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THE CYPRIOT SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY WITH THE ADVENT OF THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY PROMISES AND CHALLENGES
MAJOR DEMETRIOS A. AMAXARIS
Republic of Cyprus/National Guard Force
Submitted in part fulfilment of the requirements for the MA (LMDS)
National University of Ireland Maynooth
2008
Supervisors: Comdt Mark Hearns, Military College
Anne Gallagher, NUI Maynooth
MA (LMDS)
STUDENT DECLARATION
1. I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement any
material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any university; and that
to the best of my knowledge and belief it does not contain any material
previously published or written by another person except where due reference is
made in the text.
2. Permission is given for the Military College Library and the NUI library
Maynooth to lend or copy this dissertation upon request.
3. The views and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and
do not necessarily represent the views of the Command and Staff School, the
Military College, the Defence Forces or the Cypriot National Guard.
SIGNED: --------------------------------------- Rank: Major
NAME: DEMETRIOS AMAXARIS
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS The American author Mark Twain wrote in his book Life on the Mississippi that ‘‘we write frankly and fearlessly, but then we ‘modify’ before we print’’. This thesis is the product of countless modifications. Numerous colleagues and friends offered frank critique, ideas, suggestions and comments that forced me to delete or rewrite sections, add new information and thereby avert pitfalls. While I accepted many of their suggestions, I did not accept all of them and I alone bear responsibility for any shortfalls that still exist. I am most grateful to the Military College and NUI Maynooth because they made it possible for me to participate in a unique learning experience by entering a novel world of knowledge, creative thinking and understanding. I wish to express my sincere thanks to my two supervisors, Anne Gallagher (NUI Maynooth) and Comdt Mark Hearns (Military College), as well as my colleagues Lt. Col. Holger Offenhausen, Lt. Col. Sadek Belmessous, Comdt Bernard Markey and Major Ye Chunlei for their continuous support and encouragement throughout the year in what has been a thoroughly enjoyable experience from start to finish. It is essential to also thank Graham Thorp, who patiently proof-read the manuscript. My family and friends have been the foundation on which everything has been built. In particular, I dedicate this thesis to my wife Elena for her patience and understanding for my long absence in Ireland. I would also like to dedicate this study to my two lovely boys, Andreas and Nicolas, whose physical absence during the last nine months was the most difficult experience I have ever had in my life. Lastly, I want to express my gratitude and great respect to my father Andreas for all the struggles he has endured over the years, through extremely difficult conditions, to support me and guide me with his wise advice. By dedicating this thesis to him, I hope that I will be able to make him feel proud of everything he has achieved in his life.
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ABSTRACT
On May 1 2004 the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU with its political issue still unresolved. As a result, an international problem, considered one of the most protracted ethnic conflicts in human history, became a significant European issue. Cypriot accession to the EU has influenced the geopolitical context inside which Cyprus interacts with other agents of the international system and, as a result, the ESDP has become an important foreign policy instrument for the Republic of Cyprus as well as a significant driving force in the further development and modernisation of the Cypriot National Guard. The thesis, taking into consideration the active participation of Cyprus in the ESDP, and in the light of a potential solution to the Cyprus problem, explores the security and defence policy that Cyprus should implement in order to strengthen its National power in the ‘anarchic system of states’, solve its ‘security dilemma’ and increase its ‘utility’ as an EU member state. Furthermore, during the study of the security threats that have so far emerged in the twenty-first century, the Irish and European ‘paradigms’ are demonstrated as successful models which Greek and Turkish Cypriots should use in order to develop common defence and security structures if they truly wish to co-exist in a unified country and are willing to reduce their security dependence upon foreign powers. Given the nature of the topic, the present study constitutes a case study and the theoretical ideas of Neo-Realism and Systems Thinking have been selected to provide the theoretical framework for the aforesaid research. The analysis of the findings of the study demonstrates the political significance of the ESDP for Cyprus. The conclusions derived from the research suggest that Cyprus needs to develop a White Paper, and its concepts must be based on clear strategic political objectives. The nature of the policies adopted in the aforementioned paper must take into account the nature of Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkey’s internal political situation, the evolving asymmetrical security environment, and the necessity for peaceful co-existence between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. Furthermore, the present thesis concludes that Cyprus should join the PFP in order to enhance its military capabilities and pave the way for its future accession to NATO once its political dispute with Turkey has been settled. In this respect, and in view of the fact that the post-Annan period has impacted negatively upon the morale and motivation for change in the Cypriot National Guard, the author concludes his research by emphasising that the European dimension is not only a promise and a challenge, but also the only vision for the Cypriot Defence Forces of the future.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Student Declaration i
Acknowledgements ii
Abstract iii
Table of Contents iv
List of Acronyms viii
CHAPTER 1 1
Introduction 1
Purpose of the Paper 2
Significance of the Study 2
Rationale for Exploring the Topic- Relevance of the Topic
to LMDS
3
Limitations of the Study 4
Assumptions 4
Structure of the Thesis 5
Epilogue 6
CHAPTER 2 7
Introduction-Focus of the Study 7
Theoretical Framework 7
Systems Thinking 7
A Neo-Realist Perspective 12
ESDP 15
Current Political Situation 19
iv
Purpose 19
Greek-Cypriot Perspectives 19
Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot Perspectives 21
Epilogue 23
CHAPTER 3 24
Overall Approach-Methodology 24
Assumptions, Theory and Philosophy of the Research 25
Research Design 28
Data Collection 28
Interviews 29
Analysis 30
Epilogue 30
CHAPTER 4 31
Introduction 31
First Part: The Cypriot Security Environment 31
Prologue 31
Security Threat: Turkey 32
Security Threat: Demographic Change 33
Security Threat: Illegal Immigration 34
Second Part: The Wider Hollistic Picture 34
Prologue 35
European National Interests 35
The Irish Experience 37
Third Part: Systems Analysis 38
v
System One: NATO-US-Guarantor Powers of Cyprus-Israel 38
Prologue 39
Analysis 40
System Two: EU and Cyprus 42
Prologue 42
Analysis 43
Collective Security 43
European Geopolitical Interests 43
Common Threats 45
System Three: Turkish Internal Affairs, EU, US and Cyprus 46
Prologue 46
Analysis 47
Epilogue 49
CHAPTER 5 50
Conclusions 50
Introduction 50
Turkish Foreign Policy and Cyprus 51
Turkish-Cypriots and Greek-Cypriots 51
Innovation, Progress and Development - Demilitarisation,
PFP and NATO
53
Implications for Policy and Practise 54
Utility and Prestige – The Need for a White Paper 54
PFP, ESDP and Innovation 55
Avenues for Further Research 56
Epilogue 56
vi
BIBLIOGRAFY 58
APPENDICES 67
APPENDIX A – History of Cyprus 67
APPENDIX B – The Annan Plan 69
APPENDIX C – Lisbon Treaty, Provisions on CFSP 72
APPENDIX D – Guide for Semi-Structured Interviews 76
APPENDIX E – Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee 79
APPENDIX F – Berlin Plus Arrangement 81
APPENDIX G – Headline Goal 2010 83
APPENDIX H – EU Battle Groups 89
APPENDIX I – European Security Strategy 91
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LIST OF ACRONYMS
AKP: Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi or AK Parti. The Justice and Development Party entered the Turkish political scene on 14 August 2001 under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. In January 2005, the Party was admitted as an observer member in the European People’s Party (EPP), the conservative party of the EU. The AKP achieved a landslide victory in the July 22 2007 Turkish elections with 46.6 per cent of the vote, translating into control of 341 of the 550 available parliamentary seats. CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) was established and is governed by Title V of the Treaty on European Union (EU). It replaced European Political Cooperation (EPC) and provides for the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. The objectives of this second pillar of the Union are set out in Article 11 of the EU Treaty and are to be attained through specific legal instruments (joint action, common position), which have to be adopted unanimously in the Council. COREPER: The Permanent Representatives Committee (Article 207 of the Treaty establishing the European Community) is responsible for preparing the work of the Council of the European Union. It consists of the Member States' ambassadors to the European Union (Permanent Representatives) and is chaired by the Member State which holds the Council Presidency. CSDP: Cypriot Security and Defence Policy. EDA: European Defence Agency. ENP: European Neighborhood Policy. The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) was developed in 2004 with the objective of avoiding the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbours. EU: European Union. The Treaty of Maastricht established the EU in 1992. EU BG: EU Battle Groups. ESDP: The European Union’s European Security and Defence policy (ESDP) includes the gradual framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) aims to allow the Union to develop its civilian and military capacities for crisis management and conflict prevention at international level, thus helping to maintain peace and international security, in accordance with the United Nations Charter. The ESDP, which does not involve the creation of a European army, is developing in a manner that is compatible and coordinated with NATO. ESS: European Security Strategy document. In this document, the European Union clarifies its security strategy, which is aimed at achieving a secure Europe in a better world, identifying the threats facing the Union, defining its strategic objectives and setting out the political implications for Europe.
viii
ix
LMDS: Leadership Management and Defence Studies. NATO: The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (Atlantic Alliance) was founded by the North Atlantic Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Washington, signed on 4 April 1949, and has its headquarters in Brussels. It currently has 26 members. PFP: The Partnership for Peace is a programme of practical bilateral cooperation between individual Partner countries and NATO. It allows Partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. The formal basis for the Partnership for Peace is the Framework Document, which sets out specific undertakings for each Partner country. PSC: Political and Security Committee. It is composed of national representatives at senior/ambassador level, placed within the framework of Member States' Permanent Representations. The PSC prepares recommendations on the future functioning of the CFSP and deals with the day-to-day issues. Furthermore, in the event of a crisis, the PSC is the Council body that deals with crisis situations and examines all the options that might be considered as the Union's response within the single institutional framework and without prejudice to the decision-making and implementation procedures of each EU’s three Pillars1. TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. UK: United Kingdom. UN: United Nations. UNGS: United Nations General Secretary. EUMS: EU Military Staff. The Military Staff of the European Union is the source of the EU’s military expertise. It performs early warning, situation assessment and strategic planning for Petersberg tasks (humanitarian missions, peace-keeping and crisis management) and all EU-led operations. EUMC: The EU Military Committee (EUMC) is composed of the Chiefs of Defence and their military representatives. The EUMC is responsible for providing the PSC with military advice and recommendations on all military matters within the EU. It directs all military activities within the EU framework, including the European Union Military Staff. The Chairman of the EUMC attends meetings of the Council when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.
1 EU Pillars: (1) The Police and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters (PJCC) pillar concerns co-operation in the fight against crime. (2) The Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) pillar concerns foreign policy and military matters (3) The European Community pillar concerns economic, social and environmental policies.
CHAPTER ONE
The most important thing for practitioners to remember is that the point of decision in foreign policy is usually only the start of a long process of immersion in a fluid and unpredictable external environment.
(Smith, Hadfield, and Dunne, 2008:134)
Introduction
On 1 May 2004 the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU with its political issue still
unresolved. In this respect, an international problem, considered one of the most
protracted ethnic conflicts in human history, became a significant European issue. The
Turkish military intervention in Cyprus in 19742 and the geographical and physical
division of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities created a political
stalemate that still continues today.
Cypriot accession to the EU and the changing structures of the international system
influence the geopolitical context inside which Cyprus interacts with other states. As a
result, the Cypriot Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) should be revised on the basis
of Cypriot participation in ESDP and the new security challenges that emerge with the
advent of the twenty-first century.
2 Cyprus History: See Appendix A
1
Purpose of the Paper
The purpose of this study is to analyse the future perspectives and capabilities of the
CSDP that will allow Cyprus to strengthen its national power3, survive in the anarchic
system of states, solve its security dilemma and safeguard its sovereign status.
This study, with its Neo-Realist approach and its use of the fundamental concepts of
Systems Thinking, investigates the geopolitical environment influencing Cyprus after
its accession to the EU.
In doing so, the thesis also explains the reasons for which the island should not be
demilitarised in the event of a solution to the Cyprus problem and the transition of
Cyprus to a Bi-Zonal, Bi-Communal federal state4. The future development of a
professional Cypriot army composed of Greek and Turkish Cypriots working together
under the umbrella of ESDP activities constitutes an alternative option that should not
be ignored.
Significance of the Study
Firstly, I would like to emphasise that the present case-study is significant because it
analyses the defence and security aspects of a complex international issue. In doing so,
it provides the reader with new insights and helpful hints for reflection as regards the
study of current international conflicts and disputes that impact on regional and
international peace and stability.
3 National Power: Explained in terms of Diplomatic, Military, Economic and Informational power. 4 Bi-Zonal and Bi-Communal federal state: A federal state composed of two administrative areas administrated by the Cypriot communities separately (North-South) and a central government.
2
Secondly, the review of the CSDP within the framework of a potential solution to the
Cyprus issue falls within the realm of defence studies with a particular interest in
European studies. The study of the security challenges of Cyprus, as the theoretical
models of the analysis demonstrate, is related to the broader issue of ESDP engagement,
as well as the security challenges that the EU, NATO and the US are called on to tackle
in the twenty-first century.
Rationale for Exploring this Topic - Relevance of the Topic to LMDS
Firstly, I consider that this paper is directly linked to LMDS because the Cypriot
conflict is an international issue that influences relations between the EU, NATO,
Greece, the UK, the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey, and it falls within the realm of
European Security Strategy. The participation of Cyprus in the ESDP and its new
political identity as a member state of the EU impacts upon relations between the EU
and NATO. Furthermore, the CSDP is affected by the status of transatlantic relations
and the balance of power between the US and the EU. In this respect, during the
analysis of the geopolitical context of Cyprus, important issues of strategy, foreign
policy and conflict resolution need to be addressed.
Secondly, a large number of Greek-Cypriot army officers are serving at EU Military
Staff (EUMS) and Committee (EUMC) levels holding responsible positions relating to
EU and international security.
Thirdly, the studied theme includes an area of research where critical thinking is
extremely important for analysis and extraction of conclusions. I believe that the study
3
of the security aspects of a complicated international issue could contribute to the
further development of LMDS.
Limitations of the Study
Firstly, I am obliged to admit that my Greek-Cypriot origin creates problems of
neutrality, but I will attempt to tackle this problem by expanding my research to
Turkish, Turkish-Cypriot and foreign resources.
Secondly, due to the nature of my topic and my temporary stay in Ireland, I did not have
regular access to governmental archives and libraries in Cyprus, which could have
provided me with precious information.
Thirdly, during my research voyage to the unlimited world of knowledge, I reconfirmed
the argument that no theoretical idea or concept can always be valid at all times and in
all places. As I explain in Chapter Two, the theoretical ideas of Systems Thinking and
Neo-realism provided me with the academic compass to reach my objective, but I must
admit that at some stages some findings and data could not be explained. Where no
theory could be satisfactory, the research was limited by the author’s inability to
discover alternative routes of thinking and analysis.
Assumptions
The reader, in order to understand the themes analysed in the present study, needs to
study the history of the Annan Plan, a United Nations proposal to settle the disputed
division of Cyprus and form the ‘United Cyprus Republic’.. It was named in recognition
4
of the then UN General Secretary Kofi Annan and its final version, the Annan Plan V,
was put in two separate referenda on April 24 2004, six days prior to Cypriot accession
to the EU on May 1 2004. Seventy-six per cent of Greek-Cypriots rejected the plan
while 64 per cent of Turkish-Cypriots supported it.
Secondly, the reader should study the modern history of Cyprus as recent events have
shaped the current security environment on the island.
In this regard, the historical background of Cyprus and the main concepts of the Annan
Plan are presented in the Appendices ‘A’ and ‘B’ respectively.
Structure of the Thesis
The content of my thesis is divided into five chapters. Following the introduction,
literature review and methodology chapters, Chapter Four studies the geopolitical
environment of Cyprus and elaborates on the present and future CSDP, within the
framework of Cypriot participation in ESDP.
On the basis of the discussion of the findings and analysis of Chapter Four, Chapter
Five arrives at a final set of conclusions and examines the implications from the study
for the further development of the Cypriot Armed Forces and the CSDP.
5
Epilogue
The present chapter has attempted to set the scene and to give an outline to the various
aspects associated with the studied topic. The literature review in the following chapter
analyses the theoretical framework of the study, explains the importance of ESDP for
European states and elaborates on the current political climate concerning the Cyprus
problem.
6
CHAPTER TWO
There has been a dramatic increase in the EU’ s external relations ‘output’ but this has not always matched expectations that the EU will act decisively, consistently, and influentially in international relations.
