ABSTRACTIn response to the pressures inflicted by the processes of modernisation andglobalisation, particularly the spread of secular education among women, the SunnimalereligiousauthoritiesinIranianBaluchistan,likemanyotherplaces,adoptednewstrategies. They specifically and unprecedentedly introduced female institutions tocontrol behaviour of young females. However, these measures have significantlyaffectedthebehaviourandimageofwomenmadrasastudentsandteachersabouttheirsocial roles, which traditionally were restricted to the private sphere of familialinstitutions aswere sanctifiedby the religion. In a complexprocess of social change,associatedwith thediversificationof values, themadrasawomen, in theirownways,defined their individuality, identityandrational judgements.Thisarticle investigatesthe changes in attitudes of the religious authorities regarding religious education offemales;andexaminesthebehaviourandimagesofmadrasawomenabouttheirsocialroles in Iranian Baluchistan. In collecting data, the research is based on a variety ofmethods,bothsecondaryandprimarythroughdifferentmeansofcommunication.Keywords:Deobandi,Sunni,FemaleMadrasa,Fazelah,Talibah,Baluchistan,Iran,Education,
INTRODUCTION
In a speechmoulviMohammadYousufHusainpoor, themanagingdirectorof theCouncil forCoordinationofSunnimadrasas (seminaries) inSistanandBaluchistan (hereafterCCM),anddirectoroftheA’inul-UlumMadrasa-Gosht(TheSourceofKnowledge),hasstronglyattackedthe teachers, educational authorities, and the policies which widen the space for womenstudentsinstateSchools.In the speech, he angrily announced his concerns regarding the lack of hijab, the issue ofsocialisingandmixingofwomenandmen, and thequestionof campingandschool trips forwomen and men, even though they were held separately. He asserted that “the integrity,respect for life, isgraduallymovingawayfromus”;and“thegirlswithoutaclosememberofmalefamily(mahram)gatherandtravel for leisure,sightseeingandcamping. Is itanhonourforyou?”Headdedthat“ifthissituationreallycontinues,wehavetoshutdownthoseschools,wedon’twantourdaughters tobedishonoured”…. “Wehave forgotten theQuranandhavepursuedwestern typeofdevelopment…,…. In thepast, if someonegotabadreputationyourdecencywould request todestroyher.Youhavebecomedishonoured,whatdecencydoyouhave?”… “fromwhen theyare6yearsold, thegirls ingroupsof30-40gatherand talkwitheachothertoovercometheirsenseofshameandhonour…..Weshouldfindasolutionfortheseproblems…. Ihave reallybecomemad, Ihavecaught fire, Iwarn the teachers, theeducationauthorities,iftheycontinueinthiswayIwillreadytolosemyheadinthiscase.Wedon’twantthiskindofeducation,todestroyourreputation,tobelikeAmericanandmaleandfemalemixtogether”.Thenhesaidthat“weloudlyshout‘deathtoAmerica’butwefollowtheirways.”(Aprivateaudiowhichmaybefrom2009-2013,received2016).
Thisspeech,whichisfullofthreatsandevenencouragementofviolence,wasdeliveredquiterecentlybyatraditionalandinfluentialmoulvi,alongtimeaftertheconstructionofthefemalemadrasas(maktabs),confirmedbyCCM.TheSunniclericsandtheiraffiliatedwebsiteswidelyargue that thenotionofwomen’s freedom isa “conspiracy”by theWest (seeMahmoodzahi,2016).TheclericsintheareaarguethatitistheobligationofMuslimsandwomen’smadrasasto stop thedamagingcultural invasionspreadbysatellitesandothermeans (See Ismailzahi,2014).Theseideasreflectthecontinuousconcernsthattheclericshaveabouttheprocessofsecularisationandwomen’sincreasingscopeofsocialisation,whichinfluencewomen’slives.TheSharia-orientedinstitutions,particularlywheretheyarestrong,havealwaysattemptedtolimit the power of modern secular institutions and individuals, to limit their influence onwomen’s lives. The conservative Sunni clerics, in Sistan and Baluchistan, asmany others indifferent places, have seen secularisation and rationalisation as real threats, and corruptingfactorsinIslamicsociety.Byinfluencingwomen’slives,theybelieve,rationalism,particularlythroughsecularorstateeducation,hasbeenunderminingthecoremoralissuesdefinedbytheIslamicreligion.Thevisibilityofwomeninpublicplaceshasbeenthemostimportantsourceoffear for the conservative religiousmale authorities, believing that women in this way havebeen questioning the superiority and authority of males, and destabilising the traditionalvalues.Inresponse,tominimisewhattheyhaveconsideredasthedamagingeffectsofthisprocess,onan Islamic society in general, andwomen’s behaviour in particular, the clerics adopted newand difficult strategies. Rather than sticking only to the inefficient and old mechanisms ofpreachingaboutcontrollingwomeninthedomesticspace,fromtheearly1990s,theystartedto build religious institutions, such asmadrasas, missionary organisations andworshippingcongregations,forthem.Theseinstitutionshaveservedasanewmeansofeducationalcontrolbypartiallyincludingwomen,inorganisationswhichtraditionallywereexclusivelypreservedforthemale.In adopting such a strategy, in Iranian Baluchistan, the Sunni religious authorities wereinfluencedbynational,regionalandglobalgeopoliticaltransformation.TheIranianrevolution,andthedevelopmentswhichemergedinAfghanistanandPakistan,significantlyreshapedthereligious institutions inthewholeregion ingeneral,andparticularlytheDeobandimadrasas’organisations. However, because of the constant pressure of the secular environment, anddistrust of the IRI education system, the Sunni clerics have never felt comfortable aboutwomenchallengingpositionsandnewformsofsocialisationintheircommunities.Sincethen,anevenbiggerissueforthetraditionalclericshasbeenthespreadoftheinternetand social media, which are widely used by females, particularly young women, forcommunications, exchangeof ideas andpersonal relationships.Nowweare going to look atsome researches available on comparable women’smadrasas in the region, particularly inIndiaandPakistan.AsfarasIamaware,thereisonlylimitedempiricalresearchontheDeobandifemalemadrasas.Theexistingresearchescoversomespecificareasindifferentcountries,particularlyPakistanandIndia.However,thereisnotevenasingleresearchonDeobandifemalemadrasas(or,forthatmatter,male)inIran.Researchonwomen’smadrasas,inthesubcontinentwasneglectedfora longtime,butwhenthe JamiaHafzaMadrasarevoltalsoknownas theLalMasjid(RedMosque) event - happened in 2007 in Islamabad, thewomen’smadrasas were subjected tofurther scrutiny, mainly to understand the possibility of radicalisation of these types ofmadrasa(seeMEMRI,2010;Roul,2010;Ali,2009;Jalil,2005).
