Curbing nuisance motels: an evaluation of police as place regulators Gisela Bichler Department of Criminal Justice, California State University, California, USA Karin Schmerler Research and Analysis Unit, Chula Vista Police Department, California, USA, and Janet Enriquez Center for Criminal Justice Research, California State University, California, USA Abstract Purpose – This paper aims to evaluate a problem-oriented policing project that used regulatory policy to foster responsible place management among operators of nuisance motels located in Southern California. Design/methodology/approach – A mixed-methodological approach was used to ensure that a comprehensive assessment captured substantive outcomes, as well as implementation issues and displacement effects. Findings – Each component of the initiative generated some success, with the greatest crime reduction achieved when all motels were in full compliance with the permit-to-operate ordinance. Consistency in key project staff was critical to maintaining program integrity. Research limitations/implications – The displacement analysis suggests that crime prevention evaluations would benefit from a facilities orientation that identifies locations that might host crime if the targeted sites are rendered inopportune. And, net effects can be applied to facilities research using standardized crime rates. Practical implications – Ends-based regulatory policy offers law enforcement an alternative to conventional crime control strategies. Responsibility for crime prevention can be shifted to place managers to reduce the incidents of crime and disorder (reported and unreported to police). Ancillary benefits include better city-industry communication and more efficient use of city resources. Originality/value – This research is valuable to police agencies considering the use of ordinances to address crime and disorder problems plaguing risky facilities. Keywords Problem-oriented policing, Place management, Risky facilities, Regulatory policy, Displacement, Motels and hotels, Crime rates, United States of America Paper type Research paper Introduction Evoking responsible place management of motels through a city ordinance is an alternative to property-by-property nuisance abatement strategies. The primary goal is to place responsibility for developing and implementing specific actions needed to curb crime levels with those individuals best positioned to effect change – those who own and manage places. Typically, ordinances are used by civic authorities (city and police) The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at www.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm Received 15 September 2011 Revised 22 March 2012 Accepted 22 March 2012 Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies & Management Vol. 36 No. 2, 2013 pp. 437-462 r Emerald Group Publishing Limited 1363-951X DOI 10.1108/13639511311329787 The authors would like to thank Melanie Tennant, Amanda Lynn De Vries, Eric McCord, Stefanie Balchak, and Jill Christie-Merrall for their research assistance. This project was the overall winner of the 2009 Herman Goldstein Award for Problem-Oriented Policing. 437 Curbing nuisance motels
Transcript
Curbing nuisance motels:an evaluation of police as
place regulatorsGisela Bichler
Department of Criminal Justice, California State University, California, USA
Karin SchmerlerResearch and Analysis Unit,
Chula Vista Police Department, California, USA, and
Janet EnriquezCenter for Criminal Justice Research, California State University,
California, USA
Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to evaluate a problem-oriented policing project that used regulatorypolicy to foster responsible place management among operators of nuisance motels located inSouthern California.Design/methodology/approach – A mixed-methodological approach was used to ensure that acomprehensive assessment captured substantive outcomes, as well as implementation issues anddisplacement effects.Findings – Each component of the initiative generated some success, with the greatest crimereduction achieved when all motels were in full compliance with the permit-to-operate ordinance.Consistency in key project staff was critical to maintaining program integrity.Research limitations/implications – The displacement analysis suggests that crime preventionevaluations would benefit from a facilities orientation that identifies locations that might host crime ifthe targeted sites are rendered inopportune. And, net effects can be applied to facilities research usingstandardized crime rates.Practical implications – Ends-based regulatory policy offers law enforcement an alternative toconventional crime control strategies. Responsibility for crime prevention can be shifted to placemanagers to reduce the incidents of crime and disorder (reported and unreported to police). Ancillarybenefits include better city-industry communication and more efficient use of city resources.Originality/value – This research is valuable to police agencies considering the use of ordinances toaddress crime and disorder problems plaguing risky facilities.
Keywords Problem-oriented policing, Place management, Risky facilities, Regulatory policy,Displacement, Motels and hotels, Crime rates, United States of America
Paper type Research paper
IntroductionEvoking responsible place management of motels through a city ordinance is analternative to property-by-property nuisance abatement strategies. The primary goal isto place responsibility for developing and implementing specific actions needed to curbcrime levels with those individuals best positioned to effect change – those who ownand manage places. Typically, ordinances are used by civic authorities (city and police)
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available atwww.emeraldinsight.com/1363-951X.htm
Received 15 September 2011Revised 22 March 2012
Accepted 22 March 2012
Policing: An International Journal ofPolice Strategies & Management
Vol. 36 No. 2, 2013pp. 437-462
r Emerald Group Publishing Limited1363-951X
DOI 10.1108/13639511311329787
The authors would like to thank Melanie Tennant, Amanda Lynn De Vries, Eric McCord,Stefanie Balchak, and Jill Christie-Merrall for their research assistance. This project was theoverall winner of the 2009 Herman Goldstein Award for Problem-Oriented Policing.
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to foster better management of private property. This regulatory approach to crimecontrol aims to increase the public management of sub-standard private facilities andis a common feature of problem-oriented policing (POP) initiatives. Public managementof sub-standard private facilities is a critical component of problem-solving effortsbecause crime at private facilities accounts for a large proportion of police workloads.As more public areas, such as shopping districts and recreation facilities, are replacedwith large mall structures and other commercial properties, the safeness of privatefacilities becomes critical to a community’s well-being.
Selecting from the broad array of regulatory options can be challenging for policeadministrators unaccustomed to using civil actions as behavioral control mechanisms.Until sufficient evidence accumulates, it is unclear which strategy will produce thegreatest effect relative to the effort required to launch new regulatory policy. Using amixed methodology, this research paper evaluates an initiative designed to change placemanagement practices among nuisance motels located in Chula Vista, CA. A centralfeature of this initiative, the permit-to-operate ordinance, is an example of ends-basedregulation[1]. By evaluating the ordinance in relation to the total project, this study offersclear and convincing evidence of the anti-crime effect police can have as place regulators.
Place management of risky facilitiesRisky facilitiesBudget motels/hotels offer travelers the most economical room rates for overnightlodging. Facilities tend to cluster near highway access ramps or along major arterialroads in areas that attract large volumes of people (LeBeau, 2011). Budget propertiesare typically described as motor lodges where guests park their vehicles near to theirrented rooms. Smaller facilities tend to have a horseshoe, L-shape, or terrace structurethat is single or double story with outdoor access to rooms; whereas, some largerproperties are designed to have rooms accessed though interior corridors with severalbuilding egress points that lead to large parking lots. Check-in occurs at the front desk,which is often not visible from the parking areas. While the location advantage andanonymity afforded by these inexpensive rooms can attract crime issues, notabledifferences are found in crime levels among adjacent properties (LeBeau, 2011;Schmerler, 2005).
Explanations of crime concentration are enhanced by the recent discussion of riskyfacilities (see Clarke and Eck, 2007; Eck et al., 2007). Simply defined, risky facilities area class of properties wherein crime appears to concentrate, often at extreme levels(Eck et al., 2007). Examining crime incidents among a set of homogenous properties(i.e. apartment complexes, bars, or malls and other youth hangouts) is likely to revealthat a small proportion of locations account for the majority of crime and disorderincidents (Clarke and Eck, 2007). This pattern is so common that it has been termed theiron law of troublesome places (Wilcox and Eck, 2011)[2]. Comparing the characteristicsof high-crime facilities to those of low-crime facilities highlights differences that aresuggestive of possible regulatory action (Eck et al., 2007; Eck and Eck, 2012).Accumulating evidence points to the role played by management in creating andsustaining the most extreme criminogenic conditions (e.g. Clarke and Bichler-Robertson,1998; Hannah et al., 2007; Madensen and Eck, 2008; Mazerolle et al., 1998).
