This article was downloaded by:[University of California Berkeley]On: 4 October 2007Access Details: [subscription number 771410487]Publisher: Taylor & FrancisInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK

Journal of International Wildlife Law& PolicyPublication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:http://www.informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713778527

COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, ANDTOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT: CANCOMMUNITY-BASED NATURE TOURISM LIVE UP TOITS PROMISE?Robin L. Turner aa Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley

Online Publication Date: 01 January 2004To cite this Article: Turner, Robin L. (2004) 'COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFECONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT: CAN

COMMUNITY-BASED NATURE TOURISM LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISE?', Journal of International Wildlife Law & Policy,7:3, 161 - 182To link to this article: DOI: 10.1080/13880290490883232URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13880290490883232

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Full terms and conditions of use: http://www.informaworld.com/terms-and-conditions-of-access.pdf

This article maybe used for research, teaching and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction,re-distribution, re-selling, loan or sub-licensing, systematic supply or distribution in any form to anyone is expresslyforbidden.

The publisher does not give any warranty express or implied or make any representation that the contents will becomplete or accurate or up to date. The accuracy of any instructions, formulae and drug doses should beindependently verified with primary sources. The publisher shall not be liable for any loss, actions, claims, proceedings,demand or costs or damages whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with orarising out of the use of this material.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7

Journal of International Wildlife Law and Policy, 7:161–182, 2004Copyright C© Taylor & FrancisISSN: 1388-0292 print / 1548-1476 onlineDOI: 10.1080/13880290490883232

COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION,AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT:CAN COMMUNITY-BASED NATURE TOURISM

LIVE UP TO ITS PROMISE?

Robin L. Turner1

1. INTRODUCTION

As community-based approaches to natural resource management gained ac-ceptance, some advocates have looked to nature tourism as a means to en-sure that participating communities benefit. This article looks in depth at thepromise of nature tourism. It examines how historical legacies position ac-tors and influence relationships in the nature tourism sector. It characterizesthe logic behind the promise, analyzing how liberalizing states are likely toengage with community-based tourism. It also evaluates in a broad politicaland economic context the opportunities and tensions created in the pursuit ofconservation-based tourism in protected areas.

The analysis focuses on the Makuleke Region of Kruger National Parkin South Africa to illustrate how various factors influence prospects for com-munity benefit.2 For example, the Makuleke’s interactions with conservationmanagers, donors and advocates, government bureaucrats, and private sectorentrepreneurs are structured by their relative poverty, limited technical ex-pertise, and secure title to a valued conservation area, as well as by tourismmarket structures. While other factors, such as historical legacies of exclusionand dispossession and market structures, often disadvantage community ini-tiatives, nature tourism has promise in places where communities have securetenure or title to an area valued by the private sector. Thus, realistic appraisal of

1 Department of Political Science, University of California at Berkeley. The author would like to thank themany members of the Makuleke community, SANParks staff, and Friends of the Makuleke who sharedtheir views.

2 Protected areas like Kruger National Park are places in which the State or the owner has imposedrestrictions on the use of land and other natural resources to advance conservation.

161

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 162 TURNER

nature tourism in particular contexts requires attention to the multiple politicaleconomies in which it is embedded.

2. SITUATING COMMUNITY-BASED NATURALRESOURCE MANAGEMENT

In community based natural resource management (CBNRM) peoplewho are dependent on particular resources, or are affected by managementof them, are involved in the management and exploitation of these resources.In some cases, people are also given a voice in decision making. Usually,the people involved are in close proximity to the resources in question andconstitute the “community.” Their representatives interact with conservationor development non-governmental organizations, with government agenciesfrom environmental, parks, or land departments, and with a variety of interna-tional donors and consultants. Hulme and Murphree argue that this approachto conservation decision making became “almost a new orthodoxy” duringthe 1990s.3

Although in practice there are many forms of CBNRM,4 the startingpoint is usually a decision by the governmental or private actors controllinga protected area to involve nearby affected communities. The actual extent ofcommunity involvement, therefore, is largely within the control of these ac-tors. Despite rhetoric promoting “participation,” brief consultation with localcommunities appears to be much more common than substantial involvementin decision making. In those cases where there is a reasonable degree of par-ticipation, the agenda is often severely restricted. Proposals to use areas foragriculture or manufacturing, for example, instead of conservation may not beconsidered. Communities are more likely to have substantial decision-makingpower in cases where they have secure title to the land, and thus some controlover its use.

CBNRM emerged from the confluence of several factors. For close toa century, a “fortress conservation” model predominated, in which humanactivity was viewed as intrinsically harmful to nature.5 The model was deeply

3 David Hulme & Marshall W. Murphree, Community Conservation in Africa: An Introduction, in AFRICAN

WILDLIFE AND LIVELIHOODS: THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY CONSERVATION 1,2 (David Hulme& Marshall W Murphree, eds., 2001).

4 See Edmund Barrow & Marshall W. Murphree, Community Conservation: From Concept to Practice,in AFRICAN WILDLIFE AND LIVELIHOODS: THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY CONSERVATION, 24,supra note 3.

5 William Adams & David Hulme, Conservation and Community: Changing Narratives, Policies andPractices in African Conservation, in AFRICAN WILDLIFE AND LIVELIHOODS: THE PROMISE AND PERFOR-MANCE OF COMMUNITY CONSERVATION, 9 supra note 3; Donald S. Moore, Jake Kosek, & Anand Pandian,The Cultural Politics of Race and Nature: Terrains of Power and Practice, in RACE, NATURE, AND THE

POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 1 (Donald S. Moore, Jake Kosek, & Anand Pandian, eds., 2003); RODERICK NASH,WILDERNESS AND THE AMERICAN MIND (1973); RODERICK P. NEUMANN, IMPOSING WILDERNESS: STRUGGLES

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 163

invested in a romantic European understanding of nature as fragile and pris-tine. Conservationists sought, therefore, to exclude people from nature bycreating “protected areas,” reserves in which human residence and consump-tive activities such as hunting and agriculture were strictly limited, but wherenature was also subject to expert management. Over time, the demonstratedfailure of fences, fines, and coercion lessened support for fortress conserva-tion. Intense investment in policing protected areas against threats posed bylocal people and “poachers,” often seen as one and the same,6 did not arrest adecline in ecological conditions, and the number of threatened species contin-ued to rise. Fortress conservation also came under increasing pressure fromhuman rights and justice-oriented critiques, questioning the moral basis forexpropriation and exclusion in the name of biodiversity.7

In this context, proponents of CBNRM argued that community-basedmanagement could provide just conservation. To conservationists, they con-tended that local involvement rather than removal would provide better con-servation outcomes. And for those concerned with justice, they argued thatCBNRM would be more democratic than centralized state control of naturalresources. Community benefit was the linchpin, here. If communities wereinvolved in conservation and benefited from it, the expectation was that theywould comply with restrictions on resource use and extraction. CBNRM was,therefore, closely linked to development, narrowly understood in terms ofimproved material and economic well-being. The basic assumption was thatlocal communities did not sufficiently value conservation in and of itself.Therefore, community participation without development would jeopardizeconservation.

