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Collective Intelligence & PairedCognition (DraftNot For Dissemination) Damian Vraniak [email protected] Paired-Cognition 1 Collective Intelligence - Missing the Middle-Level of Analysis: How Do Shifting Dyadic Relationships Form Small Groups? and How Do Small Groups Form Intelligent Collective Communities? Paired-Cognition: A Paradigm Shift Bridging Individual and Collective Perspectives by Damian (McShane) Vraniak, PhD Great Lakes Mental Health Center W3177 Hamilton Road Springbrook, Wisconsin 54875 (715) 790-8801 [email protected] Manuscript prepared for publication submission. Do not disseminate.
Transcript

Collective  Intelligence  &  Paired-­‐Cognition  (Draft-­‐Not  For  Dissemination)  Damian  Vraniak        [email protected]

 

Paired-Cognition 1  

 

     

Collective Intelligence - Missing the Middle-Level of Analysis:

How Do Shifting Dyadic Relationships Form Small Groups?

and

How Do Small Groups Form Intelligent Collective Communities?

Paired-Cognition: A Paradigm Shift Bridging

Individual and Collective Perspectives

by

Damian (McShane) Vraniak, PhD

Great Lakes Mental Health Center

W3177 Hamilton Road Springbrook, Wisconsin 54875

(715) 790-8801

[email protected]

Manuscript prepared for publication submission. Do not disseminate.

Collective  Intelligence  &  Paired-­‐Cognition  (Draft-­‐Not  For  Dissemination)  Damian  Vraniak        [email protected]

 

Paired-Cognition 2  

 

Abstract

The controversy regarding research on intelligence that compares groups defined by

narrow biological features (race) or ambiguously determined social membership (ethnicity,

culture) can be placed within the broader tension between individualistic and collectivistic

approaches to the study of human behavior. The author proposes a paradigm shift that interjects a

focus between individual and group levels of analysis, in the form of a dyadic framework

specifically employing a new concept termed paired-cognition. Support for the utility of such a

formulation is provided by research and theory development in the natural sciences, primate

ethology, group formation, small-world social network analysis, and by empirical findings in a

wide variety of disciplinary applications within the military, computer science, education and

mental health. The author proposes that dyadic processes form a critical intermediate position in

the form of a sequenced, three-part conceptualization that begins with individual processing

(intelligence), inserts interpersonal processing (paired-cognition), and culminates with social

processing (distributed cognition). This sequence emphasizes how individual balance (integrity)

enables dyadic attachment and affiliation (intimacy), which, in turn, builds small group cohesion

(identity) through association and alignment, thereby defining (group, social, cultural) identity in

stepwise fashion. Implications for future research and practice include being able to more

adequately define groups, how they function and relate to other groups, to explore rich

possibilities in testing pairs rather than only individuals, and to entertain the notion of

“dualizing” educational approaches rather than continuing to bounce back and forth between

individualized instruction and various grouping models.

Collective  Intelligence  &  Paired-­‐Cognition  (Draft-­‐Not  For  Dissemination)  Damian  Vraniak        [email protected]

 

Paired-Cognition 3  

 

Paired Cognition: A Paradigm Shift Bridging Individual and Collective Perspectives

Mainstream research and practice in psychology focusing on group process emphasizes

groups as composed of individuals (Arrow, McGrath and Berdahl, 2000; Bales, 1950; Bion,

1961; Chang, Duck, and Bordia, 2006; Dion, 2000; Durkin, 1981; Freud, 1955; Gersick, 1991;

Hare, 2003; La Coursieri, 1980; LePine, 2003; Lewin, 1947; Levine and Moreland, 2006;

McGrath and Tschan, 2004; Poole and Hollingshead, 2005; Salas, Nichols and Driskell, 2007;

Smith, 2001; Whelan, 2005), often neglecting the importance of dyadic interactions. An

extensive literature focused on individual cognition and intelligence (Sternberg, 2000) contrasts

more recent literature focusing upon groups as information processors (Hinsz, Tindale and

Vollrath, 1997) and socially distributed cognition (Smith and Collins, 2009), that promotes the

study of patterns in sharing information and impressions that are socially constructed,

transmitted, and filtered through social networks. However, there is little mention or exploration

of dyads as building blocks of these networks. Indeed, those pursuing socially distributed

cognition have followed the psychometric and conceptual path of individual intelligence

scholars; for instance, Woolley et. al. (2010) found converging evidence of a general collective

intelligence factor that explains a group's performance on a wide variety of tasks. This “c factor”

was not strongly correlated with the average or maximum individual intelligence of group

members but with the average social sensitivity of group members, the equality in distribution of

conversational turn-taking, and the proportion of females in the group.

Yet, on the other hand, Bahrami et al (2010) examined dyadic low-level perceptual

decision-making for two observers of nearly equal visual sensitivity and found that two heads

were definitely better than one provided they could communicate freely, even in the absence of

any feedback about decision outcomes; and Schwatrz (1995) demonstrated that high school

student dyads constructed abstractions well above the rate one would expect given a “most

competent member” model of group performance applied to the empirical rate of individual

abstractions. Reviewing such literature leads to the first of twelve basic observations and/or

propositions supporting the rich potential in constructing a new dyadic cognitive framework,

particularly in attempting to understand the development, functioning and productivity of groups.

Collective  Intelligence  &  Paired-­‐Cognition  (Draft-­‐Not  For  Dissemination)  Damian  Vraniak        [email protected]

 

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1. There is an ongoing impasse between individualistic and collectivistic approaches to

understanding the interplay between cognition and culture.

Seriously conflicting positions have arisen in the literature between proponents of

individual versus group perspectives across many domains of study. A salient example of this

tension can be seen in the literature contrasting individual intelligence and racial/ethnic group

differences. While a great deal of focus has been on group differences, the reality remains that

within racial and ethnic group differences on intelligence have always exceeded between group

differences (Nisbett, 2009; Rushton & Jensen, 2003, 2005; Valencia & Suzuki, 2000). There is

more intra-group scatter among individual intelligence test scores than intergroup differences.

Thus, a focus on racial and ethnic group differences has yielded little if any new information in

the past decade beyond a focus on the limitations of testing and the cultural loading of particular

cognitive measures. Confer at al. (2010) suggest that cultural explanations refer to at least two

distinct concepts: evoked culture - a differential output elicited by variable between-group

circumstances operating as input to a universal human cognitive architecture, or transmitted

culture – the subset of ideas, values, and representations that initially exist in at least one mind

that come into existence in other minds through observation or interaction (Tooby & Cosmides,

1992). Confer et al. (2010) suggest that neither of these distinct senses of culture can be divorced

from the content-structuring, evolved organization of the human mind.

To characterize that organization, Kanazawa (2010) proposed ‘the savanna-IQ interaction

hypothesis’, derived from the intersection of evolutionary psychology and intelligence research,

suggesting that there is a selection for individuals to better comprehend and deal with

evolutionarily novel entities and situations… in contrast to other concepts and hypotheses, such

as employing the concept of encephalization quotient (EQ) to explain the evolution of

intelligence of species as a function of the novelty of their ecological niches (Jerisen, 1973), the

social brain hypothesis (Dunbar, 1998; Bryne and Humphrey, 1976), the Machiavellian

intelligence hypothesis explaining evolution of intelligence as a consequence of deceiving a large

number of conspecifics (Bryne & Whiten, 1988), the motivation-to-control theory explaining the

expansion of the human brain as a result of the human need to control it physical and social

environment (Geary, 2005), selection with regard to the complexities of social life (Gottfredson,

1997), emotional intelligence (Mayer, Salovey, & Caruso, 2008; Salovey & Mayer, 1990), social

intelligence (Kihlstrom & Cantor, 2000; Marlowe, 1986), mating intelligence (Geher & Miller,

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2007), and multiple intelligences (Gardner, 1983) . While Kanazawa (2010) discusses whether

general intelligence is a domain-specific adaptation or an individual-difference variable, he does

not seem to consider the possibility of conjoint, dyadic intelligence, defined in this article as

paired-cognition.

2. In order to penetrate the opposing tensions between perspectives based on individualism

and collectivism, it may be helpful to focus upon intermediate, interpersonal, dyadic

processes, particularly in the form of a new construct called paired-cognition.

Individualism implies that individuals are independent beings with personal autonomy

and a desire for self-fulfillment (e.g., Oyserman, Coon & Kemmelmeier, 2002). The emphasis is

on the personal rather than the social. In contrast, “the core element of collectivism is the

assumption that groups bind and mutually obligate individuals” (Oyserman, Coon &

Kemmelmeier, 2002, p. 3), thus emphasizing social context, situation, and social roles.

Brewer and Chen (2007) note that there exist varying forms of collectivism (i.e., relational and

group) and that a somewhat tenuous balance exists between individualism and collectivism,

illustrated in the psychological literature in the growing emphasis placed upon multicultural

understanding and the notion of intersecting identities (Sanchez-Hucles & Davis, 2010).

While culture impacts nearly all psychological phenomena, its definition and

measurement is ambiguous and the construct itself is often difficult to differentiate from identity

within community, society and other levels of group membership. Whatever terms are used to

describe culture (e.g., race, ethnicity, social class, gender, age, religion, sexual orientation,

disability status) – whether it be a narrow definition focusing upon race and ethnicity or a more

broad definition focusing on transmitted symbols of meaning (Geertz, 1973) – the challenges of

defining and understanding culture remain. The notion of cultural groupings and categories

based upon what researchers define as salient attributes remains in the synergistic space between

multiple and intersecting identities. The complexities of social location and the dynamic nature

of these variables has limited our ability to define and operationalize their impact on

psychological functioning and mental health (Brewer and Chen, 2007; McRae and Short, 2010).

Tightening focus, Harrington and Fine (2000) claim that these core issues rest within

small groups: "Small groups are the locus of both social control and social change, where

networks are formed, culture is created, and status order is made concrete." (p 312) And Harrod

et al. (2009) reviewed 31 years (1975-2005) of group research noting that the first reviewers to

Collective  Intelligence  &  Paired-­‐Cognition  (Draft-­‐Not  For  Dissemination)  Damian  Vraniak        [email protected]

 

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summarize such research (Moreland, Hogg, and Hains; 1994) “…reasoned that dyads seem

different from other groups in many ways, and that some phenomena that occur in groups (like

coalition formation, majority/minority influence, and socialization) cannot occur in dyads at all.

