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Running head: COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 1 Communication in Conflicts: Instrumentalizing Fukushima Full Paper Presentation Submitted to the Annual Conference of the International Communication Association Journalism Studies Division June 17-21, 2013 London, UK
Transcript

Running head: COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 1

Communication in Conflicts: Instrumentalizing Fukushima

Full Paper Presentation

Submitted to the Annual Conference of the International Communication Association

Journalism Studies Division

June 17-21, 2013

London, UK

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 2

Abstract

According to the theory of instrumental actualization in mediated conflicts the mass

media tend to exaggerate events consistent with the editorial line. The theory was tested using

press coverage in Germany, Switzerland, France and the UK on the Japan earthquake, the

tsunami it caused and the nuclear disaster of Fukushima. Within a period of 7 weeks after the

earthquake, the coverage in 27 national newspapers and magazines in the 4 countries on the 3

events was analyzed. As hypothesized from the theory, German and Swiss media

concentrated on Fukushima and stressed its relevance for domestic nuclear plants whereas

French and British media gave more emphasis to the Tsunami and seldom relate the nuclear

accident in Japan to domestic nuclear programs. In addition, there were remarkable

correlations between the views of journalists and the bias of statements on nuclear energy

presented in their news section. Findings are discussed and related to the framing approach.

Keywords

Communication in conflicts, nuclear energy, instrumental actualization, framing, Fukushima,

content analysis, nuclear phase-out

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 3

Communication in Conflicts: Instrumental Actualization of Fukushima

Natural disasters such as the Pacific earthquake off the coast of Japan, the tsunami

thus caused and its consequences, including the Fukushima nuclear accident, are both the

trigger for and the subject of intense media coverage. However, they are not its only cause.

Rather, the intensity and the kind of reporting depends on a number of news factors – the

geographical distance between the event and the media and their audience; the media

audience’s cultural proximity to the population of the country affected; the economic

significance of the regions affected for the countries reporting, etc. The influence of news

factors (Kepplinger, 2008a) and their news values (Kepplinger, 2008b) on the intensity of

coverage is well documented. However, there is yet another cause that remains neglected in

studies on the importance of news factors and is only given cursory attention in other

approaches: The event’s significance for political and ideological conflicts in the countries

reporting on it. When analyzing this cause, different types of countries can be distinguished.

The first type are countries where a significant political and ideological conflict exists over

how to evaluate occurrences or themes similar to the reported event. The second type are

countries where there is no such political-ideological conflict. In countries where a political-

ideological conflict exists, the events reported are politically relevant. In countries with no

such conflict, they have no political relevance. This raises the question of the role played by

the media in political-ideological conflicts.

Theories

Instrumental Actualization

In all of today’s societies, political and ideological conflicts are carried out via the

mass media (Kepplinger, Brosius & Staab, 1991). Unlike conflicts between neighbors, these

kinds of conflicts can be called “mediatized conflicts”. The mass media play a key role in

mediatized conflicts because they step in between the opponents as well as between the

opponents and the public. Therefore they may have an impact on the general public’s

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 4

acceptance of the adversarial protagonists’ positions, and thus may increase or decrease their

chances of success. In every important conflict, many events occur that support the point of

view of one or the other side. In the controversy over nuclear energy for example, an accident

in a nuclear plant supports the position of the opponents; the breakdown of the energy supply

due to a lack of oil imports strengthens the position of the supporters of nuclear energy.

Events which might influence the position of the proponents in conflicts are “instrumental” to

this position. Both protagonists and the media that share their views can strengthen their

position and weaken that of the other side by putting those events in the spotlight that support

their own point of view and weaken the point of view of their opponents. “Instrumental

actualization”, e.g. the selective highlighting of events supporting one’s own side and

weakening the opponent, is part of the behavior repertoire of all conflict participants.

Politicians, political parties, governments and business feed the mass media with information

about events that is consistent with their position and inconsistent with the position of their

opponents or competitors (Molotch & Lester, 1974; Paraschos & Rutherford, 1985). The mass

media exaggerate events consistent with the editorial line, the views of owners and the views

of journalists (Donohew, 1967; Halloran, Elliott & Murdock, 1970; Flegel & Chaffee, 1971;

Kleinnijenhuis, 1989; Kepplinger et al., 1991; Kepplinger, 1992; Entman, 1991; Herman and

Chomsky, 2002).

