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TABLE OF CONTENTSChapter
No.Topic Page No.
I Introduction 001I-A Indian Financial System 001I-B The Constituents Of Indian Banking System 003
I-C Future Lies Ahead 005II Banking Risk 012II-A Introduction to Banking Risk 012II-B Risk Types and Risk Origination 018II-C Functions of Central Department and Risk
Department019
III RBI – Credit Risk 020III-A Credit Risk 020III-B Building Blocks of Credit Risk Management 023
III-C Credit Rating Framework 032III-D Credit Risk in Off-Balance Sheet Exposures 037
IV Credit Risk Models 039V Credit Risk Scoring Models Developed By Banks 046VI Credit Risk Models - Others 063VI-A Altman’s Z – Scoring Model 064VI-B KMV Model 066VI-C Creditmetrics Approach 067VI-D Creditrisk+ 068VI-E VaR & Risk Management 069VII Managing Credit Risk in Inter Bank Exposure 076VIII Basel and Credit Risk 085IX Credit Risk Management – A Deeper Look 118X Non Performing Assets 152XI RAROC Pricing/ Economic Profit 179XII Credit Derivatives 184XIII Credit Audit 208
MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
BIBLIOGRAPHYBooksi) Risk Management In Banking - Joel Bessisii) Risk Management - ICFAIiii) Credit Risk Management - Taxmann Publicationsiv) Financial management In Banks - IIBFv) ICFAI Reader - ICFAI Pressvi) Professional Banker - ICFAI Pressvii) Business Indiaviii) Business Todayix) Business World
Sitesi) www.rbi.orgii) www.indianbanksassociation.com
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION
I-A INDIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
The growth and development of any economy depends squarely on the savings,
investments as well as the capital formation of the particular system.
Financial System us the mechanism and structure that is available in an economy to
mobilize the monetary resources/capital from various surplus sector of economy,
allocate and distribute the same to the needy sector.
The group of different entities that are engaged in the task of garnering the monetary
available in the economy with a view to channelise these resources into a number of
needy avenues in the economy will constitute the financial system.
Functions of Financial Systems
o It provides a payment system for the exchange of goods and services.
o It enables the pooling of funds for undertaking large-scale enterprises.
o It provides for mechanism for spatial and temporal transfer of funds.
o It provides a way for managing uncertainty and controlling risks.
o It generates information that helps in coordinating decentralised decision-making
o It helps in dealing with the incentive problem when one party has an informational
advantage.
The financial system thus tries to improve the allocational efficiency in their economy
and in the process helps improve capital formation as well as productivity of capital.
The role of financial system can be enhanced to the extent to which the system can
widen its reach to a large population, the extent to which it can minimize the
transaction coasts and finally the extent to which it can respond speedily and
effectively.
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Reserve Bank of India
Commercial Banks Cooperative Societies Other Institutions
Public Sector
Private Sector
Private
New Old
Foreign Non-Scheduled
Foreign Private Local Area
SBI & Associates Nationalised Regional
Rural Banks
State Land Development
PLDBs
State Cooperative
Central Cooperative
Agriculture Credit
Societies
Primary (Urban)
Cooperative Banks
Farmer’s Service
Societies
Government
NSCs
POSB
EPF
DFIs
All India
State Level
Insurance
LIC
GIC
Private
MFs
NBFCs
Public
Private
SEBI
MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
INDIAN FINANCIAL SYSTEMS
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
I-B THE CONSTITUENTS OF INDIAN BANKING SYSTEM
I. The RBI
II. Commercial Banks
a. Indian Commercial Banks – Scheduled and non-scheduled Banks
b. State bank of India and its Subsidiaries
c. Foreign Banks
III. Rural Financial Agencies
a. Cooperative Banks
b. Land development Banks
c. Regional Rural Banks
d. NABARD
IV. Development Financial Institutions
a. Industrial Financial Corporations of India
b. Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (now ICICI Bank)
c. Industrial Reconstruction Bank of India
d. State Financial Corporations
e. Industrial Development Bank of India (now IDBI Bank)
f. Small Industries Development Bank of India)
g. Export Import Bank
h. National Housing Bank
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
V. Non-Banking Financial Institutions
a. Life Insurance corporations of India
b. General Insurance Corporations of India
c. Unit Trust of India
d. Other Life-Non-life Insurance Companies
e. Merchant Banking Institutions
f. Mutual Funds
VI. Post-office Savings Banks
We will focus on Commercial Banks
The Scheduled commercial Banks constitute those banks which have been included in the
Second Schedule of Reserve Bank of India (RBI) Act, 1934. RBI in turn includes only
those banks in this schedule which satisfy the criteria laid down vide section 42 (60 of the
Act. Some co-operative banks are scheduled commercial banks albeit not all co-operative
banks are. Being a part of the second schedule confers some benefits to the bank in terms
of access to accommodation by RBI during the times of liquidity constraints.
At the same time, however, this status also subjects the bank certain conditions and
obligation towards the reserve regulations of RBI. This sub sector can broadly be classified
into:
1. Public sector
2. Private sector - Old & New
3. Foreign banks.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
I-C FUTURE LIES AHEAD
Financial Sector Reforms- Liberalization and de-regulation process- set in motion in
1991 have greatly changed the face of Indian Banking. The banking industry has
moved gradually from a regulated environment to a deregulated market economy.
The pace of transformation has been more significant in recent times with technology
acting as a catalyst.
Four trends change the banking industry world over, viz. 1) Consolidation of players
through mergers and acquisitions, 2) Globalisation of operations, 3) Development of
new technology and 4) Universalisation of banking.
We will see the future trends in the following heads:
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
Regulation and Reforms
While the banking system has done fairly well in adjusting to the new market
dynamics, greater challenges lie ahead. Banks will have to gear up to meet stringent
prudential capital adequacy norms under Basel II. In addition to WTO and Basel II, the
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) such as with Singapore, may have an impact on the
shape of the banking industry.
Under the existing Basel Capital Accord, allocation of capital follows a one-size-fit-all
approach. This would be replaced by a risk based approach to capital allocation. While
regulatory minimum capital requirements would still continue to be relevant and an
integral part of the three pillar approach under Basel II, the emphasis is on risk based
approach relying on external ratings as well as internal rating of each asset and capital
charge accordingly.
Another aspect which is included in Basel II accord is a provision for capital allocation
for operational risk. This is a new parameter and even internationally evaluation tools
are not yet fully developed. This would be another area where banking system will
have to reckon additional capital needs and functioning of its processes.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
Consolidation and Competition
The competitive environment in the banking sector is likely to result in individual
players working out differentiated strategies based on their strengths and market
niches.
The financial sector reforms have brought in the much needed competition in the
market place. The competition to the existing banks came mainly from the techno-
savvy private sector banks.
The pressure on capital structure is expected to trigger a phase of consolidation in the
banking industry. Consolidation could take place through strategic alliances /
partnerships. Consolidation would take place not only in the structure of the banks, but
also in the case of services.
Risk Management
One of the concerns is quality of bank lending. Most significant challenge before banks
is the maintenance of rigorous credit standards, especially in an environment of
increased competition for new and existing clients. Experience has shown us that the
worst loans are often made in the best of times.
Compensation through trading gains is not going to support the banks forever. Large-
scale efforts are needed to upgrade skills in credit risk measuring, controlling and
monitoring as also revamp operating procedures. Credit evaluation may have to shift
from cash flow based analysis to "borrower account behaviour", so that the state of
readiness of Indian banks for Basle II regime improves.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
Corporate lending is already undergoing changes. The emphasis in future would be
towards more of fee based services rather than lending operations. Banks will compete
with each other to provide value added services to their customers.
Technology
Banks will also have to cope with challenges posed by technological innovations in
banking. Banks need to prepare for the changes. Technology is expected to be the main
facilitator of change in the financial sector.
Technology will bring fundamental shift in the functioning of banks. It would not only
help them bring improvements in their internal functioning but also enable them to
provide better customer service. Technology will break all boundaries and encourage
cross border banking business. Banks would have to undertake extensive Business
Process Re-Engineering and tackle issues like a) how best to deliver products and
services to customers b) designing an appropriate organizational model to fully capture
the benefits of technology and business process changes brought about. c) how to
exploit technology for deriving economies of scale and how to create cost efficiencies,
and d) how to create a customer - centric operation model.
Technology solutions would make flow of information much faster, more accurate and
enable quicker analysis of data received. This would make the decision making process
faster and more efficient. For the Banks, this would also enable development of
appraisal and monitoring tools which would make credit management much more
effective. The result would be a definite reduction in transaction costs, the benefits of
which would be shared between banks and customers.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
Payment and Settlement system is the backbone of any financial market place.
The present Payment and Settlement systems such as Structured Financial Messaging
System (SFMS), Centralised Funds Management System (CFMS), Centralised Funds
Transfer System (CFTS) and Real Time Gross Settlement System (RTGS) will
undergo further fine-tuning to meet international standards. Needless to add, necessary
security checks and controls will have to be in place. In this regard, Institutions such as
IDRBT will have a greater role to play.
Outsourcing
Similarly, Banks will look analytically into various processes and practices as these
exist today and may make appropriate changes therein to cut costs and delays.
Outsourcing and adoption of BPOs will become more and more relevant, especially
when Banks go in for larger volumes of retail business. Banks should therefore
outsource only those functions that are not strategic to banks' business.
As we move along, the concept of branch banking will undergo changes. Banks will
find that many of the functions could be outsourced more profitably without
compromising on the quality of service. Specialized agencies could come forward to
undertake Marketing and delivery functions on behalf of banks. This could see banking
products being sold outside the four walls of a branch. Banks would then concentrate
on developing new products and earning fee based income.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
Product Innovation And Process Re-Engineering
With increased competition in the banking Industry, the net interest margin of banks
has come down over the last one decade. Liberalization with Globalization will see the
spreads narrowing further to 1-1.5% as in the case of banks operating in developed
countries.
Banks will look for fee-based income to fill the gap in interest income. Product
innovations and process re-engineering will be the order of the day.
The changes will be motivated by the desire to meet the customer requirements and to
reduce the cost and improve the efficiency of service. All banks will therefore go for
rejuvenating their costing and pricing to segregate profitable and non-profitable
business. Service charges will be decided taking into account the costing and what the
traffic can bear.
Revenue = Cost + Profit Profit = Revenue - Cost Equation Cost = Revenue - Profit
o From the earlier revenue = cost + profit equation i.e., customers are
charged to cover the costs incurred and the profits expected,
o Most banks have already moved into the profit =revenue - cost equation.
This has been reflected in the fact that with cost of services staying nearly equal
across banks, the banks with better cost control are able to achieve higher profits
whereas the banks with high overheads due to under-utilisation of resources, un-
remunerative branch network etc., either incurred losses or made profits not
commensurate with the capital employed.
o The new paradigm in the coming years will be cost = revenue - profit.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
Banks will increasingly act as risk managers to corporate and other entities by offering
a variety of risk management products like options, swaps and other aspects of
financial management in a multi currency scenario.
Bancassurance is catching up and Banks / Financial Institutions have started entering
insurance business. This could lead to a spurt in fee-based income of the banks.
Human Resources Management
The key to the success of any organization lies in how efficiently the organization
manages its' human resources. The principle applies equally and perhaps more aptly to
service institutions like banks. The issue is all the more relevant to the public sector
banks who are striving hard to keep pace with the technological changes and meet the
challenges of globalization.
In order to meet the global standards and to remain competitive, banks will have to
recruit specialists in various fields such as Treasury Management, Credit, Risk
Management, IT related services, HRM, etc. in keeping with the segmentation and
product innovation. As a complementary measure, fast track merit and performance
based promotion from within would have to be institutionalized to inject dynamism
and youthfulness in the workforce.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
CHAPTER II BANKING RISK
II-A INTRODUCTION TO BANKING RISK
Banking risk are defined as adverse impacts on profitability of several distinct sources of
uncertainty. Risk measurement requires capturing the source of the uncertainty and the
magnitude of its potential adverse effect on profitability. Profitability refers to both
accounting and mark-to-market measures.
Other Risks
Settlement & Performance
Risk
Country Risk
Foreign Exchange
Risk
Operational Risk
Liquidity Risk
Market Risk
Interest Risk
Credit Risk
Types of Bank Risk
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
1. Credit Risk
It is the first of all risks in terms of importance. Default risk, a major source of loss, is
the customers default, meaning that they fail to comply with their obligation to service
debt. Default triggers a total or partial loss of any amount lent to the counter party.
Credit risk is also the decline in the credit standing of an obligator of the issuer of a
bond or stock. Such deterioration does not apply default, but it does imply that the
probability of default increases.
The view of credit risk differs for the banking portfolio and the trading portfolio.
o Banking portfolio
Credit risk is important as the default of a small number of important customers
can generate large losses. There are various default events:
Delay in payment obligation – do not turn out as plain defaults, are resolved in
short periods.
Restructuring of debt obligations due to a major deterioration of the credit
standing of the borrower – very close to defaults because it is viewed that the
borrower will not face payment obligation unless its funding structure changes.
Plain defaults – implies that the non payment will be permanent
Bankruptcies – possibly liquidation of the firm or merging with the accruing
firm, are possible out comes. They all trigger significant losses. Default means
any situation other than a simple delinquency.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
o Trading portfolio
Capital market value the credit risk of issuers and borrowers in prices. Unlike
loans, the credit risk of traded debts is also indicated by the agencies’ ratings,
assessing the quality of public debt issues, or through changes of the value of their
stocks. The capability of trading market assets mitigates the credit risk since there
is no need to hold these securities until the deterioration of credit risk materialises
into effective losses. But same is not the case with over-the counter instruments
such as derivatives, whose development has been spectacular in the recent period,
sale is not readily feasible.
2. Interest Rate Risk
It is the risk of a decline in earnings due to the movements of interest rates. Most of the
items of banks’ balance sheet generates revenue and costs that are interest- rate driven.
Since interest rates are unstable, so are the earnings.
Any one who lends or borrower is subject to interest rate risk. The lender earnings a
variable rate has the risk of seeing revenue reduced by a decline in interest rates. The
borrower paying a variable rate bears higher costs when interest rates increases. Both
positions are risky since they generate revenues or costs indexed to market rates. The
other side of coin in that interest rates exposure generates chances of gains as well.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
3. Market Risk
It is the risk of adverse deviations of the mark-to-market value of the trading portfolio,
due to market movements, during the period to liquidate the transactions.
The period of liquidation is critical to assess such adverse deviations. If it gets longer,
so do the deviations from the current market value.
4. Liquidity Risk
It refers to multiple dimension; inability to raise funds at normal cost; market liquidity
risk, asset liquidity risk.
Funding risk depends upon on how risky the market perceives the issuer and its
funding policy to be. It materialises as a much higher cost of funds, although the cause
lies more with the market than the specific bank. The cost, a critically profitability
driver. also depends on the bank’s credit standings.
The liquidity of the market relates to liquidity crunches because of a lack of volume. It
materialises as an impaired ability to raise money at a reasonable cost.
Asset liquidity results from lack of liquidity related to the nature of assets rather than to
the market liquidity. Holding a pool of liquid assets acts a cushion against fluctuating
market liquidity because liquid assets allow meeting short-term obligations without
recourse to external funding.
Liquidity risk which might become a major risk for the banking portfolio, follows
adopting an Assets Liability management (ALM)
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
5. Operational Risks
Operational risks are those of malfunctions of the information systems, reporting
systems, internal risk-monitoring rules and internal procedures designed to take timely
corrective actions, or compliance with internal risk policy rules.
The New Basel Accord of January 2001 defines operational risk as ‘the risk of direct or
indirect loss resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems
or form external events. It appears at different; levels – People, Processes, Technical,
and Information Technology Model risk.
It is significant in the market universe, which traditionally makes relatively intensive
usage of models for pricing purposes. It is growing more important with the extension
of modeling techniques to other risks, notably credit risk, where scarcity of data
remains a major obstacle for testing the ratability of inputs and models.
6. Foreign Exchange Risk
The currency risk is that of incurring losses due to changes in the exchange rates.
Variations in earnings result from the indexation of revenues and charges to exchange
rates or of changes of the values of assets and liabilities denominated in foreign
currencies.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
7. Country Risk
The risk of a ‘crises’ in a country.
Sovereign risk, which is the risk of default of sovereign issuers, such as central bank or
government sponsored bank.
A deterioration of economic conditions.
A deterioration of the value of the local foreign currency in terms of the bank’s base
currency.
Impossibility of transfer of funds due to legal restrictions.
A market crisis.
Country risk is a floor for the risk of a local borrower, or equivalently, that the country
ratings cap local borrower’s ratings.
8. Performance Risk
It exists when the transaction risk depends upon more on how the borrower performs
for specific projects or operations than on overall credit standings. It appears notably
when dealing with commodities. It is ‘transactional’ because it relates to a specific
transaction.
9. Solvency Risk
It is the risk of being unable to absorb losses, generated by all types of risks, with the
available capital. It differs from bankruptcy risk resulting from defaulting on debt
obligations and inability to raise funds for meeting such obligations. Solvency risk is
equivalent to the default risk of the bank.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
II-B RISK TYPES AND RISK ORIGINATION
Risks Credit Market Liquidity InterestRate
Risk Management
General Management
Portfolio Management
ALM
Risk Department
Guidelines and Goals
Portfolio Risk – Return Profile
Risk Origination
Markets
Investment Bank
Commercial Bank
Figure shows who originates what risks and which ventral function supervise them.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
II-C FUNCTIONS OF CENTRAL DEPARTMENT AND RISK DEPARTMENT
Risk Department
Monitoring & Control of all RisksCredit & Market, in addition to ALMDecision-makingCredit PolicySetting LimitsDevelopment of Internal Tools and Risk Data WarehousesRisk-adjusted PerformancesPortfolio ActionsReporting to General Management
Market Risk
LimitsMeasures & Control of RisksCompliancesMonitoringHedgingBusiness ActionsReporting to General Management
Portfolio Management
Trading Credit RiskPortfolio ReportingPortfolio RestructuringSecuritizationsPortfolio ActionsReporting to General Management
Credit Risk
Credit PolicySetting Credit Risk Limits & DelegationsAssigning Internal RatingsCredit Administration (Credit Application & Documentations)Credit Decisions (Credit Committee)Watch ListsEarly Warning SystemsReporting to General Management
ALM
Liquidity & Interest Rate Risk Management.Measure & Control of RisksCompliancesHedgingRecommendations: Balance Sheet ActionsTransfer Pricing systemsLCOReporting to General Management
Control
AccountingRegulatory ComplianceCost accountingBudgeting & PlanningMonitoring & ControlMonitoring PerformancesReporting to General Management
Functions of
Central Department And of
Risk Department
The functions of the different central units tend to differentiate from each other when going further into the details of risk and income actins.Figure illustrates the differentiation process of central function according to their perimeter of responsibilities.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
CHAPTER III RBI – CREDIT RISK
III-A CREDIT RISK
The RBI has defined credit risk as – the possibility of losses associated with diminution in
the credit quality of borrowers or counter parties. In a bank’s credit portfolio, losses stem
from outright default due to inability or unwillingness of a customer or counterparty to
meet their commitments in relation to lending. Trading, settlement and other financial
transactions. Alternatively, losses result from reduction in portfolio value arising from
actual or perceived deterioration in credit quality.
RBI has also sated, that credit risk emanates from bank’s dealings with an individual,
corporate, bank, financial institution or a sovereign and may take any of the following
forms-
a) in case of Direct Lending : Principal and/or interest amount may not be paid
b) in case of Guarantee or Letter of Credit: funds may not be coming from the
constituents upon crystallization of the liability.
c) In case of treasury Operations: The payment or series of payments due from the
counter parties under the respective contracts may not be forthcoming or ceases.
d) In the case of security Trading Business: Funds/Securities settlement may not be
effected.
e) In the case of cross-boarder exposure: The availability and free transfer of foreign
currency funds may either frozen or restrictions imposed by the action of, or
because of political/economic conditions in the country where borrower is located.
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Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
In spite of the fact that the RBI has been laying a lot of emphasis on strengthening of credit
appraisal and monitoring systems in banks, credit quality continues to deteriorate as
reflected in high level of non-performing which continue to increase.
Factors causing credit risk
(i) Deficiency in appraisal of loans proposals and in assessment of
creditworthiness/financial strength of borrowers.
(ii) Inadequately defined lending policies and procedures.
(iii) High prudential exposure limits for individual and group of borrowers.
(iv) Absence of credit concentration limits for various industries/business
segments.
(v) Inadequate value of collaterals obtained by the banks to secure the loan facility.
(vi) Over optimistic assessment of thrust/potential areas of credit.
(vii) Liberal loans sanctioning powers for bank executives without checks and
balances.
(viii) Liberal sanctioning of non-fund based limits without proper scrutiny of
borrower’s activity, financial strength, cash flows etc.
(ix) Lack of knowledge and skills of official processing loan and subjectivity in credit
deacons.
(x) Lack of effective monitoring and consistent approach towards early recognition of
problem account and initiation of timely remedial actions.
(xi) Lack of information on functioning of various industries and performance of
economy.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
(xii) Lack of proper coordination between various departments of banks looking into
credit functions.
(xiii) Lack of well defined organisational structure and clarity with regard to
responsibilities, authorities and communication channels.
(xiv) Lack of credit proper systems of credit risk rating quantifying and managing
across geographical and product lines.
(xv) Lack of effectiveness of existing credit inspection and audit systems I banks and
slow progress in removal of deficiencies as revealed in inspection/audit of branches
and controlling offices.
(xvi) Lack of reliability and integrity of data being used for managing credit risks
associated with lending.
(xvii)Banks have been harping too much on staff accountability as a result
demotivating the staff and not looking at the credit decisions from hind sight.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
III-B BUILDING BLOCKS OF CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT:
In a bank, an effective credit risk management framework would comprise of the following
distinct building blocks:
a) Policy and Strategy
b) Organisational Structure
c) Operations/ Systems
III-B-1 POLICY AND STRATEGY
The Board of Directors of each bank shall be responsible for approving and periodically
reviewing the credit risk strategy and significant credit risk policies.
Credit Risk Policy
Every bank should have a credit risk policy document approved by the Board. The
document should include risk identification, risk measurement, risk grading/
aggregation techniques, reporting and risk control/ mitigation techniques,
documentation, legal issues and management of problem loans.
Credit risk policies should also define target markets, risk acceptance criteria, credit
approval authority, credit origination/ maintenance procedures and guidelines for
portfolio management.
The credit risk policies approved by the Board should be communicated to
branches/controlling offices. All dealing officials should clearly understand the bank’s
approach for credit sanction and should be held accountable for complying with
established policies and procedures.
Senior management of a bank shall be responsible for implementing the credit risk
policy approved by the Board.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
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Credit Risk Strategy
Each bank should develop, with the approval of its Board, its own credit risk strategy or
plan that establishes the objectives guiding the bank’s credit-granting activities and adopt
necessary policies/ procedures for conducting such activities. This strategy should spell
out clearly the organisation’s credit appetite and the acceptable level of risk-reward trade-
off for its activities.