Place managersExpanding on the role of place managers as explained by routine activity theory(Cohen and Felson, 1979; Eck, 1995; Felson, 2006)[3], Madensen and Eck argue that
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invoking strategies to change the management approach of individuals positioned togovern specific places, in this case motel managers/owners, could significantly mitigatesite-level characteristics that are conducive to crime (Madensen, 2007; Madensen and Eck,2008). According to Madensen and colleagues, place managers fulfill many functions.Place managers:
(1) organize and oversee the use of space, construction, repair, and selection ofactivities that occur on the property;
(2) establish behavioral norms and regulate (promote or prohibit) certainactivities;
(3) control general access to the property and to specific areas within the property;and
(4) direct the use of resources for the above functions, or to enhance theprofitability of the facility.
Active, engaged place managers can create crime-resilient or crime-susceptibleproperties. Those with a penchant to proactively eliminate crime opportunitiesare classified as suppressors, in contrast, promoters are managers who recognize theprofitability of crime opportunities and exploit or ignore the situation for personal orbusiness advantages. Passive management styles also interact with locationcharacteristics to generate or control crime. Managers who modify behavior or theenvironment following a crime event are classed as reactors. Alternatively, enablersinclude those place managers who fail to recognize or respond to the crime problem(Madensen and Sousa, 2008).
Integrating this typology with the broken windows theory (Wilson and Kelling,1982), Madensen and Sousa (2008) suggest that crime control and prevention strategiesthat seek to increase the number of suppressors within a neighborhood should reversethe spiral of community decay that leads to economic and social disinvestment incommunities. As originally posited by Wilson and Kelling (1982), community declinebegins with rising disorder that engenders fear in the local population. As disordercontinues unaddressed, community sentiment shifts and social cohesion begins tounravel. People are less willing to intervene, which is interpreted as tolerance, if notapproval, by those involved. Non-offenders modify their behavior, thinking that crimeis on the rise, retreating into their home, or vacating the community. This providesmore opportunity for crime to thrive because the residential management style willinevitably shift during this process. In turn, this furthers the decline in neighborhoodconditions as evidenced by increasing crime levels (Madensen and Sousa, 2008).
In many communities, budget motel properties clustered along historicalcommercial corridors are experiencing this cycle of decline. Originally developed tosupport the motoring public prior to the advent of the US Interstate Highway System,many communities linked by old scenic byways (e.g. Route 66) have central corridorsdotted with a number of small budget motels. As profit margins deteriorate within thissegment of the local hospitality industry – due to the increased popularity of air travel,changing recreational patterns, and aging of facilities – the number of managersinterested in actively investing resources to suppress delinquency begins to decline.Eventually, some of these property managers become passive reactors as higher levelsof disorder begin to manifest. Over time these place managers see their efforts as futileand slip into a passive enabler role. As more managers begin the disinvestmentprocess, management approaches shift and some individuals begin to notice crime
opportunities; this initiates the influx of promoters. If the trend continues, the balancesways in favor of crime and community decay ensues.
Based on an action research model, POP initiatives are well suited to reversing thespiral of decline by attacking the source of crime problems. Support for focussing onmanagement style is found in POP projects that demonstrate the critical role played bymotel operators. Table I outlines initiatives aimed at dealing with problematic motel/hotel properties. While the crime issues vary, narcotics activity, prostitution, andgeneral disorder are common problems that emerge when passive owners/managersallow crime opportunists to take hold in the motel. Most often, agencies choose toaddress one problematic facility at a time. Focussing on the most extreme cases, thesePOP projects attempt to force management to adopt a crime suppressor role. Commonamong these efforts is the use of strategies to: implement specific check-in practices;educate staff, particularly housekeeping and front desk clerks, about the signs ofcriminal activity; foster proactive management policies to maintain safety and publichealth standards; and, hold absentee owners accountable for the conditions andactivities occurring on site. Demonstrable reductions in crime were achieved bychanging management style. However, none of these evaluations adequately tested fordisplacement effects. As such, the true impact of forcing motel operators to changetheir management style has not been assessed.
Displacement effectsIn order to claim that a particular course of action demonstrably reduced the incidenceof crime, one must consider whether the initiative merely displaced crime problems.While it is generally argued that six forms of displacement are possible – e.g. temporal,target, method, offense type, offender, and spatial – most studies focus on spatialeffects (noted exception Weisburd et al., 2006). Investigations of spatial displacementconcur that, although possible, displacement effects rarely invalidate the benefits ofsituational crime control strategies (e.g. Barr and Pease, 1990). For instance, a recentmeta-analysis of 102 crime prevention initiatives found spatial displacement in about26 percent of the projects, though a detailed analysis of 13 studies showed these effectsto be less than the overall treatment effect (Guerette and Bowers, 2009). Curiously, moststudies considered only the possibility of immediate spatial displacement, despite whatwe know about the antecedents of crime incidents. Adjacent sites are not necessarilythe most likely locations for displaced criminal activity.
For crime events to occur, certain conditions must be present: the situation must beopportune for potential offenders to decide that the effort and potential risk is worththe anticipated reward (Cornish and Clarke, 1987). Situational inducements andcriminogenic circumstances are crime specific (Clarke, 1997; Cornish and Clarke, 2008;Clarke, 2008; Wortley, 2008) as the conditions that facilitate one crime (e.g. lack ofstreet lighting facilitating robbery at an ATM) may not influence another (e.g. creditcard fraud). Since these facilitating conditions are often specific to place functioning,we should not expect crime reduction interventions at a budget motel to necessarilydisplace crime to a dissimilar adjacent property, such as a fast food outlet.Previous initiatives also show that problematic budget motels are often locatedadjacent to relatively crime-free facilities (e.g. Arlington Police Department, 2008;Henrico County Division of Police, 2008). Under these circumstances, immediatespatial displacement is not a likely outcome. Instead, motel crime is apt to move areasonable distance to another budget property that offers the same set of crimefacilitating conditions.
Guidance for setting a reasonable displacement distance is found within offendermobility research. Studies of offender mobility suggest varying travel distances(e.g. Rossmo, 2000), with offenders traveling less than three miles to commit disorderand assault (see e.g. Wiles and Costello, 2000) and even shorter distances to sell drugs(Eck, 1995; Rengert et al., 2000). Moreover, despite the relatively short distancestraveled to crime sites, there is a tendency toward intercity movement, particularlyamong successful deviants (Morselli and Royer, 2008; Wiles and Costello, 2000).
Identifying other properties with similar place characteristics must go beyondsimple land use matching. If motels with high, stable crime levels are located adjacentto low crime facilities, then it is likely that the adjacent low crime properties have placecharacteristics that make them resilient to the crime occurring nearby. This means thatcrime prevention targeted at motel A, situated along a street with three budget motels,might displace crime to motel C, bypassing the more proximate facility B, if motels Aand C provide similar crime facilitating conditions. Physical proximity alone does notindicate situational comparability. Evaluations of programs targeting entrenchedcrime problems occurring at a subset of facilities should use properties exhibitingsimilar characteristics as control properties and to assess displacement effects.
