Masaryk University Faculty of Arts

Department of English and American Studies

English Language and Literature

Věra Hromádková

Pragmatics of legal language: Deixis

Master’s Diploma Thesis

Supervisor: Mgr. Jan Chovanec, Ph. D.

2014

I declare that I have worked on this thesis independently, using only the primary and secondary sources listed in the bibliography.

……………………………………………..

I would like to sincerely thank Dr. Chovanec for his supervision, as well as for the critical evaluation of my work, patience, and kindness.

Table of contents

Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

1. Deixis ....................................................................................................................... 3

1.1. Types of expressions used ................................................................................ 7

1.2. Deictic centre .................................................................................................... 8

1.3. Types of deixis .................................................................................................. 9

1.3.1. Personal deixis ........................................................................................... 9

1.3.2. Spatial deixis ............................................................................................... 9

1.3.3. Temporal deixis ........................................................................................ 10

1.3.4. Discourse deixis ........................................................................................ 10

1.3.5. Social deixis .............................................................................................. 11

1.4. Other types of deixis ........................................................................................ 13

1.4.1. Emotional/ emphatic deixis ....................................................................... 13

1.4.2. Extralinguistic deixis .................................................................................. 14

2. Specifics of legal language .................................................................................... 15

2.1. Legal language and linguistic variation ............................................................ 16

2.2. Characteristics of legal language ..................................................................... 19

2.2.1. Technical vocabulary ................................................................................ 19

2.2.2. Archaic, formal, unusual and difficult vocabulary ....................................... 19

2.2.3. Impersonal constructions .......................................................................... 21

2.2.4. Passive constructions ............................................................................... 22

2.2.5. Nominalizations ........................................................................................ 22

2.2.6. Long and complex sentences ................................................................... 22

2.2.7. Wordiness and redundancy ...................................................................... 23

2.3. Legal language and written discourse ............................................................. 24

3. Description of the materials .................................................................................... 26

3.1. Private documents ........................................................................................... 28

3.2. Legislation/statutes .......................................................................................... 29

4. The analysis........................................................................................................... 31

4.1. Personal deixis ................................................................................................ 31

4.1.1. Private documents .................................................................................... 32

4.1.2. Legislation................................................................................................. 37

4.2. Spatial deixis ................................................................................................... 42

4.2.1. Private documents .................................................................................... 42

4.2.2. Legislation................................................................................................. 43

4.3. Temporal deixis ............................................................................................... 45

4.3.1. Private documents .................................................................................... 45

4.3.2. Legislation................................................................................................. 49

4.4. Discourse deixis .............................................................................................. 53

4.4.1. Private documents .................................................................................... 54

4.4.2. Legislation................................................................................................. 55

5. Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 59

5.1. Summarization of the findings ......................................................................... 59

5.1.1. Personal deixis ......................................................................................... 59

5.1.2. Temporal deixis ........................................................................................ 59

5.1.3. Spatial deixis ............................................................................................. 60

5.1.4. Discourse deixis ........................................................................................ 60

5.2. Discussion of the findings ................................................................................ 60

Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 62

Primary sources ........................................................................................................ 62

Secondary sources ................................................................................................... 65

Abstract ........................................................................................................................ 67

Résumé ........................................................................................................................ 68

1

Introduction

Legal language has always been a point of interest both to linguistics and lawyers alike.

Among other things, the attention has been paid to the special functions and typical

characteristics of legal language. This topic also falls into the scope of this thesis,

because its general aim also is to conduct and inquiry into the consequences of the

representative features of legal language.

Pragmatics, as a modern linguistic discipline can provide further illuminating insights into

the widely studied subject of legal discourse. The scope of this thesis, however, only

allows for the analysis of deixis and the priority of the present investigation is to observe

the language forms and usage, not the meaning the users (receivers, readers) construe.

This thesis begins with a brief overview and evaluation of viewpoints on the pragmatic

notion of deixis as provided by various scholars in order to provide a theoretical

background for the text analysis. In the following section, legal language and its distinct

features (such as nominalization, the usage of Latin words, complex sentence structure,

and so on) will be explored, as well as the influence of the distinction between written

and spoken language in general. The paper argues that also the written/spoken

continuum can play a role in the differentiation of deixis in written legal discourse.

These viewpoints are then combined in the pragmatic analysis of written legal

documents. Specifically, the paper asserts that, due to the specific responsibilities and

qualities of written legal language, decontextualization occurs. In this view, the functions,

elements, and specific attributes of legal language determine the usage of deictic

expressions and their dependence on context. For this purpose, two categories of

written legal discourse will be examined. Firstly, the documents regulating private legal

relations and secondly, the legislative documents. The reason for this distinction is that

these categories appear to differ in the authority, in the receivers it is aimed at and in

their general purpose.

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At this point, it is important to identify the methodological approach for the analysis. The

potential deictic expressions were singled out and their usage was then evaluated for

personal, temporal, spatial and discourse deixis. In other words, lexical items which

were identified beforehand as possible indicators of deixis were more closely

qualitatively analysed.

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1. Deixis

Yule describes deixis plainly as “pointing through language” (1996, p. 9). However, he

adds that this pointing is accomplished through deictic expressions, which depend for

their interpretation on the speaker and hearer sharing the same context (1996, p. 9).

Yule (1996) also admits that deictic expressions have their most basic uses in face-to-

face spoken utterances (p. 9). Thus, Yule expects that deictic expressions will most

typically occur on the regular speech end of Svartvik and Leech’s continuum of written

and spoken language.

As opposed to Yule, Levinson does not acknowledge the pointing role of deixis, but

accentuates the importance of context, because he argues that deixis is the reflection of

the relationship between language and context (1983, p. 54). However, similarly to Yule,

Levinson affirms that deictic expressions encode the context of the speaker and hearer

and that the context is necessary in the interpretation of the expression (1983, p. 54).

Levinson aptly describes the need for context in interpretation of deixis expressions on

the following example. He wants his readers to imagine that they found a bottle in the

sea with a message in it that says: “Meet me here a week from now with a stick about

this big.” Without the necessary context, it is not clear whom to meet, where or when, or

how big a stick to bring (1983, p. 55).

Along the same line, Sidnell describes deixis as a term used to refer to those linguistic

elements which make interpretable reference only by virtue of an indexical connection to

some aspect of the speech event (2009). Again, in accordance with Yule’s and

Levinson’s observations, Sidnell acknowledges that linguistic items can have indexical

quality, i.e. to refer to extralinguistic features in the conversation and that the meaning or

the content of the indexicality can be interpreted only with regard to the speech event.

The extralinguistic reality is mentioned in the definition of deixis of Anderson and

Keenan. They assume that deictics are those linguistic elements “whose interpretation in

simple sentences makes essential reference to properties of the extralinguistic context

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of the utterance in which they occur” (Anderson and Keenan 1985, p. 259). Interestingly,

in Anderson and Keenan’s definition, the reference to extralinguistic context is not made

directly by the linguistic elements, but by their interpretation. Moreover, the statement

that the reference is made in simple sentences is difficult to decode, but it probably

means what Yule also declares, that deictic expressions will occur mainly in spoken

language. The “simple sentences” may stand for low lexical density sentences typical of

spoken language, which is more repetitive and has a restricted repertoire (Svartvik and

Leech p. 203). Hence, Anderson and Keenan’s opinion corresponds with that of Yule,

making an assertion that deictic expressions are more often found in spoken language,

assuming that “simple sentences” from their definition indeed mean a reference to low

lexical density of spoken language.

Allott stresses the role of context as strongly as Levinson. In his explanation of deixis

Allot observes that it is a technical term used in semantics and pragmatics for linguistic

items that encode sensitivity to context and for uses of linguistic items that involve this

sensitivity (2010, p. 54). The context is primary for Allott and he considers deictic

expressions as those which encode the sensitivity to context. Pointing out the sensitivity

to context evokes a concept of change or unpredictability. Indeed, Allott strongly

foregrounds the fact that many linguistic items have deictic uses, but it is usual to

distinguish a set of linguistic items which are primarily deictic from those which are not,

but may be used deicitally (2010, p. 55). Allott provides examples of expressions that

are clearly deictic and are used non-deictically, as well as examples of items that are not

primarily deictic, but are used deictically (2010, p. 55-6). Consequently, the sensitivity to

context for Allott means that it is impossible to make a clear statement indicating which

linguistic elements are always deictically used and which are never used deictically, as

a result, the deictic use is unpredictable in advance, and is again, dependent on context.

Huang makes a similar claim stating that deictics are expressions that have a deictic

usage as central, whereas non-deictic expressions do not have such a usage as basic.

However, Huang points out, similarly to Allott, that a deictic expression can be used non-

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deictically and conversely a non-deictic expression can be used deictically (Huang 2007,

p. 133). Furthermore, Allott does not, as opposed to Levinson, Yule, Sidnell and

Anderson and Keenan, include any interpretation in his definition. Allott relates deixis to

indexicality, i.e. to the sensitivity of truth-conditions to context, which is favoured term for

this general area in philosophy, while the term ‘deixis’ is mostly preferred in linguistics

(2010, p. 55). However, Allott declares that deixis is a broader category than indexicality

because indexicals are defined as terms that make the truth-conditions of an utterance

context-sensitive (2010, p. 55). Deixis is not limited to truth-conditions, but employs all

kinds of context sensitivity, therefore, deixis is a broader category than the

philosophically approached indexicality. Levinson also addresses this issue of

philosophical approach to indexicality, and states that, from the perspective of truth-

conditional semantics, the context is only required to provide the necessary information

so that it can be decided whether the utterance in question is true or false (2010, p. 56).

Allott also asks the question whether context sensitivity is dependent on the properties

of words or on the pragmatic enrichment. It might be that quantifiers are linguistically

deictic items, requiring a contextual completion, or that they (and most other items) are

in a sense ‘deictic in use’ for purely pragmatic reasons (2010, p. 56). Sidnell argues for

the latter. He maintains that deixis is not connected with particular expressions, but is

rather a general characteristic of language and interaction (Sidnell, 2009).