The strategy would, therefore, include a statement of the bank’s willingness to grant loans
based on the type of economic activity, geographical location, currency, market, maturity
and anticipated profitability. This would necessarily translate into the identification of
target markets and business sectors, preferred levels of diversification and concentration,
the cost of capital in granting credit and the cost of bad debts.
The credit risk strategy should provide continuity in approach as also take into account the
cyclical aspects of the economy and the resulting shifts in the composition/ quality of the
overall credit portfolio. This strategy should be viable in the long run and through various
credit cycles.
Senior management of a bank shall be responsible for implementing the credit risk
strategy approved by the Board.
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MMS Finance Final Term End Project Krupesh Thakkar – 59
Credit Risk Management in Banks Project Guide – Prof. Anil Mahajan
III-B-2 ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE
Sound organizational structure is sine qua non for successful implementation of an
effective credit risk management system. The organizational structure for credit risk
management should have the following basic features:
The Board of Directors
o It should have the overall responsibility for management of risks.
o The Board should decide the risk management policy of the bank and set limits
for liquidity, interest rate, foreign exchange and equity price risks.
The Risk Management Committee
o It will be a Board level Sub committee including CEO and heads of Credit,
Market and Operational Risk Management Committees.
o It will devise the policy and strategy for integrated risk management
containing various risk exposures of the bank including the credit risk. For this
purpose, this Committee should effectively coordinate between the Credit Risk
Management Committee (CRMC), the Asset Liability Management
Committee (ALCO) and other risk committees of the bank, if any.
o It is imperative that the independence of this Committee is preserved. The Board
should, therefore, ensure that this is not compromised at any cost.
o In the event of the Board not accepting any recommendation of this
Committee, systems should be put in place to spell out the rationale for such an
action and should be properly documented.
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o This document should be made available to the internal and external auditors for
their scrutiny and comments. The credit risk strategy and policies adopted by the
committee should be effectively communicated throughout the organisation.
Credit Risk Management Committee (CRMC).
o Each bank may, depending on the size of the organization or loan/ investment
book, constitute a high level CRMC.
o The Committee should be headed by the Chairman/CEO/ED, and should
comprise of heads of Credit Department, Treasury, Credit Risk Management
Department (CRMD) and the Chief Economist.
o The functions of the Credit Risk Management Committee should be as under:
Be responsible for the implementation of the credit risk policy/ strategy approved
by the Board.
Monitor credit risk on a bank wide basis and ensure compliance with limits
approved by the Board.
Recommend to the Board, for its approval, clear policies on standards for
presentation of credit proposals, financial covenants, rating standards and
benchmarks,
Decide delegation of credit approving powers, prudential limits on large credit
exposures, standards for loan collateral, portfolio management, loan review
mechanism, risk concentrations, risk monitoring and evaluation, pricing of loans,
provisioning, regulatory/legal compliance, etc.
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Credit Risk Management Department (CRMD)
o Concurrently, each bank should also set up CRMD, independent of the Credit
Administration Department.
o The functions of CRMD are:
Measure, control and manage credit risk on a bank-wide basis within the limits set
by the Board/ CRMC
Enforce compliance with the risk parameters and prudential limits set by the Board/
CRMC.
Lay down risk assessment systems, develop MIS, monitor quality of loan/
investment portfolio, identify problems, correct deficiencies and undertake loan
review/audit. Large banks could consider separate set up for loan review/audit.
Be accountable for protecting the quality of the entire loan/ investment portfolio.
The Department should undertake portfolio evaluations and conduct comprehensive
studies on the environment to test the resilience of the loan portfolio.
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III-B-3 OPERATIONS / SYSTEMS
Banks should have in place an appropriate credit administration, credit risk measurement and
monitoring processes. The credit administration process typically involves the following
phases:
Relationship management phase i.e. business development.
o Transaction management phase covers risk assessment, loan pricing, structuring the
facilities, internal approvals, documentation, loan administration, on going monitoring
and risk measurement.
o Portfolio management phase entails monitoring of the portfolio at a macro level and
the management of problem loans.
On the basis of the broad management framework stated above, the banks should have the
following credit risk measurement and monitoring procedures:
o Banks should establish proactive credit risk management practices like annual /
half yearly industry studies and individual obligor reviews, periodic credit calls
that are documented, periodic visits of plant and business site, and at least quarterly
management reviews of troubled exposures/weak credits.
o Banks should have a system of checks and balances in place for extension of
credit viz.:
Separation of credit risk management from credit sanction
Multiple credit approvers making financial sanction subject to approvals at
various stages viz. credit ratings, risk approvals, credit approval grid, etc.
An independent audit and risk review function.
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o The level of authority required to approve credit will increase as amounts and
transaction risks increase and as risk ratings worsen.
o Every obligor and facility must be assigned a risk rating.
o Mechanism to price facilities depending on the risk grading of the customer, and
to attribute accurately the associated risk weightings to the facilities.
o Banks should ensure that there are consistent standards for the origination,
documentation and maintenance for extensions of credit.
o Banks should have a consistent approach towards early problem recognition, the
classification of problem exposures, and remedial action.
o Banks should maintain a diversified portfolio of risk assets; have a system
to conduct regular analysis of the portfolio and to ensure on-going control of risk
concentrations.
o Credit risk limits include, obligor limits and concentration limits by industry
or geography. The Boards should authorize efficient and effective credit approval
processes for operating within the approval limits.
o In order to ensure transparency of risks taken, it is the responsibility of banks to
accurately, completely and in a timely fashion, report the comprehensive set of
credit risk data into the independent risk system.
o Banks should have systems and procedures for monitoring financial performance of
customers and for controlling outstanding within limits.
o A conservative policy for provisioning in respect of non-performing
advances may be adopted.
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o Successful credit management requires experience, judgement and commitment
to technical development. Banks should have a clear, well-documented scheme of
delegation of powers for credit sanction.
Banks must have a Management Information System (MIS), which should enable them to
manage and measure the credit risk inherent in all on- and off-balance sheet activities.
The MIS should provide adequate information on the composition of the credit portfolio,
including identification of any concentration of risk. Banks should price their loans
according to the risk profile of the borrower and the risks associated with the loans.
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TYPICAL ORGANISATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR RISK MANAGEMENT
BOARD OF DIRECTORS
Risk Planning - Definition of procedures
- Design of credit processes
Credit Risk –Systems- Integration of risk Procedures with credit systems- Design and development of support systems for risk assessment & monitoring
Risk Analytics- Credit Risk and Pricing models’ Design & Maintenance- Portfolio analysis And reporting
Risk Assessment and Monitoring - Sector review- Credit Rating- Review of Credit Proposals (new)- Asset review (existing)
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (COMMITTEE OF TOP EXECUTIVES INCLUDING CEO, HEADS OF CREDIT & TREASURY, AND CHIEF ECONOMIST)
RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE(BOARD SUBCOMMITTEE INCLUDING CEO AND HEADS OF CREDIT, MARKET AND
OPERATIONAL RISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES)CORE FUNCTION: POLICY AND STRATEGY FOR INTEGRATED RISK MANAGEMENT
CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT DEPARTMENT (CRMD)
CREDIT ADMINISTRATION DEPARTMENT (CAD)
OPERATIONALRISK MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
ALCO/ MARKET RISKMANAGEMENT COMMITTEE
Relationship Management & Business Development- Processing the loans – Risk Assessment, Pricing, Structuring the facilities documentation, Disbursement
-Ongoing monitoring & Risk Management- Maintaining of Problem account- Monitoring of Credit Portfolio at macro level
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III-C CREDIT RATING FRAMEWORK
A Credit-risk Rating Framework (CRF) is necessary to avoid the limitations associated
with a simplistic and broad classification of loans/exposures into a “good” or a “bad”
category. The CRF deploys a number/ alphabet/ symbol as a primary summary
indicator of risks associated with a credit exposure. Such a rating framework is the
basic module for developing a credit risk management system and all advanced
models/approaches are based on this structure. In spite of the advancement in risk
management techniques, CRF is continued to be used to a great extent. These
frameworks have been primarily driven by a need to standardise and uniformly
communicate the “judgement” in credit selection procedures and are not a substitute to
the vast lending experience accumulated by the banks' professional staff.
Broadly, CRF can be used for the following purposes:
a. Individual credit selection, wherein either a borrower or a particular exposure/
facility is rated on the CRF.
b. Pricing (credit spread) and specific features of the loan facility. This would largely
constitute transaction-level analysis.
c. Portfolio-level analysis.
d. Surveillance, monitoring and internal MIS
e. Assessing the aggregate risk profile of bank/ lender. These would be relevant for
portfolio-level analysis. For instance, the spread of credit exposures across various
CRF categories, the mean and the standard deviation of losses occurring in each
CRF category and the overall migration of exposures would highlight the
aggregated credit-risk for the entire portfolio of the bank.
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Credit risk rating frame work – highlights of RBI Guidelines
(a) Banks should develop a well-structured credit risk-rating framework by using any
number of operational parameters, financial ratios, collaterals, qualitative aspects
of management and industry characteristics.
(b) The score allotted to each parameter may depend upon their risk predicting
capacity. An illustrative list of parameters have also been provided in the RBI’s
guidelines.
(c) Risk taking framework for large mid corporates, small-scale units traders etc. can
vary. Normally it should have nine grades, of which first five may represent
acceptable credit while reaming four as unacceptable risk.
(d) Rating framework should have some minimum cut off score below which no
credit proposals should be entertained. For any relaxation, clear guidelines be
given in the loan policy document specially indicating the authority who can
permit such relaxation.
(e) Risk taking exercise should be undertaken normally at quarterly interval or at
least on half yearly basis to assess the migration in the credit quality.
(f) Implementation of credit – Risk rating structure by banks
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It should serve the following purposes:
(i) Taking credit decisions: whether to lend a borrower or not. A borrower with high
rating be financed.
(ii) Pricing of the loans (fixation of interest rates): A borrower falling in higher risk
category be priced higher.
(iii) Mitigation of risk – the extent of borrowers contribution in the form of the
margin and collaterals can be demanded based on the borrower’s risk-rating
category.
(iv) Nature of facilities: Whether to sanction cash credit, term loan or demand loan to a
borrower which may depend upon its risk categorization. Demand loan or term loan for
shorter period may be considered where risk involved is high.
(v) Delegation of Loaning Power: higher loaning powers may be vested to the field
functionaries for sanction of loans to borrowers who are rated high with
practically no risk. For borrowers falling under high risk categories, approvals of
loans be considered at higher level of authority.
(vi) Selective monitoring: it is difficult for banks to pay same degree of attention to
all the loan account due to fast expansion of credit. Borrowers who fall under
high risk rating categories can be kept under closer monitoring i.e. to be
monitored more frequently than the low risk borrowers.
(vii) Ensuring Quality: Judging quality of total credit portfolio as also under various
segments i.e. industry, trade, transport, agriculture etc. (large/medium/small).
Also identifying problem accents and the risk concentration in credit portfolio.
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(viii) Mitigation of Credit: Effectively monitoring the overall credit portfolio by
looking at the movement and mitigation of the portfolio, from higher to lower
risk categories and vice versa.
(ix) Management of Credit Risk: Effective management of credit risk by evolving
effective and robust credit polices and procedures which are sensitive and
responsive to changes.
(x) Identification of the trust areas of credit which are looking up and safe as also
those which are risky having high default risk.
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Basic Architecture of CRFs
The following elements outline the basic architecture and the operating principles of any
CRF.
2.3.1 Grading system for calibration of credit risk
Nature of grading system
Number of grades used
Key outputs of CRF
2.3.2 Operating design of CRF
Which exposures are rated?
The risk rating process
Assigning and monitoring risk ratings
The mechanism of arriving at risk ratings
Standardisation and benchmark for risk ratings
Written communications and formality of procedures
2.3.3 CRFs and Portfolio Credit Risk
Portfolio surveillance and reporting
Adequate levels of provisioning for credit events
Guidelines for asset build up, aggregate profitability and pricing
Interaction with external credit assessment institutions
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III-D CREDIT RISK IN OFF-BALANCE SHEET EXPOSURES
Risk Identification and Assessment of Limits
Credit Risk in non-fund based business of banks need to be assessed in a manner
similar to the assessment of fund based business since it has the potential to become a
funded liability in case the customer is not able to meet his commitments. Financial
guarantees are generally long term in nature, and assessment of these requirements
should be similar to the evaluation of requests for term loans. As contracts are
generally for a term of 2-3 years, banks must obtain cash flows over this time horizon,
arising from the specific contract they intend to support, and determine the viability of
financing the contract.
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Risk Monitoring and Control
For reducing credit risk on account of such off balance sheet exposures, banks may
adopt a variety of measures some of which are indicated below:
i) Banks must ensure that the security, which is available to the funded lines, also
covers the Letter of Credit lines and the guarantee facilities. On some occasions, it
will be appropriate to take a charge over the fixed assets as well, especially in the
case of long-term guarantees.
ii) In the case of guarantees covering contracts, banks must ensure that the clients
have the requisite technical skills and experience to execute the contracts. The
value of the contracts must be determined on a case-by-case basis, and separate
limits should be set up for each contract. The progress vis-à-vis physical and
financial indicators should be monitored regularly, and any slippages should be
highlighted in the credit review.
iii) The strategy to sanction non-fund facilities with a view to increase earnings should
be properly balanced vis-à-vis the risk involved and extended only after a thorough
assessment of credit risk is undertaken.
The architecture and operating principles are discussed in detail in the ensuing paragraphs.
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CHAPTER IV CREDIT RISK MODELS
A credit risk model seeks to determine, directly or indirectly,
Our past experience and our assumptions about the future,
What is the present value of a given loan or fixed income security?
The (quantifiable) risk that the promised cash flows will not be forthcoming.
The increasing importance of credit risk modelling should be seen as the consequence
of the following three factors:
o Banks are becoming increasingly quantitative in their treatment of credit
risk.
o New markets are emerging in credit derivatives and the marketability of
existing loans is increasing through securitisation/ loan sales market.
o Regulators are concerned to improve the current system of bank capital
requirements especially as it relates to credit risk.
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Importance
o These models provide the decision maker with insight or knowledge that
would not otherwise be readily available or that could be marshalled at
prohibitive cost.
o In a marketplace where margins are fast disappearing and the pressure to
lower pricing is unrelenting, models give their users a competitive edge.
o The credit risk models are intended to aid banks in quantifying, aggregating
and managing risk across geographical and product lines.
o The outputs of these models also play increasingly important roles in banks’
risk management and performance measurement processes, customer
profitability analysis, risk-based pricing, active portfolio management and
capital structure decisions.
o Credit risk modelling may result in better internal risk management and
may have the potential to be used in the supervisory oversight of banking
organisations.
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In the measurement of credit risk, models may be classified along three different
dimensions:
1 .Technique1s: The following are the more commonly used techniques:
(a) Econometric Techniques such as linear and multiple discriminate analysis,
multiple regression, logic analysis and probability of default, etc.
(b) Neural networks are computer-based systems that use the same data
employed in the econometric techniques but arrive at the decision model
using alternative implementations of a trial and error method.
(c) Optimisation models are mathematical programming techniques that
discover the optimum weights for borrower and loan attributes that minimize
lender error and maximise profits.
(d) Rule-based or expert systems are characterised by a set of decision rules, a
knowledge base consisting of data such as industry financial ratios, and a
structured inquiry process to be used by the analyst in obtaining the data on a
particular borrower.
(e) Hybrid Systems In these systems simulation are driven in part by a direct
causal relationship, the parameters of which are determined through
estimation techniques.
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2. Domain of application: These models are used in a variety of domains:
(a) Credit approval: Models are used on a stand alone basis or in conjunction with
a judgemental override system for approving credit in the consumer lending
business. The use of such models has expanded to include small business
lending. They are generally not used in approving large corporate loans, but
they may be one of the inputs to a decision.
(b) Credit rating determination: Quantitative models are used in deriving
‘shadow bond rating’ for unrated securities and commercial loans. These
ratings in turn influence portfolio limits and other lending limits used by the
institution. In some instances, the credit rating predicted by the model is used
within an institution to challenge the rating assigned by the traditional credit
analysis process.
(c) Credit risk models may be used to suggest the risk premia that should be
charged in view of the probability of loss and the size of the loss given default.
Using a mark-to-market model, an institution may evaluate the costs and
benefits of holding a financial asset. Unexpected losses implied by a credit
model may be used to set the capital charge in pricing.
(d) Early warning: Credit models are used to flag potential problems in the
portfolio to facilitate early corrective action.
(e) Common credit language: Credit models may be used to select assets from a
pool to construct a portfolio acceptable to investors at the time of asset
securitisation or to achieve the minimum credit quality needed to obtain the
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desired credit rating. Underwriters may use such models for due diligence on
the portfolio (such as a collateralized pool of commercial loans).
(f) Collection strategies: Credit models may be used in deciding on the best
collection or workout strategy to pursue. If, for example, a credit model
indicates that a borrower is experiencing short-term liquidity problems rather
than a decline in credit fundamentals, then an appropriate workout may be
devised.
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3. Credit Risk Models: Approaches
The literature on quantitative risk modelling has two different approaches to credit risk
measurement.
(a) The first approach is the development of statistical models through analysis of
historical data. This approach was frequently used in the last two decades. The
statistical approach tries to rate the firms on a discrete or continuous scale. The
linear model introduced by Altman (1967), also known as the Z-score Model,
separates defaulting firms from non-defaulting ones on the basis of certain
financial ratios. Altman, Hartzell, and Peck (1995, 1996) have modified the
original Z-score model to develop a model specific to emerging markets. This
model is known as the Emerging Market Scoring (EMS) model.
(b) The second type of modelling approach tries to capture distribution of the firm's
asset-value over a period of time. The second type of modelling approach tries
to capture distribution of the firm's asset-value over a period of time. This
model is based on the expected default frequency (EDF) model. It calculates the
asset value of a firm from the market value of its equity using an option pricing
based approach that recognizes equity as a call option on the underlying asset of
the firm. It tries to estimate the asset value path of the firm over a time horizon.
The default risk is the probability of the estimated asset value falling below a
pre-specified default point. This model is based conceptually on Merton's
(1974) contingent claim framework and has been working very well for
estimating default risk in a liquid market.
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(c) Closely related to credit risk models are portfolio risk models. In the last three
years, important advances have been made in modelling credit risk in lending
portfolios. The new models are designed to quantify credit risk on a portfolio
basis, and thus are applied at the time of diversification as well as portfolio
based pricing. These models estimate the loss distribution associated with the
portfolio and identify the risky components by assessing the risk contribution of
each member in the portfolio.
Banks may adopt any model depending on their size, complexity, risk bearing capacity
and risk appetite, etc. However, the credit risk models followed by banks should, at the
least, achieve the following:
o Result in differentiating the degree of credit risk in different credit exposures of a
bank. The system could provide for transaction-based or borrower-based rating or
both. It is recommended that all exposures are to be rated. Restricting risk
measurement to only large sized exposures may fail to capture the portfolio risk in
entirety for variety of reasons. For instance, a large sized exposure for a short time
may be less risky than a small sized exposure for a long time
o Identify concentration in the portfolios
o Identify problem credits before they become NPAs
o Identify adequacy/ inadequacy of loan provisions
o Help in pricing of credit
o Recognise variations in macro-economic factors and a possible impact under
alternative scenarios
o Determine the impact on profitability of transactions and relationship.
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CHAPTER V CREDIT RISK SCORING-MODELS DEVELOPED BY BANKS
Keeping in view the parameters used by some banks in their credit risk scoring and
rating systems in line with RBI broad guidelines and those used by eminent persons in
their models, an attempt has been made to evolve a simple but effective model by using
parameters which have significant “Predictive Power”, are more objective/sensitive in
nature and are related to the following four main heads.
I. Operational/Financial Performance of the Unit
II. Banks Accounts and securities available
III. Business/Industry Outlook
IV. Promoters/Management
I. Operational/financial performance of the unit: - the parameters are
(i) plant capacity utilization in
relation to installed
capacity
(ii) Break-even point in relation to
installed plant capacity
(iii) Sales trend in last 3 years
(iv) Profit earned during last 3
years
(v) Achievement of sales
projections
(vi) achievement of profit
projection
(vii) net profit to net sales ratio
(viii) return of capital employed
(ix) ratio of current assets to current
liability
(x) Debt – equity ratio
(xi) Debt-service coverage ratio
(xii) Ratio of net sales per annum to
working capital
(xiii) Ratio of net sales per annum to
fixed/total assets
(xiv) Inventory turnover ratio
(xv) Average collection period of
receivables
(xvi) Average payment period of accounts
payable
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II. Bank accounts & Securities available
(i) Conduct of fund and non-fund based accounts with bank/financial institutions –
whether there are regular/irregular
(ii) Compliance of terms/conditions stipulated by banks/financial institutions while
scanning the loans
(iii) Position of annual renewal/review of the loans facilities.
(iv) Position with regard to submission of balance sheet and profit/loss accounts,
monitoring data and inventory statement etc.
(v) Nature and value of securities (primary/collateral) offered to cover the loan
facilities.
(vi) Validity of creation of charge on the securities.
(vii) Interest and other income being earned by the banks.
(viii) Tenability of loan documents in the court of law.
(ix) Position of contingent liabilities, if any.
(x) Transparency and disclosure in audited annual accounts
(xi) Diversion of short-term funds for long term users
(xii) Unauthorized withdrawal of funds for personal use or diversion of funds for
investments in allied/associate and other firms.
(xiii) Utilization of loans sanctioned by banks/financial institutions for purpose other
than those for which these have been lent.
(xiv) Auditors comments on quality and valuation of current/fixed assets
III Business and Industry Outlook
(i) Intensity of market competition faced by the industry.
(ii) Technology used and whether it is successfully implemented and chances of
its obsolescence
(iii) Market demand and growth potential for the products
(iv) Quality of product(s) and their market acceptability
(v) Threats of substitutes available and likely to come in the market
(vi) Export potential for the products
(vii) Position with regard to availability of raw material
(viii) Import barriers, if any, imposed by the Government
(ix) Units’ locational advantages and disadvantages
(x) General outlook and capital market perception of the industry
(xi) Threat of dumping products by foreign companies
(xii) Type of product(s) whether customized or are for general use
(xiii) Foreign exchange component (risk) in total business covering both
exports/imports
(xiv) Nature of product(s), their applications and shelf life
(xv) Volatility of prices of finished goods and basic inputs/materials used
(xvi) Fluctuations in demand/supply of products both present and expected in
future
IV. Promoters/Management
(i) Ownership pattern of the unit, i.e. whether Public/Private Ltd. Partnership, Prop.
Ship etc.
(ii) Qualifications, experiences and knowledge of industry/business
(iii) Integrity, commitment and sincerity
(iv) Market reputation and creditability
(v) Track record of debt repayment
(vi) financial strength and their capacity to raise more funds
(vii) Pending statutory dues and litigations, if any.
(viii) Functioning of top management personnel
(ix) History of dividends/bonus issues declared
(x) Future succession plan.
