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Credit Risk Managment

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TABLE OF CONTENTS Chapter No. Topic Page No. I Introduction 001 I-A Indian Financial System 001 I-B The Constituents Of Indian Banking System 003 I-C Future Lies Ahead 005 II Banking Risk 012 II-A Introduction to Banking Risk 012 II-B Risk Types and Risk Origination 018 II-C Functions of Central Department and Risk Department 019 III RBI – Credit Risk 020 III-A Credit Risk 020 III-B Building Blocks of Credit Risk Management 023 III-C Credit Rating Framework 032 III-D Credit Risk in Off-Balance Sheet Exposures 037 IV Credit Risk Models 039 V Credit Risk Scoring Models Developed By Banks 046 VI Credit Risk Models - Others 063 VI-A Altman’s Z – Scoring Model 064 VI-B KMV Model 066 VI-C Creditmetrics Approach 067 VI-D Creditrisk+ 068 VI-E VaR & Risk Management 069 VII Managing Credit Risk in Inter Bank Exposure 076 VIII Basel and Credit Risk 085 IX Credit Risk Management – A Deeper Look 118 X Non Performing Assets 152 XI RAROC Pricing/ Economic Profit 179 XII Credit Derivatives 184 XIII Credit Audit 208
Transcript

TABLE OF CONTENTSChapter

No.Topic Page No.

I Introduction 001I-A Indian Financial System 001I-B The Constituents Of Indian Banking System 003

I-C Future Lies Ahead 005II Banking Risk 012II-A Introduction to Banking Risk 012II-B Risk Types and Risk Origination 018II-C Functions of Central Department and Risk

Department019

III RBI – Credit Risk 020III-A Credit Risk 020III-B Building Blocks of Credit Risk Management 023

III-C Credit Rating Framework 032III-D Credit Risk in Off-Balance Sheet Exposures 037

IV Credit Risk Models 039V Credit Risk Scoring Models Developed By Banks 046VI Credit Risk Models - Others 063VI-A Altman’s Z – Scoring Model 064VI-B KMV Model 066VI-C Creditmetrics Approach 067VI-D Creditrisk+ 068VI-E VaR & Risk Management 069VII Managing Credit Risk in Inter Bank Exposure 076VIII Basel and Credit Risk 085IX Credit Risk Management – A Deeper Look 118X Non Performing Assets 152XI RAROC Pricing/ Economic Profit 179XII Credit Derivatives 184XIII Credit Audit 208

MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

BIBLIOGRAPHYBooksi) Risk Management In Banking - Joel Bessisii) Risk Management - ICFAIiii) Credit Risk Management - Taxmann Publicationsiv) Financial management In Banks - IIBFv) ICFAI Reader - ICFAI Pressvi) Professional Banker - ICFAI Pressvii) Business Indiaviii) Business Todayix) Business World

Sitesi) www.rbi.orgii) www.indianbanksassociation.com

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION

I-A INDIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS

The growth and development of any economy depends squarely on the savings,

investments as well as the capital formation of the particular system.

Financial System us the mechanism and structure that is available in an economy to

mobilize the monetary resources/capital from various surplus sector of economy,

allocate and distribute the same to the needy sector.

The group of different entities that are engaged in the task of garnering the monetary

available in the economy with a view to channelise these resources into a number of

needy avenues in the economy will constitute the financial system.

Functions of Financial Systems

o It provides a payment system for the exchange of goods and services.

o It enables the pooling of funds for undertaking large-scale enterprises.

o It provides for mechanism for spatial and temporal transfer of funds.

o It provides a way for managing uncertainty and controlling risks.

o It generates information that helps in coordinating decentralised decision-making

o It helps in dealing with the incentive problem when one party has an informational

advantage.

The financial system thus tries to improve the allocational efficiency in their economy

and in the process helps improve capital formation as well as productivity of capital.

The role of financial system can be enhanced to the extent to which the system can

widen its reach to a large population, the extent to which it can minimize the

transaction coasts and finally the extent to which it can respond speedily and

effectively.

2

Reserve Bank of India

Commercial Banks Cooperative Societies Other Institutions

Public Sector

Private Sector

Private

New Old

Foreign Non-Scheduled

Foreign Private Local Area

SBI & Associates Nationalised Regional

Rural Banks

State Land Development

PLDBs

State Cooperative

Central Cooperative

Agriculture Credit

Societies

Primary (Urban)

Cooperative Banks

Farmer’s Service

Societies

Government

NSCs

POSB

EPF

DFIs

All India

State Level

Insurance

LIC

GIC

Private

MFs

NBFCs

Public

Private

SEBI

MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

INDIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

I-B THE CONSTITUENTS OF INDIAN BANKING SYSTEM

I. The RBI

II. Commercial Banks

a. Indian Commercial Banks – Scheduled and non-scheduled Banks

b. State bank of India and its Subsidiaries

c. Foreign Banks

III. Rural Financial Agencies

a. Cooperative Banks

b. Land development Banks

c. Regional Rural Banks

d. NABARD

IV. Development Financial Institutions

a. Industrial Financial Corporations of India

b. Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (now ICICI Bank)

c. Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India

d. State Financial Corporations

e. Industrial Development Bank of India (now IDBI Bank)

f. Small Industries Development Bank of India)

g. Export Import Bank

h. National Housing Bank

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

V. Non-Banking Financial Institutions

a. Life Insurance corporations of India

b. General Insurance Corporations of India

c. Unit Trust of India

d. Other Life-Non-life Insurance Companies

e. Merchant Banking Institutions

f. Mutual Funds

VI. Post-office Savings Banks

We will focus on Commercial Banks

The Scheduled commercial Banks constitute those banks which have been included in the

Second Schedule of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act, 1934. RBI in turn includes only

those banks in this schedule which satisfy the criteria laid down vide section 42 (60 of the

Act. Some co-operative banks are scheduled commercial banks albeit not all co-operative

banks are. Being a part of the second schedule confers some benefits to the bank in terms

of access to accommodation by RBI during the times of liquidity constraints.

At the same time, however, this status also subjects the bank certain conditions and

obligation towards the reserve regulations of RBI. This sub sector can broadly be classified

into:

1. Public sector 

2. Private sector - Old & New

3. Foreign banks.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

I-C FUTURE LIES AHEAD

Financial Sector Reforms- Liberalization and de-regulation process- set in motion in

1991 have greatly changed the face of Indian Banking. The banking industry has

moved gradually from a regulated environment to a deregulated market economy.

The pace of transformation has been more significant in recent times with technology

acting as a catalyst.

Four trends change the banking industry world over, viz. 1) Consolidation of players

through mergers and acquisitions, 2) Globalisation of operations, 3) Development of

new technology and 4) Universalisation of banking.

We will see the future trends in the following heads:

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

Regulation and Reforms

While the banking system has done fairly well in adjusting to the new market

dynamics, greater challenges lie ahead. Banks will have to gear up to meet stringent

prudential capital adequacy norms under Basel II. In addition to WTO and Basel II, the

Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) such as with Singapore, may have an impact on the

shape of the banking industry.

Under the existing Basel Capital Accord, allocation of capital follows a one-size-fit-all

approach. This would be replaced by a risk based approach to capital allocation. While

regulatory minimum capital requirements would still continue to be relevant and an

integral part of the three pillar approach under Basel II, the emphasis is on risk based

approach relying on external ratings as well as internal rating of each asset and capital

charge accordingly.

Another aspect which is included in Basel II accord is a provision for capital allocation

for operational risk. This is a new parameter and even internationally evaluation tools

are not yet fully developed. This would be another area where banking system will

have to reckon additional capital needs and functioning of its processes.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

Consolidation and Competition

The competitive environment in the banking sector is likely to result in individual

players working out differentiated strategies based on their strengths and market

niches.

The financial sector reforms have brought in the much needed competition in the

market place. The competition to the existing banks came mainly from the techno-

savvy private sector banks.

The pressure on capital structure is expected to trigger a phase of consolidation in the

banking industry. Consolidation could take place through strategic alliances /

partnerships. Consolidation would take place not only in the structure of the banks, but

also in the case of services.

Risk Management

One of the concerns is quality of bank lending. Most significant challenge before banks

is the maintenance of rigorous credit standards, especially in an environment of

increased competition for new and existing clients. Experience has shown us that the

worst loans are often made in the best of times.

Compensation through trading gains is not going to support the banks forever. Large-

scale efforts are needed to upgrade skills in credit risk measuring, controlling and

monitoring as also revamp operating procedures. Credit evaluation may have to shift

from cash flow based analysis to "borrower account behaviour", so that the state of

readiness of Indian banks for Basle II regime improves.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

Corporate lending is already undergoing changes. The emphasis in future would be

towards more of fee based services rather than lending operations. Banks will compete

with each other to provide value added services to their customers.

Technology

Banks will also have to cope with challenges posed by technological innovations in

banking. Banks need to prepare for the changes. Technology is expected to be the main

facilitator of change in the financial sector.

Technology will bring fundamental shift in the functioning of banks. It would not only

help them bring improvements in their internal functioning but also enable them to

provide better customer service. Technology will break all boundaries and encourage

cross border banking business. Banks would have to undertake extensive Business

Process Re-Engineering and tackle issues like a) how best to deliver products and

services to customers b) designing an appropriate organizational model to fully capture

the benefits of technology and business process changes brought about. c) how to

exploit technology for deriving economies of scale and how to create cost efficiencies,

and d) how to create a customer - centric operation model.

Technology solutions would make flow of information much faster, more accurate and

enable quicker analysis of data received. This would make the decision making process

faster and more efficient. For the Banks, this would also enable development of

appraisal and monitoring tools which would make credit management much more

effective. The result would be a definite reduction in transaction costs, the benefits of

which would be shared between banks and customers.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

Payment and Settlement system is the backbone of any financial market place.

The present Payment and Settlement systems such as Structured Financial Messaging

System (SFMS), Centralised Funds Management System (CFMS), Centralised Funds

Transfer System (CFTS) and Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) will

undergo further fine-tuning to meet international standards. Needless to add, necessary

security checks and controls will have to be in place. In this regard, Institutions such as

IDRBT will have a greater role to play.

Outsourcing

Similarly, Banks will look analytically into various processes and practices as these

exist today and may make appropriate changes therein to cut costs and delays.

Outsourcing and adoption of BPOs will become more and more relevant, especially

when Banks go in for larger volumes of retail business. Banks should therefore

outsource only those functions that are not strategic to banks' business.

As we move along, the concept of branch banking will undergo changes. Banks will

find that many of the functions could be outsourced more profitably without

compromising on the quality of service. Specialized agencies could come forward to

undertake Marketing and delivery functions on behalf of banks. This could see banking

products being sold outside the four walls of a branch. Banks would then concentrate

on developing new products and earning fee based income.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

Product Innovation And Process Re-Engineering

With increased competition in the banking Industry, the net interest margin of banks

has come down over the last one decade. Liberalization with Globalization will see the

spreads narrowing further to 1-1.5% as in the case of banks operating in developed

countries.

Banks will look for fee-based income to fill the gap in interest income. Product

innovations and process re-engineering will be the order of the day.

The changes will be motivated by the desire to meet the customer requirements and to

reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of service. All banks will therefore go for

rejuvenating their costing and pricing to segregate profitable and non-profitable

business. Service charges will be decided taking into account the costing and what the

traffic can bear.

Revenue = Cost + Profit Profit = Revenue - Cost Equation Cost = Revenue - Profit

o From the earlier revenue = cost + profit equation i.e., customers are

charged to cover the costs incurred and the profits expected,

o Most banks have already moved into the profit =revenue - cost equation.

This has been reflected in the fact that with cost of services staying nearly equal

across banks, the banks with better cost control are able to achieve higher profits

whereas the banks with high overheads due to under-utilisation of resources, un-

remunerative branch network etc., either incurred losses or made profits not

commensurate with the capital employed.

o The new paradigm in the coming years will be cost = revenue - profit.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

Banks will increasingly act as risk managers to corporate and other entities by offering

a variety of risk management products like options, swaps and other aspects of

financial management in a multi currency scenario.

Bancassurance is catching up and Banks / Financial Institutions have started entering

insurance business. This could lead to a spurt in fee-based income of the banks.

Human Resources Management

The key to the success of any organization lies in how efficiently the organization

manages its' human resources. The principle applies equally and perhaps more aptly to

service institutions like banks. The issue is all the more relevant to the public sector

banks who are striving hard to keep pace with the technological changes and meet the

challenges of globalization.

In order to meet the global standards and to remain competitive, banks will have to

recruit specialists in various fields such as Treasury Management, Credit, Risk

Management, IT related services, HRM, etc. in keeping with the segmentation and

product innovation. As a complementary measure, fast track merit and performance

based promotion from within would have to be institutionalized to inject dynamism

and youthfulness in the workforce.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

CHAPTER II BANKING RISK

II-A INTRODUCTION TO BANKING RISK

Banking risk are defined as adverse impacts on profitability of several distinct sources of

uncertainty. Risk measurement requires capturing the source of the uncertainty and the

magnitude of its potential adverse effect on profitability. Profitability refers to both

accounting and mark-to-market measures.

Other Risks

Settlement & Performance

Risk

Country Risk

Foreign Exchange

Risk

Operational Risk

Liquidity Risk

Market Risk

Interest Risk

Credit Risk

Types of Bank Risk

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

1. Credit Risk

It is the first of all risks in terms of importance. Default risk, a major source of loss, is

the customers default, meaning that they fail to comply with their obligation to service

debt. Default triggers a total or partial loss of any amount lent to the counter party.

Credit risk is also the decline in the credit standing of an obligator of the issuer of a

bond or stock. Such deterioration does not apply default, but it does imply that the

probability of default increases.

The view of credit risk differs for the banking portfolio and the trading portfolio.

o Banking portfolio

Credit risk is important as the default of a small number of important customers

can generate large losses. There are various default events:

Delay in payment obligation – do not turn out as plain defaults, are resolved in

short periods.

Restructuring of debt obligations due to a major deterioration of the credit

standing of the borrower – very close to defaults because it is viewed that the

borrower will not face payment obligation unless its funding structure changes.

Plain defaults – implies that the non payment will be permanent

Bankruptcies – possibly liquidation of the firm or merging with the accruing

firm, are possible out comes. They all trigger significant losses. Default means

any situation other than a simple delinquency.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

o Trading portfolio

Capital market value the credit risk of issuers and borrowers in prices. Unlike

loans, the credit risk of traded debts is also indicated by the agencies’ ratings,

assessing the quality of public debt issues, or through changes of the value of their

stocks. The capability of trading market assets mitigates the credit risk since there

is no need to hold these securities until the deterioration of credit risk materialises

into effective losses. But same is not the case with over-the counter instruments

such as derivatives, whose development has been spectacular in the recent period,

sale is not readily feasible.

2. Interest Rate Risk

It is the risk of a decline in earnings due to the movements of interest rates. Most of the

items of banks’ balance sheet generates revenue and costs that are interest- rate driven.

Since interest rates are unstable, so are the earnings.

Any one who lends or borrower is subject to interest rate risk. The lender earnings a

variable rate has the risk of seeing revenue reduced by a decline in interest rates. The

borrower paying a variable rate bears higher costs when interest rates increases. Both

positions are risky since they generate revenues or costs indexed to market rates. The

other side of coin in that interest rates exposure generates chances of gains as well.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

3. Market Risk

It is the risk of adverse deviations of the mark-to-market value of the trading portfolio,

due to market movements, during the period to liquidate the transactions.

The period of liquidation is critical to assess such adverse deviations. If it gets longer,

so do the deviations from the current market value.

4. Liquidity Risk

It refers to multiple dimension; inability to raise funds at normal cost; market liquidity

risk, asset liquidity risk.

Funding risk depends upon on how risky the market perceives the issuer and its

funding policy to be. It materialises as a much higher cost of funds, although the cause

lies more with the market than the specific bank. The cost, a critically profitability

driver. also depends on the bank’s credit standings.

The liquidity of the market relates to liquidity crunches because of a lack of volume. It

materialises as an impaired ability to raise money at a reasonable cost.

Asset liquidity results from lack of liquidity related to the nature of assets rather than to

the market liquidity. Holding a pool of liquid assets acts a cushion against fluctuating

market liquidity because liquid assets allow meeting short-term obligations without

recourse to external funding.

Liquidity risk which might become a major risk for the banking portfolio, follows

adopting an Assets Liability management (ALM)

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

5. Operational Risks

Operational risks are those of malfunctions of the information systems, reporting

systems, internal risk-monitoring rules and internal procedures designed to take timely

corrective actions, or compliance with internal risk policy rules.

The New Basel Accord of January 2001 defines operational risk as ‘the risk of direct or

indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems

or form external events. It appears at different; levels – People, Processes, Technical,

and Information Technology Model risk.

It is significant in the market universe, which traditionally makes relatively intensive

usage of models for pricing purposes. It is growing more important with the extension

of modeling techniques to other risks, notably credit risk, where scarcity of data

remains a major obstacle for testing the ratability of inputs and models.

6. Foreign Exchange Risk

The currency risk is that of incurring losses due to changes in the exchange rates.

Variations in earnings result from the indexation of revenues and charges to exchange

rates or of changes of the values of assets and liabilities denominated in foreign

currencies.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

7. Country Risk

The risk of a ‘crises’ in a country.

Sovereign risk, which is the risk of default of sovereign issuers, such as central bank or

government sponsored bank.

A deterioration of economic conditions.

A deterioration of the value of the local foreign currency in terms of the bank’s base

currency.

Impossibility of transfer of funds due to legal restrictions.

A market crisis.

Country risk is a floor for the risk of a local borrower, or equivalently, that the country

ratings cap local borrower’s ratings.

8. Performance Risk

It exists when the transaction risk depends upon more on how the borrower performs

for specific projects or operations than on overall credit standings. It appears notably

when dealing with commodities. It is ‘transactional’ because it relates to a specific

transaction.

9. Solvency Risk

It is the risk of being unable to absorb losses, generated by all types of risks, with the

available capital. It differs from bankruptcy risk resulting from defaulting on debt

obligations and inability to raise funds for meeting such obligations. Solvency risk is

equivalent to the default risk of the bank.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

II-B RISK TYPES AND RISK ORIGINATION

Risks Credit Market Liquidity InterestRate

Risk Management

General Management

Portfolio Management

ALM

Risk Department

Guidelines and Goals

Portfolio Risk – Return Profile

Risk Origination

Markets

Investment Bank

Commercial Bank

Figure shows who originates what risks and which ventral function supervise them.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

II-C FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL DEPARTMENT AND RISK DEPARTMENT

Risk Department

Monitoring & Control of all RisksCredit & Market, in addition to ALMDecision-makingCredit PolicySetting LimitsDevelopment of Internal Tools and Risk Data WarehousesRisk-adjusted PerformancesPortfolio ActionsReporting to General Management

Market Risk

LimitsMeasures & Control of RisksCompliancesMonitoringHedgingBusiness ActionsReporting to General Management

Portfolio Management

Trading Credit RiskPortfolio ReportingPortfolio RestructuringSecuritizationsPortfolio ActionsReporting to General Management

Credit Risk

Credit PolicySetting Credit Risk Limits & DelegationsAssigning Internal RatingsCredit Administration (Credit Application & Documentations)Credit Decisions (Credit Committee)Watch ListsEarly Warning SystemsReporting to General Management

ALM

Liquidity & Interest Rate Risk Management.Measure & Control of RisksCompliancesHedgingRecommendations: Balance Sheet ActionsTransfer Pricing systemsLCOReporting to General Management

Control

AccountingRegulatory ComplianceCost accountingBudgeting & PlanningMonitoring & ControlMonitoring PerformancesReporting to General Management

Functions of

Central Department And of

Risk Department

The functions of the different central units tend to differentiate from each other when going further into the details of risk and income actins.Figure illustrates the differentiation process of central function according to their perimeter of responsibilities.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

CHAPTER III RBI – CREDIT RISK

III-A CREDIT RISK

The RBI has defined credit risk as – the possibility of losses associated with diminution in

the credit quality of borrowers or counter parties. In a bank’s credit portfolio, losses stem

from outright default due to inability or unwillingness of a customer or counterparty to

meet their commitments in relation to lending. Trading, settlement and other financial

transactions. Alternatively, losses result from reduction in portfolio value arising from

actual or perceived deterioration in credit quality.

RBI has also sated, that credit risk emanates from bank’s dealings with an individual,

corporate, bank, financial institution or a sovereign and may take any of the following

forms-

a) in case of Direct Lending : Principal and/or interest amount may not be paid

b) in case of Guarantee or Letter of Credit: funds may not be coming from the

constituents upon crystallization of the liability.

c) In case of treasury Operations: The payment or series of payments due from the

counter parties under the respective contracts may not be forthcoming or ceases.

d) In the case of security Trading Business: Funds/Securities settlement may not be

effected.

e) In the case of cross-boarder exposure: The availability and free transfer of foreign

currency funds may either frozen or restrictions imposed by the action of, or

because of political/economic conditions in the country where borrower is located.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

In spite of the fact that the RBI has been laying a lot of emphasis on strengthening of credit

appraisal and monitoring systems in banks, credit quality continues to deteriorate as

reflected in high level of non-performing which continue to increase.

Factors causing credit risk

(i) Deficiency in appraisal of loans proposals and in assessment of

creditworthiness/financial strength of borrowers.

(ii) Inadequately defined lending policies and procedures.

(iii) High prudential exposure limits for individual and group of borrowers.

(iv) Absence of credit concentration limits for various industries/business

segments.

(v) Inadequate value of collaterals obtained by the banks to secure the loan facility.

(vi) Over optimistic assessment of thrust/potential areas of credit.

(vii) Liberal loans sanctioning powers for bank executives without checks and

balances.

(viii) Liberal sanctioning of non-fund based limits without proper scrutiny of

borrower’s activity, financial strength, cash flows etc.

(ix) Lack of knowledge and skills of official processing loan and subjectivity in credit

deacons.

(x) Lack of effective monitoring and consistent approach towards early recognition of

problem account and initiation of timely remedial actions.

(xi) Lack of information on functioning of various industries and performance of

economy.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

(xii) Lack of proper coordination between various departments of banks looking into

credit functions.

(xiii) Lack of well defined organisational structure and clarity with regard to

responsibilities, authorities and communication channels.

(xiv) Lack of credit proper systems of credit risk rating quantifying and managing

across geographical and product lines.

(xv) Lack of effectiveness of existing credit inspection and audit systems I banks and

slow progress in removal of deficiencies as revealed in inspection/audit of branches

and controlling offices.

(xvi) Lack of reliability and integrity of data being used for managing credit risks

associated with lending.

(xvii)Banks have been harping too much on staff accountability as a result

demotivating the staff and not looking at the credit decisions from hind sight.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

III-B BUILDING BLOCKS OF CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT:

In a bank, an effective credit risk management framework would comprise of the following

distinct building blocks:

a) Policy and Strategy

b) Organisational Structure

c) Operations/ Systems

III-B-1 POLICY AND STRATEGY

The Board of Directors of each bank shall be responsible for approving and periodically

reviewing the credit risk strategy and significant credit risk policies.

