Consequences of Thought Speed - Princeton University

CHAPTER FOUR

Consequences of Thought SpeedKaite Yang*, Emily Pronin†,1*School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Stockton University, Galloway, NJ, United States†Department of Psychology, and Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, PrincetonUniversity, Princeton, NJ, United States1Corresponding author: e-mail address: [email protected]

Contents

1. Introduction 1681.1 The Idea of Thought Speed 1691.2 Outline for Chapter 170

2. Thought Speed Affects Mood and Emotion 1712.1 Manic Thinking: An Initial Demonstration 1712.2 The Speed–Mood Link 174

3. More Consequences of Thought Speed 1783.1 Fast Thinking Increases Risk-Taking 1783.2 Fast Thinking Increases Purchasing Interest 1813.3 Fast Thinking Enhances Creative Insight 1853.4 Fast Thinking Elevates Self-esteem 1893.5 Fast Thinking Is Arousing 191

4. Thought Speed and Related Constructs 1924.1 Speed and Fluency 1924.2 Speed and Dual Process Theories of Thinking 1954.3 Speed and Mental Progression 196

5. How Thought Speed Works 1975.1 The Basic Idea 1975.2 Dopamine 1995.3 Embodiment and Entrainment 201

6. Thought Speed and Treatment for Depression 2026.1 Direct Experimental Tests 2036.2 Bipolar Disorder 206

7. Methods of Manipulating Thought Speed 2077.1 Rapidly Presented Stimuli 2077.2 Speed-Inducing Cognitive Activities 2097.3 Musical Tempo 2097.4 Pharmacological and Physiological Alterations 2107.5 Time Perception 210

Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, Volume 57 # 2018 Elsevier Inc.ISSN 0065-2601 All rights reserved.https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.10.003

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https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.aesp.2017.10.003

8. Some Future Directions for Thought-Speed Research 2118.1 Thought Speed and Psychophysiology 2118.2 Thought Speed and Cognition 2128.3 Thought Speed and Communication 212

9. Conclusion: Thought Speed in the Modern World 213References 214

Abstract

The speed of thinking is a frequently overlooked aspect of mental life. However, thepace of thought is an essential property of thinking, and its consequences have recentlybegun to be discovered. In this chapter, we review the psychological consequences ofaccelerated and decelerated thought pace. We begin by examining how the manipu-lation of thought speed alters mood, self-perception, risk-taking, creativity, and arousal.We highlight the energizing, activating, and hedonic effects of fast thinking, and weshow how thought-speed effects are independent of thought content, fluency, andgoal progress. We describe an adaptive theory of thought speed wherein psychologicalresponses to the acceleration of thinking confer adaptive advantages for confrontingnovel, urgent, and rapidly changing situations, and engaging in behaviors driven byappetitive motivation. Lastly, we discuss implications of thought speed and its manip-ulation for treatment of mental illness, for design and delivery of communications andmessages, and for life in the age of rapid access and exposure to information.

1. INTRODUCTION

We may never have met, but there is something I can say about you

with complete certainty: Right now, at this very moment, you are thinking.

There is no way that you could be reading this without doing it. You prob-

ably could go hours or even days without eating, drinking, speaking, or even

checking e-mail, but you could not go that long without thinking. Even

when your mind wanders to no place special, you are thinking. Even when

you try not to think about anything, you are thinking (perhaps about trying

not to think). Nothing may be more fundamental to human existence than

the ongoing action of the mind. So thought Descartes who, in what is likely

the most famous line in the history of philosophy, claimed: “I think, there-

fore I am.”

Not surprisingly, then, people devote a good deal of attention to the con-

tent of their thoughts. They tell others what they think about topics ranging

from politics, to reality TV, to where to get a good meatball sandwich. They

choose friendships, careers, and vacation destinations after first consulting

their thoughts on which choice to make. People even analyze their dreams,

168 Kaite Yang and Emily Pronin

looking for meaning in thoughts that emerge when they are not controlling

them. The research that we review herein, though, speaks to another aspect

of thinking—one that has more recently become an avenue for examining

the nature of thought. That aspect involves not WHAT we think about, but

rather HOWwe think about it. In particular, the specific case of our work, and

other work related to it, investigates the consequences of not the content of

our thoughts but rather the SPEED, or the pace, with which we have those

thoughts.

It has long been known that thoughts with positive content make people

happy compared to thoughts with negative content (e.g., Velten, 1968).

Children are taught the old trick, memorialized in the musical The Sound

of Music, of trying to alleviate a sad mood by thinking of their “favorite

things” (Wise et al., 1965). The past decade of research on thought speed

suggests a new trick for alleviating a sad mood: thinking about things really

fast. Although Rodgers and Hammerstein did not write about it, thinking

fast about favorite things like “raindrops on roses” and “whiskers on kittens”

alleviates sadness far better than thinking slowly about those very same

things. It is this pair of simple insights, that the pace of thought can be accel-

erated and that such accelerations impact mood, that provides the starting

point for our investigations of the consequences of thought speed. But

before describing this fundamental speed–mood connection, we turn to a

brief discussion of the thought-speed concept.

1.1 The Idea of Thought SpeedThought speed in its essence involves the number of thoughts that one is

having per unit of time. Until recently, the idea of thought speed came

up only rarely in scientific discussions—and was not a variable that was

manipulated; consequently, its effects were not measured or known. The

idea of thought speed as an important variable is not entirely new, though.

In the psychiatric literature, associations between various mental disorders

and the speed of thought have long been noted. Individuals experiencing

mania, for example, typically exhibit the hallmark symptoms of “racing

thoughts” and “flight of ideas” (Hanwella & de Silva, 2011; Mansell &

Pedley, 2008). Indeed, this symptom may be even more common than

the stereotypic manic symptom of euphoric affect in predicting the onset

of a manic episode (Keitner et al., 1996; Mansell & Pedley, 2008;

Molnar, Feeney, & Fava, 1988). Individuals suffering from depressive epi-

sodes experience the opposite end of the thought-speed spectrum, with their

169Consequences of Thought Speed

thoughts sometimes slowed to the point of feeling immobilized (Caligiuri &

Ellwanger, 2000). Another psychiatric disorder, ADHD or attention-deficit/

hyperactivity disorder, also has been associated with abnormal thought speed,

with at least some of those experiencing it having “sluggish cognitive tempo”

(Becker, 2013).

Thought speed has also sometimes been recognized as a feature or symp-

tom of experiences not involving psychiatric disorder. Certain mind-altering

drugs, for example, are known to make thoughts race, including stimulant

drugs such as cocaine and amphetamines (Asghar, Tanay, Baker,

Greenshaw, & Silverstone, 2003; Heilbronner & Meck, 2014; Kirkpatrick

et al., 2016; Vollm et al., 2004), as well as more pedestrian drugs such as caf-

feine and nicotine (Childs & de Wit, 2006; Durlach, Edmunds, Howard, &

Tipper, 2002; Edwards, Wesnes, Warburton, & Gale, 1985; Hinton &

Meck, 1996; Smith, 2002; Smit & Rogers, 2000; Warburton & Mancuso,

1998). Also, in everyday life, people experience fluctuations in their thought

speed even when mental disorder and drugs are not part of the picture. For

example, drinking the first cup of coffee in the morning may be a reaction to

the unpleasant feeling that one’s thoughts are too slow. Lying awake at night

with a bout of insomnia, one may lament that one’s thoughts will not slow

down. On the other hand, when participating in a productive brainstorming

session, one may instead delight in the feeling of one’s thoughts racing along.

In each of the above examples of fast and slow thought speed, the pace of

thought seems to be a symptom of some other condition—whether it be

mental illness, drug intake, tiredness, insomnia, or creative excitement.

However, we would argue—and have begun to show in our experimental

work—that thought speed is important not only as a symptom in psycholog-

ical life but also a cause of various aspects of psychological life. By manipu-

lating thought speed through controlled experimentation, we demonstrate

that the pace of thought has wide-ranging consequences. This research

development is particularly important because thought speed is quite ame-

nable to alteration—and fluctuates and varies during the course of everyday

human experience.

1.2 Outline for ChapterIn this chapter, we begin by reviewing basic evidence for a causal link

between positive mood and the speed of thinking. From there, we discuss

other consequences of thought speed, most notably consequences for self-

perception, risk-taking, creativity, andmental health. Following this review,


we offer a theoretical account to explain why thought speed impacts these

various important aspects of psychological life. Finally, we discuss the impor-

tance of thought speed in the context of modern life, where the speed of

exposure to stimuli—especially digital information and communications—

seems to be accelerating more every day.

In reviewing this material, we present an inclusive review of conse-

quences of thought speed as well as a theoretical framework for those effects.

We describe how thought speed, thought content, and behavior covary in

predictable patterns. Fast thinking is associated with what might be called an

activated state: positive mood, energy, arousal, confidence, risk-taking,

approach behaviors, and problem-solving. We describe a variety of ways

in which thought speed can be experimentally manipulated to produce

changes in affect, perception, and behavior. We also describe psychophys-

iological mechanisms that may facilitate the connections between speed,

thinking, and behavior, including activation of the dopaminergic system

and the phenomena of embodiment and entrainment. In this review, we dis-

cuss the evidence for these findings, as well as our ongoing experimental

research program on thought speed. We also discuss implications of this

work for treatment of mental illness (an area where experiments from our

laboratory have begun to offer some promise) and for modern social life.

2. THOUGHT SPEED AFFECTS MOOD AND EMOTION

Most of us will never know firsthand what it feels like to be climbing

an icy mountain, lose our footing, start falling hundreds of feet, and think we

are about to die. Researchers Noyes and Kletti (1972) found something sur-

prising in the accounts of hundreds of mountain climbers (and others) who

have had near-death experiences: Rather than feeling despair, they often

reported feeling oddly joyful and euphoric. Almost all of them reported that

they experienced an acceleration of thinking when they believed that they

were about to die. They expressed amazement at the rapid stream of mental

images and thoughts passing through their minds in what amounted to a

fraction of a minute. We now review our initial experiment showing that

this experience of mental speed may not have been a side effect of their

joy or euphoria but rather a cause.

2.1 Manic Thinking: An Initial DemonstrationPronin and Wegner (2006) provided the first direct test of the causal impact

of thought speed on mood. In that study, we described the inspiration for


our hypothesis in episodes of clinical mania, in which individuals almost

always report both racing thoughts and elated mood. The experiment aimed

to test whether people’s positive mood would be elevated in response to an

experimental manipulation of thought pace. No predictions about negative

mood were made, as mania does not have a stable profile in terms of negative

affect (i.e., irritability is not uncommon, but also not a hallmark symptom

like euphoria).

In the experiment, participants were induced to think at either a fast or a

slow rate by being induced to read text that was presented to them on a com-

puter screen at either a fast or a slow rate. In order to investigate whether

effects of thought speed would operate independently of thought content,

participants were induced to read one of two sets of content: either the pos-

itive mood version of the Velten (1968) mood induction stimuli or the neg-

ative mood version of those stimuli. In the positive mood version of the

Velten, participants read a series of statements that progressed from emotion-

ally neutral (“Today is no better or worse than any other day”) to extremely

excited and happy (e.g., “I’m going to have it all!”; “Wow! I feel great”). In

the negative mood version of the Velten, the statements progressed from the

same neutral starting point (“Today is no better or worse than any other

day”) to very depressed in tone (e.g., “I feel worthless”; “I want to go to

sleep and never wake up”). In order to manipulate thought pace, participants

were induced to read the Velten statements at a pace that was controlled by

computer presentation of streaming text. The statements streamed across

participants’ computer screen at either a fast pace (40 ms per letter) or a slow

pace (170 ms per letter). These precise speeds were selected based on

pretesting to find the average reading speed for our participant population

(of college undergraduates). The fast-speed condition was designed to be

roughly twice as fast as that reading speed, and the slow-speed condition

was designed to be roughly half that speed.

The Pronin and Wegner experiment employed a 2�2 between-

participants design, in which 144 participants were exposed to either fast

or slow streaming text involving either elating or depressing content. Prior

to the reading manipulation, participants indicated pretest positive and neg-

ative mood using a subset of the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule

(PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). Following this assessment

of baseline mood, participants completed the reading manipulation. An

experimenter instructed participants to read aloud the statements on a com-

puter screen, keeping pace with the timed presentation of the statements.

Following the speed manipulation, participants reported their subjective


thought speed and their current mood. They also completed a number of

other measures probing for additional reactions that might be induced by fast

thinking. These were: feelings of energy, power, creativity, and self-esteem.

The results revealed the predicted effect of thought speed on the measure

of positive mood. Participants reported more positive affect after being

induced to read quickly than after being induced to read slowly (see

Fig. 1). Moreover, this effect was mediated by differences across the speed

conditions in participants’ reported thought speed. That is, the reading-

speed manipulation altered participants’ reported thought speed, and differ-

ences in reported thought speed mediated the effect of reading speed on

positive mood. But, was this result due to the mood-enhancing effect of fast

thinking, or was it due to the mood-depleting effect of slow thinking?

