main dividing line

between liberalism and realism as realism perceives history as being cyclical


6

(Waever 2005, 17). Increasing cooperation among states is seen as a feature

and effect of the transformation of international relations.

As mentioned above, Liberalism does not represent a coherent

theoretical school. Instead, several strands of liberal international theory3

can be recognised; strands sharing the central assumptions and

differentiating in what aspects they focus and built their hypothesis on.

Following the listed facets of modernisation, six main post-war liberal

strands can be distinguished; Republican, Commercial, Military, Cognitive,

Sociological and Institutional4. Three of these strands, Commercial,

Institutional and Republican, are commonly agreed as being classical since

they are rooted in liberal political thought whereas the others are mostly

products of the twentieth century. All of them, however, are not

inconsistent with each other; they are rather interrelated and non-

competitive as they explore distinct aspects of international reality (Zacher

and Matthew 1995, 120-122, 139-140).

Commercial liberalism affirms the impact of economic exchanges on

international relations and the actions of states are based on economic

interests. The consequences of trade are regarded in positive terms as

unconstrained private economic activities that have the ability to generate

mutual gains in terms of increasing greater economic welfare. The desire for

economic welfare can then reduce the willingness of a society to get

involved in war. This assumption rests on classic liberal economic theory

that posits that free trade and commercial capitalism have pacifying effects

3 I use the term liberal international theory as a general term which encompasses varioustheories of international relations that share the core liberal assumptions and thus can beregarded as liberal. I do not refer in any case to an Andrew Moravcsik’s Liberal internationaltheory.4 I follow the Zacher and Matthew list of the main liberal strands but there is no generalagreement on such a list. Different authors distinguish different strands of Liberalism whichthey sometimes label with different names. For example, Moravcsik and Keohane use a termRegulatory liberalism instead of Institutional liberalism.


7

worldwide (Keohane 1990, 174, Moravcsik 1992, 25-26, Zacher and

Matthew 1995, 124). Perception of the impact of international commerce

has significantly changed during the twentieth century. Instead of stressing

the causal relationship between international free trade and peace, most of

the post-war commercial liberals5 have focused on the effect of economic

interdependence as the basis for international cooperation. “Power and

Interdependence” (1977) by Joseph Nye and Robert Keohan, in which the

concept of complex interdependence is set forth, is of crucial importance

for the further development of this area.

International institutions as independent variables are the primary focus

of Institutional liberalism that was established in response to a growing

number of international institutions and regimes in the last century. The

establishment and development of institutions is dependent on the extent

to which states share the same interests, values and beliefs. Institutions are

believed to have a positive impact on international reality by “improving the

quality of information, reducing transaction costs, facilitating tradeoffs

among issue-areas, facilitating enforcement of accords, and enhancing

states’ ethical concerns” (Zacher and Matthew 1995, 136). Key figures of

Institutional liberalism are David Mitrany (Functionalism), Ernst Haas

(Neofunctionalism), John G. Ruggie and Robert Keohane (neo-liberal

institutionalism).

For Republican Liberalism, liberal democracy constitutes the key element

of the transformation of international relations. Liberal democracy is

considered as an independent variable for growing cooperation and gradual

pacification of international relations. The apparent absence of war

between democracies has become known as ‘democratic peace’ (DP) and

according to Jack Levy “it comes as close as anything we have to an

5 Richard Cooper, Edward Morse, Richard Rosecrance and M.C. Webb amongst others.


8

empirical law in international relations”6. Regime type analysis was

recognised as the main contribution of Republican liberalism to the field of

IRT. It takes into account such variables as “representative institutions,

elites and leadership dynamics, and executive-legislative relations”

(Moravcsik 2008, 235). The Democratic Peace Theory (DPT) has unarguably

breathed a new life into liberal international theory.

2.2. Democratic peace in Immanuel Kant’s philosophy

As it was already mentioned in the beginning of the chapter, the

formulation of the democratic peace proposition took place in the 1980s. It

was related to rediscovering and reinterpreting the political philosophy of

Immanuel Kant which itself is more than two hundred years old but yet still

current.

Kant was concerned with defining the circumstances under which

perpetual peace among states and nations would be possible. He described

such circumstances in quite a short essay entitled “Towards Perpetual

Peace: A Philosophical Sketch” and consists of several parts; preliminary

articles, definitive articles and supplements that all together create a

metaphorical treaty by which acceptance of perpetual peace would be

established once and for all. Democratic peace proponents are, however,

concerned mainly with the definitive articles that appear to be closely

related to today’s notion of liberal democracy.

Before setting out the three definitive articles, Kant outlines the general

conditions of international relations using the Hobbesian concept of the

state of nature, i.e. a state without external authority or laws which is

6 Jack S. Levy (1989) “Domestic Politics and War”. In: Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb(eds.). The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.88.


9

defined as a state of war. “Hence the state of peace must be established”

(Kant 1795 [2006], 72-73). Kant recognises only two forms of government;

despotic and republican and the latter is acknowledged as the only one with

potential to eventually lead to perpetual peace. A republican form of

government requires a representative system based on the separation of

executive and legislative power. Citizens of a republic are seen as subjects

to the common legislation under which all are equal. A republic is

guaranteed by a republican constitution whose fundamental principle is the

freedom of all people as human beings with freedom defined in a negative

manner. The peace-proneness of republics lies in an assumption that

citizens being the subjects of legislation would have to give the government

their consent to enter the war with other states which becomes very

unlikely as they are the ones who suffer the consequences of war (Kant

1795 [2006], 74-78).

In the second definitive article, federalism is identified as the

fundamental principle of international law. Drawing a parallel between

people and states, Kant calls for the creation of a ‘federation of peace. Such

a federation would secure maintaining the freedom and peaceful relations

among states that, constrained by their own civil constitutions, would

remain at peace with one another. The federation would “gradually

encompass all states and thereby lead to perpetual peace” (Kant 1795

[2006], 78-80).

Perpetual peace must also be supplemented with a cosmopolitan right

that says that everyone should be treated with hospitality when being on

another’ territory as all humans have the same right of common possession

of the surface of the earth (Kant 1795 [2006], 82-85).

Michael W. Doyle in his 1983 articles brought Kant’s proposition of

perpetual peace back to life when he took Kant’s premises and applied


10

them to contemporary international relations. He claimed that pacification

is the fundamental principle characterising relations among liberal states.

There is a ‘zone of peace’, similar to ‘federation of peace’, that has been

gradually established among liberal states since the beginning of the

eighteen century. There is thereby a prospect of global peace as the number

of liberal states has been constantly growing (Doyle 1986, 1155-1156).

2.3. The democratic peace proposition

The central assumption made by Doyle is that democracies rarely if ever

go to war with one another and liberalism was recognised as a possible

source of this peacefulness. Doyle was not the first one who argued for the

idea of democratic peace, e.g. Dean Babst in “A Force for peace” (1972),

Melvin Small and David Singer in their study “The War-proneness of

Democratic Regimes” (1976) and especially Rudolph Rummel in the article

“Libertarianism and International Violence” (1983) made a similar

assumption when linking regime type to propensity to a war-like foreign

policy. It was Doyle, however, who drew the most attention of international

scholars to the new phenomenon. A series of intense debates followed and

the DPT became the most discussed liberal international theory of the

1990s.

Even though this field of study is generally called the Democratic Peace

Theory, in fact no single coherent theory covering the whole field has been

set forth. There is rather a set of hypotheses and theoretical assumptions

about the DP proposition. The main dividing line in the DP scholarship lies

between the monadic and dyadic versions of the DPT. The difference can be

summarised with one simple question: are democratic states more peaceful


11

than non-democratic states in general or are democracies peace-prone only

to each other?