Comparison motels should share various features, such as similar managementpractices and policies, building layout and accessibility, presence of high-risk amenities(e.g. bars), percentage of local guests, proximity to large recreation venues, and roomrate (Bichler et al., 2003; LeBeau, 2011; Schmerler, 2005). When this information isnot available, crime or calls-for-service (CFS) levels might provide a viable substitute toestablish situational comparability. Facilities with established or durable crime ordisorder problems are likely to be the most receptive to displaced deviance. Whenassessing city-wide initiatives, nearby comparable high-crime/high-CFS properties canserve as anticipated displacement sites, while similar facilities a bit farther a fieldmight make suitable comparison sites.
Facility size/capacity should also be considered when measuring crime levels.Schmerler (2005) recommends standardizing crime levels by dividing incident counts,such as CFS, by the number of rooms for rent to account for motel capacity.Normalizing incident counts adjusts for crime potential or opportunity, permittinga more equitable assessment of problem magnitude. For example, if both a largerproperty (e.g. 250 rooms) and a smaller property (e.g. ten rooms) experienced 12 crimeor disorder incidents during one year, the magnitude of the crime problem at thesmaller motel would be obscured until the count is standardized by size. In thisexample, the smaller property has a crime rate of 1.2 CFS per room, whereas the largerproperty has an incident rate of 0.05 CFS per room.
To generate an equitable measure of crime and disorder levels, Schmerler (2005)advocates using a mix of officer- and citizen-initiated CFS, with an emphasis on citizencalls. Restricting officer-initiated activity to only the CFS resulting in a crime report orarrest prevents policing directives (i.e. stings) from overly biasing crime and disordermeasures. Integrating CFS from both sources ensures that proactive managementpractices (i.e. staff security handles/screens potential crime incidents) will not undulysuppress official measures. Taking care to develop appropriate incident inclusioncriteria strengthens our ability to detect real change.
A final consideration merits attention. Simply calculating percent change amongthe treatment sites, displacement area, and control area is not a sufficiently sensitivemethod for estimating the overall effect of a crime prevention initiative (Eck, 2002;Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette and Bowers, 2009). Estimating the net effect of
crime control efforts requires a mechanism that will simultaneously take changesamong all study areas into consideration. This balanced approach permits theevaluation to consider any possible diffusion of benefits – where the positive effects ofcrime prevention naturally spread beyond the treatment area (Clarke and Weisburd,1994). Two rather sophisticated equations are available: the weighted displacementquotient (WDQ) measures the extent of displacement or diffusion present in designateddisplacement areas in relation to control areas; and, the total net effect (TNE) capturesthe overall effect of an initiative in the study area relative to changes experienced in thecontrol area while adjusting for any displacement or diffusion into adjacent areas (seeBowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette and Bowers, 2009). Alternatively, Eck (2002) offersthe alternative net effect (ANE). This measure simply sums the percent change acrossall three-study areas and while less sensitive, it may be more accessible to frontlinecrime analysts. If all measures generate consistent results, then a simpler calculationwould suffice.
The present studyChula Vista motel initiativeAs of 2009, Chula Vista was home to approximately 233,000 people. Located sevenmiles south of San Diego and seven miles north of the Mexican border, the city is wellsituated to accommodate tourists visiting both the San Diego Area and Baja, Mexico(Schmerler et al., 2009). Many of the motels/hotels are clustered along an arterialcommercial street that used to be part of a scenic byway – Highway 101. For manyyears, economic development efforts were stymied by the lack of adequate hotel stock(e.g. athletes using the Olympic Training Center were housed in San Diego) and theproblems afflicting many of the motels resisted conventional policing tactics.
This city’s overnight lodging industry – consisting primarily of budget motels –provided havens for serious crime, drug use, and prostitution (Schmerler et al., 2009).Despite increased attention to the motels throughout the 1990s, crime levels continuedunabated. Typically, the 27 motels in Chula Vista generated over 1,200 CFS each year(Schmerler et al., 2009). In addition to a high level of drug activity and interpersonalviolence, there were noise complaints and other disturbances (e.g. guests or visitorswould not check-out, pay for a room, or leave the property when asked). Analysisof police data, in conjunction with field interviews with 58 guests (2002), raised thepossibility that management policies and practices contributed significantly to thecrime problems. Subsequently, the City of Chula Vista launched a POP initiative withthree stages of escalating civil and social pressure to encourage motel managers tomake real changes in the way they ran their properties (for more detail see Schmerleret al., 2009)[4].
Following a hierarchy of shifting problem ownership (Goldstein, 1997; Scott andGoldstein, 2005), the crime prevention activities began with outreach, moved to codeenforcement and public accountability, and this led to legislated changes and in somecases, civil sanctions.
Stage 1: outreach. Early responses to the problems found at budget motels includedinformation sharing efforts to engage motel owners and operators. Project staffdisseminated CFS “report cards,” that tallied the nature and scope of crime anddisorder occurring at each site; report cards were shared with each operator in an effortto ensure the owners/managers were informed of the nature and scope of the problemsat their properties. Project staff also conducted seminars for managers at the ChulaVista Chamber of Commerce and the police department facility to share information on
local research, laws, and best practices. City staff and a Chamber of Commerce staffperson offered on-site technical assistance. Although several individuals took advantageof property reviews to identify environmental security issues, little change occurred.
Stage 2: code enforcement program and public accountability. Outreach efforts wereunable to correct the crime and disorder problems occurring at the most troubledproperties leading project staff to engage available civil mechanisms. Solicitingassistance from the City of Chula Vista code enforcement office, each facility wasinspected. Major problems were found with two properties and they were subsequentlyclosed. In an effort to shame managers/owners into action, project staff also begandistributing reports to all motel operators that ranked each motel property by CFS perroom rate from highest to lowest. Still, serious crime and disorder issues continuedunabated at some locations.
Stage 3: permit ordinance. Ratcheting up the pressure on uncooperative moteloperators, six city agencies formed a working group to develop a permit-to-operateordinance (city attorney, finance, fire, police, planning and building, and communitydevelopment). Together, this working group developed an annual permit process thatused compliance with public safety standards to issue permits to operate motels. Basedon a fixed city standard – the 2005 median CFS per room rate[5] – properties with crimeand disorder rates below the threshold were granted a license to operate for one year[6].Properties failing to meet the threshold were required to enter into a memorandum ofunderstanding with the city (financial guarantees are included in some cases) to takeappropriate corrective action.
General impactAs illustrated in Figure 1, the general impact of this initiative was dramatic among themost risky motel facilities in Chula Vista. Between 2004-2005 and 2006-2007[7], the toptier (most troubled properties) experienced a 68 percent reduction in CFS, small decreaseswere found among the middle tier properties (36 percent), and the well-performingproperties maintained their low crime and disorder rates (Schmerler et al., 2009). Thisdramatic reduction was mirrored in crime reports. From 2003 –to 2009, crime reportsacross the city remained relatively constant with a slight decline beginning in 2007;whereas, there was a 70 percent drop in crime reports at motels (Schmerler et al., 2009)[8].The grey-hashed area between the closing of a problem motel and the enactment of thepermit ordinance is highlighted because there were extensive communications amongmany of the stakeholders regarding the pending city council ordinance vote.