(Keren Smith, 2003; cited by Bach and George, 2006:515)
Introduction - Focus of the Study
The focus of the study is to examine the CSDP. The present chapter sets the scene for
the analysis in Chapter Four and presents: the key concepts of Systems Thinking and
Neo-Realism, the importance of the ESDP for European states, and the political climate
regarding the Cyprus problem.
The theoretical ideas of Systems Thinking and Neo-Realism constitute the theoretical
framework within which this thesis is set.
Theoretical Framework
Systems Thinking
Systems Thinking has surfaced as a distinctive model of thinking in the West during the
last 40 years, and its three primary sites of development are: the ‘new physics’, ‘family
therapy’ and ‘organisational management’ (Walsh and Ryan, NUIM Workshop, 2007).
Sanal (2004) writes that the history of elementary Systems Thinking can be traced back
to the work of the Gestalt psychologists, who emphasised the study of the mind as a
whole unit, rather than a collection of psychological parts. Systems Thinking can be
7
also described as Holistic Thinking, which maintains Aristotle’s dictum that the whole
is more important than its parts.
Systems Theory, considered as the core discipline of Systems Thinking, was proposed
in the 1940s by Von Bertalanffy and was furthered by Ashby (Introduction to
Cybernetics, 1956) and Forrester, who founded the field of ‘System Dynamics’ in 1956
(Sanal, 2004). Heylighen and Joslyn (1992), in a study prepared for the Cambridge
Dictionary of Philosophy, defined Systems Theory as follows:
Systems theory is the transdisciplinary study of the abstract organisation of phenomena, independent of their substance, type or spatial or temporal scale of existence. It investigates both the principles common to all complex entities and models, which can be used to describe them. (Heylighen and Joslyn, 1992)
Haines (2004) writes that the Systems Thinking approach is an absolute necessity to
make sense of and succeed in today’s complex world, and he presents a system’s
definition as follows:
A system is defined as a set of elements or components that work together in relationships for the overall good and objective (or vision) of the whole. Thus, the focus of all systems elements (i.e. departments) in an organisation should be the relationships with each other that assist attainment of an organisation wide shared vision and values of customer satisfaction.
(Haines, 2004)
Furthermore, Haines (2004) writes that the essence of the discipline of Systems
Thinking lies in a shift of mind seeing interrelationships rather than linear cause-effect
chains, and seeing process of change rather than snapshots.
8
Senge (1990) highlighted Systems Thinking as the ‘fifth discipline’ for learning
organisations and argued that the said theoretical approach is a ‘‘conceptual framework
that has been developed to make the full patterns clearer and to help us see how to
change things effectively’’ (Audubon Area Community Services, 1996).
As regards the field of political science, Brighi and Hill (2008) note that:
Systems Theory is associated with political science, mostly with the work of David Easton, which sees most phenomena as interrelated through processes of input, output, and feedback from the environment. Primarily, a process of homeostasis or dynamic equilibrium characterises the system, through interaction of the various forces involved. This can be as true of international politics - for example via the balance of power - and foreign policy, via the instinct for political survival, as it is of natural features such as body temperature or climate.
(Brighi and Hill, 2008:121)
Hill (2003) emphasises the importance of context as follows:
As a result of imperial expansion, world war and economic integration, we have to get used to seeing the world and the international political system as a whole. Changes in the whole are thus of great significance for the parts. Conversely, changes in a particularly important part may lead to upheaval in the system as a whole… there are three elements of the contemporary international context which can be taken to present a major change: The end of the Cold War; the process of globalisation, and the challenge to the Westphalia state system represented by the doctrine of humanitarian intervention (le droit d’ ingerence).
(Hill, 2003:11)
Bearing in mind the above, the analysis in Chapter Four is based on the following
concepts of Systems Thinking:
- Entities appear to exist independently, but in reality nothing exists solely
by itself.
9
- Systems connect with each other in order to survive.
- The relevance and strength of a relationship are the determinants of the
quality of this connection.
- Systems relationships are characterised by the dominance and power of
the more complex over the less complex systems.
- Entities interact with each other in circular patterns. A system’s identity
and behaviour are maintained by a series of feedback loops (negative or positive), which
are self-calibrating.
- Each constituent part of a system influences and is reciprocally
influenced by others.
- A system takes energy from its environment and gives energy to its
environment.
- Sub-systems influence a system (bottom-up causation). Many lower level
sub-systems work together as necessary conditions of a larger whole (upward
influence).
- A system influences sub-systems (top-down causation). Many sub-
systems are constrained by the boundary conditions set by higher-level activities
(downward influence).
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Furthermore, Walsh and Ryan (2007) noted a number of ways we may define types of
systems. Such types are normally expressed in terms of bi-polar properties, which
usually express the ends of some dimension. Some of the common types of systems are
as follows5:
- Adaptive/Non-adaptive systems: some systems adapt to changes in their
environments whilst non-adaptive systems fail to adapt to changes in their environment.
- Open/Closed systems: a closed system is one in which there is no interaction
between the system and its environment, whereas an open system is one in which there
are interactions between the system and its environment.
- Simple/Complex systems: simple systems include those such as chairs, which
integrate non-moving parts together, whereas complex systems are those such as social
systems that are made up of a multitude of parts and relationships.
- Steady state/ Dynamic systems: the state of some systems demonstrates the
property of equilibrium or a steady state, whereas the state of dynamic systems
fluctuates rapidly.
- Discrete/Continuous system: in some systems the changes between system states
are discrete, i.e. at defined intervals. In continuous systems, change is continuous
throughout some period.
5 The aforementioned terms were analysed to the students of the 64 Senior Command and Staff Course, by Tony Walsh and Anne B. Ryan during a Workshop on Systems Thinking and Ecological Thinking that took place on 13 November 2007.
11
I believe that the application of Systems Thinking concepts to the case-study of Cyprus
provides an analytical framework, which may provide insights into the dynamics within
which Cyprus is positioned.
A Neo-Realist Perspective
According to Baylis and Smith (2006:165):
The unifying theme around which all Realist thinking converges is that states find themselves in the shadow of anarchy with the result that their security cannot be taken for granted. In such circumstances it is rational for states to compete for power and security.
Neo-Realists (Structural Realists) see power as both the combined capabilities that give
a state a place or position in the international system and something that shapes the
state’s behaviour.
For Neo-Realists, international politics is essentially a struggle for power, but they do
not endorse the Classical Realist assumption that this is a result of human nature.
Instead, Neo-Realists attribute security competition and inter-state conflict to the lack of
an overarching authority above states and the distribution of power in the international
system (Baylis and Smith, 2006).
A Neo-Realist perspective places emphasis on the structures of the international system
and the role of states within it. Although Neo-Realists do not deny the importance of
unit-level explanations, they believe that the effects of structure must be considered.
Waltz argues that the structure of the international system is a major determinant of
actor behaviour since anarchy defines the system (Allison and Zelikow, 1999).
12
The most critical problem presented by anarchy is survival. Anarchy leads to the logic
of ‘self-help’ in which states are oriented to self-interests and seek to maximise their
security (Baylis and Smith, 2006).
Hobbes in Leviathan (1651) imagined politics in a pre-social ‘state of nature’
(Donnelly, 2005). He emphasised anarchy, insecurity, force and survival, and expanded
the aforesaid notion to explain the behaviour of states (Jackson and Sorenson, 2003).
Hertz (1951) argued that anarchy assures the centrality of the struggle of power ‘‘even
in the absence of aggressively or similar factors’’ (Donnelly, 2005). He developed the
concept and coined the term ‘security dilemma’, which is first mentioned in his article
‘Internationalism and the Security Dilemma’, published in World Politics in 1950
(Oziashvili, 2006).
According to the aforementioned term, states inadvertently make other states feel less
secure by striving to increase their security. As a result of this behaviour, a vicious
circle or spiral of security-insecurity arises to which there is no permanent or lasting
solution (Evans and Newnham, 1998).
Neo-Realists believe that bad things happen when even good states find themselves in
difficult circumstances. For example, the Neo-Realist Robert Jervis explains the security
dilemma by arguing that a state that has no aggressive ambitions can nonetheless create
fears among its neighbours just by strengthening its own defensive capabilities. He
notes that a sequence of actions, each provoking unintended responses from the other,
can lead to conflict even in cases where none of the actors begins with any hostile intent
(Allison and Zelikow, 1999).
13
States are functionally similar units that experience the same constraints presented by
anarchy and strive to maintain their position in the system. For this reason, weak states
respond to anarchy and the resulting security dilemma by joining political and military
alliances and regional and international organisations (Baylis and Smith, 2006). For
example, Cyprus joined the EU in order to prevent Turkey from conducting a large-
scale operation against Cypriot territorial integrity and national independence.
Hill (2003) elaborates on the changing nature of foreign policy and emphasises the
following:
- States continue to be the main actors in the international system and seek
security through power.
- States weigh options and make decisions based primarily on their
strategic situation and an assessment of the external environment.
Neo-Realism provides a theoretical framework to understand the reasons for which
Cyprus, as a weak state with limited resources, suffers from a security dilemma and is
mainly concerned about its survival.
The history of Cyprus demonstrates that national interests and the interactions of
external powers (state actors), influenced by the international balance of power, have
played a major role in Cypriot political affairs. As Mearsheimer (Offensive Neo-
Realism) argues (Baylis and Smith, 2006: 170), ‘‘the world is condemned to perpetual
great-power competition’’.
14
Although the Cypriot security environment could be studied with the use of other
theories such as Neo-Liberalism and International Political Economy (IPE), I selected
the Neo-Realist approach because its concepts, when combined with Systems Thinking,
provide an analytical framework which may lead to insights into the Cyprus problem
upon which I can make recommendations for the future development of the CSDP and
the Cypriot Defence Forces.
ESDP
The present paragraph enlightens the reader about the importance of the ESDP, which
constitutes a central theme of analysis in Chapter Four.
According to the manuscript ‘The EU in the World, The Foreign Policy of the European
Union’, issued by the European Commission in June 2007, the strategic objective of the
EU is to act more effectively to prevent conflicts happening in the first place in order to
protect its own security. The ESDP, developed in December 2003 as an integral element
of the CFSP, constitutes a part of an overall effort where the EU, in an increasingly
interconnected planet, adopts a ‘soft power’6 approach by supporting economic
development and political stability in the wider world and conducting peace-keeping
operations in close cooperation with NATO and the UN.
Besides the rapid reaction missions conducted on the basis of the concept of the EU
Battle Groups7 (EU BG), the ESDP also has an information-gathering and analysis
function and the ability to monitor the application of international agreements to
6 Soft power is a term used in international relations theory to describe the ability of a political body, such as a state, to indirectly influence the behavior or interests of other political bodies through cultural or ideological means. 7 EU BG: See Appendix H.
15
anticipate potential conflicts. These new capabilities aim to reinforce the EU’s
traditional external relations tools, including technical and financial assistance, support
for institution-building and good governance in developing countries, humanitarian aid
and diplomatic instruments such as political dialogue and mediation.
European security cooperation has increased since the end of the Cold War. Some such
as Jones (2007) believe that Europe is becoming a global actor. Kissinger (2001: 47)
argues that ‘‘the emergence of a unified Europe is one of the most revolutionary events
of our time’’.
Bearing in mind Jones’s study on the rise of European security cooperation, Cyprus and
other European states should pursue active participation in the ESDP for the following
reasons:
- Firstly, the ESDP, as an organ of collective security cooperation, increases the
military and political power of European states, reducing their reliance on the US.
European military powers is important as it can add to the security of EU states and
increase their ability to influence, deter, and coerce others through economic sanctions,
arms production and the development of efficient military forces.
Although European states do not agree to all foreign policy issues, they have
established, under the Headline Goals 20108, the rapidly deployable EU Battle Groups,
the European Gendarmerie Force, and a political-military structure to project power
independently of NATO and the US, as Figure 2.1 illustrates.
8 EU Headline Goals 2010: See Appendix G.
16
European Council ↓
General Affairs Council ↓ COREPER ↓ PSC ————— ————— ↓ ↓ EU High Representative EUMC ↓ ↓ Policy Unit EUMS ↓ Situation Center
Figure 2.1. EU Military- Political structure
Source: Jones, 2007: 201
Figure 2.2 illustrates that combining power decreases the likelihood that the dominant
state will gain ascendancy over weaker states and impose its will on them. In a Unipolar
system, states A, B, and C will have a strong incentive to aggregate power to protect
themselves from state F, the dominant power. The threat from state F may not be a
military one (Jones, 2007: 29-32).
+
F B A
C
Source: Jones, 2007: 29 Figure 2.2. Decreasing reliance on a dominant state
- Secondly, aggregating power in the ESDP allows smaller states to project
greater power in the international system. Small states like Cyprus lack the resources to
project around the globe on their own and compete with the preponderant power. The
stronger a state or group of states is in a self-help system (Neo-Realism), the less likely
17
others are to threaten it or jeopardise its interests. As Figure 2.3 illustrates, states A, B,
and C may be better able to project power abroad than other states such as D and E if
they aggregate military and economic powers (Jones, 2007: 29-32).
D A B
+
- Thirdly, European states can become much stronger when they combine military
power than when they act unilaterally. Constructing joint military forces and an EU
rapid reaction military capability through ESDP mechanisms merges military resources
(troops, weapons, and technology) and augments their ability to project power abroad.
Furthermore, a security arm in the ESDP facilitates cooperation by increasing
information flows, reducing transaction costs, resolving distribution problems, and
permitting repeated interaction among states (Jones, 2007: 46).
- Fourthly, the development of European weapons production through the
establishment of the European Defence Agency (EDA) to coordinate procurement
programs, as well as the development of intra-European weapons collaboration between
European states and European defence firms (Jones, 2007: 136-141), provide two
important advantages: firstly, they improve competitiveness and European military
standards by decreasing development costs, spreading design and development costs
and risks among several partners, and reducing duplication; secondly, they reduce
European dependence on foreign weapons industries.
C E
Figure 2.3. Projecting power abroad Source: Jones, 2007: 25
18
- Finally, European security cooperation leads to the creation of a security
community in Europe and the absence of mutual security concerns. European states are
now able to develop a collective identity and redefine their interests and identity as part
of a group (Jones, 2007: 50).
Current Political Situation
Purpose
The purpose of the present section is to demonstrate the political climate as regards the
Cyprus problem after Cypriot accession to the EU. That will allow the reader a better
understanding of the analysis in Chapter Four.
Greek-Cypriot Perspectives
Four years after Cypriot accession to the EU, the Greek-Cypriot perspectives and
assessments as regards the novel geopolitical context and the future political
developments in Cyprus remain diverse.
The incumbent president of the Republic of Cyprus Demetris Hristofias has
acknowledged the significance of the EU for Cyprus, and in an interview (Vima, 2008)
he stated that the EU must compel Turkey to fulfil its commitments vis-à-vis Cyprus.
On the other hand, he believes that a long-term strategy based on the assumption that
Cyprus could oblige Turkey to accept a fair settlement of the Cyprus issue by
controlling its accession course to the EU would lead to the partition of the island.
19
Alternatively, the Greek-Cypriot leader has suggested that his community must take
initiatives and approach the Turkish-Cypriot side with the support of the UN. In March
2008 he therefore met the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, and the two leaders
agreed to begin reunification talks in June 2008, after a three-month preparation period
(Haravgi, 2008).
Coming from a different perspective, Theophanous (2004) argues that the geopolitical
context after Cypriot accession to the EU has dramatically changed. Given that the
eastern Mediterranean is a focal point for existing and emerging energy roots, as well as
a meeting point of East and West, Theophanous maintains that the Cyprus problem is
not exclusively a Cypriot concern. He believes that the EU has many interests in a
viable solution to the Cyprus problem and he argues that the Cyprus issue will
constitute a litmus test for the credibility of the EU as a key player in international
politics.
Kentas (2003:13-63), who agrees with Theophanous, emphasises the survival concerns
of Cyprus in the anarchical order of international politics. He suggests that the accession
of Cyprus to the EU constitutes itself a new framework of interaction between Cyprus,
Greece and Turkey and provides a new option for the settlement of the Cyprus issue, on
the basis of the founding principles of the EU.
On the other hand, as the post Cold War era is one of increasingly open borders in
which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked, Emilianides,
Kentas and Kontos (2006) believe that the EU should have been more actively involved
in the efforts for a final settlement of the Cyprus issue, and they stress that the EU must
20
provide its members states and citizens with a European vision that will ensure their
future socio-economic progress and physical security.
Mallinson (2005:148-196) is less optimistic regarding Cypriot accession to the EU.