MHH decided that "most" research on dyads should be excluded, ….”

What appears to be missing from this discourse is an understanding of the fundamental

role of the pairing and partnering in dyads that does exist within groups, that in turn makes up or

forms the social and societal networks that make up cultural groupings. Being able to specify

compositional units of analysis (i.e., dyads form groups which link to form associations that

comprise community), offers the opportunity of a more fine-tuned and detailed approach to

understanding the salient identities of participants in the study of cultural communities.

3. Proposing an initial definition of paired-cognition as a new construct enables a new

evaluation of relevant theorizing and research that enables fresh insights and approaches.

Vraniak (2009a) coined the term paired-cognition to represent the primary construct that

conceptually locates and integrates a dyadic, intermediate theoretical construct between

individual and group levels of research on cognition. Paired-cognition refers to the dyadic

processing of sensory stimuli, emotional signals, and mental symbols containing information

when two individuals are involved together in tasks requiring manipulation, consolidation,

construction and storage of information in ways that direct or change behavior, feelings and

thoughts in a mutually consensual, beneficial and productive manner. Based upon this

definition, groups are comprised of shifts in pairing between and among various members of a

group, identified and characterized as a process of pairing-into-partnering. Pairing-into-

partnering and paired-cognition are characterized by stable, yet dynamic, dyadic interpersonal

processes. An understanding of paired-cognition is dependent upon the duration of on-going

contact and taking into consideration initial engagement and a sequence of shifting dyadic

connections composing various levels of attachment, affiliation, and association. Paired-

cognition occurs in dyads when two people hear, see and sense the same incoming stimuli or

information; then, together, process the information in dialogue; and, agree on a single product

(e.g., answer) or performance (e.g., behavior) that is expressed, in response to a task demand,

problem or adaptive challenge external to the dyad. Thus, paired-cognition by a dyad involves

the combined and coordinated reception of an input, redundant and complementary (dual)

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processing of information, and an integrated, singular output. If a pair disagrees on the output

and each holds to their own singular processing and output, then it is individual cognition.

The following text addresses the potential contributions of a dyadic framework in

discourse pertaining to: a) relevant theoretical frames in the natural sciences and primate

ethology b) pertinent group formation and network affiliation research; c) dyadic partnering in

core group configurations; d) paired cognition; e) paired relationships and cognition; f) empirical

support for paired cognition; g) gender distinctions; and h) clinical and research implications.

The general argument rests on the proposition that conceptualizing learning and cognition

by dyads in a paired interpersonal context will yield significant research insights about cognition

and about the forming of group process and identity (including ethnicity and culture). Dyadic

relationships present a critical intermediate feature in understanding psychological phenomena in

groups. Examining the nature of paired or dyadic interactions provides a more adequate set of

building blocks with which to effectively define identity in groups or cultures, impacting our

understanding of measured group differences.

4. In part, difficulties defining groups and measuring group differences are related to

challenges clarifying and bridging individual, interpersonal (dyadic) and social (group)

levels of analysis.

Clarifying Theoretical Underpinnings. Vraniak (1989) proposed a conceptual mapping of

processes emphasizing principles focusing on the individual, interpersonal (dyadic), social, and

cultural dimensions similar to the transactional views of Dewy and Bentley (1949) and

Brofenbrenner’s (1979) articulation of an ecological view of development ranging from the

individual to the societal level:

“The simplest partitioning in psychological science that covers the most conceptual

ground sets boundaries at the individual, interpersonal and social levels of focus and analysis.

Further conceptual partitioning can occur within each layer. (Within an individual there is

that which is physical, emotional and cognitive, for instance.) In past writing I have

suggested that conceptual templates used in various disciplines, from the physical and natural

sciences through psychology and sociology into religious and theological systems, have

analogous linguistic structures: Singularities have parts that are assembled into some sort of

integrity that makes them a unitary object or organism; if there is one object or cell there can

be two and processes by which they interact in some sort of contact and connection

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(intimacy); if there are two interacting units, objects or organisms there may be three (units

or pairings) that transact in such a way as to manifest principles that represent their relations

(identity). I have proposed that this is an invariant, universal, and sequential template that at

its simplest is described in words as … parts within the 1, processes between the 2,

principles among 3, and the pattern that penetrates through the whole and integrates all. That

this last layer integrates the previous three layers into a new, more complex singularity

means that something bridges internal action within the singularity with the interactions

between two singularities that accumulate in transactions among many. It has been given

many names, depending upon the system of inquiry – systems, ecological, transactional,

multi-dimensionality, complexity, and so on. Essentially, these inter-penetrating patterns may

be partitioned into the commonly used or technical terms structure, function, form and

energy.”

The question has been how to determine the fundamental units that define a group and

community of groups and where one sets the boundaries adequately configuring levels of

analysis. Research in the natural sciences and non-human primate ethology has begun to tackle

this particular theoretical and empirical challenge.

5. Scholars in disciplines like biology and primatology have approached similar theoretical

boundary issues in a fashion that can inform psychological research with humans

regarding how groups form and function.

Natural Sciences. Theory-building and empirical research in the physical, natural and

biological sciences has been rather systematic in attempting to focus within conceptually

bounded layers, and has also sought to bridge across them in some clear way. For instance,

Bascompte (Science, August, 2010) details research concerning the structural and functional

dynamics of ecological networks describing how plants and animals form networks of

interdependence that may be antagonistic or mutualistic, in which antagonistic interactions tend

to be arranged in compartments and mutalistic interactions tend to be nested, and the architecture

of each interaction type acts to increase the persistence of the network. Ahn, Bagrow and

Lehman (Nature, August, 2010) focus on re-defining research on the multi-scale complexity of

networks that has utilized the increasingly popular concept of nodes in terms of a new construct

they call link communities. They use the following logic:

Collective  Intelligence  &  Paired-­‐Cognition  (Draft-­‐Not  For  Dissemination)  Damian  Vraniak        [email protected]

 

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“Networks have become a key approach to understanding systems of interacting

objects, unifying the study of diverse phenomena including biological organisms and

human society. One crucial step when studying the structure and dynamics of networks

is to identify communities: groups of related nodes that correspond to functional subunits

such as protein complexes or social spheres. Communities in networks often overlap,

such that nodes simultaneously belong to several groups. Meanwhile, many networks are

known to possess hierarchical organization, where communities are recursively grouped

into a hierarchical structure. However, the fact that many relay networks have

communities with pervasive overlap, where each and every node belongs to more than

one group, has the consequence that a global hierarchy of nodes cannot capture the

relationships between overlapping groups. Here we reinvent communities as groups of

links rather than nodes and show that this unorthodox approach successfully reconciles

the antagonistic organizing principles of overlapping communities and hierarchy. In

contrast to the existing literature, which has entirely focused on grouping nodes, link

communities naturally incorporate overlap while revealing hierarchical organization.

We find relevant link communities in many networks, including major biological

networks such as protein-protein interaction and metabolic networks, and show that a

large social network contains hierarchically organized community structures spanning

inner-city to regional scales while maintaining pervasive overlap. Our results imply that

link communities are fundamental building blocks that reveal overlap and hierarchical

organization in networks to be two aspects of the same phenomenon.”

But what, exactly, makes up the specific units that link? It is at the intermediate level of

the dyadic that physical and natural science research has been quite fertile. For instance, in 1957

American physicists Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer explained how electrons form pairs and

how at low temperatures there isn’t enough energy required to break the pair, so the pair glides

freely … beginning the explorations of superconductivity and 24 years of trying to explain what

makes cuprates’ electrons pair. Ameres et al (2010) and Cazalla et al (2010) explore the extent of

base-pairing between microRNA and RNA holds important significance for functioning in

essential cellular pathways. Breitkreutz et al (2010) describe how kinases and phosphatases may

form a collaborative network of interactions to mediate cellular response, and Abbondanzieri and

Zhuang (2009) model concealed enzyme coordination between subunits crucial for the proper

Collective  Intelligence  &  Paired-­‐Cognition  (Draft-­‐Not  For  Dissemination)  Damian  Vraniak        [email protected]

 

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functioning of multi-component molecular machines; while Gregor et al (2010) describe the

stochastic emergence of ‘groupthink’ through oscillations in the synthesis and release of a

chemical signal that synchronizes the behavioral response of a cell population in the onset of

collective behavior in social amoebae. Clearly the physical and biological scientists are carefully

crafting a sophisticated hierarchy of conceptual units that link the singular with the paired and

then proceed onward and upward into small groupings of sub-units and larger collective

behavior. This sort of conceptual focus on pair-bonding and function has been occurring

similarly for decades in a variety of social science disciplines, including primate ethology,

which, in particular, provides conceptual approaches and research data regarding social

grooming and group size, structure and function that is relevant to exploring similar questions in

human beings examined later in this paper.

Primate Grooming, Cliques and Group Size. McComb and Semple (2005) examined

relationships between changes in communication abilities and changes in key aspects of social

behavior over evolutionary time that confirm that evolutionary increases in the size of the vocal

repertoire among non-human primate species were associated with increases in both group size

and time spent grooming (measure of extent of social bonding). Puga-Gonzalez, Hildenbrandt

and Hemelrijk (2009) summarized functional patterns in affiliation based on grooming that serve

several important functions such as cleaning fur, reducing anxiety, tension and stress, social

bonding, repairing relationships and social reciprocation and exchange. Individuals direct

grooming up the hierarchy in order to receive more effective support in return, groom others of

similar rank, groom former opponents immediately after a fight has been interpreted in order to

repair the relationship or ‘reconcile’. Individuals also appear to reconcile with those partners that

appeared more valuable to them, suggesting the so-called ‘valuable-relationship hypothesis’. In

addition, the degree of exchange and reciprocation appears to differ between egalitarian and

despotic species.

Many specific cognitive considerations have been suggested to underlie these affiliative

patterns. For instance, individuals may remember acts of grooming and adjust their own to

frequencies of receipt or support, and to use their knowledge of the ranks of others to secure

more support. The cognition underlying reconciliation consists of the ability to remember the

former opponent and to reconcile fights with opponents that are of greater value to them,

particularly involving three key components that influence the quality of a relationship - its

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security, its value, and the compatibility of both partners. This implies that assessing the value of

a relationship over time requires cognitive sophistication, because it asks for a precise memory

of what happened in the past and for a correct evaluation of the relationship in the long-term.