National background of coverage

The theory of instrumental actualization can be tested under near-ideal conditions

using the press coverage in Germany, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom of the

Japan earthquake, the tsunami it caused and the nuclear disaster of Fukushima: The

geographical distance between the media in these four Western countries and Japan is more or

less equal; this is also true of the cultural differences between the Western countries and Japan

and the importance of their economic and political ties with Japan. Differences in media

coverage thus cannot be explained by any of these factors. The nuclear power stations in

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 5

Germany and Switzerland are generally regarded as slightly safer than the ones in France or

the United Kingdom. However, these differences are marginal and can safely be ignored here.

Accordingly, differences in media coverage cannot be explained by the safety of nuclear

power stations in Germany, Switzerland, France and the UK either. However, there were

significant differences in opinion on nuclear energy in these four Western countries, even

before the events in Japan took place.

In Germany, the media have shown nuclear energy in an increasingly negative light

since the early 1970s. Popular opinion fell into line with the trends in media reporting after

roughly one year intervals. Since the early 80s, there have been – sometimes violent – protests

against the building of nuclear power stations (Kepplinger, 1988; Kepplinger, 2011, 205-232).

In 2000, the federal government decided to phase out nuclear energy completely by 2021.

One year prior to Fukushima (2010), 36 percent of Germans were more or less in support of

and 35 percent more or less against using nuclear energy. The rest were undecided (Köcher,

2011). In a representative survey among journalists the same year, 85 percent were against

extending German nuclear power stations’ life span (Mothes, 2012, 238). Thus we can note:

Before Fukushima, there was a conflict in the evaluation of nuclear energy in Germany. A

large majority of journalists were opposed to it. Amongst the general population, there were

two more or less equal camps for and against nuclear energy.

In a 1990 national referendum in Switzerland, 53 percent of voters were against

phasing out nuclear energy, but 55 percent were in support of a ten-year hiatus in the

expansion of nuclear energy. Only 40 percent of those eligible to vote had taken part in the

referendum (Chroniknet.de) Thus we can note: Prior to Fukushima, there was a conflict in the

evaluation of nuclear energy in Switzerland, with two more or less equal opposing camps.

There are no representative surveys among journalists on nuclear energy for the period before

2011.

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 6

For many decades, nuclear energy was not a subject of political controversy in France.

Unlike in Germany, both right- and left-wing parties regarded it in an overwhelmingly

positive light and supported its expansion. In 2008/09, President Nicolas Sarkozy planned to

build a new nuclear power station (Forster, 2009). No mass public controversy ensued. Thus

we can note: Before Fukushima, a broad consensus was in support of nuclear energy in

France. There are no representative surveys among journalists on nuclear energy for the

period before 2011.

For many decades, nuclear energy remained politically uncontroversial in the United

Kingdom also. In 2008, the British government announced plans to build new nuclear stations

in up to 18 locations (Schulz & Strubeck, 2008); one year later, the British government

approved the construction of nuclear power stations in 10 locations (“Großbritannien-

Standorte für zehn neue AKW genehmigt”, 2009). There was no mass public controversy.

Thus we can note: Prior to Fukushima, a broad consensus was in support of nuclear energy in

the United Kingdom. There are no representative surveys among journalists on nuclear energy

for the period before 2011.

Hypotheses

Seven hypotheses can be derived from the national backgrounds and the theories

outlined:

1. There was greater coverage of the three events in Japan (earthquake, tsunami,

Fukushima) in newspapers in Germany and Switzerland than in the papers in France or the

United Kingdom (total press coverage).

2. Fukushima in particular was given greater coverage in German and Swiss

newspapers than French or British papers.

3. In connection with the nuclear disaster in Japan, the newspapers in Germany and

Switzerland also covered nuclear energy in their own respective countries more than the

newspapers in France and the UK.

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 7

4. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy

in comment articles) influenced the evaluation of nuclear energy in the respective country:

The more negative the journalists’ statements, the greater the extent to which domestic

nuclear energy was included in coverage of Fukushima and its consequences.

5. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy

in comment articles) influenced the bias in coverage in news and reports: The more negative

the journalists’ comments, the more negative the coverage in their papers.

6. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy

in comment articles) influenced the selection of experts whose opinions were printed in the

papers: The more negative the journalists’ comments, the more likely their papers were to

quote experts with a negative opinion.

7. In all countries, the papers’ editorial line (journalists’ statements on nuclear energy

in comment articles) influenced the selection of politicians whose opinions were printed in the

papers: The more negative the journalists’ comments, the more likely their papers were to

quote politicians with a negative opinion.