Another distinction is created by different recognition of what accounts

for causal logic of the democratic peace, e.g. norms, institutions, or

information to name the most conventional ones. Moreover, a term ‘liberal

peace’ can be found instead of democratic peace in the DP literature as

some scholars refer to liberal states rather than to democracies. The use of

both terms can be a little bit tricky. In terms of the contemporary form of

liberal democracy, both the concept of liberalism and democracy are

necessarily bound together. Michael Doyle describes a liberal state as a

state with certain liberal norms and institutions using basically the same

characteristics as Bruce Russet or John Owen when defining democracy, i.e.

a voting right for a substantial proportion of citizens, representative

government elected in free competitive elections, the guarantee of

fundamental human rights and free-market economic liberties (Russet

1994, 14-16; Owen 1994, 89).

Nonetheless, a large number of countries going through democratic

transition became recently stuck somewhere in the middle of the process;

they managed to adopt democratic institutions but failed to implement

liberal norms7. These semi-democratic regimes are not perceived as fully

embedded democracies and are not included in democratic peace research.

But a problem occurs when researchers examine the peace proneness of

democratic states before the 20th century as almost all of the earlier states’

political systems are not able to meet today’s democratic standards.

Analysis might then differ in the democratic or war measurements used and

so do their conclusions8. Theorists also differ in what aspects of democracy

7 Larry Daimond calls such political systems electoral democracies whereas Fareed Zakariauses term illiberal democracies.8 For example Bruce Russett re-examines some alleged wars between democracies andconcludes that all of them do not meet at least one of criteria he set for democracy and war


12

they take into account regarding democratic peace. Bruce Russet (1994, 15)

for instance leaves out civil rights and economic liberties as defining

qualities and thus lowers the standards for a state to be recognised as a

democracy. Owen (1994, 89) defines a liberal democracy as a state with a

dominant liberal ideology and with a citizenry that has control over war

decisions.

It is the discrepancies in the definitions of democracy and the lack of

normalised measures of democracy that have been frequently criticised for

attempting to define democracy in a way that would safeguard the

proposition.

Nevertheless, the quantitative studies focused on hypotheses testing

usually use widely accepted databases such as the Polity database or the

Freedom House index9 to measure the democratic character of a country.

2.3.1. The monadic hypothesis

If Michael Doyle is perceived by many as “the father” of the dyadic

hypothesis, it is Joseph Rummel who has the same role when it comes to

the monadic version of the DTP. In his 1983 article “Libertarianism and

International Violence”, Rummel states that liberal states are peace prone

especially in relations with other liberal states but they tend to act in a more

peaceful manner even when facing states with different types of domestic

political systems. He builds his argument on a classical liberal assumption

that the developed society of a liberal state constrained by a system of

checks and balances would not be willing to bear the high costs of war. Such

a society would give support to a government to enter a war with another

(Russett 1994, 16-23). In case of the War of 1812 between the US and Great Britain, JohnOwen finds Britain liberal but undemocratic until the 1832 Great Reform Act, while theConfederacy during the American Civil War (1861-1865) was democratic but illiberal (Owen1994, 102).9 See Maoz and Russett (1992), Benoit (1996), Lektzian and Souva (2009)


13

state only when “aroused by an emotionally unifying issue” (Rummel 1983,

27-28).

Rummel’s article was published in the same year as Doyle’s two part

article “Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs” but, unlike Doyle’s dyadic

proposition, the monadic position did not gain more general acceptance.

Another proponent of the hypothesis, John MacMillan, argues that there

are two main reasons for that. First, many of statistical studies confirmed

the Doyle’s hypothesis finding that democratic states went to war with non-

democratic states as frequently as non-democratic states did with each

other. That was for many a confirmation strong enough to assume that

democracies are as war prone as non-democracies. Secondly, he finds the

dyadic hypothesis to be the more internally sophisticated of the two

positions. While Rummel avoids explaining war involvement of democratic

states by either neglecting the issue (1983) or regarding it as a defence

against violence initiated by others (1979, 1997), proponents of the dyadic

position developed an explanatory mechanism clarifying the circumstances

under which democracies would and would not engage in war (MacMillan

2003, 234).

MacMillan, however, points out that the statistical evidence supporting

the monadic hypothesis has been growing as theorists turned from

‘frequency’ of war involvement as the only variable to other indicators of

war proneness such as willingness to go to war or circumstances of war

involvement (Macmillan 2003, 235).

Kenneth Benoit’s quantitative analysis statistically supports the monadic

proposition. His conclusion is that “democracies were significantly less

likely, on average, to be involved in international wars during the 1960s and

1970s than less-free states” (Benoit 1996, 654) and he thus confirms that

democracies do have broader pacifying effects on state behaviour in

international relations. He argues that the lack of previous significant


14

statistical findings was caused by shortcomings of the statistical techniques

used rather than by the data itself.

MacMillan also tries to disqualify the second reason for the

predominance of the dyadic position by accusing the theorists of failing to

explain why democratic peace proneness applies only to relations with

other democracies. He points out that the primary focus of research had

been on explaining solely the nature of dyadic units, i.e. democratic-to-

democratic state relationships rather than the characteristics of

democracies as such and thereby neglected the monadic factors (MacMillan

2003, 237). He examines some normative and institutional explanations

made by proponents of the dyadic proposition; Bruce Russet, Spencer

Weart, John Owen and Bueno de Mesquita, and finds all of them insufficient

to offer a solid theoretical foundation for the dyadic position. He concludes

that “these theories are flawed through internal problems, lack of

systematic verification, distortions of the liberal political-philosophical

tradition or high incidence of counter-examples” (Macmillan 2003, 241). He

states that ‘separate peace’ among liberal states is only a part of a broader

democratic pacifism (MacMillan 2003, 233).

Many researches seem to support this broader democratic pacifism by

noting that democratic states demonstrate a lower propensity to initiate a

violent conflict (Rousseau et al. 1996, 512-513; Rioux 1998, 282; Gleditsch

and Heger 1997, 295; Schultz 2001, 137).

2.3.2. The dyadic hypothesis

The core claim of the hypothesis states that democracies rarely use force

to resolve disputes with each other but they are as conflict-prone in

relations with non-democracies as non-democratic regimes among

themselves (Doyle 1986; Russett 1994; Maoz and Abdolali 1989; Maoz and

Russett 1993; Owen 1994; Ray 1995, Kegley and Hermann 1995) Numerous


15

studies validated this claim and some of them even strengthened it claiming

that, except for a few questionable cases, democracies virtually never fight

each other (Chan 1997, 62). Due to enormous academic interest in empirical

testing of the dyadic hypothesis it became “the most replicated research

program in the modern study of international politics” (Maoz 1996, 162).

The nature of the dyadic hypothesis requires that factors be found that

would account for democracies to be both, peaceful towards each other,

and at the same time war-prone in relations with non-democratic regimes.

In this section, I look closer at the work of some of the most influential

democratic peace scholars and the explanatory mechanisms they use.

Michael Doyle in reply to one critic of his work10 summarised his

arguments and built up ‘the three pillars of liberal peace’ which are also the

three causal mechanisms of his explanation. The pillars are drawn from

Kant’s three ‘definitive articles’, each of them containing a source of liberal

peace; constitutional, international and cosmopolitan (Doyle 1986, 1159-

1162).

First, it is republican representation, (liberal structures), second, an

ideological commitment to fundamental human rights (liberal norms), and

third, transnational interdependence (liberal interests) that together, “and

only together”, sustain conditions for liberal peace (Doyle 2005, 463).

The first institutional pillar is built upon representative democratic

government the features of which have already been described above. Such

a political system allows for a rotation of elites that, under a threat of

electoral defeat, avoid any dangerous policies. Separation of powers and

public opinion further prevent elites from implementing policies that would

10It was a reply to a Sebastian Rosato’s article “The Flawed Logic of Democratic Peace Theory”

(2003)


16

“violate the obvious and fundamental [liberal] interests of the public”

(Doyle 2005, 464).