This justification for CBNRM has been extensively critiqued. It is farfrom clear, for example, that local predation provides an adequate explana-tion for species decline in protected areas.8 In addition, some conservationiststhink there is a tenuous causal connection between community participa-tion and improved ecological outcomes.9 In this article, the focus is on the

OVER LIVELIHOOD AND NATURE PRESERVATION IN AFRICA (1998); Nancy L. Peluso. Coercing Conservation—the Politics of State Resource Control, 3 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE—HUMAN POL’Y DIMENSIONS 199 (1993);MICHAEL P. WELLS, KATRINA BRANDON, & L HANNAH, PEOPLE AND PARKS: LINKING PROTECTED AREA MAN-AGEMENT WITH LOCAL COMMUNITIES (1992).

6 Roderick P Neumann, Primitive Ideas: Protected Area Buffer Zones and the Politics of Land in Africa,28 DEVELOPMENT & CHANGE 559 (1997); Peluso, supra note 5.

7 See, for example, Charles Geisler & Essy Letsoalo, Rethinking Land Reform in SouthAfrica: An Alternative Approach to Environmental Justice, 5 SOC. RES. ONLINE (2000),〈http://www.socresonline.org.uk/5/2/geisler.html〉

8 CLARK C. GIBSON, POLITICIANS AND POACHERS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF WILDLIFE POLICY IN AFRICA

(1999); N. Leader-Williams, S. D. Albon, and P. S. M. Berry, Illegal Exploitation of Black Rhinocerosand Elephant Populations: Patterns of Decline, Law Enforcement and Patrol Effort in Luangwa Valley,Zambia, 27 J. APPLIED ECOLOGY 1055 (1990).

9 See, for example, Clive Spinage, Social Change and Conservation Misrepresentation in Africa, 32 ORYX

265 (1998).

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 164 TURNER

interaction between conservation-based development and extra-local politicaleconomies.10 As the Makuleke case illustrates, CBNRM brings the communi-ties involved into complex interactions with multi-scalar political economieswhere there is limited room for communities to maneuver. The analysis isbased on interviews conducted with community members, national park offi-cials, and other involved individuals during 2002,11 on archival research,12 andon secondary literature. It does not deal with developments that have occurredin the Makuleke Region since August 2002, when interviews were completed.

The case brings three factors to light. First, the communities most likelyto be targeted for CBNRM have been particularly disadvantaged by priorconservation initiatives, through dispossession, and by the broader legaciesof African colonialism and South African apartheid. These legacies make itmore difficult for community actors in CBNRM to engage with their partnerson an equal basis. Second, conservation-based development is heavily relianton capitalist market strategies for success. In most cases, revenue generatedthrough nature tourism or other leisure spending is expected to provide the re-sources for community benefit. This market-based strategy has some benefits.Overall, however, the sectoral attributes of tourism pose special challenges toCBNRM initiatives and make it uncertain that CBNRM tourism projects willproduce substantial economic benefits. Third, the shift to CBNRM has beencoincident to broader structural shifts in Africa, such as economic crisis, par-tial liberalization, and democratization. These forces have altered the regionallandscape for conservation efforts—whether private, state, or community-based—and have done so in ways that both increase market competition andreduce the alternatives for communities seeking development.

3. LEGACIES OF DISPOSSESSION: THE MAKULEKE REGION

In African conservation, the creation of protected areas frequently hasinvolved forced relocation of people long resident in those areas and theexclusion of nearby peoples from access to them,13 particularly during the

10 Human geographers have demonstrated that the “local” is a product of interactions at multiple scales.I use extra-local here to refer to actors and dynamics beyond the formal territorial boundaries of the“community” involved in CBNRM, such as national government agencies, foreign donors, and pri-vate tourism ventures. Extra-local processes include conservation management fashions, global tourismtrends, democratization, and economic liberalization.

11 Community interviews included a mix of leaders—customary authorities, elected officials, and officialsof local organizations, elders, and young people. To protect informants’ confidentiality, I do not identifythe individuals interviewed by name.

12 Archives consulted include those of the Makuleke Communal Property Association, the Department ofLand Affairs/ Land Claims Commission, South African National Parks and Kruger National Park.

13 JANE CARRUTHERS, THE KRUGER NATIONAL PARK: A SOCIAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY (1995); NEUMANN, supranote 5.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 165

FIGURE 1. Protected Areas in Contemporary South Africa.

colonial and apartheid eras in South Africa.14 The Makuleke Region is aproduct of this history.15

The Makuleke Region is in the northeast corner of South Africa, near theborders with Zimbabwe and Mozambique (see Figures 1 and 2).16 The Regionis ecologically rich; home to a wide range of flora and fauna, including impala,kudu, leopards, buffalo, lions, deer, and many bird species. It is also on amajor wildlife migration route. The land includes floodplains, pans, wetlandsand riverine forest, and bush. Many local plants, such as the lala palm, havemultiple subsistence and commercial uses.17 There are ruins at Thulamela ofgreat archeological, historical, and cultural interest. In 2002, there were few

14 Some contend that this practice of greenlining—placing land under protected status and restrictinghuman residence and use—is prevalent in the developing world and continues to result in dispossessionand the criminalization of customary practices. Roderick P. Neumann, The Postwar Conservation Boomin British Colonial Africa, 7 ENVTL. HIST. 22 (2002), NEUMANN, supra note 5; Charles Geisler, A NewKind of Trouble: Evictions in Eden, 55 INT’L SOC. SCI. J. 69 (2003).

15 My discussion of Makuleke history draws primarily from Patrick Harries, ‘A Forgotten Corner of theTransvaal’: Reconstructing the History of a Relocated Community through Oral Testimony and Song,in CLASS, COMMUNITY AND CONFLICT: SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES, 93 (Belinda Bozzoli, ed., 1987). Thediscussion of Kruger Park draws from Carruthers, supra note 13.

16 The Region constitutes about 24,000 hectares bounded by the Luvuvhu, Limpopo, and Pafuri (Mutale)rivers. The Region is part of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park encompassing protected areasin Mozambique, South Africa, and Zimbabwe. Figure 1 is from the Department of EnvironmentalAffairs and Tourism, South Africa (Available at 〈http://www.environment.gov.za/Maps/PublishMaps/downloads/National/A4/Conservation areas.gif〉. Figure 2 is adapted from Carruthers, supra note 13, at102.