The researches, conducted by Bano (2010, 2007) and Fair (2008), in Pakistan, explain thedevelopment of women’s madrasas by applying demand side economics under uncertaineconomicconditions.Theirfocushasbeenpredominantlyontheurbanmiddleclassmadrasas,withcomplementaryandrationalgoals.But therearevarious typesofwomen’smadrasas inPakistan,andonlysomeofthem,whichworkasprivateeducationalbusinesses,aresubjecttorational choice andare likely tobe regulatedby thegovernment educationdepartment (e.g.seeJamiaMinhajul-Sharia,2010;also,Noraiee,2011).For some other researchers, the emergence of femalemadrasas has been considered as adefensive response to the modernisation of society and liberal attitudes towards women(Alam, 2010; Sikand, 2006; Winkelmann, 2005). However, these researches are based onmadrasasinIndia;itisverylikelythatmanymadrasasinPakistanhavethesameconcernsanddefinetheiraimsastranscendental.With regard to explaining the influence ofmadrasas on female students in different cases,however, anumberof researchershavemadeattempts to apply theFocauldianapproachofbodycontrolorGoffman’s“totalinstitutions”(seeAlam,2010;Farooq,2010;Mahmood,2001,2005; Winkelmann 2005; Lughud, 1998; and for a comprehensive revision sees Noraiee,2011). From this perspective, the madrasas are considered as “total institutions” whichstrongly and physically control gender relations. A question which remains from here, andneeds to be investigated further, is how strongly formal organisational regulations andmechanismsofcontrolscanmakewomensubmissive.Inanotherstudy,Jefferyetal.(2006,2004)explainedthebehaviourofreligiousauthoritiesinIndia, on the basis of gender and class relations. They believed that religious authoritiesviewedmadrasas and education from a modern middle class point of view. Based on thisapproach,itcanbesuggestedthatclericsdonothavehomogenousinterests,andinrelationtowomentheymayadoptdifferentstrategies.Inexploringthemadrasawomen’sbehaviour,nearlyall researchershaveheavily focusedonformalsourcesandcurriculumsandignoredthefactthatwomeninmadrasasarenotapassiveforce,buttheyareactiveandabletomanipulatetherulesandregulations(seeScott,2010).Inthese studies, broader political, economic and cultural reasons for the emergence anddevelopmentofthesemadrasashavebeenunderestimated.Inabroadercontext,despiteallthepressuresforIslamisationandde-secularisationofsocietyby the conservative Muslim authorities, supported by the traditional familial institutions,rationalisationhasnotbeencompletelyprevented fromprogressing(seeRuthven,2007).Ashas been argued by Riesebrodt (1993), what “fundamentalists” are not able to stop instructural transformation, they attempt to impose in symbolicways (see Ruthven, 2007:65;WoodandBunn,2009;BrannenandNilson,2005;Veter,2003;Beyer,1990).Intheglobalisingera, thesenseofpowerbyagencieswhichhaveshapedwomen’s identitiesalso should be considered. The general concepts discussed by Giddens (1991) as self-reflexivity in the context of “de-traditionalisation”, and by Bourdieu (1990) as practicalstrategies,couldbeilluminating.Inthesameway,Bauman(2007)in“LiquidTimes”andBeck(1990)asrisksociety,haveexplainedsomesignificantaspectsofglobalisingsocieties.Thesecharactersofwesternsocietiesmaynotspreadevenlyandsmoothly,buthavetouchednerveseverywhere.
This article will show that how the progress of the contradictory aspects of “de-traditionalisation”(Heelas1996)1,inIslamictraditionalsocieties,isreflectedinthemannerofthe religiousmale authorities towardswomen, particularly due to the emergence of femaleIslamicmadrasas.Thisstudyalsoexaminesthemadrasawomen’sbehaviour,inthecontextsofthe madrasas and other religious institutions. In this respect both opportunities andconstraints,inshapingwomen’sidentitieswillbediscussed.
METHODOLOGYThisstudyisbasedonbothprimaryandsecondarydata,collectedduringaperiodfrom2008-2016. Some sections of it were presented at a conference on globalisation at the CocailyUniversity in Turkey in 2010. The primary enquiriesweremade through personal contacts,interviews, informal conversations, andwritten answers to some open and semi-structuredquestionnaires.Thesemeasureswere implementedbymeansofemails, telephonecalls,postandfax,afewfacetofaceinterviews,WhatsAppandotherformsofsocialmedia.Awiderangeof secondary data was acquired by looking at thewebsites and newsletters to which I hadaccess.ThedocumentsaremainlyavailableinthePersianlanguage.Accesstowomenasmadrasastudentsorteachersisnotimpossibleforamaleresearcher,butit isextremelydifficult. Iwasable, throughmyfamilyconnections, tohaveaccesstosomeofthewomeninformantsandafewmaleclericswhoteachandworkatmadrasas.Therangeofparticipants was widened to some extent by getting written responses to the open/ semi-structuredquestionnaire. Inthisrespect, Iwasalsohelpedbythesamefamilymembers.Formanyreasons,Ishouldkeeptheirnamesanonymousandonlyusepseudonyms.Asfarastheresponsestothequestionnairesisconcerned:thenumberofrespondentswas27,ofwhom24were talibahs (femalemadrasa students)and3weremoddaress (teachers).Therespondentswere fromtwomadrasas,andsomeof themhadexperienceofstudying inbothplaces.BothmadrasasarelocatedinSaravandistrictinSoutheastIranintheprovinceofSistanandBaluchistan.Nearlyallfemalestudentsandteacherswhoparticipatedintheresearchwerefromthesameoradjacentlocalareas.Facetofaceinformalconversationswiththreewomen,includingtwofazelahs,onetalibah,andonemalemoulvi,wereconductedinaGulfcountryinAugust2015.Threeoftheseparticipantshadalreadyhelpedme incollecting informationaswell. Since then,datagatheringhasbeenfollowedupthroughViberandWhatsAppchatsandtextmessages.Geographically, theempiricalresearchgatheredfrominterviewsismainly limitedtoSaravandistrict,whereIhadmoreopportunitytofindandcontactpeople.Thenumberofparticipantsis also limited and gaining access to more women participants was extremely difficult.Meanwhile, there may be some differences between behaviour in madrasas and the waywomenbehaveindifferentsocial,politicalandculturalsettings.Thesemakedrawinggeneralconclusionsveryproblematic.But it isalsovery likely that inmanyrespects therearesomesimilarities; for example, the teaching programmes, background of the teachers, generalreligiousandculturalconcernsandmaledecisionmakers.
1-AccordingtoHeelas“Asaworkingdefinition,de-traditionalisationinvolvesashiftofauthorityfrom’without’to’within’. It entails the decline of the belief in pre-given or natural orders of things. Individual subjects arethemselves called upon to exercise authority in the face of the disorder and contingency, which are therebygenerated.’Voice’isdisplacedfromestablishedsources,comingtorestwiththeself.”(Heelas,1996:2).