Since Cyprus stands at a US strategic post in the Middle East, he underlines that the
current competition for power between a partially united would-be European state and a
united American state, the former stressing the UN’s authority, is likely to characterise
any Cyprus arrangement. He also maintains that the US-Israel-Turkey strategic axis
constitutes an additional critical factor that will impact upon any future arrangement of
the Cyprus problem.
Turkish and Turkish Perspectives
On April 24 2004 Turkish-Cypriots voted ‘yes’ to the Annan Plan, hoping to become
part of the EU in order to improve their living standards and bring an end to what they
have regarded as political and economic isolation. After the twin referenda of April
2004, they expected more EU support to end their political and economic isolation. The
majority of Turkish-Cypriots has considered the former Greek-Cypriot president
Papadopoulos a hard-liner and felt that Greek-Cypriot accession to the EU is unfair.
Turkish journalist Laciner stated:
As a matter of fact that the Turkish Cypriots’ demand from the EU is very simple and easy to be realised: they just want be noticed. If the EU and the Greek side accept the existence of more than 200,000 Turkish on the island, all the problems would be solved for the Turks. Even Ankara is ready to recognise the Greek Cyprus if the Greeks and Brussels recognise the existence of more than 200,000 Muslim Cypriots.
(Turkish Weekly, 2005)
21
On the other hand, Yynanc (2008) writes that the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali
Talat, who was keeping a moderate stance before the referenda, has become more
radical by declaring that two different peoples live in Cyprus. She reports that in a
recent meeting with a foreign ambassador, Talat stated: ‘‘I used to talk like that. But
after having seen the attitude of the Greek-Cypriots I realised that there are two peoples
on the island’’.
Moreover, Yynanc argues (Turkish Daily News, 2008) that ‘‘although the Turkish army
was reluctant about Prime Minister Erdogan and Talat’s efforts to achieve a solution to
the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan Plan, the Turkish government and the
Turkish army have the same objectives in Cyprus, but they follow different strategies’’.
Finally, she believes that the Greek-Cypriots will never accept a solution that could
satisfy both sides and as a result the existence of two separate entities on the island will
be recognised sooner or later.
The Economist (2008) agrees with Yynanc and writes: ‘‘Talat dismisses the idea that
the EU can help with a settlement, saying that with both Cyprus and Greece members of
the EU with a power of veto, the union is biased and cannot play an honest broker
role.’’
In contrast, Sariibrahimoglou (2008) supports Turkish foreign policy in Cyprus and
argues that for both the Turkish-Cypriots and Turkey, any future solution must be based
on political equality of the two communities. Despite Papadopoulos’s defeat in Greek-
Cypriot elections, she does not believe that the Greek-Cypriot policy will change,
emphasising that common policy designed in Ankara between the military leadership
22
and the government is to continue, promoting a new partnership based on two
constituent states in Cyprus.
Epilogue The literature review has set the scene for the analysis in Chapter Four by presenting the
theoretical framework of the study, the importance of the ESDP for European states and
the current political climate as regards the Cyprus problem. The next chapter outlines
the overall approach that the author uses for the aforesaid research, which stems from
the researcher’s personal and professional experiences and his philosophical and
political position.
23
CHAPTER THREE
Overall Research Approach-Methodology
Given the nature of the topic, the present paper constitutes a case-study that uses the
theoretical ideas of Systems Thinking and Neo-Realism as its basic research tools.
As maintained by Anne B. Ryan:
A case-study develops detailed, intensive knowledge about a single case or a small number of related cases. The context is extremely important, and the object is to find what kind of things are happening, how and why they are happening and what they mean to the people involved, rather than to determine the frequency of pre-determined kinds of things the researcher believes can happen.
(Ryan, 2006: 71)
The educational researcher Robert Stake (1995: xi, xii) presents the logic of the case-
study approach as follows:
Case study is the study of the particularity and complexity of a single case; coming to understand its activity within important circumstances … the qualitative researcher emphasises episodes of nuance, the sequentiality of happenings in context, the wholeness of the individual.
(Stake, 1995; cited by Schutt, 2004: 420)
In consideration of the above-mentioned definitions, and by corresponding investigation
of the world of international relations, the CSDP must be studied holistically and in its
particularity. For this reason, I attempt to provide the reader with a clear understanding
of the geopolitical context of Cyprus and the interactions between its various
components.
24
Assumptions, Theory and Philosophy of the Research
My primary personal motivation for investigating this topic arises from my strong will
to assume a learning role rather than a testing one. The complexity of the issue and the
plenitude of different and diverse opinions created in me a sense of confusion as regards
the existence of an overall truth.
During the last five years, my professional experience at the Armaments Procurement
Department of the National Guard, the striking events concerning the Annan Plan from
2002 until 2004, and my scholarship on the subject of International Relations between
the years 2003 and 2005 influenced my way of thinking and observing the social world
and the world of international relations.
I have realised that within the complexity of modern global society and the perpetual
changing of the international context my research must be broader and less specialised.
Moreover, I found Ryan’s argument that dualistic ways of viewing the world cannot be
valid and are only used to control ideas about what knowledge is legitimate quite
convincing (Ryan, 2006).
In this respect, I decided as a researcher to adopt the post-positivist approach, hoping
that my research will have an open-ended exploratory character and will answer the
fundamental research questions of the studied topic.
Although I assume that there must be an external objective and empirical reality
regarding the security dimensions of the Cyprus problem and the future security
challenges for the two Cypriot communities, I recognise that my understanding of the
25
aforesaid themes might be limited by their complexity and my personal biases.
However, in order to achieve an accurate or valid understanding of the context and
essence of the research topic, I endeavoured to adhere to the following basic research
guidelines:
(a) Plan and carry out investigations systematically, by reviewing with the
use of Internet, the following sources:
(1) The British, Greek, Greek-Cypriot and Turkish press.
(2) Official public and information offices of the UK, Greece,
Cyprus and Turkey.
(3) Official websites of governmental and international governmental
organisations and institutions.
(4) Websites of international and local media.
(5) Websites of international think-tanks and academic research
institutes.
(b) Clarify assumptions.
(c) Specify the meaning of all terms.
26
(d) Document all procedures and disclose them publicly. As Kincaid stated:
Social researchers should disclose the methods on which their conclusions are based so that others can evaluate for themselves the likely soundness of these conclusions. Such disclosure is a key feature of science. It is the community of researchers reacting to each other’s work that provides the best guarantee against purely self-interested conclusions.
(Kincaid, 1996; cited by Schutt, 2004: 73-74)
(e) Clarify as early as possible the context of the Cypriot security
environment.
(f) Maintain a sceptical stance towards current knowledge by using critical
thinking at every step of my research.
(h) Publicly explain my personal background and my motivation for
selecting the subject of this thesis.
In recent years the wave of post-positivism has brought a new perspective to bear on
foreign policy, as it rejects, in general terms, the fact-value distinction most prominent
among realists and behaviouralists9 and considers that there is little point in attempting
to work scientifically towards a ‘truthful’ picture of human behaviour. This is because
politics is constituted by language, values and ideas; thus we cannot stand outside
ourselves and make neutral judgements (Hill, 2003:9).
In order to avoid any natural bias, I was aware of the possible limitations of my own
experience working as an officer in the Cypriot National Guard. I also recognised that
9 Behaviouralism: A scholarly conviction that there can be a cumulative science of IR of increasing sophistication, precision, parsimony, and predictive and explanatory power. Behaviouralists believe that social science is not fundamentally different from the physical science and seek to apply scientific attitudes and methods to the interdisciplinary study of politics.
27
my personal experience as a Greek-Cypriot refugee might influence my overall
judgement, but I hope that I have managed to tackle this problem in a satisfactory
manner with the assistance of my supervisors and the constructive criticism of my
colleagues.
Research Design
I have adopted a qualitative approach as a framework for research design, even though
some quantitative data are used to better illuminate the study. “The methods used by
qualitative researchers exemplify a common belief that they can provide a deeper
understanding of social phenomena than would be obtained by quantitative data”
(Silverman, 2000:8).
Data Collection
For my research I have used two methods of data collection. Firstly, provided that the
topic was relevant to European security cooperation, I expanded my research to EU
documents available on the Internet and in the library of the Military College.
Moreover, I collected articles and Chaillot papers10 available at websites of academic
foundations and institutions. Secondly, I conducted five semi-structured interviews.
10 Chaillot Papers are monographic publications of various topics issued by the Institute for Security Studies of the European Union (EUISS).
28
Interviews
During my research I conducted five semi-structured11 interviews with the following
persons:
- Dr Christos Iakovou because he is an expert on Middle Eastern studies
and President of the Centre of Defence Studies at the Cypriot Ministry of Defence.
- Dr Hubert Faustman, who is a professor at Cyprus University and expert
on modern Cypriot history.
- Lt Colonel Parperis Michael, who is the Deputy Director of the ESDP
section of the Cypriot National Guard.
- The Commander of the Senior Command and Staff Course, Colonel
Michael Gannon, who has been the officer in charge of ESDP and PFP sections at
DFHQ operations, and who served in the Policy and Plans Division of the EU Military
Staff (EUMS) from 2002 until 2005.
- Lt Colonel Styliannou Konstantinos, an intelligence officer who
provided me with useful insights into the security environment of Cyprus.
With the exception of Colonel Michael Gannon, whom I interviewed in Ireland, all the
interviewees were located in Cyprus. Each interviewee received an advance e-mail or a 11 Semi-structured interviews are ‘respondent’ interviews, which allow considerable freedom in sequencing of questions, wording, and the amount of time and attention given to different topics (Robson, 2002).
29
written note containing a synopsis of my thesis and a series of exploratory questions to
act as a guide-rail to facilitate further exploration during the interview. The aforesaid
interviews have provided me with a useful additional technique for collecting data and
have contributed significantly to the examination of the studied topic.
Analysis
Qualitative data analysis is an interactive and reflexive process that begins when data
are collected rather than after data collection has ceased (Stake, 1995). During the
process of reading through the data as a qualitative analyst, I gradually refined my
focus. I tried to exhaust the data, knowing my question, my biases, and my
preconceptions and continued to be critical and explicit by getting critical feedback and
sharing details with my supervisors and colleagues. My analysis was based on the main
concepts of Systems Thinking and Neo-Realism, and I used a mixed collection of
qualitative components to achieve the purpose of the present dissertation.
Epilogue
The next chapter outlines the analysis of the data and elaborates on the geopolitical
environment of Cyprus and the CSDP within the framework of Cypriot participation in
ESDP.
30
CHAPTER FOUR
It remains for the concert of European Nations to take responsibility for an island and a people which, long orphaned by history, have contributed so much and have so much to contribute, to Europe as a civilisation.
(Christopher Hitchens, 1997: xiv)
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to study the geopolitical environment of Cyprus and
elaborate on the present and future CSDP, within the framework of Cypriot
participation in the ESDP. A number of interviews and documentary analysis form the
basis of this analysis, which uses the theoretical ideas of Neo-Realism and Systems
Thinking as research tools. The key concepts of Neo-Realism are mainly used to explain
the interactions of state actors within each system.
The first part of the chapter describes the security environment in Cyprus. The second
part examines the overall geopolitical context of Cyprus and sets the scene for the
analysis in the third part. The latter part examines three systems that impact upon the
Cypriot security environment.
First Part: The Cypriot Security Environment Prologue Today, three major factors influence the security environment in Cyprus. One is the
presence of Turkish troops in Northern Cyprus (Janes, 2008). The second is the severe
demographic change in Cyprus as a result of the illegal immigration of Turkish settlers
from Turkey. The third is illegal immigration from the Middle East.
31
Security Threat: Turkey
Firstly, the Cypriot Government is concerned about the presence of Turkish troops12 in
the northern part of the island (covering 3355 Km2 or 36.2 per cent of the sovereign
territory of the Republic of Cyprus) occupied by Turkey since 1974. In 1983 the
aforesaid territory was self-proclaimed by Turkish-Cypriots as the ‘Turkish Republic of
Northern Cyprus’ (TRNC) and was de jure recognised only by Turkey (PIO, 2008).
Cyprus perceives that the presence of these forces poses the threat of a large-scale
operation against its territorial integrity and national independence (Annual Exchange of
Information on Defence Planning, 2007).
In addition, continuous declarations on the part of Turkey that the Annan Plan remains
the only basis for a solution to the Cyprus problem, and its refusal to open its sea and
airports to Cypriot traffic in accordance with additional EU-Turkey Customs Union
protocol signed in 2005 (Europa, 2008), reinforce a vicious circle that causes Greek-
Cypriots to worry about their security and survival.
Bazis (2007: 67-82) argues that despite the clash between Erdogan and the Turkish
secularists, the principles of Turkish Foreign policy have not changed. He maintains that
Erdogan’s foreign policy is based on the doctrine of strategic depth (Stratejik Derinlik)
proposed by professor Davoutoglou. The said doctrine provides for the establishment of
Turkey as a regional power on the basis of its historical and strategic depth, and reveals
old Ottoman aspirations for influence and power outside the boarders of the Turkish
State.
12 Cypriot government’s official estimates report that the Turkish troops are estimated today at around 43,000 and the Turkish-Cypriot forces approximately 3500, and in case of mobilisation of reserves, 20000. In addition, reinforcements maintained in readiness in the southern coast of Turkey are estimated to be around 20000.
32
Security Threat: Demographic Change
The Cypriot Government argues that Turkey, in an effort to alter the country’s
demographic character, has brought 160,000 Turkish settlers into Cyprus (PIO: 2008)13.
Janes magazine (2007) reports that the population of ‘TRNC’ was 256,100 in 2006, of
whom 178,000 were ‘TRNC’ citizens (2006 TRNC census). Of the 178,000 citizens,
132,000 (74 per cent of citizens or 52 per cent of the population) had at least one
Cypriot parent and 120,000 (67 per cent of citizens or 47 per cent of the population) had
two Cypriot parents.
By the use of the concept of self-calibrating feedback loops, I maintain that the settler’s
element, which is a closed and non-adaptive system, creates xenophobia due to deep
cultural dissimilarity. Secondly, the two Cypriot communities, as a result of their
protracted physical separation, also behave as closed systems.
Faustman, in his interview to me, emphasised the cultural discrepancy between the
Turkish settlers and Turkish-Cypriots and outlined that Greek-Cypriots are xenophobic
towards Turkish-Cypriots. Iakovou (2008), elaborating on the same issue, stated that:
The Turkish-Cypriot culture 14 and social structures have a secular character and the younger generations of Turkish-Cypriots share to a large extent the Western values and ideas. In contrast, as long as the Turkish settlers remain attached to the Islamic culture and their traditional Turkish mentalities and are subject to the external control and influence of the Turkish Army, their presence on the island will constitute a severe destabilising factor in Cypriot internal affairs.
(Iakovou, 2008)
13 In 2006, the Cypriot government claimed that Turkish-Cypriots amount to only 87,000. 14 The Turkish Cypriots are the Sunni Muslim inhabitants of the island, and have been living in Cyprus since 1571, when the ottomans invaded the island. The Greek-Cypriots have been living in the island since Cyprus was colonised by ancient Greeks between the 7th and 5th centuries B.C. and they have espoused the Greek-Orthodox religion.
33
Taking into consideration the above, I believe that a multinational European task force
ought to be deployed in Cyprus under a UN mandate.
Security Threat: Illegal Immigration
The third security threat concerns the rise of illegal immigration as a result of the
political instability in the Middle East. In April 2008 the Cypriot immigration
department published a research document, according to which the number of illegal
immigrants in the areas controlled by the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ has significantly
increased since 2005 because of the uncontrolled migration from the occupied areas.
According to the study, 5736 of the 7770 illegal immigrants entered the non-occupied
areas from the occupied North, seven from the non-occupied areas, while 2027 were
found to be living in Cyprus illegally in 2007 (Phileleftheros, 2008).
Second Part: The Wider Holistic Picture
ANARCHIC SYSTEM OF STATES
NATO
Figure 4.1
USA
GREECE TURKEY
UK
EU
GREECE CYPRUS
UKTURKEY
34
Prologue
The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the advance of the globalisation process
(technological, societal and informational) have changed the context of the traditional
Westphalia state system (Hveem, 2000). Within this context, Cyprus belongs to the
countries of the ‘periphery’, which are a set of industrially, financially and politically
weaker states operating within a set of relations largely constructed by the strong capital
economies (Buzan, 1991).