Furthermore, Huang also observes that deixis is directly concerned with the relationship

between the structure of language and the context in which the language is used

(2007, p. 132). Deixis for Huang can be described as a phenomenon whereby features

of context of utterance or speech event are encoded by lexical and grammatical means

in the language (2007, p. 280). Huang makes a strong point insisting on the fact that all

human languages contain deictic terms. He asserts that language without deictics

(deictic terms) cannot serve the communicative needs of its users as effectively and

efficiently as a language which does have them (2007, p. 132).

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All the abovementioned definitions had preferred context or the focus on pointing via

language, but for Rauh, the encoder is the most important element in deixis. She

strongly stresses the communicative role of language and claims that communication

implies that an encoder directs a message to the addressee. Accordingly, she claims

that the initiative is the encoder's, because he is constructing and encoding the message

from his view. As a result, the message not only contains syntactic form and semantic

content, but also particular pragmatic information dependent on him, clearly also deixis

(1983, p. 9). As stated above, the strong position of the encoder enables Rauh to

redefine the definition of deixis. She states “deictic expressions are those expressions

of language which in some way are dependent on or related to the situation of the

encoder” (Rauh 1983, p. 10). Furthermore, the central orientation to the encoder does

not only affect the perspective of what deixis is, but is also relevant for the reconstruction

of the meaning of the deictic expressions, i.e. for their interpretation (Rauh 1983, p. 9).

As far as the function of deixis is concerned, Rauh reaches deeper than the

abovementioned authors, adopts Burks’ observations and points out that deictic

expressions have (1) indexical function and (2) symbolic meaning. The symbolic

meaning is the meaning of their types, the indexical meaning that of their tokens (Burks

1948, p. 681 in Rauh 1983, p. 11). In consequence, Rauh through Burks implements

and ontological distinction into the functions of deixis. Huang presents a similar

difference between gestural and symbolic use of deictic expressions adopted from

Fillmore. He asserts that the gestural use can be properly interpreted only by direct,

moment by moment monitoring of some physical aspects of the speech event (such as

a selecting gesture or eye contact), whereas the interpretation of symbolic use of deictic

expressions only involves knowing the basic spatio-temporal parameter of speech event

(Huang 2007, p. 134). Furthermore, Huang declares that gestural is the basic use and

symbolic use is the extended use and in general, if a deictic expression can be used in

a symbolic way, it can also be used in a gestural way, but not vice versa (2007, p. 134).

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Thus, the differentiation made by Fillmore and described by Huang (2007) resembles

that of Rauh (or Burks, respectively), is less elaborated, but on the other more explicit.

1.1. Types of expressions used

Some authors explicitly list expressions typically used deictically. For example, Sidnell

includes the English here– there, this– that, now– then, and I– you (Sidnell, 2009). Yule

provides almost the same examples – me, you, now, then, here, there (1996, p. 9). Allott

does not only name the individual expressions such as pronouns like you and we,

demonstratives like this and that, other indexicals, such as here, there, now and then,

and terms that encode sensitivity to the social context, including second person singular

pronouns in many European languages, such as French tu and vous (2010, p. 54). He

also names other general categories the usage of which can be deictic: inflectional

morphology (endings on verbs, markers of grammatical agreement and so on) such as

tense morphology, inflection for grammatical person, and inflection for respect-level,

social distance and other social factors (Allott 2010, p. 54). Similarly, Rauh also lists

pronouns, demonstratives, time adverbs like now and then, tenses and place adverbs

like here and there as the examples of deictic expressions.

Levinson is more precise and for the types of deixis provides also typical expressions

through which the deixis is realized. Thus, in Levinson's view, personal deixis, for

example, is mostly realized through pronominal systems, but includes also calls,

summons or addresses and concerns not only speaker, but also the addressee and the

audience (Levinson 1985, p. 69). Temporal deixis is manifested in the usage of tense,

time adverbs and other time-deictic morphemes (Levinson 1985, p. 73).

Huang claims that most representative linguistic expressions used as deictics include

demonstratives, first- and second-person pronouns, tense markers, adverbs of time and

space and motion verbs (2007, p. 132).

However, as pointed out above, Allott and Huang insist that purely deictic expressions

(in all instances of usage being deictic) cannot be isolated and listed, because of the

8

strong role of the context (2010, p. 55 and 2007, p. 133). Therefore, the above examples

are to be taken only as illustrative possibilities where to look for a deictic usage.

1.2. Deictic centre

Many authors dealing with deixis identify a deictic centre as a point of reference for the

usage of deixis. Allot declares that it is usual to understand deixis in terms of deictic

centres and as the basic centre he considers the speaker, though he admits that the

deictic centre can be shifted (2010, p. 57). Similarly, Levinson also points out that deixis

is generally (though not exclusively) organized in an egocentric way (1983, p. 63). This

remark goes back to Lyons and Bühler (Huang 2007, p. 135), but is approved by both

Levinson and Huang. Put informally, they observe that deixis is a “self-centred”

phenomenon, its centre being typically “I-here-now” (Huang 2007, p. 135). Rauh shares

this approach, but she elaborates on the explanation. She alleges that the encoder (the

speaker) plays a key role in communication, because he is responsible for the encoding

of the message he wants to convey. Thus, having a central role in encoding, the

encoder’s perspective, his person, his position in space and time, his consciousness and

his emotions constitute a natural centre of orientation for his perception (Rauh 1983,

p. 13). From this argument, Rauh derives that deixis is in most cases egocentric,

because the centre of orientation is most often the encoder (the speaker) (1983, p. 14).

In most simple terms, Rauh claims that the encoders (the speakers) relate everything to

themselves.

However, the central point of reference may be shifted, for example, by deictic

projection – in the particular case of spatial deixis he gives by the projection of the

speaker into other locations prior to being in those locations (Yule 1996, p. 12). This

concept has been pointed out by Lyons (Huang 2007, p. 135). Additionally, Yule

identifies the pragmatic basis of spatial deixis, the psychological distance, which causes

physically close or distant objects to be treated as psychically close or distant. This

assumption is reflected in the expressions used in conversation (Yule 1996, p. 13).

9

However, Yule admits that this assumption can be overridden by the importance of

context, for example, sometimes a physically close object can be described in

psychically distant terms such as in I don’t like that smell. This shows that the meanings

of words are invested with meaning in a context by the speaker (1996, p. 13).

1.3. Types of deixis

1.3.1. Personal deixis

Personal deixis for Levinson concerns the encoding of the role of the participants in the

speech event in which the utterance in question is delivered (1983, p. 62). Unlike Yule,

who defines deixis as “indicating people” (1996, p. 9), Levinson is not concerned with

“pointing” to people, but rather with recognition of the roles of the participants. The three-

part division of pronouns is used, ascribing them the following roles. The first person is

the grammaticalization of the speaker’s reference to himself, the second person is the

encoding of the speaker’s reference to one or more addressees and third person is the

encoding of reference to persons and entities which are neither speakers nor

addressees of the utterance in question (Levinson 1983, p. 62). Allott considers third

person pronouns as non-deictic, because they do not relate to the deictic centre of the

speaker or the addressee, at the same time Allott admits that third person pronouns are

frequently used deictically (2010, p. 57).

1.3.2. Spatial deixis

Spatial deixis, according to Levinson’s analysis, concerns the encoding of spatial

locations relative to the location of the participants in the speech event (1983, p. 62).

Levinson claims that most languages probably can differentiate between proximal and

distal, which are the less elaborate distinctions (1983, p. 62). Among the more elaborate,

though not used in English, Allott identifies, for example, the proximal/medial/distal

encoding (in Classical Arabic) or speaker-proximal/addressee-proximal/distal distinction

10

in Japanese (2010, p. 57). Furthermore, the proximal and distal can be specified relative

to other objects or fixed reference points or, they can be deictically specified relative to

the location of participants at the time of speaking (Levinson, 1985, p. 79).

1.3.3. Temporal deixis

Temporal deixis concerns the encoding of temporal points and spans relative to the time

at which an utterance was spoken (or a written message inscribed) (Levinson 1983,

p. 62). Levinson also emphasizes that the coding time (CT) may be distinct from

receiving time (RT) (1983, p. 62). Yule compares the psychological basis of temporal

deixis to that of the spatial deixis. Temporal events can be treated as objects that move

toward us or away from us such as in the coming week and the past week (Yule 1996,

p. 14). Moreover, Yule identifies often unrecognized temporal deixis in the verb tense.

The present form and the past form of a verb are the only possible forms of verbs in

English. Yule assumes that not only the present tense is the proximal form and the past

form is the distal, but the forms can also be used to communicate the distance from

current reality of facts. As an example he presents if-clauses that mark events identified

by the speaker as not being close to present reality (If I was rich…). The meaning is not

to be treated as happening in past time, but is closer to being presented as distant from

current speaker's situation. So distant that the verb form communicates the negative –

I am not rich. Therefore, the verb form does not only communicate the distance from

current time, but also the distance from the reality (Yule 1996, p. 15).

1.3.4. Discourse deixis

Discourse deixis “has to do with the encoding of reference to portions of the unfolding

discourse in which the utterance (which includes the referring expression) is located”

(Levinson, 1985, p. 62). Put simply, discourse deixis are all expressions and phrases

that navigate the reader or hearer through spoken or written text. Allott claims that

discourse deictic expressions are adapted from temporal and spatial deixis (e.g. in the

11

coming pages, that argument), because speech takes time and distal spatial

expressions may be used for something said by another (2010, p. 59). The distinction

between discourse deixis and discourse anaphora is hard to make in many cases (Allott

2010, p. 59). Rauh makes the distinction and marks the difference between anaphora

and discourse deixis again with regard to her view of the encoder being central to the

deictic encoding processes. Rauh asserts that anaphora is similar to discourse deixis in

that they in both cases the referents are linguistic units rather than extralinguistic reality.

However, anaphora does not determine relations of segments of discourse to points of

orientation, but refers to segments of discourse (Rauh 1983, p. 52). Rauh states that

anaphora lacks the egocentric feature and that anaphoric expressions can be classified

with respect to their syntactic properties (1983, p. 52). As far as the discourse deixis is

concerned, Rauh does not consider it as an independent deictic dimension, as does

Levinson, Yule and Allott, but she claims it only represents a type of use of deictic

expressions (1983, p. 42). The reason for this assumption is the difference of discourse

deixis from other categories. Rauh supposes that the situation of the encoder is

independent on his ego (1983, p. 42). Again, with Rauh’s egocentric view of the

encoder, the discourse deixis lacks the correspondence to the real or construed external

situation, but corresponds to the encoder’s situation within the course of the text (1983,

p. 48). In simple terms, Rauh considers the encoder less detached from the text than he

is from space, time and people.