The foreign policy decision-making process is transparent, respecting the

democratic commitments of a government and controlled by public. A

liberal state thus provides for ‘effective signalling’ and foreign decision

makers can thus be assured that the behaviour of the state is credible and

quite predictable (Doyle 2005, 464).

The second, normative pillar according to Doyle holds out “the prospect

of respect”. Liberal states hold a great deal of respect domestically for the

equal rights of all individuals, and internationally for foreign people’s lives

that are accurately perceived through publicity and effective

communication. However, this respect applies only to other liberal states.

Resting on the same liberal principles, they are seen as trustworthy and just

whereas non-liberal countries, which seem to be in “a state of aggression

with their own people”, are perceived as unjust and cannot be trusted.

Although both of the presumptions can be accurate, Doyle admits that they

also may be self-fulfilling (Doyle 2005, 464).

The third and last pillar links economic interdependence with the

normative commitments of liberal state providing commercial incentives to

promote peace. Doyle notes that close economic ties can only exist under

conditions of mutual security so various forms of alliances usually follow

(Doyle 2005, 465).

The very same characteristics, that combined all together create grounds

for liberal peace, also create conditions for ‘liberal imprudence’. Doyle uses

the realistic description of international relations being in a state of anarchy

from which liberal states have managed to escape only through the

establishing dyads of ‘separate peace’. In some of these dyads, war has not

occurred since 1815 (Doyle 1986, 1156-1157). But in liberal-to-non-liberal


17

state dyads the prevalent feature of the relationship is insecurity and

distrust, a solid foundation for a potential conflict (Doyle 2005, 465).

Bruce Russett explores and explicates only two of Doyle’s explanations;

liberal culture/norms and liberal structures/institutions.

The normative argument states that the state’s foreign policy is an

externalisation of its domestic norms and culture. If the political system is

democratic and liberal then the underlying characteristic of political culture

is the peaceful exchange of power through regulated political competition

respecting “the rights and continued existence of opponents” (Russett 1994,

35). Democracies therefore naturally incline to cooperation and nonviolence

even in their international behaviour. Since other states are expected to

follow the same pattern, democracies will suppose that other democracies’

behaviour will be led by the same norms of peaceful conflict resolution. The

domestic norms of non-democratic regime, however, rest on the use or at

least threat to use violence. Hence their international behaviour is expected

to be of the same kind. Therefore democracies, careful in interactions with

non-democracies, are willing to adopt the norms of its non-democratic

opponent if the application of democratic norms would jeopardize their

security. Russett finds a direct linkage between stability of democracy and

the strength of influence of liberal norms on a state’s behaviour; the more

stable the democracy is, the more influence democratic norms have on its

behaviour. If two democracies resort to the use of force against each other

after all, at least one of them is very likely politically unstable (Russet 1994,

35; Maoz and Russet 1993, 625).

Peace among democracies may also be facilitated by democratic

institutions. The structural model holds that democratic leadership

decisions and behaviour are constrained by public opinion, a legislature, and

key interest groups. It takes a significant amount of time to mobilise their

support for waging war which allows non-violent conflict resolution


18

processes to take place. Furthermore, other states do not have to fear

surprise attack. Nevertheless, non-democracies are not constraint by any of

these structures and can engage in quick surprising mobilisation and

escalation of a conflict. Democracies often happen to be in a no-choice

situation so they may rather initiate war by themselves than risk

unexpected attack. Russett adds concessions as another issue over which

large-scale violence can be initiated. Since non-democratic leaders are

aware of the democratic constraints, they might try to take advantage of

them, and demand greater concessions over the conflict issue. (Russet

1994, 40; Maoz and Russet 1993, 626).

These explanatory models were tested by Maoz and Russet (1993) who

came to the conclusion that both liberal norms, and democratic institutions

provide relevant explanations supported by large sets of data. Both the

normative, and structural model reduce conflict involvement by

democracies and further conflict escalation, although statistical support for

the normative argument appears to be more robust. Structural constraints

avert escalation of conflict to war but they do not prevent democracies

from engaging in low-level conflicts. Statistical evidence in support of the

normative model, however, shows that democratic norms help to avert

even the emergence of conflicts among democracies (Maoz and Russet

1993, 634-36). In the light of these findings, Russet draws another

conclusion. If the democratic peace logic based on the normative argument

is right, it might have profound implications for the international system

and the prospect of global peace. As the number of democratic countries in

the world has substantially increased after “the third wave of

democratisation”, and if this trend continues, democratic norms and

principles might replace the realist ones (e.g. anarchy, security dilemma of

states) that have so far dominated the world order, and consequently


19

change the character of the whole international system into one that is

more peaceful (Russett 1994 24-25, Maoz and Russett 1993, 637).

John Owen in his 1994 article refines existing theories and combines the

normative and structural into one causal mechanism. Democratic

institutional structures and liberal norms taken separately, as Russett did,

are insufficient to explain the logic of democratic peace. Liberal ideology,

however, is the starting point of his theory.

Liberals believe in freedom and equal right to pursuit self-preservation

and material well-being of all individuals and peace is a necessary condition

for that. Hence all individuals share the same interest, to maintain peace.

Liberal ideology thus defines domestic and foreign policies that incline to

peaceful conflict resolution and shapes democratic institutions, designed to

foster freedom and the rights of the citizen (Owen 1994, 89).

Domestic structures are supposed to express liberal preferences in

foreign policy. Even in a situation when current leaders do not share liberal

ideology, instead they may prefer political realism or pure pragmatism, and

their behaviour thus might lead to rockier relations with other states,

domestic structures will constrain them to actually use force against fellow

democracies (Owen 1994, 90, 99).

Liberal ideas, however, have a two-sided effect on foreign policy.

Towards other liberal democracies they lead to cooperation and

accommodation; whereas, when dealing with illiberal counterparts, they

call for caution and sometimes even for war. Liberals believe that states like

themselves share the same norms and interests and thereby are naturally

perceived as trustworthy and pacific. On the other hand states without a

predominant liberal ideology might be dangerous as “they seek other ends,

such as conquest and plunder” (Owen 1994, 89). In this regard Owen

stresses the importance of perception. In order to not to resort to the use of

force liberal democracy must believe its opponent is liberal. He


20

demonstrates it on some alleged wars between democracies (e.g. the War

of 1812) where at least one side did not perceive the other as a democracy.

(Owen 1994, 108).

Noticeably, all the three scholars made similar assumptions about

democratic norms and institutions. While shared norms and values facilitate

mutual cooperation, democratic institutions work in a way to constrain

democracies from fighting each other.

The normative and structural explanatory models are the most common

and distinct ones although more kinds of explanations underlying different

aspects were established. The informational argument holds that costly

signals are transmitted at a high level between democratic institutions,

which lowers the level of hostility in their relations (Lektzian and Souva

2009, 21-23). Another argument stands that democracies are satisfied

powers and hence they tend to favour maintaining a liberal international

order, and not challenging the status quo (Chan 1997, 78). Some DP

theorists adopted a rationalist approach11 that takes into account such

factors as elite perception and calculation or expected utility formulation.

Democratic leaders are believed to make decisions depending on the

incentives and disincentives certain behaviour would bring, e.g. high costs

of war, popularity and re-election of the leaders, etc. (Chan 1997, 79-82).

Comparing the two main approaches to the DP, the dyadic hypothesis

has gained much more attention and adherents than the monadic

11 For example: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and David Lalman (1992) War and Reason: Domesticand International Imperatives. New Haven: Yale University Press; Bruce Bueno de Mesquitaand Randolph M. Siverson (1995) War and the Survival of Political Leaders: A ComparativeStudy of Regime Types and Political Accountability. American Political Science Review (89) p.841-853; James D. Fearon (1995) Rationalist Explanations for War. International Organization(49) p. 379-414.


