Court File No. 36472

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA (ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL OF BRITISH COLUMBIA)

BETWEEN:

BRENDAN PATERSON

- and-

APPELLANT (Appellant)

HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT

(Respondent)

FACTUM OF THE APPELLANT BRENDAN PATERSON

(Section 691 (2)(c) of the Criminal Code of Canada and Rule 35 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)

KENNETH S. WESTLAKE Barrister and Solicitor 355 Burrard Street, Suite 1720 Vancouver, BC V6C 2G8 Telephone: 604-687-9831 Facsimile: 604-687-7089 Email: kenwestlake@telus.net

Kenneth S. Westlake, a.c. Daniel J. Song Brent R. Anderson Counsel for the Appellant

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA Public Prosecution Service of Canada 840 Howe Street, Suite 900 Vancouver, BC V6Z2S9 Telephone: (604) 666-0704 Facsimile: (604) 666-1599

W. Paul Riley, O.C. Counsel for the Respondent

GOWLING WLG (CANADA) LLP Barristers and Solicitors 160 Elgin Street, Suite 2600 Ottawa, Ontario KiP 1C3 Telephone: (613) 786-0171 Facsimile: (613) 788-3587 Email: jeff.beedell@gowlingwlg.com

Jeffrey W. Beedell Matthew S. Estabrooks Ottawa Agent for the Counsel for the Appellant

DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS OF CANADA 160 Elgin Street, 1 ih Floor Ottawa, ON KiA OH8 Telephone: (613) 957-4770 Facsimile: (613) 941-7865 Email: flacasse@ppsc-sppc.gc.ca

Frang:ois Lacasse Ottawa Agent for the Counsel for the Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PART I: OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................... 1

.1. OVERVIEW ...................................................................................................................................... 1

II. BACKGROUND FACTS ...................... ; ........................................................................................... 2

III. KEY FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL ...................................................................... 4

A. Admission of Possessing Marihuana "Roaches" ............................. " ....... " ............................ .4

B. Police Belief in "Exigent Circumstances" ................................................................................. 5

C. Failure to File a Report to Justice ............................................................................................ 6

IV. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF COURTS BELOW ..................................................................... 8

A. Trial Judge's Reasons on Charier VOir Dire .. '" ...................................... '" .............................. 8

B. Reasons for Judgment of Court of AppeaL .............................................................................. 9

PART II: QUESTIONS IN ISSUE ............................................................. ; ................... 11

PART III: STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT .................................................................... 13

I. POTENTIAL LOSS OF "ROACHES" NOT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES ................................. 13

A. Grounds for Belief in Exigent Circumstances Must Be Reasonable ..................................... 13

B. Warrantless Search of Dwelling-House Restricted to Indictable Offences ............................ 15

1) Power to Issue a Warrant is Discretionary .................................................................... 15

2) "Exigent Circumstances" in CDSA and Criminal Code Are the Same .......................... 17

C. Warrantless Search of Dwelling-House Must Be Necessary ................................................. 21

D. Application of PrinCiples to Mr. Paterson's Appeal ................................................................ 22

II. INVOLUNTARY STATEMENTS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN CHARTER VOIR DIRE ......................... 24

A. Involuntary Statements Are Unreliable, Unlawful or Unfair .......... '" ...................................... 24

B. Involuntary Statements Cannot Inform Reasonable Grounds for Search ............................. 27

1) Excision of Unreliable Statements ................................................................................ 28

2) Excision of Unlawfully Obtained Statements ................................................................ 29

3) Excision of Unfair Statements ....................................................................................... 30

C. Placing Onus on Crown Will Not Wholly Alter Criminal Law ................................................. 32

D. Application of Principles to Mr. Paterson's Appeal ................................................................ 34

III. FAILURE TO FILE REPORT TO JUSTICE A SERIOUS BREACH ............................................. 35

A. Diverging Authorities on the Consequences of Failing to Report .......................................... 35

B. Telewarrant Reporting Requirements Are Stringent... ........................................................... 37

C. Application of PrinCiples to Mr. Paterson's Appeal ................................................................ 39

PART IV: COSTS .......................................................................................................... 40

PART V: ORDER SOUGHT .......................................................................................... 40

PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ........................................................................... 41

PART VII: LEGISLATION ............................................................................................. 43

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S,C, 1996, c. 19

Criminal Code, R.S.C, 1985, c. C-46

Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21

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PART I: OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS

I. OVERVIEW

1. At only the blurred edges of fiction would the potential loss of trifling remnants of

marihuana constitute a police emergency. This "emergency" would be stranger still if the

police had no intention to lay charges after collecting this marihuana. In this case, Mr.

Paterson stood at the door of his residence and-after the police stuck a foot in the door

and questioned him-admitted to having a few marihuana "roaches." The police then

intruded into his home without a warrant believing that he would dispose of these

marihuana cigarette butts, even after promising him that no criminal consequences would

follow if he relinquished them.

2. Mr. Paterson submits that the state cannot assert "exigent circumstances" and peer

into the privacy of our homes for evidence of petty crimes without first securing a search

warrant. A warrantless search of a residence is an extraordinary measure of last resort,

reserved for narrow circumstances involving serious offences. Here, the police had other

legal alternatives less viol~nt to Mr. Paterson's privacy interests that would have averted the

potential destruction of the roaches-roaches the police nevertheless intended to destroy.

3. Moreover, the Court of Appeal has diluted the principle against self-incrimination by

holding that the Crown need not prove the voluntariness of an accused's statement before

relying on it to justify grounds for a search, discounting human agency as subordinate to the

state's interest in investigating crime. This decision, however, is a lone outlier of the deeply­

etched rule that involuntary statements are inadmissible for any purpose. A system of

justice that safeguards our capacity to choose to voice our innermost thoughts bestows

upon accused persons the dignity we expect in a strong liberal democracy. For this reason,

Mr. Paterson argues that the confessions rule must remain unyielding: any statement that

surfaces because of a threat, inducement, or mental illness must be "excised" from the

investigative grounds for a warrantless search.

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4. Lastly, Mr. Paterson submits that the failure of the police to report their grounds to a

justice for seizing additional items not listed in the telewarrant was a serious breach of s. 8

of the Charier. The purpose of the mandatory "report to justice" in the Criminal Code is not,

as the trial judge found, simply to access a mechanism for the return of seized items, but

rather, to maintain ongoing judicial supervision over the execution of search warrants. By

mistakenly emphasizing the proprietary interest over the continuing privacy interest in

seized items, the trial judge effectively excused the police for thwarting the prior judicial

authorization process.

5. For these reasons, Mr. Paterson submits that the courts below committed reversible

error and asks this Court to set aside his convictions and order a new trial.

II. BACKGROUND FACTS

6. Mr. Paterson was tried and convicted on four counts of possession of a prohibited or

restricted firearm contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, three counts of possession of a

controlled substance for the purpose of trafficking contrary to s. 5(2) of the CDSA, and two

counts of simple possession of a controlled substance contrary to s. 4(1) of the CDSA 1 On

May 2, 2013, he was sentenced to four-and-a-half-years.2 The Court of Appeal dismissed

Mr. Paterson's appeal from conviction on May 13, 2015. This Court granted leave to appeal

on January 28,2016.

7. On November 30,2007, at 3:50 pm, Constables Warner, Dykeman and Bell were

dispatched to an address in Langley, B.C. to meet a woman named Elaine Wallace about a

disconnected 911 call that had come in to B.C. Ambulance Services.3 The address was

linked to a Shopper's Drug Mart4 The call was a priority two call or "a little less than going

1 R. v. Paterson, 2012 sese 1680 [Appellant's Record, Vol. I TAB 3] 2 R. v. Paterson, 2013 sese 880 [Appellant's Record, Vol. I TAB 41 3 Appellant's Record, Vol. 11, p. 13 line 32 - p. 14 line 34. 4 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 40 lines 4-15.

3

lights and sirens."s The officers arrived at a parking lot with several open businesses, a

theatre, and some apartment buildings.6

8. Elaine Wallace told the police she had given to her daughter, Katherine, her cell-

phone from which the 911 call was placed. She believed Katherine was with her boyfriend,

Mr. Paterson, who lived in one of the nearby apartments. Ms. Wallace said the relationship

between her daughter and Mr. Paterson was volatile, and that he was rumoured to have a

shotgun.7

9. At this point, the police learned from dispatch that Katherine Wallace had been

transported to the Langley Memorial Hospital.8 Constables Dykeman and Warner did not

know from where or when the ambulance had picked Katherine Up.9 Dispatch did not

provide any information about the nature of her medical condition, how it was caused, or

whether it was related to Mr. Paterson or to his apartment.10 A check of Mr. Paterson's

name in the police database came back as negative.11

10. The officers did not call the cell phone Which had placed the 911 call or the

emergency department of the hospital. Constable Warner did not consider sending one of

the other two officers who had arrived in separate cars to the hospital to contact Katherine,

although this was an available option in the circumstances.12 Elaine Wallace went to the

hospital upon hearing her daughter had been taken there.13

11. The officers believed the 911 call might have come from Mr. Paterson's apartment.

Constable Dykeman testified that they wanted to see if "the incident" happened in Mr.

Paterson's suite, and whether there were any other "victims" or injured parties inside.14

5 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 15 lines 19-23. 6 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 40 lines 14-47. 7 R. v. Paterson, 2011 sese 1728 [" Voir Dire Ruling"] at paras. 7 and 8. [Appellant's Record, Vol. I TAB 1] 8 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 56 lines 44-45; p. 116 lines 13-18; p. 128 lines 1-20; p. 129 lines 15-23. 9 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 57 ilnes 40-42. 10 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 57 line 40 - p. 58 line 8. 11 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 53 lines 23-25. 12 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 139 line 30 - p. 140 line 13. 13 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 116 lines 30-35. 14 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 171ine 31 - p. 18 line 7.

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III. KEY FACTS RELEVANT TO ISSUES ON APPEAL

A. Admission of Possessing Marihuana uRoaches"

12. Constable Dykeman spoke to the manager of Mr. Paterson's building who "fobbed"

the officers through three secure entrances: the exterior doors, the elevator, and the fourth

floor hallway where Mr. Paterson's suite was located.15 The police knocked on Mr.

Paterson's door three times and announced themselves. Constable Dykeman got down on

his hands and knees, peered under the door, and saw light. He also put his ear to the door

and listened, but heard nothing. He tried to open the door but it was locked.16

13. Constable Dykeman obtained the key to the suite from the manager, inserted the

key in the door, turned the knob, and as he did so, the door opened and Mr. Paterson was

holding it,17 Constable Dykeman's purpose in obtaining the key and unlocking the door was

to determine whether there was anybody inside the suite who was injured and to see if

there was a "crime scene" there.18 Upon opening the door, Cst. Dykeman smelled fresh

and smoked marijuana. Constable Warner smelled "recently smoked" marihuana.19

14. Constable Warner asked Mr. Paterson to identify himself, and questioned him about.

the 911 call. Mr. Paterson said he did not know about the 911 call and said he found

Katherine on the floor of his apartment and helped her to leave. Mr. Paterson was not

injured as far as Cst. Warner could observe. He advised the police that no one else was in

the residence.2o Mr. Paterson tried to close the door to answer a phone call but Cst. Bell

blocked the door with his foot during questioning about the 911 cal1. 21

15. The police concluded their 911 call investigation and were satisfied there was

nobody else inside the apartment and there were no concerns about Mr. Paterson.22

15 Appellant's Record, Vol. 11, p. 16 line 40 - p. 17 line 18. 16 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 17 lines 22-28; p. 60 lines 9-34. 17 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p.19 lines 18-36. 16 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 18 lines 30-32; p. 66 lines 4-5. 19 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 19 lines 8-10; p. 118 lines 8-13. 20 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 118 lines 16-46. 21 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 171 line 46 - p. 172 line 6. 22 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 21 lines 20-25; p. 149 lines 21-33.

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Constable Warner said if there had not been a smell of marihuana, the police would have

left at that point.23 Constable Dykeman then questioned Mr. Paterson about the smell of

marijuana.24 Mr. Paterson denied the smell was coming from his apartment. Constable

Warner walked down the hallway trying to detect where the smell was coming from but did

not smell marijuana near other apartments.25 Mr. Paterson "finally" admitted that he had

smoked a couple of joints and that he had some "roaches" inside his suite.26

B. Police Belief in "Exigent Circumstances"

16. Constable Dykeman told Mr. Paterson he would have to seize the roaches but the

police were not concerned about them, and once they got them they would be on their way.

He told Mr. Paterson he intended to make a "no case" seizure. Mr. Paterson agreed to

retrieve them and attempted to close the door. Constable Dykeman put his foot in the door

and prevented Mr. Paterson from closing it because of safety concerns and the possibility of

Mr. Paterson destroying "evidence.,,27 At this point, the police had questioned Mr. Paterson

for 8-12 minutes, and Cst. Dykeman believed Mr. Paterson was "basically detained" at the

door.28

17. Constable Dykeman told Mr. Paterson he would arrest him if he refused to allow the

police to accompany him into the residence to retrieve the roaches. Mr. Paterson then

pOinted to Cst. Dykeman and said, "You may come in." Constables Dykeman and Bell

followed Mr. Paterson into his residence. 29

18. Constable Dykeman testified he considered getting a search warrant to seize the

roaches as a "last resort.,,30 If Mr. Paterson had refused to allow him to enter, Cst.

23 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 149 lines 21-41. 24 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 20 lines 14-42. 25 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 150 lines 5-12; Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at para 19. 26 Appellant's Record, Vol. 11, p. 20 lines 20-29. 27 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 21 line 43 - p. 22 line 3. 28 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 34 line 4-7; p. 70 lines 12-15; Appellant's Record, Vol. III, p. 204 lines 31-35. 29 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at paras. 22 and 24. 30 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 22 line 41 - p. 23 line 5.

6

Dykeman would have arrested him and gone into the suite to obtain them, At no point was

Cst Dykeman intending to proceed with criminal charges over the marihuana roaches,31

19. Constable Dykeman believed Mr. Paterson was committing the offence of

possession of a controlled substance by virtue of "the admission and also the smelL,,32

Constable Warner believed Mr. Paterson could be arrested on the basis of the admission

and the smell, but that it was not worth proceeding with an arrest over the roaches,33

Constable Warner also agreed there could have been minimal or no marijuana left inside

the residence. 34

20, After entering the suite, Cst Dykeman saw a bulletproof vest and a handgun in the

living room, and a baggie of pills on a speaker stand. Constable Bell also saw the handgun

and the pills. The police arrested Mr. Paterson, searched him, and called their superior

officer, Cpl. Meszaros for assistance. Constable Warner left to go to the hospital to check

on Katherine Wallace, who told him she had accidentally slipped and hit her head. 35

Corporal Meszaros arrived on scene and together with Cst. Dykeman cleared the

residence. In doing so, they saw what they believed to be ecstasy and crack cocaine. 36

C. Failure to File a Report to Justice

21. Constable Dykeman returned to the detachment, and prepared an Information to

Obtain a Search Warrant which he faxed to the Judicial Justice Centre in Burnaby, B.C. to

apply for a telewarrant Despite having seen a bulletproof vest and a handgun in the

apartment, Cst. Dykeman only sought a warrant in respect of "Marijuana, cocaine, MDMA

(ecstasy), documents identifying the occupants of the apartment at C408-20159 88 Avenue,

Langley, British Columbia, scales and score sheets.,,37 As a result, the warrant only

31 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 99 line 42 - p. 100 line 32. 32 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 22 line 36. 33 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 121 lines 20-36. 34 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 152 line 13. 35 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at paras. 24-26, 30. 36 Ibid., at paras. 26-28. 37 Information to Obtain Search Warrant [Appellant's Supplementary Record, Vol V - Tab 1]

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authorized the seizure of controlled substances, identification documents, scales, and score

sheets.38

22. Constable Dykeman returned to Mr. Paterson's residence with the warrant and

searched it with other officers. The police seized 42 items including four handguns,

ammunition, cocaine, methamphetamine, ecstasy, drug paraphernalia, a bulletproof vest, a

baggie of marijuana, and $30,000 in cash.39

23. Although this was Cst. Dykeman's first application for a search warrant, no superior

officer signed off on the ITO. Constable Dykeman read s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code to

familiarize himself with the use of a telewarrant, including subsection (9) that requires an

officer to whom a warrant is issued to file a written report to the court within seven days. He

left that task to Cst. Bell and took no steps to ensure that requirement had been complied

with.4o

24. Constable Bell did not file the 5.2 Report to Justice until February 13, 2008-74 days

after the search of Mr. Paterson's residence,41 67 days after the seven-day deadline under

s. 489.1 (9). Constable Bell did not include a statement of things seized without prior judicial

authorization, and did not set out grounds to believe the additional items were obtained by,

or used in, the commission of an offence as required by section 487.1 (9) and Form 5.2 of

the Code. The 5.2 Form that he filled out specifically included a section to address grounds

for such seizures, but he left that section blank.42 Although it was one of the first 5.2 forms

Cst. Bell had completed, he did not seek direction or assistance in preparing the report. He

could not offer any explanation for why the report was filed late, and admitted that he was

aware of the seven day deadline to file that report, which appeared in the warrant, a copy of

which he had read.43

38 Warrant to Search signed by Brad Beer, Judicial Justice of the Peace, November 30, 2007 [Appellant's Supplementary Record, Vol V - Tab 21 39 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at paras. 32-35; Report to Justice [Appellant's Supplementary Record, VoIV- Tab 3J 40 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 75 lines 15-45; p. 87 line 46 - p. 88 line 35. 41 Appellant's Record, Vol. III, p. 201 lines 35-44. 42 Appellant's Record, Vol. III, p. 229 line 12 - p. 230 line 21. 43 Appellant's Record, Vol. III, p. 202 lines 5-14; p. 228 lines 16-20; p. 228 line 24 - p. 229 line 11.

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IV. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF COURTS BELOW

25. At the outset of the trial, a Charier voir dire was declared to hear evidence on Mr.

Paterson's application under sections 8, 9, and 24(2) of the Charter.44 Mr. Paterson did not

call any evidence. The Crown called four police officers and relied on statements Mr.

Paterson made to the police at the door of his residence. The Crown conceded that if the

warrantless entry by the police into Mr. Paterson's residence violated s. 8, the warrant

should be set aside.

A. Trial Judge's Reasons on Charier Voir Dire

26. The trial judge found there were "exigent circumstances" pursuant to section 11 (7) of

the CDSA justifying the warrantless entry into Mr. Paterson's residence, and therefore the

police did not breach Mr. Paterson's Charier rights. The trial judge reasoned that (1) the

police had reasonable grounds to believe there was a controlled substance in Mr.

Paterson's residence based on the smell and his admission that he had marijuana roaches,

and (2) the police reasonably believed the substance would be lost, destroyed, or

. consumed because they did not intend to arrest him.45 The trial judge likened the "no case

seizure" to a "liquor pour-out,,46

27. The trial judge held that it was impracticable to obtain a search warrant "by reason of

[these] exigent circumstances.,,47 The police had grounds "to be very cautious for their

safety" due to the "vague" rumour of a shot gun, "bad repute" of Mr. Paterson as suggested

by Elaine Wallace, and Mr. Paterson's evasive responses and changing story.48

28. The trial judge found the handguns were lawfully seized under s. 489 of the Criminal

Code which permits a police officer executing a search warrant to seize "any thing that the

person believes on reasonable grounds" has been obtained by or used in an offence, or will

44 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 11 lines 24-29; p. 12 lines 31-34; p. 83 lines 35-42. 45 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at para. 75. 46 Ibid., at para. 79. 47 Ibid., at para. 77. 48 Ibid., at para. 80.

9

afford evidence of an offence.49 He found Mr. Paterson's s. 8 rights had been breached

because the police filed the 5.2 Report late and failed to properly complete the report. 50 In

doing so, he relied on another decision from the British Columbia Supreme Court that had

held that the failure to comply with the Report to Justice provisions will usually, but not

always, result in a breach of an accused's Charier rights.51

29. The trial judge found the breach in relation to the Form 5.2 Report was at the "low

end of the range of seriousness," "did not go to the root of the police authority to enter and

search the apartment," and therefore did not significantly impact Mr. Paterson's rights and

did not warrant the exclusion of the evidence. 52

B. Reasons for Judgment of Court of Appeal

30. The Court of Appeal held that the Crown was entitled to tender and rely on Mr.

Paterson's statements to the police in the Charier voir dire without first obtaining a ruling

that they were voluntary. Bennett J.A. noted that "voluntariness is the primary focus of the

confessions rule, along with trial fairness.,,53 She reasoned that statements of an accused

on a Charter voir dire "may never be heard by the trier of fact" and the issue on a Charier

voir dire is "not the guilt or innocence of the accused, but rather state conduct, and whether

the admission of certain evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.,,54

She said, "none of the uses of a statement on a Charter voir dire engage the need of the

protection of the confessions rule.,,55 She held that the Crown does not have to prove

voluntariness of an accused's statement before tendering it in a Charier voir dire, and that

requiring the Crown to do so "would wholly alter the practice of the criminal law" because

the onus is on an accused to prove a breach of his or her Charterrights.56

31. The Court of Appeal also agreed with the trial judge that the warrantless entry by the

police into Mr. Paterson's residence was justified pursuant to "exigent circumstances." The

49 Ibid., at paras. 100 and 101. 50 Ibid., at para. 110. 51 Ibid., at paras. 106 and 110. 52 Ibid., at paras. 120, 123, and 137. 53 R. v. Paterson, 2015 BCCA 205, ["BCCA Reasons"] para. 57. [Appellant's Record, Vol. I TAB 5] 54 Ibid., at para. 58. 55 Ibid., at para. 59. 56 Ibid., at para. 62.

10

police smelled marijuana, Mr. Paterson admitted to having roaches on the premises, and

the police had no intention of arresting him.57 Bennett J.A. also observed that the trial judge

accepted the evidence that the police officers only wanted to seize the "roaches" and be on

their with a "no case" seizure.58 She held that it was "not practical" for the police to obtain a

warrant because to do so they "would have to arrest Mr. Paterson, a much greater

interference with his liberty rights.'ljg Bennett J.A. also deferred to the trial judge's s. 24(2)

analysis, in the event the ruling on the issue of exigent circumstances was in error.60

32. The Court of Appeal declined to consider whether the incomplete and late 5.2 Report

rendered the search and seizure of Mr. Paterson's residence unlawful, and found there was

"no basis to interfere with the ruling on s. 24(2).,,61

57 Ibid., at para. 72. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., at para. 76. 61 Ibid., at paras. 88-89

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PART II: QUESTIONS IN ISSUE

33. Mr. Paterson appeals the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal on the

following issues:

I. Did the police have reasonable grounds to believe there were exigent

circumstances to conduct a warrantless search of Mr. Paterson's residence

under s. 11 (7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act?

Exigent circumstances are based on reasonable and probable grounds and thus

reviewed on appeal on a standard of correctness. Moreover, the meaning of exigent

circumstances under s. 11 (7) of the CDSA is the same as under s. 529.3(2)(b) of the

Criminal Code, and thus warrantless searches of a residence are limited to the

preservation of evidence related to indictable offences only. Finally, a warrantless

search of a residence must be necessary to prevent the destruction of evidence, and

only where no other legal avenues are available to the police.

In this case, it was not reasonable for the police to believe that Mr. Paterson would

destroy marihuana roaches when the police assured him they would conduct a "no

case" seizure. In addition, the police only had grounds to believe Mr. Paterson was

committing a summary conviction offence, and the law does not authorize a

warrantless search of a dwelling~house to seize under 30 grams of marihuana.

Lastly, the police had grounds to arrest Mr. Paterson and then apply for a warrant,

which made it unnecessary to conduct a warrantless search.

II. Did the trial judge err by failing to conduct a voir dire to determine the

voluntariness of Mr. Paterson's statement to the police before the Crown could

rely on it to establish reasonable and probable grounds for a warrantless

search?