1.3.5. Social deixis

Interestingly enough, in Yule’s chapter, social deixis is mentioned under personal deixis,

assuming it is the result of the usual three-part division exemplified by first, second and

third person pronouns. These pronouns are often elaborated with markers of social

status and this is what social deixis involves – the choice of one of the forms of social

status markers (1996, p. 10). On the other hand, Levinson lists social deixis as one type

of deixis, among personal, temporal, spatial and discourse deixis. Social deixis in

12

Levinson’s terms “concerns the encoding of social distinctions that are relative to

participant-roles, particularly aspects of the social relationship holding between speaker

and addressees or speaker and some referent” (1983, p. 63). Allott also considers social

deixis as a separate type. He claims that social deictic terms are context-dependent in

a different way from indexicals (Allott 2010, p. 59). However, the only specification Allott

provides is that “their use in an inappropriate context might be awkward or rude, but it

does not make the utterance false” (2010, p. 59). Allott points out that whereas

indexicals need context to define whether the statement is true or false, social deictic

expressions can never be false, the context can only render them to be awkward or

inappropriate. Archer, Aijmer & Wichmann (2012) define social deixis similarly to

Levinson. They do not limit the scope of social deixis to speaker and addressees, but

extend it to “relationships between speakers, addressees and others” and also

emphasize the roles and relationships in the communication (2012, p. 27). Moreover,

following Levinson (1983, p. 90-1) they divide social deixis into two types – absolute and

relational. Absolute expressions (Miss/Mr/Mrs) are fixed across contexts, whereas

relational expressions (such as honorifics and kinship terms) are determined by speaker

and referent, speaker and addressee or speaker and bystander (Archer, Aijmer

& Wichmann 2012, p. 27). Huang adopts the same distinction, but adds that absolute

information in social deixis can be illustrated by forms that are reserved for authorized

recipients (Your Majesty, Mr. President) (2007, p. 162). Moreover, Huang also points out

that social deixis is particularly closely associated with person deixis, because it usually

encodes social class, kinship relations, age, sex, profession and ethnic group (2007,

p. 163). Based on this assertion it is important to accentuate, however, that social deixis

implies that of person deixis, but not vice versa (Huang 2007, p. 163).

The participant roles, status markers, kinship terms or other speaker-adressee relational

expressions are, nevertheless, not always necessary to be explicitly present in texts. For

instance legal language is not concerned with social deixis. According to Tiersma’s

(1999) observations, legal language is highly impersonal not only in spoken, but also in

13

written language (p. 67). The reason for this is that the legal documents are mostly

meant to be of general applicability and address several audiences at once (Tiersma

1999, p. 68). Following Tiersma’s reasoning, it is assumed that the impersonality also

covers the irrelevance of the encoding of social distinctions that are relative to

participant-roles, particularly aspects of the social relationship between speaker and

addressees. In simple terms, the general applicability and the plurality and variety of

addressees cause the social deixis to be irrelevant in written legal documents. As

a result, it is not taken into consideration in the analysis.

1.4. Other types of deixis

1.4.1. Emotional/ emphatic deixis

Apart from the abovementioned categories of deixis, some authors assume that deixis

has more categories. Archer, Aijmer & Wichmann employ Lyons’ (1977) emphatic deixis,

which is used to highlight the speaker’s psychological (as opposed to physical) distance

from a given entity (2012, p. 26). This approach is shared by Yule as pointed out above

in the section on spatial deixis (1996, p. 13). However, Rauh does not share the opinion

on emphatic deixis being a separate category. She maintains that, in Lyons’ examples, it

is not clear whether the emotionality is aimed towards the entity discussed or toward the

addressee, therefore, the argument is not coherent (1983, p. 41). The emotionality

toward the addressee could fall into the category of social deixis, Rauh argues, but she

does not comment on the remaining emotionality aimed towards the entity discussed

(1983, p. 41). Furthermore, intonational features also play an important role in Lyons'

examples and it may be that intonation is the factor that gives the emotion, not the words

or phrases (Rauh 1983, p. 41).

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1.4.2. Extralinguistic deixis

Rauh employs also what Searle (1959, p. 96) calls extralinguistic deixis and Lyons

(1973, p. 10) a deixis at its purest. Extralinguistic deixis encompasses visual and

acoustic gestures accompanying linguistic deixis such as indicating a place on the map

by finger, while answering here to a question Where are we? (Rauh 1983, p. 44).

However, Rauh admits that the extralinguistic deixis (the visual and acoustic gestures)

fulfil only complementary task, because the meaning is pre-sorted by the linguistic

expression (1983, p. 44).

However, with regard to the above, emotional deixis and extralinguistic deixis will not be

considered in the text analysis, because it is not assumed that legal discourse would

provide many examples of emotionality and the extralinguistic deixis is omitted based on

the grounds that it is not possible to be included in written documents.

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2. Specifics of legal language

Mellinkoff (1963) acknowledged that “law is a profession of words” and also ascribed it

an important role by claiming that language is the main objective of law (p. vii).

Moreover, Maley (1994) also emphasizes that the legal processes are the service of

regulating social behaviour and that language is medium in the diverse arenas of the law

where legal texts, spoken or written, are generated (p. 11). Apart from distinguishing

language as the medium of law, Maley points out that language also influences the

individual processes and is the product and the outcome of these processes. Similarly,

Trosborg emphasizes that in a very basic sense, law would not exist without language.

Additionally, she identifies two functions of law. The regulative function, that tells us

which activities are permitted and which are not. Furthermore, she acknowledges that

law has also a constitutive function, creating new relations where none existed before

(1997, p. 19). Trosborg further asserts that both purposes of law are concerned with

a particular style of language used for the specific purpose (1997, p. 20). With regard to

the above, it can be said that language is crucial in law, and the social functions the law

plays determine the characteristics of the language used. The abovementioned tasks of

regulating social behaviour and creating relations are functions of authority. As Mertz

(1994) observes, law is, in effect, in the position where linguistic appropriation occurs.

By this linguistic appropriation Mertz means the rendering of everyday categories into

legal language, which effects powerful changes. Through legal language, the state

imposes its interpretations and its appropriations (of physical and symbolic power), and

social actors struggle to shift existing power relations (1994, p. 441). In simple terms,

Mertz, besides acknowledging the key position of language in legal settings, connects

functions of law with its power or authority. The functions of law executed from the status

of power exercised by the state, cause the legal documents to be viewed as detached,

official, and impersonal. Consequently, such detachment and impersonality of the

documents may lead to the decontextualization of deixis.

16

2.1. Legal language and linguistic variation

According to the observations of Biber and Conrad, variability is inherent in human

language, because speakers use language in various occasions and for different

purposes and regularly make choices (e.g. in word choice, and grammar) depending on

a number of non-linguistic factors, which include for example the speaker’s purpose in

communication and the relationship between speaker and hearer (2009, p. 4). Biber and

Conrad also point out that linguistic variation is realized on different levels, on the

highest level as different languages, on the lowest level as the differences between one

speaker compared to another speaker, or as the differences between two texts

produced by the same speaker (2009, p. 9). Linguistic variation can be studied from

different angles or by different approaches of register, genre, and style, which are the

possible perspectives of analyzing linguistic varieties (Conrad and Biber, 2009, p. 15).

Legal language is also a realization of linguistic variation and as such its description is

approached from different perspectives.

For the purposes of Mellinkoff’s book, language of the law is “the customary language

used by lawyers in those common law jurisdictions where English is the official

language” (1963, p. 3). If we broaden Mellinkoff’s definition to other languages and

countries and thus generalize it, legal language is the language used by lawyers. It is not

a complex definition, but Mellinkoff adds an observation stating that the language

includes distinctive words, phrases, and modes of expression as well as mannerisms of

composition (1963, p. 3). By this assertion, he seems to enforce the ‘otherness’ of legal

language, pointing out to differences to other varieties.

Nevertheless, he is classifying legal language according to people who use it. From this

point of view, it can be concluded that Mellinkoff sees legal language as a sociolinguistic

variety of English. He accepts that lawyers have been more or less coherent group in

a society and developed their own variety of speech and writing. Trudgill (1994), on the

other hand, points out that the users of legal language are using a register, which is

17

independent of both dialect and style of the user, but reflects the subject being talked or

written about (p. 11). This perspective considers legal language as a register, the

characteristics of which are determined by the content of the discourse.

Moreover, Tiersma considers legal language as a sublanguage of English, claiming that

it is somewhere between a separate language and ordinary English, and it is much

closer to ordinary English than many people seem to think (2005, p. 30). On his website

dealing with legal language, Tiersma explains what he means by a sublanguage:

“A sublanguage has its own specialized grammar, a limited subject matter, comprises

lexical, syntactic, and semantic restrictions, and allows ‘deviant’ rules of grammar that

are not acceptable in the standard language” (Tiersma, n.d.). These certainly are

features of legal language, but whether we call or classify legal language as an argot, a

dialect, a register, a style, and even a separate language, it obviously is “is a complex

collection of linguistic habits that have developed over many centuries and that lawyers

have learned to use quite strategically” (Tiersma, n.d.).

Additionally, Trosborg acknowledges that the specificity of legal language has given rise

to questions whether it should be treated as a separate dialect, register, or sublanguage

and in her work, she adds another category and presents legal language as a specific

field of Language for Specific Purposes (Trosborg 1997, p. 18).

The abovementioned approaches to legal language as a linguistic variety defined it as

distinct from other varieties, either with regard to its users, content or characteristic

features. However, as pointed out above, linguistic variation occurs on different levels

(Biber and Conrad, 2009, p. 9). Linguistic variety can be composed of further varieties.

Biber and Conrad point out that for example academic prose encompasses many

different kinds of publications such as research articles and textbooks (2009, p. 126). In

similar manner, legal language as a variety also contains more subgenres, subregisters

or substyles (depending on the approach of analysis).