17 Harries, supra note 15.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 166 TURNER

FIGURE 2. Makuleke Region in Kruger Park. The Makuleke Region is in thenorthernmost part of kruger national park. The region is bounded by theLimpopo River to the north, the Pafuri River to the south, and the LevuvhuRiver to the east.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 167

FIGURE 3. The Makuleke Region. The Makuleke Region is in the northernmost part of Kruger NationalPark (Figure 2). The Makuleke Region is bounded by the Limpopo River (A–C), the Pafuri River (C–D),and the Levuvhu River (B–F–E). Letters A–G indicate the circumference of the land claim. All of thisarea was once occupied by the Makuleke, but Makuleke residence was gradually limited to the smalllocation indicated on the map.

paved roads and access to most of the region was either off-road or by dirtroads. The monetary value of land and existing infrastructure was estimatedin 2000 to range between 20–70 million Rand, or $1.8–$6.3 million US.18

The Makuleke region was settled 150 to 200 years ago by the Makulekepeople, a branch of the Maluleke clan, for whom it is named.19 The area waslocated along an established trade route known to Europeans and Africans,but was outside the scope of European settlement and somewhat distant fromindigenous state structures. By the 1890s, however, the Makuleke and theirterritory had been incorporated into the Transvaal Republic.20 Over the nexteighty years, under a white supremacist regime, the Makuleke gradually losteffective access to and control of the region’s resources as provincial andnational governments claimed the land, restricted the Makuleke to a smallreserve in the Region (see Figure 3), and established protected areas.21 This

18 Eddie Koch & Geoff De Beer, Land Reform in South Africa: The Potential Role of Tourism and Forestryto Promote Equity and Productivity in the Rural Economy, in AT THE CROSSROADS: LAND AND AGRICULTURAL

REFORM: SOUTH AFRICAN INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Ben Cousins, ed., 2000). As of December 12,2001, 1 US dollar = 11.0849 South African Rand.

19 Harries, supra note 15.20 The Transvaal Republic was one of four colonies united to create the modern South African state in

1910.21 Carruthers, supra note 13; Harries, supra note 15. Figure adapted from Makuleke Land Claim Court

documents.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 168 TURNER

process culminated in the forced removal of the Makuleke in 1969. Theywere resettled about 200 kilometers away in Ntlhaveni, a newly establishedreserve for Tsonga-speaking people. In 1971, most of the Makuleke Regionwas incorporated into Kruger National Park, South Africa’s premier nationalpark (see Figure 2), and a small portion was added to the Madimbo Corridor,a military cordon sanitaire.22

Forced removal to Ntlhaveni was accompanied by political and eco-nomic changes. First, political authority within the homeland was structuredby “traditional” authorities recognized by the Department of Bantu Affairs.At removal, the Makuleke chief was made a “headman,” formally subordinateto Maluleke Chief Mhinga.23 Because recognized chiefs had considerable dis-cretion over land and revenue allocation, the formal status of the Makulekechief had material consequences. Secondly, removal brought a decisive shiftin the relative importance of subsistence agriculture versus wage labor. InNtlhaveni the Makuleke were concentrated on a relatively small parcel ofland comprising 5,000 hectares and divided into three villages. Agriculturalplots could no longer be scattered and the new reserve lacked the rich game,wild fruits, lala palm, and fish of the Makuleke Region. The Makuleke, there-fore, had to adapt their farming practices to the agricultural conditions ofthe dry savannah. Several crop failures occurred during the first few years,and many men migrated so they could earn wages to buy food. Althoughwage labor became essential to survival, Ntlhaveni’s remote location limitedemployment opportunities to nearby farms, Kruger Park, and migrant labor.

Each of the postapartheid constitutions—the 1993 Interim Constitutionand the 1996 final Constitution—included a clause in the Bill of Rights estab-lishing a right to redress for persons and communities who had lost their prop-erty after June 1913 as a consequence of racially discriminatory laws. Groupscould seek individual or collective restoration of lost land, alternative land, orcompensation. The Makuleke saw this as an opportunity to reclaim their land.They filed a collective restitution claim and established the Makuleke Com-munal Property Association (CPA) as the legal vehicle to pursue their landclaim and receive title. The CPA membership included all individuals whohad lived in the Makuleke Region and their descendents, as well as individualswho had joined the Makuleke community after removal. Representatives thennegotiated with the National Parks Board (now SANParks) and other gov-ernment ministries. The Makuleke agreed to preserve the Makuleke Region’sstatus as a conservation area early in the negotiation process. Three years afterthe claim was filed, the parties reached a settlement. In late 1998, Land Claims

22 Conrad Steenkamp, The Makuleke Land Claim: An Environmental Conflict (2001) (Doctoral Disserta-tion, University of Witswatersrand) (on file with University of Witswatersrand Library).

23 According to Harries, supra note 15, it was Chief Mhinga’s complicity in the Makuleke’s removal thatgave him authority over the Makuleke, a related but largely independent clan.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 169

TABLE 1. The Distribution of Property Rights to the Makuleke Region

Right Possessor Restrictions

Alienation Makuleke CPA can sell, alienate, orencumber the land.

SANP has pre-emptive rights; mustbe notified of intent to sell & hasfirst right of refusal

Access The Makuleke CPA and communitymembers are entitled to access

Subject to JMB policy

Permanent Residence — Not allowed, unless consistent withconservation

Agriculture — Not allowedLand use Makuleke CPA Solely for conservation and

associated commercial activitiesUse of Natural

ResourcesMakuleke CPA may use sand, stone,

etc. for building and otherapproved activities

JMB to set policy

Building Rights Makuleke CPA can createcommercial facilities (e.g. lodges);research facility; museum; royalkraal

Must be consistent with conservation

Infrastructure Makuleke CPA SANP can use as necessary tocontinue conservationmanagement

Subsurface Rights State retains mineral resources;mining and prospecting isforbidden.

If state policy changes, State mustoffer rights to the CPA at a fair andreasonable price

JMB: Joint Management Board; Makuleke CPA: Makuleke Community Property Association; SANP:South African National Parks.

Court recognized the settlement and ordered transfer of title to the MakulekeCPA.24 Table 1 describes the resultant property rights regime. The court ordermarked the first successful settlement of a land restitution claim involving aSouth African national park.

Although SANParks, the parastatal that manages all national protectedareas, resisted the Makuleke’s land claim for most of the negotiation process,the final resolution was portrayed as a “win-win solution.” SANParks achievedseveral important objectives (see Figure 4). The Makuleke Region was keptwithin Kruger National Park, which was even enlarged slightly with 3,000hectares the Makuleke reclaimed from the Madimbo Corridor. SANParks alsogained a formal commitment to continued conservation of the Region and theability to monitor and sometimes participate in Makuleke decision-making.25

24 The terms of the settlement are established in the “The Main Agreement Relating to the MakulekeLand Claim (as amended 11–13 December 1998),” which was incorporated into the Order in the Matterof the Makuleke Community (Claimant) Concerning the Pafuri Area of the Kruger National Park andEnvirons, Soutpansberg District, Northern Province, 15 December, 1998 90/98 Land Claims Court ofthe Republic of South Africa [herein after Restitution Agreement].

