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Cooperation, Competition, and the Security Dilemma The Case of Muslim States and Israel

Ali Sarihan

Abstract

The 1948 Arab-Israel War, the 1957 Suez Canal Crisis, and the 1967 Six-Day War each resulted from

the security dilemma between these opposing factions Israel and the Muslim States of the Middle

East. Israel’s decisive military victory over Muslim states in all of these wars led the Muslim nations

to create a union, which is the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), to strengthen their position

against Israel. While this approach proved sound in theory, this paper will demonstrate that the OIC

did not lead to a more secure relationship between Muslim states and Israel. This paper hypothesizes

that if Muslim states and Israel chose to cooperate instead of strengthening their military forces, they

could diminish the security dilemma between them.

Key Words: Security Dilemma, Cooperation, Competition, Muslim States and Israel

Introduction

In this paper, the position of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) will be

examined from an international security perspective. This following point will be argued that is

Muslim states established the organization after several hugely destructive clashes and fights

amidst Israel and Muslim states. Muslim states developed the OIC to prevent these kinds of

harmful clashes and promote security for Muslim nations by encouraging cooperation and

collaboration among member states. The founders of the organization believed that Islamic

solidarity would strengthen Muslim members’ position against Israel, build balance, and prevent

future aggression from Israel. Ideally, this balance of power would build stability and security

between Israel and Muslim states.

While this approach proved sound in theory, this paper will demonstrate that the OIC did

not lead to a more secure relationship between Muslim states and Israel. In fact, the situation has

deteriorated, and new conflicts have developed between Israel and Muslim states. This paper

hypothesizes that if Muslim states and Israel chose to cooperate instead of strengthening their

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military forces, they could diminish the security dilemma between them. Turkey and Israel

provide evidence of the feasibility of this solution and serve as a great example of two formerly

hostile Middle Eastern nations who came to a peaceful accord through the establishment of deep

trade and military cooperation.

In the sections to follow, existing arguments related to security dilemma and cooperation

will be explained, and then a historical overview of the OIC will be provided. Also how the OIC

emerged and why it was formed will be explored. In the second part of the paper, the obstacles to

cooperation between Israel and Muslim states will be examined. Finally, this paper will be

concluded with an examination of the implications and conclusions.

Literature Review

Robert Jervis (1978) explained that when a security dilemma exists, “An increase in one

state’s security decreases the security of others.”1 Jervis argued that a number of situations could

lead to a security dilemma. First, the lack of a clear distinction between offensive defensive

weapons can lead to confusion and undue aggression when one party perceives the armament as

an aggressive development for their opponent.2 Secondly, if offense has more advantage than

defense this causes to security dilemma as well.3 In such situations, peace can prove more costly

than warfare. According to Jervis to increase the likelihood of cooperation,

By increasing gain of mutual cooperation, and/or decreasing the costs, the actor will pay if he cooperates and the other does not. By decreasing the gain of taking advantage of the other; and/or increasing the costs of mutual noncooperation. By increasing each side’s expectation on that the other will cooperate.4

Barry R. Posen (1993) concurred with many of Jervis’s theories about security dilemmas.

According to Posen, “security dilemma is very intense when imperial order breaks down,”5 and

cited the collapse of Yugoslavia and Serb-Croatia and the Serb-Bosnia wars as examples. Posen

also explained that while the possession of nuclear weapons tends to decrease warfare between

   

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aggressive nations, such as in the Russia-Ukraine war, wars grounded in ethnic hatred tend to be

more intense, such as the conflict between the Croats and Serbs.6 While nuclear weapons provide

mutually assured deterrence, ethnic wars increase distrust and disrespect between sides because

each nation perceives the other as a threat to their ethnic identity.7

Traditional Realists, such as Morgenthau (1904-1980), argued that the desire for more

power is the true cause of anarchy and security dilemma. Traditional Realists argue that security

dilemmas are inevitable because of human nature. 8 They contend that humanity’s innate

propensity for greed and desire for power made cooperation among warring factions virtually

impossible.9 According to this theory, competition and the desire to acquire more power

threatens each state’s security.