Kudo and Dunbar (2001) proposed that primates use social grooming to service

coalitions, these directly affecting the fitness of their members by allowing them to reduce the

intrinsic costs associated with living in large groups and confirmed that the size of grooming

cliques are proportional to the size of the groups they have to support. Analysis of the patterns of

grooming among males and females found that large primate social groups often consist of a set

of smaller female subgroups (in some cases, matrilinearly based coalitions) that are linked by

individual males. This may be because males insert themselves into the interstices between

weakly bonded female subgroups rather than because they actually hold these subunits together.

Lehmann and Dunbar (2007) also found that when groups become too large, individuals will not

have enough time available to service all possible social relationships and group cohesion may

decrease. They showed that not only is grooming time determined by group size, but it is also

affected by dispersal patterns and sex ratio (e.g, when group size exceeds 40 individual time

constraints resulting from ecological pressure force individuals to compromise on their grooming

time.) The authors concluded that grooming behavior is not only linked to primate group size but

also to sex ratio and patterns of female dispersal, reflecting that philopatric females may invest a

larger amount of time into grooming behavior than dispersing females. The authors observed that

individuals in large groups have to compromise on their grooming time which leads to less

cohesive, less stable grouping patterns, eventually resulting in group fission. Thus, grooming

time as well as cognitive constraints can limit group sizes/cohesion in primates. Yet these

constraints do not create absolute limits for primate group sizes as they found that many

populations live in larger than predicted groups. But in these cases, the groups may be less

cohesive or have to depend on other mechanisms for maintaining cohesion (e.g. kinds of vocal

exchanges). Interestingly, those species that were found to live in larger than expected groups,

were also found to experience high predation pressure, which may have provided a strong

selection pressure for large group sizes. Finally, Lehmann and Dunbar (2009) mapped female

grooming networks, finding females generally live in more fragmented networks, belong to

smaller grooming clans and are members of relatively fewer clans despite living in a closely

bonded group. However, even though groups are more fragmented to begin with among species

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with larger neocortices, the removal of the most central individual causes such groups to fall

apart, suggesting that social complexity may ultimately involve the management of highly

fragmented social groups while at the same time maintaining overall social cohesion.

From Other Primates to Humans. This sampling of exploration of how pairing

(grooming) in non-human primates begins to offer valuable strategies for beginning to determine

fundamental features of how paired relationships might function and how they may build small

group and community structures in humans. For instance, Nakamura (2000) compared clique

sizes for chimpanzee grooming and for human conversation in order to test Dunbar’s hypothesis

that human language is almost three times as efficient a bonding mechanism as primate

grooming. And Zhou, Sornette, Hill and Dunbar (2004) noted recent work on both human and

non–human primates suggesting that social groups are often hierarchically structured. They

combined data on human grouping patterns in a comprehensive and systematic study. Using

fractal analysis, they identified a discrete hierarchy of group sizes with a preferred scaling ratio

close to three: rather than a single or a continuous spectrum of group sizes, humans

spontaneously form groups of preferred sizes organized in a geometrical series approximating 3–

5, 9–15, 30–45, etc. Recently, Dunbar and Shultz (2007) suggested that although early

explanations of the evolution of unusually large brains in some groups of animals, notably

primates, tended to emphasize the brain's role in sensory or technical competence (foraging

skills, innovations, and way-finding), the balance of evidence now clearly favors the suggestion

that it was the computational demands of living in large, complex societies that selected for large

brains. Recent analyses suggest that it may have been the particular demands of the more intense

forms of pair-bonding that was the critical factor that triggered this evolutionary development.

This may explain why primate sociality seems to be so different from that found in most other

birds and mammals: Primate sociality is based on bonded relationships of a kind that are found

only in reproductive pair-bonds in other taxa. They state:

“The important issue in the present context is the marked contrast between

anthropoid primates and all other mammalian and avian taxa: Only anthropoid primates

exhibit a correlation between social group size and relative brain (or neocortex) size)

size. This quantitative relationship is extremely robust; no matter how we analyze the

data … or which brain data set we use … the same quantitative relationship always

emerges. This suggests that, at some early point in their evolutionary history, anthropoid

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primates used the kinds of cognitive skills used for pair-bonded relationships by

vertebrates to create relationships between individuals who are not reproductive

partners. In other words, in primates, individuals of the same sex as well as members of

the opposite sex could form just as intense and focused a relationship as do reproductive

mates in non-primates. Given the number of possible relationships is only limited by the

number of animals in the group, primates naturally exhibit a positive correlation between

group size and brain size. This would explain why, as primatologists have argued for

decades, the nature of primate sociality seems to be qualitatively different form that

found in most other mammals and birds. The reason is that the everyday relationships of

anthropoid primates involve a form of “bondedness” that is only found elsewhere in

reproductive pair-bonds.” (p. 1346)

6. Productive research exploring the ‘social brain’, affiliative grooming, group size

parameters and gender distinctions in group-forming processes has been used to frame and

inform research with humans.

Evolution of the Social Brain in Humans. Dunbar’s (1993) original extrapolation from

non-human primate data yielded a predicted group size for modern humans very similar to that

of certain hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist societies and in other large-scale forms

in historical and contemporary society. He pointed out that data on the size of conversational and

other small interacting groups of humans are in line with the predictions for the relative

efficiency of conversation compared to grooming as a bonding process and that a sample of

human conversations shows that about 60% of time is spent gossiping about relationships and

personal experiences. He proposed that the cohesion of primate groups is maintained through

time by social grooming, used both to establish and to service those friendships and coalitions

that give primate groups their unique structure. The relationship between group size and time

devoted to grooming appears to be a consequence of the intensity with which a small number of

key "friendships" (the primary network) is serviced rather than to the total number of individuals

in the group. These primary networks function as coalitions whose primary purpose is to buffer

their members against harassment by the other members of the group. The larger the group, the

more harassment and stress an individual faces and the more important those coalitions are. It

seems that a coalition's effectiveness (in the sense of its members' willingness to come to each

other's aid) is directly related to the amount of time its members spend grooming each other.

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Hence, the larger the group, the more time individuals devote to grooming with the members of

their coalitionary clique. The mean size of the primary network is, however, related to the mean

group size for the species. This suggests that groups are built up by welding together sets of

smaller primary networks and that the total size of the group is ultimately limited not by the

number of networks that can be welded together but rather by the size of the networks

themselves.

Group Size in Modern Humans. Dunbar summarized all the data he was able to find in

the ethnographic literature for a number of historical and contemporary hunter-gatherer and

swidden horticulturalist societies. Data suggested that group sizes fall into three quite distinct

size classes: small living groups of 30-50 individuals (commonly measured as overnight camps,

but often referred to as bands in some of the hunter-gatherer literature), an intermediate level of

grouping (either a more permanent village or a culturally defined clan or lineage group) that

typically contains 100-200 people and a large population unit (the tribe or in some cases sub-

tribe) that typically numbers between 500 and 2500 individuals. The equation using this data

yields a predicted group size for humans of 147.8. An analysis of settlement size and structure

among contemporary New Guinea "neolithic" cultivators found that the figure 150 was a key

threshold in community. When communities exceeded this size basic relationships of kinship and

affinity were insufficient to maintain social cohesion; stability could then be maintained only if

formal structures developed which defined specific roles within society. In other words, large

communities were invariably hierarchically structured in some way, whereas small communities

were not. Similarly, in an analysis of data from 30 societies ranging from hunter-gatherers to

large-scale agriculturalists, Naroll (1956) demonstrated that there was a simple power

relationship between the maximum settlement size observed in a given society and both the

number of occupational specialties and the number of organizational structures recorded for it.

According to Dunbar, it turns out that figures in the region of 150 occur frequently

among a wide range of contemporary human societies, including Hutterites, research specialties

in the sciences (rarely more than 200 individuals), network sizes in academic sub-disciplines

(about 200, with a range between 100-400), most organized armies (a basic unit of about 150

men; mean size of 179.6 for the twentieth century armies). He points to other evidence

suggesting that 150 may be a functional limit on interacting groups even in contemporary

western industrial societies --marked negative effect of group size on both group cohesion and

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job satisfaction (as indicated by absenteeism and turnover in posts) within the size range under

consideration (i.e. 50-500 individuals), an informal rule in business organization identifies 150 as

the critical limit for the effective coordination of tasks and information-flow through direct

person-to-person links, an upper limit on the number of social contacts that can be regularly

maintained within a group (Coleman, 1964) and friendships among print shop workers that

reaches an asymptote at a shop size of 90-150 individuals. Most studies of social networks in

modern urban societies have tended to concentrate on specific sub-sets (e.g. "support networks")

within the wider network of "friends and acquaintances". Given this consistent upper limit in

terms of the upper maximum of individuals, how are the groups within this ‘network

community’ formed; how do they develop and function?

7. A review of group-process and social-networks research suggests very preliminary

results with respect to specifying units within levels of analysis and detailing processes

bridging well-defined boundaries between individual, interpersonal, social (group) and

community (cultural) layers.

Agency and Gender Distincitions in Small World Affiliation Networks, Social Network

Analysis, Organizational Hierarchies. Concern with the organizational structures of close

networks is the concern of an area of research called small-world networks in social science and

management, focused upon hidden relationships, covert meetings, and critical actors that lead to

planned action, especially with regards to the tensions between the need for secrecy and control

and the need for smooth information flow and the participation of a sufficient number of skilled

agents. Gutfraind (2009, 2010) and Farley (2010) explored terrorist networks, finding those who

are most highly linked does not work to adequately describe how the networks actually function.

People who have roles in multiple groups – called interstitial members – are some of the most

important because they communicate between groups and relay information. Another important

attribute, exclusivity, relates to some members of a network who have specialized training and so

are in high demand for certain jobs. Accounting for high exclusivity measures and using fuzzy

grouping techniques can lead to more nuanced descriptions of (covert) networks. Subrahmanian

(2010) explored what he calls the “bureaucracy effect” – sluggish coordination constrains an

organization’s behavior because they may not have the capacity to make radical changes without

taking time to do so, making them more predictable. Combining a bargaining model - one that

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offsets the need for secrecy and the need for information flow - with network analysis and new

mathematical techniques to predict the structure of terror organizations - Lindelauf and his

colleagues (2009) can predict how organizational structures change as the threat of being

discovered increases and how these network-shaping forces can shape the structure in ways that

enable it to be resilient when attacked. On the other hand, Farley (2010) uses a branch of

mathematics theory called lattice theory to figure out the most stable arrangements of leaders and

followers in an organizational hierarchy that can’t easily be destroyed, some version of which

split into smaller units rather than collapse. The links between small-world networks, scale-free

networks, community structure, and network models of dynamic processes, such as the spread of

disease and social contagion, are creating a new science of networks (Watts, 2004).