Cypriot EU membership has allowed it to join a regional political system that is open,
complex, adaptive and dynamic and has a strong flow of interactions with NATO, as
Figure 4.1 presents. The aforesaid figure, also demonstrates the interactions and the
bottom-up influence of the EU and NATO components.
The EU, despite US military supremacy, might become a unified political, military, and
economic actor by 2015, as well as the second most powerful agent in the international
system after the US (Jones, 2007). In this respect, Cypriot accession to the EU is a
cornerstone development which signals the beginnings of a process that could
counterbalance Turkey’s leverage on Cyprus sovereignty by allowing Cyprus to
increase its relative military, diplomatic and political power in the face of the perceived
Turkish military threat (Kentas, 2003).
European National Interests and Cyprus
According to Kentas, Kontos and Emilianides (2006), many EU states have serious
economic and political interests in Turkey, Cyprus and Greece, which need to be
35
protected. Any crisis involving two EU entities and a candidate member could create a
vicious circle that would lead to a dichotomy of conflicting national policies and create
tensions within the EU that would irreparably damage its internal cohesion and stability.
According to Parperis (2008), the political disputes between Cyprus and Turkey
following Malta’s participation in the PFP remain a major obstacle to EU-NATO
military cooperation. He argues that the aforementioned disputes damage the image of
Cyprus in the EU and affect Cypriot utility15 in the ESDP.
On the other hand, I believe that despite problems in transatlantic relations and the
disputes between Turkey and Cyprus, the progressive convergence of US-NATO-EU
strategic interests could create a positive circle in interactions between the aforesaid
actors and Cyprus. As Ilana Bet-El writes (SDA Discussion paper, 2008:13), ‘‘from
Afghanistan to Kosovo, from energy to food security, and from financial stability to
global trade relations, there is a desperate need for the US and Europe to work
together’’.
However, the establishment of a positive circle will largely depend on the strategic
objectives and implementation of the CSDP. If Cyprus truly wishes to enhance its
national power and build alliances inside NATO and the EU, it should remain attached
to ESDP, while at the same time pursuing its accession to PFP and NATO.
Today many Greek-Cypriot academics, journalists and politicians argue that Cyprus
should join the above-mentioned organisations. This issue has not yet been raised for
two reasons. Firstly, anti-Americanism in Cyprus was high because the US secretly
15 Cyprus Utility: The level of contribution of Cyprus to the enhancement of EU military capabilities, the achievement of EU strategic objectives, and the successful implementation of EU policies.
36
backed the coup against president Makarios and did not prevent the Turkish invasion of
1974. Secondly, the geopolitical context in Cyprus has changed dramatically since the
end of the Cold War and Cypriot accession to the EU, as the present study
demonstrates.
The Irish Experience
During my interview with Colonel Gannon (2008), the latter elaborated on the
requirement for EU armies to maintain high military standards and operate jointly with
NATO forces. He stated that:
The participation of Ireland in the PFP is critical because it has supported Ireland in technical terms to be able to deliver in ESDP. It exposes the Irish Defence Forces to NATO standards and levels of expertise and allows interoperability with other NATO and EU armies. It brought Ireland from UN standards - not high enough - to the highest standards of military proficiency. This was important because developments in the ESDP occurred when the Irish Defence Forces were examining new roles for themselves.
The findings from Colonel Gannon’s interview are important because in the post-Annan
Plan era the Cypriot Defence Forces face an identity problem that impacts upon the
morale of its personnel. In this respect, I consider that the EU dimension may be the
only vision for the future of the Cypriot Defence Forces in order to preserve their
existence and develop their military capabilities. As far as the political benefits are
concerned, Gannon emphasised that:
Ireland, due to its participation in the EU decision-making mechanisms, has now the ability to better promote its national interests and it has the potential to pursue a more useful role through its participation in ESDP missions in nations where there is an operation situation. Countries that were part of colonial empires and suffer from humanitarian crises need to bring non-colonial flags into their territories.
37
The Irish experience (I will refer to it as the ‘Irish paradigm’), as described by Col.
Gannon, reflects the Neo-Realist concept that small states that suffer from a ‘security
dilemma’ could strengthen their national power when they become members of regional
or international organisations. For this reason, a review of the CSDP should take into
consideration the Irish paradigm.
Third Part: Systems Analysis
The analysis in this section is aided by the use of a number of diagrams, which indicate
the members of various systems and the flows of influence within and between systems.
System One: NATO – US – Guarantor Powers of Cyprus – Israel
TURKEY
ISRAEL
USA
GUARANTOR POWERS
-UK -TURKEY -GREECE
Very Strong Influence Strong Influence Medium-Small Influence
Figure 4.2
CYPRUS
38
Prologue
The studied system is a steady-state, complex, discrete, stochastic and adaptive system,
as Figure 4.2 illustrates. The interactions between the components of this system are
influenced by five factors: one is the US insistence that Cyprus must be NATO-friendly
and must continue to house US listening posts; the second factor concerns the US vision
for a greater Middle East; the third factor is the British policy in Cyprus that for
strategic reasons aims to safeguard the permanent function of the biggest and most
important UK military installations outside its territory. The British Military bases in
Cyprus are in close proximity to Alexandria and the Suez Canal in Egypt. As Zakaria
(2008) writes, all British governments since 1890 have focused their attention on British
maritime superiority by trying to control ‘five keys’ that lock up the world - Singapore,
the Cape of Good Hope, Alexandria, Gibraltar, and Dover; the fourth factor is related to
the fear felt by the US and Britain that Russia, which supports UN and Greek-Cypriot
positions, is still a threat to NATO and could exploit the political situation in Cyprus in
order to expand its influence in the eastern Mediterranean (Mallinson, 2005); the fifth
and final factor is the Turkish geostrategy based on the doctrine of strategic depth.
Analysis of the aforementioned system reveals four findings: firstly, the existence of
strong top-down causation that favours US, British and Turkish national interests and
constrains Cypriot national power vis-a-vis Turkey; secondly, the dominance of this
system over the Cypriot security environment, which remains NATO-dominated;
thirdly, the system’s energy reinforces Cyprus’s security dilemma; fourthly, the
structure of the system compels Cyprus to maximise its relative power position and
worry about non-compliance or cheating by Turkey, the US and the UK.
39
Analysis
To start with, NATO and the guarantor powers of Cyprus are strongly influenced by the
US vision of a Greater Middle East that aims to reshape the ideological and political
map of the said region. In this regard, Cyprus must remain under the strategic control of
NATO and a future settlement of the dispute between the Christian Greek-Cypriots and
the Muslim Turkish-Cypriots could be used by the Americans as a model for the
resolution of similar conflicts in the Middle East (Theophanous, 2004).
Cyprus is also important to the US in terms of its Middle East policy of supporting
Israel and weakening Iran and Syria. In the context of the US support for Israel, Cyprus
constitutes an added western flank to defend Israel in the event of a large-scale attack,
and that explains the US support for the Israel-Turkey military agreement (Mallinson,
2005). Moreover, as Chomsky (2003:127) stated, ‘‘Israel’s value to the US depends on
the fact that it is threatened with total destruction: that makes them completely
dependent on the US for survival and therefore extremely reliable’’.
The Strategic Position of Cyprus
ISRAEL
TURKEY
CYPRUS
GREECE
Figure 4.3
40
Secondly, since the three guarantor powers of the Republic of Cyprus16 (UK, Turkey
and Greece) are NATO members, the Cyprus problem constitutes a severe destabilising
factor working against American and NATO strategic interests in the Middle East
(Emilianides et al, 2006). The US does not wish for Cyprus to remain a bone of
contention between Greece and Turkey because a war between the two NATO partners
would destabilise the south-eastern flank of NATO.
As Charalambides writes (2008), ‘‘Cyprus essentially constitutes a NATO entity
because of the presence of the Turkish troops in the north and the establishment of the
British bases in the south’’.
Thirdly, Cyprus is located within great proximity to the region that Brzezinski17 (1997)
called the ‘Eurasian Balkans’18 and it is situated between Turkey and Israel, the two
most important strategic partners of the US in the region. The creation of a vacuum of
power in Cyprus that could lead to the strategic control of the island by Russia, would
threaten the geopolitical interests of the US, the UK, Turkey and NATO in the region
(Mallinson, 2005). For this reason, the regional balance of power is dominated by the
‘energy’ of the aforementioned system that favours Turkish geostrategy vis-à-vis
Cyprus.
16 Cyprus Treaty of Guarantee: See Appendix E. 17 Brzezinski is a Polish-American political scientist, geostrategist, and statesman who served as United States National Security Advisor to Presidet Jimmy Carter from 1977 to 1981. 18 Eurasian Balkans: A term used by Brzezinski in his book ‘The Grand Chessboard’ to describe the regions of South Asia and the Middle East, which are characterized by constant political instability and ethnic conflicts.
41
System Two: EU and Cyprus
EUROPEAN UNION
NATO
Prologue
The aforementioned system is open, complex, adaptive and dynamic and creates a
positive circle vis-à-vis Cypriot national security, as Figure 4.4 illustrates. Interactions
between the EU and Cyprus are influenced by four factors: firstly, the credibility of the
EU as a key actor in the international system; secondly, the balance between the
downward influence of the EU and the upward influence of its member states; thirdly,
the interactions and military cooperation developed between the EU, PFP, and NATO
PFP
CYPRUS (Greek- Cypriots + Turkish-Cypriots)
EU MEMBER STATES
Figure 4.4 GLOBAL SECURITY
THREATS
42
and, finally, the ability of Greek and Turkish Cypriots to correctly assess their security
environment within the European framework.
Analysis
- Collective Security
According to Polanyi (Polanyi, 1957; cited by Hveem, 2000:70), ‘‘regional collective
action is not only a necessary response but the only possible international response to
globalisation’’, the role of which is usually explained in terms of the rational
maximisation of utility on the part of the state or the corporate actors involved (Hveem,
2000).
The EU, as transnational regional organisation and a self-governing political system
where the link between the regional project [European enlargement - European
Neighborhood Policy (ENP)19] and identity (superior agency of governance through the
EU institutions and pillars - potential ratification of the Lisbon Treaty) is advanced
(Hveem, 2000), provides Cyprus with two important political advantages:
- Firstly, the EU is more effective than Cyprus alone in tackling global security
threats and governing globalisation.
- Secondly, the EU institutions and policies offer Cyprus more legitimacy and
collective identity than globalisation itself.
19 ENP: The ENP is a win-win policy that represents a new focused approach in the EU relations with 16 neighbouring countries. The policy includes financial and technical support, legal advice and political dialogue and its aim is to promote human rights, democracy, the rules of law, good governance, and market economy principles to its neighbouring countries, in order to maximise its own security and achieve stability in its periphery.
43
For these reasons I believe that Cyprus should exploit the downward influence of the
EU through the ESDP and the ‘EU pillars’ in order to enhance its national security and
power.
- European geopolitical interests
As far as EU geopolitical interests are concerned, Cyprus is Europe’s backdoor to its
neighbours in the Middle East and Africa. Owing to the fact that the eastern
Mediterranean is at the crossroads of existing and emerging energy routes from the
Middle East to Europe, European security and prosperity will to a great extent depend
on security and stability in the Cyprus region (Mallinson, 2005). For this reason, Cyprus
is now of much more important strategic value to the EU than it was in the past. The
participation of Cyprus in the ESDP, PFP and NATO offers the following opportunities:
- Firstly, Cyprus could counterbalance Turkish expansion policy by the
use of strategic alliances within the EU, PFP, and NATO, while Turkey aims to join the
EU.
- Secondly, despite EU weaknesses in controlling the national security of
its state members in comparison to NATO (Kentas, 2003), the development of the
ESDP from the initial ESS document in 2003 to the full deployment of the EU Battle
Groups and the foundation of the European Defence Agency (EDA) has created a
positive circle that strengthens Cypriot national security.
44
- Thirdly, a potential ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 would
enhance Cypriot national security, since Europe will increase its autonomy and
European states will enhance their collective power. Since the ESDP will continue to be
an integral part of the CFSP that will include the framing of a common Union defence
policy, the following provision of the Treaty on European Union upon ratification of the
Lisbon Treaty becomes very important for Cyprus:
Article 42, Paragraph 7
If a member state is the victim of armed aggression in its territory, the other member states shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member states. (European Council, Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty of the Functioning of European Union20, 2008)
- Common Threats Nowadays, the Cypriot communities face common security threats such as climatic
changes, illegal immigration, and drug trafficking.
In this respect, I believe that both communities must coexist in a unified state
developing a common security and defence policy that will enable them to foster a
Cypriot national identity. For this reason, during negotiation talks for the resolution of
the Cyprus problem, they should consider the EU headline Goal for 201021, the Lisbon
Treaty, the ESDP context, and the military cooperation between the EU and NATO
(EUMS, 2007).
20 This publication contains the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, together with the annexes and protocols thereto, as they will result from the amendments introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon, signed on 13 December 2007 in Lisbon. 21 EU Head Line Goal: See Appendix G.
45
System Three: Turkish Internal Affairs, EU, US and Cyprus.
TURKISH INTERNAL AFFAIRS
NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES
Figure 4.5
US EU
CYPRUS
Prologue
The aforesaid system is complex, open, and dynamic and creates a vicious circle that
threatens Cypriot national security. Internal instability in Turkey impacts upon Turkey’s
relations with its neighbouring states, the US, the EU and Cyprus. This flow of
influence is the focus of the aforementioned analysis as shown in Figure 4.5. The
reciprocal influences from the other members of the system are not within the scope of
this study.
46
Analysis
According to The Economist (2008), ‘‘the long battle between Turkey’s mildly Islamic
party and its fiercely secular establishment is coming to a climax’’. On March 31 2008
the Turkish Constitutional Court unanimously decided to hear a case brought by the
Chief Prosecutor, who is seeking to ban the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and
bar 70 individuals, including the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, for five years.
The Economist argues that the prosecutor’s case against the AKP, that asserts in its
introduction that the party ‘‘uses democracy to reach its goal, which is installing
sharia22 to Turkey’’, constitutes a ‘judicial coup’.
The Turkish Army, considering itself the protector of the Kemalist tradition23,
maintains a major role in Turkish political affairs. Frequently in the past, the Turkish
Army has used domestic political crises to cause military provocation in Cyprus, such as
the violation of the Cypriot air space by Turkish Fighters (Klokaris-Styliannou, 2008).
The recent legal persecutions of AKP members demonstrate that the outcome of the
internal power struggle in Turkey is unpredictable. Therefore, the CSDP should be
22 Sharia: Arabic, “the way”. The said term refers to the body of laws and rules that regulate Muslim life. These laws are an expression of God’s will, according to Muslim belief, although derivation and application of the laws depend on interpretation by jurists-that is, leaders versed in Islamic law. Thus, while only one Sharia exists, it is expressed in legal interpretation, or fiqh, and there can be many schools of fiqh. Although some commandments are clearly enunciated in the Qur'an (Koran), the sacred text of Islam, jurists must derive most of them along the principles of a methodology known as the science of the law or usul al fiqh (Encarta encyclopaedia, 2008). 23 Kemalism: Kemal Ataturk is considered the father of Modern Turkey. After the end of the Greek-Turkish war 1918-1922, he created a modern and secular state, using his great prestige and charisma to introduce a vast program of reforms. These included abolishing the caliphate, which embodied the religious authority of the sultans, and all other Islamic institutions; introducing Western law codes, dress, and calendar; using the Latin alphabet; and, in 1928, removing the constitutional provision naming Islam as the state religion. By 1931 the ideology of the regime, became known as Kemalism or Atatürkism, and was articulated and defined by six principles: republicanism, nationalism, populism, statism, secularism, and revolutionism (Encarta encyclopaedia, 2008).
47
constantly concerned about ‘non-compliance or cheating’24 by Turkey, as long as the
present political situation in that country remains the same.
The domestic power struggle in Turkey impacts upon the security environment in
Cyprus both directly and in circular relation and feedback. The clash between the
Turkish deeper state25 and the AKP, in connection with the dominant role of the
Turkish Army, directly shapes the external bilateral relations of Turkey vis-a-vis the
US, NATO, the EU, and Cyprus. Thereafter, the interactions between the
aforementioned agents, influenced by the strategic weight of Turkey in the Middle East
and the Balkans, impact upon the Cypriot security environment and set boundaries to
ypriot national power.
or ethno nationalism, must be contained and eliminated (The
conomist, 2007).
yprus (Kentas, 2003) and may oblige
urkey to shift its policy in respect of Cyprus.