Credit Risk Policy

Every bank should have a credit risk policy document approved by the Board. The

document should include risk identification, risk measurement, risk grading/

aggregation techniques, reporting and risk control/ mitigation techniques,

documentation, legal issues and management of problem loans.

Credit risk policies should also define target markets, risk acceptance criteria, credit

approval authority, credit origination/ maintenance procedures and guidelines for

portfolio management.

The credit risk policies approved by the Board should be communicated to

branches/controlling offices. All dealing officials should clearly understand the bank’s

approach for credit sanction and should be held accountable for complying with

established policies and procedures.

Senior management of a bank shall be responsible for implementing the credit risk

policy approved by the Board.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

Credit Risk Strategy

Each bank should develop, with the approval of its Board, its own credit risk strategy or

plan that establishes the objectives guiding the bank’s credit-granting activities and adopt

necessary policies/ procedures for conducting such activities. This strategy should spell

out clearly the organisation’s credit appetite and the acceptable level of risk-reward trade-

off for its activities.

The strategy would, therefore, include a statement of the bank’s willingness to grant loans

based on the type of economic activity, geographical location, currency, market, maturity

and anticipated profitability. This would necessarily translate into the identification of

target markets and business sectors, preferred levels of diversification and concentration,

the cost of capital in granting credit and the cost of bad debts.

The credit risk strategy should provide continuity in approach as also take into account the

cyclical aspects of the economy and the resulting shifts in the composition/ quality of the

overall credit portfolio. This strategy should be viable in the long run and through various

credit cycles.

Senior management of a bank shall be responsible for implementing the credit risk

strategy approved by the Board.

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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59

Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan

III-B-2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE

Sound organizational structure is sine qua non for successful implementation of an

effective credit risk management system. The organizational structure for credit risk

management should have the following basic features:

The Board of Directors

o It should have the overall responsibility for management of risks.

o The Board should decide the risk management policy of the bank and set limits

for liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity price risks.

The Risk Management Committee

o It will be a Board level Sub committee including CEO and heads of Credit,

Market and Operational Risk Management Committees.

o It will devise the policy and strategy for integrated risk management

containing various risk exposures of the bank including the credit risk. For this

purpose, this Committee should effectively coordinate between the Credit Risk

Management Committee (CRMC), the Asset Liability Management

Committee (ALCO) and other risk committees of the bank, if any.

o It is imperative that the independence of this Committee is preserved. The Board

should, therefore, ensure that this is not compromised at any cost.

o In the event of the Board not accepting any recommendation of this

Committee, systems should be put in place to spell out the rationale for such an

action and should be properly documented.

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o This document should be made available to the internal and external auditors for

their scrutiny and comments. The credit risk strategy and policies adopted by the

committee should be effectively communicated throughout the organisation.

Credit Risk Management Committee (CRMC).

o Each bank may, depending on the size of the organization or loan/ investment

book, constitute a high level CRMC.

o The Committee should be headed by the Chairman/CEO/ED, and should

comprise of heads of Credit Department, Treasury, Credit Risk Management

Department (CRMD) and the Chief Economist.

o The functions of the Credit Risk Management Committee should be as under:

Be responsible for the implementation of the credit risk policy/ strategy approved

by the Board.

Monitor credit risk on a bank wide basis and ensure compliance with limits

approved by the Board.

Recommend to the Board, for its approval, clear policies on standards for

presentation of credit proposals, financial covenants, rating standards and

benchmarks,

Decide delegation of credit approving powers, prudential limits on large credit

exposures, standards for loan collateral, portfolio management, loan review

mechanism, risk concentrations, risk monitoring and evaluation, pricing of loans,

provisioning, regulatory/legal compliance, etc.

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Credit Risk Management Department (CRMD)

o Concurrently, each bank should also set up CRMD, independent of the Credit

Administration Department.

o The functions of CRMD are:

Measure, control and manage credit risk on a bank-wide basis within the limits set

by the Board/ CRMC

Enforce compliance with the risk parameters and prudential limits set by the Board/

CRMC.

Lay down risk assessment systems, develop MIS, monitor quality of loan/

investment portfolio, identify problems, correct deficiencies and undertake loan

review/audit. Large banks could consider separate set up for loan review/audit.

Be accountable for protecting the quality of the entire loan/ investment portfolio.

The Department should undertake portfolio evaluations and conduct comprehensive

studies on the environment to test the resilience of the loan portfolio.

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III-B-3 OPERATIONS / SYSTEMS

Banks should have in place an appropriate credit administration, credit risk measurement and

monitoring processes. The credit administration process typically involves the following

phases:

Relationship management phase i.e. business development.

o Transaction management phase covers risk assessment, loan pricing, structuring the

facilities, internal approvals, documentation, loan administration, on going monitoring

and risk measurement.

o Portfolio management phase entails monitoring of the portfolio at a macro level and

the management of problem loans.

On the basis of the broad management framework stated above, the banks should have the

following credit risk measurement and monitoring procedures:

o Banks should establish proactive credit risk management practices like annual /

half yearly industry studies and individual obligor reviews, periodic credit calls

that are documented, periodic visits of plant and business site, and at least quarterly

management reviews of troubled exposures/weak credits.

o Banks should have a system of checks and balances in place for extension of

credit viz.:

Separation of credit risk management from credit sanction

Multiple credit approvers making financial sanction subject to approvals at

various stages viz. credit ratings, risk approvals, credit approval grid, etc.

An independent audit and risk review function.

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o The level of authority required to approve credit will increase as amounts and

transaction risks increase and as risk ratings worsen.

o Every obligor and facility must be assigned a risk rating.

o Mechanism to price facilities depending on the risk grading of the customer, and

to attribute accurately the associated risk weightings to the facilities.

o Banks should ensure that there are consistent standards for the origination,

documentation and maintenance for extensions of credit.

o Banks should have a consistent approach towards early problem recognition, the

classification of problem exposures, and remedial action.

o Banks should maintain a diversified portfolio of risk assets; have a system

to conduct regular analysis of the portfolio and to ensure on-going control of risk

concentrations.

o Credit risk limits include, obligor limits and concentration limits by industry

or geography. The Boards should authorize efficient and effective credit approval

processes for operating within the approval limits.

o In order to ensure transparency of risks taken, it is the responsibility of banks to

accurately, completely and in a timely fashion, report the comprehensive set of

credit risk data into the independent risk system.

o Banks should have systems and procedures for monitoring financial performance of

customers and for controlling outstanding within limits.

o A conservative policy for provisioning in respect of non-performing

advances may be adopted.

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o Successful credit management requires experience, judgement and commitment

to technical development. Banks should have a clear, well-documented scheme of

delegation of powers for credit sanction.

Banks must have a Management Information System (MIS), which should enable them to

manage and measure the credit risk inherent in all on- and off-balance sheet activities.

The MIS should provide adequate information on the composition of the credit portfolio,

including identification of any concentration of risk. Banks should price their loans

according to the risk profile of the borrower and the risks associated with the loans.

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TYPICAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR RISK MANAGEMENT

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

Risk Planning - Definition of procedures

- Design of credit processes

Credit Risk –Systems- Integration of risk Procedures with credit systems- Design and development of support systems for risk assessment & monitoring

Risk Analytics- Credit Risk and Pricing models’ Design & Maintenance- Portfolio analysis And reporting

Risk Assessment and Monitoring - Sector review- Credit Rating- Review of Credit Proposals (new)- Asset review (existing)

CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (COMMITTEE OF TOP EXECUTIVES INCLUDING CEO, HEADS OF CREDIT & TREASURY, AND CHIEF ECONOMIST)

RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE(BOARD SUBCOMMITTEE INCLUDING CEO AND HEADS OF CREDIT, MARKET AND

OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES)CORE FUNCTION: POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT

CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (CRMD)

CREDIT ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT (CAD)

OPERATIONALRISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

ALCO/ MARKET RISKMANAGEMENT COMMITTEE

Relationship Management & Business Development- Processing the loans – Risk Assessment, Pricing, Structuring the facilities documentation, Disbursement

-Ongoing monitoring & Risk Management- Maintaining of Problem account- Monitoring of Credit Portfolio at macro level

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III-C CREDIT RATING FRAMEWORK

A Credit-risk Rating Framework (CRF) is necessary to avoid the limitations associated

with a simplistic and broad classification of loans/exposures into a “good” or a “bad”

category. The CRF deploys a number/ alphabet/ symbol as a primary summary

indicator of risks associated with a credit exposure. Such a rating framework is the

basic module for developing a credit risk management system and all advanced

models/approaches are based on this structure. In spite of the advancement in risk

management techniques, CRF is continued to be used to a great extent. These

frameworks have been primarily driven by a need to standardise and uniformly

communicate the “judgement” in credit selection procedures and are not a substitute to

the vast lending experience accumulated by the banks' professional staff.

Broadly, CRF can be used for the following purposes:

a. Individual credit selection, wherein either a borrower or a particular exposure/

facility is rated on the CRF.

b. Pricing (credit spread) and specific features of the loan facility. This would largely

constitute transaction-level analysis.

c. Portfolio-level analysis.

d. Surveillance, monitoring and internal MIS

e. Assessing the aggregate risk profile of bank/ lender. These would be relevant for

portfolio-level analysis. For instance, the spread of credit exposures across various

CRF categories, the mean and the standard deviation of losses occurring in each

CRF category and the overall migration of exposures would highlight the

aggregated credit-risk for the entire portfolio of the bank.

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Credit risk rating frame work – highlights of RBI Guidelines

(a) Banks should develop a well-structured credit risk-rating framework by using any

number of operational parameters, financial ratios, collaterals, qualitative aspects

of management and industry characteristics.

(b) The score allotted to each parameter may depend upon their risk predicting

capacity. An illustrative list of parameters have also been provided in the RBI’s

guidelines.

(c) Risk taking framework for large mid corporates, small-scale units traders etc. can

vary. Normally it should have nine grades, of which first five may represent

acceptable credit while reaming four as unacceptable risk.

(d) Rating framework should have some minimum cut off score below which no

credit proposals should be entertained. For any relaxation, clear guidelines be

given in the loan policy document specially indicating the authority who can

permit such relaxation.

(e) Risk taking exercise should be undertaken normally at quarterly interval or at

least on half yearly basis to assess the migration in the credit quality.

(f) Implementation of credit – Risk rating structure by banks

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It should serve the following purposes:

(i) Taking credit decisions: whether to lend a borrower or not. A borrower with high

rating be financed.

(ii) Pricing of the loans (fixation of interest rates): A borrower falling in higher risk

category be priced higher.

(iii) Mitigation of risk – the extent of borrowers contribution in the form of the

margin and collaterals can be demanded based on the borrower’s risk-rating

category.

(iv) Nature of facilities: Whether to sanction cash credit, term loan or demand loan to a

borrower which may depend upon its risk categorization. Demand loan or term loan for

shorter period may be considered where risk involved is high.

(v) Delegation of Loaning Power: higher loaning powers may be vested to the field

functionaries for sanction of loans to borrowers who are rated high with

practically no risk. For borrowers falling under high risk categories, approvals of

loans be considered at higher level of authority.

(vi) Selective monitoring: it is difficult for banks to pay same degree of attention to

all the loan account due to fast expansion of credit. Borrowers who fall under

high risk rating categories can be kept under closer monitoring i.e. to be

monitored more frequently than the low risk borrowers.

(vii) Ensuring Quality: Judging quality of total credit portfolio as also under various

segments i.e. industry, trade, transport, agriculture etc. (large/medium/small).

Also identifying problem accents and the risk concentration in credit portfolio.

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(viii) Mitigation of Credit: Effectively monitoring the overall credit portfolio by

looking at the movement and mitigation of the portfolio, from higher to lower

risk categories and vice versa.

(ix) Management of Credit Risk: Effective management of credit risk by evolving

effective and robust credit polices and procedures which are sensitive and

responsive to changes.

(x) Identification of the trust areas of credit which are looking up and safe as also

those which are risky having high default risk.

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Basic Architecture of CRFs

The following elements outline the basic architecture and the operating principles of any

CRF.

2.3.1 Grading system for calibration of credit risk

Nature of grading system

Number of grades used

Key outputs of CRF

2.3.2 Operating design of CRF

Which exposures are rated?

The risk rating process

Assigning and monitoring risk ratings

The mechanism of arriving at risk ratings

Standardisation and benchmark for risk ratings

Written communications and formality of procedures

2.3.3 CRFs and Portfolio Credit Risk

Portfolio surveillance and reporting

Adequate levels of provisioning for credit events

Guidelines for asset build up, aggregate profitability and pricing

Interaction with external credit assessment institutions

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III-D CREDIT RISK IN OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURES

Risk Identification and Assessment of Limits

Credit Risk in non-fund based business of banks need to be assessed in a manner

similar to the assessment of fund based business since it has the potential to become a

funded liability in case the customer is not able to meet his commitments. Financial

guarantees are generally long term in nature, and assessment of these requirements

should be similar to the evaluation of requests for term loans. As contracts are

generally for a term of 2-3 years, banks must obtain cash flows over this time horizon,

arising from the specific contract they intend to support, and determine the viability of

financing the contract.

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Risk Monitoring and Control

For reducing credit risk on account of such off balance sheet exposures, banks may

adopt a variety of measures some of which are indicated below:

i) Banks must ensure that the security, which is available to the funded lines, also

covers the Letter of Credit lines and the guarantee facilities. On some occasions, it

will be appropriate to take a charge over the fixed assets as well, especially in the

case of long-term guarantees.

ii) In the case of guarantees covering contracts, banks must ensure that the clients

have the requisite technical skills and experience to execute the contracts. The

value of the contracts must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and separate

limits should be set up for each contract. The progress vis-à-vis physical and

financial indicators should be monitored regularly, and any slippages should be

highlighted in the credit review.

iii) The strategy to sanction non-fund facilities with a view to increase earnings should

be properly balanced vis-à-vis the risk involved and extended only after a thorough

assessment of credit risk is undertaken.

The architecture and operating principles are discussed in detail in the ensuing paragraphs.

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CHAPTER IV CREDIT RISK MODELS

A credit risk model seeks to determine, directly or indirectly,

Our past experience and our assumptions about the future,

What is the present value of a given loan or fixed income security?

The (quantifiable) risk that the promised cash flows will not be forthcoming.

The increasing importance of credit risk modelling should be seen as the consequence

of the following three factors:

o Banks are becoming increasingly quantitative in their treatment of credit

risk.

o New markets are emerging in credit derivatives and the marketability of

existing loans is increasing through securitisation/ loan sales market.

o Regulators are concerned to improve the current system of bank capital

requirements especially as it relates to credit risk.

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Importance

o These models provide the decision maker with insight or knowledge that

would not otherwise be readily available or that could be marshalled at

prohibitive cost.

o In a marketplace where margins are fast disappearing and the pressure to

lower pricing is unrelenting, models give their users a competitive edge.

o The credit risk models are intended to aid banks in quantifying, aggregating

and managing risk across geographical and product lines.

o The outputs of these models also play increasingly important roles in banks’

risk management and performance measurement processes, customer

profitability analysis, risk-based pricing, active portfolio management and

capital structure decisions.

o Credit risk modelling may result in better internal risk management and

may have the potential to be used in the supervisory oversight of banking

organisations.

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In the measurement of credit risk, models may be classified along three different

dimensions:

1 .Technique1s: The following are the more commonly used techniques:

(a) Econometric Techniques such as linear and multiple discriminate analysis,

multiple regression, logic analysis and probability of default, etc.

(b) Neural networks are computer-based systems that use the same data

employed in the econometric techniques but arrive at the decision model

using alternative implementations of a trial and error method.

(c) Optimisation models are mathematical programming techniques that

discover the optimum weights for borrower and loan attributes that minimize

lender error and maximise profits.

(d) Rule-based or expert systems are characterised by a set of decision rules, a

knowledge base consisting of data such as industry financial ratios, and a

structured inquiry process to be used by the analyst in obtaining the data on a

particular borrower.

(e) Hybrid Systems In these systems simulation are driven in part by a direct

causal relationship, the parameters of which are determined through

estimation techniques.

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2. Domain of application: These models are used in a variety of domains:

(a) Credit approval: Models are used on a stand alone basis or in conjunction with

a judgemental override system for approving credit in the consumer lending

business. The use of such models has expanded to include small business

lending. They are generally not used in approving large corporate loans, but

they may be one of the inputs to a decision.

(b) Credit rating determination: Quantitative models are used in deriving

‘shadow bond rating’ for unrated securities and commercial loans. These

ratings in turn influence portfolio limits and other lending limits used by the

institution. In some instances, the credit rating predicted by the model is used

within an institution to challenge the rating assigned by the traditional credit

analysis process.

(c) Credit risk models may be used to suggest the risk premia that should be

charged in view of the probability of loss and the size of the loss given default.

Using a mark-to-market model, an institution may evaluate the costs and

benefits of holding a financial asset. Unexpected losses implied by a credit

model may be used to set the capital charge in pricing.

(d) Early warning: Credit models are used to flag potential problems in the

portfolio to facilitate early corrective action.

(e) Common credit language: Credit models may be used to select assets from a

pool to construct a portfolio acceptable to investors at the time of asset

securitisation or to achieve the minimum credit quality needed to obtain the

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desired credit rating. Underwriters may use such models for due diligence on

the portfolio (such as a collateralized pool of commercial loans).

(f) Collection strategies: Credit models may be used in deciding on the best

collection or workout strategy to pursue. If, for example, a credit model

indicates that a borrower is experiencing short-term liquidity problems rather

than a decline in credit fundamentals, then an appropriate workout may be

devised.

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3. Credit Risk Models: Approaches

The literature on quantitative risk modelling has two different approaches to credit risk

measurement.

(a) The first approach is the development of statistical models through analysis of

historical data. This approach was frequently used in the last two decades. The

statistical approach tries to rate the firms on a discrete or continuous scale. The

linear model introduced by Altman (1967), also known as the Z-score Model,

separates defaulting firms from non-defaulting ones on the basis of certain

financial ratios. Altman, Hartzell, and Peck (1995, 1996) have modified the

original Z-score model to develop a model specific to emerging markets. This

model is known as the Emerging Market Scoring (EMS) model.

(b) The second type of modelling approach tries to capture distribution of the firm's

asset-value over a period of time. The second type of modelling approach tries

to capture distribution of the firm's asset-value over a period of time. This

model is based on the expected default frequency (EDF) model. It calculates the

asset value of a firm from the market value of its equity using an option pricing

based approach that recognizes equity as a call option on the underlying asset of

the firm. It tries to estimate the asset value path of the firm over a time horizon.

The default risk is the probability of the estimated asset value falling below a

pre-specified default point. This model is based conceptually on Merton's

(1974) contingent claim framework and has been working very well for

estimating default risk in a liquid market.

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(c) Closely related to credit risk models are portfolio risk models. In the last three

years, important advances have been made in modelling credit risk in lending

portfolios. The new models are designed to quantify credit risk on a portfolio

basis, and thus are applied at the time of diversification as well as portfolio

based pricing. These models estimate the loss distribution associated with the

portfolio and identify the risky components by assessing the risk contribution of

each member in the portfolio.

Banks may adopt any model depending on their size, complexity, risk bearing capacity

and risk appetite, etc. However, the credit risk models followed by banks should, at the

least, achieve the following:

o Result in differentiating the degree of credit risk in different credit exposures of a

bank. The system could provide for transaction-based or borrower-based rating or

both. It is recommended that all exposures are to be rated. Restricting risk

measurement to only large sized exposures may fail to capture the portfolio risk in

entirety for variety of reasons. For instance, a large sized exposure for a short time

may be less risky than a small sized exposure for a long time

o Identify concentration in the portfolios

o Identify problem credits before they become NPAs

o Identify adequacy/ inadequacy of loan provisions

o Help in pricing of credit

o Recognise variations in macro-economic factors and a possible impact under

alternative scenarios

o Determine the impact on profitability of transactions and relationship.

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CHAPTER V CREDIT RISK SCORING-MODELS DEVELOPED BY BANKS

Keeping in view the parameters used by some banks in their credit risk scoring and

rating systems in line with RBI broad guidelines and those used by eminent persons in

their models, an attempt has been made to evolve a simple but effective model by using

parameters which have significant “Predictive Power”, are more objective/sensitive in

nature and are related to the following four main heads.

I. Operational/Financial Performance of the Unit

II. Banks Accounts and securities available

III. Business/Industry Outlook

IV. Promoters/Management

I. Operational/financial performance of the unit: - the parameters are

(i) plant capacity utilization in

relation to installed

capacity

(ii) Break-even point in relation to

installed plant capacity

(iii) Sales trend in last 3 years

(iv) Profit earned during last 3

years

(v) Achievement of sales

projections

(vi) achievement of profit

projection

(vii) net profit to net sales ratio

(viii) return of capital employed

(ix) ratio of current assets to current

liability

(x) Debt – equity ratio

(xi) Debt-service coverage ratio

(xii) Ratio of net sales per annum to

working capital

(xiii) Ratio of net sales per annum to

fixed/total assets

(xiv) Inventory turnover ratio

(xv) Average collection period of

receivables

(xvi) Average payment period of accounts

payable

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II. Bank accounts & Securities available

(i) Conduct of fund and non-fund based accounts with bank/financial institutions –

whether there are regular/irregular

(ii) Compliance of terms/conditions stipulated by banks/financial institutions while

scanning the loans

(iii) Position of annual renewal/review of the loans facilities.

(iv) Position with regard to submission of balance sheet and profit/loss accounts,

monitoring data and inventory statement etc.

(v) Nature and value of securities (primary/collateral) offered to cover the loan

facilities.

(vi) Validity of creation of charge on the securities.

(vii) Interest and other income being earned by the banks.

(viii) Tenability of loan documents in the court of law.

(ix) Position of contingent liabilities, if any.

(x) Transparency and disclosure in audited annual accounts

(xi) Diversion of short-term funds for long term users

(xii) Unauthorized withdrawal of funds for personal use or diversion of funds for

investments in allied/associate and other firms.

(xiii) Utilization of loans sanctioned by banks/financial institutions for purpose other

than those for which these have been lent.

(xiv) Auditors comments on quality and valuation of current/fixed assets

III Business and Industry Outlook

(i) Intensity of market competition faced by the industry.

(ii) Technology used and whether it is successfully implemented and chances of

its obsolescence

(iii) Market demand and growth potential for the products

(iv) Quality of product(s) and their market acceptability

(v) Threats of substitutes available and likely to come in the market

(vi) Export potential for the products

(vii) Position with regard to availability of raw material

(viii) Import barriers, if any, imposed by the Government

(ix) Units’ locational advantages and disadvantages

(x) General outlook and capital market perception of the industry

(xi) Threat of dumping products by foreign companies

(xii) Type of product(s) whether customized or are for general use

(xiii) Foreign exchange component (risk) in total business covering both

exports/imports

(xiv) Nature of product(s), their applications and shelf life

(xv) Volatility of prices of finished goods and basic inputs/materials used

(xvi) Fluctuations in demand/supply of products both present and expected in

future

IV. Promoters/Management

(i) Ownership pattern of the unit, i.e. whether Public/Private Ltd. Partnership, Prop.

