Date post: | 18-Nov-2023 |
Category: |
Documents |
Upload: | independent |
View: | 0 times |
Download: | 0 times |
Running head: COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 1
Communication in Conflicts: Instrumentalizing Fukushima
Full Paper Presentation
Submitted to the Annual Conference of the International Communication Association
Journalism Studies Division
June 17-21, 2013
London, UK
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 2
Abstract
According to the theory of instrumental actualization in mediated conflicts the mass
media tend to exaggerate events consistent with the editorial line. The theory was tested using
press coverage in Germany, Switzerland, France and the UK on the Japan earthquake, the
tsunami it caused and the nuclear disaster of Fukushima. Within a period of 7 weeks after the
earthquake, the coverage in 27 national newspapers and magazines in the 4 countries on the 3
events was analyzed. As hypothesized from the theory, German and Swiss media
concentrated on Fukushima and stressed its relevance for domestic nuclear plants whereas
French and British media gave more emphasis to the Tsunami and seldom relate the nuclear
accident in Japan to domestic nuclear programs. In addition, there were remarkable
correlations between the views of journalists and the bias of statements on nuclear energy
presented in their news section. Findings are discussed and related to the framing approach.
Keywords
Communication in conflicts, nuclear energy, instrumental actualization, framing, Fukushima,
content analysis, nuclear phase-out
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 3
Communication in Conflicts: Instrumental Actualization of Fukushima
Natural disasters such as the Pacific earthquake off the coast of Japan, the tsunami
thus caused and its consequences, including the Fukushima nuclear accident, are both the
trigger for and the subject of intense media coverage. However, they are not its only cause.
Rather, the intensity and the kind of reporting depends on a number of news factors – the
geographical distance between the event and the media and their audience; the media
audience’s cultural proximity to the population of the country affected; the economic
significance of the regions affected for the countries reporting, etc. The influence of news
factors (Kepplinger, 2008a) and their news values (Kepplinger, 2008b) on the intensity of
coverage is well documented. However, there is yet another cause that remains neglected in
studies on the importance of news factors and is only given cursory attention in other
approaches: The event’s significance for political and ideological conflicts in the countries
reporting on it. When analyzing this cause, different types of countries can be distinguished.
The first type are countries where a significant political and ideological conflict exists over
how to evaluate occurrences or themes similar to the reported event. The second type are
countries where there is no such political-ideological conflict. In countries where a political-
ideological conflict exists, the events reported are politically relevant. In countries with no
such conflict, they have no political relevance. This raises the question of the role played by
the media in political-ideological conflicts.
Theories
Instrumental Actualization
In all of today’s societies, political and ideological conflicts are carried out via the
mass media (Kepplinger, Brosius & Staab, 1991). Unlike conflicts between neighbors, these
kinds of conflicts can be called “mediatized conflicts”. The mass media play a key role in
mediatized conflicts because they step in between the opponents as well as between the
opponents and the public. Therefore they may have an impact on the general public’s
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 4
acceptance of the adversarial protagonists’ positions, and thus may increase or decrease their
chances of success. In every important conflict, many events occur that support the point of
view of one or the other side. In the controversy over nuclear energy for example, an accident
in a nuclear plant supports the position of the opponents; the breakdown of the energy supply
due to a lack of oil imports strengthens the position of the supporters of nuclear energy.
Events which might influence the position of the proponents in conflicts are “instrumental” to
this position. Both protagonists and the media that share their views can strengthen their
position and weaken that of the other side by putting those events in the spotlight that support
their own point of view and weaken the point of view of their opponents. “Instrumental
actualization”, e.g. the selective highlighting of events supporting one’s own side and
weakening the opponent, is part of the behavior repertoire of all conflict participants.
Politicians, political parties, governments and business feed the mass media with information
about events that is consistent with their position and inconsistent with the position of their
opponents or competitors (Molotch & Lester, 1974; Paraschos & Rutherford, 1985). The mass
media exaggerate events consistent with the editorial line, the views of owners and the views
of journalists (Donohew, 1967; Halloran, Elliott & Murdock, 1970; Flegel & Chaffee, 1971;
Kleinnijenhuis, 1989; Kepplinger et al., 1991; Kepplinger, 1992; Entman, 1991; Herman and
Chomsky, 2002).