C
In this regard, external factors that could lead to the development of an aggressive
Turkey ruled by irrational or dysfunctional forces within its society, such as excessive
Islamic militarism
E
Therefore, active EU involvement in domestic and external Cypriot and Turkish affairs
during Turkey’s EU candidature may constitute a subversive factor against potential
small or large scale Turkish military actions in C
T
I would contend that the Turkish political system might change under the following
preconditions: firstly, Turkey must be persuaded that there is a future for it in the EU;
secondly, the EU, by the use of its CFSP and ESDP, trade, economic assistance, norms,
24 Neo-Realist concept (See chapter 2) 25 Turkish deeper state: A term used to describe the Turkish Army, the inner circle of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Turkish nationalist organisations
48
values, judicial instruments, institutions, and proactive diplomacy, must assist Turkey in
building a stable socio-political system; thirdly, the EU must pursue a leading role in
fforts for a final settlement of the Cyprus issue.
pilogue
ational security, enhance its military capabilities, and strengthen its diplomatic power.
tandards will release Cyprus from foreign interventions, guarantees and supervision.
the findings as
well as the final conclusions and recommendations of the present thesis.
e
E
In summary, the CSDP directly or indirectly influences, and is reciprocally influenced
in different ways by, various political systems and their constituent parts at a systems
level. Cyprus, being an entity of the EU, should exploit the positive cycle of
EU/CFSP/ESDP dynamics in order to promote its national interests, safeguard its
n
The second step should be the exploitation of the same dynamics within the wider circle
of interactions between the CFSP, ESDP, PFP and NATO for the achievement of a fair
and viable settlement of the Cyprus issue. In a reunified Cyprus, Greek and Turkish-
Cypriots must formulate a common CSDP, which based on European and NATO
s
The interdependence and interplay between the studied systems cannot be ignored in the
sensitive area of southern Eurasia that Brzezinski has termed the ‘Eurasian Balkans’.
The data and findings extracted from the present analysis constitute the required
research basis upon which the next chapter studies the implications of
49
CHAPTER FIVE
Conclusions
Introduction
Cypriot accession to the EU has influenced the geopolitical context inside which Cyprus
interacts with other state actors and, as a result, the CSDP should be revised on the basis
of the ESDP agenda. The findings indicate the importance of the ESDP as a driving
force in the innovation of the Cypriot Defence Forces and its effectiveness as a
diplomatic foreign policy instrument. Furthermore, the ESDP constitutes an essential
step for the further participation of Cyprus in the PFP and NATO and enhances Cypriot
sovereignty.
I believe that the analytical framework used during my research journey helped me to
achieve the purpose of this study, although I recognise that no theory is ever adequate
enough to explain all dimensions of a social or political problem. The combination of
key concepts from Systems Thinking and Neo-Realism has been effective in exploring
the security environment of Cyprus and the interactions and relations between the main
actors involved in Cypriot political affairs.
Turkish Foreign Policy and Cyprus
Power, efficacy, utility and efficiency of states remain essential factors in the
contemporary international system where, despite its unipolar character, anarchy in the
absence of a highest authority still prevails. Regional organisations such as the EU have
emerged in the efforts of states to tackle global security threats and maintain power.
50
As long as the Turkish military threat remains evident, Turkish foreign policy follows
the strategic depth doctrine and new security issues emerge, the participation of Cyprus
in the ESDP is vital. It provides the Cypriot political leadership with new foreign policy
instruments to counterbalance Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot diplomatic efforts to
achieve legal recognition of the so-called TRNC or promote a solution plan that will
incorporate the main principles and concepts of the Annan Plan26.
Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots: Common Threats
Despite criticisms and problems, the EU has made significant progress in developing its
overall defence mechanisms within the framework of its soft power approach to tackle
emerging security threats. But what is more, it is taking important steps to develop its
hard power capabilities. Notwithstanding problems at ‘systems level’ in its relations
with NATO and the US, it is becoming understood that the US, NATO and the EU
cannot work separately and that they all need each other. Systems do not exist in
isolation and they need each other in order to survive. Cyprus, as a small state, will need
to remain an active participant in collective organisations such as the EU and create new
alliances with other partners by becoming a member of the PFP and NATO in order to
survive in the anarchical system of states. Future security threats will not distinguish
Turkish Cypriots from Greek Cypriots, as the world becomes ‘flatter’ and influences
from the external environment more significant.
26 Since April 2004, Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot diplomats and officials, as well as the leadership of the Turkish Army promote at all international steps the argument that there is an inhuman isolation of the Turkish-Cypriot community as a result of the internationally imposed embargo against Northern Cyprus. Furthermore, despite the EU diplomatic pressures, Turkey that wishes to join the EU persistently denies opening its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and aircrafts and refuses to recognise the official status of the Republic of Cyprus.
51
Instead of the two sides working separately and in isolation, I believe that the
implementation of common security and defence policies between Turkish and Greek
Cypriots in a unified state will be more successful. If we accept the correctness of the
concepts that ‘systems connect with each other in order to survive’ and ‘ systems
relationships are characterised by the dominance of more complex over less complex
systems’, the development of the ‘hard’ and ‘soft capabilities’ of the ESDP will
positively influence the military culture and security perceptions of the two
communities.
Moreover, if Turkey wants to join the EU, it would have to adopt the security policies of
the ‘EU system’, which according to the ESS document (2003) will make Europe ready
to share the responsibility for global security and building a better world. This,
according to Jones (2007), means coordinating foreign and defence policies through the
EU, to include economic sanctions, weapons production and military forces.
Since the end of the Cold War era, Europe’s major powers, Germany, France, and
Britain - historically traditional enemies - have been the driving forces in security
cooperation in the EU (Jones, 2007). I consider it paradoxical that Turkey, Greece and
the two Cypriot communities could become partners in the EU while at the same time
considering each other a major security threat. The said states have no other option than
to re-adjust their security and defence policies in compliance with EU norms and rules if
they want to coexist in the EU.
52
Innovation, Progress and Development – Demilitarisation, PFP and NATO
The Cypriot Defence Forces need to innovate and progress and the ESDP is the driving
force for change. Demilitarisation must not be a prerequisite to the resolution of the
Cyprus issue. Historically, security has always been the first priority of Cypriot foreign
policy, but because the geopolitical context is changing new issues have appeared on the
security agenda. Cyprus, as a member of the EU, participates in all three pillars upon
which the EU is based. Cyprus participates in the CFSP and contributes militarily and
economically to the ESDP and, as a result, its sovereign status, national power and
identity have been reinforced as it enjoys equal status in the EU.
The ESDP is an integral part of the CFSP and, as a result of its interaction and
cooperation with NATO, it has developed the highest military standards to achieve
interoperability. Furthermore, it has developed new roles, concepts and ideas in peace-
keeping operations and humanitarian missions. As Col. Gannon outlined in his
interview, the EU is the pioneer in civil-military cooperation, and he emphasised the
efficiency of EU military staff in non-traditional military missions in traditionally civil
roles. As the nature of war and operations changes, and novel security threats appear, a
small country such as Cyprus requires the ESDP and the EU to develop its military
capabilities and keep pace with advances in military technology. Moreover, taking into
consideration the Irish paradigm as analysed by Col Gannon and studied in various
discussions and lectures during the 64 Senior Command and Staff Course, I came to the
conclusion that Cyprus should join the PFP.
Today, the majority of EU states are either NATO or PFP members, whereas Malta,
which withdrew from the PFP in 2004, joined it again in 2008. This reality sends a clear
53
message to the Cypriot government that cannot be ignored. The PFP and ESDP could
become useful tools in the hands of the Cypriot authorities so as to innovate, transform
and enhance the efficiency of its security structures and mechanisms in order to become
a more credible and useful component (element) in the socio-economic and political
system of the EU.
With the above thoughts in mind, I would argue that if Cyprus fails to be competent and
useful in the ESDP and continues to ignore the PFP option, it will not be able to survive
in the new security environment and will lose a significant part of its national power. In
contrast, the simultaneous participation of Cyprus in the ESDP and PFP will strengthen
its military capabilities and diplomatic power, providing it with the necessary political
and foreign policy military instruments that could facilitate its future accession to
NATO.
Implications for Policy and Practice Utility and Prestige - The Need for a White Paper In the absence of the EU, Cyprus’s political utility and prestige would be minimised,
allowing foreign powers such as the guarantor powers in 1960 to claim that their
military presence on the island is essential for its internal stability. However, Cypriot
participation in the ESDP enables Cyprus to develop its military capabilities and pursue
an active European defence role in the eastern Mediterranean. In this regard, Cyprus
needs a valid and credible White Paper that will ensure better coordination between
civil and military authorities and will seriously reconsider the way forward as regards
military budgets, training, and structures. This is a very difficult task, but in the light of
54
a potential solution to the Cyprus problem, the strategic political objectives must form
the basis of common planning between the civil and military authorities of the Cypriot
State.
PFP, ESDP and Innovation
Future planning must take into account three factors: the Turkish military threat as long
as the Cyprus problem remains pending, the ESDP objectives and policies and the
Turkish-Cypriot aspect in the event of a solution. In addition to the improvement of the
military infrastructures and capabilities, the main emphasis should be given to the
training, education and personal development of the members of the Cypriot National
Guard and the promotion of training courses abroad. In addition, throughout my
experience in Ireland, I believe that Cyprus has the ability to engage private and public
academic institutions in the training circles of its personnel by establishing programmes
that will assist its members to be more competitive in the international environment. All
Cypriot officers and NCOs should be trained in foreign languages and information
technology, and ESDP and PFP programmes will contribute to this objective. Given
also the fact that security is becoming a multidimensional and complicated issue where
no state, international organisation or authority is able to work alone, Cypriot military
and civil authorities in cooperation with other EU states should perform common
combined exercises, education and training using the English language.
Furthermore, future plans for the modernisation of the Cypriot Defence forces should be
prepared within the political context described above and the financial priorities of the
Cypriot State. The traditional roles of military forces should be revised and the
formation of new independent professional security bodies and organs to carry out new
55
roles should be planned. Moreover, issues of performance management, personal
development and leadership used by the most developed EU and NATO countries
should be given higher priority, and in this regard Cypriot accession to the PFP could
accelerate such a process. Finally, Cyprus should establish multinational military, civil
and police education centres within the limits of its capabilities and organise
multinational training activities in accordance with highest NATO standards and ESDP
operational requirements.
Avenues for Further Research
In light of the conclusions and implications analysed in the previous paragraphs, I
would suggest that more research must be conducted. The issue of British Sovereign
Bases in Cyprus and the role of Britain must take special attention. Furthermore, more
analysis of Cyprus-NATO and Cyprus-PFP relations should be conducted. What is
more, further research should focus on the issues of illegal immigration, drug trafficking
and environmental change, looking at the future in the long-term. Finally, at a military
level, the future structure of the Cypriot National Guard needs to be re-examined within
the framework of the strategic objectives of the ESDP and re-assessment of the Turkish
Armed Forces threat to Cyprus ought to be carried out.
Epilogue
Analysis of the research findings has demonstrated the significance of the ESDP for
Cyprus as a means of diplomatic power, prestige, and utility in the EU in the post-
Annan Plan period. Moreover, the conclusions derived from the research suggest the
following: firstly, Cyprus needs to develop a White Paper based on clear strategic
political objectives; secondly, Cyprus should join the PFP in order to enhance its
56
military capabilities and structures, improve its training standards and pave the way for
future accession to NATO. Therefore, from a security and defence perspective coupled
with the negative impact of the Annan Plan upon the morale and motivation for change
in Cypriot National Guard, the EU dimension represents not only a promise and
challenge, but is arguably the only remaining future vision for Cypriot Defence Forces.
57
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ANNEX A
HISTORY OF CYPRUS 1450 BC: Egyptians occupy Cyprus during the reign of Thutmose III.
1400 BC: Traders from Arcadia are believed to found the first Greek colony in Cyprus.
800 BC: The Phoenicians colonize the island.
550 BC: Egypt occupies the Island
525 BC: Persians gain control of Cyprus
333 BC: Alexander the Great takes Cyprus from Persia.
323 BC: The Island becomes an Egyptian possession, under the Ptolemies.
58 BC: Rome gains control of Cyprus
395: Cyprus becomes part of the Byzantine Empire.
1191: Richard I of England seizes Cyprus.
1192: Guy de Lusignan acquires Cyprus.
1473: Venice becomes protector of Cyprus.
1489: Venice introduces direct rule of Cyprus.
1571: Turkey captures the island that becomes part of the Ottoman Empire.
1878: Ottomans lease Cyprus to Britain while Turkey retains nominal title.
1914: United Kingdom annexes Cyprus.
1925: Cyprus becomes officially a Crown Colony.
1955: The Cypriots commence a military liberation movement against the British. The
Greek – Cypriot guerrilla organisation was known as the ‘Ethniki Organosis Kypriakou
Agonos’ (National Organization of Cypriot Struggle – EOKA).
1960: Cyprus becomes an independent state.
1963, 1964, 1967: The Greek and Turkish Cypriots clash.
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1974: Turkey invades Cyprus and occupies 37 per cent of the island27.
1983: Turkish Cypriots declare ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.
1990: Cyprus applies to join the EU.
2002: UNGS Kofi Annan presents plan to the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot
communities.
2004 (April): The Annan Plan is put in two separate referenda in the Greek and Turkish
Cypriot communities.
2004 (May): Republic of Cyprus joins the EU
27 According to the official Turkish position, the military intervention of 1974 was a peace enforcement operation intended to protect the Turkish – Cypriot community against ethnic cleansing from Greek-Cypriot Nationalists and the prevention of the union of Cyprus with Greece. The event that triggered this military action was a coup on 15 July 1974, backed by the Greek military regime in Athens against the president of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios III.
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APPENDIX B
THE ANNAN PLAN
Introduction On 11 November 2002, after three years of proximity talks between the Greek-Cypriot
and the Turkish-Cypriot leaderships and the active involvement of the US and the UK,
the General Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan, proposed to the two Cypriot communities
a plan for the final settlement of the Cyprus issue. This plan, after being amended
various times, went on two separate referenda on 24 April 2004, only six days before
Cypriot accession to the EU. Seventy-six per cent of Greek-Cypriots rejected the plan
while sixty-four per cent of Turkish – Cypriots supported it.
Main Provisions – General Concept
The Annan plan provided for a loose federal system of governance with two constituent
states and a central federal government. If applicable, it would establish a new state of
affairs in Cyprus where the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the
Treaty of Alliance28 of 1960, would remain in force and would apply mutatis
mutandis29 to the new state of affairs. The constituent states should cooperate and co-
ordinate with each other and with the federal government, including through
Cooperation Agreements, as well as through Constitutional Laws approved by the
federal Parliament and both constituent state legislatures.
28 The Treaty of Alliance is annexed to the Cypriot constitution and includes a military alliance system between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus 29 Mutandis Mutandis: Latin term used in law. It means ‘‘the necessary changes having been made" where those necessary changes are implied by a prior statement or assumed to be understood by the reader
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The Role of the Constituent States
The constituent states would be entitled to conclude agreements on commercial30 and
cultural matters31 with authorities of States that would have relations with the United
Cyprus Republic32, provided that such agreements would not cause prejudice to the
United Cyprus Republic, the authority of the federal government, or the other
constituent state, and would be compatible with the European Union membership of
Cyprus.
In particular, the constituent states should participate in the formulation and
implementation of policy in external relations and European Union affairs on matters
within their sphere of competence, in accordance with Cooperation Agreements
modelled on the Belgian example. The constituent states could have commercial and
cultural relations with the outside world in conformity with the Constitution.
The UN plan provided for gradual withdrawal of Turkish troops until 2018 or the
European Union accession of Turkey, whichever first. Until the accession of Turkey to
the European Union, the United Cyprus Republic would not put its territory at the
disposal of international military operations other than with the consent of Greece and
Turkey, in addition to the consent of the governments of both constituent states.
Citizenship
For a transitional period a constituent state might, pursuant to Constitutional Law, limit
the establishment of residence by persons hailing from the other constituent state. All 30 Observation: Commercial matters include economic investment and financial assistance. 31 Observation: Cultural matters include the arts, education and sports. 32 Observation: United Cyprus Republic. The new name for the new state.
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Cypriot citizens should also enjoy internal constituent state citizenship status. This
status would complement and not replace Cypriot citizenship.
Legislative Power
The federal Parliament composed of two chambers, the Senate and the Chamber of
Deputies, would exercise the legislative power. The Senate should be composed of an
equal number of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The Chamber of Deputies
should be composed in proportion to persons holding internal constituent state
citizenship status of each constituent state, provided that each constituent state shall be
attributed no less than one quarter of seats.