Maley (1994) finds four such elements by dividing legal discourse into four groups,

which can be characterized as 1) the sources of law and originating points of legal

18

process, 2) pre-trial processes, 3) trial processes and 4) recording of judgment in law

reports (p. 16). For Maley, these are situations and contexts in which the language used

can be considered as legal language. For the classification itself he used semiotic and

functional approach, where linguistically, the configuration of meanings construct

a discourse type (also called register, or genre), which is realized in the text and

recognized as that particular genre. However, the discourse type is not isolated, it also

takes into consideration the social situation in which it needs to be explicated. According

to Halliday’s model, the situation is judged according to its field, tenor and mode, which

are broad categories of context (Maley 1994, p. 14). The field is when in all situation-

types, certain categories of meaning are functional, serving to express matter of content;

the dynamics of social interaction and point of view is the tenor; and the process of text

production and organization is the mode (Maley 1994, p.15). The outcome of this

theoretical assessment is visualized in the table below. Maley’s functional and semiotic

approach described above shows that legal language is shaped by the function of the

communication, meaning involved and circumstances in which it is used.

Similarly, Coulthard and Johnson (2007) distinguish legal genres as conventional,

repeated and distinctive features of text that arise from its communicative purposes

(p. 55). Coulthard and Johnson also define the key aspects of a genre as the style,

i.e. the use of lexis and syntax and just as Maley emphasize the motivation by function

and purpose (p. 61). Moreover, Coulthard and Johnson, citing Bhatia (2004), suggest

that the study of professional genres has in recent years moved from a focus on form

and structure to a focus on contextual factors in interpreting discourse and that context

has always been an important consideration for sociolinguistics (2007, p. 61).

After establishing it as a variety of the general language, Trosborg also makes additional

divisions of legal language (see table below). She distinguishes five groups within legal

language: language of the law, language of the courtroom, language in textbooks,

lawyers´ communication and people talking about law (1997, p. 20).

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With respect to the above, legal language is a significant linguistic diversity and as such

can be approached through different perspectives. The method used here is descriptive,

identifying the specifics of legal language that are most often selected as being typical of

the variety.

2.2. Characteristics of legal language

Although scholars may have not reached a satisfactory conclusion about what legal

language is, i.e. to which linguistic category it belongs, more consistent conclusions are

made about its characteristics, qualities and individual features. At this point, some of

the most characteristic features are considered.

2.2.1. Technical vocabulary

Tiersma (2006) lists technical vocabulary as the most commonly cited typical linguistic

feature of legal language. Indeed, also Mellinkoff (1963) observes that technical terms,

(he calls them “terms of art”) are a general linguistic attribute of legal language. Terms of

art are technical words with a specific meaning and every discipline has them and are

used as a medium of specific and shorthand communication. Examples of such

technical vocabulary are: dictum, injunction, novation (Mellinkoff, 1963, p. 16). Tiersma

also includes jargon into this category (p. 26).

2.2.2. Archaic, formal, unusual and difficult vocabulary

Although more linguistic features can be entered into this category, it covers all lexical

characteristics of legal language. Some of the most prominent and most frequently

discussed lexical peculiarities of legal language will be briefly discussed here.

Firstly, archaisms in legal English are widely acknowledged by many authors, among

others by Coulthard and Johnson (2007, p. 37). Mellinkoff’s analysis provides a more

detailed description of Old and Middle English, Latin and French words used in legal

contexts. The adoption of foreign language words into English is based on historical

20

development. Although the language was subject to changes and English as we know it

today evolved, in legal language particular expressions and phrases stayed as remnants

such as Old and Middle English the here- words (hereafter, herein, hereof) and

witnesseth (Mellinkoff, 1963, p. 13). Then came the international influence either direct

in the case of Latin, or indirect through French. The examples of borrowed Latin phrases

are ex contractu, ex delicto, lex loci actus, in personam (Mellinkoff, 1963, p. 14). From

French came words such as damage, judge, defendant, plaintiff (Mellinkoff, 1963, p. 15).

Apart from archaisms, common words with uncommon meanings are regarded as

a typical linguistic feature of legal language. Mellinkoff (1963) describes this peculiarity

as words that may mean something completely different to the lawyer than to a non-

lawyer, and gives examples of action and consideration. Action, according to Oxford

Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, means the process of doing something in order to make

something happen or to deal with a situation, whereas in legal context according to

Mellinkoff’s explanation it means lawsuit. Similarly, consideration, in legal language

meaning benefit of promisor or detriment to promissee, in general language denotes, as

explained in OALD, the process of doing something in order to make something happen

or to deal with a situation. Coulthard and Johnson (2007) even broaden this observation

by stating that general language can, and should, be interpreted as a legal definition, if

there is a need. As an example they offer dusk, or vehicle in situations when a statute is

to be interpreted, in order to determine whether it has been violated or not (p. 46). As

they suggest, even an expression from general language can, in certain situations and

contexts, become subject to legal scrutiny and thus be treated as a legal expression.

Another lexical peculiarity of legal language is the use of argot, specialized vocabulary

common to any group, designed with or without the intention to exclude strangers

(Mellinkoff, 1963, p. 17). The usage of archaisms, formal language and expressions with

flexible meanings either individually, or in combination can lead to the use of argot

(Mellinkoff, p. 18). Tiersma acknowledges this linguistic quality as well and names it

21

“jargon”. Both these characteristics aim at describing legal language as a set of linguistic

peculiarities used by legal professions.

Formal words are also a key characteristic of legal language. They can either be found

in the form of unaccustomed words (terms of art/technical terms), or in the polite

expressions of former days (approach the bench), euphemisms, undomesticated Latin

and French and variety of circumlocutions that “make the commonplace exalted”

(Mellinkoff, 1963, p. 19). Formulaic expressions also play are also significant in

reinforcing the formality of the context (for example the Miranda Warnings) by signalling

the start of a formal legal process (Coulthard and Johnson, 2007, p. 37).

In contrast to technical terms/terms of art, law also operates with expressions with

flexible meanings. These expressions with flexible meanings play the role of allowing the

law to be able to adapt to social changes, interpretation changes and other changes in

context, and through time. Among these expressions with broad or flexible meanings

Mellinkoff lists, for example, due care, reasonable, habitual, undue influence (1963,

p. 22). These expressions allow broad or restrictive interpretation, depending on the

case to be decided and on case law practice.

2.2.3. Impersonal constructions

Impersonal constructions are defined by Tiersma (2006) as an avoidance of first and

second person pronouns (I and you), and preference for the third person in referring to

oneself (as in this court finds) (p. 26). The avoidance of first and second person

pronouns is quite consistent in legal contexts. For example in contracts, the contracting

parties are identified as buyer, seller, promisor, promissee, lessor, lessee, and so on.

The contract is never formulated as I will do X or Y. Similarly, in court proceedings the

judge addresses people with their positions or responsibilities at the court even if they

are speaking face-to-face – the defendant, the plaintiff, the accused, the defense

attorney.

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2.2.4. Passive constructions

Law prefers verbs in passive voice, so as to hide or deflect attention from the person

who was responsible for the action (Tiersma, 2006, p. 26). As County Court Rules 39

Rule 2 (3) state: “Where a debtor is ordered to furnish a list under section 4(1)(b) of the

said Act of 1971, then, unless otherwise directed, the list shall be filed within 14 days

after the making of the order”. As a result of the passive forms of verbs used above, the

reader does not know who ordered the debtor to furnish the relevant list, or who should

file it.

2.2.5. Nominalizations

Another characteristic of legal language is the preference for nouns and nominalizations

over verbs (Tiersma, 2006, p. 26). The Export and Investment Guarantees Act 1991

Section 2 declares: “The Secretary of State may make arrangements under this section

with a view to facilitating, directly or indirectly, supplies by persons carrying on business

in the United Kingdom of goods or services to persons carrying on business outside the

United Kingdom.” The above excerpt uses nominalization instead of a verb at the

beginning of the sentence - make arrangements. Without the nominalization, with a verb,

the phrase would be the following – may arrange.

2.2.6. Long and complex sentences

Legal English tends to have long sentences, in some extreme cases going on for

hundreds of words before reaching a period and often the sentences contain high levels

of embedding (Tiersma, 2006, p. 26). Also Mellinkoff (1963) is aware of the attempts at

precision through numbering, lettering, and indexing (p. 22). It seems that this definition

only applies to written texts, since oral communication is subject to different rules. This

particular quality of legal language concerns both long sentences and highly structured

texts. An example of long sentences can be found at the very beginning of every Public

General Act in Great Britain under the coat of arms, in the long titles, e.g. in the case of

23

Transparency of Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act

2014 the text goes as follows:

“An Act to make provision for establishing and maintaining a register of persons carrying on the business of consultant lobbying and to require those persons to be entered in the register; to make provision about expenditure and donations for political purposes; to make provision about the Electoral Commission’s functions with respect to compliance with requirements imposed by or by virtue of enactments; to make provision relating to a trade union’s duty to maintain a register of members under section 24 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992; and for connected purposes.”

The structure of the text is complex in length and content, as the sentence above, which

is 94 words long and includes four clauses. Additionally, the structure can be complex in

lettering, numbering and indexing. As the complex structure of the Energy Act 2010

Section 2 Subsection 7 shows, the subsection is divided into three paragraphs (a, b, c)

and paragraphs (b) and (c) are further divided into three subparagraphs:

(7) The power under section 1(3) or (4) or under subsection (3) of this section may not be exercised— (a) to make a scheme unless all persons who would, by the exercise of the power, be participants consent to the exercise of the power; (b) to amend a scheme unless— (i) the scheme allows for the exercise of the power, (ii) regulations under section 3 allow for the exercise of the power, or (iii) all relevant persons consent to the exercise of the power; (c) to revoke a scheme unless— (i) the scheme allows for the exercise of the power, (ii) regulations under section 3 allow for the exercise of the power, or (iii) all persons who are participants consent to the exercise of the power.

Legislation is not the only case when structure is complex, and sentences are long, it

also occurs in contracts (the more complicated the subject matter, the more dense the

contract becomes). Contracts are also highly structured, numbered and lettered.