Uzzi et al (2007), drew together small-world research on change and robustness. Kogut

and Walker (2001) demonstrated that a small-world network can preserve its inherent structure

despite a substantial number of shocks that rewire ownership links, small-world networks are

robust to high rates of turnover, small-world structure persists, and a massive amount of

restructuring is needed to transform a small-world into another kind of structure (an important

finding for understanding how to measure and gauge the institutionalized power structure behind

an industry and economy even if the economy has experienced radical turnover of key players).

Firms organized as small-worlds can experience turnover without disruption to the underlying

organization of knowledge transfer and collaboration. Verspagen and Duysters (2004) examined

whether the network of strategic alliances, which are relatively more volatile than ownership ties

(Gulati, 2007), have small-world properties. Baum et al. (2003) examined the formation of the

short-cut links that connect the clusters of a small-world from 1952 to 1990 in a network of

Canadian investment banks that suggested that the underlying structure of the small world, while

the product of strategy, is also the consequence of chance links that make the complete structure

beyond the control of any one firm.

Such affiliation networks deserve special attention for at least three reasons. Affiliation

networks are ubiquitous. Many critical types of social networks involve teamwork: actors in a

movie (Amaral et al., 2000), creative artists who make musicals (Uzzi and Spiro, 2005),

organizational project teams, investment bank syndicates, venture capital syndicates (Kogut et

al., 2007), co-patenting inventors (Gittelman and Kogut, 2003), co-authors on scientific papers

(Newman, 2001; Guimera et al., 2005), and boards of directors (Robins and Alexander, 2004).

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Indeed, affiliation networks have been shown to have important effects on performance. They

appear to account for major leaps forward in science, art, and philosophical thinking throughout

the ages. Going back through all recorded history in Eastern and Western civilizations, Randall

Collins’ masterpiece, the Sociology of Philosophies, showed that, except for the work of three

individuals, all the other great advances, including Freud, Hegel, de Medici, Smith, Hutchinson,

Watson and Crick, and Darwin, came about by individuals who were a part of a network of

relationships in which many individuals worked as part of teams. Looking at a related knowledge

transfer and inter-corporate coordination problems, Davis et al. (2003) showed that the small-

world network of corporate elites remained relatively stable despite the massive turnover of

companies and directors. Any two boards remained capable of being linked by no more than just

four directors. This work showed that while the individual actors who make up a system can

change in terms of capabilities, political interests, technology or strategy, the underlying

organizational structure of a small world continues replicate, suggesting that a small-world

network offers a high level of flexibility for organizing a diversity of actors. It is important to

note that much of this research is very male oriented and almost entirely omits mention of

pairing or dyadic relationship.

On the other hand, an important instance of relationship differentiation in novel situations

is understanding gender roles in prosocial behavior (Eagly, 2009), where social bonds can take a

relational form by linking people to particular others in close relationships or a collective form

by linking people to groups and organizations (Brewer & Gardner, 1996). This distinction

between relationship and collective interdependence corresponds to the communal and agentic

dimensions of gender stereotypes (Gardner & Gabriel, 2004). By ascribing warm, sympathetic,

and kind attributes to women, gender role beliefs imply that women have a propensity for

bonding with others in close dyadic relationships. Expressive, affectionate qualities facilitate

friendships, romantic relationships, and family relationships and convey cooperative

interdependence (Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). In contrast, by ascribing assertive,

ambitious, and competitive qualities to men, gender role beliefs imply a social context in which

people differ in status and men strive to improve their hierarchical position (Baumeister &

Somner, 1997; Garnder & Gabriel, 2004). Such qualities are consistent with men’s directing of

much of their prosocial behavior to collectives (Gilmore, 1990). Although independence is also

one of the agentic qualities commonly ascribed to men, demonstrating a degree of independence

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in a group setting can produce influence (Moscoviici & Nemeth, 1974; Shackelford, Wood, &

Worchel, 1996) and provide an opportunity for leadership (Eagly, Wood, & Fishbaugh, 1981). In

general, superior social status is conveyed by the agentic attributes ascribed to men, such as

being dominant and masterful (Ridgeway & Bourg, 2004), even though these attributes ascribed

to women are not as favorably evaluated as the communal attributes ascribed to women (Eagly,&

Mandinic, 1994; Langford & Mackinnon, 2000). Here the recurring theme of individualistic

versus collective partitioning is somewhat altered by attending to the observation of women

bonding in close relationships, but the accumulative linking of dyadic relationships by women

into group form is not explored, nor is how men enter relationships to form collectives examined.

Again, the contribution of paired-cognition to shifting pairing and partnering in forming

communal, collective small groups is implied yet neglected. The focus upon heroic agency in

emergencies involving strangers and leadership involving high-risk rescue (e.g. aiding Jews

during WWII) in collective situations is a prominent example in this neglect of examining how

dyadic interactions build into group consensus and common social cause in the formation of

regular small social groups in school, colleges, the workplace and other organizations and

businesses.

Even broadening beyond white male CEO’s and gender distinctions, this omission of the

dyadic is evident in the April 2010 special issue of the American Psychologist concerning

diversity and leadership where Chin (2010) outlines a broadened focus on leaders and followers

representing different ethnicities, genders and sexual orientations. Ayman and Korabik (2010)

review gender, culture and leadership, invoking implicit leadership theory, cultural intelligence,

self-monitoring, the ‘big five’, the two-factor (considerate-people oriented or initiating structure

task oriented) approach, transformational leadership, and leader-member exchange (LMX)

among other approaches. They do note one of the few studies to have incorporated cross-cultural

dyads (Chen & Tjosvold, 2007). In the same issue Pittinsky (2010) lays out a two-dimensional

model of intergroup leadership. “The two-dimensional model of intergroup leadership examines

a core concern of all leadership models: How to create the leadership’s basis, the collective. The

model argues that (a) in the context of diverse collectives, the task involves not just bringing

together individuals but also subgroups and (b) an effective collective can be created by

promoting positive relations between subgroups and without trying to eliminate or diminish their

distinct subgroup identities. This involves leadership acts – by individuals and by institutions –

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that not only reduce negative attitudes among the subgroups that must be assembled but also

independently increase positive attitudes among those same subgroups…. By conceptualizing

leadership amid diversity as leading a collection of subgroups whose members retain their

subgroup identities, the model is both general enough to generate research and parsimonious

enough to avoid the laborious identification and resolution of every contingency posed by every

possible juxtaposition of cultural differences.” While this approaches linking levels of analysis, it

still does not adequately bridge individual and group until we focus on the next level down, how

dyads compose what Pittinsky calls subgroups and how dyads connecting across groups define

the nature of intergroup relations.

Although paired-cognition might greatly enhance explorations of the relational link

between important individual behavior and group processes, it is missing in studies of parenting

coordination (APA Monitor, August 2010); the embodiment, action and cognitive extension of

the mind beyond the physical boundaries of the body (Clark, 2008); internet-based social

networks response to disasters (Winerman, 2009); the calculus of selfishness in terms of

reputation, fairness and trust (Sigmund, 2010); over-imitation (Whiten and Horner, 2005; Lyons,

et al, 2007); and social network analysis and small world affiliation networks in terrorist and

business organizations (Uzzi, 2007; Watts, 2004; Gutfraind, 2010). When, implicitly or explicity,

paired-cognition is approached in studies, the research is often highly productive such as in

studying the role of mentorship in protégé performance (Malmgren, Ottino and Amaral, 2010) or

in the results for paired teammates and teams of being paired with either an aggressive or non-

aggressive partner (Bowler et al, in press).

8. There is support for, and significant benefit from, inserting dyadic pairing and

partnering into core configurations that describe typical human grouping thresholds.

Support for the significance of dyadic partnering can be found also in evolutionary theory

in the context of social and cultural psychology (Caporael, 2005). Researchers note that the dyad

is the most ancient of configurations in that it functions as the initial, fundamental unit of social

organization (Jones, 1976; Jones and Boltz, 1989; McGrath and Kelly, 1986). Citing work from

Spinoza to Tomasello, Hrdy (2009) proposes “that the crucial difference between human

cognition and that of other species is the ability to participate with others in collaborative

activities with shared goals and intentions … in a synchronicity of movement that maintains

twoness” (p.9). She emphasizes the idea of ‘to care and share’ between one and a significant

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other, particularly the mother-child dyad. On the other hand, in relevant research men were

privileged based upon bravery and the ability to function well in the group defined through

acquisition of resources, mates and territory (Lehamn and Feldman, 2008), while women shifted

selection of mates through forming dyadic relationships with men and pair-bonding (Immerson,

2003). Gender-specific styles evolved, as noted by Maccoby (1990, 1998), as males appear to

focus on association in groups, while females tend to form relationship patterns based upon

attachment and affiliation secured in one-on-one interactions (Benenson and Heath, 2006); that

is, boys tend to withdraw more in one-on-one interactions and girls withdraw more in groups.

Researchers have examined configurations of group size and task (e.g., Caporael, 1995, 1997,

2005; Vraniak, 2010) in order to define relevant levels of analysis focusing on individuals,

groups and culture. Vraniak (2010) indicates in the table below levels of identification based

upon developing and emerging shifts in pairing to determine the units that make up community

and culture. The challenge not only is to define social groups more adequately, but also to

determine group units that potentially make up community and culture. For example, Hall

(1976) in his seminal text Beyond Culture, suggested an optimum size for working groups as 8-

12 persons, which has been supported in more recent vocational research focused on software

advancement teams (Pelrine, 2009), optimal breakout group size (Goldberg, 2005), focus groups

(Krueger & Casey, 2000), and optimal numbers for Space Station residence (Michener, 2000).