Follow-up analyses (reported in Pronin & Jacobs, 2008) revealed that both

of these effects were present. Participants whowere induced to think quickly

reported more positive affect after the fast-speed induction than before it,

whereas participants whowere induced to think slowly reported less positive

affect after the slow-speed induction than before it (and both effects were

statistically significant).

Because the experiment manipulated both thought pace and thought

content, we were able to examine whether thought pace induced its effects

independently of thought content—and also how the size of the two effects

compared with each other. Notably, thought pace operated independently

of thought content (see Fig. 1). Both pace and content exerted significant

effects, and there was no interaction between the two factors. Also notably,

the effect of thought pace was at least as strong (if not stronger) than the

effect of thought content. This is especially noteworthy given that the

thought-content manipulation was not one that the experimenters devised

but rather is a widely studied and replicated manipulation designed for the

sole purpose of manipulating mood.

Depression

3

4

5

6

7

Elation

Pos

itive

moo

d

SlowFast

Fig. 1 The effect of thought speed on positive mood, independent of depressed vselated thought content (based on experiment by Pronin & Wegner, 2006).


Apart from positive mood, a number of other psychological responses

found in episodes of clinical mania were examined. These were: feelings

of increased energy, power, and creativity, as well as grandiosity/inflated

self-esteem. Compared to participants in the slow thought-speed condition,

those in the fast thought-speed condition reported greater feelings of energy,

power, and creativity; however, the thought-acceleration manipulation

only marginally increased grandiosity and did not inflate self-esteem. We

did not have specific predictions concerning negative mood, as both mania

(a disorder characterized by accelerated thinking) and depression (a disorder

characterized by slowed thinking) can involve negative affect—with manic

episodes sometimes involving irritability, for example (e.g., Mansell &

Pedley, 2008). The thought-speed manipulation did not impact negative

mood (though the thought-content manipulation did impact it, consis-

tent with previous research on the Velten mood induction as a mood

manipulation).

This experiment constitutes the first demonstration of the mood-

uplifting effects of fast thinking. Importantly, it showed that the effect of

speed is independent of thought content. In the case of this experiment,

the effect of speed was also at least as strong as that of thought content—even

with a well-established manipulation of thought content. Indeed, as can be

seen in Fig. 1, reading depressive content fast induced participants to feel at least

as happy (if not happier) than reading elating content slowly.

2.2 The Speed–Mood LinkOne of the more robust findings in research on thought speed is the positive

mood-enhancing effect of fast thinking. We now review additional findings

demonstrating the impact of thought speed on mood.

Prior to recent experiments, the relation between thought speed and

mood was suggested to us by scattered findings across varied disciplines.

For example, studies have found that differences in the tempo of music

are associated with inducing different mood states—for example, with faster

tempo music more likely to be appraised as either happy or angry, and

music with slow tempo more likely to be appraised as sad (Gagnon &

Peretz, 2003; Webster & Weir, 2005; also, more recently, Khalfa,

Roy, Rainville, Dalla Bella, & Peretz, 2008; Morton & Trehub, 2007;

Schafer, Huron, Shanahan, & Sedlmeier, 2015). Studies of drug intake

have found that drugs that induce a faster pace (“stimulant drugs”), ranging

from amphetamines to caffeine, induce not only fast thinking but also


elated mood (Asghar et al., 2003; Sax & Strakowski, 1998; Smit & Rogers,

2000; more recently, White, Lott, & de Wit, 2006). And it has long been

known that racing thoughts are a common prodrome to the elation and

euphoria of a manic episode (e.g., Goodwin & Jamison, 1990; Sims,

2002; more recently, Homish, Marshall, Dubovsky, & Leonard, 2013),

whereas depressive episodes are associated not only with reduced positive

affect but also with the slowing down of thought (American Psychiatric

Association, 2013; Hickie et al., 1999; Kraepelin, 1921; Schwartz,

Friedman, Lindsay, & Narrol, 1982; Teasdale, Fogarty, &Williams, 1980).

More recently, experimental work, primarily from our lab, has intro-

duced a number of methods for successfully inducing faster and slower

thinking—and demonstrated subsequent changes in mood. The methods

of thought-speed induction that have been used to alter mood can be

approximately divided into two categories: methods that entrain partic-

ipants’ speed of thinking to predetermined fast or slow situations and

methods that require participants to generate thoughts at different rates.

2.2.1 Induction of Thought Speed Through Paced External StimuliThe rate at which external stimuli are processed can be altered to induce

faster or slower thinking. Auditory and visual stimuli such as sounds, images,

videos, and text can be streamed at different rates. Timed readings are fre-

quently used in thought-speed research. The speed at which people read can

be altered in these manipulations by programming the presentation of words

on a computer screen. At the beginning of the manipulation, participants are

instructed to read sentences aloud as they stream across the screen, for

example,

Thank you for your participation. For the next part of this study, you will be readingsentences on your computer screen. You will be reading aloud and you will berecorded over the internet…

From Yang, Friedman-Wheeler, and Pronin (2014)

By reading aloud while keeping pace with stimuli, participants must process

stimuli at a preset rate. Faster processing can be achieved by shortening the

gap between the presentation of each letter and the following sentence, for

example, 40 ms per letter, 320 ms between sentences (in Pronin &Wegner,

2006). The induction of fast thinking through timed reading methods

increases postmanipulation positive mood (Chandler & Pronin, 2012;

Rosser & Wright, 2016; Yang et al., 2014). The positive mood-boosting

effect of fast thinking occurs independently of the content of what is read


(Pronin &Wegner, 2006), and effects of thought speed on mood can occur

both when the thought content is more limited (repetitive) and when it is

more expansive (variable) in scope (Rosser & Wright, 2016).

Similar to timed reading manipulations, timed video manipulations

effectively alter mood by changing subjective speed of thinking. Pronin

et al. (2008, Experiment 5) constructed a thought-speed manipulation

wherein participants narrated a video segment (played on mute) from

I Love Lucy. Participants who were randomly assigned to the fast-speed con-

dition narrated the episode as it streamed at eight times its normal rate (i.e., in

3 min). In the normal-speed condition, participants narrated a 3-min clip

from the same episode, played at the original speed that it was broadcasted.

In the slow condition, participants narrated a clip played at 70% of its original

speed. Following the speed manipulation, participants indicated their sub-

jective thought speed and reported positive and negative mood using the

PANAS. Participants in the fast condition reported significantly higher per-

ceived thought speed compared to those in the normal and slow conditions

(who did not differ from each other). More importantly, participants in the

fast condition reported significantly higher positive mood compared to par-

ticipants in the normal condition (the difference between the fast and slow

conditions did not reach significance).

2.2.2 Instructional and Self-generated Speed InductionsThought-speed inductions can also alter mood states through properties of

tasks and instructions. For example, brainstorming involves the generation

of ideas by participants and can be used as a speed manipulation. In one

experiment, participants were instructed to brainstorm possible “ways to

make 1-year’s college tuition in a summer” in 10 min (Pronin et al.,

2008, Experiment 1). In the fast condition, participants were instructed

to think of as many ideas as possible. In the slow condition, participants were

instructed to generate only what they considered to be good ideas. This

meant that participants experienced themselves generating more ideas

(regardless of quality) per unit of time in the fast condition, compared to

the slow condition. The manipulation achieved the intended effects as a

speed induction, with participants rating their perceived speed of thinking

as faster in the fast brainstorming condition compared to the slow brain-

storming condition. Moreover, participants in the fast condition indicated

more positive mood following the speed manipulation, compared to partic-

ipants in the slow condition.


Similarly, making a series of decisions in a shorter amount of time creates

a feeling of thinking at a faster rate, compared to making decisions in a longer

time frame. Pronin and Ricci (2007) assigned participants to make a series of

hypothetical investment decisions. In the rapid decision condition, partici-

pants were allowed 4 s to make an investment allocation decision between

one of two companies (e.g., FedEx vs Jet-Blue; Google vs Exxon). In the

slow decision condition, participants were allowed 35 s to make each deci-

sion. In the rapid decision condition, participants reported thinking faster

and feeling more positive mood on the PANAS compared to participants

in the slow decision condition. This speed-manipulation method can also

be used in a listing task that does not require the evaluation of two choices.

Pronin and Jacobs (2008) instructed participants to count integers to 100.

In the fast condition, participants counted without a pause between num-

bers. In the slow condition, participants were instructed to count to 100,

but to leave a pause of 10 s between each integer. Following the manipula-

tion, participants completed the PANAS scale. Participants in the fast con-

dition reported more positive mood compared to participants in the slow

condition.

Changing task features can also alter the speed of thought. In one exper-

iment (Pronin et al., 2008, Experiment 3), allowing participants to plagiarize

ideas that they had heard from others gave participants the feeling of racing

thoughts about that problem—when compared to the feeling of participants

who were not allowed to list any ideas that they had heard from others. Par-

ticipants in the former group not only listed more ideas per unit of time

compared to participants who were instructed to generate only ideas that

they had not heard previously, but participants in the fast-thinking condition

(those with freedom to plagiarize) reported greater positive affect compared

to participants in the slow-thinking condition (those without freedom to

plagiarize).

In another experiment by Pronin et al. (2008, Experiment 4), partici-

pants were led to complete either easy word problems or harder word prob-

lems (e.g., generating words that rhyme with “mite” vs “speck”; words with

two syllables vs four syllables). Participants in the easy (fast) condition expe-

rienced a quicker thought pace, and they reported more positive mood,

compared to participants in the difficult (slow) condition. Similar effects

were observed in a senior thesis experiment from 2006 by Shingleton

(advised by Pronin), in which participants were asked to list items in a broad

category (fast-thinking condition) vs a narrower subset of that category

(slow-thinking condition).


3. MORE CONSEQUENCES OF THOUGHT SPEED

Initial experiments investigating the effects of thought speed were pri-

marily focused on emotion, but continued research on thought speed has

revealed a host of other consequences of manipulating the pace of human

thought. We now review a number of these other consequences. These

include effects of experimentally manipulated thought pace on behavior

(e.g., risk-taking), self-perception (e.g., self-esteem), and creativity (e.g.,

problem-solving). After reviewing these wide-ranging effects, we will turn

to a theoretical discussion of the nature of thought-speed effects. That two-

part discussion will begin by differentiating thought speed from related con-

structs (Section 4), and then offer a theoretical account for the causal effects

of changes in thought speed (Section 5).

3.1 Fast Thinking Increases Risk-TakingRisk-taking refers to engaging in behaviors that are potentially rewarding,

but have a higher likelihood of causing harm, injury, or illness to oneself

or others, relative to other behaviors of everyday life (Byrnes, Miller, &

Schafer, 1999; Steinberg, 2007). For example, using drugs, engaging in

unprotected sex, bungee-jumping, and driving over the speed limit are some

instances of risky behaviors. The ability to take risks is not altogether detri-

mental. In fact, the ability to take some risks may be evolutionarily advan-

tageous (Wang, Zheng, Xuan, Chen, & Li, 2016). Imagine, for example, the

inherent risks (and the potential rewards) of investing in the stock market,

taking on a large student loan for medical school, or venturing outside

of familiar territory to hunt for food. Because the consequences of risk-

taking can be substantial—whether for good or ill—understanding the

factors that impact risk-taking is of significance. From previous research,

we know that individuals’ inclination to risk-taking is influenced by a

host of factors, and interactions among them, including personality (e.g.,

Nicholson, Soane, Fenton-O’Creevy, & Willman, 2006; Zuckerman &

Kuhlman, 2000), development of the frontal lobe and dopamine system dur-

ing adolescence (e.g., Steinberg, 2007, 2008), brain structures (e.g., Ernst

et al., 2002; Galvan, Hare, Voss, Glover, & Casey, 2006), and context

(e.g., Gardner & Steinberg, 2005; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982).

We now review experiments from our laboratory revealing that a feature

of human thought—i.e., thought pace—also impacts the human tendency

to take risks.


In a series of experiments, Chandler and Pronin (2012) manipulated par-

ticipants’ thought speed and examined effects on risk-taking. Experiment 1

involved a thought-speed induction manipulation that was similar to that of

Pronin and Wegner (2006), except that the streaming text in Chandler and

Pronin’s experiment involved neutral-content trivia rather than emotionally

valenced content. For example, trivia statements included: “Oranges con-

tain vitamin C”; “Europe is the only continent without deserts”; “A pilot

light continually remains lit in a gas stove”; and “There is no twelve of dia-

monds in a deck of cards.” Participants were instructed to read the state-

ments aloud, keeping pace with the timed presentation of the text.