Ship etc.

(ii) Qualifications, experiences and knowledge of industry/business

(iii) Integrity, commitment and sincerity

(iv) Market reputation and creditability

(v) Track record of debt repayment

(vi) financial strength and their capacity to raise more funds

(vii) Pending statutory dues and litigations, if any.

(viii) Functioning of top management personnel

(ix) History of dividends/bonus issues declared

(x) Future succession plan.

Before designing any credit risk scoring and rating systems by using some of the

parameters which have more predictive powers, sensitive and objective, it would be

appropriate consider some of the models for assessment units, health and default

probabilities.

We will look at these parameters and their scoring in details

I. Operational and Financial Performance (Max score 80)

Operational and Financial Performance of the unit being rated may be judged from

certain parameters explained below:

1. Plant Capacity Utilization (Max Score 10)

It is an important which can tell a lot about the Unit’s functioning. Low plant capacity

utilization is a disturbing feature which can be due to various reasons like, lack of

demand, imbalance in plant/machinery, frequent break downs due to plant being old etc.

whatever may be the reason, it would have an adverse effect on unit’s functioning and

ultimately on its profitability. It may be mentioned that level of plant capacity utilization

may very from the nature of industry, process of manufacture etc. it will be desirable to

compare this parameter with the average capacity utilization of other 4/5 peer units

engaged in similar activity and having plant/machinery more or less of same installed

capacity. In case the average capacity utilization of peer units in X then score allotted for

various levels of plant capacity utilization may be as under.

Plant Capacity Utilisation

> 1.25X 1.10 to 1.25X

X to < 1.10X

0.9X to< X

0.8X to 0.9X

.7X to<.80X

<.70X

Score 10 9 8 6 4 2 0OR

In case data about peer units is not available, the score will be allotted based on

comparison of actual utilization of plant capacity with the projections accepted by the

bank while sanctioning the loan.

Plant Capacity Utilisation (%)

100% or more

95-99% 90-94% 85-89% 80-84% 75-79% <75%

Score 10 9 8 6 4 2 0

2. Current Ratio (Max Score 10)

This ratio helps in measuring the liquidity and solvency of a company. Higher ratio may

be good for the creditors but a very high ratio may have impact on the company’s

profitability. The distribution of score for various levels of current Ratio is indicated

below:

Current Ratio 1.50 or more 1.30 to <1.50 1.15 to <1.30 1.0 to < 1.15 < 1.0Score 10 8 6 3 04

3. Return on Capital Employed (Max Score 10)

The percentage return on capital employed is a good indicator fro company’s earning

capacity. Any company having return on capital lower than cost of capital employed is

undesirable. The score distribution is:

ROCE >20% 17 to 20% 14 to <17% 12 to <14% 10 to <12% < 10%Score 10 8 6 4 2 0

Current Assets Current Ratio =

Current Liabilities

PBITROCE = Capital Employed

4. Debt Service Coverage Ratio (Max Score 10)

The ratio measures the capacity of the company to service its debt i.e. repaying the term

liabilities and interest thereon. The score to be allotted are:

DSCR >2.0 1.8 to 2.0 1.6 to < 1.8 1.3 to < 1.6 1.0 to < 1.3 <1.0Score 10 9 7 5 2 0

5. Debt Equity Ratio (Max Score 10)

The ratio pf Promoters/Shareholders stake in business when compared to total debts,

Lower D/E Ratio means, higher long term stability in case the ratio is gradually coming

down, represents plough back of profit.

D/E Ratio Upto 1.0 >1.0 to 1.5 .>1.5 to 2.0 .>2.0 to 2.5 > 2.5 to 3.0 .>3.0Score 10 9 7 5 2 0

6. Achievement of Net Sales Projections (Max Score 10)

The level of achievement of net sales when compared to projections is an important

indicator for unit’s efficient functioning.

% achievement of Net Sales Projection

95% and more

90% to < 95%

85% to < 90%

80% to < 85%

75% to<80%

Below 75%

Score 10 9 7 5 3 0

Net Profit + Dep+ InterestDSCR = Annual Repayments of term loan + interest there on

Total Debts D/E =

Tangible Net Worth

7. Achievement of Net Profit Projections (Max Score 10)

The level of achievement of net profit when compared to projection is important indicator

fro unit’s efficient functioning and control on its expenditure.

% achievement of Net Profit Proj.

95% and more

90% to < 95%

85% to < 90%

80% to < 85%

75% to<80%

Below 75%

Score 10 9 7 5 3 0

8. Future Cash Flow Projection (Max Score 10)

Banks obtain Cash flow Statements from the borrowing companies to assess as to whether the

company would have enough profit generation and surplus funds to repay its term loan

installments or to meet the capital expenditure as envisaged in the projections given by the

company. The various situations and scores are:

Future Cash Flows

Company will have enough profit and surplus generation of funds to meet its obligations including payment of interest and loan installments

Company will have enough profit and surplus funds after taking into account the loans already sanctioned to be released shortly.

Company will have enough profit and surplus funds after taking into account only the loans applied for by the company which are yet to be sanctioned/released.

Company may not have enough profit and surplus funds to meet its loan repayments obligations and may default.

Score 10 7 4 0

II. Conduct of Bank accounts & Availability of Collaterals (Max Score 45)

The conduct of bank accounts with banks/FIs is to be evaluated in the context of

regularity in accounts which may depend on timely payment of interest and installments

of the loans. In addition, the conduct of accounts can be gauged from compliance of

terms/conditions related to the loan and timely submission of data/information to the

bank and securities offered by the borrower to secure bank loans. Other aspect related to

this head may include operations in non-fund based limits, diversion of funds. The

parameters and score allotted to them are given below.

1. Conduct of Bank Accounts Regular/Irregular) (Max Score 10)

Accounts running regular & their conduct satisfactory

Accounts remained irregular for 15 days

Accounts remained irregular for 16-30 days

Accounts remained irregular for 31-45 days

Accounts remained irregular for More than 45 days

Score 10 8 6 3 0

2. Compliance of Terms and Conditions of Sanction (Max Score 5)

All conditions complied Conditions relating to security creation complied while others still remain to be complied.

Conditions of security creation are yet to be complied while other conditions complied.

Conditions have not been complied

Score 5 4 2 0

3. Discipline in timely submission of Financial Data/Stock Statements etc. (Max Score 5)

Timely Submission

Delayed submission upto 15 days

Delayed submission 16-30 days

Delayed submission 31-45 days

Delayed submission of more than 45 days

Score 5 4 3 2 0

4. Security Coverage (Primary & Collateral) (Max Score 10)

% to total sanctioned limits both fund and non-fund based

>200% 175 to 200%

150 to <175%

125 to <150%

100 to < 125%

<100%

Score 10 8 6 4 2 0

5. Operations in Non-Fund Based Loan Limits (Max Score 5)

Non-fund based loan limits generally include Letter of Guarantee, Letter of Credit Limit.

These are called non-fund based limits as these as these do not involve extending any

funds or money. Those, however, involve commitments by banks on behalf of their

customers to pay in the event of default by the customers. Of late it is observed that many

a timers the non-fund based limits get converted into fund based as the borrowers some

times delay and even default in honoring their commitment. It is why RBI has advised

banks that appraisal standards while sanctioning non-fund based limits should not be

diluted.

Operations in non-fund based limits

Borrower honors his commitments and arranges funds whenever L/C or L/G liability falls due.

Borrower generally arranges funds whenever liabilities devolve/or takes maximum 15 days in meeting his liabilities.

Borrower generally delays in arranging the funds whenever the liability devolve. The period of delay goes upto 30 days.

Borrower generally delays in arranging funds whenever non-fund based limits devolve. The delay is generally more than 30 days.

Score 5 4 2 0

6. Diversion of Funds (Max Score 10)

Banks take a serous view whenever they observe that the borrowers are diverting funds to

their allied and associates concerns particularly when they are themselves not doing well.

The diversion may affect the company’s liquidity and operations.

Diversion of funds

Company is not diversing any funds

Company has diverted funds my be from short terms to long terms to be utilised in the company itself to meet emergent needs.

Company has diverted funds to its allied associate concerns by marinating current ratio and D/E ratio within banks acceptable limits.

Company has diverted funds to its allied/associate concerns and for repayment of unsecured loans by affecting it CR and/or DER beyond norms acceptable to banks.

Score 10 7 4 0

III. Industry/Business Outlook (Max Score 40)

Future outlook of ay unit can be gauged from certain parameters.

1. Growth Rate – in terms of % during last two years (Max Score 10)

>20% 15-20% 10-<15% 5-<10% <5% Decline10 8 7 5 3 0

2. Threat of Competition from Existing and New Entrants Substitutes (Max Score 10)

Minimum Threat

Modest Threat

Marginal Threat

High Threat Very High Threat

Score 10 8 5 2 0

3. Reliability of Technology used and threat of its Obsolescence (Max Score 10)

Minimum Threat

Modest Threat

Marginal Threat

High Threat Very High Threat

Score 10 8 5 2 0

4. General Outlook of industry based on Market Study & Capital Market Perception

(Max Score 10)

Bright Outlook

Good Average Below Average

Dismal

Score 10 8 6 3 0

IV Promoters/Management (Max score 35)

As regard evaluating and rating of management, it is always difficult as most of the

parameters available for this purpose are generally qualitative in nature and difficult to

quantify for the purpose of assigning score/ratings. But then it is important to evaluate

management as it is revealed from various studies on sickness in industry that single most

reason for their sickness has been inefficient management, their lack if integrity and

commitment. An attempt has been made t identify parameters, based on various studies

conducted for evaluating management which are qualitative. There are also some

quantitative parameters also in evaluating the management.

1. Integrity / Commitment

Market and Banker’ Report

Willingness to offer securities to secure bank’s loan

Willingness to increase their stake in the business

Commitment towards his business and taking steps for faster implementation of

the project

Past tack record in honoring their commitment

2. financial Strength / Risk Bearing Capacity & Technical Knowledge

Financial position (net worth) of the promoter(s).

Position with regard to availability of funds/liquid assets.

Means of financing and heir stake in the business.

Technical/Financial qualifications / experience of the promoter(s).

Knowledge of product(s) and process of manufacture

Knowledge of financial / banking related aspects.

Support from Group Companies

3. Organisational Structure & Succession Plan

Type of organisational structure and hierarchy

Qualification / experience of persons holdings key positions

Employee turnover in the organisations

Coordination between various executives / departments

Positions of delegation of powers and responsibilities

Succession Plan for “Top Management”

4. Market Reputation & Past Track Records

Dealing in the market and their reputation

Price of the share and earning per share

Market capitalisation and volume of stocks traded in the market

History of repayment of dividends / bonus issues

The parameters as discussed above have been allocated score are

1. Management Integrity/Commitment, Financial Strength etc. (Max Score 20)

Parameters and its Ratings

Max Score

Of High Order

Good Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory

Integrity/Commitments 5 5 4 3 2 0Financial Strength/ technical Knowledge and Risk bearing capacity

5 5 4 3 2 0

Organisational structure and Succession plan 5 5 4 3 2 0

Market Reputation and Past Track Record 5 5 4 3 2 0

2. Management of Inventory and Receivables In Relation to Net Sales in Months

(Max Score 5)

The above measure is months and indicates as to how efficiently the inventory and

receivables are being managed. Lower the period more efficient is the management.

Ratio Value Max Score < 3mths 3 to<4 mths 4 to<5 mths 5 to<6 mths 6 mths &aboveScore 5 5 4 3 2 0

3. Realisability of Receivables and valuation of Inventory. (Max Score 5)

Realisability of Receivables and valuation of Inventory

Max Score

Comments given by Bank’s Inspector/ Stock Auditors are satisfactory

Comments given raised some doubts but no shortfall in value is indicated

Comments given indicate some shortfall in value say maximum upto 5%

Comments given are adverse which are indicative of poor quality of receivables/inventory

Score 5 5 4 2 0

4. Transparency in Accounting Statements (Max Score 5)

Transparency in Accounting Statements (related to disclosure by management and qualifications by auditors)

Max Score

Standard accounting practices are being followed which are consistent. Management has made disclosures and there re no qualifications from the auditors.

Standard accounting practices are being followed which are consistent. Management has made disclosures and auditors have given qualifications which are not damaging.

Accounts lack transparency as disclosures are not adequate. Auditors have given qualifications which re damaging and may erode company’s net worth.

Score 5 5 3 0

Average Inventory + Receivables

Net Sales per Month

Summary of Various Parameters

A. Operational / Financial Performance

1. Plant Capacity Utilization2. Current Ratio3. ROCE4. DER5. DSCR6. Achievement of Net Sales Projection7. Achievement of Net Profit Projections8. Future Cash Flows

Max Score 80

1010101010101010

B. Conduct of Bank Accounting & Availability of Securities

1. Accounts running regular / irregular2. Compliance in terms/conditions of sanction3. Discipline in timely/submission of data/information4. Primary & collateral Securities5. Operations in non-fund based loan limits6. Diversion of funds

Max Score 45

100505100510

C. Industry /Business Outlook

1. Expected Growth Rate2. Threat of Competition from existing and new entrants

and substitutes3. Technology Development and threat of obsolesce4. General Outlook/Capital Market Perception

Max Score 40

1010

1010

D. Management – Rating & Evaluation

1. Management Integrity/Commitment & financial Strength

2. Management of Inventory & Receivable in relation to its Sales

3. Realisability of Receivables & Valuation of inventory 4. Transparency in accounting Statements

Max score 35

2005

0505

Grand Total (A+B+C+D) 200

The borrowers are to be rated on the basis of score received out of 100 and therefore the

score received to be reduced to 50% as the total score of all the parameter under

A+B+C+D works out to be 200.

Risk Categorisation of Borrowers

Score Rating /Grade Risk Categorisation

90 or more AAA Particularly no risk80-89% AA Minimal Risk70-79% A+ Modest Risk60-69% A Marginal Risk50-59% B+ Medium Risk (Generally Border line/likely NPAs)40-49% B High Risk (Generally sub-standard & doubtful category

of NPAs) 30-39% C Very High Risk (Generally doubtful category of NPAs)

Below 30% D Caution (Generally loss category of NPAs)

CHAPTER VI CREDIT RISK MODELS - OTHERS

SUGGESTED CREDIT RISK SCORING & RATING MODELS

Keeping in view the parameters used by some banks in their credit risk scoring and rating

systems in line with RBI broad guidelines and those used by eminent persons in their

models, an attempt has been made to evolve a simple but effective model by using

parameters which have significantly “Predictive Power”, are more objective/sensitive in

nature and are related to the following four main heads.

VI-A ALTMAN’S Z- SCORING MODELS

The Multiple Discriminate Analysis – MDA Model or Z Score Model uses some

financial ratios having significant discriminating power to differentiate weak and

healthy units. Where:

Z = B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 + - - - - - - - BnXn

The value of z is arrived at by adding the total value of various discriminate

coefficient and independent variables. In the formula given above X, X, X, etc.

represent financial ratios and B1,B2,B3 are the weights attached to them based on

their predictive power. Altman’s sample comprised thirty-three pairs of

manufacturing firms, where industry and size were used as the paring criteria. After

considering various combinations of the twenty-two accounting and non-accounting

variables, Altman suggested the following pattern of discriminate coefficient and

independent variables.

Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 + - - - - - - - 0.999Xn

Where :

Z=Overall Score

X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets (measure of liquidity)

X2 = Retained Earning / Total Assets (measure of earning against

investment in Total Assets)

X3 = EBIT / Total Assets (measure of profitability)

X4 = Market Value of Equity / BV of Debts (measure of firm’s leverage)

X5 = Sales / Total Assets (measure of sales generating ability

of the firm’s assets)

The cut-off points for the Total Z score are as under:

(i) Z score > 2.99 classifies healthy units with the lower probability of

failure and default

(ii) Z score < 1.81 and > 2.99 represents grey area with both bankruptcy

and non-bankruptcy possibilities

(iii) Z Score < 1.81 indicates financially distressed and bankruptcy units.

VI-B KMV Model

KMV Corporation has developed a credit risk model that uses information on stock

prices and the capital structure of the firm to estimate its default probability. This

model is based on Merton's (1973) analytical model of firm value. The starting point

of this model is the proposition that a firm will default only if its asset value falls

below a certain level (default point), which is a function of its liability. It estimates

the asset value of the firm and its asset volatility from the market value of equity and

the debt structure in the option theoretic framework. Using these two values, a metric

(distance from default or DfD) is constructed that represents the number of standard

deviations that the firm's asset value is away from the default point. Finally, a

mapping is done between the DfD values and actual default rate, based on the

historical default experience. The resultant probability is called Expected Default

Frequency (EDF).

In summary, EDF is calculated in the following three steps:

i) Estimation of asset value and asset volatility from equity value and volatility of

equity return,

ii) Calculation of distance from default:

The DfD is calculated using the following formula:

iii) Calculation of expected default frequency.

VI-C CREDITMETRICS APPROACH

In April 1997, J.P. Morgan released the CreditMetrics Technical Document that

immediately set a new benchmark in the literature of portfolio risk management.

This provides a method for estimating the distribution of the value of the assets in a

portfolio subject to changes in the credit quality of individual borrower.

A portfolio consists of different stand-alone assets, defined by a stream of future cash

flows. Each asset has a distribution over the possible range of future rating class.

Starting from its initial rating, an asset may end up in any one of the possible rating

categories. Each rating category has a different credit spread, which will be used to

discount the future cash flows.

Moreover, the assets are correlated among themselves depending on the industry they

belong to. It is assumed that the asset returns are normally distributed and change in

the asset returns causes the change in the rating category in the future.

Finally, the simulation technique is used to estimate the value distribution of the

assets. A number of scenarios are generated from a multivariate normal distribution,

which is defined by the marginal rating transition distribution of the individual assets

and the correlation values among them.

Each scenario indicates a future state to which an asset can migrate. Discounting by

the appropriate credit spread, the future value of the asset is estimated. Generation of

a large number of scenarios can give a fair idea on the distribution of asset values.

The mean asset value, asset volatility, percentile level and the marginal risk volume

can summarize the output of this model.

Though there are a few subtle issues that have been raised by practitioners regarding

the implementation of this model, e.g., the estimation of correlation between the

credit quality of two assets, CreditMetrics should be viewed as the first attempt to

address a long-standing problem in portfolio risk measurement.

VI-D CREDITRISK+

CreditRisk+, introduced by Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP), is a model of

default risk. Each asset has only two possible end-of-period states: default and non-

default.

In the event of default, the lender recovers a fixed proportion of the total exposure.

The default rate is considered as a continuous random variable. It does not try to

estimate the default correlation directly. Here, the default correlation is assumed to be

determined by a set of risk factors.

Conditional on these risk factors, default of each obligor follows a Bernoulli

distribution. To get the unconditional probability generating function for the number

of defaults, it assumes that the risk factors are independently gamma-distributed

random variables.

The final step in CreditRisk+ is to obtain the probability generating function for

losses. Conditional on the number of default events, the losses are entirely determined

by the exposure and the recovery rate. Thus, the distribution of asset values can be

estimated from the following input data:

o Exposure of individual asset

o Expected default rate

o Default rate volatilities

o Recovery rate given default

o Risk sectors

The CreditRisk+ manual provides the recurrence relation used to calculate the value

distribution.

VI-E VaR AND RISK MANAGEMENT

VaR is a potential loss. VaR is a powerful concept for Risk Management because the

range and importance of its applications. It is also the foundations of economic capital

measures, which underlie all related tools, from risk-based performance to portfolio

management.

VaR provides the measure of economic capital defined as an upper bound of future

potential losses. Once defined at bank-wide level, the capital allocation systems

assigns capital, or a risk measure after diversification effect, to any subset of the

bank’s portfolio, which allows risk-adjusted performances to be defined, using both

capital allocation and transfer pricing systems. Economic capital is a major advance

because it addresses such issues as:

Is Capital adequate, given risks?

Are the risk acceptable, given available capital?

With given risks, any level of capital determines the confidence level, or

bank’s default probability. Both risks and capital should adjust to meet a

target confidence level which, in the end, determines the bank’s risk and

solvency.

Market Risk

Risk measures Volatilities SensitivitiesMarket Values

Credit Risk

Ratings/Maturities/ IndustriesWatch ListsConcentrationPortfolio Monitoring

Interest Rate Risk

Gaps Liquidity Interest rate Duration gap

Other Risks

VaR

VaR and Common Indicators of Risk

Figure illustrates the qualitative gap between traditional risk measures and VaR.

It describes the various indicators of risk serving various purposes for measuring or

monitoring risks. Such indicators or quantified measures are not fungible, and it is not

possible to convert them, except for market instruments sensitivities, into potential losses.

By contrast VaR synthesizes all of them and represents a loss, or a risk value. Because

VaR Is systematic, it is not replacement for such specific measure, but it summaries

them.

Potential Loss

Expected Loss –

It serves for Credit Risk. Market risk considers only deviations of values as losses,

and ignores expected Profit and Loss (P&L) gains for being conservative. EL

represents a statistical loss over a portfolio of a large number of loans. The law of

large numbers says that losses will sometimes be high or low. Intuition suggests that

they revert to some long term averages.

This is the foundation for economic provisions and ‘expected loss risk management.’

Institution suggests that provisioning the expected loss should be enough to absorb

losses. By definition, stastical losses averages losses over a number of periods and

yearly losses presumably tend to revert to some long-term mean. For this reason,

Statistical losses are more a portfolio concept rather than an individual concept. The

more diversified a portfolio is, the lower is the loss volatility and the closer losses

tend to be the average value.

Unexpected Loss

The intuition mentioned above, is sometimes misleading because it ignores the

transitory periods when losses exceed the long term averages. So we should not

ignore the unexpected loss. One purpose of VaR model is to specify both dimension

of risk, average level and chances/magnitude of deviation from average level.

So unexpected losses are potential losses in excess of the expected value. The VaR

approach defines potential losses as loss percentile at given confidence levels. The

loss percentile is the upper bound of loss not exceeded in more than a given fraction

of all possible cases, this fraction being the confidence level. It is L(), where is the

one tailed probability of exceeding L(). For example, L(2%) = 100 means that loss

exceeds the value of 200 in more than 2% of cases. (in a year 4 or 6 days). The

purpose of VaR models is to provide the loss distribution, or the probability of each

loss value, to derive at loss percentile for various confidence levels. The unexpected

loss is the excess of the loss percentile over the expected loss, L() – EL. Economic

capital is equal to unexpected loss measured as a loss percentile in excess of expected

loss (under economic provisioning).

Exceptional Losses

Unexpected losses does not include exceptional losses beyond the loss percentile

defined by a confidence level. Exceptional losses are in excess of the sum of the

expected loss plus the unexpected loss, equal to the loss percentile L(). Only stress

scenarios, or extreme loss modeling when feasible, help in finding the order of

magnitude of such losses. Nevertheless, the probability of such scenario is likely to

remain judgmental rather than subject to statistical benchmark because of the

difficulty of inferring extreme losses which, by definition, are almost unobservable.