National background of coverage
The theory of instrumental actualization can be tested under near-ideal conditions
using the press coverage in Germany, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom of the
Japan earthquake, the tsunami it caused and the nuclear disaster of Fukushima: The
geographical distance between the media in these four Western countries and Japan is more or
less equal; this is also true of the cultural differences between the Western countries and Japan
and the importance of their economic and political ties with Japan. Differences in media
coverage thus cannot be explained by any of these factors. The nuclear power stations in
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 5
Germany and Switzerland are generally regarded as slightly safer than the ones in France or
the United Kingdom. However, these differences are marginal and can safely be ignored here.
Accordingly, differences in media coverage cannot be explained by the safety of nuclear
power stations in Germany, Switzerland, France and the UK either. However, there were
significant differences in opinion on nuclear energy in these four Western countries, even
before the events in Japan took place.
In Germany, the media have shown nuclear energy in an increasingly negative light
since the early 1970s. Popular opinion fell into line with the trends in media reporting after
roughly one year intervals. Since the early 80s, there have been – sometimes violent – protests
against the building of nuclear power stations (Kepplinger, 1988; Kepplinger, 2011, 205-232).
In 2000, the federal government decided to phase out nuclear energy completely by 2021.
One year prior to Fukushima (2010), 36 percent of Germans were more or less in support of
and 35 percent more or less against using nuclear energy. The rest were undecided (Köcher,
2011). In a representative survey among journalists the same year, 85 percent were against
extending German nuclear power stations’ life span (Mothes, 2012, 238). Thus we can note:
Before Fukushima, there was a conflict in the evaluation of nuclear energy in Germany. A
large majority of journalists were opposed to it. Amongst the general population, there were
two more or less equal camps for and against nuclear energy.
In a 1990 national referendum in Switzerland, 53 percent of voters were against
phasing out nuclear energy, but 55 percent were in support of a ten-year hiatus in the
expansion of nuclear energy. Only 40 percent of those eligible to vote had taken part in the
referendum (Chroniknet.de) Thus we can note: Prior to Fukushima, there was a conflict in the
evaluation of nuclear energy in Switzerland, with two more or less equal opposing camps.
There are no representative surveys among journalists on nuclear energy for the period before
2011.
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 6
For many decades, nuclear energy was not a subject of political controversy in France.
Unlike in Germany, both right- and left-wing parties regarded it in an overwhelmingly
positive light and supported its expansion. In 2008/09, President Nicolas Sarkozy planned to
build a new nuclear power station (Forster, 2009). No mass public controversy ensued. Thus
we can note: Before Fukushima, a broad consensus was in support of nuclear energy in
France. There are no representative surveys among journalists on nuclear energy for the
period before 2011.
For many decades, nuclear energy remained politically uncontroversial in the United
Kingdom also. In 2008, the British government announced plans to build new nuclear stations
in up to 18 locations (Schulz & Strubeck, 2008); one year later, the British government
approved the construction of nuclear power stations in 10 locations (“Großbritannien-
Standorte für zehn neue AKW genehmigt”, 2009). There was no mass public controversy.
Thus we can note: Prior to Fukushima, a broad consensus was in support of nuclear energy in
the United Kingdom. There are no representative surveys among journalists on nuclear energy
for the period before 2011.
Hypotheses
Seven hypotheses can be derived from the national backgrounds and the theories
outlined:
1. There was greater coverage of the three events in Japan (earthquake, tsunami,
Fukushima) in newspapers in Germany and Switzerland than in the papers in France or the
United Kingdom (total press coverage).
2. Fukushima in particular was given greater coverage in German and Swiss
newspapers than French or British papers.
3. In connection with the nuclear disaster in Japan, the newspapers in Germany and
Switzerland also covered nuclear energy in their own respective countries more than the
newspapers in France and the UK.
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 7
4. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy
in comment articles) influenced the evaluation of nuclear energy in the respective country:
The more negative the journalists’ statements, the greater the extent to which domestic
nuclear energy was included in coverage of Fukushima and its consequences.
5. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy
in comment articles) influenced the bias in coverage in news and reports: The more negative
the journalists’ comments, the more negative the coverage in their papers.
6. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy
in comment articles) influenced the selection of experts whose opinions were printed in the
papers: The more negative the journalists’ comments, the more likely their papers were to
quote experts with a negative opinion.
7. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy
in comment articles) influenced the selection of politicians whose opinions were printed in the
papers: The more negative the journalists’ comments, the more likely their papers were to
quote politicians with a negative opinion.