Before designing any credit risk scoring and rating systems by using some of the
parameters which have more predictive powers, sensitive and objective, it would be
appropriate consider some of the models for assessment units, health and default
probabilities.
We will look at these parameters and their scoring in details
I. Operational and Financial Performance (Max score 80)
Operational and Financial Performance of the unit being rated may be judged from
certain parameters explained below:
1. Plant Capacity Utilization (Max Score 10)
It is an important which can tell a lot about the Unit’s functioning. Low plant capacity
utilization is a disturbing feature which can be due to various reasons like, lack of
demand, imbalance in plant/machinery, frequent break downs due to plant being old etc.
whatever may be the reason, it would have an adverse effect on unit’s functioning and
ultimately on its profitability. It may be mentioned that level of plant capacity utilization
may very from the nature of industry, process of manufacture etc. it will be desirable to
compare this parameter with the average capacity utilization of other 4/5 peer units
engaged in similar activity and having plant/machinery more or less of same installed
capacity. In case the average capacity utilization of peer units in X then score allotted for
various levels of plant capacity utilization may be as under.
Plant Capacity Utilisation
> 1.25X 1.10 to 1.25X
X to < 1.10X
0.9X to< X
0.8X to 0.9X
.7X to<.80X
<.70X
Score 10 9 8 6 4 2 0OR
In case data about peer units is not available, the score will be allotted based on
comparison of actual utilization of plant capacity with the projections accepted by the
bank while sanctioning the loan.
Plant Capacity Utilisation (%)
100% or more
95-99% 90-94% 85-89% 80-84% 75-79% <75%
Score 10 9 8 6 4 2 0
2. Current Ratio (Max Score 10)
This ratio helps in measuring the liquidity and solvency of a company. Higher ratio may
be good for the creditors but a very high ratio may have impact on the company’s
profitability. The distribution of score for various levels of current Ratio is indicated
below:
Current Ratio 1.50 or more 1.30 to <1.50 1.15 to <1.30 1.0 to < 1.15 < 1.0Score 10 8 6 3 04
3. Return on Capital Employed (Max Score 10)
The percentage return on capital employed is a good indicator fro company’s earning
capacity. Any company having return on capital lower than cost of capital employed is
undesirable. The score distribution is:
ROCE >20% 17 to 20% 14 to <17% 12 to <14% 10 to <12% < 10%Score 10 8 6 4 2 0
Current Assets Current Ratio =
Current Liabilities
PBITROCE = Capital Employed
4. Debt Service Coverage Ratio (Max Score 10)
The ratio measures the capacity of the company to service its debt i.e. repaying the term
liabilities and interest thereon. The score to be allotted are:
DSCR >2.0 1.8 to 2.0 1.6 to < 1.8 1.3 to < 1.6 1.0 to < 1.3 <1.0Score 10 9 7 5 2 0
5. Debt Equity Ratio (Max Score 10)
The ratio pf Promoters/Shareholders stake in business when compared to total debts,
Lower D/E Ratio means, higher long term stability in case the ratio is gradually coming
down, represents plough back of profit.
D/E Ratio Upto 1.0 >1.0 to 1.5 .>1.5 to 2.0 .>2.0 to 2.5 > 2.5 to 3.0 .>3.0Score 10 9 7 5 2 0
6. Achievement of Net Sales Projections (Max Score 10)
The level of achievement of net sales when compared to projections is an important
indicator for unit’s efficient functioning.
% achievement of Net Sales Projection
95% and more
90% to < 95%
85% to < 90%
80% to < 85%
75% to<80%
Below 75%
Score 10 9 7 5 3 0
Net Profit + Dep+ InterestDSCR = Annual Repayments of term loan + interest there on
Total Debts D/E =
Tangible Net Worth
7. Achievement of Net Profit Projections (Max Score 10)
The level of achievement of net profit when compared to projection is important indicator
fro unit’s efficient functioning and control on its expenditure.
% achievement of Net Profit Proj.
95% and more
90% to < 95%
85% to < 90%
80% to < 85%
75% to<80%
Below 75%
Score 10 9 7 5 3 0
8. Future Cash Flow Projection (Max Score 10)
Banks obtain Cash flow Statements from the borrowing companies to assess as to whether the
company would have enough profit generation and surplus funds to repay its term loan
installments or to meet the capital expenditure as envisaged in the projections given by the
company. The various situations and scores are:
Future Cash Flows
Company will have enough profit and surplus generation of funds to meet its obligations including payment of interest and loan installments
Company will have enough profit and surplus funds after taking into account the loans already sanctioned to be released shortly.
Company will have enough profit and surplus funds after taking into account only the loans applied for by the company which are yet to be sanctioned/released.
Company may not have enough profit and surplus funds to meet its loan repayments obligations and may default.
Score 10 7 4 0
II. Conduct of Bank accounts & Availability of Collaterals (Max Score 45)
The conduct of bank accounts with banks/FIs is to be evaluated in the context of
regularity in accounts which may depend on timely payment of interest and installments
of the loans. In addition, the conduct of accounts can be gauged from compliance of
terms/conditions related to the loan and timely submission of data/information to the
bank and securities offered by the borrower to secure bank loans. Other aspect related to
this head may include operations in non-fund based limits, diversion of funds. The
parameters and score allotted to them are given below.
1. Conduct of Bank Accounts Regular/Irregular) (Max Score 10)
Accounts running regular & their conduct satisfactory
Accounts remained irregular for 15 days
Accounts remained irregular for 16-30 days
Accounts remained irregular for 31-45 days
Accounts remained irregular for More than 45 days
Score 10 8 6 3 0
2. Compliance of Terms and Conditions of Sanction (Max Score 5)
All conditions complied Conditions relating to security creation complied while others still remain to be complied.
Conditions of security creation are yet to be complied while other conditions complied.
Conditions have not been complied
Score 5 4 2 0
3. Discipline in timely submission of Financial Data/Stock Statements etc. (Max Score 5)
Timely Submission
Delayed submission upto 15 days
Delayed submission 16-30 days
Delayed submission 31-45 days
Delayed submission of more than 45 days
Score 5 4 3 2 0
4. Security Coverage (Primary & Collateral) (Max Score 10)
% to total sanctioned limits both fund and non-fund based
>200% 175 to 200%
150 to <175%
125 to <150%
100 to < 125%
<100%
Score 10 8 6 4 2 0
5. Operations in Non-Fund Based Loan Limits (Max Score 5)
Non-fund based loan limits generally include Letter of Guarantee, Letter of Credit Limit.
These are called non-fund based limits as these as these do not involve extending any
funds or money. Those, however, involve commitments by banks on behalf of their
customers to pay in the event of default by the customers. Of late it is observed that many
a timers the non-fund based limits get converted into fund based as the borrowers some
times delay and even default in honoring their commitment. It is why RBI has advised
banks that appraisal standards while sanctioning non-fund based limits should not be
diluted.
Operations in non-fund based limits
Borrower honors his commitments and arranges funds whenever L/C or L/G liability falls due.
Borrower generally arranges funds whenever liabilities devolve/or takes maximum 15 days in meeting his liabilities.
Borrower generally delays in arranging the funds whenever the liability devolve. The period of delay goes upto 30 days.
Borrower generally delays in arranging funds whenever non-fund based limits devolve. The delay is generally more than 30 days.
Score 5 4 2 0
6. Diversion of Funds (Max Score 10)
Banks take a serous view whenever they observe that the borrowers are diverting funds to
their allied and associates concerns particularly when they are themselves not doing well.
The diversion may affect the company’s liquidity and operations.
Diversion of funds
Company is not diversing any funds
Company has diverted funds my be from short terms to long terms to be utilised in the company itself to meet emergent needs.
Company has diverted funds to its allied associate concerns by marinating current ratio and D/E ratio within banks acceptable limits.
Company has diverted funds to its allied/associate concerns and for repayment of unsecured loans by affecting it CR and/or DER beyond norms acceptable to banks.
Score 10 7 4 0
III. Industry/Business Outlook (Max Score 40)
Future outlook of ay unit can be gauged from certain parameters.
1. Growth Rate – in terms of % during last two years (Max Score 10)
>20% 15-20% 10-<15% 5-<10% <5% Decline10 8 7 5 3 0
2. Threat of Competition from Existing and New Entrants Substitutes (Max Score 10)
Minimum Threat
Modest Threat
Marginal Threat
High Threat Very High Threat
Score 10 8 5 2 0
3. Reliability of Technology used and threat of its Obsolescence (Max Score 10)
Minimum Threat
Modest Threat
Marginal Threat
High Threat Very High Threat
Score 10 8 5 2 0
4. General Outlook of industry based on Market Study & Capital Market Perception
(Max Score 10)
Bright Outlook
Good Average Below Average
Dismal
Score 10 8 6 3 0
IV Promoters/Management (Max score 35)
As regard evaluating and rating of management, it is always difficult as most of the
parameters available for this purpose are generally qualitative in nature and difficult to
quantify for the purpose of assigning score/ratings. But then it is important to evaluate
management as it is revealed from various studies on sickness in industry that single most
reason for their sickness has been inefficient management, their lack if integrity and
commitment. An attempt has been made t identify parameters, based on various studies
conducted for evaluating management which are qualitative. There are also some
quantitative parameters also in evaluating the management.
1. Integrity / Commitment
Market and Banker’ Report
Willingness to offer securities to secure bank’s loan
Willingness to increase their stake in the business
Commitment towards his business and taking steps for faster implementation of
the project
Past tack record in honoring their commitment
2. financial Strength / Risk Bearing Capacity & Technical Knowledge
Financial position (net worth) of the promoter(s).
Position with regard to availability of funds/liquid assets.
Means of financing and heir stake in the business.
Technical/Financial qualifications / experience of the promoter(s).
Knowledge of product(s) and process of manufacture
Knowledge of financial / banking related aspects.
Support from Group Companies
3. Organisational Structure & Succession Plan
Type of organisational structure and hierarchy
Qualification / experience of persons holdings key positions
Employee turnover in the organisations
Coordination between various executives / departments
Positions of delegation of powers and responsibilities
Succession Plan for “Top Management”
4. Market Reputation & Past Track Records
Dealing in the market and their reputation
Price of the share and earning per share
Market capitalisation and volume of stocks traded in the market
History of repayment of dividends / bonus issues
The parameters as discussed above have been allocated score are
1. Management Integrity/Commitment, Financial Strength etc. (Max Score 20)
Parameters and its Ratings
Max Score
Of High Order
Good Satisfactory Marginal Unsatisfactory
Integrity/Commitments 5 5 4 3 2 0Financial Strength/ technical Knowledge and Risk bearing capacity
5 5 4 3 2 0
Organisational structure and Succession plan 5 5 4 3 2 0
Market Reputation and Past Track Record 5 5 4 3 2 0
2. Management of Inventory and Receivables In Relation to Net Sales in Months
(Max Score 5)
The above measure is months and indicates as to how efficiently the inventory and
receivables are being managed. Lower the period more efficient is the management.
Ratio Value Max Score < 3mths 3 to<4 mths 4 to<5 mths 5 to<6 mths 6 mths &aboveScore 5 5 4 3 2 0
3. Realisability of Receivables and valuation of Inventory. (Max Score 5)
Realisability of Receivables and valuation of Inventory
Max Score
Comments given by Bank’s Inspector/ Stock Auditors are satisfactory
Comments given raised some doubts but no shortfall in value is indicated
Comments given indicate some shortfall in value say maximum upto 5%
Comments given are adverse which are indicative of poor quality of receivables/inventory
Score 5 5 4 2 0
4. Transparency in Accounting Statements (Max Score 5)
Transparency in Accounting Statements (related to disclosure by management and qualifications by auditors)
Max Score
Standard accounting practices are being followed which are consistent. Management has made disclosures and there re no qualifications from the auditors.
Standard accounting practices are being followed which are consistent. Management has made disclosures and auditors have given qualifications which are not damaging.
Accounts lack transparency as disclosures are not adequate. Auditors have given qualifications which re damaging and may erode company’s net worth.
Score 5 5 3 0
Average Inventory + Receivables
Net Sales per Month
Summary of Various Parameters
A. Operational / Financial Performance
1. Plant Capacity Utilization2. Current Ratio3. ROCE4. DER5. DSCR6. Achievement of Net Sales Projection7. Achievement of Net Profit Projections8. Future Cash Flows
Max Score 80
1010101010101010
B. Conduct of Bank Accounting & Availability of Securities
1. Accounts running regular / irregular2. Compliance in terms/conditions of sanction3. Discipline in timely/submission of data/information4. Primary & collateral Securities5. Operations in non-fund based loan limits6. Diversion of funds
Max Score 45
100505100510
C. Industry /Business Outlook
1. Expected Growth Rate2. Threat of Competition from existing and new entrants
and substitutes3. Technology Development and threat of obsolesce4. General Outlook/Capital Market Perception
Max Score 40
1010
1010
D. Management – Rating & Evaluation
1. Management Integrity/Commitment & financial Strength
2. Management of Inventory & Receivable in relation to its Sales
3. Realisability of Receivables & Valuation of inventory 4. Transparency in accounting Statements
Max score 35
2005
0505
Grand Total (A+B+C+D) 200
The borrowers are to be rated on the basis of score received out of 100 and therefore the
score received to be reduced to 50% as the total score of all the parameter under
A+B+C+D works out to be 200.
Risk Categorisation of Borrowers
Score Rating /Grade Risk Categorisation
90 or more AAA Particularly no risk80-89% AA Minimal Risk70-79% A+ Modest Risk60-69% A Marginal Risk50-59% B+ Medium Risk (Generally Border line/likely NPAs)40-49% B High Risk (Generally sub-standard & doubtful category
of NPAs) 30-39% C Very High Risk (Generally doubtful category of NPAs)
Below 30% D Caution (Generally loss category of NPAs)
CHAPTER VI CREDIT RISK MODELS - OTHERS
SUGGESTED CREDIT RISK SCORING & RATING MODELS
Keeping in view the parameters used by some banks in their credit risk scoring and rating
systems in line with RBI broad guidelines and those used by eminent persons in their
models, an attempt has been made to evolve a simple but effective model by using
parameters which have significantly “Predictive Power”, are more objective/sensitive in
nature and are related to the following four main heads.
VI-A ALTMAN’S Z- SCORING MODELS
The Multiple Discriminate Analysis – MDA Model or Z Score Model uses some
financial ratios having significant discriminating power to differentiate weak and
healthy units. Where:
Z = B1X1 + B2X2 + B3X3 + - - - - - - - BnXn
The value of z is arrived at by adding the total value of various discriminate
coefficient and independent variables. In the formula given above X, X, X, etc.
represent financial ratios and B1,B2,B3 are the weights attached to them based on
their predictive power. Altman’s sample comprised thirty-three pairs of
manufacturing firms, where industry and size were used as the paring criteria. After
considering various combinations of the twenty-two accounting and non-accounting
variables, Altman suggested the following pattern of discriminate coefficient and
independent variables.
Z = 0.012X1 + 0.014X2 + 0.033X3 + 0.006X4 + - - - - - - - 0.999Xn
Where :
Z=Overall Score
X1 = Working Capital / Total Assets (measure of liquidity)
X2 = Retained Earning / Total Assets (measure of earning against
investment in Total Assets)
X3 = EBIT / Total Assets (measure of profitability)
X4 = Market Value of Equity / BV of Debts (measure of firm’s leverage)
X5 = Sales / Total Assets (measure of sales generating ability
of the firm’s assets)
The cut-off points for the Total Z score are as under:
(i) Z score > 2.99 classifies healthy units with the lower probability of
failure and default
(ii) Z score < 1.81 and > 2.99 represents grey area with both bankruptcy
and non-bankruptcy possibilities
(iii) Z Score < 1.81 indicates financially distressed and bankruptcy units.
VI-B KMV Model
KMV Corporation has developed a credit risk model that uses information on stock
prices and the capital structure of the firm to estimate its default probability. This
model is based on Merton's (1973) analytical model of firm value. The starting point
of this model is the proposition that a firm will default only if its asset value falls
below a certain level (default point), which is a function of its liability. It estimates
the asset value of the firm and its asset volatility from the market value of equity and
the debt structure in the option theoretic framework. Using these two values, a metric
(distance from default or DfD) is constructed that represents the number of standard
deviations that the firm's asset value is away from the default point. Finally, a
mapping is done between the DfD values and actual default rate, based on the
historical default experience. The resultant probability is called Expected Default
Frequency (EDF).
In summary, EDF is calculated in the following three steps:
i) Estimation of asset value and asset volatility from equity value and volatility of
equity return,
ii) Calculation of distance from default:
The DfD is calculated using the following formula:
iii) Calculation of expected default frequency.
VI-C CREDITMETRICS APPROACH
In April 1997, J.P. Morgan released the CreditMetrics Technical Document that
immediately set a new benchmark in the literature of portfolio risk management.
This provides a method for estimating the distribution of the value of the assets in a
portfolio subject to changes in the credit quality of individual borrower.
A portfolio consists of different stand-alone assets, defined by a stream of future cash
flows. Each asset has a distribution over the possible range of future rating class.
Starting from its initial rating, an asset may end up in any one of the possible rating
categories. Each rating category has a different credit spread, which will be used to
discount the future cash flows.
Moreover, the assets are correlated among themselves depending on the industry they
belong to. It is assumed that the asset returns are normally distributed and change in
the asset returns causes the change in the rating category in the future.
Finally, the simulation technique is used to estimate the value distribution of the
assets. A number of scenarios are generated from a multivariate normal distribution,
which is defined by the marginal rating transition distribution of the individual assets
and the correlation values among them.
Each scenario indicates a future state to which an asset can migrate. Discounting by
the appropriate credit spread, the future value of the asset is estimated. Generation of
a large number of scenarios can give a fair idea on the distribution of asset values.
The mean asset value, asset volatility, percentile level and the marginal risk volume
can summarize the output of this model.
Though there are a few subtle issues that have been raised by practitioners regarding
the implementation of this model, e.g., the estimation of correlation between the
credit quality of two assets, CreditMetrics should be viewed as the first attempt to
address a long-standing problem in portfolio risk measurement.
VI-D CREDITRISK+
CreditRisk+, introduced by Credit Suisse Financial Products (CSFP), is a model of
default risk. Each asset has only two possible end-of-period states: default and non-
default.
In the event of default, the lender recovers a fixed proportion of the total exposure.
The default rate is considered as a continuous random variable. It does not try to
estimate the default correlation directly. Here, the default correlation is assumed to be
determined by a set of risk factors.
Conditional on these risk factors, default of each obligor follows a Bernoulli
distribution. To get the unconditional probability generating function for the number
of defaults, it assumes that the risk factors are independently gamma-distributed
random variables.
The final step in CreditRisk+ is to obtain the probability generating function for
losses. Conditional on the number of default events, the losses are entirely determined
by the exposure and the recovery rate. Thus, the distribution of asset values can be
estimated from the following input data:
o Exposure of individual asset
o Expected default rate
o Default rate volatilities
o Recovery rate given default
o Risk sectors
The CreditRisk+ manual provides the recurrence relation used to calculate the value
distribution.
VI-E VaR AND RISK MANAGEMENT
VaR is a potential loss. VaR is a powerful concept for Risk Management because the
range and importance of its applications. It is also the foundations of economic capital
measures, which underlie all related tools, from risk-based performance to portfolio
management.
VaR provides the measure of economic capital defined as an upper bound of future
potential losses. Once defined at bank-wide level, the capital allocation systems
assigns capital, or a risk measure after diversification effect, to any subset of the
bank’s portfolio, which allows risk-adjusted performances to be defined, using both
capital allocation and transfer pricing systems. Economic capital is a major advance
because it addresses such issues as:
Is Capital adequate, given risks?
Are the risk acceptable, given available capital?
With given risks, any level of capital determines the confidence level, or
bank’s default probability. Both risks and capital should adjust to meet a
target confidence level which, in the end, determines the bank’s risk and
solvency.
Market Risk
Risk measures Volatilities SensitivitiesMarket Values
Credit Risk
Ratings/Maturities/ IndustriesWatch ListsConcentrationPortfolio Monitoring
Interest Rate Risk
Gaps Liquidity Interest rate Duration gap
Other Risks
VaR
VaR and Common Indicators of Risk
Figure illustrates the qualitative gap between traditional risk measures and VaR.
It describes the various indicators of risk serving various purposes for measuring or
monitoring risks. Such indicators or quantified measures are not fungible, and it is not
possible to convert them, except for market instruments sensitivities, into potential losses.
By contrast VaR synthesizes all of them and represents a loss, or a risk value. Because
VaR Is systematic, it is not replacement for such specific measure, but it summaries
them.
Potential Loss
Expected Loss –
It serves for Credit Risk. Market risk considers only deviations of values as losses,
and ignores expected Profit and Loss (P&L) gains for being conservative. EL
represents a statistical loss over a portfolio of a large number of loans. The law of
large numbers says that losses will sometimes be high or low. Intuition suggests that
they revert to some long term averages.
This is the foundation for economic provisions and ‘expected loss risk management.’
Institution suggests that provisioning the expected loss should be enough to absorb
losses. By definition, stastical losses averages losses over a number of periods and
yearly losses presumably tend to revert to some long-term mean. For this reason,
Statistical losses are more a portfolio concept rather than an individual concept. The
more diversified a portfolio is, the lower is the loss volatility and the closer losses
tend to be the average value.
Unexpected Loss
The intuition mentioned above, is sometimes misleading because it ignores the
transitory periods when losses exceed the long term averages. So we should not
ignore the unexpected loss. One purpose of VaR model is to specify both dimension
of risk, average level and chances/magnitude of deviation from average level.
So unexpected losses are potential losses in excess of the expected value. The VaR
approach defines potential losses as loss percentile at given confidence levels. The
loss percentile is the upper bound of loss not exceeded in more than a given fraction
of all possible cases, this fraction being the confidence level. It is L(), where is the
one tailed probability of exceeding L(). For example, L(2%) = 100 means that loss
exceeds the value of 200 in more than 2% of cases. (in a year 4 or 6 days). The
purpose of VaR models is to provide the loss distribution, or the probability of each
loss value, to derive at loss percentile for various confidence levels. The unexpected
loss is the excess of the loss percentile over the expected loss, L() – EL. Economic
capital is equal to unexpected loss measured as a loss percentile in excess of expected
loss (under economic provisioning).
Exceptional Losses
Unexpected losses does not include exceptional losses beyond the loss percentile
defined by a confidence level. Exceptional losses are in excess of the sum of the
expected loss plus the unexpected loss, equal to the loss percentile L(). Only stress
scenarios, or extreme loss modeling when feasible, help in finding the order of
magnitude of such losses. Nevertheless, the probability of such scenario is likely to
remain judgmental rather than subject to statistical benchmark because of the
difficulty of inferring extreme losses which, by definition, are almost unobservable.
Measuring expected and unexpected losses
The two major ingredients for defining expected and unexpected losses are the loss
distribution and the confidence level.
1. Loss Distributors
In theory, historical loss distributors are observable historically. For market risk, loss
distributors are simply the distributions of adverse price deviation of the instruments.