Combining naturally occurring group sizes and functions, a number of core configurations can be

determined. Dunbar (1998) states:

“… that the various human groups that can be identified in any society seem to cluster

rather tightly around a series of values (5, 12, 35, 150, 500, and 2,000) with virtually no

overlap in the variance around these characteristic values. They seem to represent points

of stability or clustering in the degrees of familiarity within the broad range of human

relationships, from the most intimate to the most tenuous.” (pp187-188)

Table 1 identifies core configurations and their associated group size, modal tasks and

functions.

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Table 1. Core Configurations and Scaling Based Upon Naturally Formed Groups

____________________________________________________________________ Core Group Configuration Size Modal Tasks Proper Function_______ Individual, person 1 Growth, development, Agency, self-regulation, (Layer 1) maturation learning Dyad, pair, couple 2 Sex, interaction Pair-bonding, (Layer 2) with older children coordination and adults Work/family 6-12 Foraging, hunting, Distributed cognition, Group (3-6 pairs) gathering, direct group cohesion (Layer 3) interface with

habitat Deme (band, clan 30-50 club, camp) (3-6 groups) Movement from Shared construction (Layer 4) place to place, of reality (includes general processing indigenous psychologies) and maintenance, social identity work group coordination Macro deme 150-300 Seasonal gathering, Stabilizing and (macroband, (15-30 groups exchange of standardizing Community, or 6-10 individuals, language, intergenerational Village, bands) resources, transmission of knowledge Organizations and information (Layer 5) Tribe, 1000-2000 Extension of Storing resource and Confederation, resource acquisition knowledge wealth, legacy Corporation and sharing, securing (Layer 6) innovation ______________________________________________________________________ From Caporael (1995, 2005) and Vraniak (2010).

Core configurations are functions of both group size and task. Except for dyads, the

group size ranges should be considered modal estimates. It should be noted that the dyadic core

configuration is embedded within all of the other layers of family, deme, and macrodeme. Recall

that groups are comprised of shifting pairings of dyadic relationship. Thus, there exists a nesting

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hierarchy of dyadic units that comprise the core group configurations. The family or

work/group often consists of 3 to 6 pairs; the deme or band is comprised of 3-6 groups, and the

macrodeme or macroband is comprised of 15-30 groups or 6-10 bands.

The implications of these core configurations is not only to be able to begin to

differentiate paired-cognition in dyads from individual cognition, but also to allow us to nest

paired-cognition in well-defined and well-bounded group contexts that provides the opportunity

to observe how paired-cognition differs within and affects each context. One of the

consequences of understanding the various layers of bounded and nested group contexts is to be

able to consider how culturally formed representations are created in terms of what can be

designated as the primary unit and mechanism of transmittal -- the dyad.

9. An examination of literature regarding interpersonal relationships and cognition enables

us to refine a definition for the new construct called paired-cognition.

While paired-cognition as a construct has not been explored in the manner outlined thus

far, there has been considerable research and writing about intimate interpersonal relationships

that are essentially dyadic. We summarize three primary aspects of these relationships – a) the

typical structure of paired relationships in terms of continuity, regularity and duration of contact,

b) the function of paired relationships (e.g., depth of caring connection and degree of

commitment, forms of paired relationships) and c) relevant activities - play, passion, purpose and

pause - (Vraniak, 2009) within which they are formed. Table 2 presents some of the relevant

literature regarding the structure, function, and form of paired relationships.

As the table below indicates, the structure of paired relationships is related to the length

and continuity of contact. Dyadic relationships vary depending in part on context. Thus, a

dyadic relationship can be as brief as a day-long seminar where you are paired with someone or

as long as a 65-year marriage. They can be continuous or intermittent (Rusbult and Agnew,

2009; Sadler et al, 2009; Mikulincer and Shaver, 2010). Paired-cognition is moderated by the

length and continuity of the dyadic relationship.

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Table 2. Structure, Function and Form of Paired Relationships

Structure: Continuity, Regularity, Duration of Contact (Intermittent, Continuous)

Brief Floyd, 1997; L’Abate, 2009; Sprecher, Wenzel

& Harvey, 2009; Forgas & Fitness, 2008; Mikulinear & Shaver, 2007; Vangelisti & Perlman, 2006)

Length of time engaged in relationship; level of commitment in relationship

Moderate Long

Function: Depth, Degree of Caring Connection (Commitment)

Initial

Beginning Intermediate

Moderate Established Maintained

Attachment L’Abate, 2005, 2006; Simpson & Rholes, 1998; Feeney & Noller, 1996; Fehr & Broughton, 2001

Earliest attachment, parent-child

Affiliation Hill, 2009; Leary, 1957; Shaver & Mikulinear, 2006; Sadler et al., 2009; Wiggins & Trobst, 1997

Work and community relationships; friends

Association Bakan, 1968; Brewer, 2007; Clark et al., 1996 Guilds, professional organizations, schoolmates

Alignment McRae & Short, 2010; Thomas, 1999; Gaunt, 2009; Lee, 1996; Richeson, 2009

Power, authority, intergroup relations; political or cultural activity preferences

Form: Activity Domains of Considerate Contribution

Play Cohen, 1987; Chudacoff, 2007; McMahon et

al., 2005; Singer, et al., 2006; Sutton-Smith, 1997

Experience of delight, laughter with primary outcome happiness

Passion Coontz, 2005; Fisher, 2004; Frederickson & Losada, 2005; Greenberg & Goldman, 2008;

Experience of desire, love with primary outcome satisfaction

Purpose Cockburn & Williams, 2002; Fuchs et al., 1997a; Shebilske et al., 1997; Shestowsky et al., 1998

Experience of determination, living well with primary outcome fulfillment

Pause Carson, 2003; Fehrer, 2002; Fincham et al., 2008; Wilbur, Engler & Brown, 1986

Experience of deference and devotion with primary outcome a sense of peace

The function of paired relationships varies based upon the depth and degree of

connection. There is a great deal of literature describing the impact of depth and degree of

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connection in dyads (see Simpson and Rholes, 1998; Shaver and Mikulincer, 2006; Vangelisti

and Perlman, 2006). Vraniak (2010) proposed a phased developmental typology moving core

relationships from attachment to alignment that has significant implications for defining the

nature of political and cultural activities. This scheme indicates that initially dyads are formed in

a small group as each member becomes attached to one other group member (attachment-

integrity). A member bonds with another, different group member and forms a deeper sense of

belonging in the group (affiliation-intimacy), and then pairs with each of the remaining group

members, one after another, during which the focus of the group becomes clearer (association-

identity). The process of alignment with individuals in other groups occurs thereafter, beginning

the formation of a more extended network of relations (alignment-integration). The nature of

dyadic relationships is often context driven as individuals are often paired based upon mutual

goals (e.g., workplace teaming and collaboration; association membership).

There is a primary set of activity domains within which nearly all dyadic interactions may

be formed - play, passion, purpose and pause (Vraniak, 2010) - as described in Table 2 above. In

dyadic relationships, if these relationships have integrity, they will develop into intimacy and the

pairs co-construct a recognizable identity. If the individuals are balanced within themselves then

the primary quality of paired relationships will be in the harmony that optimizes paired-cognition

- the primary process that binds common belief, intention, action and representation into identity.

The form of paired relationships is expressed through activity. Pairs operate within

various modalities, including the physical, emotional, and cognitive. The physical-sensory

modality includes sensory perception and recognition (e.g., visual, auditory, olfactory,

somatosensory, spatial location of self, orientation) invoking stimulus-reaction patterning. The

emotional-affective modality includes perception and recognition of body and facial expressions

of feeling, mood, or emotion invoking signal-response patterning. The construct of emotional

intelligence fits within this level, as individuals who possess the abilities to read emotional cues

(i.e., emotional recognition) within dyads will be able to sustain and attain more significant

partnerings. The mental-cognitive modality includes perception and recognition, creation and

construction of thoughts, invoking symbol-representation patterning, enabling the person and the

pair to identify the patterns of each relationship experienced, leading to a deeper understanding

that enables greater co-determination of process in the formulation of the paired relationship.

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Refining the Definition of Paired-Cognition. Thus,  paired-­‐cognition  occurs  in  three  

primary  domains  –  physical,  emotional  and  mental:    

  Physical (sensory). There are three primary aspects of paired cognition in the physical-

sensory domain, called sensory perception and recognition, whether it be visual (images),

auditory (sounds), olfactory (scent), or somatosensory (feel). For example, the spatial location of

the dyad in relationship to an external object or other, as well as its direction, orientation, object

mass and speed (velocity, trajectory), are experienced in the physical sensory domain.

Determining fundamental relationship positions with regards to those objects or others, cues

basic action motifs that are well-defined stimuli-reaction (S 1-R1) loops based upon Object/Other

vectors. Whether an external object or other initiates flight, fight or freeze behaviors by the dyad

depends upon what it is, whether it is a harmful force (big, fast object), or a competitor, predator,

prey, protector or others taking common and characteristic relationship positions in relation to

self. Paired-cognition by a dyad in this domain, then, refers to two young girls walking hand-in-

hand, anxiously moving to the other side of a street when approached by a tall stranger on a

sidewalk or two parents reproaching the overly critical and demanding coach or teacher of their

child. Often task demands of physical paired-cognition by a dyad involve reducing potential

harmful energies, translating force into beneficial flow.

Emotional (affective). There are three primary aspects of paired cognition in the

emotional-affective domain. The perception and recognition of body and facial expressions of

feeling, mood, or emotion, whether it be through visual (images), auditory (sounds), olfactory

(scent), or somatosensory (feel), cues learned responses. This domain is concerned with

identifying universal aspects of others’ internal states-of-being, commonly including such

feelings as surprise-interest, excitement-joy, love-hate (anger), anguish-disgust, and fear-terror,

in service of determining fundamental relationship positions with regards to others. These

determinations cue fundamental attachment/affiliation motifs by a dyad that are well-defined

signal-response (S2-R2) loops based upon positive or negative affective valences. Whatever

unitary expression a dyad initiates, especially in terms of relationship position choice, application

and transition (shifting from one to another among an array of choices like patron, friend,

follower, advisor relationship positions and so on), affects how the dyad’s response to others

goes - whether relations become antagonistic or friendly, adversarial or advisory, persuasive or

manipulative, permissive or intrusive and controlling. In other words, dyads take common and

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Paired-Cognition 26  

 

characteristic relationship positions in relation to others in a variety of situations. Paired-

cognition in this domain refers to a dyad listening in such a way so as to empathetically mirror

and match intense feelings (e.g. two parents listening to a distraught child), a boss and manager

helpfully reflecting and refracting difficult emotions in need of resolution between two

employees, or abusive parents forcing unwanted feelings upon a child. These motifs have been

aptly and creatively expressed in a variety of artistic ways (e.g. Shakespeare’s Romeo and

Juliet). Often the task demands of emotional paired-cognition for a dyad involve reducing

potential harmful emotional energies and intensities that are too much or too little, translating

them into more beneficial flow; that is, for a pair to self-regulate, manage and optimally join

(resonate) a variety of moods, feelings and emotions between the two, together, in spite of, or in

adaptive response to, other individuals, pairs or groups.