25 The Restitution Agreement included the proviso that the Makuleke Region would be administered asa contractual national park for 20 to 50 years. Contractual parks are part of the national parks system,

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 170 TURNER

FIGURE 4. Makuleke Region Co-Management Arrangement Established in Land Restitution Agreement.

While the Region ostensibly is co-managed by the MakulekeCommunal Property Association (CPA) and SANParks, the CPA does notpossess sufficient conservation expertise or manpower to manage the regionwithout assistance, and so SANParks is effectively in charge of day-to-dayconservation management. Under the agreement, SANParks was obligatedto bear all operational costs for the first 5 years of co-management, withthe Makuleke CPA subsequently paying up to 50 percent of these costs (seeTable 2). Fees paid to enter the Region go, however, to SANParks, becausevisitors enter from a gate outside regional boundaries.

It is difficult to determine whether Makuleke commitment to conserva-tion was truly voluntary or merely a pragmatic concession as part of the landclaim negotiation. Viewed from their perspective, however, other benefitsof the agreement are easier to see. Clearly, the Makuleke gained an enor-mous symbolic victory through official recognition of the injustices that hadbeen visited upon them. Additionally, they obtained formal title to the land,and commercial rights.26 The Makuleke CPA now enjoys exclusive rightsto commercial development, although it cannot use the land for agriculture,mining, or mass settlement (see Table 1). The CPA constitution states thatthe Makuleke Region is to serve as a means towards achieving economicself reliance and development.27 Tourism, such as lodges, tours, and safari

but they remain under private ownership. A contract between the state and the owner sets the terms ofpark access and control. The Restitution Agreement allows either party to request the exclusion of theMakuleke Region from Kruger Park after 20 years on 5 years written notice.

26 Court documents indicate that restoration without conservation was unlikely. The Court Judgment states,“The restrictive conditions of title which the parties have agreed should be imposed were material inconvincing the Court that it was appropriate to order restoration in this matter.” Order, supra note 24.

27 Makuleke CPA Constitution Section 5.4.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 171

TABLE 2. Revenue and Cost-Sharing Arrangement

Source Actor

Gate Fees SANParks receives; arrangement may be reconsideredDirect Operational Management

costs for Pafuri RegionSANPParks will bear for 5 year; Makuleke CPA may contribute.

CPA will pay up to 50% of costs subsequently, but requiredcontribution may not exceed 50% of net profit, CPA maycontribute additional funds

Commercial Revenue Makuleke CPA receives incomeCommercial Development Costs Not specified in Agreement. The Makuleke CPA has secured

funding from following sources: Department of Public Works;the Department of Arts, Culture, Science & Technology;Department of Environmental Affairs & Tourism; Department ofLabor; Maputo Corridor Company; GTZ Foundation; and theFord Foundation, among others

hunting, is the chief development strategy. By the same token, the transfer ofland title did not erase the legacy of poverty resulting from land dispossessionand most CPA members will continue to live in Ntlhaveni, one of the poorestregions in the poorest province in South Africa.28 The agreement also doesnot provide the Makuleke with sufficient resources to pursue their goal oftourism-based development. They have to partner with outside actors who dohave the necessary material resources and expertise. And, indeed, they havepartnered to raise revenue from safari hunting, for example, with a privatefirm that advertised, organized, and managed the hunts.

The Makuleke have developed useful relationships. Since the mid-1990s,there has been a steady stream of volunteers and NGOs to assist communitymembers with a variety of tasks. They include the Legal Resources Cen-ter, the Environmental Wildlife Trust, the Ford Foundation, and the GermanAgency for Technical Co-Operation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur TechnischeZusammenarbeit). The Makuleke CPA has also had assistance in gatheringinformation and analyzing options at several crucial points; in approachingthe land claim negotiations, for example, in ascertaining development options,in developing a conservation management plan, and in issuing requests fordevelopment proposals. The Makuleke may not always be able to tell, how-ever, if they are receiving full, fair, and unbiased information,29 and the risk ofexploitation and unequal partnership is a continuing concern. While the riskof exploitation is bound to decline as the skills and experience of community

28 Koch & De Beer, supra note 18. In 1997, approximately 78 percent of households earned less than R1500(∼$135) per month, and a large number of households depended on low-wage employment in KrugerPark. On average, there were eight people per household. B. N. Tapela & P. H. Omara-Ojungu, TowardsBridging the Gap between Wildlife Conservation and Rural Development in Post-apartheid South Africa:the Case of the Makuleke Community and the Kruger National Park, 81 S. AFR. GEOGRAPHICAL J. 148,149 & 152 (1999).

29 Parks officials, who cannot be considered neutral, frequently asserted in interviews that the Makulekewere being used.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 172 TURNER

members increases, early decisions can have lasting effects. Some participantsin the German-funded Transform project, for example, assert that it initiallyhindered the Makuleke’s land restitution claim by suppressing recognitionof conflicts of interests between SANParks and the community.30 For sev-eral years, the Makuleke CPA worked closely with several individuals whomMakuleke community leaders perceived to have no conflicts of interest. Thisloose grouping of individuals, collectively called the Friends of Makuleke, wasmost intensely involved during the land claim negotiations. Their view now isthat the Makuleke have developed enough capacity to become self-sufficient.31

Probably the most salient aspect of the co-management arrangement forMakuleke at a practical level is that it requires CPA leaders to engage on anongoing basis with the agency that benefited most directly from their dis-possession. Because the Makuleke Region is to remain a conservation areain perpetuity, all commercial ventures must be consistent with conservation.So, if the CPA wants to build a lodge, extend a road, or create a helipad, forexample, it has to be able to demonstrate that these changes will not impedeconservation. In practice, this means that the CPA must present all commercialplans to the Makuleke-SANParks Joint Management Board, reconcile pro-posals with the conservation management plan, and conduct environmentalimpact assessments for each proposal. The CPA must, in other words, justifyits decisions to SANParks, although the agency can only block ventures onenvironmental grounds. But the technical expertise needed to develop and de-fend proposed developments is not equally distributed. There is an imbalancebetween SANParks and the CPA that can be traced to past state policies andresource allocations.32

The former homelands context introduces introduces additional ele-ments of uncertainty affecting the likely success and effectiveness of thisCBNRM project. When the Makuleke were relocated to Ntlhaveni it was partof the Gazankulu “self-governing” Bantustan. The Makuleke, like others whonow live in former homelands, still face unresolved conflicts over authorityand land tenure.33 There is, therefore, doubt about the extent to which they area coherent community of the kind imagined by CBNRM theorists. While all

30 Conrad Steenkamp & Jana Urh, Discovering Power Relations in a South African Cbnrm Case Study:The Makuleke Community of the Northern Province, in EMPOWERING COMMUNITIES TO MANAGE NATURAL

RESOURCES: CASE STUDIES FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA, 123 (Sheona Shackelton & Bruce Campbell, eds.,2000).