FINDINGSANDDISCUSSIONSNowwewilloutlineandexplainthefindingsunderthefollowingsubsections:I)ageneralviewoffemalemadrasas;II)Personalidentitiesofthefazelahsandtalibahs;III)Locallabourmarket,opportunitiesandconstraints;IV)Acquisitionofknowledgeasachoicethroughmadrasas;V)Talibahs’andfazelahs’ imagesofselfandmaleauthorities;VI)Corruptionasamainconcern;VII)Challenges:familyandsociety;VIII)Pietyandconfidence.AgeneralviewofthefemalemadrasasOpeningfemalemadrasasamongtheSunniMuslimsinSoutheastIranisanewphenomenon.Before the Islamic Revolution in 1979, therewere nowomenmadrasas in the area and themoulvis(atitleforhighly-rankedandqualifiedSunniclerics inthearea,),wereevenstronglyagainstwomen’seducationinsecularinstitutions.Aftertherevolution,themoulvis,foraboutadecade,becamemorerelaxedabouttheIslamicState’spoliciesbecausetheyfeltthatthenewregimewouldwidentheircontroloverthepublicsphere.Thus,theyadoptedasofterapproachregardingwomen’seducation. Influencedbythedevelopments inIranandamongDeobandisinPakistan,theystartedtoopenfemalemadrasasintheearly1990s.However,thefemalemadrasasstartedtoemergequiterecently;in2011onemoulvistatedinan interview that “thegirlsaredoingverywelland thenumberof theirmadrasas soonmayexceed the malemadrasas” (SH, 5 September 2011). Now (2016), it is estimated that thenumberofwomen’smadrasashasalreadyexceededthenumberofmalemadrasas.According to another moulvi (AH, 12 December 2016) there were more than 50 femalemadrasasinthetownofSaravanalonein2016.Eshaa’tal-TowhidMadrasa-Saravanstatedthattheyhad30 female affiliatemadrasas in Saravan in 2013 (Eshaa’t al-Towhid, 2013).Dar-ul-Ulum Madrasa-Zahedan (House of Knowledge Madrasa), also known as Makki Madrasa,openeditsownfemalemadrasa“Maktab-eHazratA’ishaSediqah”(“MadrasaofSaintAisha”),in1991.Thisfemalemadrasa,whichisthelargest,andpossiblytheonlyonewithboardandlodging facilities, in the whole province, has 12 branches in Zahedan (Sunni online, 2017).Consideringtheoverallevidence, thetotalnumberof femalemadrasas,bigandsmall,canbeestimatedtobeconsiderablyhigherthan500,withover10,000talibahs.Allwomenmadrasas, intermsofcatchmentareas,arehighlylocalised,whilethebiggermalemadrasasareprovincialorevenregional.Becauseoftherestraintsimposedonthemobilityofwomen, asamatterofprestige, reputation, accessibilityandpublicity,manysmallerwomenmadrasasormaktabshavebeenlocallyestablished.Theyhavebeenspreadinginlocalareastoprovide the community women with religious education. Simultaneously, it seems thatlocalisationofwomenmadrasas isusedasamechanismofsurveillance for judgingwomen’sbehaviour,andputtingpressureonthemtocomplywithreligiousvaluesandactaccordingtothemaleprojectedprogrammes.Thenumberoftalibahsineachfemalemadrasavaries,butonaveragemaybebetween20-30and the largermaktabs couldhave50-60 talibahs,while thebiggestmadrasaswhich are directlymanaged by bigmalemadrasas have over 100 talibahs(Mory,9December2016).(SeeAppendix-1;Table-1)The localmaktabs, asaffiliatesofmoreprestigiousmalemadrasas,have insomecasesbeensponsoredbywealthy local businesspeople (mainlymale). These typesofmadrasas usuallyuse volunteer fazelahs in teaching basic courses, and moulvis from the established malemadrasasforteachingmoreadvancedcourses.
Unlike the male teachers, nearly all women teachers are unpaid. For example, among allwomenmadrasasinSaravan,onlyabout2womenmadrasaspaywagestofazelahs,mainlyonapart-timebasis,andataconsiderably lowerrate thanmalemoulvis.Unpaidwomenteachersmay be rewarded from time to time with gifts from students and sometimes officials anddonors. Mory, a female part-time teacher, put it in this way “It does notmean that we getnothing.Imyselfwanttogetmywageinanotherworldandgetitinfullandfewtimesmore.”(10December2016).Thereisnotaclearfigureforthenumberofannualgraduatesfromthefemalemadrasasinthisprovince, but currently it may easily be 400-500 for the whole province. Many smallermadrasas arenotata level tohave theirowngraduates,or theyarenew,andsomeof theirtalibahs join other localmaktabs for higher level studies. These figures do not include thenumberofhafizes(memorisersoftheQuranbyheart),whoannuallycanbeafewhundredintheProvince.Onlyin2017,Darul-UluminZahedancelebratedthegraduationof136fazelahs(Eshaa’tal-Towhid,2017).For3years,from2013-2016,afewMaktabsaffiliatedtoShamsul-UlumandDarul-UlumHaqqaniyyainIranshahrhad184womengraduates(seeShamsonline,2016).AccordingtoanestimateforSaravantownandsurroundingsonly,in2015intotaltherewereabout 2,000 fazelahs but only about 100-200of themwere engaged in teaching atwomen’smaktabs (Mory, 24April 2016).Otherswork as housewives, andmany of themat the sametime teach theQuran to neighbouringwomen and children at home. Some of them are alsoactiveinparticipatingandorganisingTablighiJamaa’tgroupsforwomen.Femalemadrasas, as faras theyareaffiliatesofCCMmalemadrasas, followamale- catered,quitestandardisedcurriculum,whichisadilutedversionofthemaleone,setbytheCCM2(seeAppendix- 2; Table- 2). Therefore, the femalemadrasas are regulated and controlled by themalemadrasas. Intermsofopportunitiesforhigher levelsofeducationandmorespecialisedchoices, the femalestudentsaremore limitedand lessprivileged, incomparison to themalestudents. However, in some areas they have gained some opportunities to study at higherlevelsparticularly inZahedan.Forexample, in “Maktab-eA’ishaSediqah”, thewomencanbespecialists in the areas of Tafsir, Jurisprudence, and Guidance and Islamic Thought (Sunnionline,2017).Becauseof thenatureof femalemadrasasas local institutions,andthedominantattitudesoffamilyandmaleauthorities,nearlyallfemalemadrasasdonotbenefitfromthefullboardandlodging facilities made available for full-time male students in many large madrasas.Meanwhile,malestudents’studieslastforaperiodof9years(orinsomecasesasmuchas10oreven12years)whilefemalestudents’studiestake7years.Forthefirst3years,theymainlystudygrammar,basicsubjects inethicsandFiqh,mostly in theFarsi language,butafter thattheygraduallystarttostudysomemorecomplexandancienttextsinFiqh,TafsirandHadith,mainlytranslatedintoFarsiandsomeintoArabicaswell(SeeAppendix-2;Table-2).Furthermore,themalestudentscanmovetoothernon-localandmoreprestigiousmadrasas,bothinthesameprovinceandeveninPakistan,wheretheycancontinuetheirstudiesinmore2ThecurriculumapprovedbytheCCMisbasedonthecurriculaofaselectionofDeobandimadares(pl.madrasa)in Pakistan but it is not the same (see Farooq, 2010: 80-83). For another curriculum and the Dars-e NizamicurriculumseeFair(2008:103-114).Themaintextbooksinthecurriculumareoldandhardlyincludeanybooksfrom19th centuryandafter.Hadith, as themain specialisedarea, has a specialplace in the curriculumofmalemadrasas,butislessfocusedinfemalemadrasas.