Method
The period of investigation is 7 weeks. It starts with the ninth calendar week (February
28) and ends with the fifteenth (April 10). The earthquake took place on March 11. The press
coverage in 27 newspapers in four countries of three events – the earthquake off the coast of
Japan, the tsunami thus caused and the reactor accident in Fukushima – is examined.
This analysis focuses on coverage in 27 national newspapers and magazines. The media
selection is based on the press structure in the respective countries. In Germany, a
comparatively high number of national daily papers and magazines and in the UK, a
comparatively high number of Sunday papers were examined. In all countries, a more left-
wing, liberal (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Tagesanzeiger, Le Monde, Guardian) and a more right-
wing, conservative (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Le Figaro,
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 8
Times) quality paper was analysed respectively, so that the coverage in different categories of
paper could be compared (Table 1).
[please insert table 1 about here]
The entire coverage in the papers was examined. This also included contributions
collected on special pages. Special supplements were not encoded. All articles were examined
that included information on the following topics in their title, subtitle, lead, boxes or images:
Earthquake in Japan; tsunami in Japan; Fukushima reactor accident; nuclear energy in Japan;
nuclear energy in general; consequences of earthquake/tsunami/nuclear accident. Information
on the consequences was only included if a link to the catastrophes in Japan could be
discerned.
The analysis made a distinction between articles, statements and images. Articles are
characterised by their presentation in terms of form and content. Contributions with the same
theme but in a different form (e.g. news report and comment on the same event) count as two
articles. Separate boxes represent individual articles, as do free-standing images and graphs.
Statements include at least three elements – information on the author, a subject and a bias or
line of information on the subject. If one of these three elements changes, a new statement
begins. Images are visual representations. Image collages are treated as separate images. The
same goes for obvious montages – e.g. a close-up of a face set into the photograph of a
ravaged landscape.
Reliabilty tests are based on coding of five articles which differed in length and
complexity. Results were calculated using Holstis formula (Holsti, 1969). Reliability of
identification the topics of articles: r= 0.86; reliability of identification contents of pictures: r=
0.81; reliability of identification of (a) content and of (b) bias of statements: r=0.69). Content
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 9
and bias of statements were tested simultaneously because testing of bias without information
about content of statements would be meaningless.
Results
National differences in the instrumentalization of the catastrophes
In the first part of our analysis, we examine the instrumental actualization of
Fukushima in the four countries. To do this, we focus on the coverage provided in two
comparable newspapers in each country. One of the two papers respectively takes a more left-
wing, liberal line, and the other a more right-wing, conservative line. Table 1 provides an
overview of the data corpus. This reveals that the German and Swiss newspapers gave the
events in Japan and their significance for their own respective country far greater coverage
than papers in France and the United Kingdom. This can be seen in the number of
contributions and the numbers of statements, confirming Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, we can
see that the greatest coverage in Germany was provided by the right-wing, conservative
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, whereas in France it was the left-wing, liberal Le Monde
(Table 2).
[please insert table 2 about here]
Newspapers in all countries reported primarily on the reactor accident in Fukushima.
The second most important topic in Germany and Switzerland was the earthquake, while in
Britain it was the tsunami and its direct consequences. The newspapers in Germany and
Switzerland gave the nuclear disaster in Fukushima more coverage than the French and
British papers. This confirms Hypothesis 2. The large number of images about the tsunami in
the British papers is striking (Chart 1).
[please insert chart 1 about here]
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 10
In all countries, newspapers reported fairly little about the specific causes of the
Fukushima reactor accident. This goes both for external factors – the tsunami – and the
internal factors – insufficient measures taken to protect the reactor and errors in the measures
taken to combat the damage to it. In connection with the reactor accident in Fukushima,
newspapers in Germany and Switzerland also covered nuclear energy in their own respective
countries more than did newspapers in France and Germany. This confirms Hypothesis 3
(Chart 2).
[please insert chart 2 about here]
In connection with the reactor accident in Fukushima, newspapers in Germany
reported on nuclear energy in Germany with particular speed and intensity. On March 14 –
only three days after the accident – more than 10 articles were concerned with nuclear energy
in Germany. They gave the impression that the reactor accident in Fukushima was a general
problem of nuclear energy that also affected German nuclear energy. Swiss newspapers
followed suit only a few days later, but they did not report on nuclear energy in their own
country quite as intensely as the newspapers in Germany, where nuclear energy had been the
subject of massive conflict for a longer period. By contrast, newspapers in France and Britain
only seldom reported on nuclear energy in their own countries in connection with reports on
the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. Once again, this confirms Hypothesis 3 (Chart 3).