31 Several Friends of Makuleke expressed this view in interviews. Also see Steenkamp, supra note 22.32 In this respect, the Makuleke are comparable to many collectives targeted for participatory resource

management. The ecologically significant areas to be managed are often remote and the people livingin them or dispossessed from them are politically and economically marginalized. Inequality is deeplysedimented in the terrain on which communities and partners seek to develop conservation projects.

33 ANINKA CLASSENS, ‘IT IS NOT EASY TO CHALLENGE A CHIEF’: LESSONS FROM RAKGWADI (Programme forLand & Agrarian Stud., U. of the W. Cape, Research Report No. 9, 2001); LUNGISILE NTSEBEZA, LAND

TENURE REFORM, TRADITIONAL AUTHORITIES, AND RURAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN POST-APARTHEID SOUTH

AFRICA: CASE STUDIES FROM THE EASTERN CAPE Programme for Land & Agrarian Stud., U. of the W.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 173

land in the Bantustans was held in trust by the state, recognized chiefs wereauthorized to allocate tenure and use rights. But since elected local govern-ments have also been installed, the role of “traditional authorities” (chiefs) inpostapartheid South Africa remains unresolved. In many places it is simply notclear who owns which land in the homelands, nor who possesses the authorityto allocate land. While the successful land claim strengthened the Makuleke’stenure security in Ntlhaveni somewhat, it did not eliminate conflict betweenChief Makuleke, Chief Mhinga, and their respective adherents.34 Questionsof community membership and coherence, therefore, remain salient.

Additionally, although the Makuleke established formal membershipcriteria and a communal property association in response to the requirementof the land claim process, the presence of these formal membership defini-tions cannot be assumed to have created a unified collectivity. As Agrawaland Gibson contend,35 communities are rarely homogenous. Local decision-making processes reflect multiple actors, multiple and often conflicting in-terests, and a variety of local institutions. Disparities in perceived benefitsfrom natural resource management and tourism initiatives can exacerbate theconflicts arising from these differences. Since the land claim process began,CPA executive committee members have been the focus of external efforts toassist the Makuleke. They have received training, subsidized travel, and otherperks. These benefits have helped committee members develop the skills nec-essary to make good decisions, but they have also placed these individuals in afavored position. By contrast, the tangible benefits received by non-executiveCPA members as of 2002 were fairly small. After each safari hunt, animalmeat was shared with the community, and several dozen CPA members werehired to work in the Makuleke Region. Otherwise, although the CPA receivesall revenue from development initiatives and some of this money has beenallocated for transport for the chief and for some community projects, most ofthe money remained unspent while the CPA established a trust account. Thereis great pressure on the CPA executive committee to disburse these funds morefully and more broadly and this may eventually lead to politicization of theelection process. Research on other cases suggests that such disparities inbenefit are common.36

Cape, Research Report No. 3, 1999); STEPHEN TURNER & HILDE IBSEN, LAND AND AGRARIAN REFORM IN

SOUTH AFRICA: A STATUS REPORT (Programme for Land & Agrarian Stud., U. of the W. Cape, ResearchReport No. 6, 2000).

34 The Court Order and Agreement officially acknowledge Makuleke residence in Ntlhaveni and obligatethe State to secure rights for the Makuleke in Ntlhaveni. See Restitution Agreement, supra note 24.

35 Arun Agrawal & Clark Gibson, Enchantment and Disenchantment: The Role of Community in NaturalResource Conservation, 27 WORLD DEVELOPMENT 629 (1999).

36 Stephen R Kellert et al, Community Natural Resource Management: Promise, Rhetoric, and Reality, 13SOC’Y & NAT. RESOURCES 705 (2000).

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 174 TURNER

4. MARKETS FOR CONSERVATION: THE ECONOMICPOTENTIAL OF COMMUNITY-BASED NATURE TOURISM

The shift to CBNRM has coincided with widespread adoption of sustain-able development and market-based conservation strategies.37 Taken together,these perspectives imply that the route to successful CBNRM goes throughthe market, where capitalist logic makes it possible to assign values to con-servation and to assess its costs and benefits. On the other hand, there havebeen few efforts to estimate the full financial impacts of fortress conservation,which has imposed severe social, material, and economic costs on communi-ties subject to dislocation and use restrictions. Conservation efforts, clearly,have benefited those who derive value from conservation, those who havehad access to protected areas, and those able to mount related commercialenterprises. The logic of the market says that, if all parties were willing, thosewho benefit from conservation could compensate those negatively affected,leaving both sides better off. 38 However, this has not been the approach takenin most places.

Instead, market-based approaches to CBNRM have focused on provid-ing a stream of benefits to the participating community. Most benefits originatefrom two sources: government or private sector project funds and income fromextractive or non-extractive uses of protected area resources. Organizationalactors supporting conservation often are willing to subsidize initial organiza-tional and project costs for CBNRM. The Makuleke CPA, for example, hasreceived grants from government agencies, NGOs, and foreign foundations,and community members have been hired to work on projects in Kruger Park.39

These external subsidies to the communities participating in conservation ini-tiatives are usually viewed as short term and unsustainable. In the longer term,CBNRM is supposed to succeed by putting nature on the market. In manycases this means cultivating tourism. Tourists are accustomed to paying foraccess to nature in nature, for related services, such as transportation, lodging,and guidance, and for goods and souvenirs linked to the experience, such aspostcards and local crafts. These goods and services are, in principle, com-patible with conservation. There is also an established and lucrative market

37 David Hulme & Marshall W Murphree, Community Conservation in Africa: An Introduction, in AFRICAN

WILDLIFE AND LIVELIHOODS: THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY CONSERVATION 1 supra note 3;William Adams & David Hulme, Conservation and Community: Changing Narratives, Policies andPractices in African Conservation, in AFRICAN WILDLIFE AND LIVELIHOODS: THE PROMISE AND PERFORMANCE

OF COMMUNITY CONSERVATION, 9 supra note 3.38 This approach seems most likely to meet with success in cases where the affected party was not subjected

to coercion. For groups subject to forced removal, financial compensation without restoration may beunacceptable.

39 Supporters include the South African Department of Arts, Culture, Science & Technology, Departmentof Environmental Affairs & Tourism, Department of Labor, Department of Public Works, Maputo Cor-ridor Company, the German Agency for Technical Co-Operation (Deutsche Gesellschaft fur TechnischeZusammenarbeit), and the Ford Foundation.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 175

for game hunting,40 but conservation principles and constituencies constrainthe potential for profit here. The conservation plan for the Makuleke Regionpermits limited hunting, but the first elephant hunts in the Makuleke Regionproduced an outcry among conservationists. In 2000, the Makuleke were ableto sell the rights to hunt two elephants and two buffalo. The hunt producedR520,000 (about US$47 thousand or US$3/beneficiary) and some animalmeat.41 Hunts also occurred in 2001 and 2002.