Voluntariness protects against the admission of unreliable, unlawfully obtained, or

unfair statements for any purpose in criminal proceeding. Where a statement is

12

found to be involuntary, it must be excised from the grounds upon which the Crown

relies to justify a warrantless search. The Crown must still prove voluntariness

beyond a reasonable doubt in this context, or in the alternative, on a balance of

probabilities in a Charler voir dire.

Here, the trial judge failed to discharge his duty to conduct a voluntariness voir dire,

where Mr. Paterson's admission of possessing marihuana was made while the

police detained and questioned him at the door without cautioning him.

Furthermore, in his s. 24(2) analysis, the trial judge relied on this admission as

"mitigating" the seriousness of the warrantless search of the residence and denied

Mr. Paterson's application to exclude evidence.

III. Did the trial judge err in finding that the late filing of the report to justice did

not go to "the root of the police authority" to seize items not authorized by the

telewarrant in this case?

There are three diverging lines of authority regarding the consequences of failing to

file a report to justice. The most persuasive position is that the reporting requirement

is essential to the proper disposition of the search warrant process. Telewarrants,

particularly, have more stringent reporting requirements and a seizure outside the

scope of the initial authorization is prima facie unreasonable.

The police in this case filed the Form 5.2 report 67 days late. They seized items that

were not authorized by the telewarrant, but failed to articulate grounds justifying

these seizures as required by s. 487.1. The issuing justice therefore had no

opportunity to review the seizures to determine whether they were justified, and

whether the detention of those items was lawful.

13

PART III: STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT

I. POTENTIAL LOSS OF "ROACHES" NOT EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES

A. Grounds for Belief in Exigent Circumstances Must Be Reasonable

34. Mr. Paterson submits that the issue of whether exigent circumstances existed at the

time the police entered his residence requires an assessment of reasonable and probable

grounds. Hence, the issue is a question of law for which the standard of review is

correctness.

35. At trial, the Crown relied on "exigent circumstances" under s. 11 (7) of the Controlled

Drugs and Substances Act ["CDSA,,]62 to argue that the warrantless search in this case was

reasonable within the meaning of s. 8 of the Charier. Unfortunately, there is no definition of

exigent circumstances in the CDSA.

36. In the Criminal Code, the standard of exigent circumstances in the context of

warrantless searches appears in the following sections: 117.02 (search and seizure of

firearms and related devices without a warrant), 487.11 (search warrant and tracking device

powers without a warrant), and 529.3(authority to enter dwelling-house without a warrant).

But the only codification of the meaning of exigent circumstances appears under s.

529.3(2).

37. Under s. 529.3(1) the police can enter a dwelling-house without a warrant to arrest

and apprehend a person where the grounds to obtain an arrest warrant under s. 529.1 exist,

but by reason of "exigent circumstances" it would be impractical to obtain one. Subsection

(2) defines exigent circumstances as the following:

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), exigent circumstances include circumstances in which the peace officer

62 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 11. [Annexed at Part VII hereto]

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(a) has reasonable grounds to suspect that entry into the dwelling-house is necessary to prevent imminent bodily harm or death to any person; or

(b) has reasonable grounds to believe that evidence relating to the commission of an indictable offence is present in the dwelling-house and that entry into the dwelling-house is necessary to prevent the imminent loss or imminent destruction of the evidence.63

38. Hence, under s. 529.3(2)(b), when the police wish to enter a residence without a

warrant to prevent the loss or destruction of evidence, they must believe the following on

reasonable grounds:

1) That there is evidence in the residence related to an indictable offence;

2) That waiting for a warrant would result in the imminent loss or destruction of that

evidence; and,

3) That entry into the residence is necessary to prevent that imminent loss or

destruction of the evidence.

39. Mr. Paterson will argue below that these specific conditions under s. 529.3(2)(b) also

apply in the context of warrantless dwelling-house searches conducted under s. 11 (7) of the

CDSA. But it should be uncontroversial that where the police believe they must conduct a

warrantless search to prevent the imminent loss or destruction of evidence, their belief must

be based on reasonable grounds.64

40. The next issue, then, is whether exigent circumstances amounts to a question of

law. In Feeney,65 writing for the minority, L'Heureux-Dubs wrote in obiter that the question

of whether "exigent circumstances exist in a given case, is, of course, a finding of fact for

the trial judge.,,66 Since Feeney, however, this Court has unanimously held in Shepherd

that "the issue of whether the facts as found by the trial judge amount at law to reasonable

63 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 529.3 (emphasis added). [Annexed at Part VI! hereto] 64 R. v. Duong and Tran, 2002 BCCA 43, [2002] B.C.J. No. 90 at para. 32 [Appellant's Authorities TAB 8]; R. v. Phoummasak, 20160NCA46, [2016] O.J. No. 281 at para. 12 [Appeliant'sAuthorities TAB 24]; R. v. Fearon, 2014 SCC 77, [2014] S.C.R. 621 at para. 137 and 178 per Karakatsanis J. in dissent, but not on this point. (not reproduced) 65 R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 101 66 Ibid., at para. 156.

15

and probable grounds is a question of law," and that the trial judge's ultimate ruling is

subject to appellate review on a standard of correctness.67

41. Given that appellate courts reviewing the issue of exigent circumstances appear to

have applied this standard,68 Mr. Paterson submits that the trial judge's findings of the

underlying facts relevant to whether exigent circumstances existed are subject to deference

on appeal, but an appellate court may review the ultimate finding on a standard of

correctness.

B. Warrantless Search of Dwelling-House Restricted to Indictable Offences

42. Mr. Paterson also argues that, regardless of whether it was reasonable for the police

to believe he would dispose of the marihuana roaches in his residence, a warrantless

search of a residence under s. 11 (7) of the CDSA to prevent the imminent loss or

destruction of evidence must relate to an indictable offence. Section 11 (7) does not

empower the police to march into the most private of places on earth and conduct what the

trial judge described as "a liquor pour-ouL,,69

43. This limitation would not unduly constrain police powers. The majority of offences in

the Criminal Code and the CDSA are indictable and hybrid (which are presumptively

indictable).7o Only a small number of offences are straight summary conviction offences.

But the possession of less than 30 grams of marihuana is one of those offences, under s.

4(5) of the CDSA.7i

1) Power to Issue a Warrant is Discretionary

67 R. v. Shepherd, 2009 SCC 35, [2009]2 S,C,R, 527 at para. 20 (emphasis in original). (not reproduced) 68 See, e.g., R. v. Jones, 2013 BCCA 345, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1589 at para. 27 [Appellant's Authorities TAB 15] R. v. Crocker, 2009 BCCA 388, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1816. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 7] 69 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at para. 79. 70 See s. 34 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-21. [Annexed at Part VlI hereto]. Interestingly, s. 117.02 of the Code, which authorizes a warrantless search for firearms and other restricted and prohibited weapons in exigent Circumstances, specifically excludes dwelling-houses, even though most Criminal Code offences related to those items are indictable (or hybrid) offences. 71 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 4(5).

16

44. Mr. Paterson does not dispute that s. 11 (1) of the CDSA authorizes search warrants

for "any place" in relation to the possession of a controlled substance, including possession

of under 30 grams of marihuana. However, s. 11(1) does not compel a warrant in every

circumstance the police establish requisite grounds. Instead, as with s. 487 of the Code, s.

11 (1) affords discretion to the authorizing justice, who "may" issue a warrant if the

preconditions to granting one exist.72

45. In Chan,73 Hennessy J. commented on the "broad discretion" that an issuing justice

retains when deciding whether to grant a search warrant and some of the factors relevant to

the exercise of that discretion:

The issuing justice has discretion but he must exercise it judicially. Clearly, the issuance of search warrants is a judicial function. In making his decision, the Justice of the Peace retains a broad discretion to decline issuance of a search warrant, even where the statutory requirements have been made out. Some of the factors weighed in the balance of competing state and individual interests include the apparent strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the charge, the importance of the evidence sought, the nature of the search, and the corresponding degree of intrusion.74

46. This is critical. Parliament has ensured that an issuing justice does not simply

"rubber stamp" a warrant after perfunctorily going through a checklist. Rather, the prior

judicial authorization process actively balances competing interests, weighing the

seriousness of the offences that the police are investigating against the degree of

expectation of privacy at stake in "the place" the police wish to search.

47. The invocation of exigent circumstances, however, effectively removes judicial

oversight from the decision to encroach on a citizen's private property. When the police

circumvent the prior judicial authorization process by relying on exigent circumstances, they

72 Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19, s. 11. [Annexed at Part VII hereto]. 73 R. v. Chan, [2003] O.J. No. 188 (S.C.J.) (QL) [Appellant's Authorities TAB 3], cited with approval in R. v. X. T.N., 2004 BCPC 470, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2717 at paras. 62 and 63. (not reproduced). 74 Chan, supra note 73, at para. 49 (emphasis added). See also Descoteaux et al. v. Mierzwinski, [1982] 1 S. C.R. 860; [1982] S.C.J. No. 43 (not reproduced): " ... there are places for which authorization to search should generally be granted only with reticence and, where necessary, with more conditions attached than for other places. One does not enter a church in the same way as a lion's den, or a warehouse in the same way as a lawyer's office ... "

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make a unilateral decision, in the field, to usurp the discretion of an independent and

impartial arbiter. To counterbalance this lack of judicial oversight, Mr. Paterson submits that

in circumstances where the police intend to enter a residence without a warrant because of

a risk of imminent loss of evidence, the high expectation of privacy in the home75 demands

that the evidence the police seek to preserve relates to an indictable offence.

2) "Exigent Circumstances" in CDSA and Criminal Code Are the Same

48. This restriction regarding indictable offences is unambiguous in the only definition of

exigent circumstances in the Code. 76 Relying on this definition, Mr. Paterson contends that

the application of ordinary principles of statutory construction leads to the conclusion that, in

the case of warrantless searches into a dwelling-house, the meaning of exigent

circumstances under ss. 11 (7) and 529.3(2)(b) is the same.

49. The precursor to the CDSA, the Narcotic Control Act ["NCA"], allowed warrantless

searches of other places under s. 10, but specifically excluded dwelling-houses. 77 In 1993,

this Court in Grant,78 read down this section to permit warrantless searches, other than in a

dwelling-house, only in exigent circumstances. Later in 1995, in Silveira,79 Cory J. for the

majority wrote that, "to enter and search a dwelling-house without a warrant constitutes a

very serious breach of the Narcotic Control Act and the historic inviolability of a dwelling

place. Therefore, in the future, even if such exigent circumstances exist, the evidence would

likely be found inadmissible under s. 24(2).,,80 In response to this Court's decision in

Silveira, Parliament added this exceptional power to conduct a warrantless search of a

75 See R. v. Silveira, [1995]2 S.C.R. 297, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38 at para. 41. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 31] 76 Although s. 529.3(2)(b) restricts warrantless searches in a dwelling-house to indictable offences, the actual arrest power under s. 529.1 permits arrests for summary conviction offences. For example, s. 495(1 )(b) authorizes warrantless arrests when an officer "finds [a person] committing a criminal offence" which applies to any offence, whether summary or indictable: R. v. MacCannell, 2014 BCCA 254, [2014] B.C.J. No. 2069 at para. 33 (not reproduced). Thus, for the purposes of a dwelling-house, Parliament deliberately distinguished the power to effect a warrantless arrest from the authority to conduct a warrantless search. 77 Narcotic Control Act, RS.C., 1985, c. N-1, s. 10. (not reproduced) 78 R. v. Grant, [1993]3 S.C.R. 223, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 13] 79 Silveira, supra note 75. 80 Ibid., at para. 162.

I·'

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dwelling-house under s. 11 (7) when the CDSA came into force and replaced the NCA in

1996,81 but neglected to define "exigent circumstances."

50. However, after this Court's decision in Feeney in 1997, Parliament amended the

Code to allow justices to grant warrants to arrest individuals in a dwelling-house and

codified, for the first time, a definition for "exigent circumstances" in s. 529.3(2)(b). During

the review of Bill C-16 in the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional

Affairs, the Minister of Justice at that time, the Honourable Anne McLellan, explained that

the intent of the bill was to bring "clarity" to when police could enter a dwelling without a

warrant while simultaneously respecting the Charier.

In Feeney, the court clearly left the door open with respect to the issue of whether there were exigent circumstances other than hot pursuit under which entry into dwellings could be permitted in the absence of a judicial authorization. In this respect, Parliament has been given the opportunity to speak, and the government has introduced a bill which we believe will bring clarity to the law in this area.

We have undertaken, in consultation with the provinces and police, to define what we believe to be exigent circumstances which meet the requirements of section 1 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

Section S29.3(2)(b) speaks to the fact that the police officer has reasonable grounds to believe that evidence relating to the commission of an indictable offence is present in the dwelling house and that entry is necessary to prevent the imminent loss or destruction of the evidence. Again, I believe that this will meet section 1 Charier scrutiny. It is a reasonable limitation on any right the accused may have because one is dealing with a serious situation where one has a reasonable ground to believe that evidence will be destroyed, evidence important to an indictable offence.82

Earlier, the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Justice addressed the House of

Commons on October 31, 1997, in a motion to refer Bill C-16 to the justice committee for

second reading and concluded with the following remarks:

81 See R. v. Hunter, 2015 BCCA428, [2015] B.C.J. No. 2242 at paras. 22 and 23. (not reproduced) 82 Proceedings of the Standing Senate Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Legal Affairs No. 12 (16 Dec 1997) (Hon. Anne McLellan) (emphasis added), online: <http://www.parl.gc.caf >

19

The bill creates tools that will enhance the privacy rights of Canadians while providing law enforcement officers with the kind of flexibility needed to do their difficult task. 83

51. The Minister of Justice was faced with presenting a solution to the ambiguity in the

law post-Feeney where the interests in law enforcement required the power to react

immediately to the risk of evidence being destroyed, while the Charier demanded a

heightened protection of privacy in a dwelling-house. Her answer was to limit entry in

"serious situations" where the evidence related to an indictable offence.

52. Mr. Paterson submits there is no policy reason to interpret s. 11 (7) of the CDSA any

differently.84 The absence of a definition for "exigent circumstances" in s. 11 (7) does not

mean Parliament deliberately distinguished s. 529.3(2)(b) from s. 11 (7) because the public

had a particular overriding interest in preserving evidence of low-level offences such as the

possession of marihuana under 30 grams that outweighed the interest in other Criminal

Code summary conviction offences.85 Instead, s. 529.3 was reactive legislation in which

Parliament turned its mind to defining exigent circumstances in criminal legislation for the

first time.

53. Indeed, recently in Phoummasak, Doherty-J.A. held that the meaning of exigent

circumstances in s. 11 (7) was the same as in the Code and common law, referring to s.

529.3.86 Admittedly, Doherty J.A. did not specifically address whether the prevention of

destruction of evidence is limited to indictable offences.

54. Nevertheless, Mr. Paterson submits that the complementary nature of the CDSA and

the Criminal Code requires that their search warrant provisions be construed harmoniously

83 House of Commons Debates, 36th ParI., 1 st Sess., No. 25 (31 Oct 1997) (Eleni Bakopanos) online: <http://www.parl.gc.ca/> 84 The preamble to Bill C-16 stated that the bill is not meant to limit the power to enter granted to police under other acts or under common law, but Ms. McClellan's comments before the Senate Committee indicate that Parliament did not want to limit other exceptional situations to enter dwelling-houses, such as the "hot pursuit" exception in R. v. Godoy, [1999]1 S.C.R. 311, [1998] S.C.J. No. 85 (not reproduced): See Tetard v. R., 2010 QCCA 2235, [2010] Q.J. No. 13161 at para. 20. (not reproduced) 85 Summary conviction offences in the Criminal Code include carrying a weapon while attending a public meeting (s. 89), swearing a false statement (s. 134), disturbing the peace by discharging a firearm (s. 175(1 )(d)), and throwing a volatile substance in a public place (s. 178). 86 Phoummasak, supra note 64, at para. 12 (emphasis added).

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with each other to ensure that they are consistent, as there is a presumption of coherence

between related statutes.8? Moreover, s. 15 of the Interpretation Act creates a presumption

that a definition in an enactment applies to all other enactments relating to the same

subject-matter, unless a contrary intention appears. This presumption is related to the

common law principle that statutes in pari materia shall be taken and construed together as

one system and as explanatory to each other. 88 According to Professor Ruth Sullivan,

"other things being equal, interpretations that minimize the possibility of conflict or

incoherence among different enactments are preferred.,,89

55. Indeed, unlike a Criminal Code search warrant,90 a CDSA warrant does not restrict

the time of day during which the police can execute a search. If the doctrine of exigent

circumstances did not limit warrantless searches of residences to the investigation of

indictable offences, then the police could presumably rely on s. 11 (7) to swarm into a

person's home at 2 a.m. to prevent the imminent destruction of a few grams of marihuana,

all without prior authorization. Although legislatures can, at times, enact poorly drafted

legislation that may lead to surprising consequences, courts should choose an interpretation

that leads to reasonable results. 91

56. In Evans,92 the accused was arrested in his home after the police officer who

attended smelled marihuana and received answers from the accused essentially admitting

to possession or use. Although he applied s. 529.3(2) of the Code, Gulbransen P.C.J.

stressed the words, "indictable offences," and that the officer, at most, had grounds that the

87 See Dagg v. Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997]2 S.C.R. 403, [1997] S.C.J. No. 63 at para. 51 (not reproduced); Murphy v. Welsh, [1993]2 S.C.R. 1069, [1993] S.C.J. No. 83 at para. 10 (not reproduced); Therrien (Re) , 2001 SCC 35, [2001]2 S.C.R. 3 at para. 121. (not reproduced) 88 R. v. Loxda/e (1758),1 Burr. 445,97 E.R. 394 (not reproduced); Miln-Bingham Printing Co. v. The King, [1930] S.C.R. 282, 1930 CarswellNat 29 at para. 2. (not reproduced) 89 R. Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes (3rd ed. 1994), at p. 288 (emphasis added) (not reproduced). See also Cote, Pierre-Andre, The Interpretation ofLegis/ation in Canada, (2nd ed.) (Les editions Yvon Blais, Cowansville, Que. 1991) at p. 288: "Different enactments of the same legislature are supposedly as consistent as the provisions of a single enactment. All legislation of one Parliament is deemed to make up a coherent system ... This presumption of coherence in enactments of the same legislature is even stronger when they relate to the same subject matter, in pari materia. Apparent conflicts between statutes should be resolved in such a way as to re-establish the desired harmony." 90 Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 488. (not reproduced) 91 R. v. McKay (1996),106 C.C.C. (3d) 535, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1019 (CA) at para. 72. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 18] 92 R. v. Evans, 2004 BCPC 388, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2178. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 9]

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accused was in possession of under 30 grams of marihuana, which did not authorize entry

into a residence because it was "not a serious offence.,,93

57. Hence, limiting exigent searches of residences under s. 11 (7) to the preservation of

evidence for indictable offences would ensure that the search warrant provisions in both the

CDSA and the Code embody clarity, coherence and common sense.

C. Warrantless Search of Dwelling-House Must Be Necessary

58. Section 529.3(2) also codifies the common-law requirement that a warrantless

search be "necessary" in light of exigent circumstances. In Kelsy,94 Rosenberg J.A. wrote

the following about the extraordinary nature of these circumstances:

... whether exigent circumstances are invoked to search for evidence or to protect the public or for officer safety, it is the nature of the exigent circumstances that makes some less intrusive investigatory procedure insufficient. By their nature, exigent circumstances are extraordinary and should be invoked to justify violation of a person's privacy only where necessary.95

59. In other words, it is the unforeseen urgency inherent in exigent circumstances that

leaves the police no choice but to proceed with entering a dwelling-house without a warrant

to preserve evidence. This is why the statutory provisions that permit warrantless searches

contain the phrase, "" .by reason of eXigent circumstances it would be impractical to obtain

[a warrant].,,96 By definition, therefore, necessity renders the option of obtaining a warrant

impracticable.97

60. In contrast, the Court of Appeal held that arresting Mr. Paterson was "a much greater

interference with his liberty rights," suggesting that the breach of Mr. Paterson's privacy in

this home was less intrusive than a detention or arrest, and that the warrantless search of

93 Ibid. at paras, 12-14. 94 R. v. Ke/sy, 2011 ONCA 605, [2011] O.J, No. 4159. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 16] 95 Ibid" at para, 35 (emphasis added), 96 See Criminal Code, supra note 63; CD SA , supra note 62, 97 See Grant, supra note 78, at para. 29: "I have concluded that warrantless searches pursuant to s. 10 NCA must be limited to situations in which exigent circumstances render obtaining a warrant impracticable."

22

his residence was the preferable option.98 Constable Dykeman even claimed that obtaining

a warrant, a constitutional requirement, was "a last resort.,,99 Without accepting the Court of

Appeal's comments as a correct statement of law,100 Mr. Paterson submits that s. 11(7)

does not ask the police to engage in legal reasoning or a cost-benefit analysis of a person's

Charier-protected interests before deciding to skirt the prior judicial authorization process.

Instead, it must be necessary to enter a home without a warrant, such as when an arrest

and subsequent application for a search warrant (including a telewarrant) 101 would not

eliminate the risk of destruction of evidence. In other words, necessity implies there are no

other lawful avenues available.

D. Application of Principles to Mr. Paterson's Appeal

61. Mr. Paterson submits that it was not reasonable for the police to believe that he

would destroy marihuana roaches that they intended to seize without charging him. There

is no dispute that the purpose of entering Mr. Paterson's home was to seize marihuana

roaches and conduct a "no case seizure," which Donald J.A. has called "an extra legal

concept which flies in the face of the Charier ... ,,102

62. The police did not have grounds to believe that Mr. Paterson was in possession of

any other marihuana or contraband. They did not have these grounds because Cst.

Dykeman testified that the thought of obtaining a warrant "crossed [his] mind" but said, "I

don't think I would have got a search warrant for the roaches at that point... I may have

[obtained a warrant], but the fact that it was a couple of roaches, I wasn't concerned, and I

had indicated that to Mr. Paterson.,,103 The police would have disposed of the marihuana

roaches that they did not intend to use as evidence in a criminal proceeding. 104 Mr.

98 BCCA Reasons, supra note 53, at para. 74. 99 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 22 line 41 - p. 23 line 5. 100 See, e.g., Feeney, supra note 65, at para. 154, per L'Heureux-Dube in dissent " ... given the restrictions needed to effect an arrest in a dwelling house, it is arguable that these types of intrusion are in most cases considerably less invasive of privacy than warrantless searches. The announcement requirement, for example, allows the suspect to surrender him- or herself at the door of the residence and wevent any real intrusion of the premises."

01 Silveira, supra note 75, at para. 70: " ... Parliament has made it easier for the police to avoid exigent entries in s. 487.1 of the Criminal Code, ... by providing for telewarrants ... " 102 R. v. Lam, 2003 BCCA 593, [2003] B.C.J. No. 2565 at para. 32. (not reproduced) 103 Appellant's Record, Vol. II, p. 22 line 30 - p. 23 line 5 (emphasis added). 104 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at para. 66.

23

Paterson submits that it was not reasonable for the police to believe that, while they stood

uniformed and armed at his door, he would attempt to discard roaches he knew would not

result in criminal charges.

63. Even if the officers had reasonable grounds to believe that Mr. Paterson would

dispose of the roaches, the police conducted a warrantless search in a residence to

preserve evidence of a summary conviction offence. To the extent that s. 11 (7) of the

CDSA only permits a warrantless entry into a dwelling-house to preserve evidence of an

indictable offence, the search in this case was not authorized by law. The trial judge held

that the police had reasonable grounds to believe Mr. Paterson had a "small quantity" of

marihuana.105 If the police had reasonable and probable grounds that Mr. Paterson was in

possession of a few cigarette butts of marihuana, this would not justify a warrantless search

into his residence.