Method

The period of investigation is 7 weeks. It starts with the ninth calendar week (February

28) and ends with the fifteenth (April 10). The earthquake took place on March 11. The press

coverage in 27 newspapers in four countries of three events – the earthquake off the coast of

Japan, the tsunami thus caused and the reactor accident in Fukushima – is examined.

This analysis focuses on coverage in 27 national newspapers and magazines. The media

selection is based on the press structure in the respective countries. In Germany, a

comparatively high number of national daily papers and magazines and in the UK, a

comparatively high number of Sunday papers were examined. In all countries, a more left-

wing, liberal (Süddeutsche Zeitung, Tagesanzeiger, Le Monde, Guardian) and a more right-

wing, conservative (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Le Figaro,

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 8

Times) quality paper was analysed respectively, so that the coverage in different categories of

paper could be compared (Table 1).

[please insert table 1 about here]

The entire coverage in the papers was examined. This also included contributions

collected on special pages. Special supplements were not encoded. All articles were examined

that included information on the following topics in their title, subtitle, lead, boxes or images:

Earthquake in Japan; tsunami in Japan; Fukushima reactor accident; nuclear energy in Japan;

nuclear energy in general; consequences of earthquake/tsunami/nuclear accident. Information

on the consequences was only included if a link to the catastrophes in Japan could be

discerned.

The analysis made a distinction between articles, statements and images. Articles are

characterised by their presentation in terms of form and content. Contributions with the same

theme but in a different form (e.g. news report and comment on the same event) count as two

articles. Separate boxes represent individual articles, as do free-standing images and graphs.

Statements include at least three elements – information on the author, a subject and a bias or

line of information on the subject. If one of these three elements changes, a new statement

begins. Images are visual representations. Image collages are treated as separate images. The

same goes for obvious montages – e.g. a close-up of a face set into the photograph of a

ravaged landscape.

Reliabilty tests are based on coding of five articles which differed in length and

complexity. Results were calculated using Holstis formula (Holsti, 1969). Reliability of

identification the topics of articles: r= 0.86; reliability of identification contents of pictures: r=

0.81; reliability of identification of (a) content and of (b) bias of statements: r=0.69). Content

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 9

and bias of statements were tested simultaneously because testing of bias without information

about content of statements would be meaningless.

Results

National differences in the instrumentalization of the catastrophes

In the first part of our analysis, we examine the instrumental actualization of

Fukushima in the four countries. To do this, we focus on the coverage provided in two

comparable newspapers in each country. One of the two papers respectively takes a more left-

wing, liberal line, and the other a more right-wing, conservative line. Table 1 provides an

overview of the data corpus. This reveals that the German and Swiss newspapers gave the

events in Japan and their significance for their own respective country far greater coverage

than papers in France and the United Kingdom. This can be seen in the number of

contributions and the numbers of statements, confirming Hypothesis 1. Furthermore, we can

see that the greatest coverage in Germany was provided by the right-wing, conservative

Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, whereas in France it was the left-wing, liberal Le Monde

(Table 2).

[please insert table 2 about here]

Newspapers in all countries reported primarily on the reactor accident in Fukushima.

The second most important topic in Germany and Switzerland was the earthquake, while in

Britain it was the tsunami and its direct consequences. The newspapers in Germany and

Switzerland gave the nuclear disaster in Fukushima more coverage than the French and

British papers. This confirms Hypothesis 2. The large number of images about the tsunami in

the British papers is striking (Chart 1).

[please insert chart 1 about here]

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 10

In all countries, newspapers reported fairly little about the specific causes of the

Fukushima reactor accident. This goes both for external factors – the tsunami – and the

internal factors – insufficient measures taken to protect the reactor and errors in the measures

taken to combat the damage to it. In connection with the reactor accident in Fukushima,

newspapers in Germany and Switzerland also covered nuclear energy in their own respective

countries more than did newspapers in France and Germany. This confirms Hypothesis 3

(Chart 2).

[please insert chart 2 about here]

In connection with the reactor accident in Fukushima, newspapers in Germany

reported on nuclear energy in Germany with particular speed and intensity. On March 14 –

only three days after the accident – more than 10 articles were concerned with nuclear energy

in Germany. They gave the impression that the reactor accident in Fukushima was a general

problem of nuclear energy that also affected German nuclear energy. Swiss newspapers

followed suit only a few days later, but they did not report on nuclear energy in their own

country quite as intensely as the newspapers in Germany, where nuclear energy had been the

subject of massive conflict for a longer period. By contrast, newspapers in France and Britain

only seldom reported on nuclear energy in their own countries in connection with reports on

the nuclear disaster in Fukushima. Once again, this confirms Hypothesis 3 (Chart 3).