21

hypothesis, and it is usually the one that is referred to when the DPT is

discussed.

The monadic hypothesis, however, experienced growing support during the

end of the 1990s, when a number of the DP theorists confirmed the

negative effect of democracy on the initiation of crisis. But this growth was

stopped, and even reversed by the US invasion of Iraq, since aggressive

expansionist foreign policy of one of the oldest democracies seemed to be

in contrast to the monadic arguments. Although the research on monadic

peace remains narrower in comparison to the dyadic peace research, the

hypothesis has not vanished, and it is still a subject to DP research.12

2.4. The Democratic Peace Theory and its critics

Despite the overwhelming number of statistical studies favouring the

democratic peace proposition, a strong criticism has been drawn from other

theoretical approaches of international relations, mainly Realism. Social

constructivists contributed their own explanation of the phenomenon to the

debate and questions about democratic peace-proneness have also been

raised by other liberals.

The debate over the DPT represents another part in the ongoing

theoretical struggle between Realism and Liberalism, the two classical

traditions of international relations theory. The DPT has been naturally most

criticised from the realist positions given the fact that it undermines some

of the essential realist assumptions about international reality. The

existence of the democratic peace challenges especially two tenets of

12 See Souva, Mark and Brandon Prins (2006) The Liberal Peace Revisited: The Role ofDemocracy, Dependence, and Development in Militarized Interstate Dispute Initiation, 1950–1999. International Interactions 32(2): 183-200; Quackenbush, Stephen (2006) Evaluating theMonadic Democratic Peace. Conference Papers -- Midwestern Political Science Association,Annual Meeting, p1, 0p. Available at<http://web.missouri.edu/~marbnd/Research/monadic%20democratic%20peace-CMPS%20final.pdf>


22

Realism13; (1) realist negative approach to a prospect of international peace

and (2) realist emphasis of systemic factors as decisive for explaining

international politics (Lynn-Jones 1996, Page x).

Pessimism about lasting international peace originates from the realist

recognition of anarchy as the defining characteristic of international politics.

In the anarchical system war is always a very real possibility as “fear and

distrust of other states is the normal state of affairs” (Layne 1994, 11). Since

survival and security are the first and foremost concerns of the state (Barša

et al. 2009, 33), in international interactions “a democratic state will

respond no differently to democratic rivals than to non-democratic” (Layne

1994, 12). In a world where states are always prepared for the possibility of

war, no one can count on remaining in peace indefinitely.

Structural realism14 holds that international system, defined by its

structure, consists from functionally similar units, states (Nye 1988, 241).

The nation states are seen as the main actors of international relations

(Morgenthau [1954] 1960, 60); Waltz 1979, 94-95) whose behaviour is,

however, always constrained by the unchanging structure of the

international system and their positions in the structure, determining the

distribution of power among them (Layne 1994, 12). Systemic factors (e.g.

anarchy, variations in the distribution of power, etc.) thereby are of primary

importance in explaining outcomes of international politics. A state’s regime

type or other internal characteristics are irrelevant for international

outcomes. “Even if states change internally, the structure of the

international system remains the same” (Layne 1994, 12)

13 For thorough explications of realist theories see Hans J. Morgenthau (1948) Politics AmongNations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. New York: Knopf; Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) Theoryof International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley; or Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven Miller, eds. (1995) The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism andInternational Security. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press.14 See Kenneth N. Waltz (1979) Theory of International Politics and John J.Mearsheimer.(2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics.


23

For better clarity, I divide a vast number of realist criticisms of the

democratic peace proposition into two categories; criticisms articulated by

offensive and defensive realists.

Offensive realists, such as Mearsheimer, believe that states should be

striving to maximise their power as much as they can to ensure their own

survival (Mearsheimer 2010, 75). The insecurity in the anarchical

international system gives states strong incentives for using force which

makes war a very likely scenario. Critiques coming from offensive realists

refuse to acknowledge the democratic peace, usually regarding it as not

statistically significant and causally wrong.

Christopher Layne in “Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace”

denies the democratic proposition after testing the normative argument on

crisis behaviour of democracies in four historical cases; the 1861 “Trent

Affair” between the United States and Great Britain, the 1895-96 U.S.-

British Venezuela crisis, the 1898 Fashoda Crisis between France and Great

Britain, and the 1923 Ruhr crisis between France and Germany. The

behaviour Layne indicates in all listed cases is far from what he expected if

democratic norms had a significant influence on state foreign policy. Instead

of accommodating behaviour, he observes actions based on calculations of

national interests, strategic concerns, and ultimatums, i.e. behaviour

predicted by Realism. Realism thus provides a better and “more compelling

explanation of why war was avoided” (Layne 1994, 38). Another argument

raised by Layne is that persuasive statistical findings underlying the DPT are

spurious as (1) there was a small number of democracies before 1945, (2)

the probability of being involved in war is statistically very small for any

dyad of states regardless of their regime types since war is a rare

phenomena itself, and (3) only dyads appropriate for the democratic peace

testing should be included in research, i.e. dyads having both, opportunity

and reason for going to war (Layne 1994, 39). Layne concludes his article


24

stating that not just democratic peace is a myth but also that the DPT is

dangerous for foreign policy implications. The United States cannot afford

to have its foreign policy “shaped by theoretical approaches that are based

on wishful thinking” (Layne 1994, 49).

A similar argument about the statistical insignificance of the democratic

peace has been made also by John Mearsheimer (1990, 50-51), and David

Spiro (1994, 51).

Another strong objection has been made about the subjectivity of the

democracy definition when used by statesmen. Ido Oren claims that the

democratic peace proposition is ‘ahistorical’; researchers overlook the fact

that democratic values and their perception have changed over time (Oren

1995, 147). He accuses democracies of behaving in an opportunistic manner

when they adjust the notion of democracy so that their allies would fit the

description of it. In Oren’s own words, “the reason we [the U.S. as a

democracy] do not fight ‘our kind’ is not that ‘likeness’ has a great effect on

war propensity, but rather that we from time to time subtly redefine our

kind to keep our self-image consistent with our friends’ attributes and

inconsistent with those of our adversaries” (Oren 1995, 147).

Defensive realists like Kenneth Waltz or Charles Glaser15 argue that

instead of overexpansion, states should rather seek to gain the “appropriate

amount of power” (Waltz 1979, 40). In contrast to offensive realists, they

recognise peace and cooperation as likely features of an international

system and therefore they acknowledge that the separate peace between

democracies may exist. But peace is possible only as long as the conditions

of the international system favour its occurrence. So it is systemic factors

not democracy that are behind the democratic peace (Lynn-Jones 1996,

Page xi).

15 Charles L. Glaser (1994) Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help. InternationalSecurity 19(3):50-90.


25

An example of this approach is found in Farber’s and Gowa’s studies

“Polities and Peace” (1995). They assess the empirical and theoretical

foundations of democratic peace and state that, according to their research,

the democratic peace applies only to the post-war world after 1945 and

systemic variables, the common interests in particular, rather than a

common polity type are responsible for preventing states from going to war

(Farber and Gowa 1995, 145-146).

From the social constructivist perspective, democratic peace emerges

from perceptual and interaction processes that states undergo when

defining and thus creating their enemies and allies (Risse-Kappen 1995,

491). Thomas Risse-Kappen reinterprets the normative argument and

asserts that the attitudes and behaviour of states are to a large extent

derived from the domestic political structures of their counterparts (Risse-

Kappen 1995, 492). The peaceful relations of democracies are constructed

on the presumption of a predisposition of a democracy towards peaceful

behaviour due to the internal decision-making processes (Risse-Kappen

1995, 513). At the same time, the recognition that autocratic domestic

processes can be violent and oppressive leads democracies “to behavioural

patterns that confirm the presumption of enmity” (Risse-Kappen 1995, 514).