specialistareassuchas“Efta”(religiousedicts)andHadith(tradition).Butthefull-timewomenhaveverylimitedchancestomovetoaprestigiousmadrasaandgainspecialisedtitlesasmendo.With the increasing number of fazelahs in this province, some fundamental changes can beseeninthelocalcommunities.Forthefirsttime,manywomenattendlargepublicassembliesand large social congregations, although physically separated from themales. For example,about 3 decades ago, therewere nowomen’sTablighiJamaa’t groups in the area, and theyneverattendedTablighiJamaa’toranyothercollectiveprayersatmosques.ButnowadaystheyorganisetheirownTablighiJamaa’t inthelocalareaandevenperformprayerinmosques,inanareasegregatedbyacurtainorwallfrommaleareas.Atthesametime,thecommitmenttohijabhasbeenconsiderablyincreased.About3-4decadesago,therewerehardlyanywomenwearingniqaborburqainpublic,butnowadaystherearemany.Forexample,atthattime,inaverywell-knownreligiousvillage,therewerefewerthan5women who were seen sadri (satri or setri) and they were usually secluded in their homerather thanusinga full coveringveil andgoingout, butnow therearepossibly40-50 timesmoresatris,includingallfemalemadrasastudents,whoareverylikelytoweartheburqaandgoouttoparticipateinlocalwomen-relatedcongregationsandinstitutions.PersonalidentitiesofthefazelahsandtalibahsThe population structure of respondents in terms of age, state (secular) educationalbackground3, marital status and occupation provides us with some evidence regarding thepersonal identities of the Talibahs, the motives they have and if there is any connectionbetweentheircurrentreligiouseducationandtheirstateschooling.Thefemalerespondents,including3youngfemaleteachers,werebetween18and36yearsofage.While18(67%)ofthemwere25orunder,only3(11%)ofthemwereover30.ThismeansthattherespondentsweremostlyfromagenerationbornaftertheIranianRevolutionin1979.Inreferencetothemaritalstatus,10(37%)ofthemweresingleandbetween18to25yearsofage. The percentage of singlewomen attending localmadrasas were significantly higher, astraditionally single women, after the age of puberty, were more restricted and were notallowed to leave home. About 63% of the women who responded were married, whichindicatesthatmarriagedidnotseemtobeamajorbarriertoattendingthelocalmadrasas.The students’marital status indicated that the attitudes of familial institutions had changedand also that daughters or wives had gained more power to negotiate and improve theirpositions – both in the families and in the communities. The significant number ofmarriedtalibahsinmadrasasalsoshowedthatwomenhadgainedmorespacetopursuesomeoftheirambitionsoutsidethehomeand,atthesametime,improvethestatusoftheirownfamily,aspious and educated, in the community. On the other hand, there are some cases in whichfamiliesputpressureonwomentogotomadrasasratherthangivingthemanopportunitytochoose.
Consideringtheageof thestudents,nearlyallof themhadstateeducationundertheIslamicRepublicofIran,duringwhichmanylocalgirls’schoolsbecameavailable.Atthattime,about50%ofthetalibahshadadiploma(12yearsofstateeducation)andnearly75%ofthemhadadiplomaorasecondarylevelqualification(between9-12yearsofeducation).Theother25%wereeducateduptoprimaryschoollevelonly(upto6yearsofeducation).Eightypercentofthe single female students had diploma qualifications compared with 47% of the marriedwomen.Butnowitseemsthat,particularlyinsmallermaktabswhicharelessprestigiousthanthewomen’smadrasasattachedtolargermalemadrasas,thenumberofdiplomashasbecomeconsiderably less. For example, in amaktab in Saravan (February 2016), in grade 2, from9talibahs only3haddiplomas.Therearehardlyanyuniversitygraduatesamong the talibahs.Meanwhile, during the last decade, from the time the semi-structured questionnaire wasconducted, opportunities for diploma-holders to enter universities have considerablyincreased, and these are available in all small districts, and through correspondence nearlyeverywhere.Thelocallabourmarket:opportunitiesandconstraintsOccasionally, foreducatedwomenwithdiplomasorhigherqualifications,someteachingjobsorotherformsofemploymentmaybeavailable in localschoolsandhealthcentres,buttheirfamiliesmayrestrictthemfromacceptingsuchkindofjobswhichrequiredailycommutingtoschoolsandmuchengagementandcommitmentoutsidethehome.However,thisisnotalwaysthecase;forexample,amoulvihadtoldhisdaughterstherewouldbenoproblemwiththemworkingiftheycouldgetjobslocallybuttheywouldnotbeallowedtomovetoanotherplace.Anothermalemoulvi,withauniversitydegreeandateachingjobinamadrasa, has allowedhiswife,whohas auniversitydegreeaswell, to attenda local femalemadrasatostudy,andalsotoworkasafull-time/part-timeinasocialcaringinstitutioninthedistrictcentre.Butgenerallyspeaking,andastheresearchfindingsaboutthefemalerespondentsintheruralarea and small semi-rural town showed, the local labour market provided very limitedopportunities for employment. For example, noneof the talibahsinterviewedhad apaid joband3madrasateacherswereworkingasvolunteers.Togainmoreinsightsaboutthelabourmarketrestraints,itmaybeusefultonoticethatamongthehusbandsofthemarriedwomen,9outof17(53%)hadadiploma,butonlyafewofthemwereinteachingprofessions.Oneofthesemen,mentionedinthequestionnaire,hadadegreeandalsoworkedasateacher.Manyofthehusbandshadbeencategorisedasself-employedortheir jobs were left unspecified. Self-employment in the local area is more likely to be aninvolvementintheinformaleconomy,whichismainlybasedonsmall-scaletrading,orevenaformofunemploymentwithseasonalorcasualwork.Thisisevidencethatalargenumberofthemadrasamarriedwomenwerefromthefamilieswithinsecurejobs.Buttheconstraintsonchoicesbeyondmadrasas,suchasearlymarriageandtherestrictionofmobilityoffemales,arestillstrongandactasadisablingforce,combinedwiththeconstraintsin the local labourmarket in terms of limited employment opportunities.Where the actualchoices are limited, the experience of these women in secular education seems to have animportant influenceontheirprocessofmakingdecisionsto jointhe localmadrasas. Itseemsthatthesameprocessforgainingsocialandculturalcapitalhasbeenextendedtothereligiousfields.