Measuring expected and unexpected losses

The two major ingredients for defining expected and unexpected losses are the loss

distribution and the confidence level.

1. Loss Distributors

In theory, historical loss distributors are observable historically. For market risk, loss

distributors are simply the distributions of adverse price deviation of the instruments.

Since there are approximately as many chances that values increase or decrease, such

deviations tend to be bell shaped, with some central tendency. Coming to credit risk,

unfortunately, historical data is scare and does not necessarily reflect the current risk of

banks. For credit risk, losses are not negative earnings. They result from defaults, or less

of assets value because credit standings deterioration. Such distributions are highly

skewed to the left because the most frequent losses are very small.

Both types of distributions are shown in Figure

Prob

abili

ty

Prob

abili

ty

Gains Losses Losses

Market Risk

Credit Risk

-Large Losses-Low Probability

5%

95%

(Profit/Loss Distribution)

XValue-at- Risk

2. Loss Percentiles of the normal distribution

The normal distribution is a proxy for market random P&L over as short period. As both

upside and downside deviations of the mean are considered, the confidence interval is

‘two-tailed’. But it cannot apply to credit risk, for which loss distributions are highly

asymmetrical. So the confidence level intervals are probabilities that losses exceed an

upper bound (negative earnings, beyond zero levels). They are called ‘one tailed’ because

only one side negative deviations materialize downside risk. The point to remember is,

with a symmetrical distribution, the two-tailed probability is twice the one-tailed

probability.

Mode

(most Frequent)

Expected Loss Expected Loss + Unexpected Loss

Probability of Loss < UL

Probability of Loss > ULConfidence Level

Losses = 0 Losses

Expected Loss Unexpected Loss =VaR Exceptional Loss

VaR - Expected-Unexpected Loss Diagram

In the figure losses appear at the right –hand side of the zero level along the x-axis. The

VaR at a given confidence level is such that the probability of exceeding the unexpected

loss is equal to this confidence level. The area under the curve at the right of VaR

represents this probability. The maximum total loss at the same confidence level is the

sum of the expected loss plus unexpected loss (or VaR). Losses at extreme right-hand

side and beyond unexpected losses are ‘exceptional’. The VaR represents the capital in

excess of expected loss necessary for absorbing deviations from average losses.

CHAPTER VII MANAGING CREDIT RISK IN INTER-BANK EXPOSURE

During the course of its business, a bank may assume exposures on other banks, arising

from trade transactions, money placements for liquidity management purposes, hedging,

trading and transactional banking services such as clearing and custody, etc. Such

transactions entail a credit risk, as defined, and therefore, it is important that a proper

credit evaluation of the banks is undertaken. It must cover both the interpretation of the

bank's financial statements as well as forming a judgement on non-financial areas such

as management, ownership, peer/ market perception and country factors.

The key financial parameters to be evaluated for any bank are:

a) Capital Adequacy

b) Asset Quality

c) Liquidity

d) Profitability

Banks will normally have access to information available publicly to assess the credit

risk posed by the counter party bank.

1 Capital Adequacy

Banks with high capital ratios above the regulatory minimum levels, particularly Tier I,

will be assigned a high rating whereas the banks with low ratios well below the

standards and with low ability to access capital will be at the other end of the spectrum.

Capital adequacy needs to be appropriate to the size and structure of the balance sheet as

it represents the buffer to absorb losses during difficult times. Over capitalization can

impact overall profitability. Related to the issue of capitalization, is also the ability to

raise fresh capital as and when required. Publicly listed banks and state owned banks

may be best positioned to raise capital whilst the unlisted private banks or regional

banks are dependant entirely on the wealth and/ or credibility of their owners.

The capital adequacy ratio is normally indicated in the published audited accounts. In

addition, it will be useful to calculate the Capital to Total Assets ratio which indicates

the owners' share in the assets of the business. The ratio of Tier I capital to Total Assets

represents the extent to which the bank can absorb a counterparty collapse. Tier I capital

is not owed to anyone and is available to cover possible losses. It has no maturity or

repayment requirement, and is expected to remain a permanent component of the

counter party's capital.

The Basel standards currently require banks to have a capital adequacy ratio of 8% with

Tier I ratio not less than 4%. The Reserve Bank of India requirement is 9%. The Basel

Committee is planning to introduce the New Capital Accord and these requirements

could change the dimension of the capital of banks.

2. Asset Quality

The asset portfolio in its entirety should be evaluated and should include an assessment

of both funded items and off-balance sheet items. Whilst non performing assets and

provisioning ratios will reflect the quality of the loan book, high volatility of valuations

and earnings will reflect exposure to the capital market and sensitive sectors.

The key ratios to be analysed are

o Gross NPAs to Gross Advances ratio,

o Net NPAs to Net Advances ratio

o Provisions Held to Gross Advances ratio and

o Provisions Held to Gross NPAs ratio.

Some issues which should be taken cognisance of, and which require further

critical examination are:

o where exposure to a particular sector is above a certain level, say, 10% of total assets

o where a significant part of the portfolio is to counter parties based in countries

which are considered to be very risky

o Where Net NPAs are above a certain level, say, 5% of the loan assets.

o Where loan loss provision is less than a certain level, say, 50% of the Gross NPA.

o Where high risk/ return lending accounts for the majority of the assets.

o Where there are rapid rates of loan growth. (These can be a precursor to reducing

asset quality as periods of rapid expansion are often followed by slow downs which

make the bank vulnerable.)

o Net impact of mark-to-market values of treasury transactions.

Commercial banks are increasingly venturing into investment banking activities

where asset considerations additionally focus on the marketability of the assets, as well

as the quality of the instruments. Preferably banks should mark-to-market their entire

investment portfolio and treat sticky investments as "non-performing", which should

also be adequately provided for.

3. Liquidity

Commercial bank deposits generally have a much shorter contractual maturity than

loans, and liquidity management needs to provide a cushion to cover anticipated deposit

withdrawals. The key ratios to be analysed are

o Total Liquid Assets to Total Assets ratio (the higher the ratio the more liquid the

bank is),

o Total Liquid Assets to Total Deposits ratio (this measures the bank's ability to

meet withdrawals),

o Loans to Deposits ratio and

o Inter-bank deposits to total deposits ratio.

It is necessary to develop an appropriate level of correlation between assets and

liabilities. Account should be taken of the extent to which borrowed funds are required

to bolster capital and the respective redemption profiles.

4. Profitability

A consistent year on year growth in profitability is required to provide an acceptable

return to shareholders and retain resources to fund future growth. The key ratios to be

analysed are:

o Return on Average Assets (measures a bank's growth/ decline in profits in

comparison with its balance sheet expansion/ contraction),

o Return on Equity (provides an indication of how well the bank is performing for

its owners),

o Net Interest Margin (measures the difference between interest paid and interest

earned, and therefore a bank's ability to earn interest income) and

o Operating Expenses to Net Revenue ratio (the cost/income ratio of the bank).

The degree of reliance upon interest income compared with fees earned heavy

dependency on certain sectors, and the sustainability of income streams are relevant

factors to be borne in mind.

The ability of a bank to analyse another bank on the above lines will depend upon the

information available publicly and also the strength of disclosures in the financial

statements.

In addition to the quantitative indices, other key parameters to be assessed are:

o Ownership

o Management ability

o Peer comparison/ Market perception

o Country of incorporation/ Regulatory environment

1. Ownership

The spread and nature of the ownership structure is important, as it impinges on the

propensity to induct additional capital. Support from a large body of shareholders is

difficult to obtain if the bank's performance is adverse, whilst a smaller shareholder

base constrains the ability to garner funds.

2. Management Ability

Frequent changes in senior management, change in a key figure, and the lack of

succession planning need to be viewed with suspicion. Risk management is a key

indicator of the management's ability as it is integral to the health of any institution.

Risk management should be deeply embedded and respected in the culture of the

financial institution.

3. Peer Comparison/ Market Perception

It is recognized that balance sheets tend to show different structures from one country to

another and from one type of bank to another. Accordingly, it is appropriate to assess a

bank's financial statements against those of its comparable peers. Similarly market

sentiment is highly important to a bank's ability to maintain an adequate funding base,

but is not necessarily reflective of published information. Special notice should be taken

where the overall performance of the peer sector, in general, falls below international

standards.

4. Country of Incorporation/ Regulatory Environment

Country risk needs to be evaluated since a bank which is financially strong may not be

permitted to meet its commitments in view of the regulatory environment or the

financial state of the country in which it is operating in.

Banks should be rated (called Bank Tierings) on the basis of the above factors. An

indicative tiring scale is:

Bank Tier Description

1 Low risk

2 Modest risk

3 Satisfactory risk

4 Fair Risk

5 Acceptable Risk

6 Watch List

7 Substandard

8 Doubtful

9 Loss

5.5 Facilities

Facilities to banks can be classified into three categories:

a) On balance sheet items such as cash advances, bond holdings and investments, and

off-balance sheet items which are not subject to market fluctuation risk such as

guarantees, acceptances and letters of credit.

b) Facilities which are off-balance sheet and subject to market fluctuation risk such

as foreign exchange and derivative products.

c) Settlement facilities: These cover risks arising through payment systems or through

settlement of treasury and securities transactions.

The tiering system enables a bank to establish internal parameters to help determine

acceptable limits of exposure to a particular bank/ banking group. These parameters

should be used to determine the maximum level of (a) and (b) above, maximum tenors

for term products which may be considered prudent for a bank and settlement limits.

Medium term loan facilities and standby facilities should be sanctioned very

exceptionally. Standby lines, by their very nature, are likely to be drawn only at a time

when the risk in making funds available is generally perceived to be unattractive.

Bank-wise exposure limits should be set taking into account the counter party and

country risks. The credit risk management of exposure to banks should be centralised on

a bank-wide basis.

Basel Accord I

Codified Minimal Capital Adequacy Ratio, with Option to Countries to

Prescribe Higher ratio

Stressed Capital Adequacy as One of Many Other Dimensions of

Financial Strength

Primarily Addressed to Internationally Active Banks

Applicable to Banks on Consolidated Basis

CHAPTER VIII BASEL AND CREDIT RISK

Evolution of Regulatory environment

In the late eighties, there was a lot of cross-border lending particularly by the

Japanese banks. Japanese banks grew enormously and gathered market share;

Western banks complained about Japanese banks being regulated badly.

Basel I was an attempt to standardise the regulation governing the global banking

industry.

The Basel Capital Accord, the current international framework on Capital Adequacy

was adopted in 1988 by many banks worldwide and in 1992 in India.

The heart of the Basel I norms defined minimum required equity capital, i.e. an

attempt to contain leverage.

The feature of Basel I hovered four dimensions (Figure I)

Required equity capital was a single number calculated as a fraction of the risk

weighted assets (RWA).

RWA = w1x1 + w2x2 + : : :, where x1 was corporate

exposure, and w1 = 1.

The weights for all the other classes of assets was set at less than 1.

The main focus appeared to be on addressing credit risk.

The minimum equity requirement was set through a minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio

(CAR), at typically 8% of RWA.

Positive Point

The CAR requirement did reduce the extremely high levels of leverage in the banking

industry.

Criticisms

The accord assumes that all banks have same financial status. It prescribed “a

single size hat that fits all.”

The calculation of RWA is incorrect as Risks in the banking portfolio are not

linear.

Assets were classified on very broad lines.

Ignored differences between countries. - (If 8% works for the OECD, what is

correct for India?)

Two minimum standards

Asset to capital multiple - Risk based capital ratio (Cooke ratio)

Scope is limited

o Portfolio effects missing- a well diversified portfolio is much less likely to

suffer massive credit losses

o Netting is absent

The focus on credit risk gave banks incentives to find new ways of bearing risk.

(Eg. higher exposure in interest rate risk, OTC derivatives.)

Ignored the problem of opacity - loans, OTC derivatives, OTC trading.

No market or operational risk

Consequences

Even though these were broad recommendations, they became rigid in the hands

of weak banking regulators.

This became especially problematic countries where the regulatory framework

was not strong enough to develop their own risk management rules.

The focus shifted from taking risks with a clear understanding of the returns, to

blindly using BIS rules.

Basel II

Afterwards, over the past several years, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

has been working on a new accord to reflect changes in the structure and practices of

banking and financial markets.

The latest version of the new Basel Capital Accord known as Basel II was released in

a Consultative Paper in April 2003.

The focus has been on strengthening the regulatory capital framework minimum

capital requirement which is more sensitive to the risk profile and risk management.

The object of the new Capital Accord is to have an improved Capital Adequacy

Framework to foster a strong emphasis on risk management.

The new Capital Accord spells out how the banks should set aside capital as a buffer

against unforeseen risks.

Further the banks around the world should have similar standards of risk assessment

and measurement.

“Thus the expressed purpose of the Basel II norms is

to better align regulatory capital with actual risk. “

Basel

Pillar IMinimum Capital

Requirement

Pillar IISupervisory Control Pillar III

Market Discipline

Credit Risk Operational Risk Market Risk

Standardized Approach

IRBApproach

Foundation IRB

AdvancedIRB

Basic Indicator Standardized Advanced Measurement

Standardized Approach

ModelApproach

Basel II is of course improved version of Basel I Accord. The new Accord was to be

implemented by 2004 end, but has been postponed to 2006 so as to empower member

countries to fine-tune the provisions and sort out relevant guidelines.

The new accord consists of three pillars:

1. Minimum Capital requirements

2. Supervisory Review of Capital Adequacy

3. Market Discipline and Public disclosure.

Minimum Capital Requirement

Supervisory Control Market Discipline

Pillar (1) : Minimum Capital Requirements

The current accord is based on the concept of a capital ratio where the numerator

represents the required amount of capital by a bank and the denominator is the risk

weighted assets. The resulting capital adequacy ratio should not be less than 8%.

Under the proposed new capital accord also, the numerator of the capital ratio remains

unchanged. The minimum required ratio is also kept unchanged at 8%. The

modifications have been in the definition of risk weighted assets. The new definition

contains more focus on risks to make it more meaningful. Measuring of economic

capital will be done by aggregation of various risks viz. credit risk, market risk and

operational risk. The current accord covers two types of risks namely credit risk and

the market risk. The market risk was introduced by the Committee in 1996 and

1mplemented from 1997 by most of the banks.

In the new accord, the pillar 1 modifies the definition of the risk weighted assets. It

emphasizes on treatment of credit risk in a more scientific way and also introduction of

an explicit treatment of operational risk.

1. Credit Risk

Under the first approach the Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) is determined. However, it

has departure from the previous accord in setting the risk weights. Here risk weights

are revised from time to time depending upon the ratings of counter parties by External

Credit Rating Agencies. These exposures are to be converted into a single numeric

component of RWA.

The methods of measuring credit risk have been given as under:

(i) Standardized approach.

(ii) Foundation IRB (Internal Rating Based) approach.

(iii) Advanced IRB approach.

2. Operational Risk

The operational risk is defined as the risk of losses arising out of inadequate or

failed internal processes, people and systems or external events. The committee

provides that banks need to hold the capital to protect losses arising out of the

operational risk. This is

another area where the regulatory capital approach has been put forth.

Here again capital charges are computed directly and then multiplied by 12.5 to

make it comparable with RWA.

Basel II contains two simpler approaches to operational risk viz. the basic indicator

approach and the standardized approach.

(a) Basic Indicator Approach

In this, the measure is bank’s gross income which will include interest income as well as

non interest income. Three years average of the gross income will be taken and multiplied

by a factor of 0.15 set by the Committee which will produce the capital requirement.

(b) The Standardized Approach

I this, gross income is an indicator for the scale of a bank’s business operations. Under this

method the banks need to calculate a capital requirement for each business line. This is

calculated by multiplying gross income by specific supervisory factors determined by the

Committee. Banks should have adequate operational risk systems complied with the

minimum criteria laid down by the Committee.

3. Market Risk.

For markets risk also, a standardized as well as IRB approach is prescribed. However,

it is different from credit risk methodology. Here the capital charges are determined

directly and it has a multiplier of 12.5 so as to make it comparable to the RWA.

Again a special type of Tier III capital is introduced to cover market risk only, which

will consist of short-term subordinate debt with a minimum maturity of two years and

with a cap not exceeding 250% of Tier I capital used to meet market risk.

Here five distinct sources of market risk are identified.

1. Interest Rate Risk 2. Equity Position Risk 3. Foreign Exchange Risk

4. Commodity Risk 5. Risk from Operations

Pillar (2) : Supervisory Review

Pillar II aims at improving supervisory review process and stresses supervisory review as a

critical complement to capital requirement and market discipline. It also emphases that

supervisors need to take a comprehensive view on how banks handle their risk

management and internal capital allocation process. As per the new accord the traditional

regulation by the regulator has been outdated and control in the form of direct supervision

is coming to the forefront.

The second pillar emphasizes the need for banks to assess their capital adequacy positions

relative to their overall risks and for supervisors to review the same. The supervisors will

also take appropriate actions after making proper assessments.

This pillar adds strong risk assessment capabilities by banks as well as supervisors. It will

be necessary for the banks to have adequate capital to protect against adverse or uncertain

economic conditions.

There may also be a stress test of the assets held by the bank. The supervisors may require

a bank to reduce risk exposures so that its existing capital resources match its minimum

capital requirement.

Pillar (3) : Market Discipline

This is complementary to Pillar (1) and Pillar (2). The Committee has sought to encourage

market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which

allow the stakeholders, shareholders and other market participants to assess key

information about a bank’s risk profile and level of capital resources to absorb the

unexpected losses.

The third pillar relates to market discipline or public disclosure. The potential of market

discipline to reinforce capital regulation depends on the disclosure of reliable and timely

information with a view to enabling banks’ counter parties to make well-founded risk

assessments. Pillar III complements the other two pillars. The accord seeks to encourage

market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements.

The corporate governance has already been implemented and more and more disclosures

are now required in the balance sheet of banks. Further the banks should also have proper

policies and guidelines in place for action and compliance by various functionaries.

This pillar (3) of the new capital accord can generate significant benefits in managing

banks and supervisors to minimize risk and improve stability. Market discipline can

contribute to a safe and sound banking environment.

Other Issues

Capital Requirement Under Basel II Accord

(from Federal Reserve Bulletin-Sept.03)

Implementation of New Accord

Though the proposals of Basel II accord are suitable for a wide range of banks in different

countries but within the G-10, the Committee members have agreed to a common

implementation date for the new accord of year end 2006. In the G-10 countries this

framework will be applied to the entire banking system. For other countries, the

Committee provides that the regulator may first strengthen the supervisory system and

develop a time table and approach for implementation. But many national supervisors have

already begun to plan for the transition to Basel II. A framework will be developed for

assisting Non G- 10 country supervisors and banks in the transition stage to both the

standardized and foundation IRB approaches of the New Accord. However, the frame

work is still under preparation requiring suitable amendments on the basis of most recent

Regulatory capital (Definition unchanged) Minimum required --------------------------- = Capital Required ratio Measure of risk exposure (8% minimum unchanged)(Risk-weighted assets)(Measure revised)

Credit risk Market risk OperationalExposure + Exposure + Exposure(Measure revised) (Measure unchanged) (Explicit measure added)

Asset Securitisation

Basel II also provides a specific treatment for asset securitization which is not there in

the current accord. This is a risk management technique which relates to transfer of

ownership and/or risk associated with the credit exposures of the banks. Thus this is an

important tool in providing better risk diversification and risk mitigation and enhancing

financial stability by modifying the credit portfolio suitably.

Impact of New Capital Adequacy Norms

Undoubtedly, the new capital accord will be requiring more capital maintenance by the

banks. But it should never be presumed that the banks in India can not meet the

requirements of Basel II accord. The market risk has already been implemented.

Further, under the new accord, the risk weights for sovereign, inter bank transactions,

mortgage backed loans etc. are fixed at lower levels. The capital requirement will also

be at 8 per cent level as against existing level maintained by most of the banks, which

is above 10 per cent of the risk weighted assets. Thus the maintenance of capital as per

the rating of the accounts may not require for the banks to maintain hefty additional

capital on this score.

However, banks will have to provide capital resources for the operational risk by

keeping aside a substantial portion of gross income (8 per cent of 15 per cent of gross

income).

The impact may not be much more for capital requirement but the complexity of the

system will have to be properly resolved and suitable measures to be taken so as to

collect and preserve information required.

Issues in the Indian Context

The Basel II accord is a burning topic amongst Indian banks for the last two years. Indian

Banks are conceptually and academically ready to adopt the new norms. But a lot of issues

are involved and also there are a lot of difficulties in its implementation in the Indian

context.

The Main Issues involved are :

1. Availability of Historical Data

The historical database as required to assess various parameters, customer data base and

also other required data is not available. The probability of default, the loss given default

and the maturity value factors for computation of credit risk will be based on the historical

data. Substantial current and historical data collection on credit portfolio are required for

moving towards the IRB approach for Credit Risk Management. Such data has to be

created by the regulatory or the supervisory i.e. RBI vis-à-vis individual banks. Further it is

a very laborious and time consuming process.

2. Higher Risk Weights for Sovereign

All claims on sovereign are currently assigned a risk weight of 0 per cent. Now under the

new capital accord the risk weight of sovereign has also been fixed at 0 to 150 per cent

and it is likely to be at 50 per cent for India.

3. Cost Factor

The implementation of the Basel II accord will involve the cost factor both for individual

banks as well as the supervisory. The banks will have to improve their systems and

procedures including the computerized environment. They should have analytical

systems, models and tools in place for risk assessment, measurement and control.

4. Technological Up-gradation

For implementation of the Basel II accord, the technology up-gradation will be required for

many banks which may not be in a position to incur huge capital and revenue expenditure

on this front. The interconnectivity and the core banking solution has not been

implemented by most of the banks so far. Each bank may be required to incur an

expenditure of over Rs. 500 Crore in this area. Thus there will be requirement of large

resources for technology, the return of which will not be adequate and immediate.

5. Applicability

Even the G-10 countries are finding it difficult to implement the Basel II accord in all the

banks. Therefore the applicability to various banks in India has to be decided with the

specified time schedule i.e. the year by which the same will be implemented in some or all

the banks in India. In other words, longer time may be required for its implementation in

India.

6. Diversified Products

The new diversified products like derivatives and asset securitization are being adopted by

the banks which will have an impact on the implementation of Basel II accord in deciding

risk factor for off balance sheet exposure.

7. Legal and Regulatory Guidelines

For implementation of the Basel II accord, the new guidelines have to be framed and risk

factors etc. are also to be ascertained by the regulatory i.e. RBI. The related laws/ acts also

have to be suitably amended, if need be.

8. Higher Risk Weight to Small and Medium Enterprises

There is a higher risk weight to the small and medium enterprises. In our country, the

public sector banks have more than 40 per cent of their lending to the priority sector. The

implementation of Basel II accord can adversely affect the priority sector lending. Instead,

the banks will choose to finance good rated corporate borrowers or mortgage backed

advances.

9. Credit Rating

The risk weights are to be allotted as per the credit rating of various borrower accounts.

The rating is a yearly process and in most of the cases the rating will be based on the

audited financial statements pertaining to the previous year as the latest audited financial

statements can not be made available on the day of year end.