2.2.7. Wordiness and redundancy

Tiersma (2006) lists this typical linguistic feature among the most commonly cited

characteristics. Coulthard and Johnson also acknowledge this quality and add that

wordiness can be caused by repetitions, binominal expressions (by and with the advice

and consent, null and void, whether or not) and complex prepositions (in the course of,

in the event of, in view of the above, pertaining to) (2007, p. 39). The redundancy lies in

24

the fact that in the event of can be substituted for if, in view of the above can be replaced

by so, because the words and expressions have the same meaning.

2.3. Legal language and written discourse

The linguistic variety of legal language contains both written and spoken discourses.

This thesis, however, only focuses on written discourse in accordance with Trosborg’s

category language of the law. This category comprises of the genres of legislation,

contracts, deeds and wills and is distinguished from other categories such as lawyers’

communication and language of the courtroom based on the fact that it includes written

documents (1997, p. 20). I adopted this categorization for the choice of documents for

analysis.

The function of written texts is to communicate information as opposed to spoken

language, which aims rather at developing personal relationships (Biber and Conrad

2009, p. 109). Similar observation is made by Svartvik and Leech, who also differentiate

between spoken a written language in terms of interactivity (the development of personal

relationships) and informativity (communicating information). However, they do not

consider the differentiation as a strict matter, but rather introduce the spectrum of usage

– a continuum of spoken a written language. The point is that some written text types

(such as personal letters) are much closer to typical speech than some spoken varieties,

such as prepared speeches (Svartvik and Leech 2006, p. 200). Interestingly enough,

what Svartvik and Leech consider the most typical writing are official documents.

Legislation, contracts, deeds and wills can be considered to be such documents,

therefore, there are listed at the end of the continuum of written and spoken language.

Similarly, Crystal and Davy (1969) also emphasize that legal writing is as far removed

from ordinary conversation as possible (p. 1969).

Moreover, Svartvik and Leech also compare the written and spoken language in terms

of context that the speaker and hearer share. They claim that writers of typical written

texts have to be more explicit in making their meaning clear, because they do not share

25

common knowledge of context with their readers (2006, p. 201). Svartvik and Leech thus

consider typical writing as more decontextualized than typical speech. Consequently, it

can be asserted that the abovementioned typical written documents (legislation,

contracts, deeds and wills) from the end of the spoken-written continuum will also be

decontextualized.

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3. Description of the materials

The written documents chosen for the analysis are categorized in accordance with

Trosborg’s understanding of language of the law. This category comprises of the genres

of legislation, contracts, deeds and wills (Trosborg 1997, p. 20). However, legislation is

specific, because it regulates the other genres, i.e. contracts, deeds and wills. Moreover,

legislation is also strongly connected with the authoritative role of the state, which is

responsible for its issue, as opposed to contracts, deeds and wills, in which the

responsibilities lie more in the sphere of the parties involved. As Trosborg (1995)

argues, the relationship between the two parties of a contract is, symmetrical, as both

parties have something of interest to the other party (p. 32). In contrast, an asymmetrical

relationship exists between the legislative power and the citizens, in which case the

former has the authority to make rules for citizens to obey in order to maintain law and

order (1995, p. 33). Therefore, having such a different function and authority, legislation

is assumed to possess distinct specifics of deixis from the other genres. For that reason,

two additional categories of language of the law are created. Legislation is the first, and

the other consists of contracts, deeds and wills (further collectively termed as “private

documents” with regard to the opposition to legislation, which has an official connection

to the state). Similar distinction is made by Williams, who claims that the language of

legal documents can be loosely subdivided into two distinct types of text: documents that

are drafted by legislative bodies, which may range from international treaties to local

council regulations, and documents that are drafted to regulate private relationships,

e.g. business or insurance contracts, contracts of employment, contracts of sale, and

wills (Williams 2013, p. 354).

The criteria for the selection of individual documents for analysis are that their linguistic

standard is on the same level. Consequently, the forms and structures should be

homogenous, formalized, stable and balanced. For these reasons, continental Europe

had to be disregarded, because of the strong harmonization initiated by the European

27

Union. The legal systems of Member States are not unified; they are rather disintegrated

despite the EU harmonization. On the contrary, the harmonization results into more

disintegration. The jurisdictions of Member States have to absorb a certain amount of

European law and since the EU does not have effective instruments for its enforcement,

the individual Member States may differ in the implementation of EU law. As a result,

each Member State may adopt EU law differently; therefore, the disintegration is

strengthened rather than solved. Moreover, the terminology, principles, forms, customs

and traditions are dissimilar and unifying interpretation is missing. Based on this

reasoning, continental European jurisdictions (although geographically closer) do not

fulfil the condition of homogeneity, formality and stability. For this reason, the continental

legal systems are ignored and common law is used instead. This option not only

facilitates the focus to be on English language, but also helps to determine the

geographical range of the legal documents for analysis. The common law legal system,

being homogenous and stable, also enables to broaden the scope to jurisdictions of

more countries. As a result, the selection of the documents was determined by variation

in the country of their origin, but limited to documents written in English, in order to avoid

possible misinterpretations or generalizations that may occur if only one jurisdiction was

used. Both private documents and legislation from e.g. Great Britain, Canada, Australia,

United States or Scotland is used.

The topics of the legal documents (both private and legislative) are multiple. One theme

would create only a narrow scope of focus and probably would not reveal a variety of

issues. On the other hand, the more varied subject matter (or more branches of law)

involved, the wider variety of problems and specifics would be uncovered in the texts.

Therefore, the written legal documents cover the themes of health, family, business,

employment, culture, or civil relations, because the diversity is more suitable for finding

specific of deixis in written legal discourse.

Similarly, the choice of the length of the documents is also determined by the possibility

to show the specific characteristics of written legal language. One alternative is to

28

include large amounts of text (for example codices in legislation or long complex

contracts in private documents). However, such bodies of text are often homogeneous

and it is often possible to rely on an analysis of part of the text as being representative of

the text as a whole (Trosborg 1995, p. 37). Trosborg suggests that the results based on

half of the text could be multiplied to add up to 100% (1995, p. 37). This approach may

be acceptable for studies which use quantitative methods, but not for the purposes of

qualitative analysis of specific features of written legal texts. Therefore, not being able to

use quantitative methods due to the focus of the study, for the purposes of qualitative

analysis the choice of legal documents was remodelled. Texts of reasonable length were

selected (the details are described below in the respective categories of private and

legislative documents). The reason for this is that the present study does not aim at

making broad generalizations, but rather at pointing out the specifics that are not

dependent on the amount of text included/studied, but is resultant from the function and

attributes of written legal language.

3.1. Private documents

This category is represented by a will, a quitclaim deed and four contracts. Both the will

and the quitclaim deed are templates to be completed. The will is not general, but is

rather specific in that it deals with copyright and creative property in the case of the

testator’s death. The country of origin of the will is Great Britain. The quitclaim deed is of

American origin, being created by First American Financial Corporation. Both documents

are available on the Internet.

The contracts are the following: Product Sales Agreement, Employment Agreement,

Loan Agreement and the General Power of Attorney. The choice is dominated by

business-related contracts which are not connected with one company or transaction,

but are mutually independent.

The Employment Agreement and Product Sales Agreement are governed by the

jurisdiction of the United States, the Loan Agreement is Canadian, and finally, the

29

General Power of Attorney from the Office of Public Guardian in Scotland. The product

sales agreement and the employment contract are accompanied by terms and

conditions, which are incorporated into the respective contract and, therefore, are also

considered being part of the contracts. The Employment Agreement discussed is a

publicized version of an existent contract between Expedia, Inc. and its latest Executive

Vice President, whereas all the other contracts are templates with blanks to be

completed.

The length of the private documents varies from approximately 190 words (making the

Quitclaim deed the shortest document) to approximately 6300 words of the Employment

Contract. The entire sample of private documents comprises of 15247 words, the

average length of one document approximating 2200 words.

3.2. Legislation/statutes

The following legislative documents have been chosen for the review:

• The Immigration and Nationality Regulations

• Cancer Treatment Program Regulation

• Sale of Goods Act

• Human Rights Act

• Marriage Act

• Access to Information Act

• Film Licensed Investment Company Act

The legislative material for analysis consists of seven statutes, namely five Acts (primary

legislation) and two regulations (delegated legislation). The difference between primary

and secondary (sometimes also called delegated) legislation lies in the fact that the

latter allows the government to make changes to the law using powers conferred by

an Act of Parliament, usually carried out by the executive branch. The Acts of

Parliament, a primary legislation, are created by the legislative branch of the state and

30

no delegation is needed. Both primary and secondary legislation is analysed to

determine, whether the difference in the issuing branches of state governance will have

an impact on the deictic expressions used. The legislation has been chosen from the

same jurisdictions as the private documents. The Immigration and Nationality

Regulations, the Sale of Goods Act, the Human Rights Act, and the Marriage Act

originated in the United Kingdom. The Cancer Treatment Program Regulation was

drafted in Delaware, United States. The Access to Information Act is Canadian and Film

Licensed Investment Company Act regulates movie industry in Australia.

The length of the legislative documents is not easy to measure in words. However, as

pointed out above, the length is reasonable, so that it is not necessary to analyse long

codices. According to Trosborg’s views, such long documents are homogenous (1995,

p. 37) and therefore repetitive and are not appropriate for qualitative study. The length of

each legislative document can be measured in pages, the total amounting to 231 pages

of legislative documents. All the Acts were taken from the official websites of the

respective state legislation and most are analysed in the form as they were enacted,

i.e. they do not include subsequent amendments, apart from the proposed Cancer

Treatment Program Regulation from Delaware and the Canadian Access to Information

Act which was amended in 2013. Based on Williams’ claim that Schedules (i.e. lists or

inventories added at the end of some laws) do not form part of the legal provisions per

se (2013, p. 360), they were not included.

From temporal point of view, the Delaware Cancer Treatment Program Regulation and

the The Immigration and Nationality Regulations represent the most current legislation.

The Access to Information Act, although created in 1985 was amended in 2013. The

Australian Film Licensed Investment Company Act was adopted in 2005, and finally the

British legislation Human Rights Act of 1998, Sale of Goods Act 1979, Marriage Act

1949 were taken as enacted without further amendments.

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4. The analysis

4.1. Personal deixis

Sidnell (2009) lists personal pronouns I and you among the most often used personal

deictic expressions. According to Levinson’s view, personal deixis is mostly realized

through pronominal systems, but includes also calls, summons or addresses and

concerns not only speaker, but also the addressee and the audience (1985, p. 69).