Superficial analysis suggests that tourism is a promising strategy. ManyAfrican protected areas contain stunning landscapes, large game, and exoticflora. Large numbers of people pay fees to enter existing protected areas.More than a million people visited South Africa’s national parks in 1995.42

The tourism sector directly accounts for 3.7 percent of global gross domesticproduct (GDP),43 and tourism comprises the main source of foreign currencyfor at least thirty-eight percent of all countries.44 In 1997, ten countries incontinental sub-Saharan Africa garnered more than US$100 million in tourismreceipts.45 In South Africa, tourism is the third largest industry, the fourth mostimportant source of foreign exchange,46 and comprises about seven percent ofGDP.47 Although few solid figures are available, it is clear that nature tourism asa niche in this overall market generates substantial revenue.48 Wells estimatesthat South African nature tourism accounted for R710-6,087 (US$225 to 1,909million) in 1993.49

This superficially promising picture needs to be qualified. First, naturetourism associated with CBNRM is a relatively new entrant in a large andcompetitive field. In addition to the many state-owned protected areas, thereis a large private nature tourism industry. New community initiatives have tocompete with these public and private operations. Although some may be able

40 P Chardonnet et al. The Value of Wildlife, 21 REVUE SCIENTIFIQUE ET TECHNIQUE DE L’OFFICE INTERNATIONAL

DES EPIZOOTIES 15 (2002).41 KARIN MAHONY & JURGENS VAN ZYL, PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR PRO-POOR TOURISM: CASE STUDIES OF

MAKULEKE AND MANYELETI TOURISM INITIATIVES (Pro-Poor Tourism Working Paper No. 2, 2001).42 MICHAEL P. WELLS, THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL ROLE OF PROTECTED AREAS IN THE NEW SOUTH AFRICA

(1996).43 WORLD TRAVEL AND TOURISM COUNCIL, TRAVEL AND TOURISM: A WORLD OF OPPORTUNITY. EXECUTIVE SUM-

MARY (2003).44 DILYS ROE & PENNY URQUHART, PRO-POOR TOURISM: HARNESSING THE WORLD’S LARGEST INDUSTRY FOR THE

WORLD’S POOR (2001).45 WORLD TOURISM ORGANIZATION. COMPENDIUM OF TOURISM STATISTICS (2002).46 ANNE SPENCELEY, TOURISM, LOCAL LIVELIHOODS, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN SOUTH AFRICA: CASE STUDIES

ON THE GROWING ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR IN NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT (Inst. of Dev. Stud.,Sustainable Livelihoods in S. Africa: Research Paper No. 8, 2003).

47 SOUTH AFRICA GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATIONS (GCIS), SOUTH AFRICA YEARBOOK 2003/2004 (2003).48 Lucy Emerton, The Nature of Benefits and the Benefits of Nature: Why Wildlife Conservation Has Not

Economically Benefited Communities in Africa, in AFRICAN WILDLIFE AND LIVELIHOODS: THE PROMISE AND

PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY CONSERVATION, 208 supra note 3.49 The wide range reflects different assumptions about the relative importance of wildlife tourism. Wells,

supra note 42.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 176 TURNER

to find a market niche by highlighting community control or ecotourism,50 it isnot self-evident that CBNRM projects are well placed to compete successfully.

Second, because the sites tourists select are influenced by internationalfashions and events, initial success may prove fleeting. The events ofSeptember 11, 2001, for example, led many travelers to re-evaluate the safetyof South Africa, which benefited because the threat of terrorism there is be-lieved to be low. On the other hand, tourists worry about high crime rates andthat discourages visits.51 In the latter years of apartheid, sanctions and boycottslimited travel to South Africa. Since the transition, international travel has in-creased, and the tourism sector has grown substantially. At present, tourismis the fastest-growing sector of the economy.52 On balance, recent trends havebenefited South Africa. But in Kenya and Zimbabwe tourism has declinedsharply over the same period, as the bombing of the American Embassy inKenya and perceived domestic instability in both countries diminished theirattractiveness. These factors are largely outside the control of tourist sites andhost communities.

Third, profitable tourism requires substantial investment. Althoughtourists often pay access fees, the larger share of revenue comes from housing,transport, and tour management.53 Lodging is the simplest of these compo-nents for communities to provide, and it can range from local homestaysto luxury accommodation. If a community is located near a protected area,lodging within the community may be feasible. But in the case of Ntlhaveni,which is about 200 kilometers from the Makuleke Region, providing lodgingfor visitors has less potential.54 Within a protected area, conservation concernsare likely to limit construction, so low volume, high cost lodging may makesense. One study of the Makuleke Region estimated that five to six lodgescould produce US$360 to US$540 thousand per year.55 But provision of suchaccommodation requires substantial financial investment.56

Communities engaged in CBNRM are unlikely to have the funds toset up high-cost tourism ventures on their own, and existing state and non-governmental partners are often unwilling or unable to provide funds for

50 MARTHA HONEY, ECOTOURISM AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: WHO OWNS PARADISE? (1999).51 Spenceley, supra note 46, World Travel and Tourism Council, South Africa: The Impact of Travel &

Tourism on Jobs and the Economy (2003).52 South Africa, supra note 47.53 Michael Clancy, Commodity Chains, Services and Development: Theory and Preliminary Evidence from

the Tourism Industry, 5 REV. OF INT’L POL. ECON. 122 (1998).54 Ntlhaveni is fairly close to other parts of Kruger National Park and may host visitors to those areas.55 These estimates are based on total lodge capacity of 200 guests, paying high prices, an 8% levy on

turnover, and 50% occupancy. Each lodge would employ 30 full-time workers. Koch & De Beer, supranote 18; compare with George Oldham, Geert Creemers, & Taryn Rebeck, An Economic Evaluationof Tourism: A Case Study of Accommodation Facilities in Southern Maputaland, 17 DEV. S. AFR. 175(2000).

56 Oldham, Creemers, and Rebeck estimate that mid-market nature lodges in KwaZulu/Natal investedR200 thousand per bed. The operating surplus was approximately R9 thousand per year. Id.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 177

profit-oriented investment. The Makuleke CPA has issued calls for privatesector bids to address this problem. In an effort to protect their interests, theMakuleke CPA included several stipulations that may make this area less at-tractive to private investors.57 However, the Makuleke have been able to reachagreements with at least two private sector partners. Matswani Safaris agreedto build one high end lodge, a tent camp, and a museum; the Makuleke CPAwould receive annual lodge rent of about $75,000 at sixty percent occupancy.58

Wilderness Safaris and the Makuleke CPA announced an R45 million con-cessionary agreement to build three luxury tented lodges in July 2003.59 It isnot clear whether other CBNRM sites will be sufficiently attractive to garnerthis sort of investment while protecting their interests.