10. Calculation of Capital Requirement

The method of calculation of Capital Requirement under comprehensive approach is very

complex and not easy to calculate.

11. Higher Risk Weights

The risk weights under the new accord are ranging from 0 to 150 per cent, enhanced from

the present maximum level of 100 per cent, which will affect the risk weighted assets and

will require more capital resources.

12. Disclosures

Too many disclosures by banks sometimes may lead to a chaotic situation and can further

damage the financial position of the Bank.

Suggestions

1. The RBI has already suggested that in the first phase, the Basel II will be applicable for

the internationally operative banks. It has been further clarified that the banks having cross

border operations of more than 20-25 per cent, shall fall under the said purview of

internationally active bank.

2. RBI may redefine and pronounce the risk weights as per suitability of the country

conditions which may not affect the priority sector lending and are favourable for the

development of small sector. In other cases also the RBI may reduce the risk weight on

their best judgment assessment.

3. The discretion to assign a lower risk weight for the claims on sovereign should be

available.

4. Similarly the RBI should have flexibility in defining the exposure classes such as

sovereign, corporate, retail, small and medium enterprises etc.

5. The RBI may provide the data regarding probability of default, loss given default

maturity etc. to enable banks to compute the credit risk. The banks may also analyze and

compute the factors for probability of default and loss given default based on past

experience.

6. Possible impacts of implementation of Basel II accord may be studied by the expert

group and then the same may be implemented as per the recommendations of the expert

group.

7. The asset securitization has not become popular in India as yet. It can be promoted to

assist banks in implementing the Basel II accord comfortably by parting the assets, which

may require higher capital, under securitization deal.

8. The level of preparedness for implementation of the new capital accord may be

improved during the period down the line till year end 2006. The banks need to collect and

preserve the historical data and also analyzing the same using the technology. Banks need

to deploy and up-grade the technologies and human skills.

9. Individual banks need to have proper project planning for Basel II and to have

connectivity of the branches.

10. Individual banks to have robust internal rating system for credit risk management.

They should also have the data and a tracking of rating migration by developing rating

transition matrix.

11. Looking to the complexities of Basel II, a gradualist approach for switch over to Basel

II is suggested. The banks other than internationally active banks can be allowed a further

period of 2-3 years after year end 2006, for implementing the Basel II accord.

12. For the inter bank transactions, the cross holding of capital and other regulatory

investments by other banks, up to 10 per cent of total capital, could be permitted.

13. Export Credit Agencies should review the country risk from time to time in

consultation with or participation of the regulatory.

Credit Risk and Basel II

Introduction - Frame Work

This is presently 8% as prescribed by Basel (The minimum prescribed rate by our regulator

(RBI) is 9%).

There are three approaches to calculate the capital adequacy as described by the Basel

Accord. They are

1. Standardized approach,

2. Foundation IRB (Internal Rating Based) approach,

3. Advanced IRB approach.

The bank can choose any one of the above approaches suited to their portfolio. Here, we

discuss the major risk elements and the various approaches in respective Credit Risk areas.

Total CapitalCapital Adequacy =

Credit Risk + Operational Risk + Market Risk

Credit Risk – What is it

Credit risk is derived from the probability distribution of economic loss due to credit

events, measured over some time horizon, for some large set of borrowers. Two

properties of the probability distribution of economic loss are important; the expected

credit loss and the unexpected credit loss. The latter is the difference between the

potential loss at some high confidence level and expected credit loss. A firm should

earn enough from customer spreads to cover the cost of credit. The cost of credit is

defined as the sum of the expected loss plus the cost of economic capital defined as

equal to unexpected loss.

(i) Standardized Approach

The standardized approach is based on the External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI)

ratings for sovereigns, banks and corporates and is more risk sensitive as compared to

existing standardized approach. The primary motivation of the standardized

approach is that most banks are in early stages of developing data base on internal loss

based on different risk perception. In addition, industry wise data is also not fully

available to develop internal loss. Hence the simplest method for calculation of CAR has

been preferred.

The risk weights corresponding to each rating category is furnished below.

Standardized Approach : Proposed Risk Weight Table (Percentage)

AAA to

AA-

A+ to

A-

BBB+ to

BBB-

BB+ to

B-

Below

B-

Unrated

Sovereign (Govt. & Central

Bank)

0 20 50 100 150 100

Bank Option1 * 20 50 100 100 100 100

Bank Option2a ** 20 50 50 100 100 50

Short Term claims under Option 2 b

(up to 1 year) ***

20 20 20 50 150 20

Corporates 20 50 100 100 150 100

* Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign (Country) in which bank is

incorporated.

** Risk weighting based on assessment of individual bank.

*** Risk weighting based on assessment of individual bank with claims of original

maturity <6 months.

Off-Balance-sheet exposures

Retail Portfolio 75%

Lending fully secured by Mortgage of Residential Properties 35%

Small and Medium Enterprises 100%

Past Due Loans (Non Performing Assets):

If specific provision is less than 20% of O/S balance 150%

If provision is 20% or more of O/S balance 100%

If provision is more than 15% of O/S balance but loan is fully secured 100%

National supervisors may decide to apply a 150% or higher risk weight in case of

claims on sovereigns/ PSEs/banks/securities firms rated below B-, claims on corporates

rated below BB-, past due loans, securitization tranches (proposed risk weighted at

350%) that are rated between BB+ and BB-.

The committee is not proposing to change the existing conversion factors for off

balance-sheet items with the exception of commitments. Credit conversion factor is

o 20% for commitments of original maturity <= 1 year

o 50% for commitments of original maturity > 1 year

o 0% for commitments that are unconditionally cancelable

(ii) IRB (Internal ratings based) approach / Foundation Approach

In the foundation IRB approach, the probability of default is provided by the bank and

other parameters such as loss given default, exposure at default and maturity

(values set by the Committee according to the maturity of advances) will be provided

by the regulatory.

In the Internal Rating Based approaches, the risk weights and capital charges are

determined through the quantitative inputs provided by banks themselves or by the

regulatory and formulas specified by the Committee.

IRB approach is based on banks internal assessment of counter parties and exposures.

The main three elements are

Risk components/drivers of potential credit loss

Risk weight function, by which the risk components are converted to risk weights.

Minimum requirements.

There are six different categories of risk exposures as per this approach.

1. Sovereigns &Public Sector Entities 4. Retail Loans

2. Other Banks 5.Project Finance

3. Corporates 6.Equity Investments

Even though the broad features are mostly similar for each type of exposure, different

methodology is adopted and in each case, two concepts are identified.

EXPECTED LOSS

Rs.

Probability of Default

(PD)%

Loss Severity Given Default

(Severity)%

Loan EquivalentExposure

(Exposure)Rs

What is the probability of the counterparty

defaulting?

If default occurs, how much of this do we

expect to lose?

If default occurs, how much exposure do we

expect to have?

Borrower Risk Facility Risk Related

Risk factors are based on

Long run average probability of default (PD) of borrowers in each rating grade.

Loss given default (LGD).

Exposure at default (EAD)

Maturity (M)

Granularity of portfolio (which is determined by the concentration of a bank’s

exposure to a single borrower or a group of closely related borrowers)

However, the accord imposes on banks to meet the following requirements to the

satisfaction of the supervisory authority.

(a) There is a risk management system in the bank which is conceptually sound and is

implemented with integrity.

(b) The models granted by bank have a proven tack record of reasonable performance

in the eyes of the supervisory authority.

(c) There should be an independent risk control unit which directly reports to the

senior management and board of Directors.

(d) The output of the risk management unit should be an integral component of the

planning process and day-today operations of the bank.

(iii) Advanced IRB approach

In IRB foundation approach, estimates of default risk of obligor are provided by the

bank using internal estimates whereas other risk drivers are applied as per

supervisory norms.

However in case of IRB advanced approach, all the risk drivers except for

granularity would be based on banks internal methodologies.

Issues/Constraints and suggestions under credit risk

The nominal capital benefit accruing from credit risk due to lesser capital

requirement for claims on external rated accounts/retail portfolio/residential

property is to be shifted to unrated claims on banks, lower rated borrowers, past

due loans and high risk exposures and hence the overall capital requirement may

not be reduced much.

Issues and Constraints SuggestionsIn case of corporate claims, different risk weights are applied based on external ratings. External ratings agencies like S & P is using ‘‘ 7 σ’’ approach for assigning highest category rating. In India, due to scarcity of capital, the borrowers having economic capital @ 7 σ basis is very rare.

Supervisory authorities may permit banks to risk weight all corporate claims and advances above Rs.5 crore (above the cut of limit of retail advance) instead of external ratings in view of very limited number of external rated companies in India.

Banks should use solicited ratings from eligibleECAIs. (National supervisory authorities may,however, allow banks to use unsolicited ratings in the same way as solicited ratings)

There may be the potential for ECAIs to use unsolicited ratings to put pressure on entities to obtain solicited ratings though powers are given toSupervisors for de-recognizing such ECAIs.

Exposure to retail portfolio with risk weight at 75%

Granularity criterion may be avoided in view of fixing of maximum aggregated retail exposure to one counterpart of 1 million Euro or Rs.5 cr.

Lending fully secured by mortgages on residential property that is or will be occupied by the borrower, or that is rented, will be risk weighted at 35%.

The criteria shall be extended to all claims secured by mortgages

The unsecured portion of any loan (other than a qualifying residential mortgage loan) that is past due for more than 90 days, net of specific provisions, will be risk-weighted more.

The unsecured portion of any loan (other than any mortgage) that is past due for more than 90 days, net of specific provisions, shall be risk-weighted more

Securitization trenches that are rated between BB+ and BB- will be risk weighted at 350%.It is also noted that higher risk weight will adversely affect the expansion of asset securitization in India. It is also possible that banks may ‘cherry-pick’ their portfolios for securitization. As a consequence, banks may retain the worse assets in their B/S aftersecuritising higher quality assets.

The risk weight of 350% is very high and hence maximum cut off may be fixed as applicable to advances.

Capital relief in respect of CRM techniques. Banks shall give certain Capital relief in case of effective use of CRM techniques since it reduces credit risk or transfers credit risk after cons idering the increase of residual risks.

Issues and Constraints SuggestionsIn case of IRB approach, the entire advances should be rated, which is impracticable in present Indian scenario.

A major chunk of advances (Regulatory Advances like social lending) are difficult to rate by the bank. The regulator has to come out with uniform guidelines.

Capital adequacy ratio of the bank has to be certified by the statutory auditors. While considering the Indian banking scenario and size of the assets, auditors may be finding it difficult /time consuming to assess the rating of individual assets and portfolio of assets. In view of the above, auditors are likely to give disclaimer in their reports.

In IRB approach, retail advances shall be excluded from rating of individual advances and hence 75% RW shall be assigned on portfolio wise.

Recoveries has to be increased to minimize loss given default which in turn will reduce theunexpected losses of portfolio.

Effective legislation/ reduction of time consumption of legal process are required.

The securitization is in the nascent stage. Securitization (both asset backed and mortgaged backed) of assets by banks shall be popularized to reduce banks capital requirements.

It is expected that expected losses to be covered through pricing and unexpected losses through capital allocation. As expected losses are not transforming to proper pricing due to unhealthy competition, economic capital requirement is high.

Suitable monitoring system shall be developed by supervisors to overcome this practice. Also pricing based on rating may be extended to good individual borrowers to minimize the disparity.

CHAPTER IX CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT – A DEEPER LOOK

Credit Risk Management has been practiced since commencement of banking activity

but the discussion of risk management, the tool used in different risk management areas

and the resources deployed in terms of skills and technology have shown considerable

sophistication in recent years. The tone has been set by increasing competition for loan

business, declining spreads and the heightened risk surrounding industrial and

commercial activity.

As we have already seen the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision set up by the

bank for International Settlements (BIS) has issued some broad principles for

management of credit risk by banks. These are:

o Establishing an appropriate credit risk environment.

o Operating under a sound credit granting process.

o Maintaining an appropriate credit administration, risk measurement and

monitoring process.

o Ensuring adequate controls over credit risks.

o Role of bank supervisors/bank regulatory authorities in ensuring that banks have

an effective system in place to identify measure, monitor and control credit risk.

Credit risk management covers both the decision-making process, before the credit

decision is made, the follow-up of credit facilities, plus all monitoring and reporting

processes. The decision making process covers all the steps associated with a client’s

credit application, from the original account officer’s proposal to all credit officers who

examine the credit application, or to a credit committee which reviews/approves the

proposal. The decision based on various credit evaluation parameters based on

financial data, plus judgmental assessment of the market outlook, of the borrower, of

the management and of the shareholders. The follow-up is done through periodic

reporting reviews of the bank commitments by customer, industry and country. In

addition, “warning systems” are put in pace to signal the deterioration of the situation

of the borrower before default whenever possible. A work-out process, by which all

actions to minimize possible losses are considered and taken care can be trigged if a

default occurs.

Limits Systems and credit Screening

Credit Risk is sought to be limited by strict exposures limits aimed at limiting losses in

the event of a default. Before any credit decision is made, an authorisation has to be

specified. The authorisation states the maximum amount at risk with any customer, or

group of customers. Within the authorisation, credit decisions can be made, provided

that they meet the standards of credit risk acceptance laid down by the bank. The usage

of credit lines should remain below the limit approved. The risk reporting system

should be able to consolidate all the facilities that are made available to a customer in

order to constantly check that the line usage remains within limits.

The basic principles followed while setting up limits are simple to understand as under:

(1) Avoid a situation in which any single loss endangers the bank;

(2) To diversify and broad base the commitments across various dimensions such as

customers, industries and geographical regions;

(3) To avoid lending to any borrower an amount that would increase its debt beyond its

debt servicing capacity.

The equity of the borrower sets up some reasonable limits to its debt given

acceptable levels of its debt/equity ratio. The capital of the bank sets up another limit to

lending given the diversification requirements and/or the credit policy guidelines. The

bank regulatory authorities also often prescribe exposure limits in relation to a bank’s

capital and maximum credit exposure to an individual customer as also credit exposure

in the aggregate.

Ultimately, with a full-blown quantitative risk management systems, the

capital of the bank could be allocated to all credit lines. Such allocation of capital

requires special systems to measure risks at the level of a transaction and at the level of

the bank portfolio, including diversification effects. Risk based capital allocation is a

sophisticated systems, which goes well beyond the recording of amounts at risk. This

allocation can serve the purpose of limiting the consolidated risk according to the

actual available capital. It also makes explicit the capital usage of various credit lines.

Limits can potentially be defined in terms of capital usage. Most practices, however, do

not reach this stage, but the trend is to focus on the capital usage of credit lines because

of regulation and its emphasis on risk based capital.

Is Limits systems widely used?

It is not as relevant as it appears. When the bank is dealing with a limited number of

big customers, it is difficult to set limits. First, lending is based on a continuous

relationship. Setting limits and relationship banking are interacting processes. Second,

big corporations with an excellent credit standing are less subject to limits given the

high quality of their risk. In other words, “relationship banking” and “name lending”

tend to reduce the importance of quantitative limits. However, bank regulators do

prescribe that banks observe a system of lending limits while providing loans.

For individuals, the credit application process can be considerably simplified,

compared to what it is for corporate or financial sector borrowers. There are a large

number of customers so that statistical methods rather than customized risk appraisal

systems become relevant. Authorisations result from the appraisal of the credit standing

of borrowers based upon their observable characteristics such as yearly income,

property, values, and employment characteristics and so on. For individuals the

appraisals of the risk quality can often rely on credit scoring. Scoring so arrived at

estimates the quality of the risk as a function of a limited number of selected

characteristics / parameters.

The limit system centralises the information about the borrowers, in terms of both

authorisations and usage of credit lines. In addition to limiting the amount of risk, the

centralisation is also a basis for monitoring portfolio orientations, such as increasing

the portfolio diversification, or reducing concentration in a particular industry or

industrial group, or any other portfolio parameters.

External Ratings

The best known systems are those of specialized credit rating agencies. For example,

Moody’s uses a simplified rating scale, plus a detailed rating scale. The simplified

scale includes 6 levels. It is briefly described in the following module. Standard &

Poor’s uses similar scales.

Such ratings characterise debt issues rather than issuers. The reason is that some debt

issues, from the same borrower, could be less risky than others. Investors are more

interested in the risk of an issue, given its specific protection, than in the issuer. Ratings

qualify the risk of losses in the event of default, a combination of default probabilities

and recoveries. The ratings signify rankings, not quantitative measures of risk quality.

Common rating systems include from 6 to 10 different ranks, which are sufficient to

discriminate among risk classes.

For the internal use of banks, there are other options to be considered. First, ratings

could qualify the credit standing of the borrower, instead of combining it with recovery

risk.

Ratings attached to facilities are useful whenever guarantees are attached to individual

facilities. For transactions structured with guarantees and collaterals the quality of the

protection becomes more important than the credit standing of the borrower. Whether it

is necessary to have a dedicated rating system for facilities or not is a management

decision. However, to have a fine pricing system for different facilities to meet the

demands of competition, a bank would feel the need for a dedicated rating system to

ensure that its pricing system is risk-based.

A rating system can also serve as a tool for credit policy. For instance, some minimum

rating might be required to make a loan, or to delegate authority to credit officers. They

can be allowed or not allowed to enter transactions based on the borrower rating.

A rating system requires robustness to be accepted as a reliable tool. For corporate

borrowers, the criteria for assessing risk are well known: profitability, growth, industry

outlook, competitive advantages, management and shareholders, in addition to the

standard set of financial and operational performance rations. Ratings are required

while lending to financial institutions as well. However, the rating criteria differ

significantly from those applicable to corporate borrowers. Since the financial industry

is highly regulated, the policy of the regulating bodies, which can vary greatly between

countries, is an important factor for those institutions that operate internationally. In

addition, the rating system for individual borrowers is obviously different from that

applicable to corporate borrowers as mentioned earlier.

Internal Ratings

Internal rating systems exist in many institutions. As per the system borrowers are

ranked according to their credit quality. Sometimes, facilities are also rated, in order to

capture the quality for protection against the default of the borrower that is embedded

with the facility. Such protection can be obtained through the status of privileged debt

or collateral, guarantees or any other contractual agreement.

Rating System: Design

Finally, the design of the rating system changes across institutions. While a few will

prefer a fairly detailed rating system, with explicit rules for appraising criteria and

weighting them, others may focus more on the judgmental appraisal of risk quality,

with guidelines specifying the criteria to be appraised before making a judgment.

Credit Enhancement

Guarantees and loan covenants are the main vehicles of credit enhancement. Credit

enhancements are sought when a bank does not feel comfortable about the decision on

the basis of a borrower’s rating alone. An enhancement helps a bank not only to take

the credit decision but also to price the facility more competitively. The borrower may

not object to the credit enhancement particularly if it helps him in obtaining a lower

price from the bank. They aim at reducing the amount of loss in the event of default

because they increase the recoveries. The covenants trigger preemptive actions

whenever the credit standing deteriorates. Collaterals and third party guarantees serve

as an insurance, whose value is uncertain, in the event of default. Covenants are

virtually sort of an aid to active monitoring of risks.

Covenants

Covenants create additional obligations for the borrower. For instance, if the borrower

breaks the covenants, the lender can be entitled to a prompt repayment of its debt. This

is a powerful incentive to comply with the covenants. In practice, some waivers can be

accepted. The actual goal of covenants is to initiate negotiations with the borrower

before default, not to trigger default as such. There are financial covenants based on the

usual financial ratios. For instance, the debt / equity ratio can be specified to remain

below a stated limit; if the actual ratio exceeds the limit the lender would be entitled to

call off the credit facility. Legal covenants restrict the initiatives of the borrowers.

Typically, they seek to reduce diversification beyond the borrower’s core business or

restrict the uses of the funds of the borrower so that he repays the bank debt first,

before anything else. But there are alternatives to design the set of covenants according

to the specifics of a borrower or a transaction.

Structured Transactions

Credit enhancing devices can be sophisticated such as those in case of structured

transactions. The structure of the transaction aims at isolating the risk of the transaction

from that of the borrowing entity. Guarantees and covenants are the basic ingredients

of a transaction structure. The level of protection can also be improved with other

specific features. For instance, reserve accounts can be set up and / or built up

progressively with time whenever some target indicator hits a trigger value. The build-

up of cash balances or of collateral, serves as a first-level protection for the lender that

has privileged access to them.

Securitisation

A good example of a structured transaction is securitisation. Whenever some assets are

securitised, they serve as collateral for debt issues sold to investors. The risk of those

debt issues has to be limited and rated, so that investors know what they buy.

Typically, the flows generated by the collateral assets will be routed again to the low

risk investors as a priority. The structure isolates investors from the original credit risk

of the assets being securitised.

Credit enhancing vehicles are numerous and are being increasingly used. They range

from stand by letters of credit, complex structures for Leveraged Buy Outs (LBO),

project finance, assets acquisition or securitisation. The credit enhancement is obtained

by the separation, partial or almost total, of the risk of the transaction from the risk of

the borrower.

Credit enhancing vehicles achieve this purpose through risk transformation as well as

risk reduction. The collateral changes the credit risk into a recovery risk plus an asset

value risk. Third-party guarantees transform the default risk of the debtor into a smaller

joint default risk. Covenants, or other devices mitigating credit risk, are useful triggers

for active risk monitoring whenever the credit standing of the borrower deteriorates.

Credit Risk in banking transactions & measuring credit risk in it

From a quantitative standpoint, credit risk is measured by the loss in the event of a

default. Credit risk results from a combination of default risk, exposure risk and

recovery risk.

The resulting loss L is random and can be seen as the product of a random variable

characterising default D ( a percentage), an uncertain exposure X (a value) and an

uncertain recovery rate R ( a percentage):

Loss = D x X x (1-R)

Let us summaries the issue of measuring risk. Although a symbolic formulation, it

shows that the upstream random factors that influence exposures and recoveries have to

be investigated. It also suggests that the measure should, ideally cover all 3

components.

Let us introduce common measures of the components of credit risk from default risk

to exposure risk and recovery risk.

Internal Ratings

External Ratings

Default Statistics

From Internal Ratings to External Ratings and Default Statistics

1. Default Risk

An adequate quantitative measure of default risk is the probability of default. The

available measures are either ratings or historical statistics on defaults, which can be

used as proxies for default risk. Another method to quantify default risk is to derive an

estimate of default probability based on a borrowing entity’s characteristics.

The Historical Frequencies of Defaults

There is significant correlation between ratings and default frequencies. Such data are

published yearly by rating agencies for various periods for different rating classes.

It is important to note that most bank clients particularly in developing countries are

not rated by agencies, but are rated internally. If a correspondence can be established

between the internal rating scale and the rating scales of agencies, it provides a link

between internal ratings and historical default frequencies. In a way the methodology is

simple to implement, although the correspondence between internal rating scales can

be approximated and not exact.

Agency ratings and default frequencies

The data available from rating agencies provide relevant information from a statistical

standpoint. They include, for each rating class:

o the frequencies of defaults, yearly or for longer periods of time

o the volatility across time of yearly frequencies, which results from changes in

general economic conditions

o the transition matrices between ratings classes. These give the percentages of issues

in which ratings X changed into rating Y during a certain period. Such percentages

are available for all couples of ratings classes X and Y.