Huang (2007) extensively discusses the person deixis mostly as reflected in personal

pronouns, but includes also vocatives. These are linguistic items that can be encoded in

kinship terms, titles, proper names and in their combinations (Huang 2007, p. 136).

However, as explained above in the chapter on deixis, a strict or fixed categorization of

linguistic items encoding deixis is not possible (see Huang 2007, p. 133 and Allott 2010,

p. 55). Therefore, given the specific function, characteristics and authority of written legal

language, it can be assumed that also personal deictic expressions will diverge from the

most used expressions and phrases.

As Trosborg points out, for example, all-inclusive references are not relevant in the

discourse of contracts, because only groups of people or individual members are

concerned in contracts as opposed to legislation (1997, p. 114).

In the present study, all expressions referring to persons or entities are considered and

a conclusion is drawn from their usage as deictic expressions. The persons and entities

should be understood, in accordance with legal theory, both as natural persons and

artificial legal persons, because both have the legal status of a person in legal sense

(Garner 2004, p. 1179). Therefore, linguistic items referring both to people and to

corporations (or their parts) are taken into consideration. The ignorance of the principles

of legal theory would lead to exclusion of many linguistic items and consequently may

cause misinterpretation.

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4.1.1. Private documents

4.1.1.1. The Loan Agreement

The personal references in the Loan Agreement do not include any personal pronouns,

described as the most representative example of personal deictic expressions. However,

the nature of the contract is to regulate obligations between two parties (Black’s legal

dictionary) and naturally, the parties involved have to be indicated in some way. In the

Loan Agreement, the personal references are made by common nouns. Additionally,

these personal references can be divided into two types. The first consists of nouns

such as corporation, the parties, persons, the Lender and the Borrower. This category of

nouns is specified in the opening of the Agreement, therefore, their meaning is specified

with regard to this particular Agreement and external context is not necessary for the

expressions to be understood precisely. On the other hand, if these nouns were to be

separated from the document, they would acquire general meaning and would be

disconnected from the Loan Agreement. In addition, the context for interpretation is

needed in order to fully comprehend the terms. However, the context is highly specific,

because the required details are explicitly stated in the document that uses the general

nouns as a personal reference. Therefore, as the information (normally having to be

inferred from external context) is present in the Agreement, no inference is needed. The

second category of personal expressions in this Agreement consists of nouns and

phrases such as receiver, receiver and manager, agent liquidator or other similar

administrator, employee or other representative of the Lender, respective successors

and assigns. These terms, as opposed to the category above, reach beyond the

document. The references to persons lie within the branch of Company Law and as such

are firmly fixed with the roles the denoted people play, in what situations and what their

rights and obligations are. Although these concepts are not limited to the text of the

Agreement and extend further and refer to outside concepts, the only inference that the

reader or interpreter of the contract, or the party to it, has to make, is that these are

33

widely recognized legal concepts of Company Law and as such are satisfactorily defined

elsewhere. The only piece of contextual information needed in this case is the

background knowledge about legal system and the concepts it regulates. As opposed to

the previous category of personal expressions, these specific concepts of Company Law

will not change their meaning if set in a different document. However, although the terms

are defined by law, the physical person behind the general meaning will always depend

on the relevant situation. That being so, in order to determine who the receiver,

employee or successor is in person set of circumstances relevant in time and location

have to be taken into account. Legally binding documents such as contracts are

generally written with the aim of regulating existing situations for the present and the

future (Williams 2005: 84-91). Therefore, the personal references used may be irrelevant

at one point in time, but in the future, they may become meaningful. For example, the

company does not have any successor until it is decided that the company will vest its

rights (e.g. through amalgamation or consolidation) to another company (Garner 2004,

p. 1473). Then this latter company becomes a successor and a general term becomes

specific due to the change in context.

4.1.1.2. The Employment Agreement

Similarly to the Loan Agreement, the Employment Agreement does not make references

to persons by personal pronouns and as a replacement for them, it again uses common

nouns. The Executive, the company, the Employee and the parties again are used as

defined in the first sentence of the Agreement and, as a result, the context needed for

their interpretation is embedded in the document. In addition, the Employment

Agreement makes personal references to other persons than to the parties to the

contract. The merger and successor are external entities involved in case of conveyance

of titles connected with the company, whereas other employees, officers, directors,

agents, consultants, independent contractors refer to persons within the company. The

merger and successor depend on context in similar manner to abovementioned receiver,

34

agent, employee and successor of the Loan Agreement in that they not only are general

terms specified by the usage in the relevant branch of law, but also that they require

context to identify the physical persons behind. However, the employees, officers,

directors, agents, consultants, independent contractors referring to persons within the

company are not terms defined by law, but are also context-dependent. In order to

associate the positions of directors, agents or consultants with actual people, it has to be

known who occupies the relevant position.

4.1.1.3. The Product Sales Agreement

The Product Sales Agreement does not differ from the previous contracts in that it uses

common nouns instead of personal pronouns to make references to persons such as

Seller, Customer, parties, person or entity. Additionally, Seller’s representatives and

parent company, affiliates, contractors, subcontractors, consultants, employees, agents

and vendors (collectively termed the Indemnitees) share the context-dependence of

terms not defined by law, but interpretable in terms of awareness of social relations

within and without the company.

4.1.1.4. The General Power of Attorney

The most noticeable contrast between the General Power of Attorney (hereinafter

referred to as “GPA”) and the each of the abovementioned contracts is that it frequently

uses personal pronoun I and, possessive pronoun my. For the other party to the

contract, for the appointed person a common noun attorney is used. Moreover, the

common noun is almost in all cases modified by the possessive pronoun my. Also, both

parties are expected to be identified by their names in the preamble of this form. Other

references are made to persons, bankers, brokers, solicitors counsel, accountants,

managers, factors or agents, children or other dependants. Again, this usage of common

nouns results from the aim of the GPA of regulating existing situations for the future and

the common nouns are filled with meaning through context only after the situation

becomes relevant and the circumstances known.

35

4.1.1.5. The Quitclaim Deed

The Quitclaim Deed uses both common nouns and personal and possessive pronouns

to make references to persons. The persons involved should (concluding from the blank

spaces to be completed) be identified primarily by names. However, common nouns

such as declarant, agent, person and entity are used apart from personal pronouns I, he,

she, they. The usage of personal pronouns is not repetitive and the one instance is used

anaphorically. Also possessive pronouns his, her, their are referring to persons involved.

4.1.1.6. The Will

The will uses common nouns, personal and possessive pronouns and names to identify

persons. The common noun special trustees is used cataphorically, because it is

specified by providing a list of names only after the phrase is used three times before.

The executor is defined by name in the second article of the will. The usage of personal

pronouns includes I, he, she and possessive pronouns his, her.

The usage of personal deictic expressions of the above documents showed distinct

characteristics. The category of private documents within a wider category of written

legal discourse proved to be further differentiated. Contracts appear to share features,

which the will and deed do not possess and consequently can be viewed as a subgroup

of private documents as far as personal deixis is concerned. The specifics that the Loan

Agreement, the Employment Agreement and The Product Sales Agreement share is that

they do not use neither personal nor possessive pronouns. The typical deictic

expressions do not occur in contracts and, as a result of this, personal deixis is created

differently. In most cases, the reliance on context was visible in common nouns such as

affiliates, contractors, subcontractors, accountants, manager, agent liquidator,

administrator. Behind these common, in certain situations and according to the context,

physical people can be identified. What is more, these common nouns, apart from

referring to certain people (by the deictic usage), also make reference to general legal

36

terms specified for the relevant branch of law by statutes and precedents. These terms

are interchangeable with the persons they deictically refer to (e.g. John Smith the agent

liquidator). Therefore, the statutes and precedents which specify the legal term involved

in the deictic usage form an important part of the context of the linguistic items used for

the reference.

It is important to point out, however, that common nouns are not used exclusively in

contracts, but in limited numbers are found also in the Quitclaim Deed, in the Will and

the GPA. The common nouns with such specific deictic function are most often found in

long lists (Loan Agreement, the Employment Agreement and The Product Sales

Agreement, the GPA).

The GPA, although similar in function to the other analysed contracts (it regulates the

obligations between two parties – the attorney and the principal), the deictic expressions

used consist more of personal pronouns than of common nouns. The reason for this is

that the template has been issued by the Office of the Public Guardian, which is a public

body. The Scottish Executive (under which the Office of the Public Guardian belongs)

should follow the instructions given in a booklet on Plain Language and Legislation

issued by the Office of the Scottish Parliamentary Counsel. This booklet advocates that

the aim of plain language drafting is not to make matters simple but to express them in

the simplest way available (p. 9). Perhaps it can be concluded that, in accordance with

this manual, personal pronouns were preferred over other, more complexless simple

linguistic items.

Moreover, the absence of pronominal system shows that even though labelled as typical

deictic expressions, they are not deictic exclusively and other linguistic items can

perform deictic role. What is more, the usage of pronouns themselves also does not

automatically make them deictic. Sometimes they may be used anaphorically and refer

only to preceding linguistic item such as it happens in the Quitclaim Deed with he, she,

they. These personal pronouns refer only to the complex phrase person(s) whose

name(s) is/are subscribed to the within instrument. The usage of personal pronouns is

37

determined by the aim of creating a clearer text, but no external context for interpretation

is needed, they only refer to what has been specified earlier in the sentence.

4.1.2. Legislation

Legislative writing is highly impersonal and decontextualized, in the sense that the

illocutionary force holds independently of whoever is the sender (originator) or the

receiver of the document (Trosborg 1997, p. 103). The generality of the document

coupled with the abstract and referential nature of written medium is in contrast to the

concrete and deictic nature of speech. This is likely to influence the choice of

perspective in statutes. Even though the drafter, in principle, has a choice between

addressing the citizens directly, a third person point of view is more likely to be chosen.

A third person view reduces the immediacy of the illocution but adds to the generality of

the message. Besides, it serves the purpose of creating social distance between sender

and receiver (Trosborg 1997, p. 103).