64. Lastly, there was no necessity for the police to enter Mr. Paterson's residence to

prevent the imminent destruction of marihuana roaches that they nevertheless intended to

destroy. Was it necessary to conduct a warrantless search of the home to prevent the

imminent destruction of evidence? If other practical legal options were available, then the

answer is no, and any belief that there were exigent circumstances would not be

reasonable. Here, Cst. Dykeman testified that he had grounds to arrest Mr. Paterson, that

he had "several options" such as obtaining a warrant, but surprisingly, said that this was "a

last resort."106

65. Arresting Mr. Paterson and applying for a search warrant, regardless of how

intrusive to Mr. Paterson or inconvenient to the police it might have been, was the lawful

course of action. The viable option of not conducting a warrantless search means that the

warrantless search was not necessary. By taking the lawful route and applying for a

warrant, the police would have deferred to a justice of the peace, who would have decided

whether to exercise his or her discretion to grant the warrant. Indeed, it would not disrupt

the latticework of reason to say that a justice would likely have declined to allow the police

to search Mr. Paterson's home to seize marihuana roaches.

105 Ibid. at para. 75. 106 Appellant's Record, Vol II, p. 22 line 40 - p. 23 line 2; p. 23 lines 26·35.

24

66. Mr. Paterson also submits that the appropriate remedy would be a new trial. In his s.

24(2) analysis, the trial judge assumed that the warrantless search was a breach of s. 8, but

he did not consider how the lopsided interests involving the expeotation of privacy in a

dwelling-house and the seizure of a minor amount of marihuana impacted the seriousness

of the breach. He further held that the fact the officers had grounds to arrest Mr. Paterson

and had grounds for a warrant was "mitigating" rather than concluding that it was serious

that the officers did not actually pursue those lawful options before invoking exigent

circumstances.107 Since the balancing along the three inquiries is not capable of

mathematical precision, and "[i]t is not simply a question of whether the majority of the

relevant factors favour exclusion in a particular case,'d08 how these errors would impact the

final analysis will need to be determined by a new trial judge. A partial trial limited to the s.

24(2) issue would not be the correct remedy in these circumstances and would constrain

Mr. Paterson's ability to make full answer and defence.109

II. INVOLUNTARY STATEMENTS NOT ADMISSIBLE IN CHARTER VOIR DIRE

A. Involuntary Statements Are Unreliable, Unlawful or Unfair

67. Weathered, yet not eroded by time, the confessions rule remains a cornerstone of

criminal law, resting under the principle against self-incrimination. So fundamental is the

rule that a trial judge has a positive duty to hold a voir dire on the issue of voluntariness

even if neither party requests one, unless the accused expressly waives the requirement for

a voir dire. 11o The confessions rule excludes statements whose voluntariness is in doubt

because of threats or promises, an atmosphere of oppression, the lack of an operating

mind, or police trickery that unfairly denies the accused's right to silence.111

107 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at para. 117. 108 R. v. Leong, 2011 ONSC 3215, [2011] O.J. No. 3123 at para. 241. (not reproduced) 109 R. v. Thomas, [1998]3 S.C.R. 535,130 C.C.C. (3d) 225 (not reproduced); R v Bellusci, 2012 SCC 44, [20121 S.C.J. No. 44 (not reproduced). 110 Erven v. R., [1979]1 S.C.R. 926, [1978] S.C.J. No. 114 (not reproduced); R. v. Powell, [197711 S.C.R. 362, [1976] S.C.J. No. 27. (not reproduced) 111 R. v. Oickle, [2000]2 S.C.R. 3, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 231

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68. Iacobucci J. described voluntariness as a "shorthand for a complex of values" which

not only includes the concern for the reliability of statements, but also the individual's

freedom of will, the need for law enforcement to obey the law, and the overall fairness of the

justice system.112 In other words, it protects against unreliable confessions, unlawfully

obtained statements, and unfairness that would arise from the use of statements in

proceedings. It is this complex of values that demands that a statement the Crown is

unable to prove as voluntary always be inadmissible for any purpose.113

69. In her reasons in the court below, Bennett J.A. wrote that Mr. Paterson's position of

requiring the Crown to prove the voluntariness of a statement was "untenable" because

"there are a variety of situations in which it is reasonable for police to rely on statements,

even if they are involuntary.,,114 With respect, these situations are nowhere to be found.

Involuntary statements cannot be used for any purpose, even where they are not tendered

for their truth, such as using a prior inconsistent statement for the purposes of cross­

examining the accused. 115

70. In Singh,116 Charron J. for the majority reviewed the history of the confessions rule

and its evolution in the post-Charier era and its relationship with the right to silence. She

held that, in the context of a detention before a person in authority, the analysis of

voluntariness and the right to silence under s. 7 is "functionally equivalent." However, while

the Charier represents the bare minimum below which the law must not fall, the common

law can afford protections beyond those in the Charier. The confessions rule is an

example.117

71. While there is some overlap between s. 7 of the Charier and the confessions rule,

particularly in circumstances when they can be said to be "functionally equivalent", there are

important distinctions. Professor Hamish Stewart has argued that Singh should not be read

radically to constitutionalize the confessions rule in a manner that reduces the issue of both

112 Ibid., at paras. 69 and 70. 113 R. v. G.(B.), [1999]2 S.C.R. 475, [1999] S.C.J. No. 29 at para. 44. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 11] 114 BCCA Reasons, supra note 53, at para. 60. 115 G.(B.), supra note 113. 116 R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] S.C.J.No. 48. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 32] 117 Dickie, supra note 111, at paras. 29-31.

26

voluntariness and the right to silence to the single question of whether the accused's will

was overborne. 118 Instead he posits that the best way to constitutionalize the confessions

rule is to treat the exclusionary rule itself as a principle of fundamental justice, as in

G.(B).119 This would better reflect the principle against self-incrimination and preserve the

confessions rule in situations where a statement is deemed involuntary without any

improper police conduct, given that "the offer of leniency in exchange for a statement does

not, in itself, violate any recognized Charier right.,,12o

72. Thus, s. 7 of the Charier does not fully capture all situations where a statement

should be excluded. When Bennett J.A. suggested at paragraph 59 that an accused may

have recourse to s. 7 for a remedy for improper police conduct (or s. 269.1 of the Code for

torture),121 she failed to recognize that the confessions rule still excludes statements that

were not obtained in violation of the Charier, including when the accused is not detained.

73. Mr. Paterson also submits that the confessions rule, through its operating mind

doctrine, also protects against unfair state advantage over a vulnerable and often

marginalized segment of SOCiety: the mentally ill and disabled. Those who bear infirmities

of the mind are arguably at greater risk of bending to the will of authority and manufacturing

a confession. They also come before the criminal courts in some of the most legally

complex and morally challenging cases. Hence, there is a public interest in ensuring a

robust confessions rule prevents the police from gaining damning information from a person

with mental frailties they would not otherwise have received.

74. The Court of Appeal's hypothetical at paragraph 61 fails to appreciate this purpose.

First, the fact that it may be difficult for the Crown to prove the voluntariness of statement of

a mentally ill person does not provide a valid basis for altering the requirement of the Crown

to prove the voluntariness of a statement it wishes to use for any purpose.

118 Hamish Stewart, "The Confessions Rule and the Charter," 54 McGill L.J. 517 (2009) at 543. ~Afpellant's Authorities TAB 38J

1 Ibid., at 529. 120 Ibid., at 544. 121 BCCA Reasons, supra note 53, at para. 59.

27

75. Second, the evolution of the law of criminal evidence must not engender systemic

imbalance against those in need of the highest legal protections. In the Court of Appeal's

hypothetical scenario, the mentally ill person provides a statement because his or her

unsound mind impels a confession. A person in that same scenario, without any mental

disability, and all other things being equal, would have a choice to exercise before speaking

to the police .122 Regardless of whether the statement is used only for reasonable and

probable grounds for a search, the distinction is that the state has furthered its investigation

by benefiting from a person's mental illness. That cannot be the correct state of the law.

Instead, the proper application of the operating mind doctrine extends beyond concerns of

reliability to proted a broader conception of voluntariness that focuses on fairness.123

76. For these reasons, Mr. Paterson submits that the broad purpose of the confessions

rule is to ensure that the state cannot benefit from statements that are unreliable, unlawfully

obtained, or unfair if adduced in a criminal proceeding-even for the limited purpose of

establishing reasonable grounds for a search.

B. Involuntary Statements Cannot Inform Reasonable Grounds for Search

77. Mr. Paterson contends that an involuntary statement, as informed by the principle

against self-incrimination, cannot be admissible for the purposes of establishing reasonable

and probable grounds at the investigatory stage of the criminal process. Indeed, Professor

Stewart wrote that "[t]he core idea of the the prinCiple [against self-incrimination] is that

when the state uses its power to prosecute an individual for a criminal offence, the

individual ought not to be required to assist the state in the investigation or trial of the

offence.,,124

78. It is important, therefore, to define what self-incriminatory evidence is. In

Nedelcu,125 Moldaver J. explained that incriminating evidence includes anything that could

assist the Crown in proving its case, and did not distinguish between direct and indirect

122 A statement that is a product of a considered decision to speak to the police may still be involuntary, even if the accused's will was not "overborne", if made in response to a threat, promise or coercive circumstances: See Stewart, supra note 118, at 529. 123 Oickle, supra note 111, at para. 69. 124 Stewart, supra note 118, at 521. 125 R. v. Nede/cu, 2012 sec 59, [2012]3 S.C.R. 311. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 20]

Is

28

incriminating evidence.126 In other words, evidence may be incriminating even where it is

used indirectly to prove guilt,127 such as establishing reasonable and probable grounds.

79. In White,128 Iacobucci J. said that the principle against self-incrimination has at least

two underlying purposes: to protect against unreliable confessions, and to protect against

abuses of power by the state.129 Mr. Paterson submits that allowing the police to use

involuntary statements to form grounds to obtain evidence effectively arms them with

instruments of coercion that stifle those protections. An individual who provides an

involuntary statement has effectively lost the freedom to choose whether to assist the state

in gathering further evidence. For these reasons, any statements found to be involuntary

should be "excised" from the grounds for a search.

1) Excision of Unreliable Statements

80. In order for the Crown to justify a warrantless search, the preconditions for a search

warrant must still exist, including reasonable and probable grounds that evidence will be

found in the place to be searched. Although hearsay statements are admissible for the

limited purpose of establishing reasonable grounds,130 the police cannot rely on unreliable

information.

81. This Court in Morelli affirmed that the test for reviewing a search warrant is "whether

there was sufficient credible and reliable evidence to permit a justice of the peace to find

reasonable and probable grounds to believe that an offence had been committed and that

evidence of that offence would be found at the specified time and place.,,131 Hence, at its

core, the search warrant review process is an inquiry into reliability: "[s]aid in another way,

the test is whether there was reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed on the

basis of which the warrant could - not would - have issued.'.132

126 Ibid. at para. 9. 127 R. v. Wenham, 2013 ONSC 7431, [2013] OJ No 5535 at para. 58. (not reproduced) 128 R. v. White, [1999]2 S.C.R. 417, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 34] 129 Ibid., at para. 43. 130 R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, [1987] S.C.J. No. 15 at para. 26 (not reproduced); R. v. Debot, ~1989]2 S.C.R. 1140, [1989] S.C.J. No. 118 at para. 52. (not reproduced)

31 R. v. Morelli, 2010 SCC 8, [20101 S.C.J. NO.8 at para. 40 (emphasis added). [Appellant's Authorities TAB 19] 132 R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, [2014] O.J. No. 376 at para. 84. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 29]

29

82. Thus, where a reviewing judge finds that the grounds for obtaining a warrant

contained unreliable information, that information is "severed off" before assessing the·

balance of the evidence.133 With respect to confidential informants, the inquiry is whether

the information is compelling or corroborated and the informant credible,134 Unreliable

information from a confidential informant included in an Information to Obtain "must be

expu nged, ,,135

83. Mr. Paterson also notes that the rule permitting hearsay to be used for the limited

purpose of forming grounds is an ordinary rule of evidence. In contrast, the confessions

rule is constitutionalized, and a statement deemed to be involuntary harbours the trappings

of unreliability, as a threat or inducement or even the lack of an operating mind produces a

real risk that the statement is unreliable,

2) Excision of Unlawfully Obtained Statements

84, In Boughner,136 the police attended a motel room to proceed with a drug

investigation, knowing they did not have sufficient grounds for a warrant. After knocking on

the door, the appellant opened the door a few inches, and the officer identified himself with

a police badge, The appellant appeared shocked, his eyes nearly doubled in size, and he

slammed the door closed. The police kicked in the door of the room and entered the suite,

The trial judge found that, based on the appellant's reaction at the door, the police had a

reasonable belief that the appellant would destroy evidence, and therefore found the search

was lawful on account of exigent circumstances,

85. The Ontario Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on other grounds but held that

because the trial judge found that knocking on the door for the purposes of securing

evidence was unlawful, he "should not have permitted the pOlice to 'bootstrap' their

133 R v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 432, [2012] O.J, No, 2816 at para. 31. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 36] 134 Debot, supra note 130. 135 R v. Nguyen (1999), 41 W.C.B. (2d) 191, [1999] B.C.J. No. 12 (S.C.) at para. 61. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 21] . 136 R v. Boughner, 2003 CanLl115687, [2002] Q,J. No. 2181 (CA). [Appellant's Authorities TAB 2]

30

justification for entering the motel room based on illegally obtained evidence.,,137 In other

words, the poNce cannot rely on unlawfully obtained evidence to form a reasonable belief

there were exigent circumstances to conduct a warrantless search.

86. This mirrors the well-settled rule that the Crown cannot rely on unlawfully obtained

evidence to establish reasonable grounds for a search warrant Excision of those unlawfully

obtained grounds is automatic. Sopinka J. explained that, "[i]n this way, the state is

prevented from benefiting from the illegal acts of police officers, without being forced to

sacrifice search warrants which would have been issued in any event,,138

87. As with unlawfully obtained evidence in search warrants, where the police use

abusive and oppressive tactics or trickery that shocks the conscience of the community to

extract a statement from an accused, they should not be permitted to benefit from that

statement to further their investigation.

3) Excision of Unfair Statements

88. Lastly, highly prejudicial and inadmissible statements are excised from reasonable

and probable grounds.139 For instance, the principle of self-incrimination prevents the

Crown from relying on statutorily compelled statements to form reasonable and probable

grounds for an arrest or search. In Powers140 and Soules,141 the British Columbia Court of

Appeal and the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the Crown could not rely on statutorily

compelled statements to justify reasonable and probable grounds for an arrest in an

impaired driving investigation (this Court denied the Crown leave to appeal in both cases).

Similarly, in Porier,142 the Alberta Court of Appeal held that statutorily compelled

statements were inadmissible to establish grounds for a search warrant.

137 Ibid. at paras. 23 and 24 (emphasis added). 138 Grant, supra note 78, at para. 50. See also, R. v. Evans, [1996]1 S.C. R. 8, [1996] S.C.J. No.1 at para. 26. (not reproduced) 139 R. v. Sherbina, 2003 ABCA 124, [2003] A.J. No. 454. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 30] 140 R. v. Powers, 2006 BCCA 454, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2650. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 28] 141 R. v. Soules, 2011 ONCA 429, [2011] O.J. No. 2500. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 33] 142 R. v. Porter, 2015 ABCA 279, [2015] AJ No 973. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 26]

31

89. In Soules, the Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the Crown's arguments that White

was distinguishable because the accused's statements were not being tendered as

evidence of guilt, specifically noting Iacobucci J.'s reasons at paragraph 70: "The protection

afforded by the principle against self-incrimination does not vary based upon the relative

importance of the self-incriminatory information sought to be used."143

90. In response, the Crown in this case may rely on this Court's decision in Orbanski144

to argue that, in impaired driving investigations, police are permitted to suspend s. 10(b)

and obtain statements from the accused for the limited purpose of establishing grounds for

a breath demand. However, although Charron J. held that the suspension of s. 10(b) rights

was authorized by law and justified under s. 1 during a valid roadside stop, the driver at all

times had a choice to answer police questions or perform sobriety tests, which LaForme

J.A. highlighted in Soules:

'" the questioning by police in those cases does not involve compelled answers. In each of them, the motorist can refuse to answer if he or she chooses; they are not forcefully enlisted in aid oftheir own prosecution ... the choice of whether or not to remain silent -- and thus prevent self-incrimination -- nevertheless remains.145

91. Hence, statements that are compelled-that violate the principle against self-

incrimination-cannot be used to establish reasonable grounds, even if the Crown does not

intend to tender them as evidence in the trial proper. These compelled statements are not

excluded because they were unlawfully obtained or are unreliable. They are excluded

because it would be unfair for the law to permit their use in a criminal proceeding.

92. An involuntary statement is, by its nature, a product of compulsion. This is so

whether the police obtain a statement through trickery or an accused does not have an

operating mind to sufficiently exercise free will.146 Thus, an accused's statement that is

143 White, supra note 128, at para. 70 (emphasis added); Soules, supra note 141, at paras. 39,42 and 43. 144 R. v. Orbanski, 2005 SCC 37, [2005] S.C.J. No. 37. (not reproduced) 145 Soules, supra note 141, at paras. 42 and 44 (emphasis added). 146 R. v. Whittle, [1994] 2 S.C.R. 914, [1994] S.C.J. No. 69 at para. 30: " ... the suspect is deprived of the ability to choose by reason of mental incapacity. A finding of incapacity would exempt the suspect from participation in the ordinary processes of investigation." [Appellant's Authorities TAB 35]

32

involuntary, but otherwise lawfully obtained and reliable, will still be inadmissible for the

purposes of establishing reasonable grounds because its use by the Crown would be unfair.

C. Placing Onus on Crown Will Not Wholly Alter Criminal Law

93. At paragraph 62 of its reasons, the Court of Appeal wrote that requiring the Crown to

prove voluntariness of a statement before admitting it in a Charier voir dire would "upset the

balance" and "wholly alter the practice of criminal law." Mr. Paterson submits that placing a

higher burden on the Crown on the narrow issue of voluntariness, beyond a reasonable

doubt, would not affect the general analytical framework for assessing whether an

accused's Charter rights were infringed, on a balance of probabilities.

94. For instance, in s. 542(1) of the Code, Parliament codified the Crown's requirement

to prove voluntariness of an accused's statement in a preliminary inquiry. Just as the Court

of Appeal observed that "[t]he issue on a Charier voir dire is not the guilt or innocence of the

accused," the issue in a preliminary inquiry is not guilt or innocence but whether there is

sufficient evidence to warrant a trial. Importantly, the test for committal at a preliminary

inquiry is whether there is any evidence on which a reasonable jury, properly instructed,

could convict. 147 This is a low standard, and certainly not proof beyond a reasonable

doubt.148 Yet, even at a preliminary inquiry, where guilt is not adjudicated and the standard

for committal is low, s. 542(1) requires the Crown to prove voluntariness of a statement

beyond a reasonable doubt.149

95. This standard to prove voluntariness has also been applied in the context of

extradition proceedings. In USA v. Henry,150 Low J. began by noting that the extradition

partner had the burden of proving the identity of the person sought on a balance of

probabilities. Part of the case of the Requesting State was evidence from an officer that Mr.

Henry admitted his identity. Given the similar threshold test for extradition hearings and

147 R. v. Arcuri, 2001 SCC 54, [2001}2 S.C.R. 828 at para. 21. (not reproduced) 148 Dubois V. R., [1986}1 S.C.R. 366, [1986} S.C.J. No. 21. (not reproduced) 149 R. v. Pickett (1975),28 C.C.C. (2d) 297, [1975] O.J. No. 675 (CA) [Appellant's Authorities TAB 25]; R. v. Canning, 2005 ONCJ 144 at paras. 32-36 (not reproduced); R. v. Jama, 2013 ONSC 4291 at para. 31. (not reproduced) 150 USA v. Henry (2002), 66 W.C.B. (2d) 104, [2002] O.J. No. 5738 (S.C.J.). [Appellant's Authorities TAB 37]

33

preliminary inquiries, Low J. followed Pickett and held that the Requesting State had failed

to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Henry's statement was voluntary. As a result,

it failed to establish the identity of the person sought on a balance of probabilities.

96. Procedurally, there is no need to merge two voir dires. As Levine J.A. wrote in

Nguyen,151 because the issues ofvoluntariness and Charlerbreaches are determined on

two different onuses and standards, instead of attempting to combine both issues in one

voir dire, "[t]he sensible approach would be to determine the admissibility of statements first,

followed by the examination of the Charter issues."152 Mr. Paterson therefore submits that

requiring the Crown to establish the voluntariness of an accused's statement in a separate

voir dire before it can rely on it to establish reasonable grounds in a Charter application

would hardly be a tectonic shift in the law.

97. Nevertheless, one "blended" voir dire is acceptable, as long as the two issues are

kept separate. 153 Thus, if the higher standard of proof of the confessions rule would

potentially "upset the balance", then Mr. Paterson submits that, in the alternative, the Crown

must prove voluntariness of an accused's statement on a balance of probabilities in a

Charter voir dire. 154 If this Court accepts this as the correct framework, then a trial judge

would still have to hold a separate voluntariness voir dire on the higher criminal standard of

proof if the Crown were to lead the statement as evidence in the trial proper, resulting in

some inefficient but necessary redundancy in the process. In cases where the

voluntariness of an accused's statement is close to the line, this proposed framework would

leave open the possibility of the Crown being permitted to rely on a statement for the

purposes of establishing reasonable and probable grounds before the trier-of-Iaw, but being

barred from adducing that statement before the trier-of-fact.

151 R. v. Nguyen, 2006 BCCA 397, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2048. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 22] 152 Ibid., at para. 12. 153 See Sadikov, supra note 132, at paras. 32 and 33; R. v. RObettshaw(1996), 49 C.R. (4th) 245, \1996] O.J. No. 1539 (Gen. Div.). (not reproduced) 54 One instance where the Crown bears two different standards of proof on the same issue is the co­

conspirator's exception to the hearsay rule. The Crown must prove on a balance of probabilities that an accused is a member of a conspiracy before hearsay statements of co-conspirators can be admissible. Thereafter, the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is a member of the conspiracy in order to secure a conviction: See R. v. Calter, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 938, [1982] S.C.J. No. 47. (not reproduced)

34

D. Application of Principles to Mr. Paterson's Appeal

98. In this case, neither counsel at trial nor the trial judge turned their minds to the

voluntariness of Mr. Paterson's admission to the police that he was in possession of

marihuana roaches. Mr. Paterson also consented to having all of the evidence adduced in

the voir dire admitted in the trial proper. However, given the strict reqUirement to hold a

voluntariness voir dire, these factors do not mean that "defence counsel unequivocally

waived a voir dire to determine voluntariness, or that the result" of the trial would have been

the same had the inquiry been held.,,155

99. In fact, there are several indications that Mr. Paterson's statements to police, made

at the door of his residence, were not voluntary. The police opened Mr. Paterson's door

without consent, detained and questioned Mr. Paterson for 8 to 12 minutes,156 twice

prevented him from closing the door, failed to caution him 157 or inform him of his right to

contact counsel, and finally extracted the critical admission that he had been smoking

marihuana and was in possession of a couple of roaches.

100. Furthermore, immediately following Mr. Paterson's statements, the police offered

classic threats and inducements to have Mr. Paterson allow them entry to his apartment­

they told Mr. Paterson he would be arrested if he did not let them in, but that they would be

on their way if he let them in to collect the ro~ches. These threats and inducements

coloured the entire encounter.