Executive Power – The Presidential Council
The Office of Head of State vested in Presidential Council would exercise the executive
power of the federal state. The composition of the Presidential Council would be
proportional to the numbers of persons holding the internal constituent state citizenship
status of each constituent state, though at least one third of voting members and one
third of non-voting members must hail from each constituent state. The Council would
decide on the rotation of the offices of the President and Vice-President among its
members. Two members of the Council, not hailing from the same constituent state,
would be elected by the Council on a single list; and would rotate in the exercise of the
offices of the President and Vice-President of the Council every twenty calendar
months.
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APPENDIX C
SECTION 2 TO CONSOLIDATED VERSIONS TO THE TREATY OF
EUROPEAN UNION AND THE TREATY OF THE FUNCTIONING OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, BRUSSELS, 30 APRIL 2008.
PROVISIONS ON THE COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY
Article 42
(Ex Article 17 TEU) 1. The common security and defence policy shall be an integral part of the common foreign and security policy. It shall provide the Union with an operational capacity drawing on civilian and military assets. The Union may use them on missions outside the Union for peace-keeping, conflict prevention and strengthening international security in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. The performance of these tasks shall be undertaken using capabilities provided by the Member States. 2. The common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy. This will lead to a common defence, when the European Council, acting unanimously, so decides. It shall in that case recommend to the Member States the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. The policy of the Union in accordance with this Section shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States and shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defence realised in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework. 3. Member States shall make civilian and military capabilities available to the Union for the implementation of the common security and defence policy, to contribute to the objectives defined by the Council. Those Member States, which together establish multinational forces, may also make them available to the common security and defence policy. Member States shall undertake progressively to improve their military capabilities. The Agency in the field of defence capabilities development, research, acquisition and armaments (hereinafter referred to as "the European Defence Agency") shall identify operational requirements, shall promote measures to satisfy those requirements, shall contribute to identifying and, where appropriate, implementing any measure needed to strengthen the industrial and technological base of the defence sector, shall participate in defining a European capabilities and armaments policy, and shall assist the Council in evaluating the improvement of military capabilities.
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4. Decisions relating to the common security and defence policy, including those initiating a mission as referred to in this Article, shall be adopted by the Council acting unanimously on a proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy or an initiative from a Member State. The High Representative may propose the use of both national resources and Union instruments, together with the Commission where appropriate. 5. The Council may entrust the execution of a task, within the Union framework, to a group of Member States in order to protect the Union's values and serve its interests. The execution of such a task shall be governed by Article 44. 6. Those Member States whose military capabilities fulfil higher criteria and which have made more binding commitments to one another in this area with a view to the most demanding missions shall establish permanent structured cooperation within the Union framework. Such cooperation shall be governed by Article 46. It shall not affect the provisions of Article 43. 7. If a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States. Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States, which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation. Article 43
1. The tasks referred to in Article 42(1), in the course of which the Union may use civilian and military means, shall include joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilisation. All these tasks may contribute to the fight against terrorism, including by supporting third countries in combating terrorism in their territories. 2. The Council shall adopt decisions relating to the tasks referred to in paragraph 1, defining their objectives and scope and the general conditions for their implementation. The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, acting under the authority of the Council and in close and constant contact with the Political and Security Committee, shall ensure coordination of the civilian and military aspects of such tasks. Article 44 1. Within the framework of the decisions adopted in accordance with Article 43, the Council may entrust the implementation of a task to a group of Member States,
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which are willing and have the necessary capability for such a task. Those Member States, in association with the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, shall agree among themselves on the management of the task. 2. Member States participating in the task shall keep the Council regularly informed of its progress on their own initiative or at the request of another Member State. Those States shall inform the Council immediately should the completion of the task entail major consequences or require amendment of the objective, scope and conditions determined for the task in the decisions referred to in paragraph 1. In such cases, the Council shall adopt the necessary decisions. Article 45
1. The European Defence Agency referred to in Article 42(3), subject to the authority of the Council, shall have as its task to:
(a) Contribute to identifying the Member States' military capability objectives and evaluating observance of the capability commitments given by the Member States;
(b) Promote harmonisation of operational needs and adoption of effective, compatible procurement methods.
(c) Propose multilateral projects to fulfill the objectives in terms of military capabilities ensure coordination of the programmes implemented by the Member States and management of specific cooperation programmes.
(d) Support defence technology research, and coordinate and plan joint research activities and the study of technical solutions meeting future operational needs.
(e) Contribute to identifying and, if necessary, implementing any useful measure for strengthening the industrial and technological base of the defence sector and for improving the effectiveness of military expenditure. 2. The European Defence Agency shall be open to all Member States wishing to be part of it. The Council, acting by a qualified majority, shall adopt a decision defining the Agency's statute, seat and operational rules. That decision should take account of the level of effective participation in the Agency's activities. Specific groups shall be set up within the Agency bringing together Member States engaged in joint projects. The Agency shall carry out its tasks in liaison with the Commission where necessary.
Article 46
1. Those Member States which wish to participate in the permanent structured cooperation referred to in Article 42(6), which fulfil the criteria and have made the commitments on military capabilities set out in the Protocol on permanent structured
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cooperation, shall notify their intention to the Council and to the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. 2. Within three months following the notification referred to in paragraph 1 the Council shall adopt a decision establishing permanent structured cooperation and determining the list of participating Member States. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. 3. Any Member State, which, at a later stage, wishes to participate in the permanent structured cooperation, shall notify its intention to the Council and to the High Representative. The Council shall adopt a decision confirming the participation of the Member State concerned which fulfils the criteria and makes the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation. The Council shall act by a qualified majority after consulting the High Representative. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States shall take part in the vote. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 4. If a participating Member State no longer fulfils the criteria or is no longer able to meet the commitments referred to in Articles 1 and 2 of the Protocol on permanent structured cooperation, the Council may adopt a decision suspending the participation of the Member State concerned. The Council shall act by a qualified majority. Only members of the Council representing the participating Member States, with the exception of the Member State in question, shall take part in the vote. A qualified majority shall be defined in accordance with Article 238(3)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 5. Any participating Member State, which wishes to withdraw from permanent structured cooperation, shall notify its intention to the Council, which shall take note that the Member State in question has ceased to participate.
6. The decisions and recommendations of the Council within the framework of permanent structured cooperation, other than those provided for in paragraphs 2 to 5 shall be adopted by unanimity. For the purposes of this paragraph, unanimity shall be constituted by the votes of the representatives of the participating Member States only.
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APPENDIX D
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEWS
1. Having participated yourself in EU/ESDP appointments, could you briefly describe your experiences as regards the level of cooperation and contribution of the EU states in this organisation? 2. Which are the political and or military benefits and advantages that a small state like Cyprus could obtain through its participation in the EU/ESDP? (See also the Irish paradigm) 3. How credible is the EU as an international actor in the new system of International Relations? 4. What is your general opinion about the participation of Ireland in pfp? Which are the political, or other advantages that Ireland serves. 5. How strong is the relation between EU/ESDP and NATO today? Which are your estimations about the future structure and character of these relations? 5. I would like to have your opinion regarding the present and future ESDP and NATO relations and cooperation and some general comments in relation to transatlantic relations. 6. CFSP, ESDP and Cyprus. What new role should Cyprus claim to play as a full member of the EU regarding the present European Defence and Security policies? 7. EU and Turkey. What is the impact and influence of Turkish Diplomacy upon the EU Foreign Policy, defence and security bodies? 8. What should be the main security considerations of the EU today? 9. Have you experienced during your appointment in EUMS technical or other difficulties in connection with the non-participation of Cyprus to pfp while at the same time is not a member of the EU. 10. Bearing in mind the strategic goals and present developments of ESDP, would you agree with the argument that Cyprus should become a member of pfp? Please briefly discuss your ideas. 11. How important is Turkey for the security of Europe? 12. Given the Cypriot participation to ESDP mechanisms, would you agree that the foundation of a common Cypriot Army composed of Greek – Cypriots and Turkish – Cypriots, would be viable and feasible within the framework of a future settlement of the Cyprus issue?
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13. In what ways could Republic of Cyprus strengthen its sovereignty status as a member state of the EU? 14. How would you say Cypriot participation to pfp is important for Cyprus? 15. In your opinion, which should be the main security considerations of the Republic of Cyprus today and in the near future as a member of the EU, bearing in mind Cyprus strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean Basin? 16. Conflicting National Interests and EU/ESDP. Could I have your assessment and comments regarding the influence of National Interests upon the present and future development of EU/ESDP? 17. Do you have any suggestions, which according to your opinion could improve the cohesion, uniformity, capabilities and efficiency of ESDP in the future?
INTERVIEW GUIDE FOR COLONEL MICHAEL GANNON 1. Having participated yourself in EU/ESDP appointments, could you briefly describe your experiences as regards the level of cooperation and contribution of the EU states in this organisation? 2. Which are the political and or military benefits and advantages that a small state like Cyprus or Cyprus could obtain through its participation in the EU/ESDP? (See also the Irish paradigm) 3. How credible is the EU as an international actor in the new system of International Relations? 4. What is your general opinion about the participation of Ireland in pfp? Which are the political and military advantages or disadvantages for Ireland? 5. How strong is the relation between EU/ESDP and NATO today? Which are your estimations about the future structure and character of these relations and the cooperation between the two organisations? 6. I would like to have your opinion as regards the present and future transatlantic relations and your assessment in relation to the impact of these relations upon further development of ESDP? 7. EU and Turkey. What is the impact of Turkish Diplomacy upon the EU Foreign Policy, defence and security bodies? 8. What should be the main security considerations of the EU today in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East?
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9. Have you experienced during your appointment in EUMS technical or other difficulties in connection with the non-participation of Cyprus to pfp while at the same time is not a member of the EU. 10. What is the influence and role of the European Trio (Germany-France-UK) upon CFSP and ESDP? 11. What is the relation between Turkey and the European security? 12. At a military and political level of analysis, in what ways could small EU countries like Cyprus, Ireland and Malta increase their utility, efficiency and National power through their participation in ESDP and CFSP? 13. How are national interests and the development of ESDP reconciled? 14. From your own experience and knowledge, do you have any suggestions, which according to your opinion could improve the cohesion, uniformity, capabilities and efficiency of ESDP in the future?
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ANNEX E
CYPRUS TREATY OF GUARANTEE Nicosia, 16 August 1960 The Republic of Cyprus on one part, and Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland of the other part, I. Considering that the recognition and the maintenance of the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, as established and regulated by the Basic Articles of its Constitution, are in their common interest, II. Desiring to co-operate to ensure respect for the state of affairs created by that Constitution, Have agreed as follows: ARTICLE I The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity, and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island. ARTICLE II Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concern them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island. ARTICLE III The Republic of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on today's date. ARTICLE IV In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measure necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves
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the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty. ARTICLE V The present Treaty shall enter into force on the date of signature. The original texts of the present Treaty shall be deposited at Nicosia. The High Contracting Parties shall proceed as soon as possible to the registration of the present Treaty with the Secretariat of the United Nations, in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations. In witness whereof, the undersigned have signed the present Treaty. Done at Nicosia, this sixteenth day of August, in English and French, both texts being equally authoritative. For the Republic of Cyprus: KYPROU MAKARIOS and FAZIL KUCUK For Greece: C. CHRISTOPOULOS For Turkey: V. TUREL For the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland: HUGH FOOT
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ANNEX F
EU-NATO: THE FRAMEWORK FOR PERMANENT RELATIONS AND
BERLIN PLUS
1. The comprehensive framework for EU-NATO permanent relations, which the Secretary General/High Representative and NATO Secretary General concluded on 17 March 2003, was a landmark in the relations between the two organisations. 2. This framework of relations is built upon NATO’s Washington Summit in 1999 and the conclusions of the European Council at Nice in December 2000 as well as the EU-NATO joint declaration of 16 December 2002. The EU has established adequate modalities to involve closely in EU-led operations the non-EU European NATO members. Five countries belong to this group: Bulgaria, Romania, Iceland, Norway and Turkey (the first two are, in addition, candidates for accession to the EU). 3. The EU and NATO have built a genuine strategic partnership that is now well established and deep-rooted. For this partnership to work both organisations ensure effective consultation, cooperation and transparency at all times. This partnership is also about ensuring efficient crisis management and working together in order to identify the best possible response to a crisis. For this purpose, the EU and NATO agreed on mutual crisis consultation arrangements that are geared towards an efficient and rapid decision-making in each organisation in the presence of a crisis. Such EU-NATO consultations involve the EU's Political and Security Committee and NATO's North Atlantic Council, the EU and NATO Military Committees as well as the Secretary General/High Representative and NATO Secretary General. 4. In order to foster these consultations by guaranteeing a secure physical environment and enabling the exchange of classified documents and information, the EU and NATO concluded an agreement on the security of information. 5. When a given crisis gives rise to an EU-led operation making use of NATO assets and capabilities, the EU and NATO will draw on the so-called ‘‘Berlin Plus arrangements’’. These arrangements cover three main elements that are directly connected to operations and which can be combined: EU access to NATO planning, NATO European command options and use of NATO assets and capabilities.
6. First, NATO guarantees that the EU has access to NATO planning. At the early stages before the EU even knows whether an operation will eventually take place, this may involve a NATO contribution (by SHAPE in Mons) to the work carried out by the EU Military Staff on the definition of options (these are known as "military strategic options"). Subsequently, should the operation take place with use of NATO assets and capabilities, NATO will provide the operational planning required. 7. Second, the EU may request that NATO makes available a NATO European command option for an EU-led military operation. In this case, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) is the primary candidate for EU Operation Commander. He will remain at SHAPE where he establishes the EU OHQ. The remaining command elements determined by the EU (such as the EU Force Commander and EU Force Headquarters deployed in theatre or the EU Component Commands) may either be provided by NATO or by EU Member States. 8. Thirdly, the EU may request the use of NATO assets and capabilities. To this end, NATO has established a first list of its assets and capabilities that, in strong likelihood, NATO would decide to make available to the EU should the EU need them. In addition, NATO has defined a number of principles as well as financial and legal considerations applicable to the release of its assets and capabilities to the EU. On this basis, a specific EU-NATO agreement setting out the conditions for use of NATO assets and capabilities is drawn up for a given operation. Such agreement provides in particular for a possible recall of assets due to unforeseen circumstances, for example due to the emergence of a NATO Article 5 contingency (this means an attack against a NATO member). 9. Another important element of the EU-NATO relation is related to the development of military capabilities. More specifically, it is about how the EU and NATO and their Member States should develop in a mutually reinforcing way and deliver the military capabilities they need for crisis management. It addresses the way in which the EU and NATO could fill in those capabilities where both organisations have the same requirements and similar shortfalls. Work is currently underway in order to improve the synergy between the EU and NATO in certain capabilities areas where both have pilot projects. 10. EU-NATO relations proved to work well in connection with the first ever EU-led military operation. This was Operation CONCORDIA in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, in which the EU used NATO assets and capabilities and where the EU Operation Commander was Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR). 11. Before and during the second EU-led military operation, ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo -an operation conducted autonomously by the EU- NATO was regularly and timely informed of the EU’s intentions, in full respect of the spirit and of the letter of the crisis consultation arrangements. 12. The CME-CMX03, a joint EU-NATO crisis management exercise (19-25 November 2003), provides further experience to consolidate EU-NATO relations in crisis management.