Since there are approximately as many chances that values increase or decrease, such
deviations tend to be bell shaped, with some central tendency. Coming to credit risk,
unfortunately, historical data is scare and does not necessarily reflect the current risk of
banks. For credit risk, losses are not negative earnings. They result from defaults, or less
of assets value because credit standings deterioration. Such distributions are highly
skewed to the left because the most frequent losses are very small.
Both types of distributions are shown in Figure
Prob
abili
ty
Prob
abili
ty
Gains Losses Losses
Market Risk
Credit Risk
-Large Losses-Low Probability
5%
95%
(Profit/Loss Distribution)
XValue-at- Risk
2. Loss Percentiles of the normal distribution
The normal distribution is a proxy for market random P&L over as short period. As both
upside and downside deviations of the mean are considered, the confidence interval is
‘two-tailed’. But it cannot apply to credit risk, for which loss distributions are highly
asymmetrical. So the confidence level intervals are probabilities that losses exceed an
upper bound (negative earnings, beyond zero levels). They are called ‘one tailed’ because
only one side negative deviations materialize downside risk. The point to remember is,
with a symmetrical distribution, the two-tailed probability is twice the one-tailed
probability.
Mode
(most Frequent)
Expected Loss Expected Loss + Unexpected Loss
Probability of Loss < UL
Probability of Loss > ULConfidence Level
Losses = 0 Losses
Expected Loss Unexpected Loss =VaR Exceptional Loss
VaR - Expected-Unexpected Loss Diagram
In the figure losses appear at the right –hand side of the zero level along the x-axis. The
VaR at a given confidence level is such that the probability of exceeding the unexpected
loss is equal to this confidence level. The area under the curve at the right of VaR
represents this probability. The maximum total loss at the same confidence level is the
sum of the expected loss plus unexpected loss (or VaR). Losses at extreme right-hand
side and beyond unexpected losses are ‘exceptional’. The VaR represents the capital in
excess of expected loss necessary for absorbing deviations from average losses.
CHAPTER VII MANAGING CREDIT RISK IN INTER-BANK EXPOSURE
During the course of its business, a bank may assume exposures on other banks, arising
from trade transactions, money placements for liquidity management purposes, hedging,
trading and transactional banking services such as clearing and custody, etc. Such
transactions entail a credit risk, as defined, and therefore, it is important that a proper
credit evaluation of the banks is undertaken. It must cover both the interpretation of the
bank's financial statements as well as forming a judgement on non-financial areas such
as management, ownership, peer/ market perception and country factors.
The key financial parameters to be evaluated for any bank are:
a) Capital Adequacy
b) Asset Quality
c) Liquidity
d) Profitability
Banks will normally have access to information available publicly to assess the credit
risk posed by the counter party bank.
1 Capital Adequacy
Banks with high capital ratios above the regulatory minimum levels, particularly Tier I,
will be assigned a high rating whereas the banks with low ratios well below the
standards and with low ability to access capital will be at the other end of the spectrum.
Capital adequacy needs to be appropriate to the size and structure of the balance sheet as
it represents the buffer to absorb losses during difficult times. Over capitalization can
impact overall profitability. Related to the issue of capitalization, is also the ability to
raise fresh capital as and when required. Publicly listed banks and state owned banks
may be best positioned to raise capital whilst the unlisted private banks or regional
banks are dependant entirely on the wealth and/ or credibility of their owners.
The capital adequacy ratio is normally indicated in the published audited accounts. In
addition, it will be useful to calculate the Capital to Total Assets ratio which indicates
the owners' share in the assets of the business. The ratio of Tier I capital to Total Assets
represents the extent to which the bank can absorb a counterparty collapse. Tier I capital
is not owed to anyone and is available to cover possible losses. It has no maturity or
repayment requirement, and is expected to remain a permanent component of the
counter party's capital.
The Basel standards currently require banks to have a capital adequacy ratio of 8% with
Tier I ratio not less than 4%. The Reserve Bank of India requirement is 9%. The Basel
Committee is planning to introduce the New Capital Accord and these requirements
could change the dimension of the capital of banks.
2. Asset Quality
The asset portfolio in its entirety should be evaluated and should include an assessment
of both funded items and off-balance sheet items. Whilst non performing assets and
provisioning ratios will reflect the quality of the loan book, high volatility of valuations
and earnings will reflect exposure to the capital market and sensitive sectors.
The key ratios to be analysed are
o Gross NPAs to Gross Advances ratio,
o Net NPAs to Net Advances ratio
o Provisions Held to Gross Advances ratio and
o Provisions Held to Gross NPAs ratio.
Some issues which should be taken cognisance of, and which require further
critical examination are:
o where exposure to a particular sector is above a certain level, say, 10% of total assets
o where a significant part of the portfolio is to counter parties based in countries
which are considered to be very risky
o Where Net NPAs are above a certain level, say, 5% of the loan assets.
o Where loan loss provision is less than a certain level, say, 50% of the Gross NPA.
o Where high risk/ return lending accounts for the majority of the assets.
o Where there are rapid rates of loan growth. (These can be a precursor to reducing
asset quality as periods of rapid expansion are often followed by slow downs which
make the bank vulnerable.)
o Net impact of mark-to-market values of treasury transactions.
Commercial banks are increasingly venturing into investment banking activities
where asset considerations additionally focus on the marketability of the assets, as well
as the quality of the instruments. Preferably banks should mark-to-market their entire
investment portfolio and treat sticky investments as "non-performing", which should
also be adequately provided for.
3. Liquidity
Commercial bank deposits generally have a much shorter contractual maturity than
loans, and liquidity management needs to provide a cushion to cover anticipated deposit
withdrawals. The key ratios to be analysed are
o Total Liquid Assets to Total Assets ratio (the higher the ratio the more liquid the
bank is),
o Total Liquid Assets to Total Deposits ratio (this measures the bank's ability to
meet withdrawals),
o Loans to Deposits ratio and
o Inter-bank deposits to total deposits ratio.
It is necessary to develop an appropriate level of correlation between assets and
liabilities. Account should be taken of the extent to which borrowed funds are required
to bolster capital and the respective redemption profiles.
4. Profitability
A consistent year on year growth in profitability is required to provide an acceptable
return to shareholders and retain resources to fund future growth. The key ratios to be
analysed are:
o Return on Average Assets (measures a bank's growth/ decline in profits in
comparison with its balance sheet expansion/ contraction),
o Return on Equity (provides an indication of how well the bank is performing for
its owners),
o Net Interest Margin (measures the difference between interest paid and interest
earned, and therefore a bank's ability to earn interest income) and
o Operating Expenses to Net Revenue ratio (the cost/income ratio of the bank).
The degree of reliance upon interest income compared with fees earned heavy
dependency on certain sectors, and the sustainability of income streams are relevant
factors to be borne in mind.
The ability of a bank to analyse another bank on the above lines will depend upon the
information available publicly and also the strength of disclosures in the financial
statements.
In addition to the quantitative indices, other key parameters to be assessed are:
o Ownership
o Management ability
o Peer comparison/ Market perception
o Country of incorporation/ Regulatory environment
1. Ownership
The spread and nature of the ownership structure is important, as it impinges on the
propensity to induct additional capital. Support from a large body of shareholders is
difficult to obtain if the bank's performance is adverse, whilst a smaller shareholder
base constrains the ability to garner funds.
2. Management Ability
Frequent changes in senior management, change in a key figure, and the lack of
succession planning need to be viewed with suspicion. Risk management is a key
indicator of the management's ability as it is integral to the health of any institution.
Risk management should be deeply embedded and respected in the culture of the
financial institution.
3. Peer Comparison/ Market Perception
It is recognized that balance sheets tend to show different structures from one country to
another and from one type of bank to another. Accordingly, it is appropriate to assess a
bank's financial statements against those of its comparable peers. Similarly market
sentiment is highly important to a bank's ability to maintain an adequate funding base,
but is not necessarily reflective of published information. Special notice should be taken
where the overall performance of the peer sector, in general, falls below international
standards.
4. Country of Incorporation/ Regulatory Environment
Country risk needs to be evaluated since a bank which is financially strong may not be
permitted to meet its commitments in view of the regulatory environment or the
financial state of the country in which it is operating in.
Banks should be rated (called Bank Tierings) on the basis of the above factors. An
indicative tiring scale is:
Bank Tier Description
1 Low risk
2 Modest risk
3 Satisfactory risk
4 Fair Risk
5 Acceptable Risk
6 Watch List
7 Substandard
8 Doubtful
9 Loss
5.5 Facilities
Facilities to banks can be classified into three categories:
a) On balance sheet items such as cash advances, bond holdings and investments, and
off-balance sheet items which are not subject to market fluctuation risk such as
guarantees, acceptances and letters of credit.
b) Facilities which are off-balance sheet and subject to market fluctuation risk such
as foreign exchange and derivative products.
c) Settlement facilities: These cover risks arising through payment systems or through
settlement of treasury and securities transactions.
The tiering system enables a bank to establish internal parameters to help determine
acceptable limits of exposure to a particular bank/ banking group. These parameters
should be used to determine the maximum level of (a) and (b) above, maximum tenors
for term products which may be considered prudent for a bank and settlement limits.
Medium term loan facilities and standby facilities should be sanctioned very
exceptionally. Standby lines, by their very nature, are likely to be drawn only at a time
when the risk in making funds available is generally perceived to be unattractive.
Bank-wise exposure limits should be set taking into account the counter party and
country risks. The credit risk management of exposure to banks should be centralised on
a bank-wide basis.
Basel Accord I
Codified Minimal Capital Adequacy Ratio, with Option to Countries to
Prescribe Higher ratio
Stressed Capital Adequacy as One of Many Other Dimensions of
Financial Strength
Primarily Addressed to Internationally Active Banks
Applicable to Banks on Consolidated Basis
CHAPTER VIII BASEL AND CREDIT RISK
Evolution of Regulatory environment
In the late eighties, there was a lot of cross-border lending particularly by the
Japanese banks. Japanese banks grew enormously and gathered market share;
Western banks complained about Japanese banks being regulated badly.
Basel I was an attempt to standardise the regulation governing the global banking
industry.
The Basel Capital Accord, the current international framework on Capital Adequacy
was adopted in 1988 by many banks worldwide and in 1992 in India.
The heart of the Basel I norms defined minimum required equity capital, i.e. an
attempt to contain leverage.
The feature of Basel I hovered four dimensions (Figure I)
Required equity capital was a single number calculated as a fraction of the risk
weighted assets (RWA).
RWA = w1x1 + w2x2 + : : :, where x1 was corporate
exposure, and w1 = 1.
The weights for all the other classes of assets was set at less than 1.
The main focus appeared to be on addressing credit risk.
The minimum equity requirement was set through a minimum Capital Adequacy Ratio
(CAR), at typically 8% of RWA.
Positive Point
The CAR requirement did reduce the extremely high levels of leverage in the banking
industry.
Criticisms
The accord assumes that all banks have same financial status. It prescribed “a
single size hat that fits all.”
The calculation of RWA is incorrect as Risks in the banking portfolio are not
linear.
Assets were classified on very broad lines.
Ignored differences between countries. - (If 8% works for the OECD, what is
correct for India?)
Two minimum standards
Asset to capital multiple - Risk based capital ratio (Cooke ratio)
Scope is limited
o Portfolio effects missing- a well diversified portfolio is much less likely to
suffer massive credit losses
o Netting is absent
The focus on credit risk gave banks incentives to find new ways of bearing risk.
(Eg. higher exposure in interest rate risk, OTC derivatives.)
Ignored the problem of opacity - loans, OTC derivatives, OTC trading.
No market or operational risk
Consequences
Even though these were broad recommendations, they became rigid in the hands
of weak banking regulators.
This became especially problematic countries where the regulatory framework
was not strong enough to develop their own risk management rules.
The focus shifted from taking risks with a clear understanding of the returns, to
blindly using BIS rules.
Basel II
Afterwards, over the past several years, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
has been working on a new accord to reflect changes in the structure and practices of
banking and financial markets.
The latest version of the new Basel Capital Accord known as Basel II was released in
a Consultative Paper in April 2003.
The focus has been on strengthening the regulatory capital framework minimum
capital requirement which is more sensitive to the risk profile and risk management.
The object of the new Capital Accord is to have an improved Capital Adequacy
Framework to foster a strong emphasis on risk management.
The new Capital Accord spells out how the banks should set aside capital as a buffer
against unforeseen risks.
Further the banks around the world should have similar standards of risk assessment
and measurement.
“Thus the expressed purpose of the Basel II norms is
to better align regulatory capital with actual risk. “
Basel
Pillar IMinimum Capital
Requirement
Pillar IISupervisory Control Pillar III
Market Discipline
Credit Risk Operational Risk Market Risk
Standardized Approach
IRBApproach
Foundation IRB
AdvancedIRB
Basic Indicator Standardized Advanced Measurement
Standardized Approach
ModelApproach
Basel II is of course improved version of Basel I Accord. The new Accord was to be
implemented by 2004 end, but has been postponed to 2006 so as to empower member
countries to fine-tune the provisions and sort out relevant guidelines.
The new accord consists of three pillars:
1. Minimum Capital requirements
2. Supervisory Review of Capital Adequacy
3. Market Discipline and Public disclosure.
Minimum Capital Requirement
Supervisory Control Market Discipline
Pillar (1) : Minimum Capital Requirements
The current accord is based on the concept of a capital ratio where the numerator
represents the required amount of capital by a bank and the denominator is the risk
weighted assets. The resulting capital adequacy ratio should not be less than 8%.
Under the proposed new capital accord also, the numerator of the capital ratio remains
unchanged. The minimum required ratio is also kept unchanged at 8%. The
modifications have been in the definition of risk weighted assets. The new definition
contains more focus on risks to make it more meaningful. Measuring of economic
capital will be done by aggregation of various risks viz. credit risk, market risk and
operational risk. The current accord covers two types of risks namely credit risk and
the market risk. The market risk was introduced by the Committee in 1996 and
1mplemented from 1997 by most of the banks.
In the new accord, the pillar 1 modifies the definition of the risk weighted assets. It
emphasizes on treatment of credit risk in a more scientific way and also introduction of
an explicit treatment of operational risk.
1. Credit Risk
Under the first approach the Risk Weighted Assets (RWA) is determined. However, it
has departure from the previous accord in setting the risk weights. Here risk weights
are revised from time to time depending upon the ratings of counter parties by External
Credit Rating Agencies. These exposures are to be converted into a single numeric
component of RWA.
The methods of measuring credit risk have been given as under:
(i) Standardized approach.
(ii) Foundation IRB (Internal Rating Based) approach.
(iii) Advanced IRB approach.
2. Operational Risk
The operational risk is defined as the risk of losses arising out of inadequate or
failed internal processes, people and systems or external events. The committee
provides that banks need to hold the capital to protect losses arising out of the
operational risk. This is
another area where the regulatory capital approach has been put forth.
Here again capital charges are computed directly and then multiplied by 12.5 to
make it comparable with RWA.
Basel II contains two simpler approaches to operational risk viz. the basic indicator
approach and the standardized approach.
(a) Basic Indicator Approach
In this, the measure is bank’s gross income which will include interest income as well as
non interest income. Three years average of the gross income will be taken and multiplied
by a factor of 0.15 set by the Committee which will produce the capital requirement.
(b) The Standardized Approach
I this, gross income is an indicator for the scale of a bank’s business operations. Under this
method the banks need to calculate a capital requirement for each business line. This is
calculated by multiplying gross income by specific supervisory factors determined by the
Committee. Banks should have adequate operational risk systems complied with the
minimum criteria laid down by the Committee.
3. Market Risk.
For markets risk also, a standardized as well as IRB approach is prescribed. However,
it is different from credit risk methodology. Here the capital charges are determined
directly and it has a multiplier of 12.5 so as to make it comparable to the RWA.
Again a special type of Tier III capital is introduced to cover market risk only, which
will consist of short-term subordinate debt with a minimum maturity of two years and
with a cap not exceeding 250% of Tier I capital used to meet market risk.
Here five distinct sources of market risk are identified.
1. Interest Rate Risk 2. Equity Position Risk 3. Foreign Exchange Risk
4. Commodity Risk 5. Risk from Operations
Pillar (2) : Supervisory Review
Pillar II aims at improving supervisory review process and stresses supervisory review as a
critical complement to capital requirement and market discipline. It also emphases that
supervisors need to take a comprehensive view on how banks handle their risk
management and internal capital allocation process. As per the new accord the traditional
regulation by the regulator has been outdated and control in the form of direct supervision
is coming to the forefront.
The second pillar emphasizes the need for banks to assess their capital adequacy positions
relative to their overall risks and for supervisors to review the same. The supervisors will
also take appropriate actions after making proper assessments.
This pillar adds strong risk assessment capabilities by banks as well as supervisors. It will
be necessary for the banks to have adequate capital to protect against adverse or uncertain
economic conditions.
There may also be a stress test of the assets held by the bank. The supervisors may require
a bank to reduce risk exposures so that its existing capital resources match its minimum
capital requirement.
Pillar (3) : Market Discipline
This is complementary to Pillar (1) and Pillar (2). The Committee has sought to encourage
market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements which
allow the stakeholders, shareholders and other market participants to assess key
information about a bank’s risk profile and level of capital resources to absorb the
unexpected losses.
The third pillar relates to market discipline or public disclosure. The potential of market
discipline to reinforce capital regulation depends on the disclosure of reliable and timely
information with a view to enabling banks’ counter parties to make well-founded risk
assessments. Pillar III complements the other two pillars. The accord seeks to encourage
market discipline by developing a set of disclosure requirements.
The corporate governance has already been implemented and more and more disclosures
are now required in the balance sheet of banks. Further the banks should also have proper
policies and guidelines in place for action and compliance by various functionaries.
This pillar (3) of the new capital accord can generate significant benefits in managing
banks and supervisors to minimize risk and improve stability. Market discipline can
contribute to a safe and sound banking environment.
Other Issues
Capital Requirement Under Basel II Accord
(from Federal Reserve Bulletin-Sept.03)
Implementation of New Accord
Though the proposals of Basel II accord are suitable for a wide range of banks in different
countries but within the G-10, the Committee members have agreed to a common
implementation date for the new accord of year end 2006. In the G-10 countries this
framework will be applied to the entire banking system. For other countries, the
Committee provides that the regulator may first strengthen the supervisory system and
develop a time table and approach for implementation. But many national supervisors have
already begun to plan for the transition to Basel II. A framework will be developed for
assisting Non G- 10 country supervisors and banks in the transition stage to both the
standardized and foundation IRB approaches of the New Accord. However, the frame
work is still under preparation requiring suitable amendments on the basis of most recent
Regulatory capital (Definition unchanged) Minimum required --------------------------- = Capital Required ratio Measure of risk exposure (8% minimum unchanged)(Risk-weighted assets)(Measure revised)
Credit risk Market risk OperationalExposure + Exposure + Exposure(Measure revised) (Measure unchanged) (Explicit measure added)
Asset Securitisation
Basel II also provides a specific treatment for asset securitization which is not there in
the current accord. This is a risk management technique which relates to transfer of
ownership and/or risk associated with the credit exposures of the banks. Thus this is an
important tool in providing better risk diversification and risk mitigation and enhancing
financial stability by modifying the credit portfolio suitably.
Impact of New Capital Adequacy Norms
Undoubtedly, the new capital accord will be requiring more capital maintenance by the
banks. But it should never be presumed that the banks in India can not meet the
requirements of Basel II accord. The market risk has already been implemented.
Further, under the new accord, the risk weights for sovereign, inter bank transactions,
mortgage backed loans etc. are fixed at lower levels. The capital requirement will also
be at 8 per cent level as against existing level maintained by most of the banks, which
is above 10 per cent of the risk weighted assets. Thus the maintenance of capital as per
the rating of the accounts may not require for the banks to maintain hefty additional
capital on this score.
However, banks will have to provide capital resources for the operational risk by
keeping aside a substantial portion of gross income (8 per cent of 15 per cent of gross
income).
The impact may not be much more for capital requirement but the complexity of the
system will have to be properly resolved and suitable measures to be taken so as to
collect and preserve information required.
Issues in the Indian Context
The Basel II accord is a burning topic amongst Indian banks for the last two years. Indian
Banks are conceptually and academically ready to adopt the new norms. But a lot of issues
are involved and also there are a lot of difficulties in its implementation in the Indian
context.
The Main Issues involved are :
1. Availability of Historical Data
The historical database as required to assess various parameters, customer data base and
also other required data is not available. The probability of default, the loss given default
and the maturity value factors for computation of credit risk will be based on the historical
data. Substantial current and historical data collection on credit portfolio are required for
moving towards the IRB approach for Credit Risk Management. Such data has to be
created by the regulatory or the supervisory i.e. RBI vis-à-vis individual banks. Further it is
a very laborious and time consuming process.
2. Higher Risk Weights for Sovereign
All claims on sovereign are currently assigned a risk weight of 0 per cent. Now under the
new capital accord the risk weight of sovereign has also been fixed at 0 to 150 per cent
and it is likely to be at 50 per cent for India.
3. Cost Factor
The implementation of the Basel II accord will involve the cost factor both for individual
banks as well as the supervisory. The banks will have to improve their systems and
procedures including the computerized environment. They should have analytical
systems, models and tools in place for risk assessment, measurement and control.
4. Technological Up-gradation
For implementation of the Basel II accord, the technology up-gradation will be required for
many banks which may not be in a position to incur huge capital and revenue expenditure
on this front. The interconnectivity and the core banking solution has not been
implemented by most of the banks so far. Each bank may be required to incur an
expenditure of over Rs. 500 Crore in this area. Thus there will be requirement of large
resources for technology, the return of which will not be adequate and immediate.
5. Applicability
Even the G-10 countries are finding it difficult to implement the Basel II accord in all the
banks. Therefore the applicability to various banks in India has to be decided with the
specified time schedule i.e. the year by which the same will be implemented in some or all
the banks in India. In other words, longer time may be required for its implementation in
India.
6. Diversified Products
The new diversified products like derivatives and asset securitization are being adopted by
the banks which will have an impact on the implementation of Basel II accord in deciding
risk factor for off balance sheet exposure.
7. Legal and Regulatory Guidelines
For implementation of the Basel II accord, the new guidelines have to be framed and risk
factors etc. are also to be ascertained by the regulatory i.e. RBI. The related laws/ acts also
have to be suitably amended, if need be.
8. Higher Risk Weight to Small and Medium Enterprises
There is a higher risk weight to the small and medium enterprises. In our country, the
public sector banks have more than 40 per cent of their lending to the priority sector. The
implementation of Basel II accord can adversely affect the priority sector lending. Instead,
the banks will choose to finance good rated corporate borrowers or mortgage backed
advances.
9. Credit Rating
The risk weights are to be allotted as per the credit rating of various borrower accounts.
The rating is a yearly process and in most of the cases the rating will be based on the
audited financial statements pertaining to the previous year as the latest audited financial
statements can not be made available on the day of year end.
10. Calculation of Capital Requirement
The method of calculation of Capital Requirement under comprehensive approach is very
complex and not easy to calculate.