Following the thought-speed induction, participants reported their thought

speed, completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS;

Watson et al., 1988), and—most importantly—completed the Balloon Ana-

logue Risk Task (“BART”; Lejuez et al., 2002). The BART is a behavioral

measure of risk-taking wherein participants play a game in which they can

earn small amounts of money by pumping air into a computer-animated bal-

loon. Each pump of the balloon results in a small monetary reward for the

participant. However, the balloon bursts after a random number of pumps.

When the balloon bursts, the participant loses the money that was originally

gained from the air pumps inflating the balloon and must begin the process

anew. Thus, with each pump there is the chance to makemore money—but

also the risk of losing everything.

The results of this balloon-pumping experiment demonstrated that ele-

vated thought speed produced increased risk-taking. In the fast-thinking

condition, participants reported not only more positive mood and faster

thought speed compared to participants in the slow condition, but also dis-

played greater risk-taking behavior on the balloon-pumping task. In the fast-

thinking condition, participants pumped the balloon significantly more

times on each trial than did their counterparts in the slow-thinking condi-

tion (see Fig. 2A). Additionally, in the fast-thinking condition, participants

experienced a greater number of popped balloons as a result of their

increased risk-taking. In this particular experiment, the increased risk-taking

induced by fast thinking was neither beneficial nor costly. Interestingly, par-

ticipants in the two conditions did not differ significantly in how much

money they earned on the BART, because the earnings lost by bursting bal-

loons were offset by the earnings gained by pumping the unbursted balloons

more times. Thus, participants in the fast condition made, on average,

$11.98, whereas participants in the slow condition made, on average,

$11.40, F<1.


In a second experiment, Chandler and Pronin (2012) demonstrated the

impact of thought speed on intentions to engage in consequential, real-

world, risk-taking behaviors. In this experiment, the researchers manipu-

lated thought speed using a novel manipulation. That manipulation involved

watching scenes from one of three versions of the motion picture Baraka

(Magidson & Fricke, 1992). The scenes in the videos were of live images

from nature (e.g., snow-capped mountains, waterfalls, animals) and city-

scapes (e.g., urban structures). The three versions differed based on the aver-

age shot length presented in each scene, such that participants in the

condition designed to induce fast thinking would see a series of quick shots

(or “takes”) of a scene, while those in the condition designed to induce slow

thinking would see fewer shots—each of longer length—of that same scene

(and those in the middle-speed condition were in between). The average

shot length of each scene was 0.75 s in the fast condition, 1.5 s in the

medium condition, and 3 s in the slow condition. Each speed condition

was matched on content. Thus, for example, participants in the fast condi-

tion might see a waterfall scene in four different takes of 0.75 s each, whereas

those in the slow condition would see the waterfall scene via a single 3 s take

(and those in the medium condition would see two takes of 1.5 s each). Par-

ticipants watched the version of the video to which they were assigned, and

then completed measures of thought speed, mood, and risk-taking. The

risk-taking measure was the Cognitive Appraisal of Risky Events inventory

(CARE; Fromme, Katz, & Rivet, 1997). The CARE assesses participants’

intentions to act on risky behaviors, as well as their expectations about the

15

20

25

30

Fast Slow

Mea

n nu

mbe

r of

bal

loon

pum

pspe

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Thought-speed condition

A

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2

3

4

Fast Medium Slow

Inte

ntio

ns to

eng

age

in r

isky

beha

vior

s

Thought-speed condition

B

Fig. 2 (A) Risk-taking on the Balloon Analogue Risk Task and (B) intention to engage inrisk-taking (via CARE Inventory) both as a function of thought-speed condition (basedon Chandler & Pronin, 2012).


consequences of engaging in those risky behaviors. Behaviors include activ-

ities such as having unprotected sex, heavy drinking, illicit drug use, down-

hill skiing, and procrastination. Intentions to take risks on the CARE, and

expectancies about taking those risks, are strongly predictive of engaging in

future risk-taking behaviors (e.g., Fairlie et al., 2010; Katz, Fromme, &

D’Amico, 2000; Nickoletti & Taussig, 2006; Telzer, Fuligni, Lieberman,

& Galvan, 2013).

Results demonstrated that fast thinking induced greater intentions to

engage in consequential risk-taking behaviors, such as using illicit drugs

and having unprotected sex. Participants reported the lowest intentions to

engage in risky behaviors in the slow-thinking condition, and the highest

intentions to engage in risky behaviors in the fast-thinking condition, with

the middle-speed condition falling in the middle (see Fig. 2B). Interestingly,

participants’ thought-speed conditions also predicted the likelihood of their

perceiving negative consequences of the actions in the CARE inventory,

such that faster thinking led to significantly less perceptions of the negative

consequences. When entered in a mediation analysis, the perception of neg-

ative consequences mediated the relation between experimentally manipu-

lated thought speed and intentions to engage in risky behaviors.

Taken together, these speed and risk-taking experiments pose an intrigu-

ing account of some behavioral implications of thought acceleration. First,

fast thinking led to increased risk-taking behavior on a computer-simulated

task compared to slow thinking. Faster thinking also led to increased will-

ingness to engage in common risk-taking behaviors (e.g., substance use,

gambling), relative to slower and moderately paced thinking. These findings

provide evidence for the causal effect of thought acceleration on desire to

engage in risks as well as actual risky behavior. Second, Experiment 2 uncov-

ered a possible mechanism for the effect of fast thinking on risk-taking. The

decreased perception that risky behaviors would result in negative conse-

quences mediated the relation between thought speed and endorsement

of risky behaviors.

3.2 Fast Thinking Increases Purchasing InterestFast thinking may impact not only on willingness to take risks but also on a

more general interest in goal attainment and the pursuit of rewarding behav-

iors. In a set of senior thesis experiments by Hudson Andrews (advised by

J. Chandler and E. Pronin), effects of thought speed on consumer purchasing

interest and behavior were examined (Andrews, 2011). Participants, who


were 60 college undergraduates, read paced trivia statements for the

thought-speed induction. They then looked over a list of items that one

might want to purchase, including: Pantene shampoo, designer jeans, Panasonic

camera, Tide detergent, Nike sneakers, etc. The list included items of both

hedonic and utilitarian appeal. Results were as predicted: Participants in

the condition designed to induce fast thinking reported thinking more

quickly, and reported more positive mood, than did participants who were

induced to think slowly. More importantly, compared with participants

who were induced to think slowly, participants who were induced to think

fast indicated significantly greater interest in purchasing the various items,

t(58)¼2.37, P¼0.02. The full set of results is shown in Table 1.

In a second experiment, participants were given the opportunity to pur-

chase actual items in the laboratory. Consistent with the results of Experi-

ment 1 indicating increased interest in purchasing after being induced to

think fast, we predicted that participants induced to think quickly would

be more likely to buy products than those induced to think slowly. After

participants completed the thought-speed manipulation and our written

measures, the experimenter told them that, “as an additional way of

thanking you for your participation,” they could buy various products at

the rate of $1 each. Because participants were paid in cash for their partic-

ipation, all participants had the ability to purchase a number of these items if

they so desired. The items, which were placed on the table in front of the

participant (one of each item) were: Snickers bar,Reese’s peanut butter cup pack-

age, package of CVS Ibuprofen, Rolling Ball pen, Sharpie highlighter, travel-size

Pantene conditioner, travel-size Pantene shampoo, Aveeno moisturizing lotion, Tide

To Go stain remover stick, 5-Hour Energy bottle, and Celestial Seasonings

Sleepytime tea box. Participants were provided with a plastic bag and left to

make their selections. The result was that participants in the fast condition

were significantly more likely to make a purchase compared to participants

in the slow condition, X2¼4.69, P¼0.03. Indeed, a total of 50% of partic-

ipants in the fast-thinking condition purchased at least one item, whereas

only 23% of participants in the slow-thinking condition made a purchase.

An experiment by Pronin (2011) found similar results in the context of

financial investing rather than consumer purchasing. Making financial

investments is an interesting domain because it involves purchasing (e.g.,

buying stocks) and it also involves more risk-taking than the typical purchase

(e.g., of a bar of soap). Research on persuasion has shown robust effects of

fast speech on purchasing intent, enhancing positive attitudes toward the

speaker, interest in the message, and intentions to purchase products


(e.g., Chebat, El Hedhli, Gelinas-Chebat, & Boivin, 2007; LaBarbera &

MacLachlan, 1979; McCoy, Bedrosia, Hoag, & Johnson, 2007; Megehee,

Dobie, & Grant, 2003; Smith & Shaffer, 1995). Given that financial invest-

ment decisions sometimes take place in the interpersonal context of speaking

with a financial advisor, we aimed to test whether participants’ thought

speed when contemplating investment decisions, as manipulated by a

Table 1 Effects of Thought Speed on Product Purchasing InterestThought Speed

T dfFast Slow

Can of Pepsi 2.80 (2.54) 2.63 (1.90) 0.29 58

Movado watch 2.57 (2.18) 1.83 (1.76) 1.43 58

Designer jeans 4.57 (2.51) 3.53 (1.83) 1.82 58

iPad 4.86 (2.47) 4.43 (2.34) 0.70 58

Louis Vuitton bag 1.67 (1.24) 2.03 (1.69) �0.96 58

Helicopter tour of NYC 3.60 (2.81) 3.17 (2.39) 0.64 58

Broadway show tickets 4.80 (2.61) 4.57 (2.03) 0.39 58

Burberry perfume/cologne 2.63 (2.15) 2.63 (2.25) 0.00 58

Sony flat screen TV 4.97 (2.80) 3.30 (2.09) 2.62* 58

Panasonic digital camera 3.60 (2.19) 3.23 (1.99) 0.70 58

Yoga mat 3.83 (2.57) 2.93 (2.26) 1.44 58

Ray-Ban sunglasses 5.43 (2.45) 4.30 (2.35) 1.83 58

Pantene shampoo 3.43 (2.13) 2.07 (1.11) 3.12** 58

Tide detergent 4.23 (3.02) 2.40 (1.71) 2.90** 58

Oral-B toothbrush 3.60 (2.14) 2.97 (2.41) 1.08 58

Tylenol 3.97 (2.36) 2.93 (2.10) 1.80 58

Encyclopedia Britannica 1.90 (1.56) 2.87 (2.40) �1.85 58

Dial liquid soap 2.63 (1.67) 2.33 (1.81) 0.67 58

Nike sneakers 5.77 (2.62) 4.97 (2.61) 1.19 58

North Face jacket 4.90 (2.80) 3.70 (2.25) 1.83 58

All products 3.79 (1.15) 3.14 (0.95) 2.37* 58

Note: *P<0.05, **P<0.01. Standard deviations appear in parentheses below means.


purported financial adviser’s rate of speech, would impact their interest in

various financial investments. The experiment was conducted for the

FINRA Investor Education Foundation, which aims to promote wise

investing behavior. Participants were 80 adults at a New Jersey shopping

mall (median age¼48, age range: 18–91). The experiment employed a var-

iant on the paced reading manipulation of thought speed. Instead of reading

paced text, participants heard an audio recording of an individual—allegedly

a stock broker—describing seven potential investments that they might be

interested in. The recording was warped using digital editing software so that

the broker spoke either quickly or slowly (the warping was not noticeable,

and the speech sounded smooth). The result was that participants not only

felt more happy and energetic after listening to the fast-talking broker than

the slow-talking one, but they also reported being inclined to invest more of

their money. When participants considered making an investment of up to

$10,000 in the opportunities they had just learned about, they wanted to

invest $2763, on average, in those opportunities when the broker spoke

slowly. When the broker spoke quickly, participants wanted to invest an

average of $3567 in those same opportunities.

Thought-speed effects on consumer behavior have been replicated in an

independent laboratory (Duff & Faber, 2008; Duff & Sar, 2015). Duff and

Sar (2015) designed a thought-speedmanipulation using animated advertise-

ments for various products (e.g., a camera). In the first experiment, partic-

ipants viewed ad messages that streamed at a rate of 40 ms per letter for the

fast animation condition and 160 ms per letter in the slow animation con-

dition. Following the speed induction, participants were given a print ad

from a magazine to browse. Compared to the slow animation condition,

participants in the fast animation condition reported faster perceived

thought speed, demonstrated increased physiological arousal, and indicated

that they had greater intent to purchase an item from a print ad following the

manipulation. Duff and Sar replicated the effect of fast thinking on intention

to purchase products in a second experiment. In addition, they found that

participants who viewed the fast animation reported more perceived energy,

more positive mood—and also more negative mood—compared to partic-

ipants who viewed the slow animation. In a third experiment, participants

who viewed the fast animations were willing to spend more money and pur-

chase more products for themselves (vs purchasing for others) after viewing

an online advertisement for products from a department store. Participants

in the slow animation condition did not differ on howmuch they were will-

ing to buy for themselves vs others.