[please insert chart 3 about here]

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 11

Influence of the editorial line on coverage

The influence of the papers’ editorial line is analyzed using the coverage in all

newspapers and magazines examined. We include all of the papers examined in our analysis,

as the focal point here is not a comparison between countries, but the causes of tendencies and

bias in current news reporting. Evaluative statements on nuclear energy by journalists in

commentaries form the basis of the analysis. They serve as an indicator for defining the

papers’ editorial line. The prerequisite for papers to be included in this analysis is a minimum

of 4 evaluative statements in commentaries (independent variable). The number of evaluative

statements by journalists in commentaries (independent variable) is provided to the left in

brackets next to the names of the papers. The number of evaluative statements by other

authors in commentaries (dependent variable) is provided to the right in brackets.

The newspapers’ and magazines’ editorial line – determined via the evaluative

statements on nuclear energy by journalists in comments – had a clear influence on the

intensity of coverage of the Fukushima reactor accident: The more negatively journalists

evaluated nuclear energy in their comments, the greater the extent to which domestic nuclear

energy was included in the entire coverage of Fukushima and its consequences. This confirms

Hypothesis 4 (Chart 4).

[please insert chart 4 about here]

The papers’ editorial line – defined via journalists’ evaluative statements in comments

– had no influence on the tendency of coverage in news and reports. Nearly all newspapers

and magazines – more or less independently of comment bias – depicted nuclear energy as

negative. This contradicts Hypothesis 5 (Chart 5).

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 12

[please insert chart 5 about here]

The papers’ editorial line had a clear influence on the selection of experts whose

opinions were printed in the papers: Papers in which journalists made mostly positive

comments on nuclear energy printed predominantly the opinions of experts whose statements

were also positive. Papers in which journalists made mostly negative comments printed

predominantly the opinions of experts whose statements were also negative. This connection

could be seen primarily in German and Swiss newspapers and magazines. This confirms

Hypothesis 6. The Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Chart 6) forms an exception.

[please insert chart 6 about here]

The papers’ editorial line had a clear influence on the selection of politicians whose

opinions were printed in the papers: Papers in which journalists made overwhelmingly

positive comments on nuclear energy predominantly printed politicians whose opinions were

also positive. Papers in which journalists made mostly negative comments predominantly

printed politicians whose statements were also negative. This connection was evident

primarily in German and Swiss newspapers and magazines. This confirms Hypothesis 7

(Chart 7).

[please insert chart 7 about here]

Summary and interpretation

1. The presence or lack of public conflict influences the representation of catastrophes:

In countries where public conflict on a related topic existed prior to the catastrophes, the

media

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 13

a) played up the catastrophes through intensive coverage,

b) created a direct link to the established conflict on domestic nuclear energy, and

c) printed mainly the opinions of experts and politicians in agreement with the

editorial line.

These practices were more strongly in evidence in the German media than in media

from Switzerland. This suggests that the length and intensity of an existing public conflict

increases the tendency to adopt said practices. These results confirm the theory of

instrumental actualization: In public conflicts, the media act as agents that intervene in the

conflict by playing up information confirming the opinions of the editorial team. This is likely

also applicable to coverage of scandals.

Coverage of domestic nuclear energy can be seen as “framing” (Entman, 1991;

Scheufele, 1999): By reporting on nuclear energy in another country, nuclear energy is placed

within an extremely negative context. The impression is thus given that nuclear energy in the

papers’ own countries is a similar hazard to nuclear energy in Japan. If this interpretation is

adopted, then framing can be seen as a special form of instrumental actualization: The

instrumental actualization of contexts creates frames (among others), and the playing up of

opinions of experts and politicians creates bias. This bias is then confirmed and entrenched

through the frames. By the same token, the frames are able to corroborate the opinions’ bias.

Differences in the coverage of the Fukushima reactor accident cannot be explained by

the nature of the event – the actual threat posed to the countries by the events in Japan and the

actual threat posed by domestic nuclear power stations – as these factors all apply to

Germany, Switzerland, France and the United Kingdom equally. Neither do news factors –

geographical and cultural proximity, economic ties etc. – provide an explanation, as the news

value of these news factors is the same for the media in Germany, Switzerland, France and the

UK, due to objective conditions, such as geographical proximity/distance.