[please insert chart 3 about here]
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 11
Influence of the editorial line on coverage
The influence of the papers’ editorial line is analyzed using the coverage in all
newspapers and magazines examined. We include all of the papers examined in our analysis,
as the focal point here is not a comparison between countries, but the causes of tendencies and
bias in current news reporting. Evaluative statements on nuclear energy by journalists in
commentaries form the basis of the analysis. They serve as an indicator for defining the
papers’ editorial line. The prerequisite for papers to be included in this analysis is a minimum
of 4 evaluative statements in commentaries (independent variable). The number of evaluative
statements by journalists in commentaries (independent variable) is provided to the left in
brackets next to the names of the papers. The number of evaluative statements by other
authors in commentaries (dependent variable) is provided to the right in brackets.
The newspapers’ and magazines’ editorial line – determined via the evaluative
statements on nuclear energy by journalists in comments – had a clear influence on the
intensity of coverage of the Fukushima reactor accident: The more negatively journalists
evaluated nuclear energy in their comments, the greater the extent to which domestic nuclear
energy was included in the entire coverage of Fukushima and its consequences. This confirms
Hypothesis 4 (Chart 4).
[please insert chart 4 about here]
The papers’ editorial line – defined via journalists’ evaluative statements in comments
– had no influence on the tendency of coverage in news and reports. Nearly all newspapers
and magazines – more or less independently of comment bias – depicted nuclear energy as
negative. This contradicts Hypothesis 5 (Chart 5).
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 12
[please insert chart 5 about here]
The papers’ editorial line had a clear influence on the selection of experts whose
opinions were printed in the papers: Papers in which journalists made mostly positive
comments on nuclear energy printed predominantly the opinions of experts whose statements
were also positive. Papers in which journalists made mostly negative comments printed
predominantly the opinions of experts whose statements were also negative. This connection
could be seen primarily in German and Swiss newspapers and magazines. This confirms
Hypothesis 6. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Chart 6) forms an exception.
[please insert chart 6 about here]
The papers’ editorial line had a clear influence on the selection of politicians whose
opinions were printed in the papers: Papers in which journalists made overwhelmingly
positive comments on nuclear energy predominantly printed politicians whose opinions were
also positive. Papers in which journalists made mostly negative comments predominantly
printed politicians whose statements were also negative. This connection was evident
primarily in German and Swiss newspapers and magazines. This confirms Hypothesis 7
(Chart 7).
[please insert chart 7 about here]
Summary and interpretation
1. The presence or lack of public conflict influences the representation of catastrophes:
In countries where public conflict on a related topic existed prior to the catastrophes, the
media
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 13
a) played up the catastrophes through intensive coverage,
b) created a direct link to the established conflict on domestic nuclear energy, and
c) printed mainly the opinions of experts and politicians in agreement with the
editorial line.
These practices were more strongly in evidence in the German media than in media
from Switzerland. This suggests that the length and intensity of an existing public conflict
increases the tendency to adopt said practices. These results confirm the theory of
instrumental actualization: In public conflicts, the media act as agents that intervene in the
conflict by playing up information confirming the opinions of the editorial team. This is likely
also applicable to coverage of scandals.
Coverage of domestic nuclear energy can be seen as “framing” (Entman, 1991;
Scheufele, 1999): By reporting on nuclear energy in another country, nuclear energy is placed
within an extremely negative context. The impression is thus given that nuclear energy in the
papers’ own countries is a similar hazard to nuclear energy in Japan. If this interpretation is
adopted, then framing can be seen as a special form of instrumental actualization: The
instrumental actualization of contexts creates frames (among others), and the playing up of
opinions of experts and politicians creates bias. This bias is then confirmed and entrenched
through the frames. By the same token, the frames are able to corroborate the opinions’ bias.
Differences in the coverage of the Fukushima reactor accident cannot be explained by
the nature of the event – the actual threat posed to the countries by the events in Japan and the
actual threat posed by domestic nuclear power stations – as these factors all apply to
Germany, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom equally. Neither do news factors –
geographical and cultural proximity, economic ties etc. – provide an explanation, as the news
value of these news factors is the same for the media in Germany, Switzerland, France and the
UK, due to objective conditions, such as geographical proximity/distance.