The default rates are close to zero for the best risk qualities. They increase to around

8% a year for the lowest rating class. It can be the magnitude of yearly default rates for

the 6 rating classes in Moody’s simplified rating scale. Actual values vary every year.

The top 3 ratings characterise “investment grade” borrowers. The other 3 classes are

called “speculative grade” because of their much higher associated risk. For investment

grade borrowers, the default rate ranges from 0.02% to 0.08% a year.

The relationship between ratings and default rates is far from proportional. The

increase in the default rate when ratings decline has an exponential shape. The increase

in default rate from one class to the next changes drastically when going down the

rating scale. In order to improve the rating by one grade, the required variation of

default rate will be 6.5% for the last 2 classes of the scale, but a small decrease of

0.02% suffices to improve the grade from Aa to Aaa.

Moody’s Ratings Yearly Default Rates

Aaa 0.02%Aa 0.04%A 0.08%

Baa 0.20%Ba 1.80%B 8.30%

This observed law has important implications. The ratings drive the cost of lending by

banks. Improving the ratings class it can be done theoretically by improving the overall

solvency of the borrower. But the required improvement of solvency to gain one rating

class, measured in terms of default rate, is much higher in the lower grades of the scale

than in the upper grades.

4%

3%

2%

1%

0%Mean

%

Years

Def

ault

Rat

es Time Series of Default Rates

Volatility

Graph Default Rates : Time Series

Are Default rates volatile?

Default rates become unstable with the passing of time. The volatility of yearly

historical default rates is the standard deviation of observed values. The volatility

increases with the level of default rate, that is, when the rating diminishes. This is

consistent with the fact that low default rates are closer to the zero value floor which

limits their variations. Such volatilities are available from time series of default rates

observed across varying horizons.

If the volatility is high, the potential deviations of the default rate around the average

can be significant. If the volatility is low, deviations are small. The unexpected loss

will be higher in the first case. The default rate volatility is a simple base for measuring

the unexpected loss for loan portfolios. The unexpected loss is proportional to this

standard deviation. The expected loss is proportional to the average default rate.

Default Rates and Horizon

The cumulated default rates increase with the horizon. The longer the period the higher

the chances of observing a default. The growth of cumulated default rates with horizon

is not proportional. For high ratings, or low default rates, the increase is more than

proportional. For low ratings and high default rates, it is less than proportional. High-

risk borrowers improve their risk, when they survive for a longer time. Low risk

borrowers face risk deterioration when time passes. All these observable facts are

important in differentiating the risks across time and in valuing both expected and

unexpected losses.

Years Years

Cum

ulat

ed D

efau

lt R

ate

Vola

tility

of

Def

ault

Rat

e

Low Rating

High Rating

As time passes, the risk tends to change. It either improves or deteriorates. These shifts

are captured by the transition frequencies between risk classes. Such frequencies can be

tabulated for each pair of ratings. Within a given period, the transition frequencies can

be recorded as a transition rate (%) between classes. Transitions occur mostly in the

neighbouring classes of ratings and there is a concentration of high frequencies along

the first diagonal of the matrix. In this example, the probability of transition from class

A to B is 2% while the probability of an unchanged rating of A is 95%.

Figure 1 Time Profiles and Volatility of Default Rates

2. Exposure Risk

Exposure is the amount at risk in the event of default without considering recoveries.

Since the default occurs at an unknown future date, the amounts at risk that count are

future amounts at risk. When they are known, they must be derived from the time

profile of exposure. When they are unknown, they have to be estimated, based on

assumptions, conventions or modelling of future exposures. The type of commitment

given by the bank to the borrower is important since it sets up the upper limits of

possible future exposures.

Inter-bank exposure and country risk

A suitable framework has to be evolved to provide a centralized overview on the

aggregate exposure on other banks. Bank-wise exposure limits could be set on the basis

of assessment of financial performance, operating efficiency, management quality, past

experience supervision and control mechanism etc. Like corporate clients, banks

should also be rated and placed in a range on the basis of their credit quality. The limits

so arrived at have to be allocated to various operating centers and followed up at

regular / periodic intervals. Regarding exposure on overseas banks, banks can use the

country ratings accorded by international rating agencies and classify the countries into

low risks, moderate risk and high risk. Banks should endeavor for developing an

internal matrix that reckons the counterparty and country risks. The maximum

exposure should be subjected to adherence of country and bank exposure limits already

in place. The exposure should be monitored at least on a weekly basis till the time

banks are equipped to monitor on daily / online basis.

Credit Risk and the Balance Sheet

A time profile of exposures is defined when there is a contractual repayment schedule.

In all other cases, assumptions or projections are required to be made to estimate future

exposures. An important area for future estimates covers committed lines of credit, of

which usage is not yet 100%. Only the current usage is known, plus the level of the

authorization and the time remaining before its maturity or review date. These lines,

which are not fully used, are treated as given contingencies and recorded off-balance

sheet. For proper risk measurement, it is necessary that such contingencies are captured

in the bank’s MIS.

Not all lines are fully committed. In some cases, there is no commitment, except that

the bank is willing to increase usage up to certain limits if the borrower wants to. The

bank might have informed the customer that he could increase his borrowing. Since the

bank is not legally committed to do so, the unused fraction of the credit line does not

have to be recorded off balance sheet. The situation is similar when authorizations are

purely internal; the client has no idea of the amount that the bank is willing to lend, and

the bank commitment does not go beyond the current line usage.

The current exposure is the current line usage. There is exposure uncertainty as long as

the bank is ready to go beyond the current usage. Future exposure will certainly differ

from the current usage, because of newly opened lines of credit. In such cases, the

expected exposure becomes more relevant than the current usage. Often, only current

exposures are recorded and reported. But expected exposures might be more relevant to

assess future risks.

Product Lines

Balance Sheet Off-Balance Sheet

Projections & Assumptions

Further expected Exposures

Exposures RiskCurrent Exposure

Contingencies

From a risk stand point, off-balance sheet transactions raise specific issues. The risks

appear only conditional depending upon the initiative of a counter party or a third

party. For instance, with a confirmed line of credit, the customer can decide at any time

to draw that line up to the authorized amount. In such case, the given contingency turns

into a credit line, which then appears in the balance sheet. Given contingencies are

options, which can be exercised by the customers or a third party at a future date.

Received contingencies are options, which can be exercised at the initiative of the

bank. Risks generated off-balance sheet are conditional risks, not certain risks.

Off-balance sheet risks appear in the balance sheet only when the options are exercised.

It should be understood that the risk in such cases is potential rather than current.

In regard to given contingencies, it can be argued that since the bank has to comply

with the exercise of the option, 100% of the amount committed is at risk, even though

it is not yet drawn. A potential risk could also be valued at less than 100%. The reason

is that while some contingencies given such as committed lines of credit are very likely

to be used. Others are very unlikely to be drawn, such as guarantee given to a third

party in the event of default of the customer. The approach adopted by bank regulators

is to use a 50% weight to value the potential risk generated by off-balance sheet

transactions due to the limited probability of cost outlays. From the above

consideration, there is a case for differentiating exposures depending upon the nature of

contingencies.

Expected Exposures – The Time Profile

The measure of credit risk exposure depends upon the type of credit lines current,

projected exposure or the level of authorization that can be used.

The time profile of exposures varies widely with the type of transactions. We illustrate

some possible shapes based upon credit authorization profiles, either for amortizing

loan or for committed lines of which usage is uncertain as under:

Time profiles of credit exposure can be expressed as under:

Expo

sure

Expo

sure

Time Time

Bullet Loan, orCommodity Line of Credit Amortising Loan

3. Recovery Risk

Guarantees and covenants diminish risk because they reduce the loss in the event of

default. The loss in the event of default is the amount at risk at default time less

recoveries. Normally, recoveries require legal procedures, expenses and a significant

lapse of time. Loss in the event of default can be estimated before or after the costs of

waiting and workout costs. From a measurement standpoint, the valuation of such

guarantees is an Herculean task, if it is feasible at all. There are many uncertainties

involved. Some historical recovery rates vary widely around the average. Going

beyond some forfeit valuation is not an easy task given the uncertainty in recoveries

from guarantees. The following is a list of some credit risk enhancing effects of

guarantees along with some remarks relevant from a valuation standpoint.

All guarantees are subject to legal risk, i.e. the risk that the guarantees may not be

enforced if they happen to be used. Legal risk depends upon the type of guarantees.

Some guarantees are more enforceable than others. Letters of intent or letters of

comfort have less force than legal commitments without recourse. The legal risk also

depends upon the current environment at the time of default and after. Whenever legal

procedures are activated, the protection of guarantees becomes subject to the outcome

of such procedures. Beyond legal risk, guarantees transform and reduce risks.

Collateral can be seized and sold by the lender, thereby reducing or even canceling the

loss. The original credit risk turns into a recovery risk plus an asset value risk.

Recovery risk depends upon the nature of assets, their location, their integrity and the

legal environment. The risk on the liquidation value also varies according to the nature

of collateralized assets. It is zero with cash. The mark-to-market value of securities

held as collateral has a volatility that can be derived from market volatility combined

with the sensitivity of the securities. The methodology developed for market risk also

applies for any capital market collateral. The risk on the liquidation value of other

types of collateral, such as real estate, aeroplanes, ships and fixed equipment, is less

easy to capture. In some cases, existing data are relevant. The value of aeroplanes, for

example, can be tabulated according to their age and their remaining life. But in this

and other cases, the expected value of such collaterals remains subject to judgment

based on the characteristics of the assets.

Third party Guarantees

Third party guarantees have a two-fold risk. First, there is the legal risk of not being

able to enforce the guarantee, which depends upon the nature of the guarantee.

Secondly, default risk is enhanced because third-party guarantees transfer the credit

risk form the borrower to the guarantor at the time of default. The effect on risk is that

the default probability of the borrower is changed into a joint probability of default of

both borrower and guarantor. Usually, a joint probability of default is much lower than

a single probability. For instance, when the defaults of the borrower and the guarantor

are actually independent, the joint probability of default is the product of the

probabilities of default of each one. If the borrower and the guarantor have a 1% & a

0.5% default probability, their joint default probability becomes 0.5% X 1% = 0.005%

which is quite close to zero.

In general, the joint probability depends upon the interdependence of defaults of the

borrower and the guarantor. For example, if the guarantor is the holding company and

the borrower a subsidiary, the defaults are probably not independent. They can be

totally linked if the borrower cannot default unless the holding company defaults and

vice versa. In such case, the default probability is the same for the borrower and the

guarantor and the joint default probability of both becomes equal to that common

value.

Covenants allow for preventive action on the happening of certain events preceding a

default. On the other hand, guarantees can be considered as insurance policies that are

activated only when default occurs. They are consistent with a more passive risk

management. Covenants enhance the effect of proactive credit risk management. Their

Collateral

Covenants

Transform Credit Risk into Asset Risk

Risk Transform from Borrower to the

“Guarantor + Borrower”

Third Party Guarantee

Allow Corrective Actions

actual values depend upon how active the credit risk monitoring and management

processes are. There is no simple methodology capable of quantifying such intangible

assets as covenants.

How the risk changes as a result of impact of guarantees can be followed as under:

Guarantees and Loss in the Event of Default

The loss in the event of default is the amount at risk less the recoveries. It is increased

by any workout costs such as the carrying cost of collateral or the expenses involved in

these recovery efforts.

Credit Risk and the Potential Losses

As mentioned earlier, Loss Given Default or LGD depends upon the values assigned to

the three basic parameters: default probability, exposure and recoveries.

Expected Loss

The expected loss is the product of the loss given default and the default probability.

The LGD is the amount at risk or exposure, less recoveries.

LGD = exposure – recovery

= exposure x (1 – recovery rate%)

How exposure transforms & leads to Loss Given Default can be understood from the

following diagram:

Guarantees, Collaterals, Covenants

Recoveries

Loss in the event ofDefault

Workout Expenses

Exposures

The expected loss synthesizes both the Loss Given Default and the quality of risk:

Expected Loss = LGD x default probability

= exposure x (1 – recovery rate%) x default probability (%)

Thus, we can say that the expected loss captures in a single measure the three

components of credit risk: exposure, default probability and recovery.

Unexpected Losses and Risk-based Capital

The expected loss is a statistical loss that will occur on an average or a certain tendency

for the uncertain losses. The unexpected loss captures the deviation from such an

average. It can be inferred, for instance, from the variations of the default rate that is

from its volatility.

With a portfolio of 100 borrowers and unit outstanding balances of 10, it is almost

unlikely that a bank will lose the total outstanding balance of 1000 unless all borrowers

default at the same time. If we assume an average default rate of 1% and a recovery of

0, the expected loss is 1% x 1000 = 10. It can be understood as the loss of 10, the unit

exposure, for an average value of the number of defaults equal to 1.

However, there could probably be serious changes that the number of defaults

increases to 2 or 3, or even higher. The dispersion around the average of observed

default rates is measured by the historical volatility of observed default rates. The

volatility can be derived from available statistics. If we assume the default rate

volatility is 3%, the loss volatility is simply 3% x 1000 = 30.

Unexpected losses can be derived as a multiple of this volatility, the multiple

corresponding to some tolerance level. Statistics of default can therefore be applied

directly and in a simple manner to determine expected and unexpected losses. This can

be developed in greater detail providing loss calculations given the risk specifics of

portfolios of loans. The losses thus estimated can then be compared with risk tolerance

levels specified by the bank’s board / management based on risk appetite of the

organization and appropriate actions initiated.

It will be observed that the estimate of unexpected losses has been derived from the

deviations of default rates alone. Actually, the deviations of losses from their average

depend also upon the deviations of the recovery rates and the exposures from their

expected values. Unfortunately, such deviations are more difficult to quantify than

those of default rates. Often they are not made explicit, which makes the unexpected

loss estimate rather inaccurate.

In addition the definition of unexpected loss when all the three factors are uncertain

raises some conceptual issues. For a very conservative approach, one can ask what is

he worst-case value loss. We could use the combination of all three worst-case

parameters. The equation would be as follows:

WC (Loss) = WC (Exposure) x [1 – WC (recovery rate)] x WC (default rate)

Where WC denotes “worst case” in practical situations. However, such calculation is

based on the assumption that all worst case values occur simultaneously, which sounds

unrealistic and over-conservative. This illustrates one of the difficulties in estimating

unexpected risks. They depend upon the correlations between the underlying

parameters which themselves have uncertainties.

Default probabilities over different horizons

Yearly probabilities can be changed into probabilities for longer periods with the help

of statistics available for various horizons. The probabilities of default over various

time periods can be used to assess the credit risk of a loan up to maturity. This allows

one to change the measure of credit risk with the horizon of the exposure and to capture

the effect of the time profile of exposures. In general, the default probability changes

over time because the risk itself changes over time.

Such changes are recorded as transitions across ratings. In a first phase, it is easier to

define the effect of time when the yearly default probability is assumed constant (1%).

Then the increase in credit risk with the horizon is due to the fact that the constant

probability of default is applied to a longer time period.

In each period, there are only two possibilities: default or non-default. When periods

are chained, the number of possible situations increases, since the borrower can default

in any one of the periods considered. In the example given as under we have

endeavored to show three periods. If the company defaulted between date 0 and date 3,

it has to be in any of the first three periods. At the end of the three periods, only four

cases are possible: either the borrower did not default or he defaulted in any one of the

three periods.

0

These four events have different probabilities which can all be derived from the

constant yearly probability. The probability of no default is the product of the

probability of not defaulting in each of the periods, which is 99% for each period. The

probability of defaulting in period 3 is the probability of not defaulting before, times

the probability of defaulting at 3. The probability of defaulting in period 2 is the

probability of defaulting at 2 without having defaulted in 1. Finally, the probability of

defaulting in period 1 is 1%.

Hence the probability of default between date 0 and date 3 is the probability that

default occurs in either period 1, 2 or 3. It is the sum of these individual probabilities of

default:

0.01 + 0.01 x 0.99 + 0.01 x 0.99 x 0.99 = 0.01 x [1+0.99+(0.99x0.99)] = 0.0297

Dates

0 20

31Probability

Default (D)

0.01

0.990.99

D

ND

0.99 0.01

D

ND

0.99

0.01

0.99 x 0.01

0.99 x 0.99 x 0.01

0.99 x 0.99 x 0.99

The surviving probability after date 3 is 1 minus the default probability before date 3 or

0.9703. This is equal to the probability of no defaults, i.e. 0.99 x 0.99 x 0.99. It can be

envisaged that the default probability over n periods is less than the yearly

probabilities. For instance, 2.97% is less than three times the yearly probability of 1%.

This is because the default at period t is conditional upon no default before, an event

that has a probability always lower than 1.

The default probability between 0 and n, nPd, is approximately equal to the product of

yearly default probabilities 1Pd by the number of periods, as long as yearly default

probabilities are very low:

nPd = n x 1Pd

It can be checked above that 2.97% is very close to 3%. The 3% value assumes that the

defaults in each year are independent events. This is not true because the default at t is

actually dependent on non-default before.

Default Risk – Term Structure

Let us define the use of default rates across time horizons. Defaults observed over the

period are the basis of default rate calculations.

The number of yearly defaults can be related to the original population of issuers at the

very beginning of the multiple year observation period. The yearly defaults are

cumulated over years and then divided by the original number of issuers. These

percentages are “cumulated” default rates over various time horizons.

Future yearly default rates or “forward rates” can be calculated in numerous ways. The

ratio of the number of yearly defaults to the original sample is a first version of a

“forward” rate. For instance, there are three new defaults in year 2, which is 3% of the

original 100 population. This figure is also obtained as the difference between two

cumulated default rates of years 2 and 1 or 8% - 5% = 3%.

A second version is to relate the same number of defaults i.e. three defaults to be

surviving population only at the beginning of the current period. The surviving

population at the beginning of the year 2 is 100 – 5 = 95, or the original sample minus

the five defaults of the first year. The new yearly default rate for year 2 is 3 / 95 =

3.16%. It is also called a “marginal” default rate. It measures a forward default

frequency conditional upon no prior default.

Periods Year 1 Year 2 Year 3Number of Defaults 5 3 2

Cumulated number of Defaults 5 8 10

Cumulated Default Rates 5% 8% 10%

The aforesaid forward rates, calculated on an historical basis, have to be carefully

selected depending upon the objective of the analysis.

Default Rates – Transition Matrices

The transition probabilities between risk classes allow for the calculation of the

expected default rate of each period, given the transition and the variability of default

rates over time.

Yearly default probabilities are also mentioned. The default probability is 0.01% for

the borrower of risk class A and 0.02% for the borrower of risk class B. The

probability of defaulting before date 3 i.e. the end of the period 2 is the default

probability over year 1 plus the default probability over year 2. The yearly probability

is 0.01%. In year 2, either it stays at 0.01% if the risk class does not change or it

increases to 0.02% if the risk class becomes B. The default probability in year 2 is

derived from the probabilities of these two events, which are given in the transition

matrix:

0.95 x (0.01 + 0.01) + 0.05 x (0.01 + 0.02) = 0.0205

More often, transition matrices allow one to determine the expected frequency

distribution of migration to various ratings in the future. For instance, an issuer in the A

class can stay in A with a 95% frequency, move to B with a 4% frequency and default

with a 1% frequency. In general, migration matrices cover all defined classes over

various horizons. The distribution, starting from any given risk class, virtually looks

like a tree. The distribution widens when the time horizon becomes longer and when

the number of distinct classes grows.

Transition matrices are a simple method to project the changing structure by risk class

of a portfolio or to project the changing credit quality over time of a single issuer.

Various examples of potential applications are given in Credit Metrics, Technical

documents by J.P.Morgan & Co.Inc. (1997). As an example, the distribution of the

potential values of a bond in future can be inferred from these migration tables. The

future distribution of ratings is translated into a distribution of future possible market

spreads associated with the ratings. Once it is included in the discount rate applied to

future flows, they generate a distribution of future market values, each one associated

with a percentage frequency. The usual statistics with reference to mean and volatility

can be derived from such distributions.

Risk Classes

Dates

A

20

31

0.95

0.05B

C

0.01

0.99

Default Probability

Transition Frequency and Default Rates

Risk Class

B

Risk Class A

Risk Class B

Risk Class C

Risk Class D

_--------------

Default

1%

91%

5%

1%

0%

2%

Total 100%

Risk Class Frequency

Migration Tree

CHAPTER X N ON PERFORMING ASSETS

In simple terms, a non-performing advance can be defined as an advance where

payment of interest and /or installment of principal (in case of term loans) remain

unpaid in turn making the account irregular (out of order) for period prescribed by the

RBI.

A non-performing asset in the banking sector also is termed as an asset not contributing

to the income of the Bank. In other words it is the zero yielding assets that are

considered. The non-performing assets, interalia, includes surplus cash and bankers

balances hold over the optimal levels, amounts lying in the suspense account,

investments in shares or debentures and other securities not yielding any dividend or

interest, advances where interest is not forthcoming and even the principal amount is

difficult to recover.

After an account is classified as NPA, bank cannot book Interest charged in the

account as its income till the account remains in the NPA category. Besides, the bank

has also to make substantial loan loss provisions on such accounts as per norms laid

down by RBI.

Hence, NPAs act as a drag on bank’s profitability, a fact which is well understood by

banks who are now taking all possible steps to bring down their NPA portfolio.

It may be mentioned that banks with their best efforts have made some progress to

bring down their existing NPAs but due to heavy slippage of standard accounts to NPA

category, the overall position continues to deteriorate. Further, analysis of data relating

to NPAs may also reveal that major portion of the reduction has been either due to

comprise settlements / write off of the NPAs or on account of insurance claims

received from DICGC / ECGC. As regards reduction in NPAs due to up gradation, the

same has been quite negligible. Thus, there is a need for effective system of monitoring

of existing NPAs and of borderline NPAs, which are likely to slip to NPA category for

checking their slippage by initiating expeditious corrective actions.

The high level of NPAs in banks and financial institutions has been a matter of grave

concern to the public as bank credit is the catalyst to the economic growth of the

country and any bottleneck in the smooth flow of credit, one cause for which is the

mounting NPAs, is bound to create adverse repercussions in the economy. NPAs are

not therefore the concern of only lenders.

NPAs have a deleterious effect on the return on assets in several ways –

o They erode current profits through provisioning requirements

o They result in reduced interest income

o They require higher provisioning requirements affecting profits and

accretion to capital funds and capacity to increase good quality risk assets in future,

and

They limit recycling of funds, set in asset-liability mismatches, etc.

RBI Definition of NPA

In the year 1992, as a follow-up of Narsimhan committee recommendations, the RBI

introduced the concept of non -performing assets, based on Income Recognition

criterion, and directed banks to classify their advances into the following four

categories of assets:

Standard,

Substandard,

Doubtful, and

Loss.