Therestrictionsonmobilityactnotonlywithregardstotheemploymentofwomen,butalsotothe continuation of their secular education, particularly at the higher levels. Studying at thehigherandmoreprestigiouseducationalinstitutes,whicharemainlyestablishedinthelargercitiesandtowns,notonlyrequirespassinganentranceexambutalsoextrafinancialresources.Furthermore, the willingness of the families is crucial, to overcome the conservativecommunitytraditionsbyallowingtheirdaughtersorsisterstomovetoanotherplacefurtherawayfromtheirfamilies.Theseconstraintsmayalsoreflectthegirls’ownpreferencetostudyatalocalmadrasaratherthan in secular higher education.Among the respondents, only one studentwished that shecould continue her education at the university, while all the others preferred to study at areligiousmadrasa of their preference. However, this may not reflect their real wishes as ateacherbelievedthatmanyofthestudentshadnotmuchmotivationtostudyatmadrasas,buttheyhadnootheropportunitiestocontinuetheirstudiesatuniversities.Nowthereasonforadecreaseinthenumberoffemalediploma-holdersinmadrasascouldberelatedtoanincreaseinopportunitiesinhighereducation(Mory,4January2017).This illustrates that the respondents’ statements in this regard should be interpreted withgreat caution because they express their ideas within a context in which their choices areactually limited. Besides, they had already been engaged in amadrasa educationwhich hadattemptedtoinstilasenseofthesuperiorityofthischoiceinanabsoluteway.Meanwhile, incontrasttotheexistenceofwomenmadrasaswithfullboardandlodgingfacilitiesinPakistan,inIran,sofar,thefemaleDeobandimadrasasrarelyhavehadsuchinstitutions.AcquisitionofknowledgethroughmadrasasDesiretoacquireknowledgehasbeenmentionedasthemost importantaiminthestudents’statements. It should be noticed that for themadrasas knowledge is very much limited toreligiousunderstanding.Theevidencesuggeststhat,apartfromsomebasiclinguisticsubjects,they had hardly read books or other materials apart from religious text books which areprescribed by madrasas and are seen as comprehensive sources of “knowledge”. Butconsideringthewiderangeofcommunicationfacilitiesavailabletothem,locality,themadrasaorganisation, and textbooks are no longer determining factors to exclusively structure thebehaviourofwomen,menandcommunities.NearlyalltherespondentswantedtounderstandorbecomefamiliarwithIslamicrules,thelifeof the Prophet Mohammad and his companions, and in fewer cases, they also want tounderstandtheproblemswomenfaceandthepositiontheyshouldoccupyinIslamicsocieties.Onetalibahhaslistedheraimsasfollows:“reformingoneselfandthesociety;understandingour own religion; receiving God’s blessings; being close to God; and wishing to invite andconvert an infidel to Islam”. These aims in many ways are general, but traditionally wereconsidered as a field for the male, rather than a female who also wishes to undertakeevangelicalmissions.Manythemsaidtheywould liketobecomeamadrasateacheraftercompletingtheirstudies.Somehadevangelicalpurposesanddeclaredthattheywouldliketobecomeapreacher,andtospreadIslamicviews.Inatelephoneconversationonetalibahtoldmethatshehadadiploma,
butshealsoneededtolookafterherchildrenandthereweremanyeducatedpeopleinsecularsubjects,buttherewerenotmanyeducatedinreligion(Mory,10September2008).4The talibahs’ secular educational background, possibly influences their desire to appreciateinstitutional, systematic and authority-based achievements in the religious field. Manydiploma-holdersandthosewithStateschoolexperiencealsofeelthatthefemalemaktabsarenotserious.Mory(24April2016)said“whensomeonecomesfromthestateschools,shefeelsthat themaktabs arenotwelldisciplinedand theyarenotat thesame levelwithothersbutsoon they get used to”. The students’ interests, in some cases, can also be interpreted as adesireforself-fulfilmentinthecontextofexistingconstraintswithinthecommunity.For many ambitious women, progress through other avenues seems to be very limited ornearly impossible in the communities they live in, so the only route available to them isthroughthelocallybasedmadrasaeducation.Thepressureoftraditionslimitswomen’sactualchoices, but by attending the madrasas they gain opportunities to socialise outside thetraditionalsettingsoftheirhomesandfamilies.Thisisanindicationoroutcomeoftheprocessof“de-traditionalisation”inruralandsemi-ruralcommunitiesinthatarea.For the talibah, acquiring knowledge through traditional sources, such as familial and tribalinstitutions, is obviously neither credible nor desirable anymore. The questions they try toanswer and the research theywant tobe involved in arenot the continuationof traditionalvalues which should be taken for granted. They do not consider their acts as destiny, butperceivethemaschoicesandtheresultsoftheirownexplorationinthatparticularcontext.Inthis respect, a secular institutional source of socialisation is transmitted to the religiousinstitutions.Thislineofactionbythestudentsreducesthepressureofthelocalconstraintsandenables them to find opportunities for further (but indirect)movement towards and in thepublic sphere. This occurs through engagement in women's networks organised by theTablighiJamaa’torothertypesofwomen'scongregations.Passion for exploring and acquiring knowledge among the women, particularly youngergenerations, in those communities is, to a great extent, inconsistent with the traditionaldemandsof“passivity”,tosilencewomenandencouragethemtorestrictthemselvestobeinggood housewives at home.Manipulation of traditional values, even through existing familialand religious institutions which impose some restrictions on their behaviour, are notuncommonforyoungerwomen.Themadrasa education appears in sequential terms as a complementary process to seculareducation,asBano(2010,2007)hassuggested;but it isneitherasimplecontinuationof themodern secular education, nor a clear break from it. In spite of Bano’s findings in Pakistanurbanareas,on thebasisof thedatawegathered in thisarea there isnoexplicitpurposeofeconomicgain,ortheireconomicaimsweresimplyovershadowedatthatstagebythesearchforhigherself-esteemandprestige.Psychologically, thismighthavebeenmoredesirable forboth the parents and the students when it comes to gaining respect and improving theirprestige in the community. However, in reality, they have neither benefited from economicgains,norachievedunchallengedstatusinsociety.
4Now Mory, after about 10 years, has become a fazelah and teaches at a maktab. Compared with her early optimism and enthusiasm, now a degree of illusion is seen in her opinions.
Talibahs’andfazelahs’self-imageandmaleauthoritiesTalibahs’ motivations for attending amadrasa are various so the images they presented ofthemselves are also can very different from each other’s.Mory (4 January 2017) suggestedthat:
Intheseminaries,thereareafewdifferenttypesoftalibahs,someenterwithpreviousinterest,somehavenothingtodoandchooseitasafun.Someofthemcomebecauseofbeing unsuccessful in entering Universities. However, this group has become lessbecause of the availability of further universities and easier conditions for enteringhigher education. There is another group who enter because of families persistingmanner.Butonly those talibahswill stayandcontinue their studiesatmadrasaswhoare interested inpursuingtranscendentalends.Thisgroupdoesthisbecausetheyarenot in search of increasing their opportunities in the labour market, as in this field,thereisno,orjustaverylittleopportunitytogetajobandearnanincome.Therearealsosometalibahswhopursuenameandfameandtheyliketobeadmiredasalemah.Consideringall theseproblems, inmyopinion,onlythosecanstayandcompletetheireducation,whoaredivinelydevotedfromthebeginning,ortheyareabletochangetheirthis-worldlyaims,intheprocessofstudying.