11. Higher Risk Weights
The risk weights under the new accord are ranging from 0 to 150 per cent, enhanced from
the present maximum level of 100 per cent, which will affect the risk weighted assets and
will require more capital resources.
12. Disclosures
Too many disclosures by banks sometimes may lead to a chaotic situation and can further
damage the financial position of the Bank.
Suggestions
1. The RBI has already suggested that in the first phase, the Basel II will be applicable for
the internationally operative banks. It has been further clarified that the banks having cross
border operations of more than 20-25 per cent, shall fall under the said purview of
internationally active bank.
2. RBI may redefine and pronounce the risk weights as per suitability of the country
conditions which may not affect the priority sector lending and are favourable for the
development of small sector. In other cases also the RBI may reduce the risk weight on
their best judgment assessment.
3. The discretion to assign a lower risk weight for the claims on sovereign should be
available.
4. Similarly the RBI should have flexibility in defining the exposure classes such as
sovereign, corporate, retail, small and medium enterprises etc.
5. The RBI may provide the data regarding probability of default, loss given default
maturity etc. to enable banks to compute the credit risk. The banks may also analyze and
compute the factors for probability of default and loss given default based on past
experience.
6. Possible impacts of implementation of Basel II accord may be studied by the expert
group and then the same may be implemented as per the recommendations of the expert
group.
7. The asset securitization has not become popular in India as yet. It can be promoted to
assist banks in implementing the Basel II accord comfortably by parting the assets, which
may require higher capital, under securitization deal.
8. The level of preparedness for implementation of the new capital accord may be
improved during the period down the line till year end 2006. The banks need to collect and
preserve the historical data and also analyzing the same using the technology. Banks need
to deploy and up-grade the technologies and human skills.
9. Individual banks need to have proper project planning for Basel II and to have
connectivity of the branches.
10. Individual banks to have robust internal rating system for credit risk management.
They should also have the data and a tracking of rating migration by developing rating
transition matrix.
11. Looking to the complexities of Basel II, a gradualist approach for switch over to Basel
II is suggested. The banks other than internationally active banks can be allowed a further
period of 2-3 years after year end 2006, for implementing the Basel II accord.
12. For the inter bank transactions, the cross holding of capital and other regulatory
investments by other banks, up to 10 per cent of total capital, could be permitted.
13. Export Credit Agencies should review the country risk from time to time in
consultation with or participation of the regulatory.
Credit Risk and Basel II
Introduction - Frame Work
This is presently 8% as prescribed by Basel (The minimum prescribed rate by our regulator
(RBI) is 9%).
There are three approaches to calculate the capital adequacy as described by the Basel
Accord. They are
1. Standardized approach,
2. Foundation IRB (Internal Rating Based) approach,
3. Advanced IRB approach.
The bank can choose any one of the above approaches suited to their portfolio. Here, we
discuss the major risk elements and the various approaches in respective Credit Risk areas.
Total CapitalCapital Adequacy =
Credit Risk + Operational Risk + Market Risk
Credit Risk – What is it
Credit risk is derived from the probability distribution of economic loss due to credit
events, measured over some time horizon, for some large set of borrowers. Two
properties of the probability distribution of economic loss are important; the expected
credit loss and the unexpected credit loss. The latter is the difference between the
potential loss at some high confidence level and expected credit loss. A firm should
earn enough from customer spreads to cover the cost of credit. The cost of credit is
defined as the sum of the expected loss plus the cost of economic capital defined as
equal to unexpected loss.
(i) Standardized Approach
The standardized approach is based on the External Credit Assessment Institutions (ECAI)
ratings for sovereigns, banks and corporates and is more risk sensitive as compared to
existing standardized approach. The primary motivation of the standardized
approach is that most banks are in early stages of developing data base on internal loss
based on different risk perception. In addition, industry wise data is also not fully
available to develop internal loss. Hence the simplest method for calculation of CAR has
been preferred.
The risk weights corresponding to each rating category is furnished below.
Standardized Approach : Proposed Risk Weight Table (Percentage)
AAA to
AA-
A+ to
A-
BBB+ to
BBB-
BB+ to
B-
Below
B-
Unrated
Sovereign (Govt. & Central
Bank)
0 20 50 100 150 100
Bank Option1 * 20 50 100 100 100 100
Bank Option2a ** 20 50 50 100 100 50
Short Term claims under Option 2 b
(up to 1 year) ***
20 20 20 50 150 20
Corporates 20 50 100 100 150 100
* Risk weighting based on risk weighting of sovereign (Country) in which bank is
incorporated.
** Risk weighting based on assessment of individual bank.
*** Risk weighting based on assessment of individual bank with claims of original
maturity <6 months.
Off-Balance-sheet exposures
Retail Portfolio 75%
Lending fully secured by Mortgage of Residential Properties 35%
Small and Medium Enterprises 100%
Past Due Loans (Non Performing Assets):
If specific provision is less than 20% of O/S balance 150%
If provision is 20% or more of O/S balance 100%
If provision is more than 15% of O/S balance but loan is fully secured 100%
National supervisors may decide to apply a 150% or higher risk weight in case of
claims on sovereigns/ PSEs/banks/securities firms rated below B-, claims on corporates
rated below BB-, past due loans, securitization tranches (proposed risk weighted at
350%) that are rated between BB+ and BB-.
The committee is not proposing to change the existing conversion factors for off
balance-sheet items with the exception of commitments. Credit conversion factor is
o 20% for commitments of original maturity <= 1 year
o 50% for commitments of original maturity > 1 year
o 0% for commitments that are unconditionally cancelable
(ii) IRB (Internal ratings based) approach / Foundation Approach
In the foundation IRB approach, the probability of default is provided by the bank and
other parameters such as loss given default, exposure at default and maturity
(values set by the Committee according to the maturity of advances) will be provided
by the regulatory.
In the Internal Rating Based approaches, the risk weights and capital charges are
determined through the quantitative inputs provided by banks themselves or by the
regulatory and formulas specified by the Committee.
IRB approach is based on banks internal assessment of counter parties and exposures.
The main three elements are
Risk components/drivers of potential credit loss
Risk weight function, by which the risk components are converted to risk weights.
Minimum requirements.
There are six different categories of risk exposures as per this approach.
1. Sovereigns &Public Sector Entities 4. Retail Loans
2. Other Banks 5.Project Finance
3. Corporates 6.Equity Investments
Even though the broad features are mostly similar for each type of exposure, different
methodology is adopted and in each case, two concepts are identified.
EXPECTED LOSS
Rs.
Probability of Default
(PD)%
Loss Severity Given Default
(Severity)%
Loan EquivalentExposure
(Exposure)Rs
What is the probability of the counterparty
defaulting?
If default occurs, how much of this do we
expect to lose?
If default occurs, how much exposure do we
expect to have?
Borrower Risk Facility Risk Related
Risk factors are based on
Long run average probability of default (PD) of borrowers in each rating grade.
Loss given default (LGD).
Exposure at default (EAD)
Maturity (M)
Granularity of portfolio (which is determined by the concentration of a bank’s
exposure to a single borrower or a group of closely related borrowers)
However, the accord imposes on banks to meet the following requirements to the
satisfaction of the supervisory authority.
(a) There is a risk management system in the bank which is conceptually sound and is
implemented with integrity.
(b) The models granted by bank have a proven tack record of reasonable performance
in the eyes of the supervisory authority.
(c) There should be an independent risk control unit which directly reports to the
senior management and board of Directors.
(d) The output of the risk management unit should be an integral component of the
planning process and day-today operations of the bank.
(iii) Advanced IRB approach
In IRB foundation approach, estimates of default risk of obligor are provided by the
bank using internal estimates whereas other risk drivers are applied as per
supervisory norms.
However in case of IRB advanced approach, all the risk drivers except for
granularity would be based on banks internal methodologies.
Issues/Constraints and suggestions under credit risk
The nominal capital benefit accruing from credit risk due to lesser capital
requirement for claims on external rated accounts/retail portfolio/residential
property is to be shifted to unrated claims on banks, lower rated borrowers, past
due loans and high risk exposures and hence the overall capital requirement may
not be reduced much.
Issues and Constraints SuggestionsIn case of corporate claims, different risk weights are applied based on external ratings. External ratings agencies like S & P is using ‘‘ 7 σ’’ approach for assigning highest category rating. In India, due to scarcity of capital, the borrowers having economic capital @ 7 σ basis is very rare.
Supervisory authorities may permit banks to risk weight all corporate claims and advances above Rs.5 crore (above the cut of limit of retail advance) instead of external ratings in view of very limited number of external rated companies in India.
Banks should use solicited ratings from eligibleECAIs. (National supervisory authorities may,however, allow banks to use unsolicited ratings in the same way as solicited ratings)
There may be the potential for ECAIs to use unsolicited ratings to put pressure on entities to obtain solicited ratings though powers are given toSupervisors for de-recognizing such ECAIs.
Exposure to retail portfolio with risk weight at 75%
Granularity criterion may be avoided in view of fixing of maximum aggregated retail exposure to one counterpart of 1 million Euro or Rs.5 cr.
Lending fully secured by mortgages on residential property that is or will be occupied by the borrower, or that is rented, will be risk weighted at 35%.
The criteria shall be extended to all claims secured by mortgages
The unsecured portion of any loan (other than a qualifying residential mortgage loan) that is past due for more than 90 days, net of specific provisions, will be risk-weighted more.
The unsecured portion of any loan (other than any mortgage) that is past due for more than 90 days, net of specific provisions, shall be risk-weighted more
Securitization trenches that are rated between BB+ and BB- will be risk weighted at 350%.It is also noted that higher risk weight will adversely affect the expansion of asset securitization in India. It is also possible that banks may ‘cherry-pick’ their portfolios for securitization. As a consequence, banks may retain the worse assets in their B/S aftersecuritising higher quality assets.
The risk weight of 350% is very high and hence maximum cut off may be fixed as applicable to advances.
Capital relief in respect of CRM techniques. Banks shall give certain Capital relief in case of effective use of CRM techniques since it reduces credit risk or transfers credit risk after cons idering the increase of residual risks.
Issues and Constraints SuggestionsIn case of IRB approach, the entire advances should be rated, which is impracticable in present Indian scenario.
A major chunk of advances (Regulatory Advances like social lending) are difficult to rate by the bank. The regulator has to come out with uniform guidelines.
Capital adequacy ratio of the bank has to be certified by the statutory auditors. While considering the Indian banking scenario and size of the assets, auditors may be finding it difficult /time consuming to assess the rating of individual assets and portfolio of assets. In view of the above, auditors are likely to give disclaimer in their reports.
In IRB approach, retail advances shall be excluded from rating of individual advances and hence 75% RW shall be assigned on portfolio wise.
Recoveries has to be increased to minimize loss given default which in turn will reduce theunexpected losses of portfolio.
Effective legislation/ reduction of time consumption of legal process are required.
The securitization is in the nascent stage. Securitization (both asset backed and mortgaged backed) of assets by banks shall be popularized to reduce banks capital requirements.
It is expected that expected losses to be covered through pricing and unexpected losses through capital allocation. As expected losses are not transforming to proper pricing due to unhealthy competition, economic capital requirement is high.
Suitable monitoring system shall be developed by supervisors to overcome this practice. Also pricing based on rating may be extended to good individual borrowers to minimize the disparity.
CHAPTER IX CREDIT RISK MANAGEMENT – A DEEPER LOOK
Credit Risk Management has been practiced since commencement of banking activity
but the discussion of risk management, the tool used in different risk management areas
and the resources deployed in terms of skills and technology have shown considerable
sophistication in recent years. The tone has been set by increasing competition for loan
business, declining spreads and the heightened risk surrounding industrial and
commercial activity.
As we have already seen the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision set up by the
bank for International Settlements (BIS) has issued some broad principles for
management of credit risk by banks. These are:
o Establishing an appropriate credit risk environment.
o Operating under a sound credit granting process.
o Maintaining an appropriate credit administration, risk measurement and
monitoring process.
o Ensuring adequate controls over credit risks.
o Role of bank supervisors/bank regulatory authorities in ensuring that banks have
an effective system in place to identify measure, monitor and control credit risk.
Credit risk management covers both the decision-making process, before the credit
decision is made, the follow-up of credit facilities, plus all monitoring and reporting
processes. The decision making process covers all the steps associated with a client’s
credit application, from the original account officer’s proposal to all credit officers who
examine the credit application, or to a credit committee which reviews/approves the
proposal. The decision based on various credit evaluation parameters based on
financial data, plus judgmental assessment of the market outlook, of the borrower, of
the management and of the shareholders. The follow-up is done through periodic
reporting reviews of the bank commitments by customer, industry and country. In
addition, “warning systems” are put in pace to signal the deterioration of the situation
of the borrower before default whenever possible. A work-out process, by which all
actions to minimize possible losses are considered and taken care can be trigged if a
default occurs.
Limits Systems and credit Screening
Credit Risk is sought to be limited by strict exposures limits aimed at limiting losses in
the event of a default. Before any credit decision is made, an authorisation has to be
specified. The authorisation states the maximum amount at risk with any customer, or
group of customers. Within the authorisation, credit decisions can be made, provided
that they meet the standards of credit risk acceptance laid down by the bank. The usage
of credit lines should remain below the limit approved. The risk reporting system
should be able to consolidate all the facilities that are made available to a customer in
order to constantly check that the line usage remains within limits.
The basic principles followed while setting up limits are simple to understand as under:
(1) Avoid a situation in which any single loss endangers the bank;
(2) To diversify and broad base the commitments across various dimensions such as
customers, industries and geographical regions;
(3) To avoid lending to any borrower an amount that would increase its debt beyond its
debt servicing capacity.
The equity of the borrower sets up some reasonable limits to its debt given
acceptable levels of its debt/equity ratio. The capital of the bank sets up another limit to
lending given the diversification requirements and/or the credit policy guidelines. The
bank regulatory authorities also often prescribe exposure limits in relation to a bank’s
capital and maximum credit exposure to an individual customer as also credit exposure
in the aggregate.
Ultimately, with a full-blown quantitative risk management systems, the
capital of the bank could be allocated to all credit lines. Such allocation of capital
requires special systems to measure risks at the level of a transaction and at the level of
the bank portfolio, including diversification effects. Risk based capital allocation is a
sophisticated systems, which goes well beyond the recording of amounts at risk. This
allocation can serve the purpose of limiting the consolidated risk according to the
actual available capital. It also makes explicit the capital usage of various credit lines.
Limits can potentially be defined in terms of capital usage. Most practices, however, do
not reach this stage, but the trend is to focus on the capital usage of credit lines because
of regulation and its emphasis on risk based capital.
Is Limits systems widely used?
It is not as relevant as it appears. When the bank is dealing with a limited number of
big customers, it is difficult to set limits. First, lending is based on a continuous
relationship. Setting limits and relationship banking are interacting processes. Second,
big corporations with an excellent credit standing are less subject to limits given the
high quality of their risk. In other words, “relationship banking” and “name lending”
tend to reduce the importance of quantitative limits. However, bank regulators do
prescribe that banks observe a system of lending limits while providing loans.
For individuals, the credit application process can be considerably simplified,
compared to what it is for corporate or financial sector borrowers. There are a large
number of customers so that statistical methods rather than customized risk appraisal
systems become relevant. Authorisations result from the appraisal of the credit standing
of borrowers based upon their observable characteristics such as yearly income,
property, values, and employment characteristics and so on. For individuals the
appraisals of the risk quality can often rely on credit scoring. Scoring so arrived at
estimates the quality of the risk as a function of a limited number of selected
characteristics / parameters.
The limit system centralises the information about the borrowers, in terms of both
authorisations and usage of credit lines. In addition to limiting the amount of risk, the
centralisation is also a basis for monitoring portfolio orientations, such as increasing
the portfolio diversification, or reducing concentration in a particular industry or
industrial group, or any other portfolio parameters.
External Ratings
The best known systems are those of specialized credit rating agencies. For example,
Moody’s uses a simplified rating scale, plus a detailed rating scale. The simplified
scale includes 6 levels. It is briefly described in the following module. Standard &
Poor’s uses similar scales.
Such ratings characterise debt issues rather than issuers. The reason is that some debt
issues, from the same borrower, could be less risky than others. Investors are more
interested in the risk of an issue, given its specific protection, than in the issuer. Ratings
qualify the risk of losses in the event of default, a combination of default probabilities
and recoveries. The ratings signify rankings, not quantitative measures of risk quality.
Common rating systems include from 6 to 10 different ranks, which are sufficient to
discriminate among risk classes.
For the internal use of banks, there are other options to be considered. First, ratings
could qualify the credit standing of the borrower, instead of combining it with recovery
risk.
Ratings attached to facilities are useful whenever guarantees are attached to individual
facilities. For transactions structured with guarantees and collaterals the quality of the
protection becomes more important than the credit standing of the borrower. Whether it
is necessary to have a dedicated rating system for facilities or not is a management
decision. However, to have a fine pricing system for different facilities to meet the
demands of competition, a bank would feel the need for a dedicated rating system to
ensure that its pricing system is risk-based.
A rating system can also serve as a tool for credit policy. For instance, some minimum
rating might be required to make a loan, or to delegate authority to credit officers. They
can be allowed or not allowed to enter transactions based on the borrower rating.
A rating system requires robustness to be accepted as a reliable tool. For corporate
borrowers, the criteria for assessing risk are well known: profitability, growth, industry
outlook, competitive advantages, management and shareholders, in addition to the
standard set of financial and operational performance rations. Ratings are required
while lending to financial institutions as well. However, the rating criteria differ
significantly from those applicable to corporate borrowers. Since the financial industry
is highly regulated, the policy of the regulating bodies, which can vary greatly between
countries, is an important factor for those institutions that operate internationally. In
addition, the rating system for individual borrowers is obviously different from that
applicable to corporate borrowers as mentioned earlier.
Internal Ratings
Internal rating systems exist in many institutions. As per the system borrowers are
ranked according to their credit quality. Sometimes, facilities are also rated, in order to
capture the quality for protection against the default of the borrower that is embedded
with the facility. Such protection can be obtained through the status of privileged debt
or collateral, guarantees or any other contractual agreement.
Rating System: Design
Finally, the design of the rating system changes across institutions. While a few will
prefer a fairly detailed rating system, with explicit rules for appraising criteria and
weighting them, others may focus more on the judgmental appraisal of risk quality,
with guidelines specifying the criteria to be appraised before making a judgment.
Credit Enhancement
Guarantees and loan covenants are the main vehicles of credit enhancement. Credit
enhancements are sought when a bank does not feel comfortable about the decision on
the basis of a borrower’s rating alone. An enhancement helps a bank not only to take
the credit decision but also to price the facility more competitively. The borrower may
not object to the credit enhancement particularly if it helps him in obtaining a lower
price from the bank. They aim at reducing the amount of loss in the event of default
because they increase the recoveries. The covenants trigger preemptive actions
whenever the credit standing deteriorates. Collaterals and third party guarantees serve
as an insurance, whose value is uncertain, in the event of default. Covenants are
virtually sort of an aid to active monitoring of risks.
Covenants
Covenants create additional obligations for the borrower. For instance, if the borrower
breaks the covenants, the lender can be entitled to a prompt repayment of its debt. This
is a powerful incentive to comply with the covenants. In practice, some waivers can be
accepted. The actual goal of covenants is to initiate negotiations with the borrower
before default, not to trigger default as such. There are financial covenants based on the
usual financial ratios. For instance, the debt / equity ratio can be specified to remain
below a stated limit; if the actual ratio exceeds the limit the lender would be entitled to
call off the credit facility. Legal covenants restrict the initiatives of the borrowers.
Typically, they seek to reduce diversification beyond the borrower’s core business or
restrict the uses of the funds of the borrower so that he repays the bank debt first,
before anything else. But there are alternatives to design the set of covenants according
to the specifics of a borrower or a transaction.
Structured Transactions
Credit enhancing devices can be sophisticated such as those in case of structured
transactions. The structure of the transaction aims at isolating the risk of the transaction
from that of the borrowing entity. Guarantees and covenants are the basic ingredients
of a transaction structure. The level of protection can also be improved with other
specific features. For instance, reserve accounts can be set up and / or built up
progressively with time whenever some target indicator hits a trigger value. The build-
up of cash balances or of collateral, serves as a first-level protection for the lender that
has privileged access to them.
Securitisation
A good example of a structured transaction is securitisation. Whenever some assets are
securitised, they serve as collateral for debt issues sold to investors. The risk of those
debt issues has to be limited and rated, so that investors know what they buy.
Typically, the flows generated by the collateral assets will be routed again to the low
risk investors as a priority. The structure isolates investors from the original credit risk
of the assets being securitised.
Credit enhancing vehicles are numerous and are being increasingly used. They range
from stand by letters of credit, complex structures for Leveraged Buy Outs (LBO),
project finance, assets acquisition or securitisation. The credit enhancement is obtained
by the separation, partial or almost total, of the risk of the transaction from the risk of
the borrower.
Credit enhancing vehicles achieve this purpose through risk transformation as well as
risk reduction. The collateral changes the credit risk into a recovery risk plus an asset
value risk. Third-party guarantees transform the default risk of the debtor into a smaller
joint default risk. Covenants, or other devices mitigating credit risk, are useful triggers
for active risk monitoring whenever the credit standing of the borrower deteriorates.
Credit Risk in banking transactions & measuring credit risk in it
From a quantitative standpoint, credit risk is measured by the loss in the event of a
default. Credit risk results from a combination of default risk, exposure risk and
recovery risk.
The resulting loss L is random and can be seen as the product of a random variable
characterising default D ( a percentage), an uncertain exposure X (a value) and an
uncertain recovery rate R ( a percentage):
Loss = D x X x (1-R)
Let us summaries the issue of measuring risk. Although a symbolic formulation, it
shows that the upstream random factors that influence exposures and recoveries have to
be investigated. It also suggests that the measure should, ideally cover all 3
components.
Let us introduce common measures of the components of credit risk from default risk
to exposure risk and recovery risk.
Internal Ratings
External Ratings
Default Statistics
From Internal Ratings to External Ratings and Default Statistics
1. Default Risk
An adequate quantitative measure of default risk is the probability of default. The
available measures are either ratings or historical statistics on defaults, which can be
used as proxies for default risk. Another method to quantify default risk is to derive an
estimate of default probability based on a borrowing entity’s characteristics.
The Historical Frequencies of Defaults
There is significant correlation between ratings and default frequencies. Such data are
published yearly by rating agencies for various periods for different rating classes.
It is important to note that most bank clients particularly in developing countries are
not rated by agencies, but are rated internally. If a correspondence can be established
between the internal rating scale and the rating scales of agencies, it provides a link
between internal ratings and historical default frequencies. In a way the methodology is
simple to implement, although the correspondence between internal rating scales can
be approximated and not exact.
Agency ratings and default frequencies
The data available from rating agencies provide relevant information from a statistical
standpoint. They include, for each rating class:
o the frequencies of defaults, yearly or for longer periods of time
o the volatility across time of yearly frequencies, which results from changes in
general economic conditions
o the transition matrices between ratings classes. These give the percentages of issues
in which ratings X changed into rating Y during a certain period. Such percentages
are available for all couples of ratings classes X and Y.