Mental (cognitive). There are three primary aspects of paired-cognition in the mental-

cognitive domain. The perception and recognition, creation and co-construction of thoughts

concerns a dyad or pair determining, identifying and naming the patterns of experienced and

anticipated action and affiliation motifs described above, all with regards to co-determining

fundamental relationship positions relevant and adaptive in relation to the tasks demands

presented by a particular situation, cueing prototypical abstraction motifs that are well-defined

symbol-representation (S3-R3) loops based upon positive or negative values. An abstraction

motif is a recurring, repeated or reiterated set of occurrences arranged within a

succession/series/sequence/progression of images/figures/objects/archetypes,

elements/actions/events, or phrases/themes that pervades, preserves, constructs and

unites/binds/links fragments, segments into a certain integrated structure (loop, cycle) that

denotes meaning, significance and importance in symbolic language. In terms of interpersonal

relationships, such relationship motifs are images, operations, and themes that are repeated by a

dyad throughout a series of situations so as to form a repeating pattern. Because they recur in

different situations, motifs help to unify adaptive interactions, particularly in cases where the

task demands or challenges is fairly long, intense or complex (i.e. Bonnie and Clyde were

usually violent, Marie and Pierre Curie scientifically productive).

Whenever relationship position choices, applications and transitions (shifting from one to

another) result in expressed representations, they usually are either a collaboration or a

competition concerning possible common cause, performance and production tasks (e.g. Crick

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Paired-Cognition 27  

 

and Watson figuring out the structure of DNA before another research group did, or a married

couple agreeing on strategies for doing their taxes and sending their children to college). Most

often task demands of this kind of paired-cognition by a dyad involve avoiding harmful or

wasteful energies (force), optimizing beneficial energy surplus (flow), and maximizing

efficiency so that energy benefits may accrue and be shared with many (form).

10. Integrating paired-cognition within a shifting pairing process among initial dyads provides the

basic building blocks defining the structure and process of becoming a group.

In this manuscript the proposition is made that a coherent group is not made up of

individuals, but composed of dyads - dyads that are temporary pairings that shift among

members of the group over time. This innovative proposal suggests that the basic building block

of a group is the dyad and that, at a minimum, three dyads comprise the smallest possible group.

An initial pairing into a dyad within the context of a small social group facilitates a

common way of seeing (recognizing) the world within the dyad, as well as understandable and

acceptable differences in ways of seeing the world between the two. Creating a new dyad by

shifting to pairing with a second member of the group fosters common ways of feeling about the

world, as well as understandable and acceptable differences in ways of feeling (empathy).

Shifting to new pairings thereafter enables common ways of thinking about the world, as well as

understandable and acceptable differences in ways of thinking and representing the group to the

world as it is consensually defined within the group. In brief, the first pairings facilitate common

perceptions to be developed and shared, the second pairings foster broader mirroring and

matching of feelings (empathy across dyads), and subsequent shifts in pairings integrate the

group’s representations of priorities and purposes, helping to synchronize agreed upon actions

within a consensual process for integrating similarities and differences into a common purpose.

Put simply:

1) An emergent group begins with a single dyad and accumulates other dyads

[attachment-integrity: becoming an initial member of a group: coordination]

2) Shifting pairing enables sharing of information and values/priorities (caring)

[affiliation-intimacy: belonging to a group: cohesion]

3) Continued shifting pairs until all combinations in a small group are experienced

[association-identity: believing in the group: coherence]

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11. There is significant empirical support for paired-cognition in a widely dispersed

literature, including intriguing and distinctive contributions of gender.

Empirical support for dyadic processing and the efficiency of pairing/partnering in the

learning process is noted in the literature from different disciplines focusing on physical training,

emotional recognition and aggression among adolescents, education and conflict resolution.

Training of pilots and navigators. Training studies with have consistently demonstrated

that dyadic modeling (AIM - Shebilske, Regian, Arthur, & Jordan, 1992; 1997) achieves a 100%

increase in training efficiency over a standard individual protocol with pilots and navigators.

Despite half as much hands-on practice, dyadic trainees did not differ from individuals on tests

of skill acquisition or loss after an 8-week non-practice interval, and reacquisition of a complex

skill. The findings provided strong support and justification for the ongoing use of innovative

dyadic protocols for the training of pilots and navigators in both military and non-military

settings.

Aggression in boy dyads and victimization in dyadic conflicts. Findings supporting the

importance of dyadic processing include studies focusing on aggression (Cole, et al., 1999) as

mutually aggressive dyads display exponentially higher levels of aggression than other dyadic

formations, and relational victimization (Rudolph, Troop Gordon, & Flynn, 2009) where

conflictual peer dyadic interactions led to maladaptive social-cognitive processes (i.e., negative

peer beliefs). Cole, et al (1999) observed aggressive interactions in boys' laboratory play

groups, evaluating the relative importance of relational and individual factors in accounting for

aggressive acts. Mutually aggressive dyads displayed twice as much total aggression as

randomly selected dyads. Members of mutually aggressive dyads attributed greater hostile

intentions toward each other than did randomly selected dyads, which may serve to explain their

greater aggression toward each other. Julie Hubbard et al (2001) studied the dyadic nature of

social information processing in boys' reactive and proactive aggression. Analyses indicated that

hostile attributional biases toward a particular peer were related to directly observed reactive

aggression toward that peer even after controlling for actor and partner effects, suggesting that

these phenomena are dyadic or relationship oriented. Rudolph, Troop-Gordon and Flynn (2009)

examined whether exposure to relational victimization was associated with children’s thoughts,

emotions, and behavior in an unfamiliar, challenging peer context. Results revealed that

relational victimization predicted maladaptive social-cognitive processes (i.e., more negative

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peer beliefs and a heightened performance goal orientation) and heightened emotion and

behavior dysregulation. Several of these effects were particularly salient in the context of a

conflictual dyadic interaction.

Shifts in co-worker pairings. Sherony and Green (2002) studied leader-member

exchanges and coworker exchanges. Data from 110 coworker dyads and interaction between 2

coworkers' leadership exchange scores predicted co-worker exchange quality for the coworker

dyad. Also, after controlling for leadership exchange, greater diversity in a worker's co-worker

exchange relationships was negatively related to his or her organizational commitment, but not

job satisfaction.

Personality effects in dyads. Ronen and Ickes (2009) used an unstructured dyadic

interaction paradigm to examine the effects of gender and the Big Five personality traits on dyad

members’ behaviors and perceptions in 87 initial, unstructured interactions. Most of the

significant Big Five effects (84%) were associated with the traits of Extraversion and

Agreeableness. There were several significant actor and partner effects for both of these traits.

However, the most interesting and novel effects took the form of significant Actor × Partner

interactions. Personality similarity resulted in relatively good initial interactions for dyads

composed of 2 extraverts or 2 introverts, when compared with dissimilar (extravert–introvert)

pairs. However, personality similarity resulted in uniquely poor initial interactions for dyads

composed of 2 “disagreeables.” In summary, the Big Five traits predicted behavior and

perceptions in initial dyadic interactions, not just in the form of actor and partner “main effects”

but also in the form of Actor × Partner interactions.

Higher abstraction, improving reading, math and skills in public school students.

Schwartz (1995) studied the emergence of abstract representations in dyad problem solving in

three experiments that examined whether group cognitions generate a product that is not easily

ascribed to the cognitions that similar individuals have working alone. In each study, secondary

school students solved novel problems either working as individuals or in two person groups

called dyads. An examination of their problem-solving representations demonstrated that the

dyads constructed abstractions well above the rate one would expect given a “most competent

member” model of group performance applied to the empirical rate of individual abstractions. In

the first experiment dyads induced a numerical parity rule for determining the motions of linked

gears four times more often than individuals, who instead tended to rely exclusively on modeling

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the gears’ physical behaviors. In a second experiment requiring the construction of visualizations

on the topic of biological transmissions, dyads made abstract visualizations (e.g., directed

graphs) significantly more often than individuals. In a third experiment requiring a visualization

of organisms and their habitat requirements, dyads made abstract visualizations (e.g., matrices)

five times more often than individuals, who instead tended to draw pictures. These results are

striking because a long history of experimentation has found little evidence that group

performances can match the performances of the most competent individuals, let alone exceed

them. The extremely high frequency of abstract representations among dyads suggests that the

abstract representations emerged from collaborative cognitions not normally available to isolated

individuals. The results were interpreted to be a natural result of the collaborative task demand of

creating a common ground. To facilitate discourse dyads negotiated a common representation

that could serve as a touchstone for coordinating the members’ different perspectives on the

problem. Because the representation bridged multiple perspectives of the problem structure, it

tended to be an abstraction.

The 3rd and 4th most cited articles listed in the American Educational Research

Association’s ranking of the “Top 50 Most Cited Articles as of January 2009”, Lynn and

Douglas Fuchs’ research concerning Peer-Assisted Learning Strategies (PALS). The evaluations

demonstrated that treatment-group students, in various versions of PALS, score significantly

higher than control-group students on tests of reading and mathematics skills in the peer-assisted

dyadically-oriented learning programs (Fuchs & Fuchs, 2005).

Paired Computer Programming.  Studies examining the learning strategies of computer

programmers have found that it is significantly more creative, productive, and with greater

economic feasibility to work in pairs. Cockburn and William (2002) investigated the costs and

benefits of paired programming. They found that for a development-time cost of about 15%,

pair programming improves design quality, reduces defects, enhances technical skills, improves

team communications, and is considered more enjoyable by the programmers at a statistically

significant level. The significant benefits of pair programming are that many mistakes get

caught as they are being typed rather than in a question –answer test or in the field; the designs

are better and code length is shorter due to ongoing brainstorming and pair relaying. The pair

solves problems faster; the people learn significantly more about the system; people learn to

work together and talk more often giving better information flow and team dynamics.