Womenandmenshouldnothaveequalrights.Menhavemorerightsthanwomen,asithas been said in the Quran that “men are superior to women”. Men will always besuperiortowomen,andtheywillhavemorerightsastheProphet,peaceuponhim,hassaid: “if – apart from God – there was no one else to be worshipped, I would orderwomentoworshiptheirhusbands.”
NearlyalloftherespondentsbelievethatthesuperiorityofmenisanIslamicvalueandmanyof them had supported their ideas with a Quaranic verse: “ar-rejalo qawammuna al-nesa”,whichliterallymeans“menaresuperiortowomen”.However,inmanycasesthesamewomenclearly and strongly believed that women are as talented as men, and some of them evensuggestedthatsomewomenaremoretalentedthanmen(forsimilarcasesinIndia,seeJefferyet al. 2006). However, when it comes to women’s roles, rights and statuses they becomedivided.A talibahwith more balanced views believed that while in some areas women are moretalentedthanmen,therearesomeareasinwhichmenaremoretalentedthanwomen,so,bothmaleandfemalehaveequalrights.Butatthesametime,shealsobelievedthat:
As it has come inHadith, women are inferior to men in reasoning and religion, buthistory has shown that many women have reached high levels of scientificachievementsandtheyhavefoughtonbattlefieldsasmenhavedone,andpossibly,oneday will come when Muslim women will occupy top leadership positions in theircountries.
They also found themselves in a position to evaluate totalities such as the state and powerrelations,butatthesametimetheyhadbeenguidedbyideologiesdominantinmadrasasand
sanctioned by local communities, and national and local media. The ideas spread werepredominantlyuncritical,prejudicialandveryoftenfullofconspiracytheories.Even though their judgmentswere significantly biased and to a large extentwere based onmadrasas teachings, thesewomen’spolitical opinionsondifferent countries clearly reflectedtheir concerns about global issues. Particularism imposed by Islamic religious communities,waswidelyassociatedwithconspiracytheory,bothinabroaderandnarrowersense.Theyhadnot learned to remove strict religious boundaries, so their judgments were ready-made forblaming“outsiders”forallsortsofevilsintheIslamicsocieties.At thesame time, theyhadextended theirparticularismtogobeyondasenseofnationality,geographical and ethnic and linguistic divisions to include the Sunni Muslim community(Ummah)asawhole.Forthem,astheyweretaughtculturalsuperiorityofIslamoverallotherreligions,theirideaswerenotsubjectedtonegotiationandenlighteningdialogues.Whenitcomestofiguresasrolemodels,theyhardlyseeanyonebeyondthelocalornationalmalefigures.Intermsofgainingpoliticalpower,theyseemedcautiousandshowedlittledesiretoletthedomesticandeducationalroleofwomenbeovershadowedbyanypoliticalrole.While they had admired a traditional family role, they had redefined domestic duties. Thetraditionaldomesticrole,inthiscontext,wasredefinedasanewrole:“adomesticpower”,torelatetotheirknowledgeandstatus.Asatalibahstated:
Inmy opinion, the Almighty God has created a woman for rearing children.Womenshouldbecaringfortheirfamilieswhichmakeupsociety.Womenshouldbringuptheirchildrenproperlyso that theybecomemoreusefulrather thanharmful individuals tothesociety.Andinthiswaywomenhelptheirsocietyandcountrybetterthanaleader.
Atthesametime,manymadrasawomenhadredefinedtheirrolebeyondtraditionaldomesticduties, for example, taking responsibility for reforming society and accepting evangelicalmissionstoconvertnon-MuslimstoIslam.“Corruption”asamainconcernTheexistenceandspreadingof“corruption”insocietyispossiblythemostpopularbuzzwordheardfromthereligiouscommunitiesincludingmadrasawomen.Theysawcorruptionin:thelackofpiety,notwearinghijabatallorinaproperway,irreligiosity,immorality,adultery,andsocialisingandchattingofyoungfemaleswithyoungmales.Roza(11September2015),amarriedwoman,whostartedherpart-timemadrasastudy,nineyearsagoandexpectedtofinishitayearlater,believedthat,despitehavingauniversitydegreein theology, she had not been successful in finding a good job in the public sector. Shewashopefulthatshewouldbeusefulintermsofhelpingotherstoknowaboutreligiousdutiessuchasprayingandfastingandalsohelpthemtoavoidfallingintocorruptionwhichsheconsideredtobethemainsourceoftheprobleminthewesterncountries.Roza believes that non- Islamic cultures like Christian and European are inconsistent withIslamicSharia,inthesensethatintheirculture“womenandmenaremixedandtheyhavenocommitment to hijab. The foreign cultures cause bad-hijab or hijabless among women andcausemanyother abnormalities forbothmenand females, particularly for thosewithweakfaith”(Roza,11September2015).ManyoftheearlierrespondentsalsohadregardedtheUS,IsraelandtheUKastheworstcountriesintheworld.
The participants had no clear ideas about the countries which should be considered asuncorrupted sources of inspiration. A considerable number of them mentioned Arabiccountries,andparticularlyPalestine,astheirfavourites.OnlyafewofthemsawSaudiArabia,IraqorIranasthebestcountries.AfghanistanandPakistanwerealsomentionedasthebest,butbyfewerrespondents.Nevertheless,mostof therespondentsbelievedthatan Islamicstate isnecessary inorder toenforce Sharia law to eradicate corruption and bring about justice. They believe that theIslamicstateisneededtobringIslamtoitsglorioustimeoftheProphetandcaliphswhohadthepowertoconquerthetwogreatestempiresofthetime,IranandRome.Challenges:familyandsocietyLivingincommunity,themadrasawomenfacedvariouschallenges.Bothfazelahsandtalibahmayoftenbeignored,teasedornottakenseriouslybymalefamilymembersorolderwomen;forexample,whenamarriedtalibahhadtriedtoremindhergrandmotheraboutIslamicrulesher grandmotherhad toldher “shutup”.Whenamadrasagraduate, andnowa teacher, hadcoveredherself infrontofhermalecousin,heraunthadcalledherbyherbelittlingnametoremove her veil in front of hermale cousin (MH, 17 September 2010). Amarriedman said“mentally,Iprefertoaskreligiousproblemsfrommaleclerics,Itrustmenmorethanwomen.Atthesametime,itisdifficultformentohavedirectcontactwithnon-familywomen.”(AB,18July2010).Clash of expectations of males and females is something which can be seen in the relationbetween husbands andmarried fazelahs. The husbands expect that because of their Islamicknowledge,asinstructedbyIslam,theirfazelahwivesshouldbemoreobedient,whilefazelahsexpectthattheirmalehusbandsshouldunderstandtheirnewrole,rightsandstatus.Itseemsthatinmanyfamiliesthishasincreasedthetensionsbetweenhusbandsandfazelahwives.In thenew context of clashes of statusbetweenhusbands and fazelahs’/talibahs’wives, thehusbands,andthehusbands’families,areseenasimportantfactorsinpushingmarriedwomentoquitmadrasaordivorce.Nik(11July2015)inafacetofaceconversationtoldmethatherhusband,whowasregardedasarespectfulreligiousfigurebythelocalcommunity,was“cruel”and“abloodyliar”,didnotrespectheranddidnotallowhertoteachorattendmadrasa,andputpressureonhertostayalwayswithhim,dodomesticworkandaccompanyhimwheneverhewanted.ThispressureledtodivorceandNiksaidthatlaterherex-husbandsentamessageaskinghertoremarryhim,butshehadrejecteditandsentmessagestohimto“getlost”.Suchincidentscouldnotbeinspiringformanymadrasawomenwhoexpectedtogainmorerespectasalemah(fazelah).In conversation with another fazelah, (Mory, 11 July 2015) told me that she enjoyedsocialisation with her classmate and had the opportunity to exchange ideas on all issuesincluding intimatematters. But the expectations of husbands and their families thatwomenshoulddoalldomesticworkandbreedingputenormouspressureonher.This situation led to disappointment and depression and she could hardly continue hermadrasa studies for a while. As a result of this depression, she was looking for differentalternativestotreatherself,butdidnottakesufficientnoticeofthefactthatshewasalreadyinconflict at homewith her husbandwhowas her cousin. She toldme that conflictswere thesourceofdepression.