The finding that the fast condition in Duff and Sar’s (2015) experiment

elevated not only positive mood but also negative mood is worth noting.

This finding is atypical in the thought-speed literature, but conceivable in

the context of the experimenter’s animation manipulation, which may have

produced some negative arousal. Duff and Sar (2015) found that their

manipulation increased arousal, and it is quite possible that the speed of

the manipulation induced not only excitement but also frustration and other

negative arousal. It is important to note, though, that the effect of fast think-

ing on negative mood is not a robust effect, as shown by previous research

demonstrating nonsignificant effects of speed on negative mood (e.g.,

Chandler & Pronin, 2012; Pronin & Wegner, 2006).

Collectively, the experiments on thought speed and consumer behavior

show evidence for goal-driven, appetitive effects of fast thinking. Corrob-

orating research from the marketing and persuasion literature also highlights

the consummatory consequences of fast thinking. Telemarketers who speak

at a faster rate produce higher intention to purchase products and services

(Chebat et al., 2007). Videotaped, acted scenarios of communication

between a bookstore clerk and customers showed that participants had more

positive attitudes toward the clerk when he deliveredmessages at a fast rate of

speech, compared to a slow rate of speech (McCoy et al., 2007).

3.3 Fast Thinking Enhances Creative InsightCreative problem-solving is a prized ability, and one whose origins are not

well understood. Studies have identified possible sources of creativity in sta-

ble features of the individual, such as self-confidence, openness, and risk-

taking (e.g., Eysenck, 1993) and intellect (Sternberg, Lubart, Kaufman, &

Pretz, 2005), as well as in features of an individual’s environment, such as

birth order, mentoring, and political anarchy (e.g., Simonton, 2000). Mood,

motivation, andmania have also been implicated in creativity (e.g., Amabile,

1982; Isen, 1999; Murray & Johnson, 2010). Here, we provide new evi-

dence, jointly conducted by the authors of this chapter, that a transient

aspect of individuals’ ongoing cognitive activity—i.e., the speed of their

thinking—causally impacts creative insight and problem-solving.

In our first experiment testing whether thought speed impacts creativity,

we randomly assigned 89 participants from Mechanical Turk to either a fast

thought-speed condition or a neutral thought-speed condition. In this

experiment, we employed a neutral thought-speed condition, rather than

a slow thought-speed condition, so that we could make more direct


inferences about the impact of fast thinking on creativity (as opposed to

being unable to infer whether any observed effects were due to the slow-

speed manipulation). In both conditions, participants read aloud into an

online voice recorder, keeping pace with trivia statements as they streamed

in a YouTube video. Statements streamed at a rate of 40 ms per letter in the

fast condition and 390 ms per letter in the neutral condition (see Yang et al.,

2014). The presentation rate in the neutral condition was chosen based on its

inducing participants to report a moderate pace of thought in previous

research on MTurk (Yang et al., 2014).

Following the speed induction, participants rated their thought speed,

and then engaged in measures of two different types of creativity: insight

creativity (or creative problem-solving) and generative creativity (or creation

of artistic products). Insight creativity involves arriving at a novel and useful

solution to a problem (Mednick, 1962; Schooler & Melcher, 1995). Arriv-

ing at a novel solution is frequently accompanied by a sudden “aha!”

moment and the inability to articulate the conscious processes that resulted

in the attainment of the insightful solution (Bowden, Jung-Beeman,

Fleck, & Kounios, 2005; H�elie & Sun, 2010; Schooler & Melcher, 1995).

On the other hand, generative creativity describes the creation of artistic

products—e.g., visual, musical, literary (Amabile, 1982; Thys, Sabbe, &

De Hert, 2014), which often requires persistence, skill, and practice over

time (Amabile & Pillemer, 2012). The creative and artistic qualities of these

works are determined by independent raters, who can range from experts

in the relevant domain to college students without relevant formal train-

ing (Akinola & Mendes, 2008; Amabile, 1982; Griskevicius, Cialdini, &

Kenrick, 2006).

In order to assess insight creativity, we asked participants to complete

10 Remote Associates Test (RAT) problems (Mednick, 1962; more

recently, Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). For example, one problem

was: cracker, fly, fighter, with the solution: fire. The RAT problems were

selected from a bank of 144 RAT problems with data on difficulty and solu-

tion rate (Bowden & Jung-Beeman, 2003). Each of the 10 problems included

in this experiment could be solved by 63%–82% of participants within 15 s.

In Experiment 1, participants viewed one RAT problem per “page” of the

online experiment. After 15 s, the page automatically proceeded to the

next RAT problem. In order to assess generative creativity, participants were

asked to write three brief poems and complete three story stems. For

the poem task, participants wrote three cinquain poems (Amabile, 1982).


Participants were presented with instructions describing the form of a

cinquain poem, which consists of five lines (e.g., Line 1 is a single noun, Line

2 is two adjectives describing the noun). Then, participants were asked to

write three cinquain poems with the noun for the first line provided

in the experience (e.g., “Door” for the first poem, “Eyes” for the second

poem, and “Life” for the third poem). For the story stem task, participants

completed three sentence fragments in a creativity assessment adapted from

Griskevicius et al. (2006). The sentence fragment was an ambiguous state-

ment such as “It’s not the street I usually go down…” Participants were

instructed to write a short five-line story based off of the first sentence stem.

Participants’ poems and stories were rated on degree of creativity by a coder

blind to speed condition. A random subset (20%) of the poems and stories was

rated by a second coder (ICCs: 0.75 for poems, 0.79 for stories).

As in previous experiments using paced reading, participants in the fast

condition reported thinking significantly faster than participants in the neu-

tral condition, t(87)¼4.70, P<0.001. Similar to previous experiments on

MTurk, participants in the neutral condition rated their perceived thought

speed close to the midpoint of the scale (M¼4.60, SD¼2.40). Codings of

participants’ poems and stories, however, revealed that thought-speed con-

dition did not significantly affect participants’ generative creativity. That is,

those induced to think fast did not generate more creative poems and stories.

Another story emerged, though, when it came to participants’ responses on

the RAT, our measure of insight creativity. Participants in the condition

where they were led to think fast scored higher on the RAT than did par-

ticipants in the neutral-speed condition, t(87)¼2.18, P¼0.03. On average,

participants in the neutral-speed condition solved 6.60 out of 10 problems,

whereas those in the fast-speed condition solved 7.55 problems (Yang &

Pronin, under review).

In a second experiment, we aimed to test whether the effect of thought

speed on creative insight would replicate. In this second experiment, which

we conducted online, 318 participants were again induced to think at a fast

or neutral speed by virtue of paced reading on their computer monitor. In

order to assess insight creativity, participants were asked to complete the

RAT of creative insight, as well as a second measure of creative insight. For

this second measure, they completed nine “verbal insight problems.” The

verbal insight problems consisted of word problems that required the use of

creative problem-solving, such as inhibiting inappropriate responses andmen-

tal restructuring of the problem (DeYoung, Flanders, & Peterson, 2008;


Duncker, 1945). For example, one of the problems asked participants to think

about the following scenario:

A man in a town married 20 women. He and the women are still alive, and he hashad no divorces or annulments. He is not a bigamist (meaning he is not legallymarried to more than one woman at once), and he broke no law. How is thatpossible?

The answer to this problem is that the man was the officiant of the wedding

ceremony. The insight process involves mentally restructuring the word

“married” to mean conducting the rites of the wedding, not personally

being married to each woman. Each verbal problem was presented individ-

ually on a “page” of the online experiment. Each page was timed to proceed

to the next problem after 2 min.

Participants displayed greater insight creativity after being induced to

think fast. Those in the fast-thinking condition solved more RAT problems

than those in the neutral-speed condition, t(316)¼2.19, P¼0.03. In addi-

tion, those in the fast-thinking condition also succeeded in solving more

verbal insight problems, t(316)¼3.91, P<0.001. See Fig. 3A and B for

the average performance on insight creativity measures by speed condition

in the second creativity experiment. Taken together, the findings from these

two experiments suggest that fast thinking fosters the sorts of “aha moments”

associated with creative insight.

These findings point to the need for continued research on the effect of

thought speed on creativity. Key challenges to this research area include dis-

criminating between the types of creative ideation that would be sensitive to

2

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Neutral Fast

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BVerbal insight

Fig. 3 Number of creative insight problems solved based on speed condition for(A) remote associates test problems and (B) verbal insight problems. Error bars indicate1 SE above and below the mean.


speed effects. Insight creativity, generative creativity, and divergent thinking

each involve different cognitive processes and demands on attention

(Smith & Blankenship, 1989; Thrash, Maruskin, Cassidy, Fryer, & Ryan,

2010). Although there is no magic bullet for inducing creativity, our results

suggest that thought speed may be an easily manipulated variable that can

elicit meaningful effects.

3.4 Fast Thinking Elevates Self-esteemFast thinking involves distortions in perceptions and evaluations of the self.

Experimental research on thought speed provides some evidence in support

of the causal link between fast thinking and changes to self-perception.

Pronin and Wegner (2006) found that participants in the fast conditions felt

more powerful, strong, and creative compared to participants in the slow

conditions. Participants were marginally more likely to display grandiosity

(abnormally inflated self-esteem) in the fast conditions compared to the slow

conditions, though there were no differences in self-esteem based on speed

condition. In a series of experiments, Pronin et al. (2008) followed up on

these results by examining speed effects on a number of self-perception

measures.

In Experiment 1, Pronin et al. (2008) used a brainstorming task to

manipulate thought speed and measured self-esteem using the State Self-

Esteem Scale (SSE; Heatherton & Polivy, 1991). State self-esteem measures

individuals’ current self-evaluation. State self-esteem was significantly

higher in the fast condition compared to the slow condition. In Experiment

2, which used a speed induction that altered the number of ideas that par-

ticipants were exposed to, participants in the fast condition again reported

significantly higher state self-esteem. Experiment 3 used an indirect speed

manipulation wherein participants were exposed to ideas from a group

brainstorming session and gave a verbal presentation of ideas to a different

group (fast condition) or the original group (slow condition). For the fast

condition, participants would be free to use any of the original group’s ideas

as well as their own ideas in the presentation, thus increasing the number of

ideas available to participants in a limited amount of time. Following this

manipulation, there were no effects of speed on state self-esteem. However,

participants in the fast condition felt more powerful and appeared more

grandiose than participants in the normal-speed condition. In this experi-

ment, raters blind to condition coded participants’ speeches and evaluated

speeches from the fast condition as more grandiose than speeches from


the normal-speed condition. In Experiment 4, experimenters altered

thought speed with a listing task. Participants completed a series of word

problems that either were simple enough to elicit quick responding and

the feeling of fast thinking (e.g., list 12 words that end in “-ch”) or that

elicited slower responding and the feeling of slower thinking (e.g., list

12 words that end in “-rch”). Participants in the fast condition indicated sig-

nificantly higher state self-esteem and grandiosity compared to participants

in the normal condition. There was a trend for participants in the fast con-

dition to feel more powerful than their counterparts in the normal-speed

condition, though this effect did not reach significance. Collectively, this

set of experiments provides support for the effect of fast thinking on self-

perception. Fast thinking was found to elevate postmanipulation self-

esteem, perceived power, grandiosity, and the perceived significance of

behaviors. However, some manipulations of thought speed were more suc-

cessful than others in inducing changes on these variables.

Clearly, the relation between thought speed and self-perception variables

warrants further research. There may be specific manipulations and/or

dependent measures that are more effective in demonstrating an elevated

estimation of one’s self-worth and abilities following fast thinking. This

point is illustrated in an experiment we conducted with dysphoric and non-

dysphoric participants (see Yang et al., 2014), where self-esteemwas assessed

using the Beck Self-Esteem Scale (BSE; Beck, Brown, Steer, Kuyken, &

Grisham, 2001). In this experiment, thought speed was manipulated by hav-

ing participants read aloud timed trivia statements (e.g., “Oranges contain

vitamin C”). We did not find an effect of the thought-speed manipulation

on self-esteem in this experiment. There are at least two differences between

this study and past research. First, the measure of self-esteem was different

from the measure that has been used in previous research on the effects

of fast and slow thinking (e.g., State Self-Esteem Scale). Second, the

thought-speed manipulation was also different: in previous thought-speed

manipulations that found some evidence for the effect of speed on self-

perception variables, thought-speed stimuli approximated the emotional

and cognitive content of “self-talk” or required participants to generate their

own ideas (e.g., Pronin et al., 2008; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). It is possible

that the “self-relevance” of stimuli interacts with the speed of thinking to

produce changes in feelings of self-worth and power.

It is worth noting that the tendency for fast thinking to induce inflated

self-esteem is unlikely to be caused by any tendency for fast thinking to

induce greater feelings of success at the relevant experimental task.


A clear example of this point comes from Experiment 4 by Pronin et al.