Anna Geis et al. in “Democratic Wars” (2006) has raised some compelling

questions about the existing research and theoretical underpinnings of the

theory. Quantitative research of the DPT has generated a large amount of

data but a coherent theory has not yet been set forth. Statistical data

establish correlations based on behavioural regularities, not a cause-effect

chain. Several hypotheses with supposed causal mechanisms that have

been formulated over the last twenty years of research have been

confirmed by statistical findings. However, statistics can affirm hypotheses

only in a probabilistic way. What seems to be problematic is that


26

“probabilistic formulations which rely on statistical findings have a

propensity to self-immunization” (Geis et al. 2006, 4-5). Furthermore, it is

argued that probabilistic approaches and large generalisations that have

been made about the democratic peace conceal significant differentiation in

democratic behaviour towards peace and war. Democracies cannot be

treated as a monolithic group with the same patterns of behaviour since

some democracies are involved in war and military actions on a frequent

basis, other democracies appear to be in a long-term peaceful relations with

all other states and the rest are somewhere in the middle (Geis et al. 2006,

5-6). According to Anna et al. further research should be shifted from

explaining democratic peacefulness to democratic war involvement, an

unexplored area of the democratic peace.

When reviewing the democratic peace literature one cannot fail to notice

the wide acceptance of realist concepts of international reality in order to

overcome them by liberal means. By realist concepts I mean the following

assumptions; the state as the main actor, anarchy as the original state of

international relations, war as a natural feature of politics, and peace as a

deviation that needs to be explained. Although states are not seen as the

main actors since the citizenry is the subject of both, domestic and foreign

politics in a democratic system, it is only states and interstate wars that are

taken into account. The so called new wars, intrastate wars, extrastate wars,

and substate or inter-communal wars (Chojnacki 2006, 17), and military

interventions are entirely dismissed from the classic democratic peace

research.

Last but not least, the question has been raised about the democratic

peace proposition becoming a common part of political discourse of

western statesmen and “serving as the ideological underpinning of a self-

righteous foreign policy” (Geis et al. 2006, 8). The disconcerting matter of


27

(mis)using democratic peace arguments for ‘justifiable’ use of military force

is the main concern of the next chapter.

3.Democratic peace in practice

The previous chapter has shown the extent of the democratic peace

scholarship. The compelling thesis has soon become very popular within

International Relations Theory - virtually all liberal theorists of the 1990s

subscribed under it, and the DPT seemed to withstand all realist attacks.

Democracy has gained an enormous significance during the last century;

as a political system it has become largely wide-spread, and as a value,

democracy seems to be supported throughout the world, regardless of

ethnicity, religion, or world region (McFaul 2004, 152). The DPT constitutes

a part of this ‘movement’ of democracy. The DP scholarship contributed to

the general recognition of importance of democracy, and furthermore

imparted a flavour of scientific verification to it. More importantly, with the

rise of democracy, the DP scholarship has gained a practical significance for

international political practice.

The assumption of inherent peacefulness of democracies has significantly

shaped the character of the post-Cold War world politics. The U.S.

establishment, the European Union member states, the UN, NATO and

various human rights organisations explicitly refer to it and moreover,

democracy promotion practises has been drawn on this assumption.

The post-Cold War U.S. foreign policy is the most striking demonstration

of the growing practical significance of the democratic peace proposition.

“Democracies don’t attack each other” therefore “the best strategy to

ensure our security and to build durable peace is to support the advance of

democracy elsewhere” declared President Bill Clinton in his 1994 State of


28

the Union address, and made democratisation the pillar of his foreign policy

(Owen 1994, 87). Ten years later, President George W. Bush held a speech

in the same spirit. “America is a Nation with a mission, and that mission

comes from our most basic beliefs. We have no desire to dominate, no

ambitions of empire. Our aim is a democratic peace -- a peace founded

upon the dignity and rights of every man and woman. America acts in this

cause with friends and allies at our side, yet we understand our special

calling: This great Republic will lead the cause of freedom” (Bush 2004).

Those are the words that Georg W. Bush used when explaining necessity to

invade Iraq.

The invasion had important consequences for the DP scholarship. The

misuse of the DP thesis for the US warlike foreign policy has stirred up a

serious debate among scholars about the role of the DPT in the US foreign

policy, and responsibility of the theorists for outcomes of the invasion.

Serious concern has been expressed about consequences that the DPT can

have when used as a manual for political action.

The aim of this chapter is to examine more closely the extent, and nature

of implications of the DPT for political practice.

Firstly, I will examine the connection between democracy and democracy

promotion practices in order to highlight the growing significance of both in

international politics. Democracy promotion is further indicated as the main

implication of the DPT for political practice. Secondly, the democracy

promotion practices will be analysed to show the role they have in

international relations. Peaceful, and military types of practices are further

presented with a focus on the latter ones. Democratic interventionism will

then be analysed in order to identify to what extent the DP scholarship may

serve as a normative justification for the use of force.


29

The three most recent cases of liberal interventions will be presented;

Kosovo and Libya as representative cases of humanitarian interventions,

and Iraq as an example of coercive democratisation. The range of the thesis

does not allow the full-scope analysis of the interventions. That is why the

focus will be predominantly placed on the core motivations and outcomes

of the interventions with the aim to identify whether there is a linkage

between forced democratisation, the DPT, and peace.

The chapter will be ended with the theoretical analysis of the possible

impact that IR theories might have on the political practice.

3.1. Implications of the democratic peace

There has been a significant growth in the number of democratic regimes

in the international system after 1945, further accelerated by the end of the

Cold War. Following the Polity data IV, during the period from 1946 to 2011,

the proportion of democracies increased from 28% to 58%, while there was

a drop in the number of autocracies, from 27% to a mere 13%, and also of

anocracies,16 from 45% to 29% (Marshall and Cole 2011, 11-12). According

to these findings it is “for the first time in human history that the global

system is predominantly comprised of independent states and populated by

democratic regimes” (Marshall and Cole 2011, 11-12)17. Out of all three

regime types, democracy proved to be the most resilient to regime

transition. While some states keep changing the regime type, fewer leave

the democratic category. If this pattern is steady, eventually the democratic

16 Anocracy is incoherent category defining states that are neither fully democratic nor fullyautocratic with mixed traits from both categories and have instable or ineffective politicalinstitutions and leadership.17 These findings might be questionable since it is the choice, and the definition of measuredqualities determining the outcomes. Freedom House database analyses the level of freedomin the world by measuring civil and political liberties while Polity Data IV focuses only onpolitical institutions and processes. That is why conclusions of Freedom House vary; there wasonly 45% (87) of free countries, 31% (60) of partly free countries, and 24% (47) of not freecountries in the world in 2011 (Freedom House 2012, 24). Freedom House data indicates an11% higher rate of not free countries and 13% lower rate of free countries in comparison todemocracies and autocracies by Polity Data IV.


30

category might encompass most of, maybe even all of the countries

(Gleditsch et al. 2007, 9).

What is important with regards to world politics is that most of the

leading countries18 in the world are presently democracies, and their

political practices have a crucial impact on the rest of the world’s countries,

and the international system as a whole. The direct linkage between

democracy and peace recognised by the DP scholarship helped to

established democracy promotion as a common feature of international

politics. The idea of democracy promotion also follows the inherent logic of

the DP proposition which implies a prospect of worldwide inter-state peace

once democracy is the predominant political regime of the international

system.

Since democracy promotion gained a prominent status, related political

practices started to have a major impact on international relations. There is

a broad range of democracy promotion practices which can vary

enormously specifically in relation to one thing– if military means are used

or not.