101. In Choi,158 the trial judge failed to conduct a voir dire on the appellant's statement to

the police, which was a brief telephone conversation in which "little was said." Even though

the officer who had obtained the statement was already cross-examined in a Charter voir

155 Nguyen, supra note 151, at paras. 10 and 11. 156 Constable Dykeman said Mr. Paterson was "basically detained": Appellant's Record, Vol. 11, p. 34 line 4-7; p. 70 lines 12-15; Appellant's Record, Vol. Ill, p. 204 lines 31-35. 157 Singh, supra note 116, at para. 33: "Where the suspect has not consulted with counsel, however, the police caution becomes all the more important as a factor in answering the ultimate question of voluntariness." See also R. v. Lourenco, 2011 ONCA 782, [2011] O.J. No. 5678 at para. 7. (not reproduced) 15 R. v. Choi, 2008 BCCA 212, [2008] B.C.J. No. 885. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 4]

35

dire, and it was "improbable" that the appellant could have a raised a doubt about the

voluntariness of her statement, Lowry J.A. ordered a new trial.

102. Here, given that the trial judge failed to conduct a voluntariness voir dire and further

relied on Mr. Paterson's statements in his s. 24(2) analysis, Mr. Paterson submits that this

Court should set aside the convictions and order a new trial.

III. FAILURE TO FILE REPORT TO JUSTICE A SERIOUS BREACH

103. The reporting provisions in the Code that require the police to report their seizures to

a justice after executing a search warrant ensure that courts continue to protect a person's

privacy interests as long as seized items remain in the hands of the state. The pOlice in this

case applied for a telewarrant under s. 487.1 of the Code by submitting an ITO by fax.

Section 487.1 (9) requires that, "as soon as practicable but within a period not exceeding

seven days after a warrant has been executed," the peace officer to whom it is issued "shall

file a written report" with specific requirements. An essential component of that report is a

statement of the officer's g rounds for seizing items not mentioned in the warrant. When the

police fail to comply with these mandatory provisions, they effectively evade judicial scrutiny

over the execution of the warrant. In this case, the police filed this report 67 days late and

did not state their grounds for seizing many additional items.

A. Diverging Authorities on the Consequences of Failing to Report

104. There are three conflicting lines of authority on whether non-compliance with the

report to justice provisions constitutes a breach of the Charier, and if so, how that breach

should be characterized.

105. The first line of cases holds that failure to properly report renders the search

unlawful.159 The leading case is Guiller in which Borins J. held that the "necessity of

making a return is an integral and essential aspect of the legal execution of a search

159 R. v. Guiller (1985),25 C.R.R. 273, [1985] O.J. No. 2442 (Oist. Ct.) [Appellant's Authorities TAB 14]; R. v. MacNeil (1994),130 N.S.R. (2d) 202, [1994] N.S.J. No. 179 (S.C.) [Appellant's Authorities TAB 17]; R. v. Brown, [2003] O.T.C. 1093, [2003] O.J. No. 5089 (S.C.J.) (not reproduced).

36

warrant", and that the police failure to comply with those duties "removes an essential

safeguard to the invasion of privacy rights.,,16o Justice Borins recognized that the execution

of a search warrant is a delegation of judicial authority, and that the police must comply with

the conditions of that delegation, including allowing the issuing justice "to decide whether

grounds exist to retain some or all of the material seized.,,161 Indeed, the reporting condition

appears on the face of the warrant itself, in the same sentence that authorizes the search.

Mr. Paterson submits that this is the correct interpretation of the reporting requirements.

106. The second line of cases holds that a failure to file a Form 5.2 Report will usually

constitute a breach of s. 8 of the Charier unless the non-compliance is a mere technicality

(for example, filing the report one day late), or the accused has no reasonable expectation

of privacy in the items that were seized.162 These authorities reject the notion that non­

compliance can invalidate a warrant or render the search unlawful. A Charier remedy may

be granted but non-compliance on its ownwill rarely justify the exclusion of evidence.163

However, Mr. Paterson contends that this line of reasoning misconceives the purpose of the

mandatory reporting provisions, particularly as those provisions relate to a police officer's

duty to report her grounds for seizing additional items not mentioned in a telewarrant.

107. The third line of cases holds that non-compliance does not engage s. 8 of the

Charier.164 These cases treat the mandatory Code provisions as a mere accounting

exercise for seized items which has nothing to do with the reasonableness of the search

and seizure. Mr. Paterson urges this Court to reject this characterization. The issuance of

a search warrant is a judicial act.165 Judicial oversight does not end with the issuance of a

warrant. Rather "at every stage the rule should be one of public accessibility and

concomitant judicial accountability; all with a view to ensuring there is no abuse in the issue

of search warrants, that once issued they are executed according to law, and finally that any

160 Guiller, supra note 159, at para. 41. 161 Ibid., at para. 42 citing Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Macintyre, [198211 S.C.R. 175. 162 R. v. Garcia-Machado, 2015 ONCA 569, [20151 O.J. No. 4146 [Appellant's Authorities TAB 12]; R. v. Craig, 2016 BCCA 154, [2016] B.C.J. No. 699 [Appellant's Authorities TAB 6]; R. v. Martens, 2004 BCSC 1450, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2300. (not reproduced) 163 Garcia-Machado, supra note 162; Craig, supra note 162; Martens, supra note 162. 164 R. v. Vil/aroman, 2012 ABQB 630, [2012] A.J. No. 1425. (not reproduced) 165 Attorney General (Nova Scotia) v. Macintyre, [1982]1 S.C.R. 175 at 181, [1982] S.C.J. No.1. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 1]

37

evidence seized is dealt with according to law."166 This line also ignores this Court's clear

pronouncement that "the matter seized ... remains under the protective mantle of s. 8 so

long as the seizure continues.,,167

B. Telewarrant Reporting Requirements Are Stringent

108. Mr. Paterson submits that, in the case of telewarrants, the seizure of additional items

is unlawful and prima facie unreasonable until the officer has reported her grounds for such

seizures to a justice as required by s. 487.1 (9) of the Code.

109. The common law requirement for an inventory to be taken upon execution of a

search warrant pre-dates the Criminal Code. 168 The first Code required seized items to be

physically taken before a justice to be dealt with in accordance with law.169 The Code was

amended in 1985 to allow for a report to be filed to the justice, rather than requiring the

actual items to be brought before the justice in the interests of expediency and

convenience. 17o

110. Similarly, the telewarrant process was enacted to eliminate the need for a peace

officer to appear personally before a justice to obtain a warrant, where such an appearance

is impracticable. That process contemplates less judicial scrutiny at the outset, but provides

more fulsome reporting requirements following execution in exchange. In s. 487.1 of the

Code, Parliament has enacted additional judicial checks and balances that are unique to the

telewarrant process. That section applies to the case at bar by virtue of section 11 (2) of the

CO SA.

111. Section 487.1 (9) of the Code imposes additional duties on a peace officer to whom a

telewarrant is issued that do not exist in the case of an ordinary warrant: (1) the report to

justice must be filed as soon as practicable but within a period not exceeding seven days

after execution; (2) the report to justice must be filed whether or not anything was seized by

166 Ibid., at 186. 167 R. v. Colarusso, [1994]1 S.C.R. 20, [1994] S.C.J. No.2 at para. 91. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 5] 168 Craig, supra note 162, at para. 150, citing Entick v. Carrington (1765),95 Eng. Rep. 807 at 818. 169 Ibid., at para. 149, citing Criminal Code, S.C. 1892, c, 29, s. 569(4). 170 Ibid., at para. 160, citing Criminal Law Amendment Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 27 (1 st Supp.).

38

the officer; (3) the report shall include a statement of the time and date the warrant was

executed, or if not executed the reasons why it was not executed; (4) the report shall

indicate the location where things seized pursuant to the warrant are being held, and (5) the

report shall include a statement of anything seized in addition to things mentioned in the

warrant, the location where those items are held, and a statement of the peace officer's

grounds for believing the additional things were obtained by or used in the commission of

an offence ..

112. Section 487.1(10) also imposes a unique duty on the clerk of the court in the case of

a telewarrant to bring the ITO, warrant, and officer's report before a justice as soon as

practicable.

113. A purposive interpretation of the above provisions supports the conclusion that the

seizure of items not specified in a telewarrant is prima facie unreasonable until the officer's

grounds for seizing those items are reviewed by a justice together with the ITO and the

warrant. Where no 5.2 report is made, or where the officer fails to comply with his duties by

stating what her grounds were for seizing items not mentioned in the warrant, judicial

supervision and authorization of additional seizures becomes impossible. Such non­

compliance with the law "has the effect of removing an essential safeguard of privacy

rights" .171

114. The importance of judicial review of an officer's grounds for seizing items not

mentioned in the warrant and of the location where those items are being held is heightened

because of cooperative arrangements among and within policing agencies and/or with civil

forfeiture regimes both federally and provincially. Seizures carried out by one state actor

"will only be reasonable while the evidence is used for the purpose for which it was seized"

by that actor. i72 The police may seize items when executing a warrant obtained under the

Code purely to refer those items to civil forfeiture. The reasonableness of such seizures

may never be subject to judicial scrutiny if the police fail to comply with their reporting

duties, particularly where no criminal charges are laid.

171 R. v. Poulin, [2004] O.J. No. 1354 (S.C.J.) (QL) at para. 104. [Appellant's Authorities TAB 27] 172 Colarusso, supra note 167, at 62.

39

C. Application of Principles to Mr. Paterson's Appeal

115. In the case at bar, the ITO drafted by Cst. Dykeman did not reference firearms,

currency, or cell phones. The telewarrant was limited to authorizing the seizure of

"marihuana, cocaine, MDMA (ecstasy), documents identifying the occupancy of the

apartment at [address}, scales and score sheets.,,173 A number of the 42 items that were

seized were not mentioned in the warrant including: the four handguns, ammunition, cell

phones, substances not known to be controlled substances, and the $30,000 dollars in

cash.174

116. Constable Dykeman made no attempt to file a Form 5.2 Report to Justice even

though he was the officer to whom the warrant was issued. The report to justice, which was

filed 67 days late, did not include any statement by Cst. Bell as to his grounds for seizing

any of the items not mentioned in the warrant. He left that section of the Form 5.2 entirely

blank. The exhibit flow chart did not delineate between items seized pursuant to the

warrant and additional items. In short, virtually none of the mandatory statutory duties

imposed by s. 487.1(9) were discharged by the officers in this case.

117. The officers who seized items not mentioned in the warrant failed to report to a

justice and justify their grounds for believing the items were offence-related until they were

called upon to testify. In the meantime, several of those items were analyzed by the police,

including the firearms, the analysis of which was central to Mr. Paterson's convictions on

counts 6 through 9. Mr. Paterson had a significant expectation of privacy with respect to

some of those items, including his cell phones, the use of which he was deprived while they

were being unlawfully held by the police.

118. The trial judge's finding that the breach did not go to the root of the police authority

to seize the items, and that only Mr. Paterson's "ability to access a process to recover

seized items" was affected, made admission under 24(2) a foregone conclusion.175 Mr.

Paterson argues that the trial judge erred in his dismissive characterization of the

173 Voir Dire Ruling, supra note 7, at para. 98. 174 Ibid., at para. 95. 175 Ibid., at para. 123.

40

seriousness of the failure to comply with s. 478.1 (9), particularly given the more onerous

reporting requirements after the execution of a telewarrant. He submits that this error, in

conjunction with the other errors the lower courts made, warrants a new trial.

PART IV: COSTS

119. The appellant does not seek costs against the respondent and requests no costs be

awarded against him.

PART V: ORDER SOUGHT

120. The appellant respectfully requests this Court allow his appeal, set aside his

convictions, and order a new trial, without costs.

ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24th day of May, A.D. 2016.

~~ KENNETH S. WESTLAKE, Q.C. DANIEL J. SONG BRENT R. ANDERSON Counsel for the Appellant

"

41

PART VI: TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Attorney General (Nova Scotia) v. Macintyre, [1982] 1 S.C.R. 175 at 181, J1982] S.C.J. No.1 .................... .

R. v. Boughner, 2003 CanLiI 15687, [2002] O.J. No. 2181 (C.A.)

R. v. Chan, [2003] O.J. No. 188 (S.C.J.) (QL)

R. v. Choi, 2008 BCCA 212, [2008] B.C.J. No. 885

R. v. Colarusso, [1994] 1 S.C.R. 20, [1994] S.C.J. No.2

R. v. Craig, 2016 BCCA 154, [2016] B.C.J. No. 699

R. v. Crocker, 2009 BCCA 388, [2009] B.C.J. No. 1816

R. v. Duong and Tran, 2002 BCCA 43, [2002] B.C.J. No. 90

R. v. Evans, 2004 BCPC 388, [2004] B.C.J. No. 2178

R. v. Feeney, [1997] 2 S.C.R. 13, [1997] S.C.J. No. 49

R. v. G.(B.), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 475, [1999] S.C.J. No. 29

R. v. Garcia-Machado, 2015 ONCA 569, [2015] O.J. No. 4146

R. v. Grant, [1993] 3 S.C.R. 223, [1993] S.C.J. No. 98

R. v. GuiJ1er (1985), 25 C.R.R. 273, [1985] O.J. No. 2442 (Dist. Ct.)

R. v. Jones, 2013 BCCA 345, [2013] B.C.J. No. 1589

FN 165,166

Para. 84, FN 136, 137

Para. 45, FN 73, 74

Para. 101, FN 158

FN 167,172

FN 162, 163, 168, 169,170

FN 68

FN 64

Para. 56, FN 92

Para. 40 , 50, 51, FN 65,66,100

Para. 71, FN 113, 115

FN 162, 163

Para. 49, FN 78, 97, 138

Para. 105, FN 159, 160,161

FN 68

R. v. Kelsy, 2011 ONCA 605, [2011] O.J. No. 4159 FN 94, 95

R. v. MacNeil (1994),130 N.S.R. (2d) 202, [1994] N.S.J. No. 179 FN 159 (S.C.)

R. v. McKay (1996), 106 C.C.C. (3d) 535, [1996] B.C.J. No. 1019 Para. 55 (G.A.)

R. v. MorelJi, 2010 SCC 8, [2010] S.C.J. No.8

R. v. Nedelcu, 2012 SCC 59, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 311

R. v. Nguyen (1999), 41 W.C.B. (2d) 191, [1999] B.C.J. No. 12 (S.C.)

Para. 81, FN 131

Para. 78, FN 125, 126

FN 135

42

R. v. Nguyen, 2006 BCCA 397, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2048

R. v. Oickle, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 3, [2000] S.C.J. No. 38

R. v. Phoummasak, 2016 ONCA46, [2016] O.J. No. 281

R. v. Pickett (1975), 28 C.C.C. (2d) 297, [1975] O.J. No. 675 (C.A.)

R. v. Parler, 2015 ABCA 279, [2015] AJ No 973

R. v. Poulin, [2004] O.J. No. 1354 (S.C.J.) (QL)

R. v. Powers, 2006 BCCA 454, [2006] B.C.J. No. 2650

R. v. Sadikov, 2014 ONCA 72, [2014] O.J. No. 376

Para. 96, FN 151, 152,155

Para. 133, FN 111, 112, 117, 123

Para. 53, FN 64, 86

Para. 95, FN 149

Para. 88, FN 142

FN 171

Para. 88, FN 140

FN 132,153

43

R. v. Sherbina, 2003 ABCA 124, [2003] AJ. No. 454

R. v. Silveira, [1995] 2 S.C.R. 297, [1995] S.C.J. No. 38

R. v. Singh, 2007 SCC 48, [2007] S.C.J. No. 48

R. v. Soules, 2011 ONCA 429, [2011] O.J. No. 2500

R. v. Whittle, [1994J 2 S.C.R. 914, [1994J S.G.J. No. 69

R. v. White, [1999] 2 S.C.R 417, [1999] S.C.J. No. 28

R. v. Wong, 2012 ONCA 432, [2012] O.J. No. 2816

USA v. Henry (2002), 66 W.C.B. (2d) 104, [2002] O.J. No. 5738 (S.C.J.)

Authors Cited

Hamish Stewart, "The Confessions Rule and the Charter," 54 McGill L.J. 517 (2009)

PART VII: LEGISLATION

FN 139

Para. 49, FN 75, 79, 80, 101

Para. 70, 71, FN 116, 157

Para. 88, 89, 90, FN 141,143,145

Para. 92

Para. 79, 89, FN 128, 129,143

FN 133

Para. 95, FN 150

Paras. 71, 77, FN 118, 122, 124

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 .................. Para. 6, 26, 35, 39, 42-44,49,52,54,55,57, 63, 110, FN 62, 71, 72, 96

Criminal Code, RS.C. 1985, c. C-46 ............................. . Paras. 4, 6, 23, 24, 36, 43,44,48, 50, 52-57, 72, 94,103, 107-112, 114, FN 63, 70,85, 90, 96, 169

Interpretation Act, RS.C. 1985, c. 1-21 ............................................ Para. 54, FN 70

CONSOLIDATION

Controlled Drugs and Substances Act

S.C, 1996, c. 19

Current to May 12, 2016

Last amended on February 9, 2016

CANADA

P;Jbl'lshed by the Minis\er of Justice at the following address:

hnp:111 aws-I ois ,ju sti ce.g c. ca

CODIFICATION

Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances

L.C. 1996, ch, 19

A jour au 12 mal 2016

Demiere modification Ie 9 fevrier 2016

Publie par Ie ministre de la Justice a I'adre$se suivante:

hnp:/liois-Iaws.justice.gc.ca

---~~,~----- '----~

OFFIC!Al STATUS OF CONSOUDATIONS

Subsections 31 (1) and (2) of the Legislation Revision and Consolidation Act, in force on June 1, 2009, provide as ' follows:

Published consolidation is evidence

31 (1) Every copy of a consolidated statute or consolidated regulation published by the Minister under this Act in either print or electronic forill is evidence of that statute or regula­tion and of its contents and every copy purporting to be pub­lished by the Minister is deemed to be so published, unless the contrary is shown,

Inconsistencies in Acts

(2) In the event of an inconsistency between a consolidated statute published by the Minister under this Act and the origi­nal statute or a subsequent amendment as certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments under the Publication of Statutes Act, the original statute or amendment prevails to the €lI.i:ent of the inconsistency_

NOTE

This consolidation is current to May 12, 2016. The last amendments came into force on February 9, 2016, Any amendments that were not in force <;lS of May 12,2016 a re set out at the end of this document 'under the heading "Amendments Not in Force".

Current to May 'l2, 201£

Last amended an Februi:!=ri 9,2016

CARACTERE OFFICIEL DES CODIFICATIONS

Les paragraphes 31 (1) et (2) de la La; sur Ja revision et la c'odificatian des textes legis/atifs, en -\tigueur Ie 1er juln 2009, prevoient ce qui suit:

Codifications comme ,Hement de preuve

31 {1] Tout exemplaire d'une loi codifiee Oll d'un reglement codifie, publie par Ie ministre en vertu de la presente 101 sur support papier ou sur support electronique, fait foi de cette loi au de ce reglement et de son contenu. Tout exemplaire do=e com me pub lie par Ie ministre est repute avoir He ainsi publie, sa uf preuve con traire.

Incompatibilite - lois

(2) Les dispositions de 1a 10i d'origine avec ses modilications subsequentes par Ie greffier des Parlements en vertu de la Loi sur lapublication des lois l'emportent sur les dispositions in­compatibles de 1a loi codifiee pubhee par Ie ministre en "mu de la presente loi.

NOTE

Cette codification est a jour au 12 mai 2016. Les dernieres modifications sont entrees en vigueur Ie 9 fevrier 2016. Toutes modifications qui n'etaient pas en vigueur au 12 mai 2016 sont enoncees a la fin de ce document sous Ie titre {( Modifications non en vigueur )).

,,,'_ .. _ .. _,----,

Aj01.Jt,E3U 12 mai 7016

Dernl~re mod~fication 1~ 9fevrieT 2.D16

j, "

COr.ir=-IJ~q Dr!..!f]s Ene' SUbsiatlces rARTt ~~e·!"l·Ce5 an c ?un;shr;,errt

Sect::ion 4

Punishment

(3) Every person who contravenes subsection (I) "There the subject-matter of the offence is a substance included in Schedule I

(a) is guilty of an indic.table offenc:e and liable to im­prisonment for a term not exceeding seven years; or

(b} is guilty of an offence pLL'1isha ble on sl.llI1.l:!lllry comTiction and liable

0) for a first offence, to a fine not excee=g one tho~and dollars or to impriso=ent for a term not exceeding six months, or to both, and

(iil for a subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding t\."o iliousand'doTIars or to imprisonment for a t~'1Jl not exceeding one year, or to both.

Punishment

(4) Subject to subsection (5), every person who contra­venes subsection 0) where the subject-matter of the of­fence is a substance included in Schedule II

(a) is guilty of an indictable offence arid liable to im­prisonment for a term not exceeding five years less.a day; or

(b} is g-uilty of an offence pUJ.Jishable on su.m.m.ary conviction and liable

HI for a first offence, to a fine not exceeC!i.ug one iliousa.Dd dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, or to both, and

Hn for a subsequent offence, to a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding ODe ye<rr, or to both.

PUflisnment

(S} EveD' person who contravenes subsection (1) where the subject-matter of the offence is a substance L'1.cluded in Schedule II in an amount that does not exceed tne amount set out for b.'1at subst2llce in Schedule ViII is guilty of a.'l offence pu.rllshable on SUiTImac'-}' conviction and liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding SLX months, or to both..

PUritshment

(6) Every person .",·"ho comraV2nes subsection 0) wbere the subject-matter of u.~e offence js a snbst3JJ.c.e included in Seh edu] e III

Dro~· et ;:;u"tr:;-s >u bst.Bn~BS P,.t...rlTIE I fn;·r2ctior:5 Cot peines InfTi!lcfmns p.ar.:~C:l.llf.3le.s i·,: Artid~4

Peine

(3) Quiconque contrevient au paragraphe (1) com.met, dans Ie cas de substances inscrites a l'annexe I :

al soit un acte criminel pas sible aun emprisonne­ment maximal de sept ans;

oj soit une infraction punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure som=.aire et passible :

m s'il s' agit d'une premiere infraction, d'une amende maximale de mille dollars et d'un empri­SOllil.ement maximal de six mois, ou de hlD.e de ces peines,

(ii) en cas de recidive, d'une amende maximale de deux mille dollars et d'un' emprisonnement maxi­mal d'un an, ou de l'une de ces peines.

Pe~ne

(4} Quiconque contrevi.ent au paragraphe (1) commet, dans Ie cas de substances inscrites a l'ar.illexe II mills SOliS

reserve du paragraphe (5) :

ai soit WJ. acte criminel passible d'un =prisoD..'1e­ment maximal de cin.q aIlS moms un jour;

b} soit une infraction punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure so=ai-e et passible :

m s'il s'agit d'une premiere infraction, d'une amende ma.ximaJe de mille dollars et d'un empri­sonnement maximal de six mois, ou de l'une de ces pelle.:>,

nn en cas de recidive, d'une amende maximale de deux mille dollars et d'un emprisODJJement ma.xi­mal d'un ill), au de l'une de ces peines.