The default rates are close to zero for the best risk qualities. They increase to around
8% a year for the lowest rating class. It can be the magnitude of yearly default rates for
the 6 rating classes in Moody’s simplified rating scale. Actual values vary every year.
The top 3 ratings characterise “investment grade” borrowers. The other 3 classes are
called “speculative grade” because of their much higher associated risk. For investment
grade borrowers, the default rate ranges from 0.02% to 0.08% a year.
The relationship between ratings and default rates is far from proportional. The
increase in the default rate when ratings decline has an exponential shape. The increase
in default rate from one class to the next changes drastically when going down the
rating scale. In order to improve the rating by one grade, the required variation of
default rate will be 6.5% for the last 2 classes of the scale, but a small decrease of
0.02% suffices to improve the grade from Aa to Aaa.
Moody’s Ratings Yearly Default Rates
Aaa 0.02%Aa 0.04%A 0.08%
Baa 0.20%Ba 1.80%B 8.30%
This observed law has important implications. The ratings drive the cost of lending by
banks. Improving the ratings class it can be done theoretically by improving the overall
solvency of the borrower. But the required improvement of solvency to gain one rating
class, measured in terms of default rate, is much higher in the lower grades of the scale
than in the upper grades.
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%Mean
%
Years
Def
ault
Rat
es Time Series of Default Rates
Volatility
Graph Default Rates : Time Series
Are Default rates volatile?
Default rates become unstable with the passing of time. The volatility of yearly
historical default rates is the standard deviation of observed values. The volatility
increases with the level of default rate, that is, when the rating diminishes. This is
consistent with the fact that low default rates are closer to the zero value floor which
limits their variations. Such volatilities are available from time series of default rates
observed across varying horizons.
If the volatility is high, the potential deviations of the default rate around the average
can be significant. If the volatility is low, deviations are small. The unexpected loss
will be higher in the first case. The default rate volatility is a simple base for measuring
the unexpected loss for loan portfolios. The unexpected loss is proportional to this
standard deviation. The expected loss is proportional to the average default rate.
Default Rates and Horizon
The cumulated default rates increase with the horizon. The longer the period the higher
the chances of observing a default. The growth of cumulated default rates with horizon
is not proportional. For high ratings, or low default rates, the increase is more than
proportional. For low ratings and high default rates, it is less than proportional. High-
risk borrowers improve their risk, when they survive for a longer time. Low risk
borrowers face risk deterioration when time passes. All these observable facts are
important in differentiating the risks across time and in valuing both expected and
unexpected losses.
Years Years
Cum
ulat
ed D
efau
lt R
ate
Vola
tility
of
Def
ault
Rat
e
Low Rating
High Rating
As time passes, the risk tends to change. It either improves or deteriorates. These shifts
are captured by the transition frequencies between risk classes. Such frequencies can be
tabulated for each pair of ratings. Within a given period, the transition frequencies can
be recorded as a transition rate (%) between classes. Transitions occur mostly in the
neighbouring classes of ratings and there is a concentration of high frequencies along
the first diagonal of the matrix. In this example, the probability of transition from class
A to B is 2% while the probability of an unchanged rating of A is 95%.
Figure 1 Time Profiles and Volatility of Default Rates
2. Exposure Risk
Exposure is the amount at risk in the event of default without considering recoveries.
Since the default occurs at an unknown future date, the amounts at risk that count are
future amounts at risk. When they are known, they must be derived from the time
profile of exposure. When they are unknown, they have to be estimated, based on
assumptions, conventions or modelling of future exposures. The type of commitment
given by the bank to the borrower is important since it sets up the upper limits of
possible future exposures.
Inter-bank exposure and country risk
A suitable framework has to be evolved to provide a centralized overview on the
aggregate exposure on other banks. Bank-wise exposure limits could be set on the basis
of assessment of financial performance, operating efficiency, management quality, past
experience supervision and control mechanism etc. Like corporate clients, banks
should also be rated and placed in a range on the basis of their credit quality. The limits
so arrived at have to be allocated to various operating centers and followed up at
regular / periodic intervals. Regarding exposure on overseas banks, banks can use the
country ratings accorded by international rating agencies and classify the countries into
low risks, moderate risk and high risk. Banks should endeavor for developing an
internal matrix that reckons the counterparty and country risks. The maximum
exposure should be subjected to adherence of country and bank exposure limits already
in place. The exposure should be monitored at least on a weekly basis till the time
banks are equipped to monitor on daily / online basis.
Credit Risk and the Balance Sheet
A time profile of exposures is defined when there is a contractual repayment schedule.
In all other cases, assumptions or projections are required to be made to estimate future
exposures. An important area for future estimates covers committed lines of credit, of
which usage is not yet 100%. Only the current usage is known, plus the level of the
authorization and the time remaining before its maturity or review date. These lines,
which are not fully used, are treated as given contingencies and recorded off-balance
sheet. For proper risk measurement, it is necessary that such contingencies are captured
in the bank’s MIS.
Not all lines are fully committed. In some cases, there is no commitment, except that
the bank is willing to increase usage up to certain limits if the borrower wants to. The
bank might have informed the customer that he could increase his borrowing. Since the
bank is not legally committed to do so, the unused fraction of the credit line does not
have to be recorded off balance sheet. The situation is similar when authorizations are
purely internal; the client has no idea of the amount that the bank is willing to lend, and
the bank commitment does not go beyond the current line usage.
The current exposure is the current line usage. There is exposure uncertainty as long as
the bank is ready to go beyond the current usage. Future exposure will certainly differ
from the current usage, because of newly opened lines of credit. In such cases, the
expected exposure becomes more relevant than the current usage. Often, only current
exposures are recorded and reported. But expected exposures might be more relevant to
assess future risks.
Product Lines
Balance Sheet Off-Balance Sheet
Projections & Assumptions
Further expected Exposures
Exposures RiskCurrent Exposure
Contingencies
From a risk stand point, off-balance sheet transactions raise specific issues. The risks
appear only conditional depending upon the initiative of a counter party or a third
party. For instance, with a confirmed line of credit, the customer can decide at any time
to draw that line up to the authorized amount. In such case, the given contingency turns
into a credit line, which then appears in the balance sheet. Given contingencies are
options, which can be exercised by the customers or a third party at a future date.
Received contingencies are options, which can be exercised at the initiative of the
bank. Risks generated off-balance sheet are conditional risks, not certain risks.
Off-balance sheet risks appear in the balance sheet only when the options are exercised.
It should be understood that the risk in such cases is potential rather than current.
In regard to given contingencies, it can be argued that since the bank has to comply
with the exercise of the option, 100% of the amount committed is at risk, even though
it is not yet drawn. A potential risk could also be valued at less than 100%. The reason
is that while some contingencies given such as committed lines of credit are very likely
to be used. Others are very unlikely to be drawn, such as guarantee given to a third
party in the event of default of the customer. The approach adopted by bank regulators
is to use a 50% weight to value the potential risk generated by off-balance sheet
transactions due to the limited probability of cost outlays. From the above
consideration, there is a case for differentiating exposures depending upon the nature of
contingencies.
Expected Exposures – The Time Profile
The measure of credit risk exposure depends upon the type of credit lines current,
projected exposure or the level of authorization that can be used.
The time profile of exposures varies widely with the type of transactions. We illustrate
some possible shapes based upon credit authorization profiles, either for amortizing
loan or for committed lines of which usage is uncertain as under:
Time profiles of credit exposure can be expressed as under:
Expo
sure
Expo
sure
Time Time
Bullet Loan, orCommodity Line of Credit Amortising Loan
3. Recovery Risk
Guarantees and covenants diminish risk because they reduce the loss in the event of
default. The loss in the event of default is the amount at risk at default time less
recoveries. Normally, recoveries require legal procedures, expenses and a significant
lapse of time. Loss in the event of default can be estimated before or after the costs of
waiting and workout costs. From a measurement standpoint, the valuation of such
guarantees is an Herculean task, if it is feasible at all. There are many uncertainties
involved. Some historical recovery rates vary widely around the average. Going
beyond some forfeit valuation is not an easy task given the uncertainty in recoveries
from guarantees. The following is a list of some credit risk enhancing effects of
guarantees along with some remarks relevant from a valuation standpoint.
All guarantees are subject to legal risk, i.e. the risk that the guarantees may not be
enforced if they happen to be used. Legal risk depends upon the type of guarantees.
Some guarantees are more enforceable than others. Letters of intent or letters of
comfort have less force than legal commitments without recourse. The legal risk also
depends upon the current environment at the time of default and after. Whenever legal
procedures are activated, the protection of guarantees becomes subject to the outcome
of such procedures. Beyond legal risk, guarantees transform and reduce risks.
Collateral can be seized and sold by the lender, thereby reducing or even canceling the
loss. The original credit risk turns into a recovery risk plus an asset value risk.
Recovery risk depends upon the nature of assets, their location, their integrity and the
legal environment. The risk on the liquidation value also varies according to the nature
of collateralized assets. It is zero with cash. The mark-to-market value of securities
held as collateral has a volatility that can be derived from market volatility combined
with the sensitivity of the securities. The methodology developed for market risk also
applies for any capital market collateral. The risk on the liquidation value of other
types of collateral, such as real estate, aeroplanes, ships and fixed equipment, is less
easy to capture. In some cases, existing data are relevant. The value of aeroplanes, for
example, can be tabulated according to their age and their remaining life. But in this
and other cases, the expected value of such collaterals remains subject to judgment
based on the characteristics of the assets.
Third party Guarantees
Third party guarantees have a two-fold risk. First, there is the legal risk of not being
able to enforce the guarantee, which depends upon the nature of the guarantee.
Secondly, default risk is enhanced because third-party guarantees transfer the credit
risk form the borrower to the guarantor at the time of default. The effect on risk is that
the default probability of the borrower is changed into a joint probability of default of
both borrower and guarantor. Usually, a joint probability of default is much lower than
a single probability. For instance, when the defaults of the borrower and the guarantor
are actually independent, the joint probability of default is the product of the
probabilities of default of each one. If the borrower and the guarantor have a 1% & a
0.5% default probability, their joint default probability becomes 0.5% X 1% = 0.005%
which is quite close to zero.
In general, the joint probability depends upon the interdependence of defaults of the
borrower and the guarantor. For example, if the guarantor is the holding company and
the borrower a subsidiary, the defaults are probably not independent. They can be
totally linked if the borrower cannot default unless the holding company defaults and
vice versa. In such case, the default probability is the same for the borrower and the
guarantor and the joint default probability of both becomes equal to that common
value.
Covenants allow for preventive action on the happening of certain events preceding a
default. On the other hand, guarantees can be considered as insurance policies that are
activated only when default occurs. They are consistent with a more passive risk
management. Covenants enhance the effect of proactive credit risk management. Their
Collateral
Covenants
Transform Credit Risk into Asset Risk
Risk Transform from Borrower to the
“Guarantor + Borrower”
Third Party Guarantee
Allow Corrective Actions
actual values depend upon how active the credit risk monitoring and management
processes are. There is no simple methodology capable of quantifying such intangible
assets as covenants.
How the risk changes as a result of impact of guarantees can be followed as under:
Guarantees and Loss in the Event of Default
The loss in the event of default is the amount at risk less the recoveries. It is increased
by any workout costs such as the carrying cost of collateral or the expenses involved in
these recovery efforts.
Credit Risk and the Potential Losses
As mentioned earlier, Loss Given Default or LGD depends upon the values assigned to
the three basic parameters: default probability, exposure and recoveries.
Expected Loss
The expected loss is the product of the loss given default and the default probability.
The LGD is the amount at risk or exposure, less recoveries.
LGD = exposure – recovery
= exposure x (1 – recovery rate%)
How exposure transforms & leads to Loss Given Default can be understood from the
following diagram:
Guarantees, Collaterals, Covenants
Recoveries
Loss in the event ofDefault
Workout Expenses
Exposures
The expected loss synthesizes both the Loss Given Default and the quality of risk:
Expected Loss = LGD x default probability
= exposure x (1 – recovery rate%) x default probability (%)
Thus, we can say that the expected loss captures in a single measure the three
components of credit risk: exposure, default probability and recovery.
Unexpected Losses and Risk-based Capital
The expected loss is a statistical loss that will occur on an average or a certain tendency
for the uncertain losses. The unexpected loss captures the deviation from such an
average. It can be inferred, for instance, from the variations of the default rate that is
from its volatility.
With a portfolio of 100 borrowers and unit outstanding balances of 10, it is almost
unlikely that a bank will lose the total outstanding balance of 1000 unless all borrowers
default at the same time. If we assume an average default rate of 1% and a recovery of
0, the expected loss is 1% x 1000 = 10. It can be understood as the loss of 10, the unit
exposure, for an average value of the number of defaults equal to 1.
However, there could probably be serious changes that the number of defaults
increases to 2 or 3, or even higher. The dispersion around the average of observed
default rates is measured by the historical volatility of observed default rates. The
volatility can be derived from available statistics. If we assume the default rate
volatility is 3%, the loss volatility is simply 3% x 1000 = 30.
Unexpected losses can be derived as a multiple of this volatility, the multiple
corresponding to some tolerance level. Statistics of default can therefore be applied
directly and in a simple manner to determine expected and unexpected losses. This can
be developed in greater detail providing loss calculations given the risk specifics of
portfolios of loans. The losses thus estimated can then be compared with risk tolerance
levels specified by the bank’s board / management based on risk appetite of the
organization and appropriate actions initiated.
It will be observed that the estimate of unexpected losses has been derived from the
deviations of default rates alone. Actually, the deviations of losses from their average
depend also upon the deviations of the recovery rates and the exposures from their
expected values. Unfortunately, such deviations are more difficult to quantify than
those of default rates. Often they are not made explicit, which makes the unexpected
loss estimate rather inaccurate.
In addition the definition of unexpected loss when all the three factors are uncertain
raises some conceptual issues. For a very conservative approach, one can ask what is
he worst-case value loss. We could use the combination of all three worst-case
parameters. The equation would be as follows:
WC (Loss) = WC (Exposure) x [1 – WC (recovery rate)] x WC (default rate)
Where WC denotes “worst case” in practical situations. However, such calculation is
based on the assumption that all worst case values occur simultaneously, which sounds
unrealistic and over-conservative. This illustrates one of the difficulties in estimating
unexpected risks. They depend upon the correlations between the underlying
parameters which themselves have uncertainties.
Default probabilities over different horizons
Yearly probabilities can be changed into probabilities for longer periods with the help
of statistics available for various horizons. The probabilities of default over various
time periods can be used to assess the credit risk of a loan up to maturity. This allows
one to change the measure of credit risk with the horizon of the exposure and to capture
the effect of the time profile of exposures. In general, the default probability changes
over time because the risk itself changes over time.
Such changes are recorded as transitions across ratings. In a first phase, it is easier to
define the effect of time when the yearly default probability is assumed constant (1%).
Then the increase in credit risk with the horizon is due to the fact that the constant
probability of default is applied to a longer time period.
In each period, there are only two possibilities: default or non-default. When periods
are chained, the number of possible situations increases, since the borrower can default
in any one of the periods considered. In the example given as under we have
endeavored to show three periods. If the company defaulted between date 0 and date 3,
it has to be in any of the first three periods. At the end of the three periods, only four
cases are possible: either the borrower did not default or he defaulted in any one of the
three periods.
0
These four events have different probabilities which can all be derived from the
constant yearly probability. The probability of no default is the product of the
probability of not defaulting in each of the periods, which is 99% for each period. The
probability of defaulting in period 3 is the probability of not defaulting before, times
the probability of defaulting at 3. The probability of defaulting in period 2 is the
probability of defaulting at 2 without having defaulted in 1. Finally, the probability of
defaulting in period 1 is 1%.
Hence the probability of default between date 0 and date 3 is the probability that
default occurs in either period 1, 2 or 3. It is the sum of these individual probabilities of
default:
0.01 + 0.01 x 0.99 + 0.01 x 0.99 x 0.99 = 0.01 x [1+0.99+(0.99x0.99)] = 0.0297
Dates
0 20
31Probability
Default (D)
0.01
0.990.99
D
ND
0.99 0.01
D
ND
0.99
0.01
0.99 x 0.01
0.99 x 0.99 x 0.01
0.99 x 0.99 x 0.99
The surviving probability after date 3 is 1 minus the default probability before date 3 or
0.9703. This is equal to the probability of no defaults, i.e. 0.99 x 0.99 x 0.99. It can be
envisaged that the default probability over n periods is less than the yearly
probabilities. For instance, 2.97% is less than three times the yearly probability of 1%.
This is because the default at period t is conditional upon no default before, an event
that has a probability always lower than 1.
The default probability between 0 and n, nPd, is approximately equal to the product of
yearly default probabilities 1Pd by the number of periods, as long as yearly default
probabilities are very low:
nPd = n x 1Pd
It can be checked above that 2.97% is very close to 3%. The 3% value assumes that the
defaults in each year are independent events. This is not true because the default at t is
actually dependent on non-default before.
Default Risk – Term Structure
Let us define the use of default rates across time horizons. Defaults observed over the
period are the basis of default rate calculations.
The number of yearly defaults can be related to the original population of issuers at the
very beginning of the multiple year observation period. The yearly defaults are
cumulated over years and then divided by the original number of issuers. These
percentages are “cumulated” default rates over various time horizons.
Future yearly default rates or “forward rates” can be calculated in numerous ways. The
ratio of the number of yearly defaults to the original sample is a first version of a
“forward” rate. For instance, there are three new defaults in year 2, which is 3% of the
original 100 population. This figure is also obtained as the difference between two
cumulated default rates of years 2 and 1 or 8% - 5% = 3%.
A second version is to relate the same number of defaults i.e. three defaults to be
surviving population only at the beginning of the current period. The surviving
population at the beginning of the year 2 is 100 – 5 = 95, or the original sample minus
the five defaults of the first year. The new yearly default rate for year 2 is 3 / 95 =
3.16%. It is also called a “marginal” default rate. It measures a forward default
frequency conditional upon no prior default.
Periods Year 1 Year 2 Year 3Number of Defaults 5 3 2
Cumulated number of Defaults 5 8 10
Cumulated Default Rates 5% 8% 10%
The aforesaid forward rates, calculated on an historical basis, have to be carefully
selected depending upon the objective of the analysis.
Default Rates – Transition Matrices
The transition probabilities between risk classes allow for the calculation of the
expected default rate of each period, given the transition and the variability of default
rates over time.
Yearly default probabilities are also mentioned. The default probability is 0.01% for
the borrower of risk class A and 0.02% for the borrower of risk class B. The
probability of defaulting before date 3 i.e. the end of the period 2 is the default
probability over year 1 plus the default probability over year 2. The yearly probability
is 0.01%. In year 2, either it stays at 0.01% if the risk class does not change or it
increases to 0.02% if the risk class becomes B. The default probability in year 2 is
derived from the probabilities of these two events, which are given in the transition
matrix:
0.95 x (0.01 + 0.01) + 0.05 x (0.01 + 0.02) = 0.0205
More often, transition matrices allow one to determine the expected frequency
distribution of migration to various ratings in the future. For instance, an issuer in the A
class can stay in A with a 95% frequency, move to B with a 4% frequency and default
with a 1% frequency. In general, migration matrices cover all defined classes over
various horizons. The distribution, starting from any given risk class, virtually looks
like a tree. The distribution widens when the time horizon becomes longer and when
the number of distinct classes grows.
Transition matrices are a simple method to project the changing structure by risk class
of a portfolio or to project the changing credit quality over time of a single issuer.
Various examples of potential applications are given in Credit Metrics, Technical
documents by J.P.Morgan & Co.Inc. (1997). As an example, the distribution of the
potential values of a bond in future can be inferred from these migration tables. The
future distribution of ratings is translated into a distribution of future possible market
spreads associated with the ratings. Once it is included in the discount rate applied to
future flows, they generate a distribution of future market values, each one associated
with a percentage frequency. The usual statistics with reference to mean and volatility
can be derived from such distributions.
Risk Classes
Dates
A
20
31
0.95
0.05B
C
0.01
0.99
Default Probability
Transition Frequency and Default Rates
Risk Class
B
Risk Class A
Risk Class B
Risk Class C
Risk Class D
_--------------
Default
1%
91%
5%
1%
0%
2%
Total 100%
Risk Class Frequency
Migration Tree
CHAPTER X N ON PERFORMING ASSETS
In simple terms, a non-performing advance can be defined as an advance where
payment of interest and /or installment of principal (in case of term loans) remain
unpaid in turn making the account irregular (out of order) for period prescribed by the
RBI.
A non-performing asset in the banking sector also is termed as an asset not contributing
to the income of the Bank. In other words it is the zero yielding assets that are
considered. The non-performing assets, interalia, includes surplus cash and bankers
balances hold over the optimal levels, amounts lying in the suspense account,
investments in shares or debentures and other securities not yielding any dividend or
interest, advances where interest is not forthcoming and even the principal amount is
difficult to recover.
After an account is classified as NPA, bank cannot book Interest charged in the
account as its income till the account remains in the NPA category. Besides, the bank
has also to make substantial loan loss provisions on such accounts as per norms laid
down by RBI.
Hence, NPAs act as a drag on bank’s profitability, a fact which is well understood by
banks who are now taking all possible steps to bring down their NPA portfolio.
It may be mentioned that banks with their best efforts have made some progress to
bring down their existing NPAs but due to heavy slippage of standard accounts to NPA
category, the overall position continues to deteriorate. Further, analysis of data relating
to NPAs may also reveal that major portion of the reduction has been either due to
comprise settlements / write off of the NPAs or on account of insurance claims
received from DICGC / ECGC. As regards reduction in NPAs due to up gradation, the
same has been quite negligible. Thus, there is a need for effective system of monitoring
of existing NPAs and of borderline NPAs, which are likely to slip to NPA category for
checking their slippage by initiating expeditious corrective actions.
The high level of NPAs in banks and financial institutions has been a matter of grave
concern to the public as bank credit is the catalyst to the economic growth of the
country and any bottleneck in the smooth flow of credit, one cause for which is the
mounting NPAs, is bound to create adverse repercussions in the economy. NPAs are
not therefore the concern of only lenders.
NPAs have a deleterious effect on the return on assets in several ways –
o They erode current profits through provisioning requirements
o They result in reduced interest income
o They require higher provisioning requirements affecting profits and
accretion to capital funds and capacity to increase good quality risk assets in future,
and
They limit recycling of funds, set in asset-liability mismatches, etc.
RBI Definition of NPA
In the year 1992, as a follow-up of Narsimhan committee recommendations, the RBI
introduced the concept of non -performing assets, based on Income Recognition
criterion, and directed banks to classify their advances into the following four
categories of assets:
Standard,
Substandard,
Doubtful, and
Loss.
Categories Of NPAs
Substandard Assets
A sub standard asset is one, which has remained NPA for a period less than or equal to 12
months, from March 31, 2005. (Earlier 18 months). In such cases, the current net worth of
the borrower / gaunter or the current market value of security charged is not enough to
ensure recovery of the dues to the banks in full. In other words, such an asset will have
well defined credit weakness that jeopardize the liquidation of the debt and are
characterised by the distinct possibility that the banks will sustain some loss, if deficiency
are not correct.