Categories Of NPAs

Substandard Assets

A sub standard asset is one, which has remained NPA for a period less than or equal to 12

months, from March 31, 2005. (Earlier 18 months). In such cases, the current net worth of

the borrower / gaunter or the current market value of security charged is not enough to

ensure recovery of the dues to the banks in full. In other words, such an asset will have

well defined credit weakness that jeopardize the liquidation of the debt and are

characterised by the distinct possibility that the banks will sustain some loss, if deficiency

are not correct.

Doubtful Assets

A doubtful assets is one which, which has remained NPA for a period exceeding twelve

months. A loan classified as doubtful has all the weakness inherent in assets that were

classified sub-standard, with the added characteristic that the weakness make collection or

liquidation in full – on the basis of currently known facts, conditions and values-highly

questionable and improbable.

Loss assets

A loss asset is one where loss has been identified by the bank or interest or external

auditors or the RBI inspection but the amount has not been written off wholly. In other

words, such an asset is considered uncollectible and of such little vale that its continuance

as a bankable assets not warranted although there may be some salvage or recovery value.

Causes Of Loan Accounts Slipping To NPA Category

Before we discuss the monitoring system for NPAs, we must understand the possible

causes of accounts slipping to this category. The causes can be grouped under the

following three main heads – borrowers related, bank related and of general nature:

1. Borrower Related –

Lack of proper project planning and inefficient key management personnels.

Diversion of working capital funds by promoters for expansion, modernization,

taking up new projects, investing in associate concerns, etc.

Differences and disputes amongst promoters resulting in unauthorized withdrawals

of funds from the bank accounts.

Problems faced by importers and exporters due to devaluation of rupee and

fluctuations of various currencies in international market.

Delay on the part of the borrowers to bring the margin money (their own

contributions) to finance the project and compliance of the terms and conditions of

sanction resulting in delayed disbursement of loans by banks.

Low priority given by the promoters in upgradation of the technology and

inadequate attention to research and development (R&D) function.

Lack of effective monitoring at project implementation stage resulting in time and

cost over-runs.

Strained labor relations resulting in strikes and lockouts.

2. Bank Related –

Lack of proper pre-sanction appraisal of the loan proposals.

Sanction of the loan facilities based on optimistic and / or on pessimistic sales /

profitability projections resulting in over / under financing of projects.

Lack of effective post-sanction monitoring and follow-up of the borrower accounts,

resulting in delayed detection of problems and corrective actions.

Delay in release of term loans particularly by financial institutions resulting in

diversion of working capital funds causing liquidity problems and irregularity in

bank’s accounts.

Directed lending by banks to priority sector, more particularly to small

entrepreneurs who lack experience, expertise and financial standing.

Slow decision making process particularly with regard to sanction and

disbursement of loans for revival of potentially viable sick units.

3. General Causes

Time consuming and slow legal process for recovery of bank dues and absence of

punitive measures for borrowers who are willful defaulters.

Non or delayed implementation of new as well as expansion of the existing

projects due to failure of public issues on account of depressed capital market.

Closure of some units due to insurgency in some states, labor unrest / strikes /

lockouts, etc. as also due to natural calamities.

Slow functioning of judiciary including Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs), Board

of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), etc. Difficulties even in

execution of the decrees awarded by the courts.

Inadequate infrastructural facilities, particularly the supply of power and essential

inputs.

Lack of support by Central / State Government and delayed release of allocated

funds to various projects resulting in cost and time over-run.

Liberalization in the economy and coming up of the multinational companies in

The country with better technologies, giving tough time to local industries.

The causes listed above are illustrative in nature and there could be many more

depending upon type of industry, location of unit, etc.

Monitoring Of Existing NPAs

With a view to tackle NPAs, banks shall have to develop an effective monitoring

system which may help them in creating data base for understanding total NPA

portfolio as well as individual NPA accounts particularly those at borderline for

formulating general policy and accounts specific action plan. We are aware that the

reduction in NPAs can also be affected by write-off of the accounts where either

securities are not available or the securities available are not easily realizable and even

if these are sold the recovery may not be sufficient even to cover the cost of pursuing

recovery of the dues.

We may also come across NPAs where borrowers are serious and taking all possible

steps even inducting own funds to run their units and willing to regularize the accounts

through tagging of the sale proceeds. There may also be units which are NPAs but

potentially viable and which may turnaround not just with the funds inducted by the

promoters, but may also require some additional financial assistance from the banks.

For taking any decision on specific account either for inducting funds for revival,

effecting recovery through tagging of sale, initiating legal action for recovery of dues,

bank shall need detailed information in the form of history sheet in such account,

covering the background of the account, reasons for account becoming NPA, whether

the unit is functioning or lying closed, present position of the bank account, realizable

value of the security, financial standing of the borrower / guarantor, availability of

insurance cover from DICGC / ECGC, future profit generation, repayment capacity of

the unit, etc. The history sheet should also provide information with regard to meetings

/ contacts, if any made by bank’s officials with the borrower for regularization /

adjustment of the account and reaction of the borrower, along with comments /

recommendations of the branch as well as controlling offices.

Creation of Data Base for NPAs

In addition to taking action in specific accounts as discussed above, banks may have to

frame policy guidelines for the guidance of the field staff for effecting recovery in NPAs

for which they may have to create some data base on the following lines:

1. Classification of NPA accounts under various categories, i.e. Sub-standard, Doubtful

and Loss and reduction / recovery achieved or likely to be achieved under each head

through upgradation, amount written off, cash recovery, etc. as well as any addition

taken place due to slippage of standard account to NPA category. Further, NPA

accounts can be bifurcated under secured and unsecured categories and also under

various heads – whether suit filed, decreed, sick units under rehabilitation and other

accounts awaiting actions.

2. NPA data be collected under various heads – priority sector and non-priority sector

as well as those related to various industrial segments namely steel, cement, textile,

chemicals, etc. Such data can help in knowing the industries where NPAs are

concentrating for taking a view about flow of credit.

3. Bank should also have data on movement in NPAs portfolio, i.e. reduction /

addition under various assets categories, i.e. sub-standard, doubtful and loss both

amount-wise as well as according to the availability of securities under various heads

4. RBI has prescribed a system of “Off-site Surveillance” to review performance of

banks under various parameters on quarterly basis which also include progress with

regard to reduction and recovery in NPAs. Under the system RBI has prescribed

well-designed formats which are in five sections are briefly described as follows:

Section 1: Position of performing and non-performing loans facility-wise, i.e. cash

credits, overdrafts, bills purchased / discounted, term loans, etc. Further, the facilities

which are in performing category are to be reported under two main heads i.e. (i)

regular and (ii) irregular (overdue less than 90 days). As regards facilities which are

under NPA category are also to be reported under two main heads i.e. which are NPAs

for less than two years and those for more than two years. The section also contains

position of interest on NPAs which is in arrears.

Section 2: The section contains data on loan accounts both under performing and NPA

category. Further, NPA accounts are required to be classified under various heads i.e.

sub-standard, doubtful and loss. The provisions made by the bank in each asset code

category are also required to be mentioned.

Section 3: It provides the movement under various categories of loan accounts i.e. the

change in classification under sub-standard, doubtful and loss during the quarter under

review. The data also includes new advances made and amount recovered in NPAs.

Section 4: The section gives bifurcation of performing standard and non-performing

accounts under various sectors i.e. priority sector (agriculture, SSI, others) and non-

priority sectors (exports, non-banking, finance companies, food credit, PSUs etc.)

Section 5: The section provides specific details in respect of top NPAs of the bank

indicating amount outstanding, asset code classification, provisions of interest in

arrears, etc.

In practice, it is seen that data being called by RBI under Off-site Surveillance System

is taken as a statistical exercise by banks who are more keen in ensuring its timely

submission to RBI to avoid adverse comments from them. Analysis of the data being

submitted to RBI under Off-site Surveillance System as control returns and should

critically analyze the same for drawing inferences with a view to ultimately design

strategies for reduction and recovery in NPAs.

Monitoring Of Irregular Accounts Which Are Likely To Slip In NPA

Category

As already stated, that most of the banks have not been able to achieve overall

reduction in terms of the amount in their NPA portfolio even when they achieved

substantial reduction in existing NPAs, which could be due to lack of proper system for

timely identification of borderline accounts which are likely to slip to NPA category

for initiating corrective actions. The irregularity in an account due to overdrawing

beyond the sanctioned limits / drawing power if continues for a period more than 180

days will lead to branding the account as NPA.

The irregularity may be caused due to non-payment of interest / installments or

payment of account of invoked guarantee and debit of returned bills in the account etc

by the party. It is, therefore, essential to monitor accounts in standard category

particularly those, which have just become irregular due to non-payment of interest /

installment for one quarter. The system proposed for monitoring irregular / borderline

accounts should provide the following information timely:

1. Position of all irregular accounts, say with some cut off point – amount outstanding of

Rs.1 lac and above and irregularity of say 2-3% of the total outstanding should be

complied. Such data which can help in understanding the magnitude of the problem

and action taken at field levels, can be collected from the branches.

2. Status notes in respect of each irregular account should be prepared and submitted by

the branch office at (Regional / Zonal / HO level) for monitoring as well as deciding

future course of action. The cut-off point for monitoring based on status note should

depend on amount outstanding in the accounts and powers delegated at different levels

for rehabilitation or entering into compromise, filing suit and write of etc.

As regards information, which may be covered in status note, the same should include

the following:

(i.) Name and address of the borrower and activity undertaken.

(ii.) Latest position of the account covering all the facilities and also the

irregularity.

(iii.) Reason for irregular and steps taken by the branch / borrower to

regularize the same.

(iv.) Financial and operational performance of the unit in case it is

functioning. If the unit is closed, the same be specifically mentioned

indicating the date when it stopped working.

(v.) In case the unit is losing, reasons for losses and corrective steps

taken by the borrower to run the unit on viable line.

(vi.) Position of primary and collateral securities, their value as per

bank records and estimated realizable value.

(vii.) Position of availability of DICGC / ECGC claim and government

guarantee available, if any.

(viii.) Details of meetings and contacts made with the borrowers and

their response to regularize / adjust their loans.

(ix.) Comments on viability of the unit and whether the borrower is

keen to run the unit. In case the borrower is willful defaulter the same be also

mentioned.

(x.) Comments and recommendations of the branch and controlling office

about the future course of action for regularization / adjustment of the loan

account.

Undertaking Spot Study of the Account

Sometimes data/information received on the monitoring format, is either not clear or is

distorted/window dressed and may not help in drawing right inferences and deciding

future course of action.

In such a situation and more particularly where the units are not having viable

operations and have started incurring cash losses, it will be advisable to get “on the

spot” study conducted of the units by technical personnel(s), for getting insights of the

unit. Such studies will put the management of the unit on alert and can prove to be

immense use to the bank. There may be accounts where banks have nominated their

senior officers on company’s board, their reports can also prove helpful in evaluating

units performance and taking corrective actions whenever necessary.

Management of NPAs

The quality and performance of advances have a direct bearing on the profitability and

viability of banks. Despite an efficient credit appraisal and disbursement mechanism,

problems can still arise due to various factors. The essential component of a sound NPA

management system is quick identification of non-performing advances, their containment

at minimum levels and ensuring that their impingement on the financials is minimum.

The approach to NPA management has to be multi-pronged, calling for different strategies

at different stages a credit facility passes through. RBI's guidelines to banks (issued in

1999) on Risk Management Systems outline the strategies to be followed for efficient

management of credit portfolio. I would like to touch upon a few essential aspects of NPA

management in this paper.

Excessive reliance on collateral has led Indian banks nowhere except to long drawn out

litigation and hence it should not be sole criterion for sanction. Sanctions above certain

limits should be through Committee which can assume the status of an 'Approval Grid'.

It is common to find banks running after the same borrower/borrower groups as we see

from the spate of requests for considering proposals to lend beyond the prescribed

exposure limits. I would like to caution that running after niche segment may be fine in the

short run but is equally fraught with risk. Banks should rather manage within the

appropriate exposure limits. A linkage to net owned funds also needs to be developed to

control high leverages at borrower level.

Exchange of credit information among banks would be of immense help to them to avoid

possible NPAs. There is no substitute for critical management information system and

market intelligence.

Close monitoring of the account particularly the larger ones is the primary solution.

Emerging weakness in profitability and liquidity, recessionary trends, recovery of

installments / interest with time lag, etc., should put the banks on caution. The objective

should be to assess the liquidity of the borrower, both present and future prospects. Loan

review mechanism is a tool to bring about qualitative improvement in credit

administration. Banks should follow risk rating system to reveal the risk of lending. The

risk-rating process should be different from regular loan renewal exercise and the exercise

should be carried out at regular intervals. It is not enough for banks to aspire to become big

players without being backed by development of internal rating models. This is going to

be a pre-requisite under the New Capital Adequacy framework and if a bank wants to be an

international player, it shall have to go for such a system.

Banks should ensure that sanctioning of further credit facilities is done only at higher

levels. A quick review of all documents originally obtained and their validity should be

made. A phased programme of exit from the account should also be considered.

Measures initiated by Reserve Bank and Government of India for reduction of NPAs

Measures for faster legal process

LOK ADALATS

Lok Adalat institutions help banks to settle disputes involving accounts in “doubtful” and

“loss” category, with outstanding balance of Rs.5 lakh for compromise settlement under

Lok Adalats. Debt Recovery Tribunals have now been empowered to organize Lok

Adalats to decide on cases of NPAs of Rs.10 lakhs and above.

The progress through this channel is expected to pick up in the coming years particularly

looking at the recent initiatives taken by some of the public sector banks and DRTs in

Mumbai.

DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNALS

The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions (amendment) Act, passed

in March 2000 has helped in strengthening the functioning of DRTs. Provisions for

placement of more than one Recovery Officer, power to attach defendant’s property/assets

before judgement, penal provisions for disobedience of Tribunal’s order or for breach of

any terms of the order and appointment of receiver with powers of realization,

management, protection and preservation of property are expected to provide necessary

teeth to the DRTs and speed up the recovery of NPAs in the times to come.

Though there are around 25 DRTs set up at major centres in the country with Appellate

Tribunals located in five centres viz. Allahabad, Mumbai, Delhi, Calcutta and Chennai,

they could decide only 9814 cases for Rs.6264.71 crore pertaining to public sector banks

since inception of DRT mechanism and till September 30, 2001.The amount recovered in

respect of these cases amounted to only Rs.1864.30 crore.

Circulation of information on defaulters

The RBI has put in place a system for periodical circulation of details of wilful defaults of

borrowers of banks and financial institutions. This serves as a caution list while

considering requests for new or additional credit limits from defaulting borrowing units

and also from the directors /proprietors / partners of these entities.

RBI also publishes a list of borrowers (with outstanding aggregating Rs. 1 crore and

above) against whom suits have been filed by banks and FIs for recovery of their funds, as

on 31st March every year.

However, they serve as negative basket of steps shutting off fresh loans to these defaulters.

I strongly believe that a real breakthrough can come only if there is a change in the

repayment psyche of the Indian borrowers.

Recovery action against large NPAs

After a review of pendency in regard to NPAs by the Hon’ble Finance Minister, RBI had

advised the public sector banks to examine all cases of willful default of Rs 1 crore and

above and file suits in such cases, and file criminal cases in regard to willful defaults.

Board of Directors are required to review NPA accounts of Rs.1 crore and above with

special reference to fixing of staff accountability.

Asset Reconstruction Company:

An Asset Reconstruction Company with an authorised capital of Rs.2000 crore and initial

paid up capital Rs.1400 crore is to be set up as a trust for undertaking activities relating to

asset reconstruction. It would negotiate with banks and financial institutions for acquiring

distressed assets and develop markets for such assets. Government of India proposes to go

in for legal reforms to facilitate the functioning of ARC mechanism

Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR)

Corporate Debt Restructuring mechanism has been institutionalised in 2001 to provide a

timely and transparent system for restructuring of the corporate debts of Rs.20 crore and

above with the banks and financial institutions.

The objective of the CDR framework is to ensure timely and transparent mechanism for

restructuring of the corporates debts of viable facing problems, outside the purview of legal

proceedings, for the benefit of all concerned.

The CDR process would also enable viable corporate entities to restructure their dues

outside the existing legal framework and reduce the incidence of fresh NPAs. The CDR

structure has been headquartered in IDBI, Mumbai and a Standing Forum and Core Group

for administering the mechanism had already been put in place. The experiment however

has not taken off at the desired pace though more than six months have lapsed since

introduction.

Credit Information Bureau

Institutionalisation of information sharing arrangements through the newly formed Credit

Information Bureau of India Ltd. (CIBIL) is under way.

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of

Security Interests Act, 2002 (SARFAESI)

The act was enacted in 2002.

The principal objective of the Act is to facilitate quick and efficacious recovery of the

debts due to banks and financial institutions from the defaulting companies which are

invariable sick.

Scheme of the Act

o Enforcement of securities interest by secured creditor (Banks/FIs) without

intervention of court.

o Transfer of NPAs to Asset Reconstruction Company, which will then dispose of

those assets and realise the proceeds.

o Large framework for securitisation of assets.

Securitisation/Reconstruction company Registration

o A Securitisation/Reconstruction Company can commence or carry on its business

only on obtaining certification of Registration from RBI after fulfilling all the

criteria of RBI.

Modes of Acquisition Financial Assets

The act envisages two modes of acquiring financial assets by the

Securitisation/Reconstruction Company.

o Agreeing for specific consideration: the Securitisation/Reconstruction

Company will agree for consideration to be paid to the bank or FIs. It will issue

dentures, bond or other similar security to the bank or FI on agreed terms and

conditions.

o Without agreeing for specific consideration: the Securitisation or

Reconstruction Company may enter into an agreement with Bank/FI for

acquisition of financial asset on such terms and consideration as may be agreed

upon. In such case, it may be contracted to pay agreed percentage of realization

from NPAs to Banks and FIs.

80

CHAPTER XI RAROC PRICING/ ECONOMIC PROFIT

In acquiring assets, banks should use the pricing mechanism in conjunction with

product/ geography/ industry/ tenor limits. For example, if a bank believes that

construction loans for commercial complexes are unattractive from a portfolio

perspective, it can raise the price of these loans to a level that will act as a disincentive

to borrowers. This is an instance of marginal cost pricing - the notion that the price of

an asset should compensate the institution for its marginal cost as measured on a risk-

adjusted basis. Marginal cost pricing may not always work. A bank may have idle

capacity and capital that has not been deployed. While such an institution clearly would

not want to make a loan at a negative spread, it would probably view even a small

positive spread as worthwhile as long as the added risk was acceptable.

Institutions tend to book unattractively priced loans when they are unable to allocate

their cost base with clarity or to make fine differentiations of their risks. If a bank

cannot allocate its costs, then it will make no distinction between the cost of lending to

borrowers that require little analysis and the cost of lending to borrowers that require a

considerable amount of review and follow up. Similarly, if the spread is tied to a too

coarsely graded risk rating system (one, for example, with just four grades) then it is

more difficult to differentiate among risks when pricing than if the risk rating is

graduated over a larger scale with, say, 15 grades.

A cost-plus-profit pricing strategy will work in the short run, but in the long run

borrowers will balk and start looking for alternatives. Cost-plus-profit pricing will also

work when a bank has some flexibility to compete on an array of services rather than

exclusively on price. The difficulties with pricing are greater in markets where the

lender is a price taker rather than a price leader.

The pricing is based on the borrower's risk rating, tenor, collateral, guarantees, historic

loan loss rates, and covenants. A capital charge is applied based on a hurdle rate and a

capital ratio. Using these assumptions, the rate to be charged for a loan to a customer

with a given rating could be calculated.

This relatively simple approach to credit pricing works well as long as the assumptions

are correct - especially those about the borrower’s credit quality. This method is used

in many banks today. The main drawbacks of this method are:

o Only ‘expected losses’ are linked to the borrower’s credit quality. The

capital charge based on the volatility of losses in the credit risk category

may also be too small. If the loan were to default, the loss would have to be

made up from income from non-defaulting loans.

o It implicitly assumes only two possible states for a loan: default or no

default. It does not model the credit risk premium or discount resulting from

improvement or decline in the borrower's financial condition, which is

meaningful only if the asset may be repriced or sold at par.

Banks have long struggled to find the best ways of allocating capital in a manner

consistent with the risks taken. They have found it difficult to come up with a

consistent and credible way of allocating capital for such varying sources of revenue as

loan commitments, revolving lines of credit (which have no maturity), and secured

versus unsecured lending. The different approaches for allocating capital are as under:

o One approach is to allocate capital to business units based on their asset

size. Although it is true that a larger portfolio will have larger losses, this

approach also means that the business unit is forced to employ all the

capital allocated to it. Moreover, this method treats all risks alike.

o Another approach is to use the regulatory (risk-adjusted) capital as the

allocated capital. The problem with this approach is that regulatory capital

may or may not reflect the true risk of a business. For example, for

regulatory purposes, a loan to a AAA rated customer requires the same

amount of capital per Rupees lent as one to a small business.

o Yet another approach is to use unexpected losses in a sub-portfolio

(standard deviation of the annual losses taken over time) as a proxy for

capital to be allocated. The problem with this approach is that it ignores

default correlations across sub-portfolios. The volatility of a sub-portfolio

may in fact dampen the volatility of the institution's portfolio, so pricing

decisions based on the volatility of the sub-portfolio may not be optimal. In

practical terms, this means that one line of business within a lending

institution may sometimes subsidize another.

Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)

As it became clearer that banks needed to add an appropriate capital charge in the

pricing process, the concept of risk adjusting the return or risk adjusting the capital

arose. The value-producing capacity of an asset (or a business) is expressed as a ratio

that allows comparisons to be made between assets (or businesses) of varying sizes and

risk characteristics. The ratio is based either on the size of the asset or the size of the

capital allocated to it. When an institution can observe asset prices directly (and/ or

infer risk from observable asset prices) then it can determine how much capital to hold

based on the volatility of the asset. This is the essence of the mark-to-market concept.

If the capital to be held is excessive relative to the total return that would be earned

from the asset, then the bank will not acquire it. If the asset is already in the bank's

portfolio, it will be sold. The availability of a liquid market to buy and sell these assets

is a precondition for this approach. When banks talk about asset concentration and

correlation, the question of capital allocation is always in the background because it is

allocated capital that absorbs the potential consequences (unexpected losses) resulting

from such concentration and correlation causes.

RAROC allocates a capital charge to a transaction or a line of business at an amount

equal to the maximum expected loss (at a 99% confidence level) over one year on an

after-tax basis. As may be expected, the higher the volatility of the returns, the more

capital is allocated. The higher capital allocation means that the transaction has to

generate cash flows large enough to offset the volatility of returns, which results from

the credit risk, market risk, and other risks taken. The RAROC process estimates the

asset value that may prevail in the worst-case scenario and then equates the capital

cushion to be provided for the potential loss.

RAROC is an improvement over the traditional approach in that it allows one to

compare two businesses with different risk (volatility of returns) profiles. A transaction

may give a higher return but at a higher risk. Using a hurdle rate (expected rate of

return), a lender can also use the RAROC principle to set the target pricing on a

relationship or a transaction. Although not all assets have market price distribution,

RAROC is a first step toward examining an institution’s entire balance sheet on a

mark-to-market basis - if only to understand the risk-return trade-offs that have been

made.