Possibly,thelackofsuccessinfulfillingexpectations,suchassocialprestigeandtosomeextenteconomic gains, as experienced some years later,might have disappointed the localwomenandsomeoftheirfamilies.However,while thenumberofwomen’smadrasashasdramatically increased, thenumberofgraduates has become fewer. For example, while the number of women students slightlyincreasedinthe“VillageMadrasa”, thebiggestandmostprestigiouswomen’smadrasainthearea, the number of women graduates consistently declined from about 30 in 2001 to 9 in2016-2017, after a gradual improvement from 3 in 2010 (See Appendix- 3; Table- 3 andFigure-1).The drop out indicates that the students’ interest in completing the course and obtainingreligiousqualifications isdiminishing, therefore, thedropoutrate fromthe“VillageMadrasa”hasbeenincreasing5.Afemaleteacherinthismadrasasaid:
The reasons behind this decline are spread of corruption, lack of consent andinterventionofhusbands/mastersandalsoheavydomesticdutiesofhousewives.Mostgirlswanttogotostateschoolsanduniversitiestogetjobsandmakemoney.(Nik,19July2011,24July2011).
Forsomesimilarreasons,manyother localwomenstart toattendmadrasasbutdropout inearlier stages of their studies, and thus only few are left to complete theirmadrasa studies(Mory, 11 July 2015). For example, at amaktab in Saravan,whichwas established in about2002, therewere about 25 talibahs in the educational year of 2015-2016. Thismaktab onlykeptclassesopenwhentherewasaminimumof4talibahs.So, in2015-2016, therewereno3rd,6thor7thgrades(thefinalyear)becauseofdropout.Mory also believed thatmadrasas were not very popular because over there, “there is noname,nojobandnoincome”,andmanywomenleavemadrasatogotoseculareducationandpreferredthisworldlylifetootherworldlyrewards(4January2017).PietyandconfidenceWhile themadrasawomen,even inamadrasa framework,havebecomemoreconfidentandmore aware of their status, and expect men to respect them, and even attend women'smeetingsandgotomosque,theyhavebecomemorehijabi,intermsofdresscode.Competingwithmenintheareaofreligiouspietyalsomaybeinterpretedasaformofconfidenceandachallengeagainstthetraditionallymalemonopolisticandexcludingrole.Hijab, isatthesametimeisusedagainstlesshijabiwomen,particularlywithhighereducationbackgrounds.Women, as fazelahs, or talibahs, find themselves in competition with male authorities whoenjoy farmore freedomandrespect,both inprivateandpublicspheres.Thiswaspossiblyareason that many women fazelahs and talibahs, from closed and semi-closed environments(includingtotalinstitutions),comparedwithmen,putmoreemphasisontheirpietyandhijab,and even sometimes show less tolerance towards what they see as corruption and non-religious behaviour. In performing the religious duties, religiouswomen evenmay bemorepersistentthanthemales.
Forexample,Inoticed,in2015,inUnitedArabEmirates, inashoppingmall,thatthewomenwere rushing to themosques toperformpraying,while amale clericwasmore relaxedandbelievedthatmissingprayersincertainconditionswasacceptable.Thewomenmayconsidertheir strictness as a mechanism for building their identity to challenge a patriarchalenvironment.Morysaid:
Inmyview fazelahs becomemore awareof their rights in an Islamic framework andbecomemoreconfidentaboutaskingfortheirrights;andtheirhusbands,whenseethatwomenarereasonable,as faraspossible, theyaccept.Certainly,womenhavebecomemore confident and mutual respect increase [this]… does not mean that fazelahsbecomemoreobedient,iftheyseethattheirhusbandsarenotpreparedtoaccepttheirwives'rights,thenthewomenchoosetodivorce.(25April2016).
Using the concept of “divorce”, which was unimaginable in traditional and religiouscommunities,hasbecomequitenormalforfazelahs.Itmeanstheydonotfearoftalkingabout“rights”andusingmodernandindividualbasedsolutionstoachievethem.In thesecases, itseemsthatwomenshapetheir identityagainst“others”,byredefiningtheirpiety as hijabis (owners ofhijab). In their new positions as fazelahs and talibahs they haveredefinedthetraditionalvaluesastheirownpossessions,somethingthattheyhaveacquiredbytheirownefforts,notvaluestobesimplyinheritedfromthepast.Theygainedthesevalues,not through families and informal institutions, but through independent and formalinstitutions,madrasas,andobtainedqualificationsfromthere.At the same time, this condition limits women’s ability to question the nature of existingauthorities.Thisisthedisablingaspectofthereligiouseducationinmadrasas,whichsuppressanycriticalapproachandmovementforfurtherpluralism.