(2008). In that experiment, participants in the fast condition completed eas-

ier word problems than those in the slow condition. In the experiment, par-

ticipants were asked to rate their success on the word problems. The fast

thought-speed condition (which had the easier word problems) induced

feelings of fast thinking and positive mood, but it did not impact perceived

success at the problems and, therefore, perceived success could not have

mediated the relation between thought speed and self-esteem.

3.5 Fast Thinking Is ArousingFast thinking increases perceived energy and arousal. Across several exper-

iments, we have found that when participants are induced to think fast, they

report feelingmore energy than when they are induced to thinkmore slowly

(Pronin & Wegner, 2006; Pronin et al., 2008, Experiments 1 and 2).

Research from music studies, cognitive psychology, and neuropsychology

strongly suggests that altering the subjective experience of speed affects phys-

iological activation. For example, sympathetic arousal increases when listen-

ing to fast-paced music or beats (Khalfa et al., 2008). Experimental stress and

threat inductions activate physiological responses that allow the body to

spring to action (Engert et al., 2011). The psychophysiological activation

during episodes of mania bears similarity to the psychophysiological activa-

tion under the influence of stimulant drugs such as amphetamines (Asghar

et al., 2003). Interestingly, bipolar disorder may be characterized by distur-

bances in the amount of variability of sympathetic activity rather than simple

differences in the average level of sympathetic activity. Gruber, Mennin,

Fields, Purcell, and Murray (2015) found that relative to participants with

depression and healthy controls, participants diagnosed with bipolar

I disorder exhibited greater fluctuations in sympathetic arousal during a

6-day measurement period. However, the mean level of sympathetic arousal

did not differ between the groups.

Although there is some compelling evidence that tempo, behavioral acti-

vation, and arousal affect physiological responses, direct tests of the effects of

thought speed on psychophysiological measures are needed. Duff and Sar

(2015) found that exposure to fast animations of product messages increased

physiological arousal, measured using electroencephalogram (EEG), com-

pared to slow animations. The effects of dopamine may be a crucial com-

ponent to the experience of thought speed. Past work has shown that the

association between actions and pleasant outcomes (e.g., pressing a lever that


causes a piece of food to be dispensed) is modulated by dopamine (Wise,

2004). Dopamine may modulate the experience of fast thinking that is

accompanied by a pleasurable, rewarding experience of novel stimuli (in this

case, each thought constitutes a novel stimulus for the brain). The learned

association between fast thinking and appetitive motivation is perhaps facil-

itated by dopaminergic networks. Dopamine affects time perception and has

been implicated in learning and memory of reward-driven, appetitive

behaviors (Meck, 2005; Wise, 2004).

4. THOUGHT SPEED AND RELATED CONSTRUCTS

In this section, we review a number of constructs that seem related to

thought speed and discuss those relations. These include fluency, System 1

thinking, and goal progress.

4.1 Speed and FluencyThought speed bears some conceptual overlap with fluency, and the distinc-

tion is therefore worth considering here. Fluency is a psychological con-

struct that describes the ease with which stimuli can be processed. Fluent

stimuli can consist of sentences presented in an easy-to-read font, prototyp-

ical exemplars, flowing lines, familiar objects, continuity of speech, and

high-contrast presentation of objects (Alter & Oppenheimer, 2009). Impor-

tantly, fluent stimuli can be characterized by the fast processing speed that

they engender (Winkielman, Schwarz, Fazendeiro, & Reber, 2003). Also,

subjective evaluations of fluent stimuli are more positive, and a “warm

glow” of positive affect can result (e.g., Monin, 2003; Winkielman et al.,

2003), which is consistent with the positive mood effects engendered by fast

thinking.

Prior manipulations of thought speed have sometimes involved fluency.

For example, Pronin et al. (2008) manipulated the ease of completing word

tasks as a manipulation of thought speed. Participants in the fast-thinking

condition completed “easy” word problems that they could solve quickly

(e.g., listing words that rhyme with “mite”; listing words that end in

“-ch”), whereas participants in the slow-thinking condition completed

“hard” versions of these word problems (e.g., listing words that rhyme with

“speck”; listing words that end in “-rch”). Participants in the fast condition

reported thinking faster and scored higher on positive mood. Other manip-

ulations of fast thinking, though, have involved exposure to less fluent stim-

uli, rather than more fluent stimuli. For example, in our I Love Lucy


experiment (described earlier), participants verbally narrated a television

program at either its normal speed or at a fast speed (eight times normal).

Although the episode is clearly more difficult to process and comprehend

at eight times normal speed, participants reported more positive affect in that

condition.

In a recent set of experiments in our laboratory, Jacobs and Pronin (2017)

directly examined whether fluency could account for effects of fast thinking

on mood. In Experiment 1, Princeton University undergraduates were ran-

domly assigned to one of four possible conditions combining levels of high

and low speed and fluency in a 2�2 design. In each condition, the partic-

ipants read text that streamed across a computer screen, describing a series of

ordinary events that unfolded during the course of a college student’s day. In

the fluent conditions, each sentence of text contained a grammatically cor-

rect, easy to comprehend description of an event in the day (e.g., “I went to

the bathroom to take a shower and brush my teeth”). In the disfluent con-

ditions, the words in that sentence were scrambled in a way that made them

more difficult to comprehend (e.g., “Bathroom I went my shower to brush

and to the teeth take a”). In the fast conditions, the sentences streamed at a

rate of 40 ms per letter. In the slow conditions, the sentences streamed at

170 ms per letter. The total reading time across the four versions of the

manipulation was controlled by removing redundant sentences in the slow

conditions. For example, the following excerpt in the fast/fluent condition

was modified in the slow/fluent condition by removing the italicized

sentences:

I went to the bathroom to take a shower and brush my teeth. The warm waterwoke me up. I went back to my room and got dressed. Then I had a bowl ofcereal. I also finished some reading I had left over from the night before. I left myroom to go to Biology, my first class of the day.

Jacobs and Pronin (2017)

Following the manipulation, participants indicated posttest positive and

negative mood, perceived thought speed, and perceived fluency. Results

showed that participants in the fast conditions reported significantly faster

thought speed compared to participants in the slow conditions. Participants

in the fluent conditions reported significantly greater ease of processing

compared to participants in the disfluent conditions. Controlling for pretest

positive mood, there was a significant effect of thought-speed condition on

posttest positive mood, F(1,55)¼7.13, P¼0.01 (see Fig. 4A). However,

there was no effect of fluency on posttest positive mood and no interaction

between speed and fluency. In other words, positive mood was higher in


conditions where fast thinking was induced, even when the content of sen-

tences was scrambled in a disfluent manner. In addition, fast thinking did not

increase fluency. Rather, fast conditions were associated with less fluency

compared to slow conditions, indicating that subjective fluency also could

not explain the effect of fast thinking on positive mood.

In a second experiment, Jacobs and Pronin manipulated fluency by inter-

jecting (into the text that participants read) common disfluencies found in

everyday speech. In the low-fluency condition, participants again read a

description of a college student’s day—but this time the description included

expressions such as like, um, and uh (e.g., “My alarm, um, went off this, uh,

morning at, like, eight o’clock.”). In the high-fluency condition, partici-

pants read the description without the speech disfluencies (and some sen-

tences were added to equate for length without impacting meaning,

coherence, or tone). The experiment manipulated thought speed using

the same methods from Experiment 1, thus employing a 2�2 design with

thought speed as one independent variable and fluency as the other indepen-

dent variable.

Results of this second experiment were consistent with the previous

experiment: participants in the conditions designed to induce faster thinking

reported more positive mood than did participants in the conditions

designed to induce slower thinking (Ms¼5.03 vs 3.03), F(1,56)¼38.38,

P<0.0001 (see Fig. 4B). Again, there was no main effect of fluency on

mood and no interaction between fluency and speed. In addition, partici-

pants reported greater perceived fluency in the slow-thinking condition

than in the fast-thinking condition, suggesting that subjective fluency could

not account for the effect of fast thinking on positive mood. The findings

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Low fluency High fluency

Po

sit

ive

mo

od

A

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Low fluency High fluency

Po

sit

ive

mo

od

BFast thought speedSlow thought speed

Fig. 4 Effects of thought speed and fluency on positive mood in Experiment 1 (A) and inExperiment 2 (B) (Jacobs & Pronin, 2017).


here indicate that fast thinking and fluency are not the same construct.

Alone, the fluency of stimuli does not affect perceived thought speed.More-

over, perceived fluency may sometimes be higher when thought speed is

slower, providing further evidence that the psychological consequences of

fast thinking are not explained by fluency effects.

A consideration of the relation between fluency and thought speed still

raises interesting ideas and questions. For example, fluency generally is con-

ceived as involving low-level processing, whereas fast thinking generally is

conceived as involving higher order thinking. It is interesting to consider

whether rapid thought speed at a lower level might engender similar effects

to higher order fast thinking. Future research should investigate whether

accelerations of lower level processing speed, such as reaction time or rapid

visual processing, might elicit elevated mood and other consequences of fast

thinking.

4.2 Speed and Dual Process Theories of ThinkingThe idea of “thinking fast” has been invoked in recent literature on judg-

ment and decision-making. Daniel Kahneman’s best-selling book Thinking,

Fast and Slow discusses research in judgment and decision-making that pro-

duces a compelling argument for dual process models of thinking (Chaiken,

1980; Kahneman, 2011). Kahneman’s delineation of two systems of think-

ing invokes the notion of speed. In System 1, thinking is automatic, effort-

less, intuitive, and “fast.” Thinking in this system is often susceptible to bias

and use of heuristics. System 2 describes thinking that is “slow.” This is the

slowness of effort, in which thinking is principled, constructed intentionally,

and follows a logical progression. An example would be employing logic to

reason through a problem and arrive at the accurate conclusion.

We suspect that there are differences between our conceptualization of

thought speed and Kahneman’s identification of System 1 and System 2

thinking. Our conceptualization of thought speed involves thought

rate—i.e., fast thinking in our conceptualization involves more thoughts

per unit time. From our perspective, the experience of fast thinking might

be exemplified by the experience of a flight of ideas in a great brainstorming

session, an excited recounting of events during a particularly active day, or an

episode of “racing thoughts” in mania. Slow thinking would describe think-

ing that is more sluggish, sleepy, and laborious, as in the experience of

“writer’s block” or psychomotor slowing in depression. These experiences

each involve perceived or actual increases or decreases in the number of


thoughts per unit of time. This definition of thought speed can be differen-

tiated from the “fast” and “slow” thinking of System 1 and System 2. Think-

ing in System 1 may be fast insofar as it results in an attitude or a decision

through a quicker process, but System 1 involves mental shortcuts, rather

than more thoughts per unit of time. System 2 involves a more effortful,

deliberate, and principled way of thinking, for example, hypothesis testing

and solving logic problems. This results in a longer time to make a decision.

However, it does not necessarily mean that there are fewer thoughts per unit

time when engaging in System 2 processing.

Although we are not currently aware of empirical research that distin-

guishes between our conceptualization of thought speed and dual process

theories of thinking, we can imagine that the two constructs can be differ-

entiated in an experiment along the lines of Jacobs and Pronin’s experiments

on fluency. A 2�2 experiment could be constructed, with thought speed

and system of thinking as the independent variables.

4.3 Speed and Mental ProgressionA final construct worth considering is that of motivation and goal progress.

A reader might wonder whether effects of fast thinking reflect the percep-

tion that one is closer to reaching one’s goal. For example, if I am thinking

fast, might I be more likely to conclude that I am almost finished with my

thought task, and therefore might I feel happier, more creative, and more

self-assured? Mental progression describes the feeling that thinking is

“going somewhere” (Mason & Bar, 2012). In other words, one has the sense

that one is making progress toward a goal. This would be the opposite expe-

rience from rumination, where thoughts cycle repetitiously through a nar-

row set of ideas (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993). Mason and Bar

(2012) found that exposure to stimuli that progressed across different cate-

gories resulted in better mood compared to exposure stimuli that stagnated

(all within the same category). Carver and Scheier (1990) proposed a model

of goal attainment wherein affect is linked to the monitoring of progress

toward goals. According to Carver and Scheier, individuals experience pos-

itive mood when they feel that they have spent less time than expected

working toward goals. On the flip side, when individuals spend longer than

expected on goal attainment, this leads to negative mood. The rate of accel-

eration or deceleration of goal attainment plays a role as well, in their model.

One response to the question of whether thought-speed effects are actu-

ally caused by changes in perceptions of goal progress is that thought-speed


manipulations often involve no sense of goal progress. For example, the use

of long lists of trivia statements in speed manipulations produces effects on

positive mood, risk-taking, and creativity (Chandler & Pronin, 2012; Yang

et al., 2014). The trivia statements used in these experiments do not give

participants a feeling of progression to a specific end, nor do the statements

converge topically, but are instead randomly ordered (e.g., A pilot light

continually remains lit in a gas stove; A sprinkler system protects a building against

fire; In Ring Toss, players through a loop over a peg). Moreover, speed effects

can occur even when the content of stimuli is repetitive (Rosser &

Wright, 2016).