Peline ~ Gas particu[;ers

(5) Quieonque contcevi.ent au paragraphe (1) commet, d.an.s 1e cas de substa.Dces inserites a la fois a l'a.ij.Dexe II et a l'ar..nexe "'iTIIl, et ce pourvu que 18. quantite en cause n'exc;ede pas celle mentioDIlee a c.ette derniere 8.11 ... l1e'(e, 1.l..'1Je. ifuTacton punissable sur dedzratoD de culDab,i,t€: par procedure sommaire et passible d'une a.rnend~ tn~­male de. mille dollars et d_\m. e::rrpnsolulelnent HldY.J1TI.81 de six IlJOjS~ Oll de rune de ces pei;esL

~s} Q1.l1conque c.ontrevient au paragraphe (1) cC:;.r:mel:

d~~~1S le cas de s1.J.bst2..nces inst..rites a l'aIJI'::.exe III :

a} soit un 2..c:t:~. c:rirrUDccl p3ssible {ru~J en1pDSGDD.e­

lYlp.nt IT13xiT.nal de trois =:;.DS;

ContFoJJ~d DJ"T.Jgs and S[Jb-~t~nr;'3F PA.RT II :::n-ii)~C:E;m~~T

Sl!:cdon ·tl

D/"'Q!;lues et '<;!urres S"JDst.&n(;'B$

PARTIE!I E::a:er.:utlon .:;'[ m8"5u-r8S de c::r;;:r::ra~n7;: Article 11

.~--------~------------------------- -------- ------------.------------

PART II

Enforcement

Search, Seizure and Detention

Information for search warrant

11 (1) A justice who, on exparte application, is satisfied by information on oath that there rue reasonable groUDcJ.s to believe that

{a) a controlled sub$Unce or precursor in respect of

which this Act has been c.ontravened,

(b} any thing in whir-h a controlled substa:""lee or pre­cUrsor referred to 1...1"1 paragr-aph (a) is contained or concealed,

(e) offence-related propt:L-ty, or

(d) any thL.'l.g that vlill afford evidence in respect of an offenc.e under this "Act or an offence, in whole or in part in relation to a contravmtion of this i"hct, under sec.tion 354- or 4-62.31 of the Criminal Code

is in a place may, at any time, issu"e a 'NarraDt authorizing a peac.e officer, at any tim.e, to search the place" ror any such controlled substance, precursor, property or thing and to seize it.

AppHcation of section 487.1 of the Criminal Code

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), an informrttion may be submitted by telephone or other mea.% ot' telecommunication in accordance VI<ith section 487.1 of the Criminal Code, IA>ith such modifications as the cir­CUillSTances require.

Execution in another provInce

{3} A justice may, where a pla.c.e referred to in subsec­tion (J j is in a province other than t..~at in 'Nhic:b. the jus­tice has jurisdiction, issue the warrant retes--ed to in that subsection and the W3.J.---yant may be executed iLl. the other province after it has been endorsed by a justice having ju­risc.Dction ill that other prO~v~illte_

Effect of endc;-r-se-ment

{4j ~An endorscIl;.ent th3tis made on a \'i~2"HT~L.t a.s pro-,,,id­ed for in subsectioD_ (3) is sllL~cient authorit'l to ciD}T

peace office~ to v.,;-nom it ~vas origin2Jly directed 2JJ.d to ;}1l peace offic.ers l,-·/itsLin the jv.rlsdict"ioll of fne justice boy

PARTiE [I

Execution et mesures de contrainte

Perquisitions, fouilies, saisies et retention

Mandat de perquisition

1'1: (''0 Le juge de paix qui, sur demande ex parte, est couvaincu sur 1a roi d'une denonciation faite SOliS ser­ment qu'il =iste des motifs raisonnab1es de croire a 1a presence, en un lieu, d'un au de plusieurs des a.t-odes enumeres ci~dessous peut delivrer a un agent de 1a paix un mandat l'autorisant, a tout moment, a perquisitionn.er en ce lieu et ales y saisir : .

at une substance designee ou un precurseur ayant donne lieu a une infraction a 1a presente loi;

hj une chose qui coutient ou recele une substance de-­signee ou un precurseur vise a l' alinea a);

d) lli1e chose qui servira de preuve relativement a une bfrac:tion a la preseute loi oll, dans les cas OU eile de­coule en tout ou en partie d'une cODtravention ~ la presente 10i, a une infraction prevue am: articles 354 Oli 462.3J du Code criminel.

Application de t'artide 487.1 du Code crfminel

(2) La denonciation visee au paragraphe (1) peut se falie par telephone ou tout autre moyen de teIeco:mmunica­tiOIL, confo=ement a l'article 487.1 du Code criminel, compte tenu des adaptations necessaires.

ExecUDon hors du ressort

{3} Le juge de paix peut deJivrer le man Gat PODT Pernw­

sinon dE.n.s WJe province ou il n'a pas co;pet;nce: ie mandat y est alors E'_xecutoire une fois vise par l.'njuge de p3.lx ayant competence d.3J.J.s h province en question.

Effe"t du visa

~4j Le ;,,:}sa confere a tout agent de la palx a qui 1t~ ln3nciat etait a.d.rtsse ell premier lieu~ ains-i cell-X de la cjr·' cUIlscrjptlon t.emtorialc: en C3.use; tant Ie PO\l',,'oir (l'exe­cute.r l~ Ii1i-lncl2t q-cc c.elui d~:: CLiS])OSf:T) seIon ]e: drolt a.D­

pJicab 1.c:~ des biens S;iJsis_

1;1

C:;.rrrmllf:d Or..;gs a~G 5LJb5t~:)(;eS

PAP.T U Er;jDrc:e'T.e-rl~ Se.m:::h. 5~;-:-uTe ane Delsfltion SeatOT\o~ 11-12

whom it is endorsed to execute the warrant and to deal with the things seized h> accordance with the law.

Search of person and seizure

(5} Wnere a peace officer who executes a wac-rant issued under subsection (1) has reasonable grounds to believe that any per-son found in the place set out in the warrant has on their person any controlled substance, precursor, property or thing set out in the Vlrarrant, the peace officer ITlay search the person for the controlled substance, pre­cursor, property or thing and seize it

Se~zure of things not spedfied

(61 A peace officer who executes a warrant issued under subsection 0) may seize, 4"'). addition to the things men­tioned in the v,'ac-rant,

(a) any controlled substance or precursor i.e"'). respect of which the peace officer believes on reasonable grounds that tim Act has been contravened;

{hi iLTly thing that the peace officer believes on reason­able grounds to contain or conceal a controlled sub­stance or precursor referred to in paragraph (a);

(e) anything that the peace officer believes on reason­able grolll'1ds is offence-related property; or

(dl any thing that L\e peace officer believes on reason­able grounds will afford evidence in respect of an of­fence under this Act.

Where warrant not necessary

(7) A peace orncer may exerose any of the powers de:­scribed in subsection (n (5) or (6) without a ,'>'arrant if the conditions fat obtaining a warrant exist but by reason of e.xigent circumstances it would be impracticable to ob­taiE one.

Sei;zure of addrtEona~ things

(8) A peace officer who executes a warrant lssu.ed llilder subseCTIon (1) or exercises pov,'ers nnder sub:oection (5) or (7) may se:ize~ in addition to the things ITi_entioTIed IT! the warrant and in subsection (6), any tJl.ing that the peace officer belie~Jes orr re3.sonable grounds has been obtained by or nsed in the commission of ill offence or that vvilla..fford evidence in respect of a...'l offence. 1!i!:9'6, c. ;9. 5.11:10,)5, c, ¥.:::. 13.

Ass~stance and US8 0~ fon::;e

12 For the purpose of exercising ~ly of the pC'\Aicrs de­scribed m seCDOll i j, a peace. officer may

{a) erJ1st snen 2.'sS}Sl2.J."1Ce ~~s tbe oftlce-r dt~erns l~-LCe:s­

s3_ry~ arid

Dro£;!!.Jes m i<l:J'TeS $ubstaf"i=:~s

PA.RT'i E I ~ E):eC:'L..n.:ion e1. rnes~res- d.;;: wmr(3-imt' ?~~quis)TIcns, iouliles. 5?isie.s~: ra,lo(::n"UOI1 Art-ides 1"ir~2

Fouilles et s81sies

(5) L'executant du mandat peuI fouiller toute perso=e qui se trouve daI'...51e lieu faisant l'objet de la perquisition en ,'lie de deoouvrir et, le cas echeant, de saisir des sub­stances designees, des precurselrrS ou tout autre bien au chose mentiorm€:s au mandat. s'il a des motifs raison­nables de croire qU'elle en a sur elle.

Saisie de choses non specifiees

(6) Outre ce qui est mentionne clans Ie mandat, l'execu­tant peut,. a condition que son avis so it fonde sur des mo­tifs raiso=ables, saisir:

a) toute substance designee au tout prerurseur qui, a son av'J.5, a donne lieu a une iru.""raction a 1a presente 10i;

o} toute chose qui, a son avis, contient ou recele une subS"'"L3Ilce designee ou un pn';curseur vise a l'alinea 3.);

c) toute chose qui, a son avis, est un bien iniraction­nel;

d} tOu-te chose qui, a son av1.s, servira de preuve relati­Vemb"lt a une infraction i 12. presente loi.

Perquisiticm sans mandat

Cll L'agent de la paix peut exercer sans mandat Ies pou­vorrs vises aux paragraphes (1), (5) ou (6) Iorsque l'ur­gence de la situ.ation rend son obtention difficile.ment realisable, SODS reserve que Ies conditions de delivrance en soient reDDies.

Saisie d'autrcs choses

(8i L'age:IC.t de la paL'Z qui execute Ie mandat ou qui exerce les pouvojrs vises aux paragraphes (5) Oll (7) peut, en plus des thoses rm:ntionnees au lli3.<"ld"t et au para­graphe (6), salsi:;:- toute dlDse cimit il a des motifs Taison~ nables de cToire qu'elle. a de obtenue au u;ilisee d3.<"J.S Ie cadre de 1a pe--pdration d'une iDnaction ou qu'elle sel ..... i­r2. de preuve a regard de celle-ci~ ~ 995, cnc i 9, arc.. 1 '1: 20[J5. ,:::-0.. 4, ere 13.

As-s~stance ei:: usage- de !a force

12 DcLns rexercice t'lcs potrvoirs que jni c.oniere Yar­-Dele 11, l'agent d_e 13. pai:~ pent reCOlJIir :{ rassistance qulil estime necessair£ et a. la force justifiee pa~' ]eS circons­t;"L:JCes.

ContmtJed Drugs and Substances SCHEDULE lj

Drogues et autres sl.Jb:::tE!nces ANNEXE II

-~--.-----~--.--- -----------~----- -------------------------~

SCHEDULE II

(Sections 2, 3,4 to 7,10,29,55 and 60)

2

Cannabis, its preparations a nd derivatives, including (1) Cannabis resin (2) Cannabis (marihuana) (3) Cannabidiol·

(4)

(2-[3-methyl-6-(1-methylethenyl)-2--cyc! ohexen-l-y lj-5-pe ntyl-l ,3-benzened iol) Cannabinol (3-n-amyi-6,6,9-trimethyl-6-dibenzopyra n-1-01)

(5) and 6) [Repealed, SOR/2015-192, s. 1] (7) Tetrahydrocannabinol

(tetrahydro-6,6,9-trimethyl-3-pentyl-6 H-dibenzo[b,d]pyran-1-ol)

(7.1) [Repealed, SOR/2015-192, s. 1] but not including (8,· Non-viable Cannabis seed, with the

(9) exception of its derivatives Mature Cannabis stalks that do not include leaves, flowers, seeds or branches; and fi ber derived from such stalks

Synthetic cannabinoid receptor type 1 agonists, their salts, derivatives, isomers, and salts of derivatives and isomers - with the exception of ((35), 2,3~di h yd ro-S·methyl-3-(4-morpholinylmethy!) pyrrolo[1 ,2,3-de]-1,4-benzoxazin-6~yl )-l-naphtha! enyl'methanone (WIN 55,212·3) and its salts - including those that fall within the following core chemical structure classes: (1 ) Any substance that has a 2-

(cyclohexyi)phenol structure with su bstitution at the l-position of the benzene ring by a hydroxy, ether or ester g roup and furth er substituted at the 5~ position of the benzene ring, whether or not further substituted on the benzene ring to any extent, and substituted at the 3'-position ofthe cyclohexyi ring by an al kyl, carbonyl, hydroxyl, ether or ester, and whether or not further substituted on the cyciohexyl ring to any extent, including (i) Nabilone ((±Hrans~3-(U­

dimethylheptyl)-6,6a,7,8,1 0, 10a­hexa hyd ro-1-hydroxy-6',6-

(ii)

(jii)

(iv)

d imethy 1-9 H-di benzo [b,d]pyra n-9-one) Parahexyl (3-hexyl-6,6,9-trimethyl~7,8,9, 1O-tetrahydro-6H­dibenzo[b,d)pyran-l-ol) 3·(1 ,2-d; methyl heptylJ-7 ,8,9, 1 O~ tetra hyd ro~6, 6,9-tri met h yl-6H­dibenw[b,d]pyran-1 '01 (DM HP) 5-(1 .. 1 ~dimethylheptyl)-2-(5-hydroxy~2~(3-

hyd roxyp ro pyi )eyel 0 h exyl) p he no I (CP 55,940)

ANNEXE II

(articles 2, 3, 4 a 7, Hi, 29, 55 et 60)

2

Chanvre indien (Cannabis), ainsi que ses preparations et derives, notammant: (1) resine de cannabis (2) cannabis (marihuana) (3) cannabidiol ([m&thyl-3 (methyl-1

&theny!)-6 (cyclohexenyl-1 )-2]-2 pentyl-5 benzenedio!-1,3)

(4) cannabinol (n-amyf-3 hydroxy-l trimethyl-6,6,9 6H-dibenzopyranne)

(5) et (6) [Abroges, DORS!2015-192, art. 1] (7) tetrahydrocannabinol (tetra hydro

hydroxy-l trimethyl-6ro,9 pentyl-36H-dibenzo[b,d]pyranne)

(7.1) [Abroge, DORS/2015-192, art. 1] mais non compris: (8) graines de cannabis steril~s - a

I'exception des de,iv8s de ces graines (9) tige de cannabis mature - a I'exception

des branches, des feuilles, des fleurs 8t des graines - ai nsi que las fibres obtenues de cette tige

Agonistes de synthese des recepteurs cannabinordes de type 1, leurs sals, leurs derives et leurs isomeres ainsi que les sels de leurs derives at isomeres - a I'exclusion de ((3S}-2,3-dihydro-5-methyl-3-(4-morpholinylmethyl)pyrroto[1,2,3-del-1 ,4-benzoxazi n-6-yl)-1-naphthalenyl-methanone (WIN 55,212-3) et ses sels -, notamment ceux qui entrant dans les categories de structure chimique de base suivantes: (1) toute substance avant une structure 2-

(cyclohexyl)phenol substituee en position 1 du cycle benzenique par un groupe hydroXy, ether ou ester et substituee davantage en position 5 du cycle benzenique, qu'li y ait ou non davantage de substitution sur ce cycle dans quelque mesure que ce soit, at substituee en position 3' du cycle cyclohexyle par un alkyle, un carbonyle, un hydroxyle, un ether ou un ester, qu'f! y ait ou non davantage de substitution sur ce cycle dans quelqu8 mesure que ce soit, notamment: (i) nabilone ((±)-trans-3-(1, 1-

dimethyiheptyl)~6,6a,7,8, 10,1 Oa­hexa hydra-1 ~hydroxy-6, 6-di methyl-9 H -dibenzo [b,dj py ra n-9-one)

(ii) parahexvl (3-hexyl,6,6,9-trimethyl-7 ,8,9, 1 0-tetrahydro-6H­dibenzo[b,dJpyran-l-01)

(i iil 3-(1 ,2·dimethylheptyl)-7 ,8,9, 10~ tetrahydro-6,6,9-tri methyl-6H­dibenzo[b,d]pyran-l-ol (DMHP)

(iv) 5-( 1, 1-di methvlheptyi )-2-(5-hyd roxy-2·(3· hyd roxyp ropy I )eye! 0 hex'll)p h enG i (CP 55,940)

Controlled Drugs ~md Sub~Umcf;!S Drogues et autres- substances SCHEDULE II ANNEXEli

(V) 5-{1,1-dimethylheptyll-2-{3- IV) 5-(1,1-dimethylheptyl)-2-(3-hydroxycyclohexyl)phenol (CP hydroxycyclohexyl)ph€mol (CP 47,497) 47,497)

(2) Any su bsta nce that has a 3-( 1- (2) toute substance avant une structure 3-(1-naphthoyl)indole structure with naphthoyl)indole substituee a I'atome substitution at the nitrogen atom of the d'azote du cycle indole, qu'il y ait ou non indole ri ng, whether or not further davantage de sUbstitution sur ce cycle substituted on the indole ring to any dans quelque mesure que ce soit et qu'iI y extent a nd whether or not substituted on ait ou non substitution sur Ie cycle the naphthyl ring to any extent, including naphtyle dans quelque mesure que ce (i) l-pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indoJe soit, notamment :

(JWH-018) (i) 1-pentyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole (ii) l-butyl-3-( l-na phthoyl) I ndol e (JWH-018)

(JWH-073) (ii) 1-butyl-3-( l-naphthoyl)lndole Iiii) l-pentyJ-3-(4-methyl-1- (JWH-073)

naphthoyl)indole (JWH-122) (iii) l-pentyl-3-(4-mBthyl-l-(iv) 1 "hexyl-3-(1-naphthoyl)indole naphthoyl)indole (JWH-122)

(JWH-019) (iv) l-hexyl-3-(1-naphthoy!)indole (v) 1-(4-pentenyl)-3-( 1- (JWH-019)

naphthoylHndole (JWH-022) (v) 1-{4-pentenyl)-3-(1-(vi) 1-butyl-3-(4-m ethoxy-l- naphthoyl)indole (JWH-022)

naphthoyl)indole (JWH-OBO) (vi) 1-butyl-3-{4-methoxY-1-(vii) 1-pentyl-3-(4-methoxy-l~ naphthoyl)indole (JWH-OSO)

naphthoyl)indole (JWH-OB1) (vii) 1-pentyl-3-(4-methoxy-1-(viii) 1-(2-morpholin-4-ylethyl)-3-( 1- naphthoylHndole (JWH-081)

naphthoyl)indole (JWH-200) (viii) 1-(2-morpho lin·+ylethylj-3-1 1-(ix) 1-pentyl-3-(4--ethyl-l- naphthoyl)indole (JWH-200)

naphthoyl)indole (JWH~21 0) (ix) 1 -pentyl-3-(4-ethyl-l-(x) 1-pentyl-3-(2-methoxy-1- naphthoyl)indole (JWH-21 0)

naphthoyl)indole (JWH-267) (xl l-pentyl-3-(2-mBthoxy-l-(xi) l-[(N-methylpiperidi n-2- naphthoy!)indole (JWH-267)

yl}methylj-3-(1-na phthoyl)indole (xi) 1-[(N-methylpiperidin-2-(AM-1220) yl)methylJ-3-(1-naphthoyl}i ndole

(xii) 1-(5-fl uoropentyl)-3-( 1- (AM-1220) naphthoyl)indole (AM-2201) (xii) 1-(5-fluoropentyl )-3-(1-

(xiii) 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-3-(4-methyl-1- naphthoyl)i ndole (AM-2201) naphthoyl}indole (MAM-2201) (xiii) 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-3-(4-methyl~ 1-

(xiv) 1-( 5-fl uo ropentyl )-3-(4-ethyl-1- nsphthoyl)fndole (MAM-2201) naphthoylJindole (EAM-2201) (xiv) 1-(5-fluoropentyl)-3-(4-ethyl-l-

(xv) (( 3R)-2,3-di hydro-5-m ethyl-3-( 4- naphthoyl)indole (EAM-2201) morphol inylmethyl)pyrrolo[l ,2,3- (xv) (( 3R)-2,3-dl hyd ro-5-methyl-3-( 4-de]-l ,4--benzoxazin-6-yl)· 1- morpholi nylmethyl)pyrrol o[ 1,2,3-naphthalenyl-methanone (WIN del-l A-benzoxazin-6-yl }-1-55,212-2) naphthalenyl-methanone (WIN

(3) Any substance that has a 3-(1- 55,212-2) naphthoyl)pyrrole structure with (3) toute substance avant une structure 3-(1-substitution at the nitrogen atom of the naphthoyl)pyrrole substituee a I'atome pyrrole ring, whether or not further d'azote du cycle pyrrole, qu'il y ait ou non substituted on the pyrrole ring to any davantage de substitution sur ce cycle extent a nd whether or not substituted on dans quelque mesure que ce soit et qu'i! y the naphthyl ring to any extent, induding ait ou non substitution sur Ie cycle (i) 1-pentyl-5-{2-flu orophenyl )-3-(1- naphtyte dans que!que mesure que ce

naphthoyl )pyrrol e (JWH~307) SOlt, notamment : (4) Any substance that has a 3- (I) l-pentyl-5-12-f!uorophenyl )-3-(1-

phenylacetylindole structure with naphthoyl)pyrrote (JWH-307) SUbstitution at the nitrogen atom of the (4) toute su bstance avant u ne structure 3-indole ring", whether or not further phenylacetylindole substituee 3 I'atome substituted on the indole ring to any d'azote du cycle indole, qu'il y £lit ou non extent and whether or not substituted on davantage de substitution sur ce cycle the phenyl ring to any extent, including dans quelque mesure que C8 soit et qu'i! y (i) 1-pentyl-3-12- . ait ou non substitution sur Ie cycle

methoxyphenylacetyl)indole phenyle dans quelque mesure que ce soit, (JWH250) notarnment:

CUfJ=:r,: to 11/1.3)-'12, :'::015 07 .~jDtJr::Hl i2 nlai 2D16

Com:ro}J~d Drugs and Sl1bst~nces SCHEDULE II

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(ii) 1-pentyl-3-12-methylphenylacetyl}indole IJWH-251}

liii) 1-pentyl-3-(3-methoxyphenylacetyl)indole (JWH-302)

Any substance that has a 3-benzoY!lndole structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring, whether or not further substituted on the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted on the phenyl ring to any extent, including (t) 1-(1-methylpiperidin-2-ylmethyl)-3-

(2-iodobenzoyl)lndole (AM-2233) Any substance that has a 3-methanone(cyc!opropyl)indole structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom of the indole ring, whether or not further substituted on the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted on the cyclopropy[ ring to any extent, including (i) (1-pentyl-1 H-indol-3-yl)(2,2,3,3-

tetramethylcyclopropyl)­methanone (UR-144)

(ii) (1-(5-flu oropentyl )-1 H-indol-3-y! )(2,2,3,3-tetra m ethylcycl 0 propyl)­methanone (5F-UR-144)

(iii) (1-12-(4-morpholinyliethyl)-1 H­i ndol-3-yl)(2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropyl)­methanone (A-796,260)

Any substance that has a quinolin-8-yl 1 H­indole-3-carboxylate structure with substitution at the nitrogen atom ofthe indole ring, whether or not further substituted on the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted on the quinolin-8-yl ring to any extent, including (i) l-pentyl-B-quinol inyl ester-1 H­

indole-3-carboxylic acid (PB-22) (ii) 1-(5-fluoropentyll-8-quinolinyl

ester-l H-indoie-3-carboxylic acid (5F-PB-22)

Any substance that has a 3-carboxamideindazole structure with substitution at the nitrogen 3tom of the indazoie ring, whether or not further su bstituted on the indazole ring to any extent and whether 01 not substituted at the carboxamide group to any extent, including (i) N-(adamantan-1-yf)-1-pentyl-l H­

indazole-3-carboxamide (AKB48) (ii) N-(adarnantan-l-yI1-1-{5-

f!uoropelltyl)-1 H-indazole-3-carboxamide (5F-AKB48)

(iii) N-{1-(anlinocarbonvl)~2-' methylpropyi)-1-(4-fl uorobenzyl)-l H-i:1dazole-3-carboxarnIde (AB-FUB!I"JjJ~CJ:-,)

Drogues.et outr-es suostEmces ANNEXE II

(5)

(5)

(7)

(8)

Ii) l-pentyl-3-{2-methoxyphenylacetyl)indole (JWH-250) .