CONCLUSIONInthecontextofgeopoliticaltransformationsatglobalandregionallevels,andinresponsetothe ideological pressures by the Iranian Shia regime, the SunniDeobandimoulvis started toopenwomen’smadrasasinSouthEastIran,SistanandBaluchistaninthe1990s.Thedevelopmentof thesemadrasas, in this social setting,wasnotmerely a response to therational needs of the market, but ideological, gender and ethno-religious issues were alsoinvolved. This was in reality a complex and a Janus-faced process, full of push and pullchallenges posed by modern society in modern times, and it simultaneously containedinclusionandexclusionofwomen.Womenwere included in terms of gaining a further opportunity to enter a fieldwhichwaspreviously monopolised by the male authorities, moulvis. However, the male authoritiesadopteda strategy, beyond the traditional familial institutions, of includingwomen, throughplannedorganisationalcontrol,mainlyinsemiclosedformsofmadrasas,withoutlodgingandboardingfacilities.Simultaneously,therewasaprocessofexclusionofwomenthroughbeing“curtainedoff”,pressuredtowearhijabs,andstudyingshortercourses.WhiletheprocessesofcontrolandfurtherdisciplinarymeasureshaveinternalisedaparticularformofanIslamicwomanhood,theyhavenotabolishedagency,butincreasedthecapacityofwomen toactas individuals.Thishasbeenaprocessof “de-traditionalisation”, ina senseof
breaking away from traditions and increasing individuals’ capacity to realise their own“interests against the weight of customs, tradition, transcendental will (…) even ifunintentional”(Mahmood,quotedinWinkelmann,2005:99).Consideringtheevidence,Goffman’sconceptof“totalinstitution”andtheFocauldianapproachofbodycontrolmaynotbesufficienttoexplaintheissue.Theintentionsandexpectationsofthe studentsasanactive force shouldnotbeunderestimated.These studentsandgraduatesare able tomanipulate the regimented education system andmove beyond the institutionalintentions and the established rules. The individualistic valueswhich have shapedwomen'sidentities further developed through the intra-institutional setting (see Scott, 2010; Yunus,1994).Incompetingwithmen,theyhavetriedtoredefinecertaintraditionsandtheirdomesticroleastheir own possessions, acquired through their own efforts and enquiries. They haveinterpretedpietyandhijabastheiridentity.Theevidencealsoindicatesthattheexpectationswomenhadtoachieve,throughthemadrasaroute,havenotbeenproperlyfulfilled.Thus,theearlier enthusiasm of the women for studying and graduating in madrasa has relativelydeclined, although the total number of women’smadrasas and talibahs in the province hasdramatically increased. This is another form of resistance, bywomen, against the projectedformsofcontrol.Toput these changes inawider context, it canbe concluded that theprocessof changehasbeenassociatedwithcreatingopportunitiesandenablingforcesfordiscoveringandspreadingof women’s rational authority and to some extentweakening the authority of traditions. Inotherwords, this has been a complex procedure, but has been associatedwith a process ofrationalisation and individualisation, a basis for understanding the important role of theagency.The evidence suggests, however, that even in the most traditional communities,individualisationandthebuildingofidentitybywomenhavebeenspreadingindifferentwaysand social settings such as religiousmadrasas. Individualisation and self-confidence of thewomen in religious communitiesmay intensify the clash of expectations betweenmale andfazelah.Asameansofastrongeremphasisontheiridentityinthecontextofcompetitionswithmaleauthorities, who represent themselves as real and pious Muslims, and also with less hijabiwomen,madrasawomenmaybefurtherradicalised.Ifthecurrenttensions,whicharebasedon highly biased and conflict-laden religious ideologies, continue in the whole region, thenumber of fazelahs among the Sunnis in southeast Iran may increase. Under suchcircumstances,itisalsolikelythatforsometime,madrasawomenwillstronglycontributetodeepening the level of religiosity, and spread strict Sharia-based rules, associatedwith evenfurther emphasis on totalitarian values. However, there are increasing counter-approachescomingfromthewomengraduatesofthestateschoolsanduniversitieswhopushforgainingmoreopportunitiesanddirectengagementinthepublicsphere,arguingthatindividualchoiceand tolerance are not sufficient to counter the totality of societal or religious goods, whicheasilycansupportandlegitimiseviolence.
Table-1:Woman’sMaktab-KLinSaravanin1916(Mory,10December2016)Foundationdate 2007(1385hs)The current Number oftalibahs
30,plus20inRukhani(readingQuran)
Teachers 11females,and2maleswhoteachathigherlevels(finalyears)Hafiztalibah Initiallyno,laterhadbutwithoutsuccessWage Nowage,maygetsomepresentswhenthereisagraduationcelebrationDevelopment Originally was opened as women’smadrasabut also opened a men's
Table-3:Women’steachingsyllabus:Year Textbooks(Dateofdeath)Year1 ، پنج کتاب، ماالبد 2و 1، تعلیم اللغھ عربی، جلدھای 2و 1دستور آسان، سھ جلد زیور بھشت، ، صرف بھائی، قصص جلدھای
منھDastur-e Asan- Grammar for learning Arabic-Mohammad Ebrahim Damani (a contemporarylocalauthor)Zivar-eBahisht3vol.AshrafAliThanavi(1943)Sarf-eBahaei-BahaUddinAmoli(1621)Qesas-eNabiyeen-AbolHasanAliNadwi(1999)Ta’limalLoghaArabi,1&2-MuhammadAminMesriPanjKetab-AcollectionofFarsipoetryfrom5Classicreligiouspoetssuchas,Saa’di,Jami,Attar,BukhariMalabodmenhMemorizinghalfChapterofQuran
Year2 ، میزان الصرف، فقھ میسر 4و 3، جمال اقرآن، تعلیم اللغھ 4و 3نحومییر، آیات منتخبات، قصص نبیین جلد Nahou-Mir-MirShareefAliJarjani(1413)Ayat-eMontakhabat-MohammadEbrahimDamaniQesas-eNabiyeen-,3&4Jamalal-Quran-AshrafAliThanavi(1943)Ta’limal-LoghaArabia3&4MuhammadAminMesriMeezaan-as-Sarf-SiraajuddinUsmanAwadhi(1357)Fiqh-eMaysar(Hanafi)-ShafiqalrahmanNadwi(19?)MemorizinghalfChapterofQuran
Year3 آن، تسھیل الضروری، ترجمھ بخش اول قر5و 4شرح مائھ عامل، صرف میر، قرائت الراشده، زیور بھشت Qraa’tAl-Rashedah-AbolHasanAliNadavi(1999)(Arabicvocabulary)Zivar-eBahishtThanavi3Vol(sections3and4).(1943)Altashial-zaruriLamasaelal-Quduri-(HanafiFiqh)MuhammadAshiqElahiMadani(2001)TranslationofQuran-section1SharhMaatAmil-SheikhAbdal-Qahiral-Jurjani(1078)Sarfi-Mir-MirShareefAliJarjani(1413)MemorizinghalfChapterofQuran
Year4 ، ریاض الصالحین5تیسیر، قدوری، ترجمھ قرآن بخش دوم، خلفای راشدین، نحو الواضح، قصص النبیین جلد Mukhtasaral-Quduri-AbuHasanAhmedQuduri(1037)Taisir(Mostalehal-Hadith-MahmudIbnAhmadal-Tahan(borne1935-)TranslationofQuransection2Kholafay-eRashedin-Abd-al-ShakurLaknawi(1961)AnNahwal-Vazeh-Alial-JarimandMostafaAmeenQesasal-Nabyyin-4AbolHasanAliNadwi(1999)Ryadhas-Salehin-AbuZakariaYahyabinSharafal-Nawawi(1277)MemorizinghalfChapterofQuran(intotaltheymemorise2chaptersbytheendofyear4)
Year5 ھدایھ فی النحو، ھدایھ فی الدرایھ جلد اول، مصطلح الحدیث، عقیده الطحاویھ، 3آثار اسنن اصول الشاشی ترجمھ بخش Hedayat-fialnahvaHedayahfialdarayahvol1–Burhanal-DinAbialHasanAl-Farghani(1197)Mostalehal-Hadith-MahmudIbnAhmadal-Tahan(borne1935-)Asaral-Sonan-MohammadIbnAlianNimawayAqeedatAttahaawiyeh-AbuJafarAhmedTahaavi(933)TranslationofQuran-part3AssowlAsh-Shaashi-NizamuldeenShaasheiQandi(1359)