In order to directly test whether fast thinking effects can occur indepen-

dently of goal progress, Pronin and Jacobs (2008) conducted a simple exper-

iment. Speed and goal pursuit were manipulated in a 2�2 design.

Participants were instructed to count to 100. In the goal pursuit conditions,

participants were given a clear target goal of counting to 100 four times. In

the no-goal conditions, participants were told to keep counting until the

experimenter instructed them to stop. In the fast conditions, participants

were instructed to count without any pause between numbers. In the slow

conditions, participants were instructed to count with a 10-s interval

between each number that they counted. Results revealed a main effect

of speed on mood, with fast thinking once again leading to more positive

mood than slow thinking. There was no effect of goal pursuit on mood

and no interaction between goal pursuit and speed.

5. HOW THOUGHT SPEED WORKS

Why does thought speed exert a wide range of effects on human emo-

tion, judgment, and action? In this section, we present an adaptive theory of

thought speed that aims to explain these relationships.

5.1 The Basic IdeaThe evidence we have reviewed concerning consequences of thought speed

shows that fast thinking is associated with positive mood, heightened arousal

(increased energy), high confidence, and increased tendencies toward both

risk-taking and creative problem-solving. The particular constellation of

effects that are induced by accelerated thought speed is coherent from an

adaptive perspective. Taken together, the combination of positive mood,

arousal, confidence, risk-taking, and creative problem-solving is a set of

responses likely to be induced by and needed in circumstances posing an


urgent need for action to ensure an individual’s survival and reproduction

(Pronin, 2013). The adaptive theory posits that thought speed and this con-

sequent constellation of effects, which might be termed an activated state, are

naturally linked. In situations that involve increased demand, individuals

benefit from a “call to action,” with increased energy, motivation, excite-

ment, and action-oriented emotion. Interpreting a demanding situation as

ripe with opportunity would likely lead to this state of activation with an

eagerness to think and act quickly to attain desired goals and outcomes.

These situations immediately induce racing thoughts, but they also require

a positive emotional drive (in terms of both affect and energy), as well as

confidence and a willingness to take risks, and even a capacity to engage

in creative problem-solving. See Fig. 5 for a schematic illustration of this

pathway.

The appetitive motivation (behavioral activation system) results in

actions that move a person toward a desired object or end (Gray, 1987).

Interestingly, the failure of motivational systems to spur an individual to

action after exposure to stressful and aversive situations (e.g., learned help-

lessness) has been identified as a key aspect of depression (Maier & Seligman,

1976). According to our adaptive theory, accelerating thoughts should pro-

duce increased behavioral activity and arousal, including positive mood,

optimism, perceived energy, creativity, novelty-seeking, risk-taking, posi-

tive self-evaluation, and motivation to approach goals. The deceleration

of thought speed should inhibit these psychological states. Rather, the decel-

eration of thinking should result in more negative mood, sadness, and

inhibited activity. Certain situations within the environment necessitate

faster thinking. For example, emergency situations likely require faster than

usual rates of thinking and acting. Emergency preparedness literatures

emphasize both speed and deliberate action in the event of a catastrophe

(e.g., Fast, Weaver, Miller, & Ferrin, 2016; Lovett, Massone, Holmes,

Hall, & Lopez, 2014).

Situation

Fast environment

(elicits fast thinking)

Interpretation

Demand

Opportunity

Response

Mobilize for action(excitement, energy,

activation, risk-taking, etc.)

Fig. 5 An adaptive model of thought speed: from environment to action.


This connection between fast thinking and emergencies calls to mind the

activation of the “fight or flight” response that prepares the body for urgent,

life-saving actions. Like the “fight or flight” response, the adaptive activation

of fast thinking in demanding situations likely involvesmyriad cognitive, affec-

tive, and physiological processes (Pronin, 2013). However, the adaptive acti-

vation of fast thinking is arguably more general in scope. Fast thinking is likely

adaptive for the stress response because it enables an individual tomake a quick

getaway or initiate effective actions to engage in the situation. Fast thinking is

likely adaptive in nonemergency situations that involve a level of demand and

opportunity, as well. The efficient identification of changes in one’s environ-

ment and sensitivity to novelty may be abilities that confer adaptive benefits

(Eckart & Bunzeck, 2013). Examples of adaptive advantages of fast thinking

in nonthreatening circumstances include quickly associating a reward with

an action that likely caused the reward, rapidly processing novel locations

and social situations in order to identify food, shelter, and allies, and generating

multiple mental representations of ways to solve problems. States of positive

mood and arousal have been linked to productive generation of ideas (Baas,

DeDreu, &Nijstad, 2008;Martindale &Greenough, 1973). A speedy pursuit

of rewards likely ensures the actual attainment of positive outcomes.

5.2 DopamineWhat are the processes, cognitive and physiological, that explain the con-

nection between fast thinking and motivation to spring to action? Firing

of the dopaminergic system is likely to result from fast thinking. Situations

involving fast thinking produce mental exposure to multiple novel stimuli in

short order. The exposure to novel stimuli leads to increased levels of dopa-

mine and increased firing of dopamine neurons, especially in areas of the

brain associated with goal pursuit (e.g., Rebec, Christensen, Guerra, &

Bardo, 1997). Increased activation of the dopaminergic system is consistent

with the effects observed in response to fast thinking. Specifically, increased

dopamine activity is associated with feelings of being rewarded, motivation

to attain goals, and even an accelerated internal clock (Blackburn, Phillips,

Jakubovic, & Fibiger, 1989; Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Kandel, Schwartz,

Jessell, Siegelbaum, & Hudspeth, 2013).

An accumulation of research on dopamine suggests that it is particularly

important in modulating sensitivity to rewards and the coordination of

learned behaviors that result in the attainment of rewards (Wise, 2004).

The persistence of practiced, goal-directed behaviors that are associated with


reward-seeking and attainment is facilitated by dopamine (Packard,

Cahill, &McGaugh, 1994). The ability to predict rewards and learn and exe-

cute behaviors that result in maximally rewarding outcomes is modulated by

dopamine, as demonstrated in experiments with dopamine-enhancing or -

inhibiting substances (Pessiglione, Seymour, Flandin, Dolan, & Frith, 2006).

Dopamine is also closely associated with the addictive effects of stimulant

drugs, such as cocaine, but less closely involved in addiction pathways for

nonstimulant drugs such as alcohol (Wise, 1988).

In addition to facilitating appetitive and consummatory behaviors, espe-

cially in the case of learned behaviors that aid in goal attainment, dopamine

has also been implicated more directly in the experience of thought speed.

Eckart and Bunzeck (2013) conducted a randomized, double-blind,

placebo-controlled experiment wherein participants received a precursor

to dopamine, a cholinergic inhibitor, or a placebo. Participants were

exposed to a series of pictures and tested for sensitivity to novel stimuli,

processing speed, and memory. The group that received the dopamine pre-

cursor exhibited increased processing speed for all stimuli, including novel

stimuli, relative to the placebo control and the cholinergic inhibitor groups

(Eckart & Bunzeck, 2013).

Research from Warren Meck and his colleagues has shed light on the

functions of dopamine on internal timing. An organism’s internal timing,

or “clock speed” refers to its sense of the duration of time on a task. For

example, animals that are trained to press a lever to receive a reward follow-

ing a particular schedule respond according to intervals of time that corre-

spond to the schedule. An animal can be conditioned to associate a light that

turns on every 18 s with engaging in a behavior that elicits a reward. Every

18 s, a light turns on, a lever is lowered, and pressing the lever results in the

delivery of a reward (e.g., Meck, 2007). During test periods, the timing and

the frequency of engaging in the rewarding behavior in the absence of

reward can be measured. During testing phases, experimenters can admin-

ister drugs that alter dopamine levels in the brain and then measure subse-

quent time perception on the task. Stimulant drugs such as cocaine and

methamphetamine are dopamine agonists that amplify the amount of dopa-

mine available in synapses. Dopamine antagonists such as haloperidol inter-

fere with the binding of dopamine to postsynaptic receptors. Dopamine

agonists (methamphetamine or cocaine) administered in rodents resulted

in a faster internal clock speed. Rodents administered methamphetamine

or cocaine exhibited reward-driven behavior faster than the rate set by

the training procedure (Heilbronner & Meck, 2014). In addition, the speed


effects of dopamine agonists were accompanied by increased impulsivity on

a behavioral task. When fluoxetine (e.g., Prozac), a drug that alters the reup-

take of serotonin, was administered, rats exhibited decreased impulsivity, but

no differences in clock speed. Similar effects of dopamine agonists have been

observed in humans, as well. When D-amphetamine was administered to

humans, clock speed increased. On the other hand, when participants

received haloperidol, clock speed decreased (Lake & Meck, 2012).

5.3 Embodiment and EntrainmentThe effects of entrainment and embodiment may also help explain why

thought-speed manipulations work. Entrainment describes the tendency

for physiological arousal and psychological processing to become synchro-

nized with external tempo. Temporal processes of the human body (e.g.,

respiration rate, heart rate, muscular contractions) can become synchronized

with the speed of external stimuli. For example, in an experiment by Khalfa

et al. (2008), participants reported more arousal and displayed greater respi-

ration rate in response to fast music in major key and also in response to

beat-only fast tempo music (with no musical tones) as compared to slow

music in minor key and also beat-only slow tempo music (with no musical

tones). Participants’ blood pressure, zygomatic activity, and electrodermic

response all decreased (and their corrugator activity increased) after listening

to fast music in major key compared to slow music in minor key, though

these results are difficult to interpret because of the conflation of musical

tempowithmusical key. Other experiments on entrainment have found that

physiological arousal, as measured by EEG recordings, increased after fast-

speed induction compared to slow-speed induction (Duff & Sar, 2015;

Trochidis & Bigand, 2013). In terms of our research on thought speed,

experiments concerning entrainment suggest that fast-paced external stim-

uli, such as rapidly streaming text, are likely to induce internal psychological

responses that are synchronous with that fast pace, thereby inducing

responses such as fast thinking and arousal.

The manipulation of thought speed may also induce emotional and cog-

nitive effects due to embodiment. Embodiment describes the priming of

schema by engaging in stereotypical behaviors and action sequences.

Research studies on facial feedback, misattribution, and embodiment have

pointed to the possibility that inducing the experience of an aspect of a par-

ticular mental state activates the entire experience of that mental state. This

may occur through the priming of schema, the activation of efferent


neurons, or the attempt to make sense of physiological changes. According

to Bargh, Chen, and Burrows (1996), embodiment effects may occur

throughwhatWilliam James described as “ideomotor action.”When people

imagine performing a behavior, or think about the context in which certain

behaviors are performed, a mental representation of the behavior is acti-

vated. In this preparatory state, conscious or unconscious, courses of actions

and possible outcomes may all be modeled in the mind prior to the inception

of behavior. For the relation between thinking and behaving, the causal flow

may be reversed, as well. There is a substantial body of literature in psychol-

ogy that supports the idea that enacting a set of behaviors can induce mental

representations and emotional states that correspond with how the behavior

is typically experienced (e.g., Davis, Senghas, &Ochsner, 2009;Mussweiler,

2006; Soussignan, 2002). Thus, when people are induced to think quickly—

for example, by engaging in the action of fast-paced reading, this may acti-

vate the arousing and energizing emotional state that is usually associated

with situations that require fast thinking.

6. THOUGHT SPEED AND TREATMENT FOR DEPRESSION

Depressive disorders are mood disorders that are characterized by

anhedonia, the loss of interest in activities that were once pleasurable, feel-

ings of sadness, worthlessness, loss of energy, loss of motivation, and phys-

iological symptoms such as disruptions of sleep and appetite (DSM-5,

American Psychiatric Association, 2013). In the 1960s, Beck’s Cognitive

Theory of Depression (e.g., Beck, 1963) revolutionized the conceptualiza-

tion and the treatment of depression. Beck identified regular distortions in

thought content that characterized and maintained depression. The impor-

tance of cognition in depression continued to be emphasized in research on

rumination as a trait-like predictor of depression (Nolen-Hoeksema, 2000).

Rumination and distraction describe two opposing ways of processing neg-

ative events. When one engages in rumination, thoughts go down a “rabbit

hole,” and emotions, reactions, and their consequences are continuously

processed. Ruminative processing is consistently correlated with greater risk

for depression and more severe symptoms of depression, and treatments thus

have aimed to reduce rumination and correct cognitive biases (Beck, Rush,

Shaw, & Emery, 1979; Brewin et al., 2009; Lo, Ho, Yu, & Siu, 2014;

McGinn, 2000). Thus, considering the speed of cognition in treating depres-

sion continues the legacy of examining the cognitive dimensions of depres-

sion and seeking to affect those dimensions as a mode of treatment.