3.1.1. Non-military democracy promotion

In the eyes of democratic politicians democracy promotion very often

equals peace promotion. Democratisation has been predominantly

perceived as a ‘one-way ticket’ to more peaceful domestic political order

and external relations of a state. However, empirical studies on this matter

are rather ambiguous. On the one hand there are empirical findings

confirming the presupposed peaceful impact of democratisation. Michael

Ward and Kristian Gleditsch introduced findings that the process of

democratisation reduces the probability of a country to be involved in war

as both, a target, and an initiator by approximately one half (Ward and

18In a sense of the most politically and economically influential


31

Gleditsch 1998, 59). On the other hand, Mansfield and Snyder warned

against enthusiastic approach to democratic regime transition as they claim

that states that have recently undergone democratic transition are much

more war-prone than states that have not gone through any regime change

(Mansfield and Snyder 1995, 8). Also Russett argued that well established

democracies are more stable, and less likely to resort to the use of force

(Russet 1994, 35).

Peaceful democracy promotion practices include various kinds of

assistance that would help build a nation’s capacity for democratic

governance, e.g. the most common practice is free election assistance. Such

activities can be carried either by national governments, but there is always

a question of impartiality, or by various intergovernmental organisations

(IGOs), e.g. the United Nations (UN), the European Union (EU), or the

Organization of American States (OAS). The IGOs usually provide states with

monitoring, supervising, organising, and legitimizing free elections. The

actual effect of their judgment is quite substantial since it can decide if a

government or political leader will be recognised as legitimate by the

international community.

In a situation when a dictator seizes power from a fairly elected

government, the IGOs can isolate or remove a dictator (Russett 2005, 402).

The OAS helped to prevent or reverse military coups in Paraguay (1996),

Ecuador (2000), and Venezuela (2002). Moreover, the IGOs have the right

and ability to impose variety of economic and political sanctions on a

government that gained power in an undemocratic manner or that violated

severely human, or/and political rights of its citizens. This has happened in

the case of Burma, Syria, Sudan, Belarus, etc.


32

3.1.2. Military democracy promotion

While democracies rarely initiate war, they do get involved very often in

ongoing wars, and usually end up on the winning side19 (Gleditsch et al.

2007, 11). The democratic involvement in large-scale wars is, however, not

as frequent as the use of military intervention, often pursuit for the purpose

of human rights protection, or/and democracy promotion. Intervention can

be carried out for various self-interested reasons, however, the

humanitarian interventions have become prevalent.

In this section I would like to take a closer look at the democratic

interventions used, besides protection of human lives as a way to promote

democracy; particularly at the interventions in Kosovo (1999), Iraq (2003),

and Libya (2011) in terms of their justification and outcomes.

Intervention has become a regular, and quite popular tool of foreign

policy after 1945 as a low-scale alternative to war. Interventions per se do

not meet standards of interstate war20 so they have not been included in

the conventional DP research, however, as many scholars pointed out

intervention is usually considered by its targets as an act of war, and it often

serves as an opening act of actual war (Kegley and Hermann 1996, 309-310).

When analysing the intervention behaviour, democracies prove to be the

most frequent interveners while non-democracies are most often targets of

interventions (Gleditsch et al. 2007, 23).

The importance (not the frequency) of the use of intervention has

increased with the end of the Cold War along with utilisation of liberal ideas

for its justification; promotion of democracy, peace-keeping, help in

humanitarian crisis, or protection of civilians before their own governments

19 That applies to almost all major wars since the beginning of the 20th century; the two WorldWars, the Korean War, the Gulf War of 1991, the Kosovo War in 1999, the 2001 war inAfghanistan and the Iraq War of 2003.20 Russett defines interstate war as “large-scale institutionally organised lethal violence” withthe threshold of one thousand battle casualties (Russett 1994, 12).


33

(Kegley and Hermann 1996, 316). This is generally called liberal

interventionism.

Liberal interventions can be carried out unilaterally by a democratic

state, or multilaterally by an IGO, e.g. the UN, the EU, or an alliance such as

NATO. The US, however, has a key role in this field since majority of military

interventions were initiated by the US government. This is hardly surprising

as it results from the hegemonic position of the US after the Second World

War that has been further strengthened by dissolution of the Soviet Union,

and American symbolic victory of the Cold War21. This is why the U.S.

military interventionism is at the forefront of scholars’ attention.

It seems to be difficult to distinguish liberal universalistic motivations

from the self-interested ones in case of intervention carried out by great

powers (Gleditsch et al. 2007, 14). Distinction between universalism and

self-interest seems to blur in the rhetoric of the US establishment in terms

of a conviction “what is good for us is good for the world”.22

Nevertheless the attention in this thesis is placed on the proclaimed

motivations, aims, and subsequent effects of intervention on a target state.

The connection between intervention and democratisation has been the

main concern of many empirical studies, however, their results are not

clear-cut, and does not allow to make any major conclusions.

James Meernik who examined the period of democratic interventions

from 1948 to 1990, concludes that most of the targeted states retained

their current political regime after the intervention. However, according to

his findings when compared to countries that have not undergone any

intervention, intervened states tend to experience more likely the

democratic growth in the future (Meernik 1996, 400).

21 It has been subject of many debates to what extent the US actually contributed to thedissolution of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War as it was rather a conjunction ofseveral economic and political factors. But more importantly, the US, and democracy as apolitical system showed the greater viability than their communist counterparts.22 See Bush’s statements in the beginning of this chapter


34

Nils Gleditsch et al. concluded his empirical analysis on the democratic

use of intervention between the years 1946 and 1996 arguing that military

intervention leads to destabilisation of the regime of the target country, and

regime change is likely to take place. If the intervener is democratic then the

change is likely to go in a democratic direction. However, the democratic

improvement appears to be only in the first year after the intervention. In

the long run they do not find any strong connection (Gleditsch et al. 2007,

40-41).

A study of Mark Peceny (1999) examined ninety U.S. military

interventions from 1898 to 1992. Out of those ninety interventions twenty

nine had the explicit goal to support “pro-liberalization policies” (Peceny

1999, 199). Only thirteen states became really more democratic after the

intervention, and almost all of them retained the same level of democracy

also ten years thereafter (Peceny 1999, 199-200).

Whereas listed studies give partial support to positive relationship

between intervention and democracy promotion, the works of Hermann

and Kegley on the one side and the findings of Bueno de Mesquita and

Downs on the other draw contradictory conclusions.

Margaret Hermann and Charles Kegley23 give strong support to the

military democracy promotion stating that “interventions by democracies

intended to promote democracy have generally led to an increase in the

democraticness of those targets’ political regimes” (Hermann and Kegley

2001, 242). Bueno de Mesquita and George Downs (2006) analysed three

specific types of interveners – democratic, non-democratic, and the UN –

between 1946 and 2001. Presented evidence suggests that democratisation

is rarely achieved by external military intervention and in fact, interventions

23 Kegley, Charles W., Jr. and Margaret G. Hermann (1997) A Peace Dividend? Democracies‘Military Interventions and Their External Political Consequences. Coooperation and Conflict32(4): 339-369.Hermann, Margaret G and Charles W. Kegley, Jr. (1998) The U.S. Use of Military InterventionTo Promote Democracy: Evaluating the Records. International Interactions 24(2): 91-114.


35

do not do much to promote democracy at all (Bueno de Mesquita and

Downs 2006, 647).

The findings of the presented quantitative studies differ in their

conclusions. Nonetheless, the same pattern of limited democratisation of a

targeted country emerges in the most of them, however the viability, and

quality of imposed democracy stay rather unclear.

Now, I will have a look at the three major international interventions of

the post-cold war era; the Kosovo War, the Iraq War, and the Libyan civil

war. By the general overview of the interventions in Kosovo and Libya, I

would like to demonstrate the typical cases of humanitarian interventions

where democratisation as such is not the primary goal but comes

consequently as a part of post-conflict reconstruction strategy.