Doubtful Assets
A doubtful assets is one which, which has remained NPA for a period exceeding twelve
months. A loan classified as doubtful has all the weakness inherent in assets that were
classified sub-standard, with the added characteristic that the weakness make collection or
liquidation in full – on the basis of currently known facts, conditions and values-highly
questionable and improbable.
Loss assets
A loss asset is one where loss has been identified by the bank or interest or external
auditors or the RBI inspection but the amount has not been written off wholly. In other
words, such an asset is considered uncollectible and of such little vale that its continuance
as a bankable assets not warranted although there may be some salvage or recovery value.
Causes Of Loan Accounts Slipping To NPA Category
Before we discuss the monitoring system for NPAs, we must understand the possible
causes of accounts slipping to this category. The causes can be grouped under the
following three main heads – borrowers related, bank related and of general nature:
1. Borrower Related –
Lack of proper project planning and inefficient key management personnels.
Diversion of working capital funds by promoters for expansion, modernization,
taking up new projects, investing in associate concerns, etc.
Differences and disputes amongst promoters resulting in unauthorized withdrawals
of funds from the bank accounts.
Problems faced by importers and exporters due to devaluation of rupee and
fluctuations of various currencies in international market.
Delay on the part of the borrowers to bring the margin money (their own
contributions) to finance the project and compliance of the terms and conditions of
sanction resulting in delayed disbursement of loans by banks.
Low priority given by the promoters in upgradation of the technology and
inadequate attention to research and development (R&D) function.
Lack of effective monitoring at project implementation stage resulting in time and
cost over-runs.
Strained labor relations resulting in strikes and lockouts.
2. Bank Related –
Lack of proper pre-sanction appraisal of the loan proposals.
Sanction of the loan facilities based on optimistic and / or on pessimistic sales /
profitability projections resulting in over / under financing of projects.
Lack of effective post-sanction monitoring and follow-up of the borrower accounts,
resulting in delayed detection of problems and corrective actions.
Delay in release of term loans particularly by financial institutions resulting in
diversion of working capital funds causing liquidity problems and irregularity in
bank’s accounts.
Directed lending by banks to priority sector, more particularly to small
entrepreneurs who lack experience, expertise and financial standing.
Slow decision making process particularly with regard to sanction and
disbursement of loans for revival of potentially viable sick units.
3. General Causes
Time consuming and slow legal process for recovery of bank dues and absence of
punitive measures for borrowers who are willful defaulters.
Non or delayed implementation of new as well as expansion of the existing
projects due to failure of public issues on account of depressed capital market.
Closure of some units due to insurgency in some states, labor unrest / strikes /
lockouts, etc. as also due to natural calamities.
Slow functioning of judiciary including Debt Recovery Tribunals (DRTs), Board
of Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), etc. Difficulties even in
execution of the decrees awarded by the courts.
Inadequate infrastructural facilities, particularly the supply of power and essential
inputs.
Lack of support by Central / State Government and delayed release of allocated
funds to various projects resulting in cost and time over-run.
Liberalization in the economy and coming up of the multinational companies in
The country with better technologies, giving tough time to local industries.
The causes listed above are illustrative in nature and there could be many more
depending upon type of industry, location of unit, etc.
Monitoring Of Existing NPAs
With a view to tackle NPAs, banks shall have to develop an effective monitoring
system which may help them in creating data base for understanding total NPA
portfolio as well as individual NPA accounts particularly those at borderline for
formulating general policy and accounts specific action plan. We are aware that the
reduction in NPAs can also be affected by write-off of the accounts where either
securities are not available or the securities available are not easily realizable and even
if these are sold the recovery may not be sufficient even to cover the cost of pursuing
recovery of the dues.
We may also come across NPAs where borrowers are serious and taking all possible
steps even inducting own funds to run their units and willing to regularize the accounts
through tagging of the sale proceeds. There may also be units which are NPAs but
potentially viable and which may turnaround not just with the funds inducted by the
promoters, but may also require some additional financial assistance from the banks.
For taking any decision on specific account either for inducting funds for revival,
effecting recovery through tagging of sale, initiating legal action for recovery of dues,
bank shall need detailed information in the form of history sheet in such account,
covering the background of the account, reasons for account becoming NPA, whether
the unit is functioning or lying closed, present position of the bank account, realizable
value of the security, financial standing of the borrower / guarantor, availability of
insurance cover from DICGC / ECGC, future profit generation, repayment capacity of
the unit, etc. The history sheet should also provide information with regard to meetings
/ contacts, if any made by bank’s officials with the borrower for regularization /
adjustment of the account and reaction of the borrower, along with comments /
recommendations of the branch as well as controlling offices.
Creation of Data Base for NPAs
In addition to taking action in specific accounts as discussed above, banks may have to
frame policy guidelines for the guidance of the field staff for effecting recovery in NPAs
for which they may have to create some data base on the following lines:
1. Classification of NPA accounts under various categories, i.e. Sub-standard, Doubtful
and Loss and reduction / recovery achieved or likely to be achieved under each head
through upgradation, amount written off, cash recovery, etc. as well as any addition
taken place due to slippage of standard account to NPA category. Further, NPA
accounts can be bifurcated under secured and unsecured categories and also under
various heads – whether suit filed, decreed, sick units under rehabilitation and other
accounts awaiting actions.
2. NPA data be collected under various heads – priority sector and non-priority sector
as well as those related to various industrial segments namely steel, cement, textile,
chemicals, etc. Such data can help in knowing the industries where NPAs are
concentrating for taking a view about flow of credit.
3. Bank should also have data on movement in NPAs portfolio, i.e. reduction /
addition under various assets categories, i.e. sub-standard, doubtful and loss both
amount-wise as well as according to the availability of securities under various heads
4. RBI has prescribed a system of “Off-site Surveillance” to review performance of
banks under various parameters on quarterly basis which also include progress with
regard to reduction and recovery in NPAs. Under the system RBI has prescribed
well-designed formats which are in five sections are briefly described as follows:
Section 1: Position of performing and non-performing loans facility-wise, i.e. cash
credits, overdrafts, bills purchased / discounted, term loans, etc. Further, the facilities
which are in performing category are to be reported under two main heads i.e. (i)
regular and (ii) irregular (overdue less than 90 days). As regards facilities which are
under NPA category are also to be reported under two main heads i.e. which are NPAs
for less than two years and those for more than two years. The section also contains
position of interest on NPAs which is in arrears.
Section 2: The section contains data on loan accounts both under performing and NPA
category. Further, NPA accounts are required to be classified under various heads i.e.
sub-standard, doubtful and loss. The provisions made by the bank in each asset code
category are also required to be mentioned.
Section 3: It provides the movement under various categories of loan accounts i.e. the
change in classification under sub-standard, doubtful and loss during the quarter under
review. The data also includes new advances made and amount recovered in NPAs.
Section 4: The section gives bifurcation of performing standard and non-performing
accounts under various sectors i.e. priority sector (agriculture, SSI, others) and non-
priority sectors (exports, non-banking, finance companies, food credit, PSUs etc.)
Section 5: The section provides specific details in respect of top NPAs of the bank
indicating amount outstanding, asset code classification, provisions of interest in
arrears, etc.
In practice, it is seen that data being called by RBI under Off-site Surveillance System
is taken as a statistical exercise by banks who are more keen in ensuring its timely
submission to RBI to avoid adverse comments from them. Analysis of the data being
submitted to RBI under Off-site Surveillance System as control returns and should
critically analyze the same for drawing inferences with a view to ultimately design
strategies for reduction and recovery in NPAs.
Monitoring Of Irregular Accounts Which Are Likely To Slip In NPA
Category
As already stated, that most of the banks have not been able to achieve overall
reduction in terms of the amount in their NPA portfolio even when they achieved
substantial reduction in existing NPAs, which could be due to lack of proper system for
timely identification of borderline accounts which are likely to slip to NPA category
for initiating corrective actions. The irregularity in an account due to overdrawing
beyond the sanctioned limits / drawing power if continues for a period more than 180
days will lead to branding the account as NPA.
The irregularity may be caused due to non-payment of interest / installments or
payment of account of invoked guarantee and debit of returned bills in the account etc
by the party. It is, therefore, essential to monitor accounts in standard category
particularly those, which have just become irregular due to non-payment of interest /
installment for one quarter. The system proposed for monitoring irregular / borderline
accounts should provide the following information timely:
1. Position of all irregular accounts, say with some cut off point – amount outstanding of
Rs.1 lac and above and irregularity of say 2-3% of the total outstanding should be
complied. Such data which can help in understanding the magnitude of the problem
and action taken at field levels, can be collected from the branches.
2. Status notes in respect of each irregular account should be prepared and submitted by
the branch office at (Regional / Zonal / HO level) for monitoring as well as deciding
future course of action. The cut-off point for monitoring based on status note should
depend on amount outstanding in the accounts and powers delegated at different levels
for rehabilitation or entering into compromise, filing suit and write of etc.
As regards information, which may be covered in status note, the same should include
the following:
(i.) Name and address of the borrower and activity undertaken.
(ii.) Latest position of the account covering all the facilities and also the
irregularity.
(iii.) Reason for irregular and steps taken by the branch / borrower to
regularize the same.
(iv.) Financial and operational performance of the unit in case it is
functioning. If the unit is closed, the same be specifically mentioned
indicating the date when it stopped working.
(v.) In case the unit is losing, reasons for losses and corrective steps
taken by the borrower to run the unit on viable line.
(vi.) Position of primary and collateral securities, their value as per
bank records and estimated realizable value.
(vii.) Position of availability of DICGC / ECGC claim and government
guarantee available, if any.
(viii.) Details of meetings and contacts made with the borrowers and
their response to regularize / adjust their loans.
(ix.) Comments on viability of the unit and whether the borrower is
keen to run the unit. In case the borrower is willful defaulter the same be also
mentioned.
(x.) Comments and recommendations of the branch and controlling office
about the future course of action for regularization / adjustment of the loan
account.
Undertaking Spot Study of the Account
Sometimes data/information received on the monitoring format, is either not clear or is
distorted/window dressed and may not help in drawing right inferences and deciding
future course of action.
In such a situation and more particularly where the units are not having viable
operations and have started incurring cash losses, it will be advisable to get “on the
spot” study conducted of the units by technical personnel(s), for getting insights of the
unit. Such studies will put the management of the unit on alert and can prove to be
immense use to the bank. There may be accounts where banks have nominated their
senior officers on company’s board, their reports can also prove helpful in evaluating
units performance and taking corrective actions whenever necessary.
Management of NPAs
The quality and performance of advances have a direct bearing on the profitability and
viability of banks. Despite an efficient credit appraisal and disbursement mechanism,
problems can still arise due to various factors. The essential component of a sound NPA
management system is quick identification of non-performing advances, their containment
at minimum levels and ensuring that their impingement on the financials is minimum.
The approach to NPA management has to be multi-pronged, calling for different strategies
at different stages a credit facility passes through. RBI's guidelines to banks (issued in
1999) on Risk Management Systems outline the strategies to be followed for efficient
management of credit portfolio. I would like to touch upon a few essential aspects of NPA
management in this paper.
Excessive reliance on collateral has led Indian banks nowhere except to long drawn out
litigation and hence it should not be sole criterion for sanction. Sanctions above certain
limits should be through Committee which can assume the status of an 'Approval Grid'.
It is common to find banks running after the same borrower/borrower groups as we see
from the spate of requests for considering proposals to lend beyond the prescribed
exposure limits. I would like to caution that running after niche segment may be fine in the
short run but is equally fraught with risk. Banks should rather manage within the
appropriate exposure limits. A linkage to net owned funds also needs to be developed to
control high leverages at borrower level.
Exchange of credit information among banks would be of immense help to them to avoid
possible NPAs. There is no substitute for critical management information system and
market intelligence.
Close monitoring of the account particularly the larger ones is the primary solution.
Emerging weakness in profitability and liquidity, recessionary trends, recovery of
installments / interest with time lag, etc., should put the banks on caution. The objective
should be to assess the liquidity of the borrower, both present and future prospects. Loan
review mechanism is a tool to bring about qualitative improvement in credit
administration. Banks should follow risk rating system to reveal the risk of lending. The
risk-rating process should be different from regular loan renewal exercise and the exercise
should be carried out at regular intervals. It is not enough for banks to aspire to become big
players without being backed by development of internal rating models. This is going to
be a pre-requisite under the New Capital Adequacy framework and if a bank wants to be an
international player, it shall have to go for such a system.
Banks should ensure that sanctioning of further credit facilities is done only at higher
levels. A quick review of all documents originally obtained and their validity should be
made. A phased programme of exit from the account should also be considered.
Measures initiated by Reserve Bank and Government of India for reduction of NPAs
Measures for faster legal process
LOK ADALATS
Lok Adalat institutions help banks to settle disputes involving accounts in “doubtful” and
“loss” category, with outstanding balance of Rs.5 lakh for compromise settlement under
Lok Adalats. Debt Recovery Tribunals have now been empowered to organize Lok
Adalats to decide on cases of NPAs of Rs.10 lakhs and above.
The progress through this channel is expected to pick up in the coming years particularly
looking at the recent initiatives taken by some of the public sector banks and DRTs in
Mumbai.
DEBT RECOVERY TRIBUNALS
The Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions (amendment) Act, passed
in March 2000 has helped in strengthening the functioning of DRTs. Provisions for
placement of more than one Recovery Officer, power to attach defendant’s property/assets
before judgement, penal provisions for disobedience of Tribunal’s order or for breach of
any terms of the order and appointment of receiver with powers of realization,
management, protection and preservation of property are expected to provide necessary
teeth to the DRTs and speed up the recovery of NPAs in the times to come.
Though there are around 25 DRTs set up at major centres in the country with Appellate
Tribunals located in five centres viz. Allahabad, Mumbai, Delhi, Calcutta and Chennai,
they could decide only 9814 cases for Rs.6264.71 crore pertaining to public sector banks
since inception of DRT mechanism and till September 30, 2001.The amount recovered in
respect of these cases amounted to only Rs.1864.30 crore.
Circulation of information on defaulters
The RBI has put in place a system for periodical circulation of details of wilful defaults of
borrowers of banks and financial institutions. This serves as a caution list while
considering requests for new or additional credit limits from defaulting borrowing units
and also from the directors /proprietors / partners of these entities.
RBI also publishes a list of borrowers (with outstanding aggregating Rs. 1 crore and
above) against whom suits have been filed by banks and FIs for recovery of their funds, as
on 31st March every year.
However, they serve as negative basket of steps shutting off fresh loans to these defaulters.
I strongly believe that a real breakthrough can come only if there is a change in the
repayment psyche of the Indian borrowers.
Recovery action against large NPAs
After a review of pendency in regard to NPAs by the Hon’ble Finance Minister, RBI had
advised the public sector banks to examine all cases of willful default of Rs 1 crore and
above and file suits in such cases, and file criminal cases in regard to willful defaults.
Board of Directors are required to review NPA accounts of Rs.1 crore and above with
special reference to fixing of staff accountability.
Asset Reconstruction Company:
An Asset Reconstruction Company with an authorised capital of Rs.2000 crore and initial
paid up capital Rs.1400 crore is to be set up as a trust for undertaking activities relating to
asset reconstruction. It would negotiate with banks and financial institutions for acquiring
distressed assets and develop markets for such assets. Government of India proposes to go
in for legal reforms to facilitate the functioning of ARC mechanism
Corporate Debt Restructuring (CDR)
Corporate Debt Restructuring mechanism has been institutionalised in 2001 to provide a
timely and transparent system for restructuring of the corporate debts of Rs.20 crore and
above with the banks and financial institutions.
The objective of the CDR framework is to ensure timely and transparent mechanism for
restructuring of the corporates debts of viable facing problems, outside the purview of legal
proceedings, for the benefit of all concerned.
The CDR process would also enable viable corporate entities to restructure their dues
outside the existing legal framework and reduce the incidence of fresh NPAs. The CDR
structure has been headquartered in IDBI, Mumbai and a Standing Forum and Core Group
for administering the mechanism had already been put in place. The experiment however
has not taken off at the desired pace though more than six months have lapsed since
introduction.
Credit Information Bureau
Institutionalisation of information sharing arrangements through the newly formed Credit
Information Bureau of India Ltd. (CIBIL) is under way.
Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of
Security Interests Act, 2002 (SARFAESI)
The act was enacted in 2002.
The principal objective of the Act is to facilitate quick and efficacious recovery of the
debts due to banks and financial institutions from the defaulting companies which are
invariable sick.
Scheme of the Act
o Enforcement of securities interest by secured creditor (Banks/FIs) without
intervention of court.
o Transfer of NPAs to Asset Reconstruction Company, which will then dispose of
those assets and realise the proceeds.
o Large framework for securitisation of assets.
Securitisation/Reconstruction company Registration
o A Securitisation/Reconstruction Company can commence or carry on its business
only on obtaining certification of Registration from RBI after fulfilling all the
criteria of RBI.
Modes of Acquisition Financial Assets
The act envisages two modes of acquiring financial assets by the
Securitisation/Reconstruction Company.
o Agreeing for specific consideration: the Securitisation/Reconstruction
Company will agree for consideration to be paid to the bank or FIs. It will issue
dentures, bond or other similar security to the bank or FI on agreed terms and
conditions.
o Without agreeing for specific consideration: the Securitisation or
Reconstruction Company may enter into an agreement with Bank/FI for
acquisition of financial asset on such terms and consideration as may be agreed
upon. In such case, it may be contracted to pay agreed percentage of realization
from NPAs to Banks and FIs.
CHAPTER XI RAROC PRICING/ ECONOMIC PROFIT
In acquiring assets, banks should use the pricing mechanism in conjunction with
product/ geography/ industry/ tenor limits. For example, if a bank believes that
construction loans for commercial complexes are unattractive from a portfolio
perspective, it can raise the price of these loans to a level that will act as a disincentive
to borrowers. This is an instance of marginal cost pricing - the notion that the price of
an asset should compensate the institution for its marginal cost as measured on a risk-
adjusted basis. Marginal cost pricing may not always work. A bank may have idle
capacity and capital that has not been deployed. While such an institution clearly would
not want to make a loan at a negative spread, it would probably view even a small
positive spread as worthwhile as long as the added risk was acceptable.
Institutions tend to book unattractively priced loans when they are unable to allocate
their cost base with clarity or to make fine differentiations of their risks. If a bank
cannot allocate its costs, then it will make no distinction between the cost of lending to
borrowers that require little analysis and the cost of lending to borrowers that require a
considerable amount of review and follow up. Similarly, if the spread is tied to a too
coarsely graded risk rating system (one, for example, with just four grades) then it is
more difficult to differentiate among risks when pricing than if the risk rating is
graduated over a larger scale with, say, 15 grades.
A cost-plus-profit pricing strategy will work in the short run, but in the long run
borrowers will balk and start looking for alternatives. Cost-plus-profit pricing will also
work when a bank has some flexibility to compete on an array of services rather than
exclusively on price. The difficulties with pricing are greater in markets where the
lender is a price taker rather than a price leader.
The pricing is based on the borrower's risk rating, tenor, collateral, guarantees, historic
loan loss rates, and covenants. A capital charge is applied based on a hurdle rate and a
capital ratio. Using these assumptions, the rate to be charged for a loan to a customer
with a given rating could be calculated.
This relatively simple approach to credit pricing works well as long as the assumptions
are correct - especially those about the borrower’s credit quality. This method is used
in many banks today. The main drawbacks of this method are:
o Only ‘expected losses’ are linked to the borrower’s credit quality. The
capital charge based on the volatility of losses in the credit risk category
may also be too small. If the loan were to default, the loss would have to be
made up from income from non-defaulting loans.
o It implicitly assumes only two possible states for a loan: default or no
default. It does not model the credit risk premium or discount resulting from
improvement or decline in the borrower's financial condition, which is
meaningful only if the asset may be repriced or sold at par.
Banks have long struggled to find the best ways of allocating capital in a manner
consistent with the risks taken. They have found it difficult to come up with a
consistent and credible way of allocating capital for such varying sources of revenue as
loan commitments, revolving lines of credit (which have no maturity), and secured
versus unsecured lending. The different approaches for allocating capital are as under:
o One approach is to allocate capital to business units based on their asset
size. Although it is true that a larger portfolio will have larger losses, this
approach also means that the business unit is forced to employ all the
capital allocated to it. Moreover, this method treats all risks alike.
o Another approach is to use the regulatory (risk-adjusted) capital as the
allocated capital. The problem with this approach is that regulatory capital
may or may not reflect the true risk of a business. For example, for
regulatory purposes, a loan to a AAA rated customer requires the same
amount of capital per Rupees lent as one to a small business.
o Yet another approach is to use unexpected losses in a sub-portfolio
(standard deviation of the annual losses taken over time) as a proxy for
capital to be allocated. The problem with this approach is that it ignores
default correlations across sub-portfolios. The volatility of a sub-portfolio
may in fact dampen the volatility of the institution's portfolio, so pricing
decisions based on the volatility of the sub-portfolio may not be optimal. In
practical terms, this means that one line of business within a lending
institution may sometimes subsidize another.
Risk Adjusted Return on Capital (RAROC)
As it became clearer that banks needed to add an appropriate capital charge in the
pricing process, the concept of risk adjusting the return or risk adjusting the capital
arose. The value-producing capacity of an asset (or a business) is expressed as a ratio
that allows comparisons to be made between assets (or businesses) of varying sizes and
risk characteristics. The ratio is based either on the size of the asset or the size of the
capital allocated to it. When an institution can observe asset prices directly (and/ or
infer risk from observable asset prices) then it can determine how much capital to hold
based on the volatility of the asset. This is the essence of the mark-to-market concept.
If the capital to be held is excessive relative to the total return that would be earned
from the asset, then the bank will not acquire it. If the asset is already in the bank's
portfolio, it will be sold. The availability of a liquid market to buy and sell these assets
is a precondition for this approach. When banks talk about asset concentration and
correlation, the question of capital allocation is always in the background because it is
allocated capital that absorbs the potential consequences (unexpected losses) resulting
from such concentration and correlation causes.
RAROC allocates a capital charge to a transaction or a line of business at an amount
equal to the maximum expected loss (at a 99% confidence level) over one year on an
after-tax basis. As may be expected, the higher the volatility of the returns, the more
capital is allocated. The higher capital allocation means that the transaction has to
generate cash flows large enough to offset the volatility of returns, which results from
the credit risk, market risk, and other risks taken. The RAROC process estimates the
asset value that may prevail in the worst-case scenario and then equates the capital
cushion to be provided for the potential loss.
RAROC is an improvement over the traditional approach in that it allows one to
compare two businesses with different risk (volatility of returns) profiles. A transaction
may give a higher return but at a higher risk. Using a hurdle rate (expected rate of
return), a lender can also use the RAROC principle to set the target pricing on a
relationship or a transaction. Although not all assets have market price distribution,
RAROC is a first step toward examining an institution’s entire balance sheet on a
mark-to-market basis - if only to understand the risk-return trade-offs that have been
made.