Two of the 24 motels that requested permits in 2008 (the first year they wererequired) did not clearly meet the CFS standard during the corresponding performancereview period (federal fiscal year October 1, 2006 to September 30, 2007). Bothproperties ultimately entered into memorandums of understanding with the city thatprovided financial guarantees that the motel operators would implement substantialchanges in management and security practices in 2008. Subsequently, both of thesefacilities fulfilled their obligations and were in compliance the subsequent year. Whilethis initial assessment suggests that the initiative was successful, several questionsrequire attention. How effective was the permit-to-operate ordinance relative tothe total project? Was motel crime simply displaced to neighboring jurisdictions?Did manager behavior actually change in response to law enforcement activities?And ultimately, was it worth the effort? To address these questions the evaluation ofthe Chula Vista Budget Motel project involved two distinct research components: animpact assessment and a process evaluation.
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MethodologyImpact assessment research designProgrammatic impact was determined by comparing pre- and post-levels of CFSamong budget motels located in the study area, a comparison zone, and displacement/diffusion region. Despite efforts to ensure comparability among study groups, theimpact assessment can be classified as a non-equivalent control group design (Cookand Campbell, 1979). CFS counts for crime and disorder calls to each property werecompared for two pre- and post-periods to separate the effects of the permit-to-operateordinance from the larger project. These values were normalized by the number ofrentable rooms prior to being used in the displacement measures that are described below.
Selecting comparison areas. Selecting appropriate comparison and displacementareas can be challenging when initiatives involve city-wide strategies. Thus, siteswithin the region were carefully screened using the following criteria: the propertiesmust have medium or high rates of crime activity as captured through CFS per roomrates[9]; the facilities must be classed as budget motels/hotels[10]; the properties mustbe located on arterial roads or near freeway onramps; the sites could not be located in adense, urban core of a major city (i.e. downtown San Diego); and must be located inSan Diego County. These criteria were developed to enhance the equivalence ofproperties used. In total, 27 similar facilities were identified. To minimize possiblehistory effects two properties were disqualified – one from the diffusion group and onefrom the comparison group – due to targeted crime control activities by the respectivepolice agencies that occurred during the study period. The remaining propertieswere reclassified into potential displacement sites and comparison locations basedon proximity to Chula Vista.
1.60
Managersurvey
Reportcards
Problemmotelclosed
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passed
All motelsin
complianceManagersurvey
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S r
ate
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01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 05-06 06-07 07-08 08-09
High tier (1.0+)
Middle tier (0.5-0.99)
Low tier (<0.5)
City standard (0.61)
Figure 1.Annual change in medianCFS ratios of motelsin high-, middle-, andlow-rate tiers
Motels/hotels located within three miles of Chula Vista’s hospitality corridor wereused to determine whether CFS increased among nearby properties; nine potentialdisplacement sites with CFS room ratios above 0.5 were chosen from National City andSouthern San Diego. Spatial displacement was most likely to involve budget motelslocated within three miles of Chula Vista for two reasons: first, a highway system linksthese alternative locations directly to Chula Vista; and second, studies of offendermobility find that most serious offenders (engaged in the types of crime and disorderplaguing Chula Vista motels) rarely travel more than three miles when selecting crimetargets (e.g. Rossmo, 2000)[11].
Contamination is a constant threat when agencies get involved in publicized POPefforts. To find comparison properties that were less likely to be influenced bycontamination, a wider search area was used; 16 medium and high crime facilities (at orabove a CFS room rate of 0.5) located in two San Diego County cities (La Mesa and ElCajon) were selected. These cities contain similar motel stock to the study area, but arelocated greater than ten miles from the treatment city thereby ensuring some degree ofinsulation from local conditions affecting the treatment sites.
Gross and net displacement effects. The CFS per room rate (CFS rate) was generatedby dividing the total annual number of CFS (certain officer- and most citizen-initiated)received for crime- and disorder-related issues by the number of rooms at each motel.Traffic stops/pedestrian stops (unless they resulted in an arrest or crime report), andother non-crime related activity was excluded. Two different sets of time periods wereused in order to detangle the effect of the ordinance from the larger project: the pre- andpost-ordinance evaluation compared 2005-2006 and 2007-2008, while the overall projectimpact set an earlier pre-initiative period (2004-2005) against a later post-initiativeperiod (2008-2009). Recall that all time periods corresponded with the federal fiscalyear (October 1-September 30).
Several measures were calculated from the median of study group CFS rates (for adetailed discussion of these equations see Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette, 2009;Guerette and Bowers, 2009). A simpler, alternative equation was also used to assess theTNE (see Clarke and Eck, 2005; Eck, 2002 for a discussion of this alternative equation).Using the median of annual rates for each study group diminishes the effect of randomspikes and is more appropriate for non-normal distributions found among riskyfacilities. This generates a more conservative estimate of changes in CFS levels. Thecalculations were as follows:
where S represents crime and disorder levels among the study group motels withsubscript 2 designating the post-test and subscript 1 indicating the pre-test; Crepresents crime and disorder levels among the comparison motels with subscriptsdenoting the pre- and post-test time periods, and; D represents crime and disorderlevels among the displacement/diffusion motels with subscripts denoting pre- andpost-test time periods.
Process evaluation research designThree methods were used to enhance the rigor of the process evaluation. First, themanager survey, supplemented with site audits, provides evidence of change inmanagement behavior. Capturing information about the resources used to completethis project (measured by time spent working with or attending to issues at the studyproperties) across two time periods – project development and implementation, andpost-ordinance maintenance – helps to determine the cost-benefit associated withthe project. Finally, to provide guidance for agencies considering the use of POP togenerate an ordinance-based initiative, a program fidelity evaluation was conductedto suggest aspects of this project that were critical to its success.
Manager survey and site audits. Two methods were used to capture informationabout place management. The manager survey documented standard policies andpractices. The pre-test included 77 questions administered in-person to the primarymanager/operator of 23 properties (two managers declined to participated and twoproperties had closed)[12]. Two teams of interviewers (two research staff, andfrequently, a volunteer from the City of Chula Vista, were in each group) met withrespondents over a three-day period in November 2002. Reliability assessments of sixpilot interviews used during the training process revealed consistent administration.Moreover, field observations of the research teams during data collection helped toensure protocols were followed. Researchers noted their impressions of whether themanager was forthcoming immediately after questioning respondents; 81 percent ofmotel operators were considered to have been relaxed during the questioning, leadingstaff to rank their answers as open and honest. The questions targeted: general hoteloperations and property description, policies and procedures (e.g. check-in, security),troublesome guest behavior, and factors affecting business success. During thefollow-up survey (a copy is available upon request), 27 of the original questionswere administered online with follow-up telephone calls conducted by one researcher;the response rate was considerably lower, with only 42 percent of managers agreeingto participate.
More objective data about management changes were captured with codeenforcement inspections of security features (e.g. doors without deadbolts, peepholesor nearby windows, and security chains). Code enforcement and fire department staffalso examined health conditions (e.g. building standards related to sewage, structuralintegrity, and fire regulations). This information was supplemented with site visits[13]documented with pre- and post-implementation photographs and written notes abouteach property to gauge esthetic improvements.
Cost-benefit analysis. The amount of time city personnel spent on the initiativewas calculated by summing for each project phase the time dedicated by specificpersonnel categories (e.g. public safety analysts, city attorney) within each agency (e.g.city attorney, police department, code enforcement)[14]. Police department timecommitments includes staff dedicated to this research effort (public safety analysts,police managers), as well as the time police officers spent on certain officer- and most
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citizen-initiated CFS at the motels. Time spent on calls was calculated by subtractingthe time at which a call was cleared from the time the officer was dispatched.Investigative costs were not included. Each city agency involved in the initiative(city attorney, code enforcement, finance, etc.) also included the time currentlydedicated to maintaining the ordinance.