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 ‘Need for Cognition’ impacts dyadic decisions. Shestowsky et al. (1998) investigated the

role of ‘need for cognition’ in dyadic decision-making. Consistent with the notion that individual

differences in NC correspond to differences in attitude strength, the pre-discussion views of

people high in NC were found to be more predictive of dyadic decisions than were the pre-

discussion views of people low in NC. High-NC people were viewed by their discussion partners

(and by themselves) as being more effective persuaders, generating more arguments to support

their views (and thus counter those of their partners), and generating more valid arguments than

their low-NC counterparts.

Distributed social cognition.  Smith and Collins (2009) observed that research on person

perception typically emphasizes cognitive processes of information selection and interpretation

within the individual perceiver and the nature of the resulting mental representations. The

authors focus on the ways person-processes create, and are influenced by, the patterns of

impressions that are socially constructed, transmitted, and filtered through social networks. As

the socially situated cognition perspective suggests, it is necessary to supplement consideration

of intra-individual cognitive processes with an examination of social context (Smith & Semin,

2004). The authors describe a theoretical mode of processes of distributed social cognition that

takes into account the individual perceiver, the interacting dyad, and the social network in which

they are embedded. The model assumes that perceivers elicit or create, as well as interpret,

impression-relevant information in dyadic interaction and that perceivers obtain information

from third party sources who are linked to perceivers and targets in social networks. They

present results of a multi-agent simulation of a subset of these processes. Implications of their

theoretical model open the possibility of correcting biases in person perception and

understanding the nature of underlying mental representations of persons.

Co-leaders shared mental modes and group climate. Miles and Kivighan (2008)

examined the relation between the convergence in group co-leaders' mental models of their

groups and group members' perceptions of group climate was examined. Analyses of the degree

of similarity and group climate data showed an increase in similarity of co-leaders' mental

models within groups across sessions, and that similarity in co-leader mental models was related

to increases in the engaged and decreases in the avoiding aspects of the group climate.

Gender (and Age) Distinctions. Pairs of individuals vary along gender dimensions. A pair

may be of the same or opposite gender and a pair can be made up of individuals of the

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Paired-Cognition 32  

 

approximate same age or of significantly different ages (one is younger and the other older).

There is a significant literature that suggests that how pairs function significantly varies by

gender or by age, but rarely have these two variables been systematically investigated in relation

to one another (see Benenson & Heath, 2006; Benenson, 2006; Blakemore, 2003; Baumeister &

Sommer, 1997; Maccoby, 1998; Nelson, 2009; Strough & Berg, 2000; Strough et al, 2008;

Vraniak, Schmelzer and Haugen, 2009).

Immerson (2003) cites evolutionary psychology indicating that human attachment (i.e.,

pair bonding) suggests that female choice of a mating partner shifted towards men who were

motivated to share resources with the female and to exhibit paternalistic behaviors. Nelson

(2009) noted significant gender differences in marital dissatisfaction and parenting. This led to

speculation that fathers’ patience and attention may be more dependent on the marital dyadic

relationship than the mothers’. Baumeister and Sommer (1997) proposed that women's social

orientation is toward close dyadic relationships, whereas men's are oriented toward larger group

associations. Gender differences in aggression, helping behavior, desire for power, uniqueness,

self-representations, interpersonal behavior, and intimacy fit this view.

Strough and Berg (2000) examined whether gender differences in affiliative aspects

(collaboration and cooperation) of dyadic conversations occur because girls are more oriented

than boys toward goals focused on others. Preadolescents (11–13 years old; 51 boys, 53 girls)

worked with a same- or an other-gender peer on a 4-week-long creative-writing task at school.

Dyadic conversations and goals were assessed twice. High-affiliation conversations and mutual-

participation goals were more prevalent in female than in male and mixed-gender dyads. Mutual-

participation goals mediated gender differences in high-affiliation conversations. Control and

task-performance goals did not differ by dyad gender. In mixed-gender dyads, conversation

strategies and goals did not differ by gender.

Gender preferences for group context. Maccoby (1998) believes differences in boys’ and

girls’ styles of play may stem from heightened levels of androgen, which fosters active,

rambunctious behavior. Boys tend to be too boisterous and domineering to suit the tastes of

many girls, who prefer less roughhousing and would rather rely on polite negotiations rather than

demands or shows of force when disputes with their playmates (Martin & Fabes, 2001; Moller &

Serbin, 2006). Throughout childhood, boys prefer playing or working together in same-sex

groups, whereas girls are more likely than boys to withdraw in group settings, choosing instead

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to focus attention on individuals and functioning best in same-sex dyads (Benenson & Heath,

2006). In addition, girls are expected to play quietly and gently and are subject to criticism (by

both boys and girls) should they become rough like boys (Blakemore, 2003).

Pairing in Groups. Vraniak, Smelzer and Haugen (2009) studied differential outcomes for

men and women, older and younger youth, who participated in a 36-week group support and skills

development experience called 123Mystery (Vraniak, 2006, 2009), an innovative group experience

focused upon systematically increasing the ability of individuals to self-regulate actions, feelings and

thoughts (balancing within), enhancing interpersonal relationships (harmonizing between), and

optimizing functioning in small social groups (synchronizing among), as well as developing

capacities to manage inter-group (family, work-group, community-group) relations (integrating

through). Weekly participation in a 90-minute group session of 8-12 individuals, who meet in pairs

between group sessions, involves focusing upon one laminated skill card given to each individual

each week. The first twelve skill cards focus upon individual skills, the second set of twelve skill

cards focus upon interpersonal skills, and the third set of twelve skill cards focus upon development

of social skills in group formation. Pairings of group participants shift every four weeks and at the

end of each twelve-week segment 123Mystery groups meet for an inter-group session introducing the

focus of next 12-step skill development segment. Twelve such community groups met weekly,

including groups of adult men, adults women, teen boys, teen girls, and pre-teen boys and girls,

involving adults and youth who are in mental health treatment, special education classes, Boy Scouts,

Girls Venture Crews, Reservation Boys and Girls Clubs, high schools, middle schools, Rotary (and at

least one or two groups in India). In some form 123Mystery groups operated for the past ten years,

but this report concerned the results of a three-year private foundation-funded effort, 2007-2009. The

findings indicated:

While adult females in 123M women groups started with greater relationship skills than adult

males in the 123M men’s groups, women tended to resist shifting pairing once they became

comfortable with a partner and tended to resist opening up their group in the transition from year-to-

year to new members, whereas men, although starting with fewer skills, progressed through new skill

development more quickly and continued in greater numbers from year to year. Youth groups showed

quicker skill development than adult groups, with younger 123M group participants showing the

strongest skill acquisition and integration, in the shortest period of time, of all participants.

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Paired-Cognition 34  

 

Shifting the pairing group members every four to eight weeks in the following systematic

manner was done in order to attempt to avoid development of triangles or cliques early in the

process and to foster the most efficient progression through typical phases of group formation.

Focusing on pairing members during and between group gatherings, as well as shifting who is

paired with whom, permits a more considered approach to forming groups that is less

individually oriented and random with regards to the dynamics of attachment, affiliation and

association (coherent group purpose and identity). In the graphic below it is depicted how the

author systematically shifted pairings in a manner that avoided the creation of cliques and small

closed sub-units that might eventually conflict with one another or undermine the eventual

greater cohesion of the group. This ‘optimizing’ of shifting pairing facilitated the maximum

amount of pairing-into-partnering, preventing early closure of one overly-bonded pair or triad

that might inhibit a more open involvement of all group members in relationships with one

another, more typical of naturally-forming coalitions undermining group formation.

Figure 1. Shifting pairing into partnering composes group formation.

         1-­‐2                                                            2-­‐3       1-­‐4          3-­‐4                                                            4-­‐5       2-­‐5          5-­‐6                                                            6-­‐1       3-­‐6

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Paired-Cognition 35  

 

Measurement of Dyadic Functioning and Paired Cognition. Perceptions of dyadic

relationships have been present in assessment for decades. For example, in the area of marital

relationships thousands of research articles have been published regarding satisfaction and

quality of relationships (e.g., Graham & Jezionski, 2006). In these measures each member of the

dyad is asked to reflect upon their perceptions of their relationship. A different measurement

focus is taken here.

Recent publications support a view, as articulated by Kuczinski’s (2002) edited

Handbook of Dynamics in Parent-Child Relations, wherein the dynamics of parent-child

relationships include bi-directionality and an expand dyadic conceptualization both theoretically

and methodologically. With this expansion of theory within the family context, increased rigor

came into measurement with the book Dyadic Data Analysis by Kenny, Kashy, Cook and

Sumpson (2006). Building upon Kenny’s Social Relations Model Elfenbein and others (2006,

2009, 2010) explored the dyadic effects in nonverbal communication, finding that some dyads

were systematically more or less accurate than the individual-level skill of perceivers and

expressors and that this dyadic effect was of similar magnitude to individual emotional

perception. Work in team and group dynamics is increasingly exploring dyadic concepts as

illustrated in Miles and Kivighan (2010) examination of co-leader similarity and group climate in

group interventions and testing a team cognition/team diversity model or Resick et al (2010)

exploring team composition, cognition and effectiveness by examining mental model similarity

and accuracy.

Remarkably missing from this widespread focus on dyadic measurement across a number

of disciplines and settings has been research concerning intelligence testing, cognitive

assessment and measuring achievement. Questions of assessment procedures with two, paired

participants and the nature of the units of measurement when two individuals are problem-

solving together are intriguing, as is the relevance for predicting future educational and work-

place success where paired-cognition is fast becoming the most prevalent form of information

and knowledge learning, processing and production.

 

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Paired-Cognition 36  

 

12. The clinical implications of employing the construct of paired-cognition are substantial.

At the sensory perception and recognition level (1), four eyes (and hands) can perceive

and adaptively process the shape of objects, objects in motion, object orientation in space from

slightly different perspectives and experience. At the interpersonal level (2) in terms of the

recognition emotions in facial expressions the same is the case, a dyad perceiving and

interpreting emotions in a third parties will have slightly different ‘takes’ on what the emotions

are and what they mean. It would be quite interesting to test the processing of such sensory and

emotional information by dyads and compare it to individual processing.