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 14

2. The editorial line often influenced the selection of experts, even in countries where

no conflict existed prior to the catastrophes. This was particularly striking in the case of

British newspapers, as in the UK – unlike in Germany, Switzerland and France – a clear

distinction is made between commenting roles (editorial writer, commentator etc.) and

reporting roles (reporter, editor etc.), with the intention of clearly demarcating news and

opinion (Esser 1998).

3. Editorial lines had no influence on the bias of coverage in news and reports. One

reason for this is that only “pure” forms of news reporting were included in the analysis. The

inclusion of more opinionated hybrid forms such as commentaries and interviews reveals a

different picture.

4. The existence of events and information on events that occur in connection with

public controversy is a necessary, but not an exhaustive cause for the intensity and kind of

coverage. Merely pointing out their existence therefore does not provide sufficient

explanation for the intensity and kind of coverage. Rather, this is a rhetorical argument used

to distract from the question of the other causes of coverage, which include the economic,

political and ideological interests of media agents.

5. If the news media were indeed political agents in their coverage of Fukushima, they

can be regarded as successful ones: In Germany, three days after the accident in Japan (March

14), Chancellor Angela Merkel announced the temporary closure of seven nuclear plants.

Two days later, she spoke about a possible nuclear phase-out. Three months after the accident

in Japan (June 6), the cabinet in Berlin decided to phase out nuclear energy by 2022.

In Switzerland, the government and parliament decided in 2011 not to allow the

construction of new nuclear plants, and to close down existing plants after their normal

duration of operation. In France, the new government decided in 2012 to close down one old

nuclear plant by 2016 (Fessenheim, “AKW Fessenheim geht vom Netz”, 2012). In Great

Britain, no political decisions were made.

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA 15

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COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

18

Table 1: Media examined

Germany Switzerland France

United

Kingdom

National daily

newspapers

Frankfurter

Allgemeine Zeitung,

Frankfurter

Rundschau,

Handelsblatt,

Süddeutsche

Zeitung, taz, Die

Welt

Tagesanzeiger,

Neue Zürcher

Zeitung

Le Monde, Le

Figaro

Guardian,

Independent,

Telegraph,

Times

Tabloid papers Bild Blick - The Sun

Weekly

newspapers

and magazines

Frankfurter

Allgemeine

Sonntagszeitung,

SPIEGEL, Focus

Sonntagsblick,

Weltwoche

Le Point,

Le Nouvelle

Observateur

Independent

on Sunday,

Observer,

Sunday

Telegraph

Total 10 5 4 8

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

19

Table 2: Extent of entire coverage in quality newspapers

Germany Switzerland France United Kingdom

SZ FAZ TA NZZ Monde Figaro Guardian Times

Articles 256 457 249 248 235 163 113 99

Statements 438 553 372 570 431 155 174 87

Images 105 98 60 54 72 63 86 83

Note. Not including weekend or Sunday papers

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

20

Chart 1: Emphasis on the earthquake, tsunami and reactor accident

- Number of articles and images -

Note. Articles with main topic “Earthquake“, “Tsunami“, “Reactor accicdent“

80

27

63

16 49

15 34 27

65

56

49

35

49

43 43

79

241

73

178

35

168

58

109 52

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

Earthquake Tsunami Reactor accident

Germany

Articles Images

Switzerland

Articles Images

France

Articles Images

UK

Articles Images

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

21

Chart 2: Emphasis on various aspects of the reactor accident

- Number of articles -

189

117 115 101

211

98

50 20

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

Germany Switzerland France UK

External and internal factors Course of reactor accident Domestic nuclear energy

37 37 35 49

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

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Chart 3: Thematization of domestic nuclear energy

- number of articles mentioning “nuclear energy in own country” -

UK

France

Switzerland

Germany

0

5

10

15

20

25

March 12 March 19 March 26 April 2 April 9

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

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Chart 4: Influence of commentary bias on the representation of Fukushima’s relevance to

domestic nuclear energy

Note. Linear regression: y=12.27-2.59x; p<.05; beta=-.59; R

2 (adj.) =.29

Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments

Dependent variable (y-axis): Percentage of articles mentioning domestic nuclear energy among all articles that mention Fukushima

Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of articles that mention Fukushima)

Different statements summarised according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant statements: Fukushima

can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to domestic

nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe. The risks

of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are acceptable. A

comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic nuclear power.)