The personal expressions implemented in legislation can be divided into three

categories based on the persons they refer to. The first group contains references made

to individuals who do not have any connection with state or administration; they do not

hold any offices. The key noun in all the expressions (except the applicant) is person.

This isolated noun would, from pragmatic perspective, require more information (from

the context) to be properly understood. The information needed here is provided by the

text in the immediate proximity of the noun. The person is thus specified by relative

clauses such as:

1) (person) who has been made a party to criminal proceedings;

2) (person) who claims that a public authority has acted (or proposes to act) in

a way which is made unlawful;

3) person who meets all technical, financial, and residency requirements of this

regulation;

4) a person who is an associate of the person by any other application, person

38

who has been granted humanitarian protection under the immigration rules;

5) person who by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to

contract;

These relative clauses add enough specification to the individual noun, the result being

that pragmatic interpretation through context is not necessary for maximum

understanding. The personal expressions referring to people without connection to the

state or the administration, do not, as opposed to the common nouns referring to

physical people in the abovementioned private documents, point to a particular

individual directly. The purpose of legislation in general is to provide rules, which should

be observed by citizens of the state issuing the rules. The authority of the legislature is

in this respect unquestionable (Trosborg 1995, p. 50). The legislation does not itself

point to individual people and their responsibilities automatically but only concerns those

to whom the particular Act is relevant. Trosborg (1995) points out that there is a distance

between the legislature and the body of addressees, who are never directly addressed.

In this case, for example, the phrases listed above – the legislation uses such phrases,

because it is not able to determine exactly who the person involved is or ever will be

(e.g. by name, address, position, etc.). Rather, fully in accordance with the aim of

legislation to be general and to prescribe rules to an unspecified number of citizens, this

specification by relative clauses is sufficient. Therefore, the relative clauses modifying

the common noun person make the linguistic element context independent. Additionally,

Trosborg (1997) in her later work also points out that the references to the citizens as

the regulated part is not a problem as long as the act extends to all citizens (p. 105).

However, the abovementioned instances of person being modified by longer phrases is

the case when it must be specified to whom the act extends (Trosborg 1997, p. 105).

On the other hand, there are also expressions without person as a key noun modified by

relative clause. They are, similarly to the private documents above, common nouns such

as clergyman, sister, relative, officer, applicant, uninsured, seller, and buyer. At first, this

expression in isolation appears to be a general term and for the purposes of proper

39

understanding it seems that interpretation from the context is needed. However, no

external context or additional information is required, because the terms are explained

for the purpose of the relevant act or regulation. Consequently, these linguistic items are

again used non deictically and can be included in Halliday and Hasan’s category of

textual endophora, because the expressions refer to a thing as identified in the previous

text (1992, p. 33). In this particular example of legislative discourse, the reader does not

reach outside the acts or regulations to determine who is the clergyman, sister, relative,

officer, applicant, uninsured, seller, and buyer. By using structure of the respective

section, the reader is not required to reach out of the legislation for the understanding of

the applicant. To pragmatically summarize the category of expressions pointing to

individual people not connected with state or administration in the analysed legislation

and regulations, the information needed for understanding are present in the text either

in the immediate proximity of the noun modified by relative clauses or in the preceding

provision. The terms used are precise even without context, therefore, are independent

on context, which is fully in accordance with the character and the aim of legislation.

The second category of expressions referring to personal entities is concerned with

bodies and authorities of institutions. These bodies are defined either by common law or

by European Union law. The examples include House of Parliament, Commission,

Committee of Ministers, Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Delaware Health and

Social Services. Thus, they are similar to legal terms that appeared in the analysis of the

private documents in the sense that they have to be recognized as such, but they are so

firmly set in the system and so comprehensively regulated that no extra context is

needed. Correspondingly, also the bodies and organizational elements of institutions

have roles ascribed, tasks assigned and procedures set by the wider context of the

whole legal system. The only expression, which does not fit this description, is a court in

the Human Rights Act, in the Sale of Goods Act (in the Marriage Act and the Information

Access Act it is explained by textual endophora). Nevertheless, the difference does not

mean that pragmatic inference through context is automatically needed for the

40

information to be obtained so as to fully comprehend the term. Structure of the Act is

itself enough to provide the necessary information. The argument will be shown on the

Human Rights Act, the same reasoning applies on the Sale of Goods Act. The court is

used in Sec. 9 subs. 2 of the Human Rights Act. The situation in which the term is

placed and used in is expressed in Sec. 9 subs. 1. From this section, the reader is lead

to Sec. 7 subs. 1 paragraph a) for the specification of the situation and of the context the

term is used in. Thus, the reader progresses from the isolated term to the situation it

belongs through reference. However, the process is not completed, because

Sec. 7 subsection 1 paragraph a) does not explain the term per se. Rather, it states that

the proceeding is brought under this Act in the appropriate court or tribunal. Here,

knowledge of legal system as a whole comes into play and inference has to be made as

far as how to determine which court or tribunal is appropriate. This is a question of

procedure and the answer can be found either in the Civil Procedure Rules or in Courts

and Legal Services Act 1990. Therefore, only with the aid of inference in combination

with structure of the Act is the reader able to discover what is hidden under the plain

term the court. In this respect, the term is not so firmly set in the text of the Act itself (as

the applicant above), but in order to arrive at a satisfactory meaning, inference has to be

made. The inference mainly consists of the knowledge where to possibly find the

appropriate court or tribunal. As a result, in the case of a court, the reliance on the text of

the Act for the obtainment of meaning is not as straightforward as above.

The third category of personal expressions deals with functions or offices held by

individuals such as Secretary of State, Minister, The Governor in Council. Similarly to

the bodies and institutions, the offices are governed by law and as such the terms are

fixed. The holder of a judicial office does not fit this description of legally regulated

terms. To be more precise, it is a very general term if it stands as it is, in isolation. It is

used in Section. 18 subs. 2 at the beginning of a sentence. As in examples in categories

above, structural reading can supply the substantial content of such general term. Thus,

from structural perspective, Sec. 18 subs. 1 contains an accurate list of what functions

41

fit the description of judicial office. From this follows that the holder of a judicial office is

not a general term and has specific meaning in the context of the Human Rights

Act 1998.

Pronominal systems are present in some legislative documents, but they are not used

deictically. For example, his and their in the Sale of Goods Act, and similarly in the

Marriage Act, the Film Licensed Investment Company Act and Access to Information Act

are always used anaphorically. Anaphora allows a speaker/writer to recall to the

consciousness of a hearer/reader entities or concepts that have already been introduced

into a discourse (Botley 2000, p. 2). Therefore, the personal and possessive pronouns

are not used deictically, but point to what has been already mentioned in the discourse.

An example of this issue is given from the Sale of Goods Act. In section 45 subsection 6

the Act states: “Where the carrier or other bailee or custodier wrongfully refuses to

deliver the goods to the buyer or his agent in that behalf, the transit is deemed to be at

an end”. In this sentence, the pronoun his only refers to the buyer. Without the pronoun,

the phrase would need to be buyer’s agent. Similarly, in the Australian Film Licensed

Investment Company Act their only refers to shareholders mentioned earlier in the

following sentence: “Shareholders whose shares are affected by a decision under this

paragraph lose their entitlement to a deduction for the shares.”

Legislative writing is highly impersonal and decontextualized. Trosborg explains it in

terms that the illocutionary force holds independently of whoever is the sender

(originator) or the receiver of the document (1997, p. 103). The generality of the

document coupled with the abstract and referential nature of written medium is in

contrast to the concrete and deictic nature of speech. This is likely to influence the

choice of perspective in statutes. Even though the drafter, in principle, has a choice

between addressing the citizens directly, a third person point of view is more likely to be

chosen. A third person view reduces the immediacy of the illocution but adds to the

generality of the message. Besides, it serves the purpose of creating social distance

between sender and receiver (Trosborg 1997, p. 103).

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4.2. Spatial deixis

Spatial deixis “concerns the specification of locations relative to anchorage points in the

speech event” and can be specified relative to other objects or fixed reference points or,

they can be deictically specified relative to the position of participants at the time of

speaking (Levinson, 1985, p. 79). In Huang’s terms, space deixis is concerned with the

specification of the situation in space relative to that of the parties to the conversation at

CT (coding time) in a speech event (2007, p. 149). According to Allott’s observations,

spatial deixis (also known as space or place deixis) is encoded by adverbs (here, there)

demonstratives and demonstrative phrases (e.g. this, that), certain adjectives (e.g. local,

nearby), particles (away, hither) and verbs (e.g. come, go), as well as phrases such as

on the right of, in front of (2010, p. 57).

With regard to the above, spatial deixis, encoded by the usage of the typical linguistic

expressions or phrases, is employed for the location in space (at the time of utterance).

Considering the characteristics, structure and function of written legal documents (both

private and legislative), spatial deixis is used in a different way or is not used at all.

4.2.1. Private documents

The analysis of spatial deixis of private documents is less complex than that of personal

deixis. The documents employ spatial information only scarcely and distinction between

the types of documents is missing (contracts and the Will and Deed).

The spatial expressions found in private documents do not allow for the interpretation in

contexts, because they are so accurate and specific that they should not be considered

as deictic. It does not mean that deictic expressions are not precise, but rather

incomplete without the context. In the case of private documents, the spatial expressions

used consist mostly of exact addresses or exact indications of places. For example in all

private documents except the Will the parties involved are identified by the usage of their

home address or registered office (if the address is not explicit, there is at least a blank

43

cell which indicates that address of the person is to be filled in). The Will, the Quitclaim

Deed and the GPA also feature an exact place where the document has been executed.

Additionally, the Loan Agreement, the Product Sales Agreement and the Employment

Agreement implement a spatial expression is the clauses in which the documents are

set within a jurisdiction governing them.

Consequently, all the expressions are either geographical names of the city, province or

addresses of the parties or persons involved and as such do not have to be interpreted

in any context, they are comprehensible as they are.

4.2.2. Legislation

As far as spatial expressions in the legislative documents are concerned, in the number

they are fewer than personal expressions. It is not surprising, because in most Acts or

other legislative instruments (apart from exceptions dealing with geographical issues) it

is assumed that no geographical delimitation is needed. The legislation, based on

democratic political principles, concerns the whole state. Thus, the jurisdiction of the

Acts is not based on what the individual Act determines, but on broad political and

constitutional principles. Thus, the spatial expressions in legislation are scarce.