Neo-Realists, or structural realists, such as Kenneth N. Waltz (1988), address the issue of

cooperation from an international structure perspective. Waltz (1988) posited, “A state of war

exists if all parties lust for power.”10 Structural realists argue that competition for more power

and international anarchy cause war. Neo-Realists believe that bi-polar world is less likely to

inspire war among vying factions than a multi-polar world, because in a multi-polar world,

“dangers are diffused, responsibilities unclear, and definitions of vital interests easily

obscured.”11 In this sense, a Neo-realist approach to the security dilemma argues that a bi-polar

world would provides more stability, less miscalculation of related powers, and fewer

overreaction likelihood between opposite sides.12

Charles L. Glaser (1994-1995) introduced Contingent Realism, an alternative to

Structural Realism. Contingent Realism contends that Structural Realists are pessimistic about

state relations, and argues that Structural Realists have competition bias. According to

Contingent Realists, though states may be lustful over power, collaboration potentially can place

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them in a better power position.13 They argue that competition is not the only approach that

increases benefits. Cooperation also has the potential to benefit both parties.

In addition, Glaser (1994) stated, “When the risks of competition exceed the risks of

cooperation, states should direct their self-help efforts toward achieving cooperation.”

Contingent Realism argues that cooperation leads to mutual gain for both parties. In contrast,

Structural Realism can make no such claim, and boasts more of a relative gain scenario, which in

increases security among the various factions.14 Contingent Realism contends that even if the

states have security concerns, security cooperation could allow the states to enhance their

military capacity without threading anyone else.

States that were seeking only security could deploy adequate capabilities without threatening other states. Moreover, uncertainty about motives would be reduced, if not eliminated, since security-seekers would not need offensive capabilities. Insecurity could be virtually eliminated.15

John J. Mearsheimer (1995) examined International institutions theory to determine

whether institutions can preclude war as the theory claims. This institutional perspective

contends, “Institutions can discourage states from calculations self-interest on the basis of how

every move affects their relative power positions. Institutions are independent variables, and they

have the capability to move states away from war.”16 Even though such institutions do not create

a worldwide state, they build decentralized collaboration among the states to force them to obey

the rules without having superior authority over them.17 18

Mearsheimer analyzed institutional theories under three sub-categories: liberal

institutionalism, collective security, and critical theory. Liberal institutionalism posits that

solving cheating problem between states will facilitate cooperation among them. Collective

security, alternately, argues that responsible states’ military powers play a significant role in

preventing war against aggressors. According to this theory, “institutions are the key to

   

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managing power successfully.”19 Unlike liberal institutionalism and collective security, critical

theory states that for a peaceful world, nations should seek peace, and institutions must play key

role in carrying out the peaceful transformation.20

Mearsheimer claimed that even though many policymakers and academics believe that

institutions can promote international peace, “these theories do not accurately describe the

word.”21 He noted that an intergovernmental institution like the League of Nations (LON) was

not able to prevent World War II.

Democratic peace theorists argue that, “Democracies will not fight each other because the

citizenry must consent, and they do not want to pay the costs of war (lives, infrastructure, et

cetera).”22 As Immanuel Kant (1795) asserted, democratic states should become involved in a

war only in self- defense, not as an aggressor or invader of another nation. Rawls (1999)

concurred, and stated, “Democracies only go to war when their safety and security are seriously

endangered by the expansionist policies of outlaw states.” These arguments posit that trust and

respect preclude war between democratic states. 23 Democratic peace theorists argue that

transparency and visibility of issues between factions prevents any likelihood of a security

dilemma situation, and encourages cooperation and peace between vying nations. Democratic

peace theory suggests that security dilemmas can be precluded with democratic regimes because

democracy eliminates these sources of conflict matters: “private information, indivisibility of

issues and commitment problem.”24

Despite this argument, democratic peace theory has its opponents, who contend that

democracy does not bring peace. Instead, they claim the following:

Democratic peace is in fact an imperial peace based on American power. First, the democratic peace is essentially a post-World War II phenomenon restricted to the Americas and Western Europe. Second, the United States has been the dominant power in both these regions since World War II and has placed an overriding emphasis on regional peace.25

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Erik Gartzke (2007) staunchly supported capitalist peace theory, and stated, “Free

markets and development diminish disputes and war.” Lake (1992) asserted that capitalism

creates powerful pacifists. In this sense, capitalist peace theory argues that economic

development and economic interdependence prevent conflict by making war too costly and peace

more advantageous for both sides. Capitalist peace theory also contends that democracy and

capitalism together strengthen peace, but “capitalism, not democracy, leads to peace.”26 In

contrast to democratic peace theory, capitalist peace theorists argue that democracy does not

bring peace without liberalism.