Program fidelity. The development of any intervention rarely proceeds as planned.Pooling information from many sources – research activity time sheets (e.g. time sheetsdocumenting the manager survey development and administration), e-mail betweenresearch staff, meeting minutes, memos, and retrospective interviews with individualsinvolved with the project – generates a comprehensible description of projectoperations and implementation. Examination of these materials uncovered issuesencountered during strategy implementation and possible research limitationsaffecting the outcome measures.
ResultsImpact assessmentTables II and III provide the gross effects of the initiative on vulnerable properties.Comparing the percent change in median CFS per room rates following theimplementation of the permit ordinance suggests that both Chula Vista and thedisplacement motels (National City and Southern San Diego) benefited from theinitiative (see Table II). Interestingly, Table III suggests that the overall project impactshowed a more pronounced decline in Chula Vista and the comparison area[15]. Takentogether, the significant declines reported in these tables illustrate the gross effect ofthe initiative. A more sensitive exploration is needed to tease out the relative impact ofthe project.
Several notable findings emerge from examining the net effects (see Table IV). First,across all measures used, the permit-to-operate ordinance generated a greaterreduction in crime and disorder among Chula Vista motels than the total project. This
Propertydescription Total CFS count Median of CFS rates
Notes: aThe pre-ordinance federal fiscal year ran from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2006 and thepost-ordinance federal fiscal year ran from October 1, 2007 to September 30, 2008. bA one tail w2 testreveals that this overall change is significant (w2¼ 57.49; df¼ 2; po0.001). cA one-tail w2 test indicatesthat this overall change is significant (w2¼ 10.59; df¼ 2; po0.01)
Table II.CFS pre- and
post-initiative for thepermit-to-operate
ordinance for troublesomemotels in the study area,
displacement zone, andcomparison areaa
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Curbingnuisance motels
suggests that it is possible that the dramatic reduction in crime could have beenachieved by only implementing the ordinance.
The WDQ score of 1.79 for the ordinance indicates that a diffusion effect occurred;meaning, that the problematic study area and displacement motels experienced a
Property description Total CFS count Median of CFS rates
Notes: aCrime and disorder counts were only available for El Cajon comparison sites prior to 2005.The pre-project period was the federal fiscal year from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2005 and thepost-project period included the federal fiscal year 2008-2009. bA one-tail w2 test reveals that thisoverall change is significant (w2¼ 123.54; df¼ 2; po0.001). cA one-tail w2 test indicates that this overallchange is significant (w2¼ 8.50; df¼ 2; po0.05)
Table III.Overall project impactmeasured by change inCFS among troublesomemotelsa
Coefficient UsePermit-to-operate ordinance
impact Total project impactScore Interpretation Score Interpretation
Net effect Determines study areaimpact in relation tochanges in the controlarea
0.39 þ Value indicatesa decrease in thestudy area relativeto the control area
0.34 þ Value indicatesa decrease in thestudy area relativeto the control area
Weighteddisplacementquotient (WDQ)
Measures the extent ofdisplacement ordiffusion in thedisplacement area inrelation to the studyand control areas
1.79 þ Value indicatesthere was adiffusion effect;study area effectsare amplified
�1.23 � Value suggeststhe study areaeffect was eclipsedby changes inother areas
Total net effect(TNE)
Indicates the overalleffect in the study areain relation to changesin the control areawhile adjusting forany displacement/diffusion effects
0.81 þ Value suggeststhe response waseffective overall
�0.05 Small � valuesuggests nochange overallrelative to otherareas
Alternative neteffect (ANE)
Estimates the total neteffect of the project
�1.04 � Value indicatesthe response waseffective overall
Notes: For more information on how to interpret these findings please see: Guerette (2009) or Gueretteand Bowers (2009). The alternative net effect is explained by Eck (2002)
substantive decline in crime and disorder once all Chula Vista motels were incompliance, meanwhile there was no change in the median crime level measuredamong the comparison properties. In contrast, the WDQ score calculated for the totalproject (�1.23) shows that overall crime and disorder decreased substantially amongtroubled properties in the study area and the comparison area, with no change foundin median scores among motels located in the displacement regions. Interpretingthese figures together might suggest that the reduction in crime experienced in ChulaVista was eclipsed by overall lack of change in the displacement area. This is notnecessarily a poor outcome. This means that overall, the initiative had no impact onthe displacement properties; crime was not moved to properties with similar pre-testcharacteristics.
The TNE values also indicate that the magnitude of change resulting fromthe permit-to-operate ordinance far exceeds the total project impact. Notably, while theANE also found that the permit-to-operate was effective overall, it offers a conflictingassessment of the total project impact. Where the TNE shows the overall projectimpact to be negligible, the ANE suggests otherwise. Regardless, both show that thismotel initiative reduced CFS in Chula Vista and the project did not simply displaceproblems to other vulnerable locations.
Findings from the process evaluationManager surveys. Several notable changes were uncovered through the managersurveys (see Table V). Place management improved as indicated by a reduction in thenumber of properties renting to guests staying more than 30 days[16] and an increasein the number of facilities operating with written check-in policies. Indirectly, thedramatic decrease in the local customer base reflects a decrease in permissive rental
.
Pre-intervention(23 respondents;November 2002)
(%)
Post-intervention(10 respondents;
May 2008)(%) % change
Property characteristicsFamily operated 67 50 �25Chain or franchise 39 30 �23Policies and practicesLocal customer base 70 30 �57Rent rooms for more than 30 days 44 30 �32Drivers’ License or ID recorded at check-in 100 100 0Written check-in policies 55 90 64Motel rules posted/handed out 73 70 �4Refused to rent rooms 83 70 �16Troublesome guest behavior (prior month)Too many people in the room 65 20 �69Guests partying loudly 30 30 0Vandalism/Graffiti 35 10 �71Suspected prostitution 17 0 �100Suspected drug dealing 35 10 �71Theft of/from car 9 10 11Threats to motel staff 17 0 �100Stealing from motel 35 30 �14
Table V.Selected indicators from
the manager survey ofpolicies and practices
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practices[17]. Prior to the project, 70 percent of motels served primarily local customers(people living within 30 miles): following the enactment of the permit ordinance, only30 percent of motels rented primarily to local clientele.
Significant reductions were found in the level of: too many people in the room,vandalism and graffiti, suspected prostitution and drug dealing, and threats to motelstaff. Two exceptions are noteworthy: guests partying loudly and theft of or fromvehicles did not show substantive change. In general, this self-reported victimizationsuggests that while conditions at the properties did change, some crime and disorderissues remained.
Site audits. Radical improvement in room safety was immediately apparent.According to code enforcement reports, the number of motel rooms in Chula Vistathat did not meet basic safety standards[18] declined from at least 378 pre-test, to 0post-intervention. An example illustrates the nature of these safety problems.Site visits revealed that in 2002, 33 percent of properties did not have peepholes and28 percent did not have deadbolts on room doors; whereas, no motels were deficientin 2008. It is also noteworthy that all motels applying for operating permits hadacceptable health inspections in 2008.
A case study provides a more subjective illustration of the nature of some changes.Prior to the start of this initiative, the El Primero Hotel had a CFS ratio of 1.6 andcharged $200 per week to rent a room. After meeting with project staff, reviewing thereport cards, and participating in the voluntary site audits, the original owners decidedto sell the property. The new owners enacted improvements and completely remodeledthe property. The property’s CFS ratio dropped to 015 in 2005 and room rates increasedconsiderably, to $100 per night in 2008.