Sluggish thought speed has long been identified in the symptom profile

of depression. Roughly a century ago, Kraepelin (1921, p. 75) described the

thoughts of people with depression as “paralyzed” or “immobile,” andWells

(1922, p. 538) wrote that “often absolutely nothing occurs to the patient.”

When a person experiences an episode of clinical depression, his or her

thoughts can become so sluggish that they can even feel as though they have

come to a halt (e.g., Ianzito, Cadoret, & Pugh, 1974; Judd, Rapaport,

Paulus, & Brown, 1994; Philipp, Maier, & Delmo, 1991). Empirical studies

have shown that depressed individuals experience disruptions in cognition

in domains such as working memory and processing speed (e.g., Hubbard

et al., 2016; Schwartz et al., 1982).

In a new research program, we have begun to investigate whether accel-

erating the thought pace of individuals experiencing depression might help

to alleviate at least some of their symptoms. This idea is motivated by three

pieces of knowledge: (1) fast thinking boosts positive mood, energy, and

self-esteem (all of which are lacking in a depressive episode); (2) depressive

episodes are characterized by deficits in thought speed; and (3) intervening

in the cognitive process of individuals experiencing depression can alle-

viate their symptoms. Also, there is one extant study supporting this idea.

In a (1978) paper, Teasdale andRezin report asking clinically depressed indi-

viduals to repeat aloud letters from the alphabet. The letters (either A, B, C,

orD) were presented in a randomized order, with a letter appearing every 1,

2, or 4 s. The result was that the more quickly participants were induced

to repeat the letters, the more of a reduction in depressed mood they

experienced.

6.1 Direct Experimental TestsIn our first experiments investigating the effect of fast thinking on depressed

individuals, we (Yang et al., 2014) predicted that fast thinking would

improve positive mood for individuals experiencing symptoms of depres-

sion. In Experiment 1, we first administered a Beck Depression

Inventory-II (BDI-II; Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996) prescreen to 866 par-

ticipants on Amazon.com’s Mechanical Turk crowdsourcing website. Par-

ticipants were English-speaking residents of the United States. From this

sample, participants who scored 12 or above on the BDI-II were invited

via e-mail to participate in the experiment. To recruit a control group of

nondepressed participants, we randomly selected a subset of participants

who scored <12 on the BDI. A final sample of 128 participants completed


http://Amazon.com

the thought speed and mood experiment. Of this sample, 35 participants

reported mild to moderate depressive symptoms, and 15 reported severe

depressive symptoms (BDI-II�29), whereas 78 participants were in the

nondepressive group, having reported no depressive symptoms or minimal

symptoms in the initial prescreen.

Once in the experiment, participants completed pretest measures of

positive and negative affect (PANAS; Watson et al., 1988) and depressive

symptoms using the Center for Epidemiological Studies–Depression scale

(CES-D; Radloff, 1977). Then, participants were randomly assigned to

one of two thought-speed inductions. In the fast condition, participants

viewed a YouTube video containing trivia statements that screened at a

preset rate of 40 ms per letter with 500-ms intervals between sentences.

In the neutral/moderate speed condition, each sentence streamed at a rate

of 390 ms per letter with 1000-ms intervals between sentences. For ethical

reasons, we did not include a slow condition. The total duration of the speed

induction, fast or moderate, was less than 3 min. To ensure that participants

complied with the speed induction, participants were instructed to make,

and submit via the Internet, a voice recording of themselves reading aloud

the statements.

Following the speed induction, participants completed posttest measures

of subjective thought speed (single-item speed measure; Pronin & Wegner,

2006), positive and negative affect (PANAS), and depressive symptoms

(CES-D). Moderately depressive participants reported that their subjective

thought speed was significantly faster in the fast condition compared to

the neutral/moderate condition. Moreover, moderately depressive partici-

pants reported greater positive affect in the fast condition relative to the

neutral condition, controlling for baseline positive affect, F(1,32)¼6.30,

P¼0.02. These effects on subjective thought speed and positive mood also

emerged for the nondepressive patients (consistent with previous research).

The severely depressive participants, however, did not report a boost in

thought speed after the fast condition and showed no significant mood effect

(P>0.20). (See Fig. 6 for the estimated marginal means of posttest positive

mood by speed condition and depression status.) Follow-up analyses showed

that thought-speed condition had no effect on negative affect or on CES-D

depressive symptoms for any of the three participant groups.

We replicated thought-speed effects on positivemood in a second exper-

iment with 196 nondepressive, moderately depressive, and severely depres-

sive participants on MTurk. In this experiment, we used a rigorous method

to contact participants immediately after screening to ensure that any


depressive symptoms would not have abated by the time participants initi-

ated the actual experiment. During the experiment, participants reported

pretest positive and negative affect (PANAS), self-esteem (Beck Self-Esteem

Scale; Beck et al., 2001), and depressive symptoms using the Physician

Health Questionnaire (PHQ; Kroenke, Spitzer, &Williams, 2001). Follow-

ing the manipulation, they completed these measures again. As in Experi-

ment 1, the thought-speed manipulation elevated reports of thought

speed for participants whose BDI scores were consistent with moderate

depression (and for nondepressive participants), but not for those whose

BDI scores were consistent with severe depression. And, as in Experiment

1, the fast-thinking condition led participants with moderate depressive

symptoms to report increased positive affect. Again, consistent with Exper-

iment 1, this positive mood boost was also found for nondepressed partic-

ipants, but not for those whose BDI scores suggested severely depressive

symptoms. There also was no effect of thought-speed condition on negative

affect for participants with moderate or severe depressive symptoms, though

the nondepressive participants indicated higher negative affect in the fast

condition. There were no speed effects on self-esteem or depressive symp-

toms for any of the participant groups.

In a recent experiment, Stoddard (2015) tested a novel thought-speed

manipulation using a sample of women with subclinical depression. Partic-

ipants aged 50–69 were recruited based on a score of �14 on the PHQ-9

(Kroenke et al., 2001), which corresponds with depressive symptoms in

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

None/minimalsymptoms

Mild/moderatesymptoms

Severesymptoms

Po

stt

est

po

sit

ive

mo

od

A

1

1.5

2

2.5

3

3.5

4

4.5

5

None/minimalsymptoms

Mild/moderatesymptoms

Severesymptoms

Po

sit

ive

mo

od

B Neutral

Fast

* * n.s.** n.s. *

Fig. 6 Fast thinking enhances posttest positive mood (controlling for pretest positivemood) for participants with no depressive symptoms and symptoms of mild to moder-ate depression, but not for participants with symptoms of severe depression, in Exper-iment 1 (A) and Experiment 2 (B) (based on data from Yang et al., 2014).


the minimal to moderate range. Thought speed was manipulated with a

writing task. In the fast-thinking condition, participants were instructed

to write as fast as possible for 10 min on a blank sheet of paper about any

topic. In the control (normal speed) condition, participants were instructed

to copy, at a leisurely pace, an article that experimenters provided. Perceived

thought speed, positive and negative mood (PANAS-X with additional

mood items), depressive symptoms (Zung Self-Rating Depression Scale;

Zung, 1965), and physiological arousal were measured before and after

the manipulation. In this experiment, participants did not report greater

posttest positive mood (relative to pretest) in the fast-thinking condition

compared to the neutral-speed condition, but they did report less depressive

symptoms and reduced negative mood following the fast-thinking manip-

ulation. Results for physiological arousal were mixed, with some markers

indicating that fast thinking enhanced a positive sympathetic response

(e.g., increased heart rate variability) and other markers indicating a stress

response (e.g., decreased temperature, increased electrodermal response).

Taken together, these experiments provide some promising evidence

that supports further investigations to test thought-speed manipulations as

a route to supplementing treatments for depression, particularly among indi-

viduals experiencing mild to moderate symptoms of depression. We note,

however, that the effect of fast-thinking inductions has been measured only

immediately following those inductions, and thus, we cannot assess the

duration of the beneficial responses. Clearly, more research is needed to

establish both the duration of the speed effect and whether repeated expo-

sures to fast-thinking inductions (e.g., several times a week for 2 months)

could improve depressive symptoms over time. Severely depressive partic-

ipants were not responsive to the thought-speed manipulations. It is possible

that they were already experiencing psychomotor slowing or impairments in

processing speed that made the induction as it was presented not suitable

for them.

6.2 Bipolar DisorderBipolar disorders are mood disorders that are characterized by extreme fluc-

tuations between positive and negative mood states. In particular, bipolar

I disorder is defined by the presence of alternations between periods of

intense positive mood, elation, and energy (mania) and periods of depression

(DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013). Manic phases consist of

disturbances in affect, cognition, physiological arousal, and behavior.


Hallmark symptoms of a manic episode include the feeling of euphoria and

positive affect; heightened energy and arousal (and decreased need for sleep);

increased risk-taking; grandiosity (i.e., inflated self-esteem); irritability;

motivation to pursue rewards; increased buying and spending; and height-

ened creativity (DSM-5, American Psychiatric Association, 2013;

Andreasen, 1987; Di Nicola et al., 2010; Goodwin & Jamison, 1990;

Gruber, 2011; Jamison, 1989; Johnson, 2000; Mansell & Pedley, 2008;

Meyer, Beevers, & Johnson, 2004; Murray & Johnson, 2010;

Schuldberg, 1990).

Notably, the long list of symptoms of a manic episode bears a remarkable

resemblance to the list of responses engendered bymanipulations that induce

fast thinking (Pronin, 2013; Pronin & Wegner, 2006). This resemblance

raises questions for future thought-speed research. Given that thought speed

is a common prodrome of a manic episode (indeed, more common than

euphoric affect; e.g., Goodwin & Jamison, 1990), might alterations of

thought pace play a causal role in the onset of a manic episode? Might

manipulations that slow thought pace be able to play a role in preventing

the onset of a manic episode? The latter question is one we believe worthy

of experimental investigation.

7. METHODS OF MANIPULATING THOUGHT SPEED

Thought speed has been successfully manipulated using various

methods. Below, we outline major categories of speed manipulations,

including direct (e.g., timed stimuli) and indirect manipulations with sub-

stantial evidence to support their effectiveness as speed manipulations

(e.g., time pressure, sympathetic arousal). Table 2 displays speed induction

techniques that have been used in experimental research.

7.1 Rapidly Presented StimuliOne form of direct speed induction is the cognitive entrainment on external

stimuli that stream at predetermined rates. This form of speed manipulation

involves participants’ exposure to stimuli that are presented at specific

speeds. The stimuli used in this form of speed manipulation have been pri-

marily written, though both visual images and auditory stimuli have also

been tested and shown to demonstrate similar effects (e.g., Chandler &

Pronin, 2012; Pronin, 2011). Whether the induction is written (e.g., text

presented at a rapid speed), visual (e.g., images presented at a fast speed),

or auditory (e.g., speech presented at a rapid speed), the relevant stimuli


Table 2 Methods of Manipulating Thought SpeedSpeed InductionMethod Procedure References

Pharmacological Administration of

amphetamines and

stimulants

Asghar et al. (2003)

Physiological Sympathetic arousal

(e.g., elevation of heart

rate, respiration)

Mata et al. (2012)

Paced reading Keep pace with

computer-presented

paced text

Chandler and Pronin (2012), Duff

and Sar (2015), Pronin et al. (2008)

(Experiment 2), Pronin and Wegner

(2006), Rosser and Wright (2016),

and Yang et al. (2014)

Twitter Read dense (“Twitter-

style”) text vs more

traditional (“airy”) text

Molouki and Pronin (in preparation)

Warped audio Listen to fast vs slow

speech

Kallinen and Ravaja (2005) and

Pronin (2011)

Musical tempo Listen to music or

rhythms at different tempi

Khalfa et al. (2008) and Trochidis

and Bigand (2013)

Average shot

length

Watch film clip with short

vs long average shot

length

Lang, Zhou, Schwartz, Bolls, and

Potter (2000) and Chandler and

Pronin (2012)

Warped video View video stimuli that

proceed at sped-up

(warped) vs normal pace

Pronin et al. (2008)

Plagiarizing Generate original text vs

plagiarize

Pronin et al. (2008) and Stoddard

(2015)

Brainstorming List all solutions to

problem vs viable ones

Pronin et al. (2008) (Experiment 1)

Word problems Do easy vs less easy

problems

Pronin et al. (2008) (Experiment 4)

Decision-

making

Make choice every 4 s vs

every 35 s

Pronin and Ricci (2007)

Counting

upward

Count at a fast vs slow

pace

Pronin and Jacobs (2008)

Category listing List members of big vs

small category

Shingleton (unpublished senior

thesis)

Time pressure Vary amount of time

allotted to complete a task

Ariely, Ockenfels, and Roth (2005)

Temporal

perception

Induce perception that

time flew by or dragged

on

Sackett, Meyvis, Nelson, Converse,

and Sackett (2010)

can be carefully controlled, such that presentation is at predetermined rates

using simple tools such as Microsoft PowerPoint and YouTube for pre-

senting the stimuli, and basic video and sound editing software for producing

the stimuli. For example, Yang et al. (2014) used YouTube videos of

PowerPoint slides that streamed sentences at fast and neutral rates. The sen-

tences were comprised of affect-neutral trivia statements, such as “oranges

contain vitamin C” and “Europe is the only continent without deserts.”