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ANNEX G
HEADLINE GOAL 2010
Approved by General Affairs and External Relations Council on 17 May 2004. Endorsed by the European Council of 17 and 18 June 2004. A. The 2010 Headline Goal 1. The European Union is a global actor, ready to share in the responsibility for global security. With the adoption by the European Council in December 2003 of the European Security Strategy, it affirmed the role it wants to play in the world, supporting an international order based on effective multilateralism within the UN. In this context of new dangers but also new opportunities, Member States’ strong commitment to give the enlarged European Union the tools to make a major contribution to security and stability in a ring of well governed countries around Europe and in the world is stronger than ever. The EU has the civilian and military framework needed to face the multifaceted nature of these new threats. The availability of effective instruments including military assets will often play a crucial role at the beginning of a crisis, during its development and/or in the post conflict phase. 2. Member States have therefore decided to set themselves a new Headline Goal, reflecting the European Security Strategy, the evolution of the strategic environment and of technology. Lessons learned from EU-led operations will also be taken into account. Building on the Helsinki Headline and capability goals and recognising that existing shortfalls still need to be addressed, Member States have decided to commit themselves to be able by 2010 to respond with rapid and decisive action applying a fully coherent approach to the whole spectrum of crisis management operations covered by the Treaty on the European Union. This includes humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. As indicated by the European Security Strategy this might also include joint disarmament operations, the support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The EU must be able to act before a crisis occurs and preventive engagement can avoid that a situation deteriorates. The EU must retain the ability to conduct concurrent operations thus sustaining several operations simultaneously at different levels of engagement. 3. Interoperability but also deployability and sustainability
will be at the core of
Member States efforts and will be the driving factors of this goal 2010. The Union will thus need forces, which are more flexible, mobile and interoperable, making better use of available resources by pooling and sharing assets, where appropriate, and increasing the responsiveness of multinational forces. 4. The ability for the EU to deploy force packages at high readiness as a response to a crisis either as a stand-alone force or as part of a larger operation enabling follow-on phases is a key element of the 2010 Headline Goal. These minimum force packages must be military effective, credible and coherent and should be broadly based on the Battle Groups concept. This constitutes a specific form of rapid response, and includes a combined arms battalion sized force package with Combat Support and Combat Service Support. Rapid reaction calls for rapid decision making and planning as well as rapid deployment of forces. On decision-making, the ambition of the EU is to be able to take the decision to launch an operation within 5 days of the approval of the Crisis
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Management Concept by the Council. On the deployment of forces, the ambition is that the forces start implementing their mission on the ground, no later than 10 days after the EU decision to launch the operation. Relevant air and naval capabilities would be included. The need for reserve forces should be taken into account. These high readiness joint packages (Battle Groups) may require tailoring for a specific operation by the Operation Commander. They will have to be backed up by responsive crisis management procedures as well as adequate command and control structures available to the Union. Procedures to assess and certify these high readiness joint packages will require to be developed. The development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battle Groups will strengthen the EU's ability to respond to possible UN requests. 5. Member States have identified the following indicative list of specific milestones within the 2010 horizon: (a) As early as possible in 2004, in conformity with the December 2003 European Council Conclusions and in line with the Presidency note annexed, the establishment of a civil-military cell within the EUMS, with the capacity rapidly to set-up an operation center for a particular operation. (b) The establishment of the Agency in the field of defence capability development, research, acquisition and armaments (European Defence Agency) in the course of 2004. This will also support, as appropriate, the fulfilment of the commonly identified shortfalls in the field of military equipment. (c) The implementation by 2005 of EU Strategic lift joint coordination, with a view to achieving by 2010 necessary capacity and full efficiency in strategic lift (air, land and sea) in support of anticipated operations. (d) Specifically for Airlift the transformation of the EACC into the EAC by 2004 is welcomed, as is the intention on the part of some Member States who so wish to develop a European Airlift command fully efficient by 2010. (e) The complete development by 2007 of rapidly deployable Battle Groups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets. (f) The availability of an aircraft carrier with its associated air wing and escort by 2008. (g) To improve the performance of all levels of EU operations by developing appropriate compatibility and network linkage of all communications equipment and assets both terrestrial and space based by 2010. (h) To develop quantitative benchmarks and criteria that national forces declared to the Headline Goal have to meet in the field of deployability and in the field of multinational training. B. Process 6. This Headline Goal 2010 will generate the necessary analysis, adaptation and development of scenarios in view of the development of new Headline Goal Catalogues as required by the EU Capability Development Mechanism
(including a clear
categorization of capabilities)
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7. To achieve these objectives the EU will apply a systemic approach in the development of the necessary military capabilities, aiming at creating synergies between Member States' forces in order to enhance the ability of the EU to respond more rapidly and effectively to crises. 8. This approach requires Member States' to voluntarily transform their forces by progressively developing a high degree of interoperability, both at technical, procedural and conceptual levels. Without prejudice to the prerogatives of Member States over defence matters, a co-coordinated and coherent development of equipment compatibility, procedures, concepts, command arrangements and defence planning is a primary objective. In this regard, commonality of security culture should also be promoted. Deployability, sustainability and other crucial requirements such as force availability, information superiority, engagement effectiveness and survivability will play an immediate pivotal role. 9. Interoperability must be considered in a broad framework including military, civilian and civil-military aspects. The EU will further strengthen the coordinated use of its civil and military capabilities acknowledging that modern Crisis Management Operations typically require a mixture of instruments. Work will be undertaken to consider interoperability issues including between the military and civilian assets in civil protection operations. Moreover the EU will promote the principle of interoperability in the field of military capabilities with its partners, notably NATO and the UN, and its regional partners, in line with the European Security Strategy. The strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has also a particular significance for the EU. 10. Tightening the United Nations is a European priority. Real world experience, with the successful termination of operation ARTEMIS in the Democratic Republic of Congo, has shown the potential for the EU to conduct operations in support of UN objectives. Work with the UN DPKO at an institutional level could also be beneficial in this respect and as a valuable means to strengthen EU-UN relationship. The development of EU Rapid Response elements including Battle Groups will strengthen the EU's ability to respond to possible UN requests. 11. As underlined by the European Security Strategy and demonstrated by operation CONCORDIA in FYROM, the EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the EU and NATO in crisis management. The establishment of a small EU cell at SHAPE and of NATO liaison arrangements at the EUMS as early as possible in 2004 will improve the preparation of EU operations having recourse to NATO assets and capabilities under the Berlin plus arrangements. This will also enhance transparency between the EU and NATO embodying this partnership. Furthermore, promoting the further use of agreed standards
will reduce
unnecessary duplication and produce more effective forces for both the EU and NATO. In this framework the EU-NATO capability Group will continue to play a central role in accordance with its mandate as defined in the Capability Development Mechanism. Complementarily and mutual reinforcement of EU and NATO initiatives in the field of rapid response should be ensured.
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C. Way Ahead 12. The relevant bodies of the Council and the European Defence Agency when established will develop the necessary set of benchmarks and milestones in order to evaluate progress towards the achievement of these objectives notably in the field of interoperability, deployability and the other crucial requirements identified above. Work will proceed in the field of equipment, forces and command and control based on a systemic and coherent approach. 13. In the field of equipment, the 2010 perspective should allow Member States to harmonise their respective future requirements and calendars in order to achieve a convergent fulfilment of capability needs. 14. In the field of forces: - All the forces contributed to the EU will be categorized on the basis of their combat effectiveness and operational readiness in relation to the range of possible tasks; - Concerning Rapid Response, suitable force package requirements, taking also into account the agreed EU Battle Groups concept, should be identified at the beginning of the second semester of 2004 in view of allowing Member States to start contributing to the constitution of high readiness joint packages. In full respect with the voluntary nature of the process, the contributions should indicate when and for what period the force package would be available to the EU; - From 2005 onwards the EU will launch an evaluation process in order to scrutinise, evaluate and assess Member States' capability commitments, including Rapid Response; - Qualitative requirements, such as interoperability, deployability and sustainability, as well as quantitative ones for the forces will need to be identified in greater detail; - Forces available will be tested through HQ exercises as well as opportunities offered by national and multinational field exercises. In particular, Rapid Response elements will need to undertake regular realistic training, including multinational exercises; - The collection of existing operational doctrines will be complemented with common concepts and procedures on the basis of work conducted in the framework of the European Capability Action plan and in coherence with NATO. 15. In the field of Command and Control, the ability to plan and conduct operations will be reinforced in the light of the December 2003 European Council Conclusions and by developments in the European Capability Action Plan. Specifically: - The work of the ISTAR Information Exchange framework Project Group will contribute to the development of a EU information-sharing policy and associated framework for implementation by 2010, with an interim architecture by 2006; - The work of the Space Based Assets Project Group will contribute to the development of a EU space policy by 2006. 16. Under the auspices of the Council and in the framework of its responsibilities for the political direction of the development of military capabilities the PSC, based on the opinion of the EUMC and in liaison, as appropriate, with the European Defence
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Agency, will direct the necessary steps leading to the more precise definition of the Headline Goal 2010 based on the elements set out in this paper and of the milestones identified in Para 5. Taking into account the comprehensive Spring 2004 military capability assessment (Single Progress Report, Capability Improvement Chart) further progress will also be required on the recognised shortfalls and deficits from the 2003 Headline Goal. Implementing this Headline Goal 2010 will include the following steps: - In 2004: By the beginning of the second semester, preparatory development work on high readiness joint packages requirements in the framework of EU Rapid Response should be finalised. Under broad guidance of the PSC, the necessary planning assumptions and scenarios preliminary to the definition of the military requirements necessary to fulfil the 2010 horizon should be elaborated by the EUMC in an iterative process with the PSC. In this framework focused military scenarios could be presented for political approval. Work should also start on the capability evaluation process, notably on the definition of the necessary benchmarks and criteria. By the end of the year, framework nation or multinational high readiness joint packages should be contributed to the EU as an intermediate phase on rapid response development. - A Conference on military capabilities will be organised in the second semester of 2004. - By the beginning of 2005: establishment of a list of detailed capability target criteria. - By mid 2005: Finalisation of the Requirements Catalogue 2005, including Rapid Response, in accordance with the EU Capability Development Mechanism. The capability evaluation process could be already launched. - By the end of 2005: a bidding process
could be launched in view of the
production of the Force Catalogue and Progress Catalogue. The database of military assets and capabilities relevant to the protection of civilian population against the effects of terrorist attacks, including CBRN, would be maintained in connection with the Force Catalogue, produced in accordance with the EU Capability Development Mechanism. - By 2007, complete development of rapidly deployable Battle Groups including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets. - Between 2006 and 2010 the normal iterations described in the Capability Development Mechanism will continue to take place with the involvement of the European Defence Agency, as appropriate. Building on the Headline Goal 2010, a longer term vision beyond 2010 will be formulated with the objective of identifying trends in future capability developments and requirements and increasing convergence and coherence.
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ANNEX H
EU COUNCIL SECRETARIAT – FACTSHEET - EU BATTLE GROUPS February 2007
Full Operational Capability 2007 The European Union is a global actor, ready to undertake its share of responsibility for global security. With the introduction of the Battle Groups Concept the Union has another military instrument at its disposal for early and rapid responses when necessary. Since January 2005, the EU Battle Groups Concept has reached its Initial Operational Capability. This means that the EU has at least one Battle Group on standby on a permanent basis. On 1 January 2007 the EU Battle Groups Concept reached Full Operational Capability. From that date the EU will be able to fulfil its ambition of having the capacity to undertake two concurrent single Battle Groups-sized rapid response operations, including the ability to launch both such operations nearly simultaneously. At the 1999 Helsinki European Council, Rapid Response was identified as an important aspect of EU crisis management. As a result, the Helsinki Headline Goal 2003 assigned to Member States the objective of being able to provide rapid response elements available and deployable at very high levels of readiness. Subsequently a EU Military Rapid Response Concept was developed. In June 2003, the first EU autonomous military crisis management operation, Operation Artemis, was launched. It showed very successfully the EU's ability to operate with a rather small force at a distance of more than 6 000 km from Brussels. Moreover, it demonstrated the need for further development of rapid response capabilities. Subsequently, Operation ‘Artemis’ became a reference model for the development of a Battle Groups-sized rapid response capability. In 2004, the Headline Goal 2010 aimed for the completion of the development of rapidly deployable Battle Groups, including the identification of appropriate strategic lift, sustainability and debarkation assets by 2007. Within this context and based on a French/British/German initiative, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) developed the Battle Groups Concept. In June 2004, the EU Military Committee (EUMC) agreed the Battle Groups Concept, and since then the work has been taken forward, based on an agreed roadmap. The work was concluded in October 2006 with the delivery of one single Battle Groups Concept document. Basic features The Battle Groups is the minimum militarily effective, credible, rapidly deployable, coherent force package capable of stand-alone operations, or of being used for the initial phase of larger operations. It is based on combined arms, battalion-sized force and reinforced with combat support and combat service support elements. In its generic composition, but depending on the mission, the Battle Groups are about 1 500 personnel strong.
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The Battle Groups are based on the principle of multinationality and may be formed by a framework nation or by a multinational coalition of Member States for an autonomous EU operation. In all cases, interoperability and military effectiveness will be key criteria. A Battle Groups concept is associated with a deployable force headquarters and pre-identified operational and strategic enablers, such as strategic lift and logistics. Member States may also contribute niche capabilities, providing specific elements with added value to the Battle Groups. The Battle Groups are sustainable for 30 days in initial operations, extendable to 120 days, if re-supplied appropriately. Tasks Battle Groups will be employable across the full range of tasks listed in Article 17.2 of the Treaty on European Union and those identified in the European Security Strategy, in particular in tasks of combat forces in crisis management, bearing in mind their size. Based on the Headline Goal 2010,which places the emphasis on rapid response and deployability, the EU has progressed well in further developing its military capability. As a basis for the capability development process, the following five illustrative scenarios have been used: conflict prevention, separation of parties by force, stabilisation, reconstruction and military advice to third countries, evacuation operations and assistance to humanitarian operations. Although the Battle Groups capability could be used in all scenarios, the latter two scenarios in particular have specific requirements for rapid response. A possible option is for a EU Battle Groups to be used in a EU autonomous initial operation in order to enable other organisations (e.g. the UN) to generate the necessary forces for a subsequent larger crisis management operation. The operation would as a rule be conducted under a UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR), although operations could be envisaged where a UNSCR would not be necessary (e.g. evacuation of EU citizens). Standards, training and certification to qualify as a EU Battle Groups, the Battle Groups packages have to meet commonly defined and agreed military capability standards. Standards and criteria, set by Member States, form the basis for developing specific instructions to ensure coherence between the constituent parts of the Battle Groups package, taking into account the demands for multinationality. A basic principle is that the Battle Groups training is the responsibility of the Member States concerned. The EU facilitates the coordination among Member States. The certification of Battle Groups also remains a national responsibility of the contributing Member States. The EU Military Committee, assisted by the EU Military Staff, monitors the Battle Groups certification process. Training is a key requirement for Battle Groups. Member States are conducting a series of exercises in this context. For instance, exercise European Endeavour 06 was carried out in Germany in November 2006 to certify the German/Dutch/Finnish Battle Groups Force Headquarters. Exercise Quick Response conducted in Belgium in September 2006 also featured an EU Battle Groups. Other examples include the Swedish-led exercise ‘Illuminated Summer’ in July 2007 in the context of the Nordic Battle Groups, and the Greek-led exercise EVROP II-07 in May 2007 for the ‘HELBROC’ Battle Groups. The certification of the Battle Groups package by the Member States will provide the EU with the necessary assurance that it is ready for a possible mission. The Operation Commander, who will be appointed by the Council on a case-by-case basis, has the authority to tailor the command and control structure and the Battle Groups package to the specific requirements of the operation. Battle Groups commitments The Member States conduct the generation of a Battle Groups package and are responsible for offering a complete
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package. The Battle Groups package has no fixed structure and thus provides Member States with the necessary flexibility to form their own Battle Groups package. This could lead, for instance, to Battle Groups with a mountain or amphibious capability. This flexibility facilitates a smoother force generation and a broader spectrum of capability. The Member States offer their Battle Groups packages at the six monthly EUMS chaired Battle Groups Coordination Conferences (BGCC). The planning horizon of the BGCC is five years. It is up to the Member States how they constitute a Battle Groups package, for what time frame it will be offered, and how often. The last BGCC before Full Operational Capability was held on 27 October 2006. It confirmed that 2007 and 2008 are completely subscribed. MS have committed several other Battle Groups packages for the period after these years. Operation headquarters are pre-identified for most of the Battle Groups packages. At the beginning of 2007, the EU will welcome potential contributions from 25 Member States, one candidate state and one non-EU NATO country, filling over 20 time slots with Battle Groups packages. Role of the Battle Group Concept The Battle Group Concept provides the EU with a specific tool in the range of rapid response capabilities, which contributes to making the EU more coherent, more active and more capable. The Battle Group Concept enables the EU to respond rapidly to emerging crises with military means, taking into account the size and capabilities of the Battle Groups on standby. The Battle Group Concept also has the potential to be a driver for capability development and for making the armed forces of Member States more capable of undertaking rapid long-range deployments. Significantly, the Battle Group Concept underlines the need for additional strategic lift capabilities. Furthermore, the Battle Groups Concept emphasises the need for accelerated Decision-making. Not only do the EU bodies need to be ready but the national decision-making processes need to be synchronised to meet the demanding timelines. Setting up a Battle Group package is an opportunity for enhanced military co-operation between Member States. This improves mutual knowledge of each other's capabilities with regard to military means and political decision-making. Finally, the Battle Group Concept reinforces the EU's military identity in a concrete manner. The European Union Battle Groups Since the Battle Groups Concept was agreed in June 2004, much has been achieved. With the full commitment of the Member States, the Battle Groups Concept has already shown its potential value in securing increased co-operation and capability development among Member States. It has contributed to enhancing the EU's capability to deal with rapid response and will continue to do so. Since the Battle Groups Concept was agreed in June 2004, much has been achieved. With the full commitment of the Member States, the Battle Groups Concept has already shown its potential value in securing increased co-operation and capability development among Member States. It has contributed to enhancing the EU's capability to deal with rapid response and will continue to do so.