Cost-benefit analysis. Table VI displays the estimated annual time spent dealingwith problematic motels for two periods – project development compared to ordinanceimplementation. Aside from code enforcement and the city attorney’s office, most ofthe non-police city and other related costs pertain to the development and assessmentof the regulatory response. In contrast, the vast majority of the law enforcement costspertain to attending CFS. For this reason, the city and other related commitmentsare listed separately from law enforcement costs. Average annual personnel hours arealso reported.
The savings in dedicated patrol officer time attending CFS was significant; onaverage 1,253.4 hours per year are being saved following the implementation of theordinance (51.2 percent reduction). Of note, this does not factor in detective andother personnel costs borne by the department. If these values were included, thesaving of police personnel time would be considerably higher. This is a significant gainin light of the relatively minor cost required to maintain the ordinance.
Program fidelity. Study duration and history effects. While lengthy study periodsmay introduce history threats, they were also instrumental in the success of thisinitiative. The evaluation spanned nine fiscal years. Various events and macro-levelsituations may have affected crime levels at the Chula Vista motels, or motels in thedisplacement or comparison areas, that were unrelated to the initiatives described here.For instance, at least one notoriously troubled motel in the displacement area wasdisqualified because it was the subject of a targeted law enforcement initiative(National City Police Department, 2002). Despite assurances from all relevant agenciesthat all motel-oriented policing activities were reported to Chula Vista program staff,it is plausible that other, undocumented policing activities occurred. However, apotentially greater concern is posed by macro-economic trends.
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Since the permit-to-operate ordinance was couched within the overall project impact,it is important to acknowledge that the extended follow-up period intersects withboth the economic bubble growth and collapse associated with the housing marketthat dramatically affected cities in Southern California, particularly Chula Vista. Ifthese conditions harmed the overnight lodging industry, it was not evident in themonthly transient occupancy tax figures. City revenue from motels, calculatedat a 10 percent tax rate, show that the average annual revenue generated for ChulaVista was $2.1 million pre-ordinance (2001-2006) and $2.5 million post-ordinance(2007-2009)[19]. While the relative stability of tax figures might be an artefact ofincreasing room rates that typically followed radical management changes[20], thesedata clearly show that the aggregate profitability of the motels operating in ChulaVista maintained constant throughout the duration of the project. Macro economicfactors did not have an immediate impact. Moreover, upgrading facilities and invokingstronger place management does not necessarily lead to widespread insolvency amongmotel operators.
Extended project timelines contributed significantly to the success of this initiativefor several reasons. Interviews of police staff revealed that lengthy implementationperiods provided sufficient time for motel operators to respond to the site audits, reportcards noting crime problems, and the stipulations of the permit ordinance. Operatorsneeded time to voluntarily take responsibility for developing and implementingchanges on their own before escalation to more coercive strategies was warranted.Considerable effort was extended to ensure that various community stakeholderswere routinely provided with information throughout the duration of the project.
Time spent on dealing withproblematic motels Average annual personnel hours
Notes: aOrdinance implementation time commitment costs include enforcement and maintenance ofthe ordinance program for federal fiscal years (October 1-September 30). bCity personnel estimatedtime spent on this project. cTotal research time costs were concentrated in a shorter time period:pre-ordinance activity occurred in 2002-2003 and post-ordinance activity occurred only in 2008.To calculate the average annual hours, the number of years included in the pre- and post-ordinanceperiods was used
Table VI.Staff time committed to
addressing problemsmeasured in hours
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Curbingnuisance motels
This degree of communication gave interested parties sufficient opportunities to raiseconcerns and respond to requests. Ancillary benefits included public endorsement ofthe project and the development of interagency rapport. From a budgetary and staffingperspective, spreading each phase of the initiative over a couple of fiscal years enabledproject staff to manage competing priorities and regular duties: the motel project wasnot a full-time assignment.
Staff turnover, a consistent plague in all crime prevention programming, did notthreaten the Chula Vista motel project. Despite a change in command staffand retirements/transfers among project personnel, this initiative remained on coursein part because both a key member of the program staff and the research partnerremained the same throughout the duration of the study. Consistency in somepersonnel was essential to maintaining the focus of the project, integrity of programimplementation, and stability in data collection (pre- and post-test measures). Involvinga research partnership with faculty from an academic institution contributed toprogram stability. Academics are less apt to be transferred out of a department/unitduring multi-year projects as the promotion and retirement processes are different thanthose of law enforcement agencies.
Data reliability. Due to budgetary constraints, the survey of motel operatorsconducted during the pre-test was not fully replicated during the follow-up period.The laundry list of items used in the original survey (77 questions), was reduced to 27questions that directly tapped policies and practices shown to be associated with crimeproblems (Bichler et al., 2003; Schmerler, 2005). While instrumentation was not at issuesince the original wording was retained, the shorter survey may have reduced therapport built with respondents. During the pre-test, 81 percent of respondents wereranked as being forthcoming with information. In contrast, the research staff reportedthat fewer respondents were thought to be forthcoming during the shorter follow-upsurvey. In addition, the face-to-face administration process used to gather baselineinformation generated a response rate of 88 percent (23 of 26 attempted) and thisdropped considerably on the follow-up (40 percent), where internet/telephone surveymethods were used (ten of 25 completed the survey). Using fewer questions andchanging to a less personal administration style may have decreased the researcher/subject rapport and this may have adversely affected the response rate and thereliability of self-reported victimization. It is the latter issue that is of concern here.
During the follow-up motel manager survey, several respondents noted that callingthe police to assist when problems arise was now being counted against them.Reluctance to call police may have suppressed post-test CFS counts, particularlyamong smaller properties. For example, to maintain an acceptable threshold, a 200-unitmotel could conceivably have 99 CFS during the year without violating the permit-to-operate standard; whereas, a smaller facility of only 15 units would only have sevenCFS before risking their permit for the following year. For this reason it is possible thatsmaller properties may be more inclined to suppress calling activity.
Several performance measures are needed to ensure that real change is capturedwhen assessing problem-solving activity that is likely to decrease citizen-generatedCFS. To this end, a mixed methodology was used in this evaluation (i.e. victimizationsurvey and code enforcement reports) and key outcome measures including bothcitizen- and select officer-initiated call activity as described above. Since all researchcomponents found consistent or complimentary evidence that crime and disorderdeclined in the study area, the self-reported reluctance to call the police is unlikelyto have materially altered these findings. The results are more convincing because the
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findings from each component concur. Future evaluations of POP efforts are stronglyencouraged to adopt a mixed-method approach.
In sum, to successfully develop and implement an ordinance that will fosterimproved place management of private facilities several factors must be considered:
(1) private parties must have sufficient time to voluntarily develop and implementchanges at their facilities;
(2) clear, consistent communication is needed among all relevant stakeholdersthroughout the duration of the project to garner political support;
(3) stability in project staff is critical to maintaining the integrity of the project;
(4) developing research partnerships with academic institutions can improve thebreadth of information available to understand a problem, provide scientific rigorto program evaluations, and increase the stability of project staff personnel; and
(5) using a mixed methodology and various measures to capture the impact of theprogram are essential to providing: clear and convincing evidence that realchange resulted from the POP activity, and sufficient mitigation to thwartpotential research limitations.