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 14
2. The editorial line often influenced the selection of experts, even in countries where
no conflict existed prior to the catastrophes. This was particularly striking in the case of
British newspapers, as in the UK – unlike in Germany, Switzerland and France – a clear
distinction is made between commenting roles (editorial writer, commentator etc.) and
reporting roles (reporter, editor etc.), with the intention of clearly demarcating news and
opinion (Esser 1998).
3. Editorial lines had no influence on the bias of coverage in news and reports. One
reason for this is that only “pure” forms of news reporting were included in the analysis. The
inclusion of more opinionated hybrid forms such as commentaries and interviews reveals a
different picture.
4. The existence of events and information on events that occur in connection with
public controversy is a necessary, but not an exhaustive cause for the intensity and kind of
coverage. Merely pointing out their existence therefore does not provide sufficient
explanation for the intensity and kind of coverage. Rather, this is a rhetorical argument used
to distract from the question of the other causes of coverage, which include the economic,
political and ideological interests of media agents.
5. If the news media were indeed political agents in their coverage of Fukushima, they
can be regarded as successful ones: In Germany, three days after the accident in Japan (March
14), Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the temporary closure of seven nuclear plants.
Two days later, she spoke about a possible nuclear phase-out. Three months after the accident
in Japan (June 6), the cabinet in Berlin decided to phase out nuclear energy by 2022.
In Switzerland, the government and parliament decided in 2011 not to allow the
construction of new nuclear plants, and to close down existing plants after their normal
duration of operation. In France, the new government decided in 2012 to close down one old
nuclear plant by 2016 (Fessenheim, “AKW Fessenheim geht vom Netz”, 2012). In Great
Britain, no political decisions were made.
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 15
References
AKW Fessenheim geht vom Netz (2012, September 15). [NPP Fessenheim goes
offline]. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
Baumann, N. (2012, June 14). Zehn Jahre Atomausstieg. [Ten years nuclear phase-
out]. FOCUS-Online. Retrieved from http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/tid-
18598/zehn-jahre-atomausstieg-meilenstein-als-zerreissprobe_aid_518339.html
Chroniknet.de. 23. September 1990. Retrieved from
http://www.chroniknet.de/daly_de.0.html?year=1990&month=9&day=23
Donohew, L. (1967). Newspaper Gatekeepers and Forces in the News Channel. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 31(1), 61. doi:10.1086/267482
Entman, R. M. (1991). Framing U.S. Coverage of International News: Contrasts in
Narratives of the KAL and Iran Air Incidents. Journal of Communication, 41(4), 6–27.
doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.1991.tb02328.x
Esser, F. (1998). Editorial Structures and Work Principles in British and German
Newsrooms. European Journal of Communication, 13(3), 375–405.
doi:10.1177/0267323198013003004
Flegel, R. C., & Chaffee, S. H. (1971). Influences of Editors, Readers, and Personal
Opinions on Reporters. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 48(4), 645–651.
doi:10.1177/107769907104800404
Forster, S. (2009, January 30). Präsident Sarkozy baut einen zweiten EPR in
Frankreich. [President Sarkozy builds second EPR in France]. Radio France Internationale-
Online. Retrieved from http://www.rfi.fr/actude/articles/109/article_1107.asp
Großbritannien - Standorte für zehn neue AKW genehmigt (2009, November 9). [UK
– locations for ten new NPPs approved]. Spiegel Online. Retrieved from
http://www.spiegel.de/wissenschaft/technik/grossbritannien-standorte-fuer-zehn-neue-akw-
genehmigt-a-660295.html
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 16
Halloran, J. D., Elliott, P. R. C., & Murdock, G. (1970). Demonstrations and
communication: A case study. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
Herman, E. S., & Chomsky, N. (2002). Manufacturing consent: The political economy
of the mass media (2nd ed.). New York: Pantheon Books.
Holsti, O. R. (1969). Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities.
Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley cop.
Kepplinger, H. M. (1988). The Way into the Media Crisis of Nuclear Energy. VGB
Kraftwerkstechnik, 68(11), 1085–2091.
Kepplinger, H. M. (1992). Put in the Spotlight - Instrumental Actualization of Actors,
Events, and Aspects in the Coverage on Nicaragua. In S. Rothman (Ed.), The Mass media in
liberal democratic societies (pp. 201–219). New York: Paragon House.