(ii) l-pentyl-3-(3· methoxyphenylacetyl)indole (JWH-302l

(iii) l-pentyl-3-(2-methylphenylacetyl)indole (JWH-251J

toute substance avant une structure 3-benzoyl indole substitu~e a I'atome d'azote du cyde indole, qu'il y ait au non davantage de substitutioi> sur ce cycle dans quelque mesure que ce salt et qu'il y ait au non substitution sur Ie cycle phenyle dans quelque mesure que ce soit, notamment: (i) 1-11-methylpiperidin-2-ylmethyl )-3-

(2-iodobenzoyl)indole (AM-2233) toute substance avant une structure 3-methanone(cyclopropy!)indole substituee a I'atome d'azote du cycle indole, qu'il y ait au non davantage de substitution sur ce cycle dans quelque mesure que ce soit et qu'it y ait au non substitution sur Ie cycle cyclopropyle dans quelque mesure que ce soit, notamment: (i) (1-pentyl-1 H-i ndol-3~yl)(2,2,3,3-

(ii)

(i i i)

tetramethylcyclopropyl)­methanone (UR-144) (1-(5-fluoropentyl )-1 H-indo!-3-yl)(2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropyl)­methanone (5F-UR-144) (1-(2-(4-morpnolinyl)ethyr}-1 H-i ndol-3-yl )(2,2,3,3-tetramethylcyclopropyl)­methanone (A-795,260)

toute substance ayant une structu re qUinolin-8-yl 1 H-indole-3-carboxylate substituee a I'atome d'azote du cycle indole, qu'fI y ait ou non davantage de substitution sur ce cycle dans quelque mesure que ce soit et qu'il y ait au non substitution sur Ie cycle quinolin~8~yl da ns quelque mesure que Ce soit, notsmment: (i) acide 1~pentyl-8-quinolinyl

(ii)

ester-1 H-indoie-3-carboxylique (PB-22) aeide 1-{5~fluoropentyi)-B­quinolinyl ester-1 H-indole-3-carboxylique (5F-PB-22)

tOUt8 substance avant une structure 3-carboxamideindazole substituee a I'atome d'azote du cycle indazole, qu'iI y ait au non davantage de substitution sur ce cycle dans quelque mesure que ce soit et qu'iI y ait au non substitution au groupe carboxamide dans quelque mesure que ce soit, notamment : (i) N-{adama Iltall-l-yl)-1 ~pentyl-l H­

indazole-3-carboxarnide (AKB48) N-(adamantan-l-y[)-1-(5-fluQ,opentyl)-l H~indazole~3~ c3iboxamide (SF-AKB48)

CO'}troHBd Drugs and SUOs1;;'f)[;BS

SCHEDULE II

(iv) N-(1-amino-3-methyl-l-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-pentyl-l H­indazole-3-carboxaniide (AB­PINACA)

(9) Any substance that has a 3-carboxamideindoie structure with substitution atthe nitrogen atom of the indole ri ng, whether or not further substituted on the indole ring to any extent and whether or not substituted at the carboxamide group to .any extent, including Ii) N-(adamantan-l-yl)-l-

fluoropentylindole-3-carboxamide (STS-135)

{ii) N-(adamantan-1-yl)-1-pentyl i ndol e,3~ca rboxa m i de (APICA)

1996, c. 19, SCh.ll; SOR/98-1S7;SORlZOD3-3z, 5.1; SORIZD15-192.

59

Drogues ~ sutres s/Jbsti:m[;~.!' ANNEXEIi

(9)

(iii) N-(1-(aminocarbonyl)-2-methyl propyl )-1-(4-fluorobenzyl}-l H-indazoie-3-carboxamlde (AB-FUBINACA)

(Iv) N-(1-amino-3-methyl-l-oxobutan-2-yl)-1-pentyl-l H­indazole-3-carboxamide (AB­PINACA)

toute substance ayant une structure 3" carboxamideindoie substituee a I'atome d'azote du cycle indole, qu'IJ y ait ou non davantage de substitution sur ce cycle dans quelque mesure que ce soit et qu'il y ait ou non sUbstitution au groupe carboxamide dans quelque mesure que ce soit, notamment: (il N-(adamantan-l "yl)-l-

fl uoropentyl i ndol e-3-carboxa m ide (STS-135)

(ii) N-(adamantan-l-yl)-l c

pentyl indo I e-3-carboxam i de (APICA)

1996, ch.19, ann. II; DORS/9S-157; DORS/ZOQ3.32, art, 1; DORS/2015-192.

Controlled Drugs and Subst;mces SCHEDULE VIII

SCHEDULE VIII

(Sections 4 and 60)

Substance 1 Ca nnabis resin 2 Can nabis (marihuana)

1996, c, 19, Sch. VIII; SORI97-230, s. 16.

Amount

1 9

30 9

Drogues et 8/.1tre.s ~ubsran(;es AI\INEXEVlII

.~~~~~.----~~----

ANNEXE VIII

(articles 4 et 60)

Substance 1 Resine de cannabis 2 Cannabis (marihuana)

1996, ch.19,ann. VIII; DORSI97-230, art. lB.

82

Quantite

1 9 30 9

ControiJed Drug~ BrJd Substances AMENDMENTS NOTlN FORCE

~-------

AMENDMENTS NOT IN FORCE

- SORJ2016-73, s. 1

S.C. 1996, c. 19

1 Item 24 of Schedule III to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is repealed.

- SOR/20·16-73, s. 2

2 Schedule III to the Act is amended by adding the following after item 34:

35 2C-phenethylamines and their salts, derivatives, isomers and salts of derivatives and isomers that correspond to the following chemical description: any substance that has a 1-amino-2-phenylethane structure substituted at the 2' and 5' or 2' and 6' positions of the benzene ring by an alkoxy or haloalkoxy grou p, or substituted at two adjacent carbon atoms of the benzene ring which results in the formation of a fUran, dihydrofuran, pyran, dihydropyran or methylenedioxy group - whether or not further substituted on the benzene ring to any extent, whether or not substituted at the amino group by one or two, or a combination of, methyl, ethyl, propyl, isopropyl, hydroxyl, benzyl (or benzyl substituted to any extent) or benzylene (or benzylene substituted to any extent) groups and whether or not substituted at the 2-ethyl (beta carbon) position by a hydroxyl, oxo or alkoxy group - and its salts and derivatives and salts of derivatives, including (1) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-N-(2-

methoxybenzyljphenethylamine (25B­NBOMe)

(2) 4-chloro-2,5-dimethoxy-N-(2-methoxybenzyl )phenethylami ne (25C-NBOMe)

(3) 4-iodo-2,5-dimethoxy·N-(2~ methoxybenzyl)phenethylamine (251~ NBOMe)

(4) 4-bromo~2,5-dimethoxybenzeneethanamine (2C-B)

8?

Drogues £ot autrES- substances MODIFlCA nONS NON EN VIGUEU:....R'--______ _

MODIFICATIONS NON EN VIGUEUR

- 0 0 R S 12 0 1 6 -7 3, a rt. 1

L.C. 1996, ch. 19

1 L'artide 24 de l'annexe III de 1a Loi reglementant certaines drogues et autres substances est abroge.

- DORS/2016-73, art. 2

2 L'annexe III de la meme loi est modifiee par ad­jonction, apres l'article 34, de ce qui suit:

35 Les 2C-phenethylamines, leurs sels, derives et isomeres, ainsi que les sels de leurs derives et isomeres, qui repondent a Is description chimique sulvante: toute substance avant une structure 1-amino-2-phenylethane substituee en positions 2' et 5' ou 2' et 6' du cycle benzenique par un groupe alcoxy ou halogenoalcoxy, au substituee a deux atomes de carbone adjacents du cycle benzenique de far;;on a entrainer la formation d'un groupe furane, dihydrofurane, pyrane, dihydropyrane ou methylenedioxy - qu'll yait ou non davantage de substitution su r Ie cycle benzenique dans queJque mesure que ce soit, qu'il y ait ou non substitution au groupe amino par un ou deux groupes methy!e, ethyle, propyle, isopropyle, hydroxyle, benzyle (ou benzyle substitue dans quelque mesure que ce soit) ou benzylene.(ou benzylene substitue dans quelque mesure que ce soit) ou par llne combinaison de ceux-ct, et qU'iJ y ait QU non substitution en position 2-ethyle (carbone beta) par un groupe hydroxyle, oxo ou alcoxy -, les sels et derives de cette substance ainsi que les sels de ses derives, notamment: (1 j 4-bromo~2,5-dimethoxy-N-(2h

methoxybenzyle)phenethylamine (25B­NBOMe)

(2) 4-chloro-2,5-dimethoxy-N-{2-mHhoxybenzyle)phenethyJamine (25C-NBOMe)

(3) 4-iodo-2,5-dimethoxy-N-(2-methoxybenzyle)phenethylamine (25J~ NBOMe)

(4) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxybenzfmeethanariline (2C-B)

Controlled Drugs Q,..,d Sub$r~nces PART It EnforcF;!mt"fl'i: Secti"cn. 11

PARTH

Enforcement

Search, Seizure and Detention

Information for search warrant

11 f1} A justice who, on ex parte application, is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that

Is) a controlled substance or precursor in respect of which this Act has been r.ontravened,

(hi any thing in which a controlled substance or pre­cursor referred to in paragraph (a) is contained or concealed,

(e) offence-related property, or

(d) any thing that will afford evidence in respect of an offence under this }-...ct or an offence, in whole or in part in relation to a contravention of this Act, under section 354 or 462.31 of the Criminal Code

is in a place may, at any time, issUe a warrant authorizing a peace officer, at any rime, to search the place for any such controlled substance, precursor, property or thing and to seize it.

Application of section 487.1 ofthe Criminal Code

{2} For the purposes of subsection (1), an information may 1;le submitted by telephone or other means ot' teleco=unication in accordance with section 4871 of the Criminal Code, with such modifications as the cir­cumstances require.

Execution in another province

(3) A justice may, where a p1ace referred to in subsec­tion (1) is in a province other than that in which the jus­tice has jurisdiction, issue the warrant referred to in that subsection and the warrant may be executed in the other provLTlCe a..~er it has been endorsed by a justice having ju­risdiction in that other province.

Effect of endorsem ent

(4) All endorsement that is made on a waJ.-rant as prmoid­ed for in subsection (3) is sufficient authority to any peace officer to ,,-,hom it was originally directed and to all peace officers within the jurisdietion of the justice by

C~r'Gnttc: May l2, 2[;12 i4

DrogUi;ts sl :JurteS substances PARTlE Ii EX6CW'Ljon et mesures de con7ffiirrte Artid~ 11

PARTIE Ii

Execution et mesuresde contrainte

Perquisitions, fouilles, saisies et retention

Mandat de perquisition

11 (1) Le juge de paix qui, sur demande ex parte, est Convab"l.CU sur 1a foi d'une denonciation faite SOliS ser­ment qu'il existe des motifs raisonnables de crorre a la presence, en un lieu, d'un ou de plusieurs des articles enumeres ci-dessous peut deJivrer a un agent de la paix un mandat l'autorisant, a tout moment, a perquisitionner en ce lieu et a Ies y saisir : .

a) une substance designee ou un precurseur ayant donne lieu a une infraction a la presente loi;

b) une chose qui contient ou reco':le line substance de­signee ou un prkurseur vise a l'alinea a);

c) un bien illiuctionnel;

d} une chose qill servira de preuve relativement a une infraction a Ia presente loi ou, dans les cas OU elle de­coule en tout ou en partie d'une contravention a la presente loi, a une infraction prevue aux articles 354 ou 462.31 du Code criminel.

Application de I' articie 487,1 du Code criminef

{2} La denonciation visee au paragraphe (1) peut se faire par telephone ou tout autre moyen de h~leco=lli-llca­tion, conformement a l'article 487.1 du Code criminel, compte terru des adaptations necessaires.

Execution hors du ressort

(3) Le juge de paix peut delivrer Ie mandat pour perqui­sition dans une province ou il n'a pas competence; le mandat y est alors executoire une fois vise par unjuge de paix: ayant competence da...'1S 1a pro-vince en question.

Effet dll visa

(4) Le visa conf'ere a tout agent de la paix a qui 1e mandat etait adress€: en premier lie.u, aiilsl qu'a ceIT" de la cir­conscription territoriale en cause, tant le pOHvoir d'exe­cuter Ie manoat que celui de disposer, seIon 1e droit ap­plicahle, des biens saisis

C.ilNADA

CONSOLlDATION

Criminal Code

R. S. c., 1985, c. C-4.6

Currentto May 12,2016

Last amended on Juiy 23,2015

PL:blishec by the !\riinLstr.r of Jus1fce at the foUol.-vi:lg a-dorcss:

i:tlp://I M \r'<;S-\ 01 s.j u sticE. gc_ ca

CODIF!CATION

Code criminel

L.R.c. (1985), c:h, C-46

Ajour au 12 mal 2016

Derniere modification Ie 23 juillet 2015

Pl!biie par ,Ie i11lnlstre de la Jus:k:e a f¥.adress€ suivante :

http:!:'; oj s~1 aws.lustrce>g cxa

C6fTrinaJ Coda PART Ui Ftfe.clr:--:'$ and O:heiWe.Gpons i..irniti:i110nS on ACc:e-s.s Sections 117.011·11"1.03

ence in that Part to the appeal court were a reference to the superior court. 1.995, c. 39, s. 138.

Revocation or order under s. 117.011

117.012 A provincial court judge may, on application by ¢e person against whom an order is made 1l.11der subsec­tion 117.011 (5), revoke the order if satisfied that the cir­cumstances for which it was made have ceased to exist. 1995, c. 39, s. i 39.

Search and Seizure

Search and seizure- without warrant where offence committed

t 17.02 ('I) VV'bere a peace officer believes on reasonable grounds

(a) that a weapon, all imitation fuea.rm, a prohibited device, any ammunition, any prohibited ammUD.ition or an e.-plosive substance was used in the commission of an offence, or

(b) that an offence is being committed, or has been committed, under any provision of this Act that lc"t­valves, or the subject-matter of which is, a firearm, an imitation firearm, a crciss-bow, a prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or an ex-plosive substance,

and evidence of the offence is likely to be found on a per­SOll, in a vehicle or in any place or premises other than a dwelling-house, the peace officer may, where the condi­tions for obtaining a warrant exist but, by reason of exi­ge...Tlt circumstances, it would not be practicable to obtain a "'larrant, search, without warrant, the person, vehicle, place or premises, and seize any thing by means of or in rela.tion to which that peace officer believes on reason­able grounds the offe.l1ce is being CDmmitted or has been committed.

Dispositron of sejzed things

(2) Any thing seized pursuant to subsection (1) shall be dealt "I"'1th in accordance v,ith sections 490 and 491.

Seizure QI1 failure to produce allthorization

117.03 en Despite section 117.02, a peace officer ·/,'ho finds

(a) a perSG!1 i2:1 pcssessioll of a probibited ETearm~ 2 res~-ricted Ii-I"eaTDJ. or 2. I~on~rest~icte[~ fire2.rn.:: \vhc

'::.)

Cod~ c,iminei

Ordonnance d-e restrict jon An:jdes 117.011n117.03

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Oli (8) et 1a mention de 1a cour d'appel dans cette partie vaut celie de 1a cour supeneure. 18951 ch. 39, art. 139.

Revocation de !'ordonnance prevue a !'article 117.011

117.012 Le juge de 1a cour provinciale peut, sur de­mande de 1a personne -Yisee par une ordonnance rendue en application du paragraphe 117.011(5), revoquer l'or­donnance lorsqu'il est convaincu qu'elie n'est plus justi­fiee eu egard aux circonstances. 1955, ch. 39, art. 139.

Perquisition et saisie

. Perqufsition et saisie sans mandat en cas d'infraction

117.02 (1.) Lorsqu'il a des motifs raisonnables de croire a 1a perpetration d'une infraction avec usage d'une arme, d'une fausse arme a feu, n'un dispositit prohibe, de muni­tions, de munitions prohibees au de substances explo­sives au d'une infraction Ii la presente loi relative a une arme a feu, une fausse arme a feu, une arbalete, une arme prohibee, une fuJJle a autorisation restreinte, un disposi­tit prohibe, des munitions, des munitions prohibe.es au des substances explosives et de croire qu'une preuve de celie-ci peut etre trouvee surune personne, dans ill .. vehl­cule au en tout lieu, sauf une maison d'habitation, ragent de Ia paix, lorsque l'urgence de Ia situation rend difficile­ment realisable l'obtention d'un mandat et que les condi­tions de delivrance de celui-ci sont reunies, peut, sans mandat, fouiller 130 personne au Ie vehicule, perquisition­ner dans ce lieu et saisir tout objet au moyen ou au sujet duquel il a des motifs raisonnables de noire que l'infrac­tion est perpi§tree au 1'a ete.

Disposition des objets sa isis

(2} Il est dispose conformement aux at"iicles 490 et 491 des objets saisis. 1995, ch. 39, art. 13:9.

Saisie a defailt de presenter res documents

,HJJ3 ('J Par derogation a l'article 117.CI2, lQJ."squ'il trou"'\}·e, lli""1e. personne. qui a en sa possession 1J.ne -arille a feu prohibee, nne arme a feu ii at,toris9.'::ion restreinte, une an:ne 3. feu sar.i.S re.striction, une anne prohibee

1 une

s;:-ll1e 2~ 3utOTISi:ltlon r2-strcirrte~ un dlSPO:"ljtif "9foh50t ou deS Tr~lJJJ-itiG'Qs prob5hces et qui est inc,:~p~i b] e de .kl.i :;rre­:Se:r:ter ~_';12r-}e-ch2.m'p pOUT eX2IiJ.Cn uri.';::: ZIPt:')T-is:~tion (ll_l un

Ctimjn&i Code PAti-T:XV Special Piucedure :;>lid Powers Other PrOVts~ons Respect~fig Sesrch Wa,r;;;n~s, Pre-ss.-v;niort QI-dE::'rs and Productiort Q,ae-rs

Other Provisions Respecting Search Warrants, Preservation Orders and Production Orders

Telewarrants

487.1 (1) VIlbere a peace officer believes that an in­dictable offence has been committed and that it would be impracticable to appear personally before a justice to make application for a W'ctlTant in accordance with sec­tion 256 or 487, the peace officer may submit an informa­tion on oath by telephone or other means of telecommu­nication to a iustice designated for the purpose by the chief judge of the provincial court having jurisdiction in the matter.

lnformation submitted by telephone

(2) An information submitted by telephone or other means of telecommunication, other than a means of telecommunicatio.n that produces a wTiting, shall be on oath and shall be recorded verbatim by the justice, who shall, as soon as practicable, cause to be filed, with the clerk of the court for the territorial division in which the warrant is intended for execution, the record or a tran­scription of it, certified by the justice as to time, date and contents.

Information submitted by other means of telecommunication

(2.1) The justice who receives an infonnation submitted by a means of telecommunication that produces a writing shall, as soon as practicable, cause to be filed, with the clerk of the court for the territorial division in which the warrant is intended for execution, the information certi­fied by the justice as to time and date of receipt.

Administration of oath

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), an oath may be administered by telephone or other means of telecommu­nication.

Alternative to oath

(3.1) A peace officer who uses a means of telecommuni­cation referred to in subsection (2.1) may, instead of swearing an oau'l, make a statement in writing stating that all matters contained ill the information are true to his or her knowledge and belief and such a statement is deemed to be a statement made under oath ..

Code criminei PARTIE XV Pror:.:edurE::;:,t pOLJ\ioirs SpeCi:::lUX

Autres dispositions _ ma:ndats os perqvfSitiofl et Drdonn<i rlc8$ de pres8f\1aHon aU de communk:ation Article 4B7_1

Autres dispositions: mandats de perquisition et ordonnances de preservation ou de communication

T elemandats

481.1 (1) L'agent de la paix qui emit qu'un acte crimi­nel a ete comInis et considere qu'il serait peu cominode de se presenter en personne devant un juge de paix pour y demander un mfuldat de perquisition en conformite avec l'artic1e 256 ou 487 peut faire, a un juge de paix desi­gne par Ie juge en chef de la cour provinciale qui a com­petence, une denonciation sous serment par telephone ou a l'aide d'un autre moyen de telecommunication.

Demonciation presentee par certains moyens

{2} La denonciation presentee par telephone ou a l'aide d'un autre moyen de commw-llcation qui ne peut rendre la communication sous forme ecnte est faite SOllS ser­ment et consignee mot a mot dans un procE>s-verbal au emegistree mecamquement par Ie juge de paix qui, dans les plus brefs delais, fait deposer aupres du greffier du tribunal de la circonscription territoriale ou Ie mandat doit etre execute Ie proces-verbal ou une transcription de l' enregistrement de la denonciation; Ie juge de paix en certifie Ie contenu, la date et l'heure.

Denonciation presentee par d'autres mavens

(2.1) Le juge de paix qui rec;oit la denonciation presentee par un moyen de telecommunication qui rend la commu­nication SOllS forme ecrite la fait deposer dans les plus brefs delais aupres du greffier du tribunal de la CITcons­cription tenitoriale OU Ie mandat doit etre execute et il certifie la date et l'heure de sa reception.

Serment

(3} Pour l'application du paragraphe (2), un serment peut etre prete par telephone ou a l'aide d'un autre moyen de telecommunication.

Alternative au serment

(3.1) L'agent de la paix qui presente mle denonciation de la fac;on prev'Ue au paragraphe (2.1) peut, au lieu de pre­ter serment, choisir de hire UD.8 declaration par ecrit se­Jon Jaquelle il croit HaiS, au meilleur de sa connaissance, les renseignements coIitenus dans Ia denonciation. Sa declaration est reputee etre faite sons serment.

Ajourau12m~i201f!

Crimina} Code PART XV Sp,;cial Proce.dure and Powers Othe-r ProviSions Respecting Se~rch Vvarrams, Preserva~ictl OldE'rs and Production Orders

Sections 488. 1-48.9.1 ~~~~

Exception

(11) This section does not apply in circumstances where a claim of solicitor-client privilege may be made 1.lllder the Income Tax Act or under the Proceeds of Crime (Money Laundering) and Terrorist Financing Act. R.S., 1985. c. 27 11.t Supp.J, s. 71; 2000. c. 17, s. 89; 2001. c. 41. 5. 80.

Seizure of things not specified

489 (1} Every person who executes a warrant may seize, in addition to the things mentioned in the warrant, any thing that the person believes on reasonable grounds

{a} has been obtained bytbe commission of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament;

{b} has been used in the commission of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament; or

{c} ",ill afford evidence in respect of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament.

Seizure without warrant

(2) Every peace 'officer, and every public officer who has been appointed or designated to administer or enforce any federal or provincial law and whose duties include the enforcement of this or any other Act of Parliament, who is lawfully present in a place pursuant to a warrant or otherwise in the execution of duties may, without a w<Lrrant, seize any thing that the officer believes on rea­sonable grounds

{a} has been obtained by the commission of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament;

(0) has been used in the commission of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament; or

(c) vvill afford evidence in respect of an offence against this or any other Act of Parliament.

R.S_, 1985, C C-'-6. s. "-B9; FLS .• 1985. c. 27 (ls, Soop), s. 72, c. "-2 14th Supp.J, s, 3; 1993, c. 40. s. 15~ 1987. c. 18, s_ 48.

Restitution of property or report by peace officer

439.1 (1) Subject to this or any other Act of Parliament, where a peace officer has seized anything under a war­rant issued 1.1Ilder this Act or under section 487.11 or 489 or otherwise in the excocution of duties under tlris or any other Act of Parliament, the peace officer shall, as soon 8.S

is practicable,

!"::.78

Code. climine/ PART~E XV Procedurs et pau'vo~rs s-peda\Ji: AlJtres disposlt~or,s- rnandcts d9 perquisition Bt ardollnaflces de pieservation Oli de-cOlT1rnuflfce:tion Artid2"S 488.1-489.1

Exception

(1: 1} Le present a..rticle ne s'applique pas lorsque peut etre invoque Ie privilege des communications entre client et avocat en vertu de la Loi de l'imp8t sur Ie revenu ou Ie secret professionnel du conseiller juridique en vetta de la Loi sur Ie recyclage des produits de la criminalite. et lefi­nancementdes activites teTToristes. LR119851. ch. 2711"' 5uppl.), art. 71; 2000. ch. 17, art_ 89; 2001, ch. 41, art. 80.