The invasion of Iraq accounts for something quite different than

humanitarian intervention; eventually it was presented as a project of

forced democratisation, however, the true motives and aims of the US

establishment still remains controversial. The invasion will be analysed in

terms of used justifications, and their relevance to the intervention.

3.1.2.1. Humanitarian interventions – the case of Kosovo and Libya

Both, the international intervention in Kosovo in 1999 and Libya in 2011

were directed against domestic authoritarian regimes that were using

extreme military means to suppress their own citizens, and thus committing

a large violation of human rights.

The military intervention in Kosovo against the Milosevic authoritarian

regime of Serbia (former Yugoslavia) was carried out by NATO after a year

of ongoing war in the area with a long history of ethnic violence. The explicit

goal of the operation was to “halt a humanitarian catastrophe and restore

stability” (NATO 2004).


36

The Alliance’s air campaign led to quick withdrawal of Serbian forces from

Kosovo, and shortly after its defeat the Milosevic regime collapsed. Only a

few months after the intervention had begun was international civilian

administration of the area (UNMIK) established under a United Nations

mandate. In addition, the multinational peacekeeping mission (the Kosovo

Force, KFOR) was introduced to secure fragile peace that was occasionally

disrupted by the occurrence of ethnic violence. Both, the process and the

outcomes were celebrated as a great success of NATO, and western

democracies. The intervention followed by transitional UN administration

brought stability to Kosovo and consequently helped to stabilize south-

eastern Europe. The whole process graduated in 2008 when Kosovo

declared independence. The example of Kosovo set the standard of

humanitarian intervention – was dedicated to humanitarian purposes and

eventually led also to democratisation of the country.

In Libya, a wide civil uprising against Muhammar al-Qaddafi erupted in

February 2011, and was seen as another act in Arab spring that will follow

the successful path of similar uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt. Neverthless,

Qaddafi used all the power he had to suppress the uprising, and responded

with a brutal crackdown on Libyan citizens.

Reaction of international community was swift; the UN Security Council

imposed economic and political sanctions followed by a no-fly zone over

Libya, and the Arab League suspended Libya from its sessions. In

consequence to incessant violence, the humanitarian intervention was

authorised by the UN allowing UN member to “take all the necessary

measures to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas under threat of

attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, including Benghazi, while excluding a

foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan territory” (Fisher


37

and Biggar 2011, 699). The international intervention24 under NATO

command conducted an air campaign to protect civilians and also provided

the time and space necessary for opposition forces to eventually overthrow

Qaddafi. The National Transitional Council officially took up power over the

country in October 2011 and Libya is recently undergoing democratic

regime transition.

When comparing the two interventions, certain similarities and

distinctions are apparent. Both were lead by an alliance of democratic

countries against non-democratic regimes in order to protect lives of the

foreign people. Both operations were quick and successful. As a

consequence, interventions initiated the process of democratic transition; in

Kosovo this was largely due to the UN activities, but in Libya the result and

outcomes are not yet obvious.

However, interventions gained a different international status as the

intervention in Kosovo was called illegal as it did not gain the authorisation

of the UN Security Council. By contrast, the intervention in Libya gained the

authorisation and international support even from the Arab League

countries very quickly without its legitimacy once being questioned. While

in the case of Kosovo, some doubts remain about the legitimacy. The

intervention in Libya has been hailed as a model intervention, and

consequently restored the trust in international interventions after the US

failure in Iraq. The shift towards broader international cooperation is

apparent.

24 There were 18 countries involved in the intervention; fourteen NATO members and fourArab state partners; Jordan, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, and Qatar.


38

3.1.2.2. The invasion of Iraq

The US invasion of Iraq in 2003 was the most controversial foreign policy

decision in the post-Cold War era. Much of the controversy derives from the

fact that George W. Bush and his administration failed to provide a

sufficient, and coherent explanation of the leading cause for them to enter

into this war. A set of entirely different explanations were articulated in

order to justify violation of Iraqi sovereignty and large-scale war. First, the

US Intelligence brought to light evidence that Iraq possesses weapons of

mass destruction (WMDs), and that Sadam Hussein can possibly provide

support for Al Qaeda. Sadam Hussein, and his regime were proclaimed to be

of a great danger to the US, and George W. Bush called for a pre-emptive

strike.

The concept of pre-emptive war derives from the conditions of the Cold

War; the US were under constant threat of an imminent nuclear attack

against which they could not effectively defend themselves (Russett 2005,

396). But such conditions never applied to Iraq. Even nuclear-armed Iraq

would not pose a serious threat to the US, at least not a threat that could

not be contained by deterrence (Hinnebusch 2007, 209). The Bush

establishment took a Cold War concept out of context, applied it under

wrong conditions, completely dismissed the doctrine of deterrence, and did

not offer a single logical explanation. Robert Jervis argued that the only

thing that would make the deterrence strategy seem inadequate for this

purpose was “the overweening confidence of the Bush administration to

dominate and overthrow any regime it disliked” (Hinnebusch 2007, 209).

An intergovernmental coalition under the US lead was established and

launched an attack on Iraq without the UN authorisation. As ex-weapon

inspectors and Iraq specialist expected, the WMDs have never been found.

A new justification of the invasion had to be found, one with completely

different logic, as it was obvious that Iraq posed little threat to the US (and


39

some argue that it must have been clear to the establishment even before

the attack). That is when democratic peace argument emerged on the scene

as a post hoc justification.25 Virtually all DP theorists opposed the war as

well as most of the realists who would not accept foreign policy based on

the DP ideas26 (Russett 2005, 397).

Both, pre-emptive war and the democratic peace argument seemed to be

unconvincing as their use was not coherent with either of the concepts.

Various additional explanations were introduced by journalists and

academics but analysis of the true motives and causes of the invasion of

Iraq is beyond the scope of this thesis27.

The consequences of the invasion are indeed unfortunate. The

occupation of Iraq suffered from large inconsistencies in strategy, and

unremitting domestic resistance. The country has become largely unstable,

racked by the insurgency, and sectarian killing, and Iraq was close to civilian

war. In 2006 many observers and journalists proclaimed the US defeat and

called for redefining of the mission or complete withdrawal of American

troops from the country28. It is worth noting that the Iraq War has become

extremely unpopular with public in the US, and worldwide, and was

generally ascribed to the US imperial ambitions.

After the overthrow of Sadam Hussein the US aimed to establish

legitimate democratically elected government which they could gradually

hand power over. This succeeded in 2011. By the end of 2011 the last US

troops were withdrawn from Iraq and the Barack Obama government

25 See quotation of a part of Bush’s speech in the beginning of the chapter26 See Christopher Layne in the chapter 2.427 For further explanations see Raymon Hinnebush (2007) The US Invasion of Iraq:Explanations and Implications. Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 16(3): 209-228; orCharles-Philippe David (2010) How Not to do Post-invasion: Lessons Learned from USDecision-making in Iraq (2002-2008). Defense & Security Analysis 26(1): 31-63.28 For example see Fareed Zakaria and Michael Hastings (2006) Rethinking Iraq: The WayForward. Newsweek 158(19). Available at:http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2006/11/05/rethinking-iraq-the-way-forward.html


40

officially ended the US mission. Iraq remains politically highly unstable with

a weak central government, and the security situation has been deteriorating

as violence among deeply divided society has been further escalated by Al

Qaeda attacks.

3.2. Democratic peace and democracy promotion practices

In this section I would like to address the question of compatibility of the

DPT with democracy promotion practices.

The findings and formulations of the DP research as described in the

previous chapter are compatible only with limited and non-coercive forms

of democracy promotion. This is what virtually all DP theorists have

advocated (Hobson 2011, 173).

But the DPT in any of its forms does not appear to apply for coercive

forms of democracy promotion. In fact, coercive democratisation is at odds

with the nature of the research, and intentions of the researches; most of

the DP theorists explicitly do not support forced regime change. Russett

himself called the justification of the Iraq War a perversion of the DP

‘creation’ (Russet 2005, 395-396).