Kepplinger, H. M. (2008a). News Factors. In W. Donsbach (Ed.), The international
encyclopedia of communication (pp. 3245–3248). Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell.
Kepplinger, H. M. (2008b). News Values. In W. Donsbach (Ed.), The international
encyclopedia of communication (pp. 3281–3286). Malden, Oxford, Carlton: Blackwell.
Kepplinger, H. M. (2011). Die Konstruktion der Kernenergiegegnerschaft. [The
Construction of Antagonism against Nuclear Energie] In H. M. Kepplinger (Ed.),
Realitätskonstruktionen (1st ed., pp. 205–232). Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für
Sozialwissenschaften.
Kepplinger, H. M., Brosius, H.-B., & Staab, J. F. (1991). Instrumental Actualization:
A Theory of Mediated Conflicts. European Journal of Communication, 6(3), 263–290.
doi:10.1177/0267323191006003002
Kleinnijenhuis, J. (1989). News as olds: A test of the consonance hypothesis and
related news selection hypotheses. International Communication Gazette, 43(3), 205–228.
doi:10.1177/001654928904300304
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 17
Köcher, R. (2011, April 20). Atemberaubende Wende. [Stunning Turn]. Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung.
Molotch, H., & Lester, M. (1974). News as Purposive Behavior: On the Strategic Use
of Routine Events, Accidents, and Scandals. American Sociological Review, 39(1), 101–112.
Mothes, C. (2012). Macht die Profession den Unterschied? Eine
dissonanztheoretische Untersuchung zum Informationsverhalten von Journalisten und Nicht-
Journalisten im Hinblick auf Objektivität als Professionsmerkmal (Dissertation). [Does the
Profession reason the difference? A dissonance-theoretical Examination of the Information
Behaviour of Journalists and Non-Journalists with Study Focus on Objectivity in
Journalism]. Technische Universität Dresden, Dresden.
Paraschos, M., & Rutherford, B. (1985). Network News Coverage of Invasion of
Lebanon by Israeli in 1982. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 62(3), 457–464.
doi:10.1177/107769908506200301
Scheufele, D. A. (1999). Framing as a Theory of Media Effects. Journal of
Communication, 49(1), 103-122. doi: 10.1111/j.1460-2466.1999.tb02784.x
Schulz, B., & Strubeck, W. (2008, March 6). Großbritannien treibt Kernkraftausbau
voran. [UK promotes Expansion of Nuclear Energy] Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung.
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
18
Table 1: Media examined
Germany Switzerland France
United
Kingdom
National daily
newspapers
Frankfurter
Allgemeine Zeitung,
Frankfurter
Rundschau,
Handelsblatt,
Süddeutsche
Zeitung, taz, Die
Welt
Tagesanzeiger,
Neue Zürcher
Zeitung
Le Monde, Le
Figaro
Guardian,
Independent,
Telegraph,
Times
Tabloid papers Bild Blick - The Sun
Weekly
newspapers
and magazines
Frankfurter
Allgemeine
Sonntagszeitung,
SPIEGEL, Focus
Sonntagsblick,
Weltwoche
Le Point,
Le Nouvelle
Observateur
Independent
on Sunday,
Observer,
Sunday
Telegraph
Total 10 5 4 8
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
19
Table 2: Extent of entire coverage in quality newspapers
Germany Switzerland France United Kingdom
SZ FAZ TA NZZ Monde Figaro Guardian Times
Articles 256 457 249 248 235 163 113 99
Statements 438 553 372 570 431 155 174 87
Images 105 98 60 54 72 63 86 83
Note. Not including weekend or Sunday papers
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
20
Chart 1: Emphasis on the earthquake, tsunami and reactor accident
- Number of articles and images -
Note. Articles with main topic “Earthquake“, “Tsunami“, “Reactor accicdent“
80
27
63
16 49
15 34 27
65
56
49
35
49
43 43
79
241
73
178
35
168
58
109 52
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Earthquake Tsunami Reactor accident
Germany
Articles Images
Switzerland
Articles Images
France
Articles Images
UK
Articles Images
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
21
Chart 2: Emphasis on various aspects of the reactor accident
- Number of articles -
189
117 115 101
211
98
50 20
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
500
Germany Switzerland France UK
External and internal factors Course of reactor accident Domestic nuclear energy
37 37 35 49
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
22
Chart 3: Thematization of domestic nuclear energy
- number of articles mentioning “nuclear energy in own country” -
UK
France
Switzerland
Germany
0
5
10
15
20
25
March 12 March 19 March 26 April 2 April 9
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
23
Chart 4: Influence of commentary bias on the representation of Fukushima’s relevance to
domestic nuclear energy
Note. Linear regression: y=12.27-2.59x; p<.05; beta=-.59; R
2 (adj.) =.29
Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments
Dependent variable (y-axis): Percentage of articles mentioning domestic nuclear energy among all articles that mention Fukushima
Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of articles that mention Fukushima)
Different statements summarised according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant statements: Fukushima
can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to domestic
nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe. The risks
of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are acceptable. A
comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic nuclear power.)