Süddeutsche*(11/101)*

FAZ*(20/90)*

Welt*(13/47)*

FR*(13/162)*

Handelsbla@*(5/46)*

taz*(20/108)*

LeMonde*(18/64)*Tagesanzeiger*(6/80)*

NZZ*(16/113)*

Times*(11/13)*

Independent*(8/9)*

Guardian*(13/27)*

Telegraph*(4/15)*

Focus*(7/13)*

0*

5*

10*

15*

20*

25*

P2* P1* 0* 1* 2*

Bias of statements

by journalists in comments

Percentage of articles mentioning

domestic nuclear energy among all

articles that mention Fukushima

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

24

Chart 5: Influence of commentary bias on the tendency of coverage of nuclear energy

Note. Linear regression: y=-0.42-0.05x; p=n.s.; beta=-.13; R

2 (adj.) =.00

Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments

Dependent variable (y-axis): Bias of statements of all agents (incl. journalists) in reports/news

Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of statements of all agents in reports, news)

Different statements summarised according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant Statements:

Fukushima can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to

domestic nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe.

The risks of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are

acceptable. A comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic

nuclear power.)

Süddeutsche*(11/101)*

FAZ*(20/90)*

Welt*(13/47)*

FR*(13/162)*

Handelsbla@*(5/46)*

taz*(20/108)*

LeMonde*(18/64)*

Tagesanzeiger*(6/80)*

NZZ*(16/113)*

Times*(11/13)*

Independent*(8/9)*

Guardian*(13/27)*

Telegraph*(4/15)*

Weltwoche*(4/15)*

Focus*(7/13)*

Q1*

0*

1*

Q2* Q1* 0* 1* 2*

Bias of all

statements in news

Bias of statements

by journalists in comments

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

25

Chart 6: Influence of commentary bias on the presentation of experts

Note. Linear regression: y=0.12+0.70x; p<.01; beta=.76; R

2 (adj.) =.54

Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments

Dependent variable (y-axis): Bias of statements by experts in reports/news

Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of statements by experts in reports, news)

Different statements summarized according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant statements:

Fukushima can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to

domestic nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe.

The risks of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are

acceptable. A comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic

nuclear power.)

Süddeutsche*(11/6)*

FAZ*(20/5)*

Welt*(13/1)*

FR*(13/17)*

Handelsbla?*(5/4)*

taz*(20/4)*

LeMonde*(18/7)*Tagesanzeiger*(6/11)*

NZZ*(16/7)*Times*(11/5)*

Guardian*(13/3)*

Weltwoche*(4/2)*

Focus*(7/3)*

N2*

N1*

0*

1*

2*

N2* N1* 0* 1* 2*

Bias of all expert statements

in news

Bias of statements

by journalists in comments

COMMUNICATION IN CONFLICTS: INSTRUMENTALIZING FUKUSHIMA

26

Chart 7: Influence of commentary bias on the presentation of politicians’ opinions

Note. Linear regression: y=0.30+0.84x; p<.05; beta=.71; R

2 (adj.) =.49

Independent variable (x-axis): Bias of statements by journalists in comments

Dependent variable (y-axis): Bias of statements by politicians in reports/news

Designation of values: (Number of statements by journalists in comments/Number of statements by politicians in reports, news)

Different statements summarized according to bias: for nuclear energy (+2) and against nuclear energy (-2). (Relevant Statements:

Fukushima can be generalized. Fukushima is a problem specific to Japanese nuclear power. The problems of Fukushima can be applied to

domestic nuclear energy. Fukushima shows the general problems (uncontrollability) of nuclear energy. On the whole, nuclear power is safe.

The risks of nuclear power are overestimated. The risks of nuclear power can be calculated. The risks of domestic nuclear power are

acceptable. A comparison of risks to other risks is valid. Nuclear energy is less dangerous than other risks. Demands to phase out domestic

nuclear power.)

Süddeutsche*(11/40)*FAZ*(20/37)*

Welt*(13/21)*

FR*(13/57)* Handelsbla?*(5/12)*

taz*(20/33)*

LeMonde*(18/1)*

Tagesanzeiger*(6/11)*

NZZ*(16/13)*

Focus*(7/1)*

Weltwoche*(4/1)*

L2*

L1*

0*

1*

2*

L2* L1* 0* 1* 2*

Bias of all politicians’

statements in news

Bias of statements

by journalists in comments


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