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC), formerly Organization of Islamic

Conference, is an inter-governmental organization. The OIC is the second largest organization

after the United Nations, with its membership of 57 states spread over four continents. According

to the OIC, the organization is “the collective voice of the Muslim world.”27 Muslim states

established the OIC in September of 1969, shortly after six-day war between Egypt, Jordan,

Syria, and Israel. The peak event was the criminal arson of the Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied

Jerusalem by Israeli forces in 1969. After this act, key members of Muslim states, such as

Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, decided to establish an organization designed to create Islamic

solidarity. This effort became the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). According to the

OIC charter, mainly, the Organization aims to carry out the following goals.

Preserving Islamic social and economic values; promote solidarity amongst member states; increase cooperation in social, economic, cultural, scientific, and political areas; uphold international peace and security; and advance education, particularly in the fields of science and technology.28

   

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Israel’s attack to the Arab states during the six-day war and its victory during the conflict,

worried Muslim states. Prior to the six-day war, the nations experienced two more Arab-Israeli

wars, which also concluded in an Israeli victory. The six-day war marked the third Israeli victory

against Muslim states.

The tension between Israel and neighboring Muslim states began with Israel’s

establishment in 1949. Muslim states did want to live with a Jewish neighbor, and they did not

want to have fear of Israel aggression. From the Arab states perspective, Israel was the result of

Western imperialism in the Middle East, and Arab states were striving to gain independency

from Western domination (e.g., French hegemony in Libya or British dominancy in Saudi Arabia

after World War II).29 The establishment of Israel in the Middle East meant that the Western

imperialist threat now was located at the heart of the Muslim world. At that time, a pan-Islamism

view began to fill the gap in the region where Ottoman Empires existed before.30 This movement

promoted Muslim states as the dominant power of the Middle East region, but Israel appeared as

the biggest obstacle for the pan-Islamic goal.

In addition to the general Muslim opposition, Israel also had to face targeted conflict with

Palestinians in the region. All Muslim states defended Palestine in the struggle against Israel,

because Palestinians were Muslims; and, the Muslims situation were becoming hugely

ambiguous after Israel’s occupation in that region. In response, Israel took a similarly rigid stand

about their right to the land. Prime minister David Ben-Gurion spearheaded the argument, later

termed Ben-Gurionism, which contended that Israel had to show its force against opposite ideas

until they accept Israel’s existence in the region.31 Today, these two extreme arguments, “Ben-

Gurionism” and “Pan-Islamism,” continue to cause tension among warring factions in the

Middle East.

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All these conflicts have created a security dilemma in the region amidst Muslim states

and Israel. Muslim states perceived Israel’s increased military power as a threat of their security.

Israel, conversely, saw any expansion of Muslim state armament as a threat for its security. Lack

of trust and shared information served as the main reasons for the contentious situation between

states. As a result of the intensified security dilemma, OIC emerged in 1969 to strengthen

Muslim states’ position against Israel and to transform the security dilemma to a balance of

power through strong Islamic solidarity.

The Events That Led to the Security Dilemma

In May of 1948, when the British decided to lift its mandate regime from Palestine area,

Israel declared statehood in Tel-Aviv; and thereafter the armies of Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Iraq

marched into Israel along with the Sudanese, Yemenites, Moroccans, Saudis, Lebanese, and

other Muslim groups. 32 From these Muslim states’ point of view, Islam was fighting the

diffusion of Judaic ideas in the region.33 As Ahmed Shukeiry stated, “The attack aimed the

elimination of Jewish state from the Middle East.”34

From the Israeli perspective, the war was one of independence; while Arabs considered it

an “al-Nakba” (the catastrophe). 35 The Muslim states sought to preclude a strong Israeli

occupation in Palestine and in the Middle East as a whole. Failure to upset the Israeli presence in

their region would weaken the authority of the Muslim states. Even though the Arabs had

superior numbers, Israel’s more organized war strategies defeated Arab’s inexperienced and

poorly organized forces. Because of the Israeli victory, Israeli occupation in Palestine increased

from 56 to 78 percent, and 700,000 Palestinians had to leave from their homelands for Arab

states or refugee camps. Despite the Muslim states’ expectation, 1948 War strengthened the

Israeli state and weakened the Muslim state’s authority in the Middle East.