ImplicationsThis evaluation demonstrates that a problem-oriented framework can be used tochange management practices among troublesome, private facilities withoutdisplacing crime issues to other vulnerable sites. Policing through regulatory policyhas the potential to shift the focus of crime control from a place-by-place or case-basedstrategy to an omnipresent solution. Evident from the POP projects reviewed (recallTable I) is a tendency to police entrenched crime problems one at a time; nine of the 14motel POP projects reviewed describe policing efforts targeting a single motel. Mostspecified required changes to each property and used the threat of existing codeenforcement or nuisance abatement procedures to coerce compliance. Eck and Eck(2012) would classify these efforts as means-based regulatory actions involvingcommand and control policies – motel operators were required to adopt specificpractices or technologies.
Two problems surface with this approach. First, providing motel operators withan itemized list of corrections can backfire. As aptly demonstrated by the Oaklandairport motel POP project (Oakland Police Department, 2003), management can enactsuperficial changes, in full compliance with required corrections, that do not meet thespirit of the requested change. For instance, ordering a property to dismiss a problememployee will not change management practices because motel owners can replace onepoor employee with another – replacing a promoter with an enabler will ensure thatcrime problems continue unabated. In the end, the Oakland project achieved successwhen they changed to an ends-based approach.
Second, a piecemeal approach that targets facilities individually is less likely toproduce sustained crime reductions. Addressing a single, high-crime site governed byan active crime promoter or passive enabler will simply deflect crime to nearbyfacilities that are receptive to deviant behavior. Further, motel operations are unlikelyto remain static: properties with motel operators that are passive enablers (e.g. failingto adequately screen prospective guests) may change, possibly in response to macro-level economic conditions, into active promoters of crime (e.g. knowingly renting rooms
by the hour to prostitutes). This means that an assortment of managers, withvarying interests in preventing crime, will exist in a city. Drawing from themodified broken windows theory presented by Madensen and colleagues (Madensen,2007; Madensen and Eck, 2008; Madensen and Sousa, 2008), reversing the spiral ofcommunity decline will require routine and community-wide efforts to bolster therigor of place management.
Ends-based regulations that apply to all facilities equally while providing flexibilityfor individual circumstances and room for adjustment to address community dynamicsholds greater promise for success. Giving place managers the freedom to, experimentwith and individualize prevention methods so as to find the solution that best fitstheir unique property and budget, can: reduce the strength of objections; decreaseobligations on civic leaders and police to produce means evidence (Eck and Eck, 2012);shift the responsibility for crime reduction on those most capable of invoking change(Scott and Goldstein, 2005); and, reduce the possibility of displacement.
Police can act as place regulators of private facilities without incurring excessivecosts. Control and management of private facilities is a critical issue affecting thedevelopment of community crime problems. Apathy frustrates crime preventionefforts: often the people best situated to rectify the conditions that generate crimeissues are the ones least motivated to invest the time and resources to make thechanges needed. This study found clear evidence of behavioral change (i.e. theimplementation of better management practices, such as hiring high-level privatesecurity, controlling access to the property, and rigorously screening guests andvisitors) on the part of motel operators that materially decreased the crime anddisorder incidents occurring on their properties. Police efforts were able to affectchange at the most criminogenic properties without increasing crime and associatedcosts at the well-managed properties in the city. The resource savings (time spenton the project vs dealing with crime and disorder incidents at budget motels) andconsistent tax revenue generated suggests that regulatory policies are a viableand effective method of exerting public influence to police private facilities. Given thecurrent civic crisis in budgetary shortfalls, such initiatives may provide a mechanismto reduce the drain on city resources that festering crime problems cause. Establishinga small licensing fee or fine system could produce the financial support needed tomaintain ends-based monitoring, thereby ensuring the sustainability of the ordinance(Eck and Eck, 2012).
By using a POP framework, law enforcement agencies can acts as both a catalystand facilitator to bring about real change in the underlying causes of crime. Policeagencies regularly collect invaluable data about community problems; their datasystems also offer a potential means of measuring success and monitoring situationsso as to identify when crime and public safety issues begin to resurface. In addition tobeing able to draw attention to issues, law enforcement agencies are uniquelypositioned to engage stakeholders in developing solutions. The routine actions ofpolice put them into direct contact with the community, social service agencies, privatebusiness and professional associations, and various branches of city governance.Though often lacking the resources to resolve crime problems independently, policedepartments are well versed in the art of forming a task force to accomplish specificaims. The Chula Vista motel project aptly demonstrates the leadership role lawenforcement can play in developing partnerships to resolve crime problems.
Displacement analysis is critical to determining whether a crime preventionprogram was effective; however, the method used must be tailored to the type of facility
being examined. This study used an innovative approach to measuring displacementthat involved three facets. Instead of measuring displacement from a target area, afacilities orientation was adopted. The conditions required to support crime aresituation-specific and thus, like facilities are more apt to experience displacementthan areas of different land use that are adjacent to the targeted site. Second, using acity-wide crime prevention strategy necessitated the use of similarly situated budgetmotels with stable crime levels in four other nearby jurisdictions, with the closestlocations set as the displacement facilities and the locations farther away acting as thecomparison sites. Evaluations of POP are strengthened by incorporating offendermovement tendencies when stipulating likely displacement sites. Third, in measuringcrime and disorder incidents, the number of officer- and citizen-initiated callsassociated with each facility was standardized (dividing by the room count).Standardizing the outcome measure controlled for differential opportunity and reducedthe manipulative impact of intentional changes in CFS patterns. By integrating thesefacets, this study is the first to use a facilities approach to measuring net displacementthat controls for differential opportunity.
Calculating displacement effects does not have to be complicated. Comparing themore sophisticated WDQ and TNE coefficients suggested by Guerette and Bowers(2009) (also see Bowers and Johnson, 2003; Guerette, 2009) to the simpler equationsuggested by Eck (2002) revealed that making the effort to conduct a morerigorous investigation of the effects of a crime prevention strategy can be informative.However, the WDQ and TNE rely on ratios rather than percent change. While thismakes the coefficients more sensitive, if the displacement sites and the control siteshave stable crime levels during the pre- and post-test, one might be forced to divide ormultiply values by zero. In fact, zero values should appear when using standardized,facilities-based values. If the crime prevention was a resounding success, the valuesfor at least the comparison sites should be the same, thereby generating ratios withvalues of zero. In this situation Eck’s (2002) ANE equation could be more appropriateas it relies on the addition of percent change ratios within each area. For manycrime analysts accustomed to calculating percent change, this equation may be moreaccessible. Ease of calculation and interpretation might encourage greater use,in turn, leading to an increased number of project assessments that capturedisplacement effects.
ConclusionRegulatory policies offer law enforcement an alternative to conventional crime controlstrategies. An array of regulatory options focussed on means-based anti-crime policy(i.e. codifying the locking mechanisms required for each motel room) and ends-basedpolicy (i.e. setting acceptable crime thresholds) are viable. As was shown here, whilethe Chula Vista budget motel initiative included several strategies, the findings showthat the permit-to-operate ordinance exhibited the strongest impact on crime,producing a notable decline in crime and disorder, and demonstrable changes inproperty management. These results were not compromised by displacement effects.The ends-based regulatory instrument used here may be more powerful overallbecause it was precise and carried the most significant penalty – failure to controlcrime on the property incapacitates the business – whereas, the overall project offered adiffused influence that was harder to measure. This research is valuable to other policeagencies that are considering adopting ordinances to address problems at riskyfacilities.
1. Eck and Eck (2012) differentiate between ends-based and means-based policies: ends-basedregulation specifies targets and standards of operation with accompanying sanctionsor penalties for failure to achieve target thresholds; and, means-based policies require theadoption of prescripted mechanisms considered effective in thwarting crime problems.