Imposed democratisation is supported by scholars only as a part of the

‘consequent responsibility’ in the defeated country, like it happened in

Kosovo, or Afghanistan after 2001. Consequent democratisation, and

stabilisation also serve as a way a way how to avoid future wars (Russett

2005, 405; Rummel 2005).

A question has also been raised about the responsibility of DP theorists

for consequences of political practices drawn upon their findings. Most of

the DP researchers reached a conclusion that theorists are not, and cannot

be directly responsible for decisions of policy-makers. However, some


41

scholars point to certain aspects of the DP research that makes it vulnerable

to its misuse for political ends.

First, it is the ‘normative overload’ some scholars point to. A fair number

of studies favouring the normative perspective have been focused on one-

sided embracing of the peace-bringing nature of democracy. For instance

Nils Petre Gleditsch stated that “the importance of democracy lies in it

being a near-perfect sufficient condition for peace” (Gleditsch 1995, 297).

Democracy and democratic states were to some extent idealised and a little

attention was paid to ‘the dark side of DP’; when, how, and what kind of

military violence democracies do use (Geis 2011, 167; Hobson 2011, 173).

Second, the findings of the dyadic hypothesis that democracies are war-

prone in their relations to non-democracies, and their further theorisation,

can make the theory more vulnerable to its political exploitation in a sense

that the use of force against non-democracies can more easily be defended.

For example, Michael Doyle in his work keeps arguing for the existence of

liberal incentives for conflicts in relations between liberal and non-liberal

societies (Doyle 1986, 1156-1157; Doyle 2005, 465).

The debate over the impact of the DP research on the invasion of Iraq has

initiated a more general debate about possible implications, and influence

of the IR theories on the political sphere.

3.3. From theory to practice

Mainstream objectivist conception of science (and social science) claims

that subject and object of study are detached from each other. Regarding

the IRT it follows that IR theories describe the nature and outcomes of

international relations without affecting either of them (Bürger and

Villumsen 2007, 417). However, the DPT has proved otherwise, and

seemingly narrowed the gap between academia and political sphere.


42

The use of the DP proposition as the main justification, and proclaimed

motivation for coercive democratisation of Iraq raised concerns about

consequences that the DPT can have when used as a manual for political

action. It also initiated a more general debate whether IR theories have

implications for political outcomes, and whether IR theorists are to some

extent responsible for them.

From liberal perspective, John Owen argues that subject and object are

never completely separate in social science, and academic discourse can

have an impact on political discourse and vice-versa (Owen 2011, 162).

Postructuralism denies the division of the theory and the practices of IR into

two separate spheres entirely and states that “IR theories co-constitute and

theorists contribute to the constitution of the world they study” (Bürger and

Villumsen 2007, 418). According to Ish-Shalom, collapse of the dichotomy of

subject and object undermines the illusory objectivity of the social sciences

(Ish-Shalom 2006, 588). He offers an interesting explanatory model of how

theory is being translated into practice. It is not theory per se that affects

political reality but it is social perception and political articulation of theory

that drives political action. He formulates a concept of theory as a

hermeneutical mechanism with hermeneutics understood as a process of

interpreting reality. The three stage process of the mechanism goes from

formulating theoretical constructs, transforming them into public

conventions and then into political convictions (Ish-Shalom 2006, 566).

Theories are perceived as theoretical constructs that read and interpret

political concepts. So they do not simply explain but define political

concepts by attaching meaning to them (Ish-Shalom 2006, 569). To be able

to affect political action, theoretical constructs need to be comprehended

and adopted by public, i.e. to be transformed into public conventions. The

last stage involves human agents – political entrepreneurs - who transform

public conventions into political convictions that can be used for political


43

action (Ish-Shalom 2006, 572). During the process theory is being narrowed,

simplified, and adjusted to political needs. A complex theory becomes a set

of rigid assertions which are interpreted as whole facts.

The loss of its probabilistic nature is the most troublesome aspect of the

translation of theory into political practice. For the DPT it means that wide-

range research of DP with different methodological underpinnings and

explanatory models is dismissed and it is treated as a coherent and

consensual theory instead (Geis 2011, 166). Even if the DPT really was

coherent and consensual, as John Owen points out, social science “abstracts

from the complexity of the world and isolates a few conditions thought to

have causal power. The world it depicts is simple and coherent” but

nonetheless the real world “resists conforming to our abstract models”

(Owen 2011, 159). So implications of theory for practice will always be

limited.

4. Conclusion

The thesis has assessed the DPT from both, the theoretical, and the

practical perspective. The main objective was to offer a complex analysis of

the DP scholarship with special focus on the practical significance of the DP

proposition for foreign policy decisions of democratic states and practices of

the international politics.

In regard to the scope of the thesis, I set two research questions at the

beginning of my work. I would like to address these questions in order to

analyse if some light was shed on them or not.

The first question was concerned about the ways the DPT is translated into

political practice:


44

As was demonstrated by the speeches of the US presidents, the DP ideas

and assumptions have become a part of the mindsets of political leaders of

western democracies. It seems that the DPT has transformed into a few

simple axioms used for political ends; democracies never fight each other

hence the more democracies the more peace in the world. If democracies

go to war it is for liberal reasons, i.e. defend and promote freedom and

human rights, and they fight against ‘real threats’ – authoritarians who pose

a serious danger to democratic states and their citizens. That is a common

depiction of the democratic peace that greatly resonates with the general

public, and is articulated by policy-makers of western democracies when

facing an international crisis.

Through the general recognition of the simplified, and narrowed DP

arguments, the democracy promotion practices gained ‘scientific’ support

for further acceptance, and embedding of the practices as common political

tools for democratic governments and international organisations.

The use of the DPT to back up the democracy promotion practices can be

questionable since no DP theorist, except for a few exceptions, makes

explicit predictions about the spread of peace that would be related to the

spread of democracy. This is implied only by the inherent logic of the

theory. Nevertheless, it is the democracy promotion practices that

constitute the main implications of the DPT for the practice of democratic

states and international organisations.

The second research question was related to the extent the DP ideas

might be exploited for war-waging purposes:

Even though democracy promotion is usually a part of majority of liberal

interventions, democratisation imposed by force is not usually the primary

goal. The two presented cases of humanitarian interventions; intervention

in Kosovo and Libya cannot serve for drawing any larger generalisation,


45

however, they were chosen as representative examples to demonstrate the

common motivations and processes of such interventions. Democratic

transition usually comes second in the case that the autocrats oppressing

their own people are overthrown as a consequence of the intervention.

Democratisation is then a part of a larger strategy for recovering and

stabilising of the targeted country.

The only case when the DP research was misused for political purposes,

was the US invasion of Iraq in 2003. The articulation of the primary aim of

democratic peace by the Bush administration was served after the invasion,

when the first used justification was proven to be hollow. The exploitation

of the DPT did not discredit the DPT as such, however, it has pointed to

certain weaknesses in theoretical underpinning, and presentation of the

findings of the DP scholarship.

With regards to the US foreign policy, I agree with the conclusion made

by John Owen (2011), that the Iraq War was an extreme example of the

liberal tradition of the US foreign policy, rather than the pure effect of the

DPT. However, the cited quotation, and the statements of the DP scholars

show that the DP research did partially contribute to the normative

justification of the invasion.

As a solution, more moderate, critical, and self-reflective research agenda

should be introduced, “exploring the highly complex relationship between

democracy, violence, and peace which would illuminate both sides of the

‘Janus face’ of liberal democracies” (Geis 2011, 165).

The thesis has demonstrated that DP research remains the prominent

field of study of IRT with a large potential for further research; particularly

the relationship between democracy, war involvement, and

democratisation should be more closely examined.


46

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