Third, the structure of the tourism sector makes it difficult for communi-ties to capture substantial benefits. Tourism is a complexly structured globalindustry. The hotel and transport sectors are highly concentrated, and the ma-jority of benefits accrue to the larger players.60 Nature tourism is less likelyto be controlled by the largest transnational firms, but Emerton’s research in-dicates that benefits often flow away from communities.61 The individuals orfirms that manage tours by arranging transportation, accommodation, guides,and schedules often capture a larger share of the revenue than communitymembers. These agents are often situated closer to potential tourists and haveeasier access to them. Evidence also indicates that the most lucrative employ-ment opportunities—for example as safari leaders or lodge managers—areoften captured by outsiders, ostensibly on the basis of skills.62 To counterthese pressures, the Makuleke have developed training programs and incor-porated local employment requirements into their joint venture contracts.63

57 Spenceley, supra note 46. Although partners are expected to have a reasonable rate of return, for example,they have to finance fully any joint projects. They must agree to implement their ventures in a mannerthat “advances the community.” Ventures must also provide for the eventual transfer of lodges built onMakuleke land to the CPA.

58 Spenceley, supra note.59 Press releases and news coverage provide too few details for a thorough assessment of this agree-

ment. However, the Wilderness Safaris managing director stated that the Makuleke would receive apercentage of turnover, rather than a flat rental fee, community members would receive training andemployment (up to 200 jobs), and some scholarships would be provided. 〈http://www.aboutravel.co.za/FRONTEND/A SCRIPTS/article.asp?pklArticleID=2592&pklIssueID=322〉

60 Clancy, supra note 53.61 Emerton, supra note 48.62 James Murombedzi, Committees, Rights, Costs and Benefits: Natural Resource Stewardship and Com-

munity Benefits in Zimbabwe’s Campfire Programme, in AFRICAN WILDLIFE AND LIVELIHOODS: THE PROMISE

AND PERFORMANCE OF COMMUNITY CONSERVATION, 244 supra note; Isaac Sindiga, Tourism Developmentin Kenya, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF TOURISM DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA, 129 (Peter U C Dieke, ed.,2000).

63 Matswani Wilderness Safaris proposed to implement a vocational training program so that Makulekecould serve as tour guides, hospitality staff, and managers. Additionally, several Makuleke youth areparticipating in a training program sponsored by the Endangered Wildlife Foundation. Training hasincluded conservation management, tourism, business, safari guidance, and Geographic Information

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 178 TURNER

There is also reason to believe that tourist expectations limit movementaway from common employment patterns. Although the “nature tourist” ex-perience reflects a very complex interaction between wildlife, say, and humanlabor,64 the experience is frequently marketed and understood as a simplisticjourney into the authentic and pristine.65 Nature tourism in southern Africa hasbeen deeply racialized. Ventures into “wild” nature are typically mediated bynon-local, “skilled,” usually white guides, who are guides assisted by local,“unskilled,” black laborers.66 Disrupting these established expectations canreduce commercial success with white tourists, who appear to constitute themajority, at present.67

For most communities, then, success at nature tourism requires new setsof relationships with extra-local actors, but on uneven terrain.68 Their abilityto negotiate the terms of engagement depends crucially on their status vis-a-vis the protected area and their relationships with other, better situated actors.When communities hold title to land or have secure, state-recognized tenure,69

they possess greater ability to determine how an area will be used. Whenanother party holds formal rights, the community must rely on that actor toaddress its interests. Some of the largest southern African CBNRM initiatives,such as Zimbabwe’s CAMPFIRE program, have involved communal land,where effective control often resides with community actors but formal tenureis held by the state. While these property arrangements are rooted in colonialdisregard for African land tenure, postcolonial governments have not rectifiedthem and the resulting lack of property rights has made it more difficult forcommunity residents to benefit from tourism initiatives on these lands.70 The

Systems (GIS) wildlife monitoring. The program relies heavily on distance learning, with short intensivetraining sessions conducted in Ntlhaveni or Kruger Park. This program has been in progress for severalyears and is intended to lead to formal certification, but advancement has been slow and some studentshave dropped out.

64 Moore, Kosek & Pandian, supra note 5.65 Moore, Kosek & Pandian, supra note 5; E. M. Bruner & B. Kirshenblattgimblett, Maasai on the Lawn—

Tourist Realism in East-Africa, 9 CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 435 (1994); A. Norton. Experiencing Nature:The Reproduction of Environmental Discourse through Safari Tourism in East Africa, 27 GEOFORUM 355(1996).

66 Like “nature,” racial categories also are the product of social and historical processes. The interplaybetween race and nature in tourist sites deserves closer attention. For some points of departure, seeKevin C. Dunn. Fear of a Black Planet: Anarchy Anxieties and Postcolonial Travel to Africa, 25 THIRD

WORLD QUARTERLY 483–499 (2004); Moore, Kosek & Pandian, supra note 5.67 Wells estimates that whites constituted 69 percent of domestic tourists in South Africa in 1992. The

proportion of non-white South African tourists is expected to rise substantially. The majority of extra-regional tourists to Africa are from Europe. Regional tourism comprises a plurality of non-domestictourists, but there are few good statistics on the characteristics of those tourists. Wells, supra note 42.

68 While most CBNRM communities are deeply embedded in extra-local relationships, CBNRM initiativeshave been heavily shaped by states and nongovernmental organizations. Institutional ties with the private-sector actors that dominate tourism are likely to be weak.

69 In South Africa, the relationship to the land over which animals travel is crucial as the law does notpermit ownership of wildlife.

70 Murombedzi, supra note 62.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 179

ability to make credible threats to comply with or sabotage arrangementsalso affects negotiating power. Regardless of land tenure, close ties betweenmembers of the community and well-positioned actors may help to lessen theimbalance between the community and prospective private sector partners.

The Makuleke community is better situated than most. They have astrong relationship to the Makuleke Region, a place recognized to have eco-logical value and commercial potential. Their CPA also has title to the regionand court-recognized exclusive rights to commercial development, there. Any-one trying to use the land must engage with them. Additionally, the formalco-management agreement between the Makuleke CPA and SANParks estab-lishes clear expectations and constraints for each partner.71 Many CBNRMinitiatives would benefit from such clarity. And, finally, the Makuleke have astrong network of supporters with media ties, technical expertise, and financialresources.

5. CBNRM IN THE CONTEXT OF TRANSFORMATION

The shift towards CBNRM cannot be understood in isolation from themost recent wave of democratization and adoption of neoliberal economicpolicies worldwide. Democratization has produced substantial but uneven po-litical transformations in many sub-Saharan African countries.72 Forty-one offorty-eight African states held competitive multiparty elections between 1989and 2000.73 In South Africa specifically there has been a formal deracializa-tion of the polity and the establishment, accordingly, of substantial constraintson government action, reflected in the Bill of Rights. But while democratiza-tion has strengthened the participation-based arguments for CBNRM it hasalso and simultaneously undermined the rationale for directing resources to-wards conservation, which is perceived to benefit only a small minority. InSouth Africa, democratization has also fueled efforts to transform SANParks’internal management and its relationship with communities. These effortshave met with mixed success.74 Post-apartheid legislation has also enabled

71 Hannah Reid, Contractual National Parks and the Makuleke Community, 29 HUMAN ECOLOGY 135 (2001).72 MICHAEL BRATTON & NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, DEMOCRATIC EXPERIMENTS IN AFRICA: REGIME TRANSITIONS

IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1997); Michael Bratton, Second Elections in Africa, 9 J. OF DEMOCRACY

51 (1998); Christopher Fomunyoh, Democratization in Fits and Starts, 12 J. OF DEMOCRACY 37 (2001);Nicolas Van De Walle, Elections without Democracy: Africa’s Range of Regimes, 13 J. OF DEMOCRACY 66(2002). Countries with large nature tourism sectors—such as South Africa, Kenya, Namibia, Tanzania,and Zimbabwe—have a mixed record on democratization.