   

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When Gamal Abdel Nasser became president of Egypt in 1956, he wanted to carry out

economic, social, and military improvements to built Egypt as a superpower of Middle East. As

the first step of his agenda, he decided to nationalize the Suez Canal to increase Egypt’s

economic position. This decision was unacceptable for Britain and France, since they were using

this canal for their gas transportation from the Gulf States to Europe. To opposed Nasser’s

efforts, Britain, France, and Israel made an agreement in Paris, called the Amilcar.36 This accord

established that Israel would attack Egypt, and British and French forces would invade Suez

Canal to make peace between Israel and Egypt. They did what they planned, but they forgot

about the American factor.

Because the United States was in the Cold War with the Soviet Russia and the Middle

East was a very important region for both sides of cold war. The triple occupation in Egypt led to

antipathy against Western states and increased Muslim states’ sympathy toward Soviet Russia.

Because of that the United States showed strong opposition against the British and French

occupation in Egypt, the two nations left Egypt without gaining any benefit from the occupation.

Conversely, Nassir strengthened his position in the Arab world with their withdrawal.37

After a high-tension period between Israel and its neighbors, Egypt, Jordan, and Syria,

the six-day war started on June 5, 1967, when Israeli forces launched surprise air strikes against

Arab forces. As with prior conflicts between the nations, the conflict stemmed from the presence

of Israel in the Middle East. The high tension led to armament increases by both sides. Nasser

began amassing his troops in the Sinai Peninsula on Israel's border, which increased security

concerns in Israel. In response, Israel provided pilot and ground crew training in rapid

preparation for a possible attack. In this war, like previous wars, Arab states sought the

destruction of Israel. As President Abdel Nasser (1967) stated, “Our basic objective will be

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destruction of Israel.”38 The expansion in the level of security led Israel to attack neighboring

Arab states on June 5 in a preemptive strike.

Historically, Israel and Muslim states in the Middle East have had a number of security

dilemmas, and as a result, they have warred on several occasions. Any military action on the part

of either nation directly impacts the security level of the other in the negative manner.39

The security dilemma and its result three big wars led to the establishment of OIC, which

sought to strengthen solidarity among the 57 Muslim member nations and establish a strong,

firm, and disciplined Islamic movement against Israeli. The OIC sought to consolidate power

under the umbrella of one organization, because, thus far, Israel had tremendous military

superiority over Muslim states in the region.

In 1999, the OIC made the decision to combat terrorism. The expressed the desire “to

promote cooperation among them for combating terrorists’ crimes that threaten the security and

stability of the Islamic States and endanger their vital interests.”40 In 2002, at the Ninth

Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers, the OIC strongly

condemned the 9/11 terrorist attacks against United States and stated that the United States

should take action against Israeli state terrorism to prevent the killing of Palestinian people to

stabilize the region.41 The OIC used the opportunity to express their lingering feelings that Israel

is a threat to the region’s security and stability.

The OIC established permanent observer mission of the OIC to the United Nations (UN)

in New York on October 10, 1975 with resolution 3369. 42 The mission of the OIC is

strengthening and enhancing relations with the members of the United Nations, in particular with

the United States. In addition, Former American President George W. Bush announced the

establishment of the Office of the U.S. Special Envoy to the OIC on June 27, 2007. When

   

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President Barack Obama began his term, the OIC secretary general sent a letter to welcome him

to office and encourage the continuance of the partnership established with former President

Bush.43

The above developments indicate a desire on the part of the OIC to have strong and deep

relations with United States to create a balance against Israel in the Middle East. The OIC

recognizes that United States’ support strengthens Israel in the region. Accordingly, if OIC has

similar relations with the United States, Israel’s strong position could be undermined, and the

balance of power turned positively towards Muslim states.

Ultimately, OIC came into being in response to the constant security dilemma between

Muslim states and Israel, with the purpose of increasing the level of security in the Muslim

nations through more cooperation and solidarity among OIC members. More importantly, the

OIC sought to amass enough power to serve as a deterrent against future attacks from Israel.