2. Although, Wilcox and Eck (2011) contend that the high levels of crime experienced by somesites might be a simple correlate of popularity.
3. Felson (2002) argues that the geographical and temporal patterns of crime are bestunderstood by uncovering everyday patterns of work, social, and residential routinesbecause these habits shape the convergence of the six essential ingredients of crime events.Crimes occur when a motivated offender, a suitable target, intersect at a specific location, andthere is a conspicuous absence of capable guardians, intimate handlers, and effective placemanagers (Cohen and Felson, 1979; Eck, 1995, 2002; Felson, 1995, 2002, 2006). An additionalelement is the convergence setting or place; these are locations where people gather as theyare getting ready to commit a delinquent act or they could be behavioral settings (Barker,1968) from which the idea of the crime event develops. Convergence settings play a criticalrole in crime commission, particularly when co-offenders are required (Felson, 2006).
4. As is often the case with POP initiatives, a recursive process is required. Initial efforts toresolve entrenched crime problems are quite frequently insufficient, leading many to repeatthe analysis, response, and assessment phases several times before an effective and stableresolution is reached. Entrenched, long-standing crime problems are complex and not easilydislodged.
5. The median CFS rate is calculated on the prior federal fiscal year (October 1-September 30).Using a variable threshold integrates flexibility into the ordinance; permitting the city torespond fairly to shifting situations. When first enacted, the CFS threshold was 0.61 CFS perroom. At the time, this figure was the 2005 median CFS rate for the city. The thresholddropped to 0.5 following the exclusion of several officer-initiated call types, at the request ofcity motel operators.
6. A copy of the ordinance (CVMC 5.39) can be found at: www.codepublishing.com/CA/chulavista_html.html
7. The federal fiscal year, running from October 1 to September 30, was used for all of theresults reported.
8. This dramatic reduction is also reflected in felony arrests; while officer-initiated CFS atmotels declined 19 percent from 2000-2001 to 2008-2009, officer-initiated felony arrestsdecreased 86 percent (from a total of 44 to 6).
9. The Chula Vista city standard of 0.5 CFS per room rate was used.
10. Temporary overnight lodging facilities are classed as motels if guests and visitors candirectly access rooms without having to enter the motel lobby or main building; whereas,hotels include facilities designed so that the guests and visitors must pass through a frontlobby or enter through an external door to an interior corridor to access rooms. Budgetaccommodations are generally considered properties with the lowest nightly rates.Generally, those properties with room rates under $60 per night are classed as budgetmotels/hotels (Schmerler, 2005).
11. Crime activity could displace to apartment complexes within Chula Vista. It is arguable thatapartment buildings are similar to motels in that they have comparable density, general levelof anonymity, and high levels of transient populations. Thus, CFS standardized by numberof units was examined for complexes of eight or more units between October 1, 2004 andSeptember 8, 2008. No displacement was found: these results are available upon request.
12. This instrument is available in the appendix of the Herman Goldstein Submission for theProblem-Oriented Policing Award by Schmerler et al. (2009), titled, “Reducing Crime andDisorder at Motels and Hotels in Chula Vista, CA” located at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2009/09-47(w).pdf. A shortened list of notable items can be found on theChula Vista Police Department web site at: www.chulavistapd.org/motels
13. During the pre-test, 26 environmental surveys were conducted. This systematicenvironmental survey captured information about pedestrian and vehicle accessibility,social climate (e.g. physical evidence of drug use or prostitution), surrounding land use,lighting, and target hardening features. Due to its excessive length, the environmentalsurvey is available upon request from the corresponding author. Alternatively, a copy ofthis instrument can be found in the appendix of Schmerler et al. (2009) located at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2009/09-47(w).pdf. This instrument was notadministered during the follow-up due to budget constraints. Instead, code enforcementinspections were used to determine whether specific security features were in place.
14. For two reasons the amount of time devoted to this project was used to estimate project cost.First, soft costs in salaries and benefits of personnel, whose time is split between different tasks,is often underestimated and personnel costs often comprise the largest resource required toconduct problem-oriented policing initiatives. Knowing how many hours each phase of thisinitiative required would enable other communities to better estimate if they have the resourcesavailable to conduct a similar project. And second, time spent can be easily converted to dollarfigure by multiplying the number of hours by the average wage for each agency or positioninvolved in the project. This permits easier adjustment for regional variation in baseline salaries.
15. Earlier data were not available for all sites so the total project assessment does not includethe impact of early outreach efforts and the pre-test manager survey.
16. Housing long-term residents in facilities designed for temporary overnight lodging is generallyassociated with higher levels of crime and disorder (for an explanation see Schmerler, 2005).
17. A disproportionate number of local clientele is associated with high crime and disorder levels(Schmerler, 2005). At any time, most budget motels are likely to have a small portion of localguests. People may stay at a motel located within their city of residence for several legitimatereasons (e.g. their home is being fumigated or remodeled, or a domestic argument or theinitiation of divorce or separation may generate a temporary need for housing). However,when the balance of tenants is drawn from the surrounding community a significantcorrelation with crime develops (Bichler et al., 2003). Explanations for this pattern vary.
18. All rooms must have deadbolts, peepholes (or a nearby window) and door chains/security bars.
19. Transient occupancy tax revenues (TOT) were drawn from the 2009 report titled, “San DiegoCounty TOT Collections,” produced by the San Diego Convention and Visitors Bureau.
20. For example, in 2005 the Royal Vista Inn changed $45 per night when its CFS ratio was 0.76;whereas, in 2009 with a change in ownership to the Comfort Inn and Suites and a CFS of 0.33,the hotel charged about $109 per night.
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Further reading
Aurora Police Department (1996), “Red coach motor inn”, Submission for the Herman GoldsteinAward for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1996/96-04.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Police Department (1998), “Independence lodge project”, Submissionfor the Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, availableat: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-11.pdf (accessed March29, 2011).
Edmonton Police Service (1995), “The Klondiker hotel project: hotels, crime, and problem-solvingon the beat”, Finalist, Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-OrientedPolicing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1995/95-21%28F%29.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Fresno Police Department (1998), “Big star motel project”, Submission for the Herman GoldsteinAward for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-21.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Fresno Police Department (2001), “The Fresno inn”, Submission for the Herman Goldstein Awardfor Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2001/01-23.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Hollywood Police Department (1998), “Federal highway project”, Submission for the HermanGoldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-25.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Reno Police Department (2006), “Motel interdiction program: a nuisance abatement project”,Finalist, Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing,available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2006/06-43.pdf (accessedMarch 29, 2011).
Woodbury Police Department (2001), “Creating relationships and safe hotels”, Submission for theHerman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at:www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/2001/01-72.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
Yuma Police Department (1998), “Tropicana motel”, Submission for the Herman GoldsteinAward for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing, available at: www.popcenter.org/library/awards/goldstein/1998/98-86.pdf (accessed March 29, 2011).
About the authors
Gisela Bichler is a Professor in the Department of Criminal Justice at California State University,San Bernardino. Generally, Dr Bichler’s research explores the interplay between the environmentand offending behavior. She is Founder and Co-Director of the Center for Criminal JusticeResearch – CSUSB. Gisela Bichler is the corresponding author and can be contactedat: [email protected]
Karin Schmerler is a Senior Public Safety Analyst for the Research and Analysis Unit of theChula Vista Police Department. She is responsible for strategic and administrative analysisproducts for the agency.
Janet Enriquez is a Research Associate with the Center for Criminal Justice Research – CSUSB.
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