Saisie de chases non specifiees

489 (1) Quiconque execute un mandat peut saisir, outre ce qui est mentionne dans Ie mandat, toute chose qu'j} croit, pour des motifs raisonnables :

a} avoir tte obtenue au moyen d'llile infraction a la presente loi ou a toute autre loi federale;

b} avoir He employee a la perpetration d'une infrac­tion ii la presente loi au a toute autre loi federale;

c) pouvoir seMI de preuve touchant la perpetration d'une illi-Taction a la presente loi ou a toute autre loi federale.

Saisie sans mandat

(2) L'agent de la pm ou Ie fonctionnaire public nomme ou designe pour l'application ou l'execution d'une loi fe­derale ou provinciale et charge notamment de faire ob­server la pre.sente loi au toute autre loi fedenle qui se trouve legalement en un enclroit en vertu d'un mandat ou pour l'accomplissement de ses fonctions peut, sans man­dai, saisir toute chose qu'il croit, pour des motifs raison­nables:

a) avoir ete obtenue au moyen d'une infraction a la presente 10i ou a toute autre loi feder-ale;

b} avoir ete employee a la perpetration d'une illi"Tac­tion a 1a presente 10i au a toute autre loi federale;

c} pouvoir servir de preuve touchatlt la perpetration d'une infraction a 1a presente loi ou a toute autre 10i feder-ale.

L>R. (1985), ch. C46. act 439: LR. (1985). ch. 27 11 ee suppi.), 3rt. 72, ch. 42 (4' suPpU. art 3; 1983, ch. 40, artc 16; 1897, en. 18, 8rt. 48.

Remise des biens ou ,apports

489. 'i (1) Sons reserve des autres dispositiop.s de 12 pre­sente loi ou de toute antre loi federale, l'agent de la psi'C qui a saisi des biens en vertu d's'} mandat deceme sons ]e regime de 1a presente loi, en vertu des articles 48711 on 489 ou aut:reElcnt dans l'exercice des fonctions que lui canIere la presente !oi ou llile autre loi fcderale doit, dans les P!1_\S brefs a£lals possible:

;)

Criminal Code PAR! XV Special Procedl.!ie' and Powers Other Provisions Respecting S€arch VVarisnts, Pr-esetvat[on Orders. and PrQQuction Orders

Code criminef PARTIE XV P{OCl3-d~ie £t pou'JOfrs speciaux Autre::; dtsposi1rons . rr-.and;;.ts de- p-erquisi!lo!l et ordor.nances- de preservaTion DU de commuillcatiQfl.

SectjoJl:s 489.1-490 A.rt~des 489_1r490 ------------.------------~----- ~------------ ----------

telecommunication, the statements referred to in subsec­tion 487.1(9). R.S., 1885, c. 27 (1st Supp.J, s. 72; 1SS3, c. 40, s. 17; 1997, c, 1B, s. 49.

Detention of things seized

490 (1) Subject to this or any other Act of Parliament, where, pursuant to paragraph 489.1(1)(b) or subsection 489,1(2), anything that has been seized is brought before a justice or a report in respect of anything seized is made to a justice, the justice shall,

(a} where the lawful owner or person who is lav"fully entitled to possession of the thing seized is knovvn, or­der it to be returned to that oVv-ner or person, unless the prosecutor, or the peace officer or other person having custody of the thing seized, satisfies the justice that the detention of the thing seized is required for the purposes of any investigation or a preliminary in­quiry, trial or other proceeding; or

(b) where the prosecutor, or the peace officer or other person having custody of the thing seized, satisfies the justice that the thlng seized should be detained for a reason set out in paragraph (a), detain the t.h.ing seized or order that it be detained, taking reasonable care to ensure that it is preserved until the conclusion of any investigation or until it is required to be produced for the purposes of a preliminary inquiry, trial or other proceeding,

Further detention

{2} Nothing shall be detained under the authority of paragraph (1)(b) for a period of more than three months after the day of the seizure, or any longer period that ends when an application made under paragraph (a) is decided, unless

(a) a justice, on the making of a swnmary application to him after three clear days notice thereof to the per­son from whom the thing detained was seized, is satis­fied that, having regard to the natme of the investiga­tion, its further detention for a specified period is warranted and the justice so orders; or

(Of proceedings are mstituted in which the tlril1.g de­tained may be required,

Idem

{3} More than one order for fur-'-iller detention may be made under paragraph (2)(a) but the Clllilulati,e period of detention shall not exceed one year from the day of the seizure, or any longer period that ends vvheu an applica­tion nlaae. undEr paragraph ta) is decided; ll.i11~ss

t.L..i.ii8li t 'to Mal' ! 2, 2.0l6 530

par un autre moyen de t{Mcommunication, les indica­tions visees au paragraphe 487.1(9). loR. (1385), ch. 27 11,r su ppl.J, art. 72; 1993, ch. 40, art 17; 19E7, ch. 1 B, art. 43.

Detention des choses saisies

490 (1) Sous reserve des autres dispositions de la pre-­sente 10i ou de toute autre 10i federale, lorsque, en vertu de l'alim~a 489.1(1)b) ou du paragraphe 489,1(2), des choses qui ont He saisies sont apportees devant un juge de pffix ou lorsqu'un rapport a l'egard de choses saisies est fait a un juge de paix, celui-ci doit :

a) lorsque Ie proprh~taire legitime ou la personne qui a droit a la possession legitime des choses saisies est connu, omonner qu' elles lui soient remises a moins que Ie poursuivant, l'agent de la paix au toute per­sonne qui en a la garde ne Ie convainque que leur de­tention est necessaire aux fins d'une enquete, d'une enquete preliminaire, d'un pI'oc6; ou de toute autre procedure;

b) lorsque Ie poursuivant, l'agent de la paix ou la per­sonne qui en ala garde convainc Ie juge de pm que la chose saisie devrait etre detenue pour un motif enonce a l'alil'1.ea a), detenir cette chose au en ordo=er la de­tention, en prenant raisormablement soin d'en assurer la conservation jusqu'a la conclusion de toute enquete ou jusqu'a. ce que sa production soit requise aux fins d'une enquete preIiminaire, d'un proces ou de toute autre procedure.

Ordonnance de prolongation

(2} Rien ne peut etre detenu SOliS l'autorite de l'alinea (1)b) au-dela soit de l'expiration d'une periode de trois mois apres la saisie, soit de la date, 5i elle est posterieure, ou. il est statue sur la demande visee a l'alinea a), a moins que:

a} un juge de paix convaincu, a la suite d'une de­mande sommaire qui lui a He faite apres avis de trois joms francs a la personne qui, au moment de la saisie, avait la possession de 1a chose detenue, que, compte tmu de la nature de l'enquete, la prolongation de sa detention pendant une periode specifiee est justifiee ordonne une telle prolongation;

h) des procedures ont ete engagees au cours des­queUes la chose Mtenue peat etre requise.

Idem

(3) II pent etre rendn plus d\me ordonnance de 'prolon~ gation de detention en ..-ernl ciu sous-alinea (2)8.), mais rien nc pent elre detenu pour unc duree totale qui de­passe soit un an 2. eompter de la saisie, soit une pcriode

S~criOflS 5.27 ~529

Return

(9) ''>Then the pu.rposes of ~'"ly order made under this sec­tion have been c.a...-ried out, the prisoner shall be returned to the place where he was coru"lned at the time L~e order was made. R.S .• 1985. c. C-4S. s. 527; R.S., 1885, r.. 27 {1st Sup".), <is. 82, 101{E). 203; 1294, c. "4, s. 5D; , 9~5, Co. 22, 5.. 10; 1987, c.. lB, So. 62; 2015~ r.. 3, $_ 52!F1,

Endorsement of \Narrant

Endorsing warrant

528. (1} \I\/here a II/arrant for the a.,.'Test or coIJJJ:IJittal of an accused, in any form set out Ll1 pa.,.-j: XXViII ill relation thereto, caIJnot be executed in accordance 'Nith section 514 or 703, a jusTIce within whose jurisdiction the accused is or; is believed IO be shall, on application and proof on oath or by affidavit of the signature of the justice 'who is­sued. the warrant, authorize the arrest of the accused y,ithin his jurisdiction by making an endorsement, which may be in Form 28, on the 'vv<lirant

Copy of amdavrt or ""Jarrarrt

!1 .1} A copy or an affidavit or warrant submittecl by a means of telecommunication that procluces .a writing has the same probative force as the original for the pu..rposes of subsection (I).

Effect of endorsement

(2) An endorSement that is made on a warrant pursuant to subsection (1) is sufficient authority to the peace offi­cers to whom it was originally directed., a.l"1cl to all peace officers wi.t.bin the territorial jurisdiction of the justice by 'whom it is e.~dorsed, to execute the warrant and. to take the accused before the justice who issued the warrant or before any other justice for £'le sa..rne territorial divi.sion. R.S., 19B5, c. C....!l.Ei, s. 528: RS., 188S( t. 27 (1st SlIpp.L s. 93; l~S4, c. 44, S. 51.

Powers to Enter Dvvelling-houses to CarrY out PTr8sts

I

.lncluding auth or~zation to enter in warrant of arrest

529 (1) A warrant to arrest or apprehend a person is­sued by a judge or justice UDder this or any other ... I\ct of ParJianJent Dlay authorize 3. pf~ac~ officer, subject to S1..lD­

sec.ti{)~ (2)~ to enter a d·v,;-elE.i.~g-hollse de.scriLl'2d ill the \,,~arr;::iTrt for the: purpcse of 3IT~Stillg or apprehen.diIlg the person if the jl~dge or justice is sat--isfitd DY i:-~£Grm8tioE orl ccth. ~E ~\,;r~t~n:; th;:<-.t t}Jere ~irT :-tc.SoE2~.;le gro~lI!ds to

Code crimin::;} PARTIE XVl- fVi;:"SUf,;;''':. ton.r:;:;'-;,c"i 12 c.i.:.mp:o~:..t~i-::,.: c"'G': ;;~e-v,,~r:u ::::;:; .... G~1 '..l:; jl<~2 ci~ ;::.aix G~ !" ;;lisO! i:'n ims;-Le ;:tr']"'iSO~J~

A:Li::;i~..,. 5::::/ -529 -----

Retour

(9} Le prisonnier doit erre reWlli'!le a l'mdroit d'ou il a He. trlli"lsfeze lorsque les buts pour lesquels.l'ordollilance rendue en vertu du present artiCle ont ele atteints.

LR.. {-,SB5L ch. C-46, :;11- 527; LR. (1985t, :::h. 27 I~I e-r -suppl,), :;!rt 92, "1 D'HA) et 2a3~ ~89.4< ch, 44"srl.- 50; 1995, ch, 22, En.. 10; 1.997, en. lB, art 62: 2015, ch, 3, Cr' ... 52{F). .

Visa du mandat

Mandat vise

.528 (1) Lorsqu'un manclat pour l'arrestation d'un pre­venu au un mand.at de depot, redige.s seIan une formule de mandat mentionnee a la partie Y....x. VIII, ne peut eIre execute conforrn.~lDent a l'artic.le 514 ou 703, lli"l. juge de paL>e clans Ie ressort duque1 faccuse se trouve ou est pre­s=e 5e trouve.r doit, sur demande, eT sur preuve sous serment Oll par afficlavlt de la signature clu juge cle paix qui a deceme Ie ma..T1clat, autoriser l'arrestation du prevo=-­nu dans Ies limites de sa juridictioIl, en apposant a l'en­dos du manclatun visa seIon 1a formule 28.

Copies

(1.1} Les copies de l';;l.fld.avit ou du manclat transmises a l'aide d'un moyen de teJecommunication Qui rencl la communication SOliS forme ecrite ont, pour l;application clu paragraphe (I), la meme force pro bmte que l'original.

Effet d u visa

{2} Un visa appose sur un mmdat cl'apd~s Ie paragrapbe (1) c;on5titue une autorisation sUl"iisante, pour les agents de la paix a qui il a ete. en premier lieu adresse et pour tous les agents cle la paix dans Ja juricliction territori_ale du jnge de parr qui Ie vi.se, d'executer Ie mandat et d'ame­ner Ie pre.venn clevant Ie juge de paix qui a deceme Ie mandat au clevallt tout autrejuge de'paix pour 1a meme circonscription territoriale. LR. nS851. ch. C-46, sri:. E2S: LA. {~~9B5), c:h_ 27 (r=r suppLL -'In.. S3~ 1984, ch. 44, art. 51,

Entree dans une rnaison d'habitation pour arrestation

Autorisation de penetrer dai1s Uf1e rrcaisor; drh2bitat~a?i

529 (1) Le 1112w.OX[ d'arrestation de.liVTe en verti} de 1a presente lei 00. d\1J~e antl~e 101 federale peut~ SODS rtserJe. dn paragrapbe (2) et si ie j"!.2g(~ (JU 1e: juge de P2i."\~ qU) le de~ livre est SUT 12 fQl ci"\rrre aeXIODt,,-iatloIl. S01.~S. Se.rJ!lent. ec~~Jt:~ qu\l e:~Jste deS IT1Dtifs T'cJ.so!'2.J.-::.z::.bles de cJ.'oi:'e tLllE: ia p~;-sonne t~ui en I.2-1t foojpt 5f~ tIOlY'i.: e ou se. ti·(j~l\'e-.ra d;::L~}'::. l:rQf !Tl;~'l~::(;n d-'}Llbii::r.ti~)n desl~Dee;_ 2T~.tG:li-

C"rnini;i! C~-;:d;;:. P t..RT X'v1 CDrn~2:IJ;ng ~ppS;;r2;r.::; OT .s:;::;:l' sed BeiQf'::: ~ JUS'liCE;; <:!I!C: ~;-;t~r:m ;::;elE::e:.se

?ov,;ers -;:0 E r.'l:er ~we;i;ng~j--.DL's:-;:~ t~ C21~ry QUi Ar!"es~s Sec:tions 52S-523.3

believe that the person IS or will be preseDt ill the dwelling-house.

Execution

(2} An authorization to enter a dwelling-house granted under subsection (1) is subject to the condition that the peace officer may not enter the dwelling-house unless the peace officer has, immediately before entering the dwelli.'1g-house, reasonable grounds to believe that the person to be arrested or apprehended is present in the dwelling-house. F:.S .. , 1985, C .. C-46! f» 52..9: 1.954, r; .. 44, s .. 52; IS97, c.. 39, s .. 2 ..

Warrant to enter dwe!l1ng+!ouse

529.1 A judge or justice may issue a warrant hJ. Form 7.1 authorizing a peace officer to enter a dwelling-house de­scribed in the 'warrant for the purpose of fu--resting or ap­prehending a person identified or identLfiable by the war­rant if the judge or justice is sa.tisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is or will be present in the dwelling-house and that

(a) a warrant referred to in tris or any other Act of Parliament to arrest or apprehend the person is ill force anywhere in Canada;

(b) grounds exist to arrest the person without warrant under paragraph 495(1)(6) or (b) or section 672.91; or

(c} grounds exist to ac.'Test or apprehend wit,.~out war­rant the person ll...'"lder a.rl Act of Parliament, other than thlsAd.

1997, c, 39,s. 2; 20(:2, c .. 13, s. 23.

Reasonable terms and condrtfons

529.2 Subject to section 529.4, the judge or justice shill include in a warrant referred to in section 529 or 529.1 any terms and conditions that the. judge or justice consid­ers advisable to ensure that the entrj into the dwelling­house is reasonable in the circumstances. 1.997, c, 38. s. 2 ..

Authorrty "to enter dvvefl1ng v.rithout warrant

529.3 (1 i "\Vithout limiting or restricting aDY power a peace officer may bave to enter a dwelling-house Ulder this or 2..ny o-u.\er At\ct or lavl: thE- pe.ace officer il12..y enter the dwelling-house for the purpose of arresting or appre­hending a person, ~v\ithO~lt 3.. l.varr2:..nt referred to in sec­bon 529 Dr 529 .. 1 2-:.2thorizing the ent~y\ jethe peace cif..c.er }~as reasollzble groun·d..s to behe l/2 th2~t tbe persoi1 is prescIlt ill t~e d-'..\'e..ll-1rig· .. hollse; z-nd tb [~ c:on2..itioDs fDr 00-tain"lng (l .. Vr:?...IT2.nt UJ.id..,~r section 52..9.1 exist bEt hy re,aSOTl.. of f'.X~gt:::ut c..iJ-:-CtLcn.:=:·.taI\!::eS it ~,~o\:ld bf; i.::~l_~:rf~Ctic?.bl'2 to ;Jo,,-

Co:ie c,-ir.;-jr:ei

m;,Se :::!l ~~b,==r:~ p~::-vis;:;jr;:;

En,;;~ C2":15 W",~ ;7;;;-is;:>n cf~C'bii:2t;w-1l pour .,rr-;,.s~ti~r: Artir:::f;:..5 529~5-29 .. 3:

ser un agent de la paix a y penetrer 21-'in de pro ceder a 1'arrestation.

Executlon

(2} L'autorisation est deliVTee sallS resenre de la condi­tion su:,,:ante : l'agent de la paix ne peut penetrer dans 1a :maison d'habitation que si, au moment d.e Ie faire, il a des motifs rcisoDIlables de croire que 1a personne a arreter s'ytrouve. LR {i9B5L eM .. C~46, ~rt. 5.2g; l.9&4, eh. 44, =r:.. 52; 1987, ch. 3B • .art.. 2.

Mandat d'errtree

529.1 Le jllge au Ie jllge de paix. peut delivrer un man­daI, seion 12 fonnille. 7.1, autorisant uri agent de la paix a penetrer dans une maison d'habitation designee pour proceder a l'a.c'Testation d'une perso=e que le mandat nomme au pennet ci'identifier s'il est convaincu, sur la foi d'une cienonciati.on sous serment, qu'il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire que cette personne s'y trouve au s'ytrouvera et que, selon Ie cas:

cJ eUe fait deja l'objet au Canada, en verm de la pre­sente loi ou d'un.e autre 10i feelerale, d'llil mandai d'ar­Testation;

br il EXiSLe des motifs de l'arreter S8.IlS manaaI aux termes des alineas 495(1)a) ou b) ou de l'article 672.91;

c) il existe des motifs pour ran-eter sans mandat en vertu d'une aUITe loi federale.

: 9Si, ch. 39, art, 2: 2.D02, ch. 13, BIT. 23 ..

fV!aoaHtes

52.9.2 Sous res~n;e de l'artide 529.4, le.juge ou Ie juge de paix enonce dfuJ.s Je mandat vise 'lUX articles 529 et 529.1 les mod2.1ites qu'il estime itJ.diquees pour que l'entree daD.5 la maisoil d'haoltation soit raisonnable dans les cir­consLances. 1.997. en.. 29, 2!l"': .. 2 ..

PO!lVGtr de penetrer sans mandat

529.3 (1) L'agent de la paix peut, sans que soit restreint ou limite le pou-vcir d~entrer qui lui e.st c.orrfere.. en vertu de Ia presence .lOt au d'cme autre lei ou ci'une regle de droit, penE'trer clans une maison d'habltgti on pour l'ar­restaricn d\ .. lTie pcrsonne sans etre :2..1u..ri du rTl~ndat vise :?tux articles ~29 au 529 .. 1 s;il a des motifs t2isonn2..bles de crG~re. gEe 12.. per-sonne trouv~J S1 lc:s ~onditiorrs de ae-1i\TC?~nCe dE In2~c~at p:tVLl a l'arbc:le 529 .. l SO!lt relli'"'jes el 51. l\l:rge:J..C2.. d~ 1a siillatLon rer).d ciiffi~il2lT.lent rec..Esablt: SOD CJbtE..r~-jC~:;L

Cr.~~jr"",j CDde:

p 4~T:XV~ CafJ1p'5~l;;-:b ;",cp==-i=r;;lfl c-:.': c·~ ,!l,tL'.1Sf;:C 52TO~2 " .h.!s~tc;; i!;cd :!l~er~r., ;;=~'=;::5e

~O\I'([O':r.$. 1·::; =m-s:r D\fV~liing~hC't1sc~ \i) C-c;>;ry m;i. hr,t's:s S"!::~ O"'~ 528 3-52.9,4

Exigent circumstances

(21F~rthe purposes of subsection (1), erigent circum­stances include cirCUIP..stances in wrJieb the peace officer

{a} has reasonable grounds to suspect that entry iL,-to the dwelling-house is neceSSlli-Y to prevent imroinent bodily harm or death to any person; or

(b) has reasonable grounds to believe that evidence relating to the coIlJ.I!lission of EG.'l indidable offence is present.in the dwelling-house and that e.IJ.t:y into the dwelling-house is necessary to prevent the i.rnm.inent loss or ~e...TJ.t destruction of the evide...'lce.

19.97, c. 39. 5.. 2.

Omitting announcement before entry

529.4 ('0 Ajudge or justice who authori2es a peace offi­cer to enter a dwelliD.g~house under section 529 or 529.1, or any other judge or justice, may authorize the peace of­ficer to enter the dwelling-house without prior announce­ment if the judge or justice is satisfied by information on oath that there are reasonable grounds to believe that prior announcement of the entry would

{a} ex-pose the peace officer or any other person to i.J:n­roL'lent bodily harm or death; or

(b) result in the imminent loss or imminent destruc­tion of evidence reIa-b.ng to the commission of an in­dictable offence.

Execution Oof authorizatbn

(Zi _Pu"'l authorization under this section is subject to the condition that the peac.e officer may not enter the dwelling-house wiLhout prior announcement despite be­ing authorized to do so unless t.le peace officer has, im­mediately before entering the d.welling-house,

{a} reasonable grounds to suspect that prior an­nouncement of the entry v,'ould e:x-pose the peace offi­cer or 3...'lY other person to hurr:inent bodily nann or dearn; or

(b} reasonable grounds to believe that prior an­nouncement of the en t,-y would result in the :mmiuent loss or lITlJ.uinent destruction of e"\idenc:e relating to the cdn:m.ission of an ind.ictabJe offence.