Despite this goal, when we look at the contemporary Middle East, a number of serious

security problems still exist between Israel and neighboring Muslim states. For example, in a

2003 speech in Malaysia, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad argued that the Jews control the

world, “With these they have gained control of the most powerful countries and they, this tiny

community, have become a world power. Jews rule the world, getting others to fight and die for

them, but will not be able to defeat the world's 1.3 billion Muslim.”44 He also asserted “The

Europeans killed 6 million Jews out of 12 million, but today the Jews rule the world by proxy.

They get others to fight and die for them.”45

Despite the founding goals of the OIC, the Middle Eastern region has seen little

improvement in the security dilemma since the inception of the organization. The conflict

between Palestinian and Israel continues, the likelihood of Iran emerging as a nuclear-armed

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threat to Israel increases, and Israel’s repression over the United States to attack to Iran still

stands as a threat of the entire region stability. Hezbollah attacks in Israel also continue, and

recently, Lebanon fought with Israel over border disputes in 2006. Egypt also withdrew its

ambassador from Israel because Israel killed five Egyptian police officers in August of 2011.46

The unrest in the Middle East continues in full force.

More importantly, Turkey, one of Israel’s best allies, downgraded all relations with Israel

and expelled the Israeli embassy because of a flotilla crisis. During this incident, the

Turkish Foundation for Human Rights and Freedoms and Humanitarian Relief (İHH) was

carrying humanitarian aid and construction materials to the Israeli blockade in the Gaza Strip  via

ships, but they were attacked by Israeli helicopters and speed boats in the summer of 2010.

Israel defended the attack and stated that they were defending their territory from potential

danger. Nine Turkish volunteers died in the Israeli attack, however, and Turkey demanded an

apology and compensation from Israeli government. When Israel rejected Turkey’s request for

an apology or compensation, Turkish leaders cut diplomatic, economic, and militaristic ties with

Israel.47 This tension also aggravated relations between the OIC and Israel because the general

secretary of OIC, Ekmeleddin Ihsanoglu, is from Turkey, and he has very close relationships

with current Turkish decision makers. All of these crises and developments clearly show that the

region continues to experience intense conflict among warring factions.

In conclusion, the OIC has not yet achieved its mission of increasing security in the

Middle East. In theory, the OIC would increase economic, political, and military solidarity

among Muslim states to strengthen their position against Israel. The escalation in power would

create balance and serve as a deterrent against Israel in the Middle East. This vision has not yet

become a reality, as Israel and Muslim states still have many serious problems. This dilemma

   

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leads one to question why the World’s second largest organization OIC could not solve its

Muslim member states’ security problems with Israel.

This paper contends that instead of trying to create deterrent power against each other,

Israel and the Muslim states should develop a trade cooperation to solve their security problems.

As capitalist peace theory states, having trade cooperation and strong trade relations make states

interdependent. Strong ties between states, increase trust and respect for each other. This increase

in trust can lead to improved information sharing and decreases in miscalculations of relative

power.

Trade relations require states to become transparent, and the openness increases levels of

trust. Besides, deficiency of any member in the cooperation negatively affects rest of the

members, domino effect appears here. To avoid any negative effects, allied states tend to avoid

war in an effort to protect their own interests. For example, the current European Union has

strong trade cooperation among their 27 members, and the likelihood of a war breaking out

amidst the members is less likely because such conflict would undermine all of their national

interests, regardless of who wins or loses the war.

If Muslim neighbors, such as Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Israel could have strong

cooperation, they could live in much more secure and stable conditions. Moreover, instead of

spending significant resources to buy and to produce weapons, such as Iran’s nuclear weapon

project, they could make investments in promoting their nations’ development and welfare

standards. Most importantly, the states in the Middle East would not have the fear of attack

against each other. The security dilemma would disappear.

The next section will explore the reasons that both nations continue to pursue deterrent

powers, rather than cooperation, to address their security dilemma. It will begin with an

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examination of domestic obstacles, and will follow with an explanation of international

frustrations for cooperation between Israel and Muslim states.

Domestic Obstacles for Cooperation

Polarization between the Religions:

Jerusalem is holy place for both Islam and Judaism. For Muslims, the Prophet

Mohammed prayed with all prophets in Jerusalem, at Al-Aqsa Mosque, and more importantly, he

made his ascension from this mosque. For Jewish people, Jerusalem is the holiest city because

King David of Israel first established it as the capital of Israel in c. 1000 BCE. This historical

context provides clarity about the religious motivation that drives both the Muslims and Jews to

control this area. Currently, Jerusalem serves as the capital city of Israel but Muslim states do not

accept this situation, and they strongly want Israel to leave this territory to Palestine.