CHAPTER XIII CREDIT DERIVATIVES
Effective management of credit risk is a critical factor in comprehensive risk
management and is essential for the long-term financial health of business
organizations, especially banks. Credit risk management encompasses identification,
measurement, monitoring and control of the credit risk exposures.
For enabling the banks and the financial institutions, in India, to manage their credit
risk effectively it was being felt appropriate to permit them the use of credit risk
hedging techniques like the credit derivatives, which are over the counter (OTC)
financial contracts and can help banks and financial institutions in managing the risk
arising from adverse movements in the credit quality of their loans and advances, and
their investments. Banks can derive many benefits from the credit derivatives such as,
o Transfer credit risk and hence free up capital, which can be used in other
opportunities,
o Diversify credit risk,
o Maintain client relationships, and
o Construct and manage a credit risk portfolio as per their risk preference and
appetite unconstrained by funds, distribution and sales effort.
A Working Group on introduction of Credit Derivatives in India, comprising officers
from the Reserve Bank of India and industry was set up to study the need and scope for
allowing banks and financial institutions to use credit derivatives, the regulatory issues
involved and make suitable recommendations in this regard.
The entire guidelines are available on the RBI site.
Conceptual Aspects
o Credit derivatives are over the counter financial contracts. They are usually
defined as “off-balance sheet financial instruments that permit one party to
transfer credit risk of a reference asset, which it owns, to another party without
actually selling the asset”. It, therefore, “unbundles” credit risk from the
credit instrument and trades it separately. Credit Linked Notes (CLNs), another
form of credit derivative product, also achieves the same purpose, though CLNs
are on-balance sheet products. Another way of describing credit derivative is
that it is a financial contract outlining potential exchange of payments in which
at least one leg of the cash flow is linked to the “performance” of a specified
underlying credit sensitive asset.
o Protection Seller refers to the party that contracts to receive premiums or
interest-related payments in return for assuming the credit risk on an asset or
group of assets from the Protection Buyer. The Protection Seller is also known
in the market as the Credit Risk Buyer or Guarantor.
o Protection Buyer refers to the party that contracts to transfer the credit risk on
an asset or group of assets to the Protection Seller. The Protection Buyer is also
known in the market as the Credit Risk Seller or Beneficiary.
o Premium, is the fee the protection buyer pays to the protection seller as in case
of insurance business.
o Credit event is defined as a scenario or condition agreed between the
contracting parties that will trigger the credit event payment from the Protection
Seller to the Protection Buyer. Credit events usually include bankruptcy,
insolvency, merger, cross acceleration, cross default, failure to pay, repudiation,
and restructuring, delinquency, price decline or rating downgrade of the
underlying asset / issuer.
o Credit event payment or settlement is the amount that is paid following a
credit event. This is defined in the contract, and is normally one of three types:
(a) Physical delivery: payment of par or other specified value in exchange for
physical delivery of the Reference Asset (or a variety of assets) of the
Reference Entity as allowed under some contracts.
(b) Cash settlement: payment of par less recovery value. The Reference Asset
will normally retain some value after a credit event has triggered settlement
of the contract. The recovery value is normally determined at a date up to
three months after the credit event, by a dealer poll or auction.
(c) Fixed Amount: Payment of a fixed amount.
o Reference Asset refers to the asset to which payments under the credit
derivative contract are referenced or linked. It is also called reference
obligation.
o Underlying Asset refers to the asset on which credit risk protection is bought
by the Protection Buyer. It could be a bank loan, corporate bond / debenture,
trade receivable, emerging market debt, municipal debt, etc. It could also be a
portfolio of credit products. This is usually also the Reference Asset.
o Reference Entity is the entity upon whose credit the contract is based.
o Deliverable Obligation defines what assets are eligible for delivery as
settlement in a physical delivery contract. It usually includes Reference
Obligation but will often be broader to include other obligations.
o Obligations defines what assets may trigger a Credit Event. These are usually
same as the underlying asset.
o Sponsor denotes the entity that places the portfolio in a Special Purpose
Vehicle for issue of notes.
o Senior Debt means that portion of funding in case of structuring of a
Collateralized Debt Issue (CDO), which has the lowest risk weight, or the
highest rated debt.
o Mezzanine Debt refers to that portion of funding in case of structuring of a
Collateralized Debt Issue (CDO), which has debt in ascending order of risk
weights, or in descending order of ratings.
o Equity refers to the balance funding in case of structuring of a Collateralized
Debt Issue (CDO), which has the highest risk weight, or the lowest rated debt.
Types of Credit Derivatives and basic structures:
Credit derivatives can be divided into two broad categories:
(a) Transactions where credit protection is bought and sold; and
(b) Total return swaps.
(a) Transactions Where Credit Protection Is Bought and Sold
(i) Credit Default Swap (CDS)
It is a bilateral derivative contract on one or more reference assets in which the protection
buyer pays a fee through the life of the contract in return for a credit event payment by
the protection seller following a credit event of the reference entities. In most instances,
the Protection Buyer makes quarterly payments to the Protection Seller. The periodic
payment is typically expressed in annualized basis points of a transaction’s notional
amount. In the instance that no pre-specified credit event occurs during the life of the
transaction, the Protection Seller receives the periodic payment in compensation for
assuming the credit risk on the Reference Entity/Obligation. Conversely, in the instance
that any one of the credit events occurs during the life of the transaction, the Protection
Buyer will receive a credit event payment, which will depend upon whether the terms of
a particular CDS call for a physical or cash settlement. With few exceptions, the legal
framework of a CDS – that is, the documentation evidencing the transaction – is based on
a confirmation document and legal definitions set forth by the International Swaps and
Derivatives Association, Inc. (ISDA). If a Credit Event occurs and physical settlement
applies, the transaction shall accelerate and Protection Buyer shall deliver the Deliverable
Obligations to Protection Seller against payment of a pre-agreed amount. If a Credit
Event occurs and cash settlement applies, the transaction shall accelerate and Protection
Seller shall pay to Protection Buyer the excess of the par value of the Deliverable
Obligations on start date over the prevailing market value of the Deliverable Obligations
upon occurrence of the Credit Event. The procedure for determining market value of
Deliverable Obligations is based on ISDA definitions or may be defined in the related
confirmation and some cases a pre-determined amount agreed by both parties on
inception of the transaction is paid.
The structures of physically settled CDS and cash settled CSD are shown in Figure 1 and
Figure 2 respectively.
Figure 1
Physically Settled Credit Default Swap
Figure 2
Cash Settled Credit Default Swaps
(ii) Credit Default Option
It is a kind of CDS where the fee is paid fully in advance.
(iii) Credit Linked Note (CLN)
It is a combination of a regular note and a credit-option. Since it is a regular note with
coupon, maturity and redemption, it is an on-balance sheet equivalent of a credit default
swap. Under this structure, the coupon or price of the note is linked to the performance of
a reference asset. It offers lenders a hedge against credit risk and investors a higher yield
for buying a credit exposure synthetically rather than buying it in the publicly traded debt.
CLNs are generally created through a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or trust, which is
collateralized with highly rated securities. CLNs can also be issued directly by a bank or
financial institution. Investors buy the securities from the trust (or issuing bank) that pays
a fixed or floating coupon during the life of the note. At maturity, the investors receive par
unless the referenced credit defaults or declares bankruptcy, in which case they receive an
amount equal to the recovery rate. Here the investor is, in fact, selling credit protection in
exchange for higher yield on the note. The Credit-Linked Note allows a bank to lay off its
credit exposure to a range of credits to other parties. Figure 3 shows a simple CLN
structure.
(iv) Credit Linked Deposits/ Credit Linked Certificates of Deposit
Credit Linked Deposits (CLDs) are structured deposits with embedded default swaps.
Conceptually they can be thought of as deposits along with a default swap that the investor
sells to the deposit taker. The default contingency can be based on a variety of underlying
assets, including a specific corporate loan or security, a portfolio of loans or securities or
sovereign debt instruments, or even a portfolio of contracts which give rise to credit
exposure. If necessary, the structure can include an interest rate or foreign exchange swap
to create cash flows required by investor. In effect, the depositor is selling protection on
the reference obligation and earning a premium in the form of a yield spread over plain
deposits. If a credit event occurs during the tenure of the CLD, the deposit is paid and the
investor would get the Deliverable Obligation instead of the Deposit Amount. Figure 4
shows the structure of a simple CLD. Figure 4
(v) Repackaged Notes
Repackaging involves placing securities and derivatives in a Special Purpose Vehicle
(SPV) which then issues customized notes that are backed by the instruments placed. The
difference between repackaged notes and CLDs (Credit Linked Deposits) is that while
CLDs are default swaps embedded in deposits/notes, repackaged notes are issued against
collateral - which typically would include cash collateral (bonds / loans / cash) and
derivative contracts. Another feature of Repackaged Notes is that any issue by the SPV has
recourse only to the collateral of that issue.
Figure 5 below pictorially depicts the transactions under a Repackaged Note.
Figure 5
(vi) Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs)
CDOs are specialized repackaged offerings that typically involve a large portfolio of
credits. Both involve issuance of debt by a SPV based on collateral of underlying credit(s).
The essential difference between a repackaging programme and a CDO is that while a
simple repackaging usually delivers the entire risk inherent in the underlying collateral
(securities and derivatives) to the investor, a CDO involves a horizontal splitting of that
risk and categorizing investors into senior class debt, mezzanine class and a junior debt.
CDOs may be further categorized, based on the structure with which funding is raised.
The funding could be raised by issuing bonds, which are called Collateralised Bond
Obligations (CBOs) or by raising loans, which are called Collateralised Loan Obligations
(CLOs). The transactions under a CDO are shown in figure 6.
Figure 6 Collateralised Debt Obligations.
(b)Total Return Swaps
Total Return Swaps (TRS), also called Total Rate of Return Swaps (TROR) are bilateral
financial contracts designed to synthetically replicate the economic returns of an
underlying asset or a portfolio of assets for a pre-specified time. One counterparty (the TR
payer) pays the other counterparty (the TR receiver) the total return of a specified asset, the
reference obligation. In return, the TR receiver typically makes regular floating payments.
These floating payments represent a funding cost. In effect, a TRS contract allows the TRS
receiver to obtain the economic returns of an asset without having to fund the assets on its
balance sheet. Should the underlying asset decline in value by more than the coupon
payment, the TRS receiver must pay the negative total return, in addition to the funding
cost, to the TRS payer. At the extreme, a TRS receiver can be liable for the extreme loss
that a reference asset may suffer following, for instance, the issuing company’s default.
As such, a TRS is a primarily off-balance sheet financing vehicle. In contrast to credit
default swaps, which only transfer credit risk, a TRS transfers not only to credit risk (i.e.
the improvement or deterioration in credit profile of an issuer), but also market risk (i.e.
any increase or decrease in general market prices). In TRS payments are exchanged
among counterparties upon changes in market valuation of the underlying, in addition to
the occurrence of a credit event as is the case with CDS contracts.
Capital Adequacy and Provisioning
Recognition of protection of credit risk- Minimum Conditions
Bank fulfills the following criteria of recognition of protection of credit risk:
Existence of adequate Risk Management Policies, Procedures, and Systems and
Controls
The credit derivatives activity to be undertaken by bank should be under the
adequate oversight of its Board of Directors and senior management. Written
policies and procedures should be established to cover credit derivatives business.
Banks using credit derivatives should have adequate policies and procedures in
place to manage associated risks. There should be adequate separation between the
function of transacting credit derivatives business and those monitoring, reporting
and risk control. The participants should verify that the types of transactions
entered into by them are not inappropriate to their needs and needs of the
counterparty. Further, all staff engaged in the business should be fully conversant
with the relevant policies and procedures. Any changes to the policy or
engagement in new types of credit derivatives business should be approved by the
Board.
Satisfaction of minimum criteria
The credit derivative should conform to the following minimum criteria i.e., it
should be direct, explicit, irrevocable and unconditional. These criteria are explained
below:
Direct
The credit protection must represent a direct claim on the protection provider.
Explicit
The credit protection must be linked to specific exposures, so that the extent of the
cover is clearly defined and incontrovertible.
Irrevocable
Other than a protection purchaser’s non-payment of money due in respect of the
credit protection contract, there must be no clause in the contract that would allow
the protection provider unilaterally to cancel the credit cover.
Unconditional
There should be no clause in the protection contract that could prevent the
protection provider from being obliged to pay out in a timely manner in the
event that the original obligor fails to make the payment(s) due.
Satisfaction of Minimum Operational requirements
In order for protection from a credit derivative to be recognised, the certain
conditions must be satisfied which are prescribed by the RBI:
Recognition of Amount of Protection Bought and Sold
The credit event payment or settlement amount will determine the amount of credit
protection bought /sold in case of CDS. This could be payment of par or other specified
value in exchange for physical delivery of the Reference Asset (or a variety of assets of the
Reference Entity as allowed under some contracts (Physical Delivery Settlement), or
payment of par less recovery value (Cash Settlement) or payment of fixed amount as per
the CDS agreement (Fixed Amount Settlement). In case of CLN the amount of protection
bought will be equal to the funds raised from issue of the CLNs and the amount of
protection sold will be equal to the book value of the CLN.
Some credit derivative contracts may contain a materiality threshold specified for
determining the loss that must be reached before a credit event is triggered. Therefore, the
materiality threshold may affect the amount of credit protection that may be recognized.
Capital Adequacy for Credit Derivatives in the Banking Book
As stated above banks will be initially permitted to use credit derivatives only for the
purpose of managing their credit risk and not for taking derivative positions with a trading
intent. It means that banks may hold the derivatives in their banking books and not in the
trading books except in case of Credit Linked Notes, which can be held as investments in
the trading book.
Protection Buyer
Where an asset is protected by a credit default swap (CDS), the Protection Buyer may
replace the risk weight of the underlying asset with that of the Protection Seller to the
extent of amount of protection as determined as per paragraph 4.2 above. Where an asset
is protected by a credit derivative funded by cash (CLN), the Protection Buyer may reduce
the amount of its exposure to the underlying asset by the amount of funding received. For
the unprotected portions the risk weight of the underlying asset will apply. The treatment
of capital requirement will be modified if there are mismatches in the structures as
discussed below.
Presence of Mismatches
In many credit derivative transactions, it is difficult to achieve an effective hedge due to
the existence of mismatches and therefore, suitable adjustments will be made to the extent
of credit protection recognizable on account of presence of such mismatches as outlined
below:
(a) Asset mismatches: Asset mismatch will arise if the underlying asset is different
from the reference obligation (in case of cash settlement) or deliverable obligation
in case of physical settlement).
(b) Maturity mismatches: If the maturity of the credit derivative contract is less than
he maturity of the underlying asset, then it would construe as a maturity mismatch
though the protection buyer would be completely hedged if the contract maturity
were to be higher than the maturity of the underlying asset. In case maturity
mismatches the capital adequacy will be determined in the following manner.
(i) If the residual maturity of the derivative product is less than one year no
protection will be recognized and the risk weight of the underlying asset
will apply.
(ii) If the residual maturity of the credit derivative is one year or more
protection will be recognized and the risk weight will be weighted
average of risk weight of the Protection Seller and risk weight of the
reference entity (weighted by proportions of period for which protection
is available and the period for which protection is not available, counted
from the date of contract till maturity of the derivative. Thereafter, the
risk weight of the reference will apply.
(c) Currency mismatches: A currency mismatch is caused if the credit derivative
contract is denominated in a currency different to the underlying asset. In such an
event, the credit protection obtained should be marked to market to the prevailing
exchange rate and if the value of credit protection (valued in terms of the currency
of the underlying asset) is less than the value of the underlying asset, the residual
risk must be risk-weighted on the basis of the underlying asset.
Protection Seller
Where a Protection Seller has sold protection through a CDS it acquires credit exposure to
the Reference Asset. This exposure is to be risk-weighted according to the risk weight of
the Reference Asset. In a funded credit derivative (CLN), the Protection Seller acquires on
balance-sheet exposure to both the Reference Asset and the Protection Buyer. The CLN
can be held in the banking book or trading book as decided by the bank. If held in the
banking book, the amount of exposure will be equal to the book value of the note and will
be risk weighted by the higher of the risk weight of the reference entity or the Protection
Buyer. Where the credit derivative is referenced to more than one obligor, the amount of
credit protection provided would depend on the structure of the contract.
Capital adequacy for Credit Derivatives in the Trading Book
o As stated in paragraph 3.(v) above banks will hold investments in CLNs issued by
Protection Sellers in their banking book or trading book. The assets in the trading
book are held primarily for generating profit on short-term differences in
prices/yields as against assets in the banking book which are contracted basically on
account of relationship or for steady income and statutory obligations and are
generally held till maturity. A CLN held in the trading book will represent a
position to the note itself, with an embedded credit default product. A credit-linked
note has a notional position to the specific risk of the Reference Asset. There is also
specific risk to the Protection Buyer and general market risk according to the
coupon or interest rate of the note. The risk weight for such positions would be the
risk weight for ‘All other Investments’ i.e. 102.50% as per present guidelines.
Provisioning Requirements
o Sufficient provisioning (based on what would be the provisioning applicable if the
reference asset were on the seller's books) would have to be made by the credit
protection seller if it is offering credit protection on a non performing asset.
o The protection buyer should not make any provision for a reference asset that has
turned NPA and on which it has bought protection which is valid on date.
Some Other Issues
Exposure Norms
Exposure ceilings for all fund based and non-fund based exposures will be computed in
relation to total capital as defined under capital adequacy standards. As per present
policy, from April 1, 2003 exposure calculation will be computed on the basis of 100%
of non-fund based exposures in addition to fund-based exposures.
While determining the overall sectoral / borrower group / individual company
exposure, suitable reduction will be allowed in the level of exposure with respect to the
credit protection bought by means of credit derivatives. Conversely, the protection
seller's exposure would increase as the protection seller acquires what is equivalent to a
credit exposure on the reference asset. For the credit protection seller, the method of
measuring exposure that would be applicable would be similar to the manner in which
non-fund based credit limits such as guarantees are reckoned. Once the exposure is
computed to individual/group entities, banks will have to ensure that they are within
the overall ceiling as laid out in the relevant RBI guidelines.
Issues Relating to Documentation
It is recommended that transactions in credit derivatives may be covered by the 1992
ISDA Master Agreement and the 1999 ISDA Credit Derivatives Definitions and
subsequent supplements to definitions with suitable modifications to suit conditions in
India. Credit Linked Notes that are typically issued as bonds will be subject to
additional documentation requirements of bonds. However, banks should consult their
legal advisors about adequate documentation and other legal requirements and issues of
credit derivative contracts before engaging in any transactions.
Issues related to Accounting
Normal accounting entries for credit derivative transactions are fairly straightforward
depending on cash flows that take place at various points in time during the tenor of the
transaction. e.g. for a credit default swap, there will be periodic payment of fees by the
protection buyer to the protection seller. If there is a credit event, then settlement will
be appropriately accounted depending on whether cash settled or settled via physical
exchange versus par payment.
Fair Value Accounting
o Prudent accounting principles require that derivatives create assets and liabilities
which should be captured on the balance sheet at fair economic value based on
current market prices taking into account credit and market risk characteristics
arising from these positions. All future cash flows arising from the contracts should
be brought to present value using appropriate discount rates from mid-market data.
The determination of future cash flows may require use of appropriate valuation
models ranging from simple deterministic derivations to exotic pricing models.
o Banks may adopt suitable norms for accounting of Credit Default Swaps and Credit
Linked Notes with the approval of their respective boards. All derivatives should
be fair valued at least on a quarterly basis. The changes in fair value must be
reported in current earnings.
Maintenance of Statutory reserves on CLN issued by banks
Normally CLNs will be issued by SPVs set up by banks for specific purpose. However,
it is possible that some banks may consider issuing CLNs themselves, in which case
they have to maintain CRR and SLR as required. However, before issuing CLNs,
banks will be required to take prior approval of RBI.
Disclosures
The banks will be required to disclose the following in the Notes on Accounts of their
annual accounts in respect of the credit derivative transactions:
o The types of transactions carried out and their corresponding risks,
o The gains/losses, realized/unrealized from various types credit derivative
transactions undertaken by the banks,
o Contribution of derivatives to the total business and the risk portfolio,
o Fair Value of derivative positions.
CHAPTER XIII CREDIT AUDIT
Credit Audit examines compliance with extant sanction and post-sanction processes/
procedures laid down by the bank from time to time.
Objectives of Credit Audit
o Improvement in the quality of credit portfolio
o Review sanction process and compliance status of large loans
o Feedback on regulatory compliance
o Independent review of Credit Risk Assessment
o Pick-up early warning signals and suggest remedial measures
o Recommend corrective action to improve credit quality, credit administration and
credit skills of staff, etc.
Structure of Credit Audit Department
The credit audit / loan review mechanism may be assigned to a specific Department or the
Inspection and Audit Department.
Functions of Credit Audit Department
o To process Credit Audit Reports
o To analyse Credit Audit findings and advise the departments/ functionaries
concerned
o To follow up with controlling authorities
o To apprise the Top Management
o To process the responses received and arrange for closure of the relative Credit
Audit Reports
o To maintain database of advances subjected to Credit Audit
Scope and Coverage
The focus of credit audit needs to be broadened from the account level to look at the
overall portfolio and the credit process being followed. The important areas are:
1. Portfolio Review: Examine the quality of Credit & Investment (Quasi Credit)
Portfolio and suggest measures for improvement, including reduction of
concentrations in certain sectors to levels indicated in the Loan Policy and
Prudential Limits suggested by RBI.
2. Loan Review: Review of the sanction process and status of post sanction
processes/ procedures (not just restricted to large accounts)
all fresh proposals and proposals for renewal of limits (within 3 - 6 months
from date of sanction)
all existing accounts with sanction limits equal to or above a cut off depending
upon the size of activity
randomly selected ( say 5-10%) proposals from the rest of the portfolio
accounts of sister concerns/group/associate concerns of above accounts, even if
limit is less than the cut off
Action Points for Review
Verify compliance of bank's laid down policies and regulatory compliance with
regard to sanction
Examine adequacy of documentation
Conduct the credit risk assessment
Examine the conduct of account and follow up looked at by line functionaries
Oversee action taken by line functionaries in respect of serious irregularities
Detect early warning signals and suggest remedial measures thereof
Frequency of Review
The frequency of review should vary depending on the magnitude of risk (say, for the high
risk accounts - 3 months, for the average risk accounts- 6 months , for the low risk
accounts- 1 year).
Feedback on general regulatory compliance.
Examine adequacy of policies, procedures and practices.
Review the Credit Risk Assessment methodology.
Examine reporting system and exceptions thereof.
Recommend corrective action for credit administration and credit skills of staff.
Forecast likely happenings in the near future.
Procedure to be followed for Credit Audit
Credit Audit is conducted on site, i.e. at the branch which has appraised the advance
and where the main operative credit limits are made available.
Report on conduct of accounts of allocated limits are to be called from the
corresponding branches.
Credit auditors are not required to visit borrowers’ factory/ office premises.