Süddeutsche*(11/101)*
FAZ*(20/90)*
Welt*(13/47)*
FR*(13/162)*
Handelsbla@*(5/46)*
taz*(20/108)*
LeMonde*(18/64)*Tagesanzeiger*(6/80)*
NZZ*(16/113)*
Times*(11/13)*
Independent*(8/9)*
Guardian*(13/27)*
Telegraph*(4/15)*
Focus*(7/13)*
0*
5*
10*
15*
20*
25*
P2* P1* 0* 1* 2*
Bias of statements
by journalists in comments
Percentage of articles mentioning
domestic nuclear energy among all
articles that mention Fukushima
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
24
Chart 5: Influence of commentary bias on the tendency of coverage of nuclear energy
Note. Linear regression: y=-0.42-0.05x; p=n.s.; beta=-.13; R
2 (adj.) =.00
Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments
Dependent variable (y-axis): Bias of statements of all agents (incl. journalists) in reports/news
Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of statements of all agents in reports, news)
Different statements summarised according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant Statements:
Fukushima can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to
domestic nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe.
The risks of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are
acceptable. A comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic
nuclear power.)
Süddeutsche*(11/101)*
FAZ*(20/90)*
Welt*(13/47)*
FR*(13/162)*
Handelsbla@*(5/46)*
taz*(20/108)*
LeMonde*(18/64)*
Tagesanzeiger*(6/80)*
NZZ*(16/113)*
Times*(11/13)*
Independent*(8/9)*
Guardian*(13/27)*
Telegraph*(4/15)*
Weltwoche*(4/15)*
Focus*(7/13)*
Q1*
0*
1*
Q2* Q1* 0* 1* 2*
Bias of all
statements in news
Bias of statements
by journalists in comments
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
25
Chart 6: Influence of commentary bias on the presentation of experts
Note. Linear regression: y=0.12+0.70x; p<.01; beta=.76; R
2 (adj.) =.54
Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments
Dependent variable (y-axis): Bias of statements by experts in reports/news
Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of statements by experts in reports, news)
Different statements summarized according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant statements:
Fukushima can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to
domestic nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe.
The risks of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are
acceptable. A comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic
nuclear power.)
Süddeutsche*(11/6)*
FAZ*(20/5)*
Welt*(13/1)*
FR*(13/17)*
Handelsbla?*(5/4)*
taz*(20/4)*
LeMonde*(18/7)*Tagesanzeiger*(6/11)*
NZZ*(16/7)*Times*(11/5)*
Guardian*(13/3)*
Weltwoche*(4/2)*
Focus*(7/3)*
N2*
N1*
0*
1*
2*
N2* N1* 0* 1* 2*
Bias of all expert statements
in news
Bias of statements
by journalists in comments
COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA
26
Chart 7: Influence of commentary bias on the presentation of politicians’ opinions
Note. Linear regression: y=0.30+0.84x; p<.05; beta=.71; R
2 (adj.) =.49
Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments
Dependent variable (y-axis): Bias of statements by politicians in reports/news
Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of statements by politicians in reports, news)
Different statements summarized according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant Statements:
Fukushima can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to
domestic nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe.
The risks of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are
acceptable. A comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic
nuclear power.)
Süddeutsche*(11/40)*FAZ*(20/37)*
Welt*(13/21)*
FR*(13/57)* Handelsbla?*(5/12)*
taz*(20/33)*
LeMonde*(18/1)*
Tagesanzeiger*(6/11)*
NZZ*(16/13)*
Focus*(7/1)*
Weltwoche*(4/1)*
L2*
L1*
0*
1*
2*
L2* L1* 0* 1* 2*
Bias of all politicians’
statements in news
Bias of statements
by journalists in comments