Ideological Disagreements:

This aforementioned religious disjuncture has built nationalistic political ideologies on

both sides. Zionism is simply the self-determination of Jewish people in an independent national

homeland.48 “The creation of Jewish state in Palestine is the only viable and permanent solution

to the problem of Jews.”49 In short, Zionism forces Jews to procure an independent state in

Palestine.

In contrast, Islam orders Muslims to spread their religion across the World, a practice

termed jihad, and Muslim states in the Middle East struggle against Jewish diffusion in the

region. In the eyes of those Muslim nations, ousting Jewish state from region and declaring

Palestinian independence is necessary for the protection of Islamic values, and it is necessary for

the diffusion of Islam as the Islamic holy book, The Quran, orders.

   

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The conflict between Zionism and pan-Islamism frustrates cooperation in the Middle

Eastern region. For example, Iran had good relations with Israel during the reign of Mohammad

Reza Shah Pahlavi between the years of 1941 and 1979. However, the Iranian people did not

like the Shah’s western-based style of governance or his friendly relations with Israel. Exiled

leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini ended the Shah’s Reign in Iran with the advent of 1979

Islamic Revolution. The Iranian people strongly supported the Islamic revolution, and relations

with Israel have subsequently deteriorated. In addition, one of the biggest defenders of nuclear

arms in Iran, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, won the 2005 and 2009 presidential elections with

majority support against more reasonable and pragmatic conservative leader Akbar Hashemi

Rafsanjani.

The third Egyptian president, Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, provides another example, as

he made an accord with the United States at Camp David in 1978. In 1981, a short time later, he

was assassinated by Omar Abdel-Rahman, who opposed collaboration with Israel and was a

member of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad.  The fifth Prime Minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, also

made the Oslo accord with Palestine in 1993 to solve the problems with peaceful methods. He

also was assassinated in 1995 by Yigal Amir, who was a radical right-wing Orthodox Jew that

opposed the signing of the Oslo Accords. In 2006, Palestinian’s militaristic wing, Hamas, won

the Palestinian elections against the more moderate Fatah party. Furthermore, Turkish Prime

Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, became the hero of Arab world because he scolded Israeli

President Shimon Peres at Davos in 2009 because of Israel’s siege over Palestinian.

As the examples above demonstrate, hegemonic, radical, and fundamental nationalistic

groups’ have stymied efforts at cooperation among Israel and Muslim states. In sum, populist

and extremist policies have overwhelmed realistic and more moderate policies for both sides.

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International Obstacles to Collaboration

The East versus the West:

In 1948, following the United Nations’ decision to partition Palestine in 1947, Israel

declared its independence with the support of Western; particularly Britain and the United States.

Due to British economic troubles in the Middle East after World War II50, Britain could no

longer maintain the Palestinian area and decided to withdraw from the region with at least cost.51

Otherwise, the Jewish-Arab conflict would prove too costly for Britain. The United States

wanted to have a strong ally like Israel in the region to support the U.S. in their struggle against

the dangers of the diffusion of Soviet communism in the Middle East.

Muslim states strongly opposed the partitioning of Palestine, because they perceived this

act as a new Western imperialism in the Middle East.52 Many Muslim states obtained their

independence through the mandate of Western states’ (e.g., in 1932, Iraq received independence

from England, in 1946 Syria obtained independence from France; and in 1922, Egypt gained

independence from the United Kingdom). All of these western-based colonization experiences

led the states to oppose the new Western-sponsored state of Israel in Palestine.

The Arab public still perceives Israel as both oppressor of the Palestinians and as an alliance with traditional Western colonial power, currently represented by the US invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.53

By supporting Palestine in the Israeli-Arab conflict, Muslim states and also Russia are

confronting, not only Israel, but also Western expansion or colonization in the Middle East. This

internationalized polarization makes collaboration too hard between Muslim states and Israel.

The Western interests that support Israel contest this characterization and state that they

do not want to colonize the Middle East and simply want to protect Jewish people’s rights.