The speed of presentation was determined by pilot testing to assess average

reading speed in the participant sample. Participants were instructed to read

aloud (and submit an online voice recording), in order to ensure that they

kept pace with speed manipulation.

The content and variability of external speed stimuli can be adjusted, as

well. Pronin and Wegner (2006) used timed presentations of progressively

more depressing or progressively more elated statements (Velten, 1968).

Participants were instructed to read each statement aloud, keeping pace with

the timed presentation of the statements. Rosser and Wright (2016) used

affect-neutral trivia statements, but altered the variability of the stimuli so

that participants read all distinct statements or read the same three statements

repeated multiple times over the course of the speed induction.

7.2 Speed-Inducing Cognitive ActivitiesBeyond entrainment to the pace of external stimuli, thought speed can be

manipulated by changing the parameters and demands of cognitive tasks. Fast

and slow thinking can be self-generated. Pronin et al. (2008) induced fast and

slow thinking using various cognitive activities that involved the generation of

ideas. For example, brainstorming was used as a speed induction by instructing

participants to generate any ideas that come to mind without censoring them-

selves (fast condition) vs to carefully think through the problem and generate

only good solutions (slow condition). Subsequent reports of subjective

thought speed confirmed that participants indeed felt that their thoughts were

going faster in the standard brainstorming condition compared to the compar-

ison idea-generation condition (Pronin et al., 2008). Another example of a

cognitive task that can generate different thought speeds involves having par-

ticipants solve easy vs more difficult word problems (Pronin et al., 2008).

7.3 Musical TempoSimilar to the timed presentation of words and images, musical and rhythmic

stimuli have been used to induce the psychological effects associated with


fast and slow thinking. Auditory stimuli can be presented as beats that tap out

a fast or a slow tempo (Khalfa et al., 2008). It is more common, however, for

tempo to be paired with musical tone and variation. Participants are more

likely to report positive emotions and arousal in response to music in a major

key and fast tempo (Khalfa et al., 2008; Morton & Trehub, 2007). Negative

emotions and sadness are more commonly associated with music in a minor

key proceeding at a slow tempo (Trochidis & Bigand, 2013). Although there

is substantial evidence that tempo fluctuations in music produce effects on

mood and arousal that corroborate evidence from direct manipulations of

thought speed, we recommend musical thought-speed inductions include

a manipulation check for perceived thought speed.

7.4 Pharmacological and Physiological AlterationsChemically and physically induced variations in thought speed may be the

most commonly experienced speed manipulations in everyday life. The con-

sumption of caffeine may be an everyday fast speed induction that many take

for granted. Placebo-controlled studies have found that stimulant drugs such as

caffeine and amphetamines not only increase processing speed but also

increase sympathetic arousal and can elevate positive mood, perceived energy,

alertness, and novelty-seeking (Childs & de Wit, 2006; Durlach et al., 2002;

Kirkpatrick et al., 2016; Sax & Strakowski, 1998; Smith, 2002; Vollm et al.,

2004; White et al., 2006). Interestingly, after administration of methamphet-

amine or cocaine, rats exhibited increased clock speed (a measure of internal

time estimation) and increased impulsivity (Heilbronner & Meck, 2014).

Likewise, aerobic exercise that increases sympathetic nervous system

arousal and exposure to rapidly moving stimuli (e.g., speed setting on a

treadmill) may be considered a form of self-induced thought-speed alter-

ation. Exercise has been shown to increase cognitive processing speed

(Brisswalter, Collardeau, & Rene, 2002; Yagi, Coburn, Estes, & Arruda,

1999). Aerobic exercise directly alters the speed of heart rate, respiration,

and movements of the skeletomuscular system. A substantial body of

research supports the positive mood-boosting effects of exercise and the

use of exercise as a treatment for depressive symptoms (for meta-analysis,

see Mata et al., 2012; Mead et al., 2009; Rethorst, Wipfli, & Landers, 2009).

7.5 Time PerceptionThe progression, duration, and enjoyment of time may be properties of

experience that affect thought speed. The progression of thoughts in a


logical, expansive manner produces more positive emotions compared to

the feeling that thoughts are stuck in a stagnant cycle (Mason & Bar,

2012). Time pressure, which involves allotting a long time vs a short time

for a task, may induce participants to think faster or slower. Time pressure

increases the riskiness of decisions (Ariely et al., 2005). However, time pres-

sure is an imperfect manipulation of thought speed, because it induces more

aversive experiences such as agitation, negative mood, anxiety, and burnout

(Glowinkowski & Cooper, 1987; Teuchmann, Totterdell, & Parker, 1999).

On the other hand, the subjective feeling that time progressed faster than

expected can lead to more positive reactions. One experiment manipulated

the experience of time progression by telling some participants that they had

spent 5 min on a task, when, in reality, they had worked on the task for

10 min, whereas other participants were told that they had spent twice as

long on the task (Sackett et al., 2010). When participants were led to believe

that time passed more quickly than it actually did, participants reported the

task as being more enjoyable. It would be interesting for future research to

examine whether distortions in time perception can in fact induce a posthoc

impression of fast thinking, and whether that posthoc feeling, in turn,

induces consequences of fast thinking.

8. SOME FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR THOUGHT-SPEEDRESEARCH

The adaptive theory of thought speed provides a framework for

predicting the varied consequences of accelerating and decelerating thought

speed. Some key causal relations in this theory have been tested, including

the effects of thought speed on mood and risk-taking. However, as elabo-

rated below, several key relations predicted by the model need to be further

explored through empirical research.

8.1 Thought Speed and PsychophysiologyThe adaptive theory of thought speed predicts that accelerating thought

speed stimulates psychophysiological activity that enables action and arousal,

whereas decelerating thought speed should reduce activity and arousal.

There is some empirical evidence to support this prediction: researchers

have found increased activity of the sympathetic nervous system following

fast thinking induction, but not slow thinking induction (Kallinen &Ravaja,

2005; Stoddard, 2015). There is also corroborating evidence from multiple

disciplines to suggest that increasing the subjective experience of speed


should affect physiological arousal (see Section 3.5 on fast thinking and

arousal). Fast thinking also increases arousal as measured by EEG (Duff &

Sar, 2015). Future research should continue to examine physiological

responses to fast and slow thinking. Physiological arousal may mediate the

relation between fast thinking and behavioral activation (e.g., problem-

solving, risk-taking, consumption). More research is also needed to clarify

the relation between thought speed and dopaminergic networks of the

brain. Does the experience of fast thinking activate networks that modulate

reward-sensitivity?

8.2 Thought Speed and CognitionA key assumption of our theory is that fast thinking can be adaptive under

specific circumstances.Wewould predict that the ability to lock in and focus

on novel or potentially threatening stimuli that emerge at a fast rate would be

useful for survival. This could be manifested in the ability to quickly detect a

predator or a dangerous situation and to enact a sequence of behaviors to

avoid a harmful predicament. Alternatively, the ability to quickly detect

and act upon rewarding stimuli would be evolutionarily advantageous, as

well. Both situations necessitate an ability to quickly simulate or model

courses of actions and their consequences and to determine the most effec-

tive present behavior. When conscious, intentional, and effortful screening

of alternatives is not possible, fast thinking may continue to dominate the

selection of automatic, intuitive, and familiar responses.

How does the alteration of perceived thought speed affect cognitive pro-

cesses that support decision-making? The acceleration and deceleration of

thought may itself be a manipulation of processing speed. Although this idea

seems likely, empirical research should be conducted to confirm that

thought-speed manipulations affect processing speed in domains such as psy-

chomotor speed, decision speed, and perceptual speed. Experiments should

examine whether thought-speed manipulations affect reaction time, stimu-

lus detection, inhibition, response accuracy, and working memory.

8.3 Thought Speed and CommunicationSpeed of delivery is an essential property of audio and video forms of com-

munication where information unfolds over a time course (Bosker, 2017).

For instance, participating in a conversation, playing a radio broadcast,

watching an advertisement on TV, listening to a lecture, and watching

the news all involve perceiving stimuli presented in a sequence with a par-

ticular amount of information per unit of time. Synchronization of speech


rate occurs spontaneously during interpersonal conversations (Kurzius,

2015). As a result, thought-speed research has implications for the produc-

tion, delivery, and reception of communication. The consequences of such

variations can be significant, as, for example, in the case of health commu-

nications designed to influence and promote health behaviors (Yang &

Pronin, 2017).

The rate of speech is a potent indicator of emotional tone in messages,

especially for differentiating between sad and happy emotional content

(Breinstein, van Lancker, & Daum, 2001). And “fast speakers” can be per-

ceived as more intelligent, attractive, objective, persuasive, and credible,

compared to “slow speakers” (Chebat et al., 2007; Miller, Maruyama,

Beaber, & Valone, 1976; Street, Brady, & Putman, 1983). News stories spo-

ken at a faster pace are rated more positively and induce more sympathetic

arousal than slower-read ones (Kallinen & Ravaja, 2005). In the modern

world of Internet and social media technologies, though, rapid speech is only

one of a number of speedy communication methods that people are exposed

to. For example, social media like Twitter present text in brief, densely

packed, and constantly flowing stories. In an initial investigation of the con-

sequences of exposure to such stimuli, Molouki and Pronin (unpublished)

tested whether sentences constructed in the brief and dense style characteristic

of Twitter posts induced subjectively faster speed of thinking compared to

sentences written in a more conventional or “airy” style. Mechanical Turk

participants (N¼95) who read Twitter-style sentences reported significantly

faster thought speed compared to those who read conventional sentences (i.e.,

sentences that said the same thing but with less shorthand, fewer abbreviations,

and overall more characters). However, there were no effects of the Twitter

manipulation on postmanipulationmood or creativity, suggesting that reading

Twitter-like text may be more complicated than a standard thought-speed

manipulation. The thought-accelerating effects of electronically mediated

communications like Twitter and instant messaging should be examined.

There is a dearth of empirical research measuring how these novel technolog-

ical forms of communication may influence thought speed.

9. CONCLUSION: THOUGHT SPEED INTHE MODERN WORLD

In this chapter, we reviewed a frequently overlooked dimension

of the mind: the experience of speed in thinking. We may not be aware

of the pace of our thinking until we experience sudden shifts, such as

the malaise of being sick or a sudden inspiration from a flow of ideas.


But thought speed, and mundane alterations in it, are a constant property

of our human existence.

The idea of “today’s fast-paced world” seems like an apt description of

contemporary society in the industrialized world. Never before has exposure

to news, commentary, conversation, and information been as rapid and

accessible as it is today (truly a fingertip away on mobile devices). It seems

like new innovations in products and services, such as rideshare apps, mobile

banking, fast food stores, and online dating, keep enabling more efficiency

and more speed. Of course, these sentiments that life is racing by are not

entirely new. Artists and writers from Virgil to Pink Floyd (e.g., “tempus

fugit” and the song “Time”) have commented on the perception that time

is limited, fleeting, or racing by. More recently, though, some have again

voiced a nostalgic call to return to the slower past. Proponents of the Slow

Movement emphasize the quality of relationships and experiences over the

quantity of meetings that you attend or items on the schedule. For example,

the “Slow Food” movement, which focuses on traditional (sometimes labo-

rious) processes of preparing food and stopping to enjoy meals, began as a

protest of the fast food industry (Hsu, 2014). Others caution that children’s

creativity has been steadily decreasing as a consequence of technologies and

lifestyles that increase the pace of living but do not allow as many opportu-

nities for free play, face-to-face social interaction, and engagement in

“reflective abstraction” (Kim, 2011).

Why are the things that speed us up so irresistible? Our review may shed

light on this question. Multiple lines of evidence from fields including social

psychology, cognitive psychology, clinical psychology, psychopharmacol-

ogy, neuroscience, and marketing research have pointed to the mood-

uplifting, behaviorally activating, and physiologically arousing consequences

of fast thinking, as well as to the depressing effects of slow thinking. Tem-

porary states of being in a rush, of ideas taking flight, or simply of thinking

more quickly than we were a minute ago, may not facilitate a nostalgic

return to the “slow life,” but they may produce some of the positive feelings

that we crave.

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Consequences of Thought Speed - Princeton University

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