EXceptiol1

(3) .Lt.;.. peace O-ffCe.T -':,}:lJO enters J. d"':}/elEn.g-ho13se \1./it.!.~OlJt

a ".varrC..ilt un der :';ection .529 . .3 TTlay noil enter the

~~~i:i;E ::':i::rl~ :.1:-:'= m~;s(w> d'h:;:l011o'~on DoUr .:;rreS"'"...2-DOIl

l:,rtid:::$- S:=-.3~529.~

Sitllatfo!1 d'vrgence

(21 Pour l'application du paragraphe 0), il y a notam­ment urgence clans Ies cas all l'agent de la. p~ selon Ie cas :

a) a des motifs raisonnables de souPGD=er qu'il est necessaire de penetrer clans 1a maison d'habitation pour eviter a UIle personne des leslons cOIporelles im­minentes ou 1a mort;

. bf a des motifs raisonnables de' c:roire que des E:1f:­ments de preuve rclatifs a la perpetration d'un acte crirrrinel se trouvent dans 1a maison d'habitation et qu'il est necessaire d'y penetrer pour eviter leur perle ou leur destruction in::tminentes.

'r8S7. en, 3.9, ai'"L... 2.

Omission de prevenir

529.4 (1) Le juge oule juge de pm qui, en \Term des ar­tides 529 au 529.1, auiorise un agent de la paix a penetrer dans une maison d'habitation, ou tout autre juge ou juge de paix, peut l'autoriser a ne pas prevenir a'\.'Cl1t d'y pene­trer s'il est convaincu, sur la foi d'une denonciation SOliS

serment, qu'il existe des motifs raisonnables de croire. que Ie fait de prevenir, selon Ie cas :

a} exposerait l'agent de 1a paix au une autre personne a des lesions cOLporelles imminentes au a La mort:

b} entrainerait 1a perte ou la destruction imminentes d'flements de preuve relatifs a la perpetration d'un

. .• 1 aCLe CTImlne_.

Exec:ution de ['autorisation

(2) L'autorisation est de.liwee sous reserve de 1a condi~ tion swvante: l'agent de la paix ne peut pe.netrer rums 1a maison d'habitabon sans prevenir que S1., au moment Oll il entre, il a des motifs raiso:nnables, selon Ie cas :

a} de soup~onner que Ie fait de prevenir l'ex-poserait au exposerait une autre personne a des leslom corpo­relies irnr:ninentes ou a la mort;

b} de croire que le fait de prevenir entrainerait 1a perte au 1a destruction imminentes d'elements de preuve relatifs 2.1a perfjetration d'un acte crimffiel.

exception

(3} l)e merr~er l'agent d.~: ~a pcc.i:'( qtli ;H~De.tre d.ans Ul"le

llla1S0!l (fh2brt3.j0D sans ma"S.Gat arr::{ te.r.T~1e:cS cle. rarticle )2,9_3 112: [-t.ut y peT'~etTcr s;~ ns pre,/e:E~:r (r0.-::~ 51, ~r.l mO:Tleut

Crimlnal Code PART XVtll Procedure on. Prehmin.ary inql.'iry T a ktng Evidence of Witnesses Sectrofl:5: 541·542

Contents of address to accused

(2) Before hearing any vvitness called by an accused who is not represented by counse1, the justice shall address the accused as follo'w5 or to the li..1ce effect:

"Do you wish to say anything in ans,,""er to these charges or to any other charges which might have arisen from the evidence led by the prosecution? You are not obliged to say anything, but whatever you do say may be given in evidence against you at your trial. You should not make any confession or admission of guilt because of any promise or threat made to you but if you do make any statement it may be giv­en .in evidence against you at your trial in spite of the promise or threat."

Statement of accused

{3} '\Vb.ere the accused who is not represented by counsel says anyLhing in answer to the address made by the jus­tice pursuant to subsection (2), the answer shall be taken down in "fiting and shall be signed by the justice and kept ",ith the evidence of the Vl-itnesses and dealt with in accordance with this Part.

Witnesses for accused

(4) Where an accused is not represented by counsel, the justice shall ask the accused:if he or she wishes to call any witnesses after subsections (2) and (3) have; been com­plied with.

Depositions of such witnesses

(5) The justice shall hear each vvitness called by the ac­cused who testifies to fu'1y matter relevant to the inquiry, and for the purposes of this subsection, section 540 ap­plies with such modilications as the circumstances re­quire. R.S .. 1985. c. C-46, s_ 541; R.S, 1985. c. 27i1st Supp.l, s. 99; 1994, c. 44. 5.54.

Confession or admission of accused

542 (1) Nothing in this Act prevents a prosecutor giving in evidence at a preliminary inquiry any admission, con­fession or statement made at any time by the accused that by law is admissible against him.

Restriction of publication of reports of preliminary inquiry

(Z} Everyone who publishes in any document, or broad­casts or transmits in allY way, a report that any admis­sion or confession was tendered in evidence at a prelimi­nary inquiry or a report of the nature of such admission or confession so tendered in evidence unless

(al the accused has been discharged, or

(b) if the a.ccused has been ordered to stand t)~iA, the trid 1123 ended,

Cod& uimine! PARTfE xvm Procedure 3 ~'.=::nquelE: prelimifl13ire Man~.ere de recuE:1-lIir les temoignages Art;d"" 541-542

Allocution au prevenu

{2} Avant d'entendre ses temoins, le juge de paix adresse au prevenu qui n'est pas represente par avocat les paroles suivantes ou d'autres au meme effet:

Desirez-vous dire quelque chose en reponse a ces accusations ou a toute autre accusation qui pourrait decouler des faits mis en preuve par la poursuite? VallS n'etes pas oblige de dire quoi que ce sait, mais tout ce que vous direz peut S€.L-vir de preuve contre VDUS lors de votre proces. Aucune prom esse de faveur ni aucune menace a votre endroit ne dolt vous inciter it faire un aveu ou a vous reconnaitre coupabJe, mais tout ce que vous direz maintenant pourra servir de preuve contre vous a votre proces, malgre la prom esse ou la menace_

Declaration du prevenu

(3) Lorsque Ie prevenu qui n'est pas represente par avo­cat dit quelque chose en reponse aux paroles du juge de paLx, sa reponse est prise parecrit_ Elle est signee par Ie juge de paix et conservee avec les depositions des te­moins et traitee selan Ia presente partie.

Temoins a decharge

(4) Lorsque ant He observes les paragraphes (2) et (3), le juge de paix demande au prevenu qui n'est pas represen­te par avo cat s'il desire appeler des temoins.

Depositions de ces temoins

(5) Le juge de paix entend chaque temoin appele par le pn~venu, qui depose sur toute matiere pertinente a l'en­quete, et, pour l'application du present paragraphe, l'ar­tide 540 s'appJique avec les adaptations necessaires_ L.R. (19851. ch. C-46, art. 541; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 (1"' suppl.J. art. 99; 1994. ch. 44, art. 54.

Aveu OIJ confession de I'accuse

542 (1) La presente loi n'a pas pour effet d'empecher un poursuivant de fournir en preuve, 3. une enquete prelimi­naire, tout aveu, confession ou declaration fait a quelque moment que ce soit par Ie prevenu et qui, d'apres la loi, est admissible contre lui.

Restriction vlsant la pub1ication de rapports sur !'enquete pn'?!iminaire

{2:} Est coupable d'une infraction punissable sur declara~ tion de culpabilite par procedure sorrunaire quiconque public on diffuse de quelque fattoD. que c.e soit un rapport portant QU'U11 aveu on une confession a etc presente en preuve a une enquete preiimiU3irc, ou un rapport indi­quant Ja nat,lre de tout semblable aveu au confession ainsl presentc en preuve, sauf 51 l'accuse a et<~ libcn~ ou, dans k c.as 00. l'accuse a eteyenvoye pour subir son p1o­ces, si Ie procE~S a pris fin_

Criminal Coda-PART X\lFIJ Procedure on: Preliminary Inquiry T <3 king Evidence af Witl1esses SF;I'ctiOfl$ 54-2w543

is guilty of an offence punishable on slilllmmy convic­tion.

(3) [Repealed, 2005, c. 32, s. 19] R.S., 1985, c. C-46. S. 542; R,S., 1985, c. 2711st5u>,p.). $.101(E); 2005. C. 32, •. 19.

Remand Where Offence Committed in Another Jurisdiction

Order that accused appear or be taken before justice where offence committed

543 (1) ,\'\7here an accused is charged with an offence al­leged to have been committed out of the limits of the ju­risdiction in which he has been charged, the justice be­fore whom he appears or is brought may, at any stage of the inquiry after hearing both 'parties,

(a) order the accused to appear, or

(b) if the accused is in custody, issue a warrant in Form 15 to convey the accused

before a justice having jurisdiction in the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed, who shall con­tinue and complete the inquiry.

Transmission of transcript and documents and effect of order 0; warrant

(2) Where a justice makes an order or issues a warrant pursuant to subsection (1), he shan cause the transcript of any evidence given before him in the inquiry and all documents that were then before him and that are rele­vant to the inquiry to be transmitted to a justice having jurisdiction in the place where the offence is alleged to have been committed and

(a) any evidence the transcript of which is so trans­mitted shall be deemed to have been taken by the jus­tice to whom it is transmitted; and

{b) any appearance netice, promise to appear, under­taking or recognizili'lCe issued to or given or entered into by the accused under Part XVI shall be deemed to have been issued, given Of entered into in the jurisdic­tion "rhere the offence is alleged to have been commit­ted and to require. the accused to appear before the justiee to 1",.-hom the transcript and documents are tra."lsmitted at the time provided in the order made in respect of the accused under paragraph (1)(a).

R.S., c_ C-3d, s. 471; 8.S., G. 2(2nd Supp_), s. 7.

Code Cfirninet ?}\RTlE XVIII F,oredure d: l'i;3nquete pre-hminaire Man~ere de- ~ec\Je)liir les u.§mDign8<ges Articles 542-543

~----~

(3) [AbrogE\ 2005, ch. 32, art. 19]

L.R. ,19B5), ch. C-46, art, 542; L.R. (1985), ch. 27 11 e, SU?pl.l. art. 101(A); 2005, ch. 32, 8rt. 19.

Renvoi lorsque I'infraction a ete commise dans una autre juridiction

Prevenu se presentant ou conduit devant un juge de paix de l'endroit ou I'infraction a eM com mise

543 {1} Lorsqu'un prevenu est inculpe d'une infraction presumee avoir ete commise a l'exterieur des limites du ressort au il a ete inculpe, Ie juge de paix devant qui il comparait ou est amene peut, a toute etape de l'enquete, apres avoir entendu les dellX parties:

a) ordonner au prevenu de comparaitre;

b} si Ie prevenu est sous garde, decerner un mandat redige selan 18. formule 15 pour que Ie prevenu soit emmene,

devant un juge de paix ayant juridiction a l'endroit OU l'infraction est presumee avoir He commise, et ce deIT'ier devra continuer et completer l'enquete.

Transmission de la transcription et des documents et effet de I'ordonnance ou du mandat

(2) Lorsqu'un juge de paix rend une ordonnance ou de­cerne un mandat en application du paragraphe (1), il fait transmettre a un juge de paix ayant juridiction a l' endroit ou l'infraction est preslilllee avoir de commise la trans­cription de taus temoignages rendus devant lui lars de l' enquHe et tous les docru-nents qu'il avait alors devant lui et qui se rapportent a l'enquete, et:

a) tout temoignage dont lo. transcription est ainsl transmise est cense avoir He recueilli par Ie juge de paix auquel elle est transmise;

b} toute citation a cornparaitre delivree au prevenu, toute promesse de comparaitre ou prom esse remise par lui, ou tout engagement contracte par lui am;: tcrrnes de la partie XV1, sont censes l'avQir EM dans le ressort 011 l'infraction est presumee avoir de cormDise et enjoindrc au prevenu de cornparaitre devant Ie juge de paix auquel 1a traIlscription et les docl.Lments sont transmis au moment prevu dans l'ordonnance rendue au sajd du prevenu en vcrtu de l'alin,~a (l )a).

CANADA

CONSOLIDATION

Interpretation Act

R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-21

Currentto May 12, 2016

Last amended on February 26, 2015

Published by the Min ister of Justice at the following address:

http:/,1aws-lois.justice.gc.ca

CODIFICATION

Loi d'interpretation

L.R.C. (1985), ch. 1-21

Ajourau 12 mai 2016

Derniere modification Ie 26 fevrier 2015

Publie par Ie ministre dela Justice a I'adresse suivante :

http://loi5-laws.justi ceo 9 C. ca

OFFICIAL STATUS OF CONSOLIDATIONS

Subsections 31 (1) and (2) of the Legislation Revision and Consolidation Act, in force on June 1, 2009, provide as follows:

Published consolidation ;s evidence 31 {1) Every copy of a consolidated statute or consolidated regulation published by the Minister under this Act in either print or electronic form is evidence of that statute or regula­tion and of its contents and every copy purporting to be pub­lished by the Minister is deemed to be so published, unless the contrary is shov,'n.

Inconsistencies in Acts [2} In the event of an inconsistency between a consolidated statute published by the Minister under this Act and the origi­nal statute or a subsequent amendment as certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments under the Publication of Statutes Act, the original statute or amendment prevails to the extent of the inconsistency.

NOTE

This consolidation is current to May 12, 2016. The last amendments came into force on February 26, 2015. Any amendments that were not in force as of May 12, 2016 are set out at the end of this document under the heading nAmendments Not in Force".

Cu rrent to May 12, 2C15

L~~t BrTt"nded on F-ebru;;!ry 25,1'015

CARACTERE OFFICIEL DES CODIFICATIONS

Les pa ragraphes 31 (1) et (2) de la Loi sur la revision et fa codification des textes legislatifs, en vigueur Ie 1er juin 2009, prevalent ce qui suit:

Codifications comme element de preuve 31 (1) Tout exemplaire d'une 10i codifiee ou d'uu reglement codifie, publie par Ie miuistre en vertu de la pn~sente loi sur support papier ou sur support electronique, fait foi de cette 10i ou de ce reglement et de son contenu. Tout exemplaire donne comme publie par Ie ministre est repute avoir He ainsi publie, saufpreuve contraire.

Incompatibilite - lois (2) Les dispositions de la 10i d'origine avec ses modifications subsequentes par Ie greffier des Parlements en vertu de la Loi sur la publication des lois l'ernportent sur les dispositions in­compatibles de la loi codifiee publiee par Ie ministre en vertu de la presente loi.

NOTE

Cette codification est a jour au 12 mai 2016. Les dernieres modifications so nt entrees en vigueur Ie 26 fevrier 2015. Toutes modifications qui n'etaient pas en vigueur au 12 mai 2016 sont enoncees a la fin de ce document so us Ie titre ({ Modifications non en vigueur n.

A.iourali ~2 rn~j 2016

Derni E!r-::: rnod:fic.atl on ~e 26 fevr; e 120 t 5

'r;o?;;,pn:Tafiolf

RU,les c-i CDlls'r:-U\;:Iior.

Sectinns 14-- .... 8 ~~~---~--.--~-----~.~~~-~-

an enactment form no part of the enactment, but are in­serted for conveDje...'lCe of reference only_

Application of I nterpretation Provisions

Application of definitions and interpretation rules

15 ("0 Definitions or rules of interpretation in an enact­mentapply to all the provisions of the enactment, includ­ing the provisions that cont2in those dr.;finitions or rules of interpretation.

rnterpretation sections subject ta exceptions

(2) wnere an enactment contains an interpretation sec­tion or prm;ision, it shall be read and construed

{a/ as bei.'g applicab1e only if a contrary intention does not appear; and

(b) as being applicabie to all other enactments relat­ing to the same subject-matter unless a contrary in­tention appears.

Words in regulations

16 Whe.re an enactr.J.ent confers power to make regula­tions, e>..--pressions used in the regulations have the same respective med.-YJ.L.'1gs as in the enactment CJJnferring the power.

Her Majesty

Her Majesty not bound or a.ffected unless stated

17 No enactment is binding on HeT M2.jesty or affects Her Majesty- or Her l\-lajesty's rights or prerogatives in ili""ly manner, except as mentioned or referred to in the enactment_ R.S., c.. 1-23, s. 16c

Prociamatior;

1 B (i; "'\IVhere an enactment auL~orizes ~'1e issue: of 2I pro-c12JU3tiQr.:.~ "Lhe proclalnation sball be "tll"'1de:i"stocd to be a proclamatioD of the Governor in CotLncil.

Proc-~3m2:"tfon to be fssued on ad\!FCe

(2} \~Jhei'e the: C·o"i-~eft~();- Gene'r-al is authoriz~'~l tc- lSS~H~ a p:roclaL'J.ation~ tb e proclar.L' a.tlon shall be l.lf.l.rlerstood to be a nICh--': lar::-::C3tiGn issued unde!"' (":ill order of the (}o\'crDOr in

i.1!::f"Dn~t8'J·Dn

H~g~:E:$ {rifITe~pri!1z:uan Pre<"rnbLLjE:S ~, :"IOTes ~arg;Ii~\~S

Artid~ 14-18

ments du texie ne font pas partie de celill-ci, n'y figurant qu'a titre de repere Oil d'inforrnatioIL

Dispositions interpretatives

Application

15 (1) Les definitions ou les reg1es d'interpretaticn d'un texte s'appliquent tmt aux dispositions Oll eIles figurent qn'au reste du texk

Restdctlor.

(2} Les dispositions definitoires on L'1terpretatives d'un texte:

3) n'ont d'applic.ation qu'a d.efaut d'indication. contraire;

b) s'appliquent, saill indication contraire, aux autres textes portant sur un domaiJJe identique.

Terminoiogie des reg!emeflts

16 Les termes figurant dans Ies re.glernents d'application d'un tex:te ant Ie meme sens que dans celui-ci.

Sa rv1ajeste

Nmt-obfigatiolf, saut indication contreire

17 Sauf h'1.dication contraire y figurant, nul tex-te ne lie Sa Majeste ni n'a d'eftet sur ses moits et prelOgatives. S.n..., c:h. j·23, ;:0;"'4 i 6.

Proclamations

Auteur

18 (~) Les proclamations dont 13 plise est ,mtorisee par un te>.:Le- e.manent au gouverneu.;:' '\~J.l c:oD.seiL

PdS8 sur decret

(2) Les- prOcJ?.Jn;,-uons que 1e gou\:erI1CUI gene-rii. est au­to rise 2. pr:::ndrE ~_:(lnt caIlSicli'ni-=:s cor-time prises au titre. (fn:rl d{c.ret du gOll",=.rerneuf en c.ol1sc:il; toutefolS i1 n'est

Offences

Indictable and summary conviction offences

34 (1) Where an enactment creates an offence,

(a) the offence is deemed to be an indictable offence if the enactment provides that the offender may be pros­ecuted for the offence by indictment;

(b} the offence is deemed to be one for which the of­fender is punishable on summary conviction if there is nothing in the context to indicate that the offence is an indictable offence; and

(c) if the offence is one for which the offender may be prosecuted by indictment or for which the offender is punishable on SUIDlli8Tj conviction, uoperson shall be considered to have been convicted of an indictable of­fence by reason only of having been convicted of the offence on summary comictiou.

Criminal Code to apply

(2) All the provisions of the Criminal Code relalli~g to in­dictable offences apply to indictable offences created by an enactment, and all the provisions of that Code relating to summary conviction offences apply to all other of­fences created by an enactment, except to the extent that the enactment otherwise prmides.

Documents similady construed

(3) In a commission, proclamation, warrant or other document relating to criminal law or procedure in crimi­nal matters,

{a} a reference to an offence for which t,.\e offeuder may be prosecuted by indictment shall be construed as a reference to an. indictable offence; and

{o} a reference to any other offence shall be construed

j nfractions

Mise en accusation ou procedure sommaire

34 {1} Les regles suivantes s'appliquent a l'interpn~ta­tion d'un texte creant une infraction;

a} l'infraction est reputee un acte criminel si Ie texte prevoit que le contrevenant peut etre poursuivi par mise en aecusation;

b) en I'absence d'indication sur 1a nature de l'infrac­tion, celle-ci est reputee punissable sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire;

c) 5'il est prevu que I'infraction est punissable sur de.­claration de culpabilite soit par mise en accusation soit par procedure sommaire, la personne declaree cou­pable de !'infraction par procedure sommaire n'est pas censee avail' ete condamnee pour un acte criminel.

Application du Code criminef

(2) Sam disposition contraire du texte creant l'in....fraction, les dispositions du Code criminel relatives aux actes cri­minels s'appliquent aux actes crimineis prev'Us par un texte et celles qui portent sur les ir..£ractlons purrissables sur declaration de culpabilite par procedure sommaire s'appliquent a to utes les autres infractions creees par Ie texte.

Application aux documents

(3) Dans tout document, notarnment commission, pro­clamation au mandat, relatif au droit penal ou ala procE;­clure pl"nale :

a) la mention d'une infraction punissable sur declara~ Don de culpabilite par mise en accusation equivaut a. celie d'un acte crircinel;

b) la mention de toute autre in.fraction equivaut a _ ~ ___ ':L'] _ -' -

rnrerpretation Ru!es of COflstfiJctiQn Powers to Emer Dwelirng-houses- to Carry out Ariests Sections 34.1-35

Powers to Enter Dwelling-houses to Carry out Arrests

Autho"rization to enter dwelling-house

34.1 Any person who may issue a warrant to arrest or apprehend a person under any Act of Parliament, other than the Criminal Code, has the same powers, subject to the same terms and conditions, as a judge or justice has under the Criminal Code

(a) to authorize the entry into a dwelling-house de­scribed in the v-rarrant for the purpose of arresting or apprehending the person, if the person issuing the warrant is satisfied by information on oath that there . are reasonable grounds to believe that the person is or ,..,ill be present in the dwelling-house; and

(b) to authorize the entry into the dwelling-house without prior announcement if the requirement of subsection 529.4(1) of the Criminal Code is met.

1997, c. 39, s. 4.

Definitions

General definitions

35 {1} In every enactment,

Act, in respect of an Act of a legislature, includes a law of the Legislature of Yukon, of the Northwest Tenitories or for Nunavut; (foi provincia/e)

bank means a bank listed in Schedule I or II to the Bank Act; (banque)

Br;tish Commonwealth or British Commonwealth of Nations has the same meaning as "Commonwealth"; (Commonwealth, Commonwealth britannique, Com­monwealth des nations au Commonwealth des na­tions britanniques)

broadcasting means any racliocommunication in whicb the transmissions are intended for direct reception by the general public; (mdiodiffusion)

Canada, for greater certa:inty, includes tJ.1e i..TJ.ternal wa~ ters of Canad.a and the territorial sea of Canada; (Canada)

Canadian ",faters ltJ.cludes the ~eFitorial sea of Canada and the internal waters of Canada; (eaux c2nadiennes)

Clerk of the F'rivy Co,t!F}cj[ 0r Clerk of the QU2en Fs Privy Council me2n.s t.'J.c Clerk ,)f tbe Pnvy C01h"1cii ~TJ.d

l!1tt;!rpn§r~rjori

Regie::; cnnteFpretation E:1tree: da;-Js un:e maison: d'habiration pour arrestat~on Articles 34.1-35

Entree dans une ma!son d'habitation pour arrestation

Autorisation de p€metrer dans une matson d'habitation

34. '1 Toute personne habilitee a delivrer un mandat pour l'arrestation d'une personne en vertu d'une autre loi ffderale que Ie Code criminel est investie, avec les memes reserves, des pouvoirs que Ie Code criminel confete aux juges oujuges de pa:ix pour auto riser quiconque est char­ge de l'execution du mandat:

a) a penetrer dans une maison d'habitation designee en vue de l'arrestation, si eIle est convaincue, sur la foi d'une denonciation SOliS sennent, qu'i} existe des mo­tifs raisonnables de croire que la personne a arreter s'y trouve au s'y trouvera;

b) a ne pas prevenir au prealable, pOUTva que l'exi­gence posee au paragraphe 529.4(1) du Code criminel soit remplie.

1997, ch. 39, art. 4.

Definitions

Definitions d'appiication generale

35 {1} Les definitions qui suivent s'appliquent a tOllS les textes.

agent dipiomatique 01.1 consuiaire Sont compris parmi les agents diplomatiques au consulaires les ambassa­deurs, envoyes, ministres, charges d'affaires, conseillers, secretaires, attaches, les consuls generaux, consuls, vice­consuls et leurs supph§ants, les suppleants des agents consulaires, les hauts-commissaires et delegues perma­nents et leurs suppleants. (diplomatic or consular offi­cer)

banque Banque figurant aux: annexes I au II de la Loi sur les banques. (bank)

Canada nest entendu que Ies eaux interieures et la mer territoriale du Carlada font partie du territoire de celui-ci. (Canada)

caution au cEtutionnement L'emploi de caution, de cautiO!'riement ou de termes de sens analogue implique que ]a garantie correspondante est 5uffisante et que, .sauf disposition c:'-.1lresse contrall-e, il suffit d'nne seule per­SDnne pour la foumir. (security and sureties;

·-:;ornm.or? i.!ve.alth~ CGml11Gn-~vea-fth brjtEnniq[!8; C0:71-

~71oF~¥veBh~h deS tJ8tions ou Com-rnc.0'fvealth des na~

tieFTJS b~ra:3nniqu"3s AssDcjation des p:}y-:.:; figllrant .1 ran-

_ ....... _------- ._- • __ • __ <. __ ..... ---------

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