CHAPTER XIII CREDIT DERIVATIVES

Effective management of credit risk is a critical factor in comprehensive risk

management and is essential for the long-term financial health of business

organizations, especially banks. Credit risk management encompasses identification,

measurement, monitoring and control of the credit risk exposures.

For enabling the banks and the financial institutions, in India, to manage their credit

risk effectively it was being felt appropriate to permit them the use of credit risk

hedging techniques like the credit derivatives, which are over the counter (OTC)

financial contracts and can help banks and financial institutions in managing the risk

arising from adverse movements in the credit quality of their loans and advances, and

their investments. Banks can derive many benefits from the credit derivatives such as,

o Transfer credit risk and hence free up capital, which can be used in other

opportunities,

o Diversify credit risk,

o Maintain client relationships, and

o Construct and manage a credit risk portfolio as per their risk preference and

appetite unconstrained by funds, distribution and sales effort.

A Working Group on introduction of Credit Derivatives in India, comprising officers

from the Reserve Bank of India and industry was set up to study the need and scope for

allowing banks and financial institutions to use credit derivatives, the regulatory issues

involved and make suitable recommendations in this regard.

The entire guidelines are available on the RBI site.

Conceptual Aspects

o Credit derivatives are over the counter financial contracts. They are usually

defined as “off-balance sheet financial instruments that permit one party to

transfer credit risk of a reference asset, which it owns, to another party without

actually selling the asset”. It, therefore, “unbundles” credit risk from the

credit instrument and trades it separately. Credit Linked Notes (CLNs), another

form of credit derivative product, also achieves the same purpose, though CLNs

are on-balance sheet products. Another way of describing credit derivative is

that it is a financial contract outlining potential exchange of payments in which

at least one leg of the cash flow is linked to the “performance” of a specified

underlying credit sensitive asset.

o Protection Seller refers to the party that contracts to receive premiums or

interest-related payments in return for assuming the credit risk on an asset or

group of assets from the Protection Buyer. The Protection Seller is also known

in the market as the Credit Risk Buyer or Guarantor.

o Protection Buyer refers to the party that contracts to transfer the credit risk on

an asset or group of assets to the Protection Seller. The Protection Buyer is also

known in the market as the Credit Risk Seller or Beneficiary.

o Premium, is the fee the protection buyer pays to the protection seller as in case

of insurance business.

o Credit event is defined as a scenario or condition agreed between the

contracting parties that will trigger the credit event payment from the Protection

Seller to the Protection Buyer. Credit events usually include bankruptcy,

insolvency, merger, cross acceleration, cross default, failure to pay, repudiation,

and restructuring, delinquency, price decline or rating downgrade of the

underlying asset / issuer.

o Credit event payment or settlement is the amount that is paid following a

credit event. This is defined in the contract, and is normally one of three types:

(a) Physical delivery: payment of par or other specified value in exchange for

physical delivery of the Reference Asset (or a variety of assets) of the

Reference Entity as allowed under some contracts.

(b) Cash settlement: payment of par less recovery value. The Reference Asset

will normally retain some value after a credit event has triggered settlement

of the contract. The recovery value is normally determined at a date up to

three months after the credit event, by a dealer poll or auction.

(c) Fixed Amount: Payment of a fixed amount.

o Reference Asset refers to the asset to which payments under the credit

derivative contract are referenced or linked. It is also called reference

obligation.

o Underlying Asset refers to the asset on which credit risk protection is bought

by the Protection Buyer. It could be a bank loan, corporate bond / debenture,

trade receivable, emerging market debt, municipal debt, etc. It could also be a

portfolio of credit products. This is usually also the Reference Asset.

o Reference Entity is the entity upon whose credit the contract is based.

o Deliverable Obligation defines what assets are eligible for delivery as

settlement in a physical delivery contract. It usually includes Reference

Obligation but will often be broader to include other obligations.

o Obligations defines what assets may trigger a Credit Event. These are usually

same as the underlying asset.

o Sponsor denotes the entity that places the portfolio in a Special Purpose

Vehicle for issue of notes.

o Senior Debt means that portion of funding in case of structuring of a

Collateralized Debt Issue (CDO), which has the lowest risk weight, or the

highest rated debt.

o Mezzanine Debt refers to that portion of funding in case of structuring of a

Collateralized Debt Issue (CDO), which has debt in ascending order of risk

weights, or in descending order of ratings.

o Equity refers to the balance funding in case of structuring of a Collateralized

Debt Issue (CDO), which has the highest risk weight, or the lowest rated debt.

Types of Credit Derivatives and basic structures:

Credit derivatives can be divided into two broad categories:

(a) Transactions where credit protection is bought and sold; and

(b) Total return swaps.

(a) Transactions Where Credit Protection Is Bought and Sold

(i) Credit Default Swap (CDS)

It is a bilateral derivative contract on one or more reference assets in which the protection

buyer pays a fee through the life of the contract in return for a credit event payment by

the protection seller following a credit event of the reference entities. In most instances,

the Protection Buyer makes quarterly payments to the Protection Seller. The periodic

payment is typically expressed in annualized basis points of a transaction’s notional

amount. In the instance that no pre-specified credit event occurs during the life of the

transaction, the Protection Seller receives the periodic payment in compensation for

assuming the credit risk on the Reference Entity/Obligation. Conversely, in the instance

that any one of the credit events occurs during the life of the transaction, the Protection

Buyer will receive a credit event payment, which will depend upon whether the terms of

a particular CDS call for a physical or cash settlement. With few exceptions, the legal

framework of a CDS – that is, the documentation evidencing the transaction – is based on

a confirmation document and legal definitions set forth by the International Swaps and

Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA). If a Credit Event occurs and physical settlement

applies, the transaction shall accelerate and Protection Buyer shall deliver the Deliverable

Obligations to Protection Seller against payment of a pre-agreed amount. If a Credit

Event occurs and cash settlement applies, the transaction shall accelerate and Protection

Seller shall pay to Protection Buyer the excess of the par value of the Deliverable

Obligations on start date over the prevailing market value of the Deliverable Obligations

upon occurrence of the Credit Event. The procedure for determining market value of

Deliverable Obligations is based on ISDA definitions or may be defined in the related

confirmation and some cases a pre-determined amount agreed by both parties on

inception of the transaction is paid.

The structures of physically settled CDS and cash settled CSD are shown in Figure 1 and

Figure 2 respectively.

Figure 1

Physically Settled Credit Default Swap

Figure 2

Cash Settled Credit Default Swaps

(ii) Credit Default Option

It is a kind of CDS where the fee is paid fully in advance.

(iii) Credit Linked Note (CLN)

It is a combination of a regular note and a credit-option. Since it is a regular note with

coupon, maturity and redemption, it is an on-balance sheet equivalent of a credit default

swap. Under this structure, the coupon or price of the note is linked to the performance of

a reference asset. It offers lenders a hedge against credit risk and investors a higher yield

for buying a credit exposure synthetically rather than buying it in the publicly traded debt.

CLNs are generally created through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or trust, which is

collateralized with highly rated securities. CLNs can also be issued directly by a bank or

financial institution. Investors buy the securities from the trust (or issuing bank) that pays

a fixed or floating coupon during the life of the note. At maturity, the investors receive par

unless the referenced credit defaults or declares bankruptcy, in which case they receive an

amount equal to the recovery rate. Here the investor is, in fact, selling credit protection in

exchange for higher yield on the note. The Credit-Linked Note allows a bank to lay off its

credit exposure to a range of credits to other parties. Figure 3 shows a simple CLN

structure.

Figure 3

Credit Linked Note Structure

(iv) Credit Linked Deposits/ Credit Linked Certificates of Deposit

Credit Linked Deposits (CLDs) are structured deposits with embedded default swaps.

Conceptually they can be thought of as deposits along with a default swap that the investor

sells to the deposit taker. The default contingency can be based on a variety of underlying

assets, including a specific corporate loan or security, a portfolio of loans or securities or

sovereign debt instruments, or even a portfolio of contracts which give rise to credit

exposure. If necessary, the structure can include an interest rate or foreign exchange swap

to create cash flows required by investor. In effect, the depositor is selling protection on

the reference obligation and earning a premium in the form of a yield spread over plain

deposits. If a credit event occurs during the tenure of the CLD, the deposit is paid and the

investor would get the Deliverable Obligation instead of the Deposit Amount. Figure 4

shows the structure of a simple CLD. Figure 4

(v) Repackaged Notes

Repackaging involves placing securities and derivatives in a Special Purpose Vehicle

(SPV) which then issues customized notes that are backed by the instruments placed. The

difference between repackaged notes and CLDs (Credit Linked Deposits) is that while

CLDs are default swaps embedded in deposits/notes, repackaged notes are issued against

collateral - which typically would include cash collateral (bonds / loans / cash) and

derivative contracts. Another feature of Repackaged Notes is that any issue by the SPV has

recourse only to the collateral of that issue.

Figure 5 below pictorially depicts the transactions under a Repackaged Note.

Figure 5

(vi) Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs)

CDOs are specialized repackaged offerings that typically involve a large portfolio of

credits. Both involve issuance of debt by a SPV based on collateral of underlying credit(s).

The essential difference between a repackaging programme and a CDO is that while a

simple repackaging usually delivers the entire risk inherent in the underlying collateral

(securities and derivatives) to the investor, a CDO involves a horizontal splitting of that

risk and categorizing investors into senior class debt, mezzanine class and a junior debt.

CDOs may be further categorized, based on the structure with which funding is raised.

The funding could be raised by issuing bonds, which are called Collateralised Bond

Obligations (CBOs) or by raising loans, which are called Collateralised Loan Obligations

(CLOs). The transactions under a CDO are shown in figure 6.

Figure 6 Collateralised Debt Obligations.

(b)Total Return Swaps

Total Return Swaps (TRS), also called Total Rate of Return Swaps (TROR) are bilateral

financial contracts designed to synthetically replicate the economic returns of an

underlying asset or a portfolio of assets for a pre-specified time. One counterparty (the TR

payer) pays the other counterparty (the TR receiver) the total return of a specified asset, the

reference obligation. In return, the TR receiver typically makes regular floating payments.

These floating payments represent a funding cost. In effect, a TRS contract allows the TRS

receiver to obtain the economic returns of an asset without having to fund the assets on its

balance sheet. Should the underlying asset decline in value by more than the coupon

payment, the TRS receiver must pay the negative total return, in addition to the funding

cost, to the TRS payer. At the extreme, a TRS receiver can be liable for the extreme loss

that a reference asset may suffer following, for instance, the issuing company’s default.

As such, a TRS is a primarily off-balance sheet financing vehicle. In contrast to credit

default swaps, which only transfer credit risk, a TRS transfers not only to credit risk (i.e.

the improvement or deterioration in credit profile of an issuer), but also market risk (i.e.

any increase or decrease in general market prices). In TRS payments are exchanged

among counterparties upon changes in market valuation of the underlying, in addition to

the occurrence of a credit event as is the case with CDS contracts.

Figure 7 shows the structure of a simple TRS.

Figure 7

Total Return Swap

Capital Adequacy and Provisioning

Recognition of protection of credit risk- Minimum Conditions

Bank fulfills the following criteria of recognition of protection of credit risk:

Existence of adequate Risk Management Policies, Procedures, and Systems and

Controls

The credit derivatives activity to be undertaken by bank should be under the

adequate oversight of its Board of Directors and senior management. Written

policies and procedures should be established to cover credit derivatives business.

Banks using credit derivatives should have adequate policies and procedures in

place to manage associated risks. There should be adequate separation between the

function of transacting credit derivatives business and those monitoring, reporting

and risk control. The participants should verify that the types of transactions

entered into by them are not inappropriate to their needs and needs of the

counterparty. Further, all staff engaged in the business should be fully conversant

with the relevant policies and procedures. Any changes to the policy or

engagement in new types of credit derivatives business should be approved by the

Board.

Satisfaction of minimum criteria

The credit derivative should conform to the following minimum criteria i.e., it

should be direct, explicit, irrevocable and unconditional. These criteria are explained

below:

Direct

The credit protection must represent a direct claim on the protection provider.

Explicit

The credit protection must be linked to specific exposures, so that the extent of the

cover is clearly defined and incontrovertible.

Irrevocable

Other than a protection purchaser’s non-payment of money due in respect of the

credit protection contract, there must be no clause in the contract that would allow

the protection provider unilaterally to cancel the credit cover.

Unconditional

There should be no clause in the protection contract that could prevent the

protection provider from being obliged to pay out in a timely manner in the

event that the original obligor fails to make the payment(s) due.

Satisfaction of Minimum Operational requirements

In order for protection from a credit derivative to be recognised, the certain

conditions must be satisfied which are prescribed by the RBI:

Recognition of Amount of Protection Bought and Sold

The credit event payment or settlement amount will determine the amount of credit

protection bought /sold in case of CDS. This could be payment of par or other specified

value in exchange for physical delivery of the Reference Asset (or a variety of assets of the

Reference Entity as allowed under some contracts (Physical Delivery Settlement), or

payment of par less recovery value (Cash Settlement) or payment of fixed amount as per

the CDS agreement (Fixed Amount Settlement). In case of CLN the amount of protection

bought will be equal to the funds raised from issue of the CLNs and the amount of

protection sold will be equal to the book value of the CLN.

Some credit derivative contracts may contain a materiality threshold specified for

determining the loss that must be reached before a credit event is triggered. Therefore, the

materiality threshold may affect the amount of credit protection that may be recognized.

Capital Adequacy for Credit Derivatives in the Banking Book

As stated above banks will be initially permitted to use credit derivatives only for the

purpose of managing their credit risk and not for taking derivative positions with a trading

intent. It means that banks may hold the derivatives in their banking books and not in the

trading books except in case of Credit Linked Notes, which can be held as investments in

the trading book.

Protection Buyer

Where an asset is protected by a credit default swap (CDS), the Protection Buyer may

replace the risk weight of the underlying asset with that of the Protection Seller to the

extent of amount of protection as determined as per paragraph 4.2 above.  Where an asset

is protected by a credit derivative funded by cash (CLN), the Protection Buyer may reduce

the amount of its exposure to the underlying asset by the amount of funding received. For

the unprotected portions the risk weight of the underlying asset will apply. The treatment

of capital requirement will be modified if there are mismatches in the structures as

discussed below.

Presence of Mismatches

In many credit derivative transactions, it is difficult to achieve an effective hedge due to

the existence of mismatches and therefore, suitable adjustments will be made to the extent

of credit protection recognizable on account of presence of such mismatches as outlined

below:

(a) Asset mismatches: Asset mismatch will arise if the underlying asset is different

from the reference obligation (in case of cash settlement) or deliverable obligation

in case of physical settlement).

(b) Maturity mismatches: If the maturity of the credit derivative contract is less than

he maturity of the underlying asset, then it would construe as a maturity mismatch

though the protection buyer would be completely hedged if the contract maturity

were to be higher than the maturity of the underlying asset. In case maturity

mismatches the capital adequacy will be determined in the following manner.

(i) If the residual maturity of the derivative product is less than one year no

protection will be recognized and the risk weight of the underlying asset

will apply.

(ii) If the residual maturity of the credit derivative is one year or more

protection will be recognized and the risk weight will be weighted

average of risk weight of the Protection Seller and risk weight of the

reference entity (weighted by proportions of period for which protection

is available and the period for which protection is not available, counted

from the date of contract till maturity of the derivative. Thereafter, the

risk weight of the reference will apply.

(c) Currency mismatches: A currency mismatch is caused if the credit derivative

contract is denominated in a currency different to the underlying asset. In such an

event, the credit protection obtained should be marked to market to the prevailing

exchange rate and if the value of credit protection (valued in terms of the currency

of the underlying asset) is less than the value of the underlying asset, the residual

risk must be risk-weighted on the basis of the underlying asset.

Protection Seller

Where a Protection Seller has sold protection through a CDS it acquires credit exposure to

the Reference Asset. This exposure is to be risk-weighted according to the risk weight of

the Reference Asset. In a funded credit derivative (CLN), the Protection Seller acquires on

balance-sheet exposure to both the Reference Asset and the Protection Buyer. The CLN

can be held in the banking book or trading book as decided by the bank. If held in the

banking book, the amount of exposure will be equal to the book value of the note and will

be risk weighted by the higher of the risk weight of the reference entity or the Protection

Buyer. Where the credit derivative is referenced to more than one obligor, the amount of

credit protection provided would depend on the structure of the contract.

Capital adequacy for Credit Derivatives in the Trading Book

o As stated in paragraph 3.(v) above banks will hold investments in CLNs issued by

Protection Sellers in their banking book or trading book. The assets in the trading

book are held primarily for generating profit on short-term differences in

prices/yields as against assets in the banking book which are contracted basically on

account of relationship or for steady income and statutory obligations and are

generally held till maturity. A CLN held in the trading book will represent a

position to the note itself, with an embedded credit default product. A credit-linked

note has a notional position to the specific risk of the Reference Asset. There is also

specific risk to the Protection Buyer and general market risk according to the

coupon or interest rate of the note. The risk weight for such positions would be the

risk weight for ‘All other Investments’ i.e. 102.50% as per present guidelines.

Provisioning Requirements

o Sufficient provisioning (based on what would be the provisioning applicable if the

reference asset were on the seller's books) would have to be made by the credit

protection seller if it is offering credit protection on a non performing asset.

o The protection buyer should not make any provision for a reference asset that has

turned NPA and on which it has bought protection which is valid on date.

Some Other Issues

Exposure Norms

Exposure ceilings for all fund based and non-fund based exposures will be computed in

relation to total capital as defined under capital adequacy standards. As per present

policy, from April 1, 2003 exposure calculation will be computed on the basis of 100%

of non-fund based exposures in addition to fund-based exposures.

While determining the overall sectoral / borrower group / individual company

exposure, suitable reduction will be allowed in the level of exposure with respect to the

credit protection bought by means of credit derivatives. Conversely, the protection

seller's exposure would increase as the protection seller acquires what is equivalent to a

credit exposure on the reference asset. For the credit protection seller, the method of

measuring exposure that would be applicable would be similar to the manner in which

non-fund based credit limits such as guarantees are reckoned. Once the exposure is

computed to individual/group entities, banks will have to ensure that they are within

the overall ceiling as laid out in the relevant RBI guidelines.

Issues Relating to Documentation

It is recommended that transactions in credit derivatives may be covered by the 1992

ISDA Master Agreement and the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and

subsequent supplements to definitions with suitable modifications to suit conditions in

India. Credit Linked Notes that are typically issued as bonds will be subject to

additional documentation requirements of bonds. However, banks should consult their

legal advisors about adequate documentation and other legal requirements and issues of

credit derivative contracts before engaging in any transactions.

Issues related to Accounting

Normal accounting entries for credit derivative transactions are fairly straightforward

depending on cash flows that take place at various points in time during the tenor of the

transaction. e.g. for a credit default swap, there will be periodic payment of fees by the

protection buyer to the protection seller. If there is a credit event, then settlement will

be appropriately accounted depending on whether cash settled or settled via physical

exchange versus par payment.

Fair Value Accounting

o Prudent accounting principles require that derivatives create assets and liabilities

which should be captured on the balance sheet at fair economic value based on

current market prices taking into account credit and market risk characteristics

arising from these positions. All future cash flows arising from the contracts should

be brought to present value using appropriate discount rates from mid-market data.

The determination of future cash flows may require use of appropriate valuation

models ranging from simple deterministic derivations to exotic pricing models.

o Banks may adopt suitable norms for accounting of Credit Default Swaps and Credit

Linked Notes with the approval of their respective boards. All derivatives should

be fair valued at least on a quarterly basis. The changes in fair value must be

reported in current earnings.

Maintenance of Statutory reserves on CLN issued by banks

Normally CLNs will be issued by SPVs set up by banks for specific purpose. However,

it is possible that some banks may consider issuing CLNs themselves, in which case

they have to maintain CRR and SLR as required. However, before issuing CLNs,

banks will be required to take prior approval of RBI.

Disclosures

The banks will be required to disclose the following in the Notes on Accounts of their

annual accounts in respect of the credit derivative transactions:

o The types of transactions carried out and their corresponding risks,

o The gains/losses, realized/unrealized from various types credit derivative

transactions undertaken by the banks,

o Contribution of derivatives to the total business and the risk portfolio,

o Fair Value of derivative positions.

CHAPTER XIII CREDIT AUDIT

Credit Audit examines compliance with extant sanction and post-sanction processes/

procedures laid down by the bank from time to time.

Objectives of Credit Audit

o Improvement in the quality of credit portfolio

o Review sanction process and compliance status of large loans

o Feedback on regulatory compliance

o Independent review of Credit Risk Assessment

o Pick-up early warning signals and suggest remedial measures

o Recommend corrective action to improve credit quality, credit administration and

credit skills of staff, etc.

Structure of Credit Audit Department

The credit audit / loan review mechanism may be assigned to a specific Department or the

Inspection and Audit Department.

Functions of Credit Audit Department

o To process Credit Audit Reports

o To analyse Credit Audit findings and advise the departments/ functionaries

concerned

o To follow up with controlling authorities

o To apprise the Top Management

o To process the responses received and arrange for closure of the relative Credit

Audit Reports

o To maintain database of advances subjected to Credit Audit

Scope and Coverage

The focus of credit audit needs to be broadened from the account level to look at the

overall portfolio and the credit process being followed. The important areas are:

1. Portfolio Review: Examine the quality of Credit & Investment (Quasi Credit)

Portfolio and suggest measures for improvement, including reduction of

concentrations in certain sectors to levels indicated in the Loan Policy and

Prudential Limits suggested by RBI.

2. Loan Review: Review of the sanction process and status of post sanction

processes/ procedures (not just restricted to large accounts)

all fresh proposals and proposals for renewal of limits (within 3 - 6 months

from date of sanction)

all existing accounts with sanction limits equal to or above a cut off depending

upon the size of activity

randomly selected ( say 5-10%) proposals from the rest of the portfolio

accounts of sister concerns/group/associate concerns of above accounts, even if

limit is less than the cut off

Action Points for Review

Verify compliance of bank's laid down policies and regulatory compliance with

regard to sanction

Examine adequacy of documentation

Conduct the credit risk assessment

Examine the conduct of account and follow up looked at by line functionaries

Oversee action taken by line functionaries in respect of serious irregularities

Detect early warning signals and suggest remedial measures thereof

Frequency of Review

The frequency of review should vary depending on the magnitude of risk (say, for the high

risk accounts - 3 months, for the average risk accounts- 6 months , for the low risk

accounts- 1 year).

Feedback on general regulatory compliance.

Examine adequacy of policies, procedures and practices.

Review the Credit Risk Assessment methodology.

Examine reporting system and exceptions thereof.

Recommend corrective action for credit administration and credit skills of staff.

Forecast likely happenings in the near future.

Procedure to be followed for Credit Audit

Credit Audit is conducted on site, i.e. at the branch which has appraised the advance

and where the main operative credit limits are made available.

Report on conduct of accounts of allocated limits are to be called from the

corresponding branches.

Credit auditors are not required to visit borrowers’ factory/ office premises.


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