At the cognitive level there is already data suggesting that children, adolescents, therapy

co-leaders, computer programmers, military pilots, navigators, and other dyads process

information more efficiently and effectively than do individuals. While there has not been a

coherently detailed and overarching conceptualization of why this is the case, such advantages in

some way have to rely on combined memory storage capacity (two bodies of experience are

better than one), complementary processing of different aspects of the information to be

processed (partitioning focus, thus increasing the speed of processing the entire data set), and so

on (the analogy here is Intel’s dual-core computer processing chip). Again many of the tasks on

tests of cognitive function that have focused on the individual performing could be used (and/or

modified) to see how a pair or dyad performs differently. It is intriguing to consider that most

real-world cognitive processing tasks are done by dyads, including couples, peers, and co-

workers. Our extensively elaborated testing enterprise might be beneficially re-oriented toward

testing the cognitive capabilities of student dyads, co-worker pairs and family members. While

researchers have found mutual influences in development between mothers and infants, parent

and child, no one has viewed development and developmental tasks from the perspective of a

dyadic cognitive performance (paired-cognition) perspective.

Understanding paired-cognition in light of the importance of dyadic relationships is a

critical area in need of further development. New clinical insights can be formed by examining

the pairing process during a group engagement (e.g., group and family therapy, work/task

groups). Focusing on pairing members during and between group gatherings, as well as shifting

who is paired with whom, permits a more considered approach to forming groups that is less

individually oriented and random with regards to the dynamics of attachment, affiliation and

association, gaining a more succinct operationalization of the phases of group development.

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Paired-Cognition 37  

 

In psychology paired-cognition is the significant construct that might greatly enhance

explorations of the relational link between individual behavior and group processes, as in social

processes now of significant concern such as the lack of relationship skills leading to tension and

conflict in college freshmen (NY Times, July 25, 2010).

Paired cognition takes into consideration findings of evolutionary psychology allowing us

to understand the implications of gender and cultural identity in the formation of relationships.

One of the most fruitful potentials in utilizing the concept of paired-cognition is in the area of

more adequately defining group units of analysis and then exploring cultural differences in

approaches to paired-cognition. What are the determinants of how we pair and partner, how pairs

compose small social groups and how groups configure themselves into cultural communities?

And at each layer of context, how do we think and feel and move (and shift) together? In relation

to mental health treatment, social support or educational classroom management situations, the

following clinical parameters and features follow from the preceeding discussion (Vraniak,

2010), based upon six years of facilitating twelve 36-week long groups:

“While it certainly is possible for one person to facilitate a group, just as it is possible for one

parent to raise children alone, it is not optimal. Specifically arranging for two co-facilitators

to pair in the guiding of a group allows for clear and crucial modeling of a number of adaptive

and mature behaviors, emotions, and thoughts in relationship, to be observed by group

participants. It also allows for flexible management of situations such as when an individual

group member is so unbalanced that empathic partnering with a co-facilitator is called for as

an aside while group process can continue, such as when a group participant’s partner can’t be

in attendance and a co-facilitator can be the temporary partner, and a host of other frequently

occurring situations that only one facilitator would have difficulty handling alone.

As indicated earlier, optimal group size has been found to be quite relevant to effective

operation, with 6-12 persons being most often mentioned as most desirable. Since pairing and

partnering is such a crucial aspect of the process and the co-facilitators are one pair in this

mix, all groups have between 6 and 10 participants, meaning that with the two co-facilitators

group size equals 8-12 persons. Another aspect of the lower limit of 6 participants is that this

gives three pairs, which is the definition of the minimum size of a group (given the

proposition that a group is not made up of individuals but of paired relationships).

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Paired-Cognition 38  

 

A similar rationale holds for the number of groups necessary for a sufficiently integrated

social layer or level to be formed – the minimum is three groups to begin the process, given

that part of the process is to learn both within group, between group and among group skills. It

turns out also that beginning with three groups and generating at least two groups from each

(during a second generation cycle), will allow one to reach the maximum community size of

150 after the completion of a third generation.

The importance of pairing and shifting the group participants is not only obvious in terms of

supporting each individual in learning self-regulation skills and then learning critical

relationship skills, but allows some counter-balancing of the different biases men and women

have in responding within dyads and groups. Since the two-hour group process explicitly

moves from individual retrospection to partner dialogue to group conversation and back again,

women’s tendency to withdraw from group participation into dyadic intimacy and men’s

predilection to avoid or minimize intimate dyadic interaction and invest more comfortably in

group discussion, can be concretely minimized, allowing for more complete skill development

by both in domains within which each tends to spend less time and effort.

There is quite a tendency, in both men and women, to hold fast to one partnership that has

become safe and reliable, once such a relationship has been secured. Typically this is with a

person in a group that is more like oneself along some dimensions than pairing with someone

in the group who is quite different. Unfortunately, it is just those differences that must be

bridged and, in fact, utilized in group-life for potential divisiveness and conflict to be avoided

(or effectively worked through at some point), as well as for maximum use of member talents

and perspectives to be most effectively utilized. By the time each group member has partnered

with three other members, the pairings usually are between individuals who are increasingly

more different. In fact, this is a reiteration of middle development – first we partner with a

same-gendered child who likes what we like, and then with one of the same gender who

sometimes likes something that we do not, until we can temporarily pair with just about anyone

in our gender peer group, all in service of eventually being able to partner with someone really

weird – someone of the opposite gender!

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Paired-Cognition 39  

 

Another new, innovative element of this group process is to explicitly avoid setting up

relational triangles in the partner shifting process until later in the process. This cleanly and

clearly facilitates the attachment/bonding and affiliation/boundary process that is pre-requisite

to determining a focal purpose for the group (cohesion, coherence phase), while avoiding

setting up triads that can split a group into factions or create difficult tensions for those who

have not learned how to avoid negatively triangulating.

Indeed, the arrangement for inter-group sessions every 12 weeks allows experience and

emotional response to precede mental representation (naming) at each phase of learning –

being in a pair while learning how to self-regulate physical, emotional and mental energies in

the first twelve weeks gives relationship experience that can be very useful during the second

twelve weeks when the focus is on interpersonal skills, and meetings between groups at the end

of twelve weeks and twenty-four weeks provides relevant experience to be processed and

named during the third twelve-week segment when the focus is specifically on fostering

functioning within, between and among small groups.

The mentoring of group co-facilitators in a monthly group session is crucial to fostering

relevant and appropriate individual, interpersonal and social skill development in those

modeling and guiding the process for group participants, as well as to trouble-shoot unique

challenges that inevitably arise in different groups. In addition, the mentoring can illustrate

attending to positive skill acquisition while ignoring off-track interactions, and modeling

context forming skills in the selection of exercises and guiding of process.”

In the workplace, computer programmers are finding that it is significantly more creative

and productive to work in pairs (Pervasive Paired Learning), executives are being taught that

facilitating groups is best done collaboratively with a partner. At home the methods for keeping

marriages physically, emotionally, mentally and spiritually functioning well are being refined

(e.g. Relational Discrepancy Therapy). And the schools have toyed with peer-tutoring (e.g.

Reciprocal Peer Tutoring), scripted cooperation and guided peer questioning (Think-Pair-Share),

elder mentoring (e.g. START, SAFE, MAGIC, PASS), and others (e.g. Kids’n Kin, Mentor’s

Plus, Roots and Shoots, Check and Connect, Women in Motion, Future Force, The Giraffe

Program, Youth Motivators) under the general rubric of cooperative and collaborative learning

strategies. Among the cooperative techniques that are used by dyads are scripted cooperation,

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Paired-Cognition 40  

 

devised by Angela O'Donnell and Donald Dansereau; reciprocal peer tutoring, devised by John

Fantuzzo and his colleagues; and guided peer questioning, as outlined by Alison King. What has

not occurred has been a transformative move to systematically dualize classroom instruction for

students.

Remaining questions too be explored concerning paired-cognition and group processes

include:

What are the concepts and constructs that define the term paired-cognition?

Does thinking-in-pairs improve memory acquisition, retention and retrieval?

Does dyadic-cognition improve learning and performance?

Does expressive-dialogue-between-partners improve contributions in groups?

Do paired-cognition capacities unfold in a patterned developmental manner?

What are the advantages and disadvantages of coupled-mental-processing as compared to

individual or group processing (e.g. speed, efficiency, effectiveness)?

Does paired-cognition operate differently in relation to processing sensory stimuli, emotional

experience and signals, or abstract information?

Does thinking-with-a-partner result in a different way of recognizing reality, realizing

relationship and/or representing relations than does doing so alone or in a small group?

To what extent can dyadic-thinking be taught as a skill rather than cultivating a talent that

inherently varies in character, quality and strength among individuals?

In what manner does paired-cognition offer a construct that helps us to more adequately form

positive and productive families, teams, work and community groups?

How might the concept of paired-cognition enhance the study of individual differences and

group identification?

How might the concept of paired-cognition enhance the study of inter-group relations?

How might the construct of thinking-as-a-couple help improve marriages and other kinds of

partnering?

If triangulation (gossip, slander, libel, affairs, politics, etc) is the bane of community and society,

how might the systematic study of paired-cognition in relation to third parties alter our

understanding and ability to alter the negative effects of triangulation?

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Paired-Cognition 41  

 

How does a new understanding of the construct of paired-thinking impact our study of violence,

abuse, depression, mentoring, grandparenting or a myriad of other related concepts?

When and how we will start testing pairs of individuals to evaluate how well they will do in one

of the most frequent cognitive processing arrangement – with a peer student, a spouse, a

co-worker, a supervisor, an elder – that is, paired cognition?

Weaknesses in the clinical and research literature on cognition in groups include:

1) inordinate focus upon the individual (growth and development, cognition)

2) missing conceptualization of interpersonal constructs intermediate between, and linking,

individual to social layers/levels/domains

3) inappropriate and inadequate definition of what a group is (e.g. made up of individuals

and individual perceptions of reality)

4) insufficient consideration, understanding and/or articulation of phases of group

development

5) little sequencing of distinct growth, development and maturational processes, especially

omitting issues of gender differences in development as they relate to connecting-in-

relationship and forming groups (including social & cultural identity)

6) Meager attention to and incorporation of the findings and contributions of evolutionary

psychology, especially in terms of potential gender differences

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