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ANNEX I
A SECURE EUROPE IN A BETTER WORLD EUROPEAN SECURITY STRATEGY
Brussels, 12 December 2003
Europe has never been so prosperous, so secure nor so free. The violence of the first half of the20th Century has given way to a period of peace and stability unprecedented in European history. The creation of the European Union has been central to this development. It has transformed the relations between our states, and the lives of our citizens. European countries are committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operating through common institutions. Over this period, the progressive spread of the rule of law and democracy has seen authoritarian regimes change into secure, stable and dynamic democracies. Successive enlargements are making a reality of the vision of a united and peaceful continent. The United States has played a critical role in European integration and European security, in particular through NATO. The end of the Cold War has left the United States in a dominant position as a military actor. However, no single country is able to tackle today’s complex problems on its own. Europe still faces security threats and challenges. The outbreak of conflict in the Balkans was a reminder that war has not disappeared from our continent. Over the last decade, no region of the world has been untouched by armed conflict. Most of these conflicts have been within rather than between states, and most of the victims have been civilians. As a union of 25 states with over 450 million people producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product (GNP), and with a wide range of Instruments at its disposal, the European Union is inevitably a global player. In the last decade European forces have been deployed abroad to places as distant as Afghanistan, East Timor and the DRC. The increasing convergence of European interests and the strengthening of mutual solidarity of the EU makes us a more credible and effective actor. Europe should be ready to share in the responsibility for global security and in building a better world. I. THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT: GLOBAL CHALLENGES AND KEY THREATS Global Challenges The post Cold War environment is one of increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly linked. Flows of trade and investment, the development of technology and the spread of democracy have brought freedom and prosperity to many people. Others have perceived globalisation as a cause of frustration and injustice. These developments have also increased the scope for non-state groups to play a part in international affairs. And they have increased European dependence – and so vulnerability – on an interconnected infrastructure in transport, energy, information and other fields. Since 1990, almost 4 million people have died in wars, 90 per cent of them
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civilians. Over 18 million people worldwide have left their homes as a result of conflict. In much of the developing world, poverty and disease cause untold suffering and give rise to pressing security concerns. Almost 3 billion people, half the world’s population, live on less than 2 Euros a day. 45 million die every year of hunger and malnutrition. AIDS is now one of the most devastating pandemics in human history and contributes to the breakdown of societies. New diseases can spread rapidly and become global threats. Sub-Saharan Africa is poorer now than it was 10 years ago. In many cases, economic failure is linked to political problems and violent conflict. Security is a precondition of development. Conflict not only destroys infrastructure, including social infrastructure; it also encourages criminality, deters investment and makes normal economic activity impossible. A number of countries and regions are caught in a cycle of conflict, insecurity and poverty. Competition for natural resources - notably water - which will be aggravated by global warming over the next decades, is likely to create further turbulence and migratory movements in various regions. Energy dependence is a special concern for Europe. Europe is the world’s largest importer of oil and gas. Imports account for about 50 per cent of energy consumption today. This will rise to 70 per cent in 2030. Most energy imports come from the Gulf, Russia and North Africa. Key Threats Large-scale aggression against any Member State is now improbable. Instead, Europe faces new threats, which are more diverse, less visible and less predictable. Terrorism: Terrorism puts lives at risk; it imposes large costs; it seeks to undermine the openness and tolerance of our societies, and it poses a growing strategic threat to the whole of Europe. Increasingly, terrorist movements are well resourced connected by electronic networks, and are willing to use unlimited violence to cause massive casualties. The most recent wave of terrorism is global in its scope and is linked to violent religious extremism. It arises out of complex causes. These include the pressures of modernization, cultural, social and political crises, and the alienation of young people living in foreign societies. This phenomenon is also a part of our own society. Europe is both a target and a base for such terrorism: European countries are targets and have been attacked. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. Concerted European action is indispensable. Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction is potentially the greatest threat to our security. The international treaty regimes and export control arrangements have slowed the spread of WMD and delivery systems. We are now, however, entering a new and dangerous period that raises the possibility of a WMD arms race, especially in the Middle East. Advances in the biological sciences may increase the potency of biological weapons in the coming years; attacks with chemical and radiological materials are also a serious possibility. The spread of missile technology adds a further element of instability and could put Europe at increasing risk. The most frightening scenario is one in which terrorist groups acquire weapons of mass destruction. In this event, a small group would be able to inflict damage on a scale previously possible only for States and armies.
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Regional Conflicts: Problems such as those in Kashmir, the Great Lakes Region and the Korean Peninsula impact on European interests directly and indirectly, as do conflicts nearer to home, above all in the Middle East. Violent or frozen conflicts, which also persist on our borders, threaten regional stability. They destroy human lives and social and physical infrastructures; they threaten minorities, fundamental freedoms and human rights. Conflict can lead to extremism, terrorism and state failure; it provides opportunities for organised crime. Regional insecurity can fuel the demand for WMD. The most practical way to tackle the often-elusive new threats will sometimes be to deal with the older problems of regional conflict. State Failure: Bad governance – corruption, abuse of power, weak institutions and lack of accountability - and civil conflict corrode States from within. In some cases, this has brought about the collapse of State institutions. Somalia, Liberia and Afghanistan under the Taliban are the best-known recent examples. Collapse of the State can be associated with obvious threats, such as organised crime or terrorism. State failure is an alarming phenomenon that undermines global governance, and adds to regional instability. Organised Crime: Europe is a prime target for organised crime. This internal threat to our security has an important external dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal migrants and weapons accounts for a large part of the activities of criminal gangs. It can have links with terrorism. Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states. Revenues from drugs have fuelled the weakening of state structures in several drug-producing countries. Revenues from trade in gemstones, timber and small arms, fuel conflict in other parts of the world. All these activities undermine both the rule of law and social order itself. In extreme cases, organised crime can come to dominate the state. 90 per cent of the heroin in Europe comes from poppies grown in Afghanistan – where the drugs trade pays for private armies. Most of it is distributed through Balkan criminal networks, which are also responsible for some 200,000 of the 700,000 women victims of the sex trade worldwide. A new dimension to organised crime, which will merit further attention, is the growth in maritime piracy. Taking these different elements together – terrorism committed to maximum violence, the availability of weapons of mass destruction, organised crime, the weakening of the state system and the privatisation of force – we could be confronted with a very radical threat indeed. II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES We live in a world that holds brighter prospects but also greater threats than we have known. The future will depend partly on our actions. We need both to think globally and to act locally. To defend its security and to promote its values, the EU has three strategic objectives: Addressing the Threats The European Union has been active in tackling the key threats. _ It has responded after 11 September with measures that included the adoption of a European Arrest Warrant, steps to attack terrorist financing and an agreement on mutual legal assistance with the U.S.A. The EU continues to develop cooperation in this area and to improve its defenses.
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_ It has pursued policies against proliferation over many years. The Union has just agreed a further programme of action, which foresees steps to strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement. The EU is committed to achieving universal adherence to multilateral treaty regimes, as well as to strengthening the treaties and their verification provisions. _ The European Union and Member States have intervened to help deal with regional conflicts and to put failed states back on their feet, including in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and in the DRC. Restoring good government to the Balkans, fostering democracy and enabling the authorities there to tackle organised crime is one of the most effective ways of dealing with organised crime within the EU. In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those that are near at hand. Nuclear activities in North Korea, nuclear risks in South Asia, and proliferation in the Middle East are all of concern to Europe. Terrorists and criminals are now able to operate worldwide: their activities in central or Southeast Asia may be a threat to European countries or their citizens. Meanwhile, global communication increases awareness in Europe of regional conflicts or humanitarian tragedies anywhere in the world. Enlargement should not create new dividing lines in Europe. Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe Our traditional concept of self- defence – up to and including the Cold War – was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will often be abroad. The new threats are dynamic. The risks of proliferation grow over time; left alone, terrorist networks will become ever more dangerous. State failure and organised crime spread if they are neglected – as we have seen in West Africa. This implies that we should be ready to act before a crisis occurs. Conflict prevention and threat prevention cannot start too early. In contrast to the massive visible threat in the Cold War, none of the new threats is purely military; nor can any be tackled by purely military means. Each requires a mixture of instruments. Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through political, economic and other pressures while the underlying political causes are also tackled. Dealing with terrorism may require a mixture of intelligence, police, and judicial, military and other means. In failed states, military instruments may be needed to restore order, humanitarian means to tackle the immediate crisis. Regional conflicts need political solutions but military assets and effective policing may be needed in the post conflict phase. Economic instruments serve reconstruction, and civilian crisis management helps restore civil government. The European Union is particularly well equipped to respond to such multi-faceted situations. Building Security in our Neighbourhood Even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important. It is in the European interest that countries on our borders are well governed. Neighbors who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states where organised crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe. The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the EU closer to troubled areas. Our task is to promote a ring of well-governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy
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close and cooperative relations. The importance of this is best illustrated in the Balkans. Through our concerted efforts with the US, Russia, NATO and other international partners, the stability of the region is no longer threatened by the outbreak of major conflict. The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform. It is not in our interest that enlargement should create new dividing lines in Europe. We need to extend the benefits of economic and political cooperation to our neighbors in the East while tackling political problems there. We should now take a stronger and more active interest in the problems of the Southern Caucasus, which will in due course also be a neighbouring region. Resolution of the Arab/Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe. Without this, there will be little chance of dealing with other problems in the Middle East. The European Union must remain engaged and ready to commit resources to the problem until it is solved. The two state solution - which Europe has long supported- is now widely accepted. Implementing it will require a united and cooperative effort by the European Union, the United States, the United Nations and Russia, and the countries of the region, but above all by the Israelis and the Palestinians themselves. The Mediterranean area generally continues to undergo serious problems of economic stagnation, social unrest and unresolved conflicts. The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered. Our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. An International Order Based On Effective Multilateralism In a world of global threats, global markets and global media, our security and prosperity increasingly depend on an effective multilateral system. The development of a stronger international society, well functioning international institutions and a rule-based international order is our objective. We are committed to upholding and developing International Law. The fundamental framework for international relations is the United Nations Charter. The United Nations Security Council has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Strengthening the United Nations, equipping it to fulfill its responsibilities and to act effectively, is a European priority. We want international organisations, regimes and treaties to be effective in confronting threats to international peace and security, and must therefore be ready to act when their rules are broken. Key institutions in the international system, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the International Financial Institutions, have extended their membership. China has joined the WTO and Russia is negotiating its entry. It should be an objective for us to widen the membership of such bodies while maintaining their high standards. One of the core elements of the international system is the transatlantic relationship. This is not only in our bilateral interest but strengthens the international community as a whole. NATO is an important expression of this relationship. Regional organisations
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also strengthen global governance. For the European Union, the strength and effectiveness of the OSCE and the Council of Europe has a particular significance. Other regional organisations such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the African Union make an important contribution to a more orderly world. It is a condition of a rule-based international order that law evolves in response to developments such as proliferation, terrorism and global warming. We have an interest in further developing existing institutions such as the World Trade Organisation and in supporting new ones such as the International Criminal Court. Our own experience in Europe demonstrates that security can be increased through confidence building and arms control regimes. Such instruments can also make an important contribution to security and stability in our neighbourhood and beyond. The quality of international society depends on the quality of the governments that are its foundation. The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the international order. Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform. As the world’s largest provider of official assistance and its largest trading entity, the European Union and its Member States are well placed to pursue these goals. Contributing to better governance through assistance programmes, conditionality and targeted trade measures remains an important feature in our policy that we should further reinforce. A world seen as offering justice and opportunity for everyone will be more secure for the European Union and its citizens. A number of countries have placed themselves outside the bounds of international society. Some have sought isolation; others persistently violate international norms. It is desirable that such countries should rejoin the international community, and the EU should be ready to provide assistance. Those who are unwilling to do so should understand that there is a price to be paid, including in their relationship with the European Union. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid and when necessary, robust intervention. III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE The European Union has made progress towards a coherent foreign policy and effective crisis management. We have instruments in place that can be used effectively, as we have demonstrated in the Balkans and beyond. But if we are to make a contribution that matches our potential, we need to be more active, more coherent and more capable. And we need to work with others. More active in pursuing our strategic objectives. This applies to the full spectrum of instruments for crisis management and conflict prevention at our disposal, including political, diplomatic, military and civilian, trade and development activities. Active policies are needed to counter the new dynamic threats. We need to develop a strategic culture that fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention. As a Union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defence, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously. We could add particular value by developing operations involving both military and civilian capabilities.
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The EU should support the United Nations as it responds to threats to international peace and security. The EU is committed to reinforcing its cooperation with the UN to assist countries emerging from conflicts, and to enhancing its support for the UN in short-term crisis management situations. We need to be able to act before countries around us deteriorate, when signs of proliferation are detected, and before humanitarian emergencies arise. Preventive engagement can avoid more serious problems in the future. A European Union, which takes greater responsibility and which is more active will be one, which carries greater political weight. More Capable. A more capable Europe is within our grasp, though it will take time to realise our full potential. Actions underway – notably the establishment of a defence agency – take us in the right direction. To transform our militaries into more flexible, mobile forces, and to enable them to address the new threats, more resources for defence and more effective use of resources are necessary. Systematic use of pooled and shared assets would reduce duplications, overheads and, in the medium-term, increase capabilities. In almost every major intervention, military efficiency has been followed by civilian chaos. We need greater capacity to bring all necessary civilian resources to bear in crisis and post crisis situations. Stronger diplomatic capability: we need a system that combines the resources of Member States with those of EU institutions. Dealing with problems that are more distant and more foreign requires better understanding and communication. Common threat assessments are the best basis for common actions. This requires improved sharing of intelligence among Member States and with partners. As we increase capabilities in the different areas, we should think in terms of a wider spectrum of missions. This might include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. The last of these would be part of broader institution building. The EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus, enhance the operational capability of the EU and provide the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis management. This reflects our common determination to tackle the challenges of the new century. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. More Coherent. The point of the Common Foreign and Security Policy and European Security and Defence Policy is that we are stronger when we act together. Over recent years we have created a number of different instruments, each of which has its own structure and rationale. The challenge now is to bring together the different instruments and capabilities: European assistance programmes and the European Development Fund, military and civilian capabilities from Member States and other instruments. All of these can have an impact on our security and on that of third countries. Security is the first condition for development. Diplomatic efforts, development, trade and environmental policies, should follow the same agenda. In a crisis there is no substitute for unity of command. Better co-ordination between external action and Justice and Home Affairs policies is crucial in the fight both against terrorism and organised crime. Greater coherence is needed not only among EU instruments but also embracing the external activities of the individual member states. Coherent policies are also needed regionally, especially in dealing with conflict. Problems are rarely solved on a single country basis, or without regional support, as in different ways experience in both the Balkans and West Africa shows.
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Working with partners. There are few if any problems we can deal with on our own. The threats described above are common threats, shared with all our closest partners. International cooperation is a necessity. We need to pursue our objectives both through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with key actors. The transatlantic relationship is irreplaceable. Acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world. Our aim should be an effective and balanced partnership with the USA. This is an additional reason for the EU to build up further its capabilities and increase its coherence. We should continue to work for closer relations with Russia, a major factor in our security and prosperity. Respect for common values will reinforce progress towards a strategic partnership. Our history, geography and cultural ties give us links with every part of the world: our neighbours in the Middle East, our partners in Africa, in Latin America, and in Asia. These relationships are an important asset to build on. In particular we should look to develop strategic partnerships, with Japan, China, Canada and India as well as with all those who share our goals and values, and are prepared to act in their support. Conclusion This is a world of new dangers but also of new opportunities. The European Union has the potential to make a major contribution, both in dealing with the threats and in helping realise the opportunities. An active and capable European Union would make an impact on a global scale. In doing so, it would contribute to an effective multilateral system leading to a fairer, safer and more united world