73 Nicolas Van De Walle, Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa’s Emerging Party Systems, 41 J. MOD.AFR. STUD. 297 (2003).

74 Jacklyn Cock & David Fig, From Colonial to Community-Based Conservation: Environmental Justiceand the Transformation of National Parks (1994–1998), in ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN SOUTH AFRICA 131(David A. Mcdonald, ed., 2002); STEPHEN TURNER & SHAMIM MEER, CONSERVATION BY THE PEOPLE IN SOUTH

AFRICA: FINDINGS FROM TRANSFORM MONITORING AND EVALUATION, 1999 (Programme for Land & AgrarianStudies, U. of the W. Cape, Research Report No. 7, 2001).

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 180 TURNER

some of the individuals and communities displaced by conservation to seekredress.

Most African governments have adopted and partially implemented poli-cies to stabilize and liberalize the economy.75 These policies, promoted byinternational financial institutions and largely adopted in the context of eco-nomic crisis, have included measures to cut government spending, privatizeparastatal organizations, and reduce state intervention in markets.76 But thisliberalization also has implications for CBNRM.

Firstly, African governments are now less willing to fund conserva-tion efforts of any sort. Revenue constraints argue against devoting substan-tial resources to CBNRM, or to other community engagement efforts, whichcan be seen as a distraction from conservation. Secondly, governments havestarted formally to introduce market incentives for the management of stateprotected areas. This includes privatization of some operations, such as foodconcessions and lodge management, as well as increased efforts to make theseself-financing. But while tourism generates substantial revenue and foreignexchange much of the wealth has gone into private hands, benefiting the stateonly indirectly.

The coincidence of liberalization and CBNRM, therefore, is not withoutconflict. As each nature tourism area competes for a share of the growing butstill limited nature tourism market, it may be difficult for CBNRM projectsto win the competition for tourists and investors. When given the option ofinvesting in a state protected area or in a CBNRM project, many investorsare likely to choose the state area. The Makuleke experience demonstratesthat there is reason for concern, here. Shortly after the Makuleke CPA issuedits call for private sector development proposals, SANParks announced thatseveral other sites in Kruger National Park were available to commercialtender.77 Some of the parties that had expressed interest in the MakulekeRegion subsequently withdrew their bids. Although the Makuleke CPA stillreceived some proposals and eventually was able to reach agreement with twoprivate partners, the competition with SANParks clearly reduced their choiceof partners and their negotiating leverage. It is unclear whether the timing ofthe competitive SANParks announcement was deliberate or inadvertent. Butsimilar situations are likely to arise in other CBNRM tourism initiatives.

75 NICOLAS VAN DE WALLE, AFRICAN ECONOMIES AND THE POLITICS OF PERMANENT CRISIS, 1979–1999 (2001).76 South Africa adopted neoliberal economic policies in 1996 with the adoption of the Growth, Employ-

ment, and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy. Some scholars see South Africa’s path as somewhat divergentbecause state leaders arguably had greater choice about whether to adopt adjustment and liberalizationpolicies. Adam Habib & Vishnu Padayachee, Economic Policy and Power Relations in South Africa’sTransition to Democracy, 28 WORLD DEVT. 245 (2000); Tasha Fairfield, The Emergence of Neoliber-alism in South Africa: Learning from a “Least Likely” Case (Unpublished M.A. thesis, University ofCalifornia-Berkeley, 2002) (On file with author).

77 Mahoney & Van Zyl, supra note 41, Spenceley, supra note 46.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 COMMUNITIES, WILDLIFE CONSERVATION, AND TOURISM-BASED DEVELOPMENT 181

6. CONCLUSION

This analysis historicizes community-based natural resource manage-ment and puts its tourism-based development promises in a broader po-litical and economic context. The Makuleke case suggests that relying onconservation-based tourism for development is a risky business. While tourismhas substantial promise, many community-based initiatives are not well-positioned to compete against state-supported protected areas or privateventures.

Two considerations are important, going forward. First, the communi-ties participating in CBNRM face a much more restricted set of options thanis commonly realized. Nature tourism, while it has limitations, may be oneof the better options for development in communities that cannot remove userestrictions on protected areas. The effects of economic liberalization reachfar beyond protected areas, as governments seek to reduce their payrolls andrestrict spending on social programs and development. In many countries, in-cluding South Africa, unemployment has risen and the formal labor market hasshrunk in recent years. These effects are most concentrated among unskilledor low skilled workers, who comprise the majority of the Makuleke.78 In thiscontext, in which labor migration is unlikely to prove sufficient to maintainor improve conditions in Ntlhaveni, securing guaranteed employment fromtourism venture partners may provide substantial benefits. For those com-munities that can alter land status, careful consideration of the opportunitycosts imposed by conservation and the prospects for beneficial partnerships innature-based tourism is warranted.79 But, in all cases, actors should carefullyand explicitly consider the challenges and opportunities of nature tourism.

Second, the rationale for CBNRM needs reconsideration. Proponentshave argued that it can provide both democracy and material benefit. But,clearly, in many cases attention to material development has outweighed thefocus on democracy. CBNRM emerged from a conservation history deeplyintertwined with injustice, exclusion, and dislocation, and it is far from clearthat a largely materialist strategy can respond adequately to this legacy. Al-though the Makuleke people hope that the conservation future of the MakulekeRegion will improve their economic condition, for example, it is not the onlybasis on which they judge success. They see regaining title to their ancestralhome as an immense symbolic achievement, the value of which is largely inde-pendent of subsequent commercial success or failure. It is equally evident thatthe conditions of their engagement with SANParks matters immensely. TheMakuleke CPA was explicitly empowered to make commercial decisions in

78 Tapela & Omara-Ojungu, supra note 28.79 Emerton, supra note 48.

Dow

nloa

ded

By:

[Uni

vers

ity o

f Cal

iforn

ia B

erke

ley]

At:

01:1

2 4

Oct

ober

200

7 182 TURNER

relation to which the authority of SANParks was clearly limited. This particu-lar CBNRM initiative is, thus, based on explicit recognition of past injusticesand the partners are now able to meet on more equal ground. Ultimately, thesefactors, rather than the material benefits flowing from economic development,may prove to be the determinants of CBNRM “success.”