Moreover, while Israel was a loyal and strong ally of the Western world against the Soviet threat

   

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during cold war; Russia’s’ current competition with the West, along with the newly emerged

Nuclear Iran dangerous, has increased the importance of an alliance between Israel and the

Western world. This alliance with the Western world benefits Israel because of Western

economic subsidies, especially from United States.54 To keep Israel as a strong state, the U.S. has

provided nearly 3 billion dollars annually in grants to Israel since 1985, and Israel is becoming

the largest annual recipient of American aid. 55 International foreign aid prevents trade

cooperation between Muslim and Israel sides because their foreign supports ensure meet all of

their financial needs. In this sense, foreign aid undermines the likelihood of cooperation between

Israel and Muslim states.

Nuclear Weapons and the Armament Race:

Even though Israel does not officially accept its weapons, Israel has between 75 and 400

nuclear warheads, along with intercontinental ballistic missiles.56 This underscores the necessity

for balance and deterrent power among Muslim states in the region, because these nuclear

weapons make Israel militarily dominant power over all non-nuclear states. To create balance in

the region, Muslim states spend a lot of money on weapons. The logic of the armament is that

building a balance of power against Israel will deter Israel from making future attacks, and

provide stability in the Middle East. This same scenario occurred during the cold war era

between the United States and the Soviet Union. Iran pursues a nuclear weapons program under

the guise of protecting Iran against nuclear Israel. Ostensibly, Israel’s nuclear weapons compel

Muslim states to high levels of armament to create a balance of power against Nuclear Israel.

Unfortunately, this policy proved counterproductive, because despite high level of

armament between both sides, serious security problems still exist between Israel and Muslim

states in the region. This dilemma indicates that more weapons actually undermine stability and

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safety. Such scenarios tend to escalate security dilemmas while precluding cooperation between

Israel and Muslim states.

Lack of Common Threat and Authoritative Third Party Mediation:

When developing cooperation between opposing sides of a prolonged conflict, a common

enemy can serve as the glue that binds the two factions together. For example, the European

Union has brought long-term enemies France and Germany under the umbrella of an

organization that worked against the communist Soviet expansion. Thus, lack of common threat

towards both parties is the other defection of cooperation between Israel and Muslim states. To

elaborate, they do not feel that cooperation is a necessity to struggle with an enemy to overcome

it, such as a terrorist organization that attacks to both sides. Furthermore, also, there is no a third

party who has authority and capacity of enforcing the opposite sides for a peace agreement.

Western actors are not accepted as fair mediators by Muslim states; vice versa Muslim actors by

Israel.

Palestinian Issue:

Muslims states see Israel as an invader in Palestine, and they contend that Israel should

withdraw from Palestinian territory. In the eyes of the citizens of these Muslim states, Palestine

is a nation aggrieved by Israeli territorial occupation. Muslim people give Palestinians

militaristic and economical support to fight against Israel, and, while all 57 OIC members

recognize the statehood of Palestinian, 29 of them neither recognize nor maintain relations with

Israel.57 To strengthen Palestine’s international position, Turkey proposed Palestinian statehood

to UNESCO, and UNESCO accepted this offer with 40 votes.58 However, Israel says they

received the territories from the Prophet Moses therefore they deserve to have a state in this area.

Thus, the prolonged deadlock frustrates cooperation between Muslim states and Israel.

   

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Implications

Key members of Muslim states in the Middle Eastern region established the Organization

of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to address their security dilemmas with Israel. The 1948 Arab-

Israel war, the 1957 Suez Canal Crisis, and the 1967 Six-Day War each resulted from the

security dilemma between these opposing factions. Israel’s decisive military victory over Muslim

states in all of these wars led the Muslim nations to create a union to strengthen their position

against Israel. The Muslim states planned to create balanced and deterrent power against Israel

through Islamic solidarity among Muslim members of the OIC.

Despite its mission, after 43 years of existence, security dilemmas, trust and commitment

problems, and ongoing conflict still exist between Israel and Muslim states. This paper

demonstrates that insofar as the parties do not change their strategies from competition to

cooperation, they will continue to have serious security doubts about one another. Addressing

this security dilemma via cooperation would benefit both sides of the conflict and will lead to a

decrease in the resources spent on weapons, and an increase in the funds available to make new

economic and social investments within their states. As contingent theory states, cooperation will

bring mutual gain and benefit to both parties, while competition leads to relative gain.59 Of

course, for a peaceful cooperation, domestic and international frustrations must be resolved to

pave way for cooperation.

  20  

WORKS CITED

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