The situation of British Acts is slightly different, however. The United Kingdom of Great

Britain, consisting of four regions: of England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland

often needs to determine which region has its own rules within the Act. The regions have

their history, language heritage, policies and to a certain extent differ across these

regions from one another, and also from England. Naturally, because the variation lies

mainly in the geographical remoteness from England’s centralized government and of

course historical factors such as the gradual and diverse settlement of the Isles. This

division is visible in all Acts with their jurisdiction based in Great Britain: The Immigration

and Nationality Regulations, Human Rights Act, Marriage Act, Sale of Goods Act.

As far as deixis is concerned, such expressions have to be interpreted in a context, if

they are to be fully understood. In this case of spatial expressions in/of England and

44

Wales, in Scotland, in Northern Ireland, Australia, Channel Islands, Canada no context

is needed for their interpretation, because they are geographical specifications. The

same applies for the phrase in any part of the UK in the Human Rights Act, although it

may seem that it is more general than the previous ones and may need context for

a proper understanding. However, the expression is not unspecific, it only encompasses

more entities within the scope of its reference.

Apart from geographical localization, some acts contain other references. The Marriage

Act and the Sale of Goods Act, among other issues, regulate sites in which marriage can

be solemnized, places in which banns can be publicized and in the case of Sale of

Goods Act the delivery of goods. Therefore, it seems that the subject matter determines

the frequency and usage of spatial expressions. However, the usage of these phrases

(in the parish church, in register offices, goods delivered at a distant place) is

decontextualized. Either the common noun (place) is modified so as not to allow for

ambiguity or vagueness (place other than that where they are when sold (Sec. 33 Sale

of Goods Act), place of publication of banns (Sec. 6 The Marriage Act), places in which

marriage can be solemnized (Sec. 15 The Marriage Act) or the common noun is defined

in the Interpretation section of the act (parish Sec. 78 The Marriage Act).

The typical spatial deictic expressions mentioned in the introductory section above such

as here, there, this, that do not occur in the spatial context in legislation. In the

Australian Film Licensed Investment Company Act, that occurs often, but mainly in the

sentences such as:

1) If the Minister is of the opinion that there may be grounds for deciding that the

FLIC is in breach of a condition of the scheme, the Minister must (…).

2) A person commits an offence if the acquisition has the result, in relation to the

FLIC, that if an unacceptable foreign ownership situation already exists in relation

to the FLIC because there is a group of foreign persons who hold, in total,

a particular type of stake in the FLIC of more than 33% (…).

45

Although it can be expected that the meaning of there is deictic, i.e. it can only be

defined relative to the time and place of a particular utterance (Biber 1999, p. 560), in

the abovementioned examples there is used as the so-called existential there. As Biber

observes, this construction serves to introduce new information, usually in the form of an

indefinite noun phrase later in the clause (here grounds, a group) (Biber 199, p. 154). As

a result, there is used in an ordinary subject position and has a different function than

the usual spatial deictic.

Judging from their usage in private documents, here, there, this, that may also signal

discourse deixis, therefore, they are analysed in the respective section on discourse

deixis.

4.3. Temporal deixis

Time deixis is concerned with the encoding of temporal points and spans relative to the

time at which an utterance is produced in a speech event (Huang 2007, p. 144).

Temporal deixis is manifested in the usage of tense, time adverbs and other time-deictic

morphemes, and is connected either to relatively fixed point of interest or they can be

used to locate events in absolute time (Levinson, 1983). In short, temporal deixis makes

temporal references in relation to something or without any referential point,

i.e. absolutely. Allott also differentiates between the relative (now, then, last year, this

morning, tonight, . . . ago) and absolute (e.g. in 1999) references (2010, p. 58).

Given the attempts of legal writers to be unambiguous (Crystal and Davy 1969, p. 194),

it is to be expected that the absolute references will be more frequent than the relative

and the other possible temporal deictic expressions will not be relevant or will be used

non-deictically.

4.3.1. Private documents

One of the most frequent encodings of temporal deixis occurs through verb tense

(Levinson 1983, Huang 2007, p. 148). An interesting phenomenon in this connection is

46

the usage of shall. According to Kimble’s views, shall is to be used only in the modal

form in legal discourse, to imply an obligation. Kimble points out:

Shall originally meant obligation or compulsion, from Old English and Germanic words meaning “to owe”. It was a finite verb that gradually, over centuries, developed into an auxiliary. So did the modal will, which originally carried the sense of volition. Because obligations and intentions concern future conduct, and because English verbs lack a true future form, shall and will came naturally to be used with future time. In short, through evolution, they can now work in two ways: to express modal meanings or to mark future time. To distinguish these two uses, a set of rules developed, or were prescribed, or both. Use shall to express plain future in the first person. Use will to express plain future in the second and third persons. Do just the reverse to convey modal meanings (Kimble 1992, p. 62).

According to Kimble’s research on authorities among legal drafters, they insist that shall

must be used for modal meaning only despite the fact that shall can also be used to

refer to the future. Biber in his Grammar of spoken and written English (1999), for

example, asserts that central modal verbs (to which shall belongs) can also be used to

make time distinctions even though they are not formally marked for tense. For example,

shall and will can be used to refer to the future time (Biber 1999, p. 484).

However, Kimble emphasizes that, in contracts, shall must be used to prescribe an

obligation. If has a duty to can be substituted for shall, then the usage is correct (Kimble

1992, p. 64). Therefore, Kimble argues that the usage of shall for future reference is

incorrect, or more, that it is the misuse of shall and creates confusion and ambiguity

(1992, p. 61). This debate is important to determine whether shall is used deictically to

refer to the future or whether its use is decontextualized and only denotes an obligation.

The private documents contain the usage of shall in both future and modal forms. The

following sentences imply and obligation:

1) Notwithstanding any other provision of this Will, after my death, my

executor (…) shall (has a duty to) transfer all of the Creative Property to the

special trustees named in this Will (…).

2) The Company shall (has a duty to) indemnify and hold Employee harmless

for acts and omissions in Employee's capacity as an officer, director or

employee of the Company to the maximum extent permitted under applicable

47

law (…).

3) Seller shall (has a duty to) sell to Customer, and Customer shall (has a duty

to) purchase from Seller, the Product (…).

In other instances, however, the verb is used in different ways than to imply an

obligation:

1) In this Loan Agreement, unless the context otherwise requires, the following

words and phrases shall have the meaning set out below.

2) Notwithstanding delivery of the Product or any other provision of these

Terms, title to the Product shall not pass to Customer until the Seller has

received payment in full (…).

3) All documents which may be granted by my Attorney to whatever person or

persons shall be equally valid and binding as if granted by me.

4) The expiration of the Term shall not give rise to any payment to Executive or

acceleration obligation under this Section 1(d).

5) All income and principal of the Creative Property Trust (…) shall be

distributed immediately upon receipt to_________.

The modal usage of shall is not relevant for the analysis for temporal deixis, because it

prescribes obligations to the relevant parties. However, the other usages are more

interesting. Assuming that contracts apply into the future (Kimble 1992, p. 64), it can be

concluded that they should be written in the future tense and, therefore, use temporal

deixis. However, Kimble suggests that this assumption is wrong and in most cases

drafting convention and modern idiom require the present tense, because shall is rather

misused for the indication of the legal result or conditional (sentence 2 above) and

relative clause (1992, p. 65). Therefore, from the temporal deixis perspective, shall in

private documents is not only used to express obligation, but also to emphasize the

future reference and consequently the permanence of the contract. These future

references are indicated by non-human subject (the words and phrases, title to the

Product, the expiration).

48

The execution of all private documents is identified by an exact date, as well are other

situations such as the date of repayment of the loan, the day of delivery, the starting

days of set periods. All these are set firmly in the calendar without the need to extract

external info from any context, therefore, deixis is not relevant in such cases. Moreover,

also adverbs of time denoting temporal frequency are used non-deictically such as

annually, biweekly (in the Employment Agreement).

The abovementioned adverbs are used non-deictically, but there are more examples of

decontextualised expressions such as business day in the Loan Agreement. It is used

twice in Agreement, in both cases to set the deadlines in Articles 6.1 (a) and (b).

Although it may seem that it is a feature originating in general language and would need

further context as far as the country and its cultural specifics are concerned, in this case

this is not so. Business day is specified at the opening of the Agreement in the first

Article as specifically as possible (“a day other than a Saturday, Sunday or public

holiday and on which banks are open for business in Toronto, Ontario”). The explication

of an expression of general language at the beginning of the Agreement makes the

context unnecessary. What needs to be known about the content that the expression

business day carries, is limited to the text of the Agreement itself. Therefore, a phrase

that would in particular conditions need context for its proper interpretation is in the case

of Loan Agreement decontextualised by clarifying the phrase in the document.

However, there are linguistic elements or phrases that have to be interpreted in the

context and can be regarded as deictic. One of these expressions is immediately in

Article 6.2 (a) of the Loan Agreement (but also occurring in Terms and Conditions of the

Employment Agreement and in the last sentence of the Will). The entire sentence in the

Loan Agreement says that “upon the occurrence of any event of Default, the Lender may

declare all entire principle amount and interest to be immediately due and payable.” Its

temporal character is not set in relation to another action (for example, immediately after

the declaration) and in this case means at once, without delay. In the case of dispute

whether the amount declared due and payable has been paid in the prescribed manner,

49

the context would be needed for the qualification. For example, the court would take into

consideration how the announcement was sent (by e-mail, by mail, by phone, and so on)

by the Borrower to the Lender, or if there were force majeure obstacles, which the

Lender could not overcome. From this point of view, it can be concluded that one

expression in the set of fifteen temporal expressions is deictic and for its accurate

interpretation in the case of a dispute, context would be needed. Similarly, in the

Employment Agreement “the right to use the product shall immediately cease” and in the

Will “the income (…) shall be immediately distributed” show that this circumstance

adverbial is used deictically. According to the Longman grammar of spoken and written

English, the circumstance adverbials add information about the action or state described

in the clause, answering questions such as how, when, where, how much, to what

extent and why? (Biber 2000, p. 763). It is clear that the question how answered

immediately is not enough for written legal discourse. “It is impossible to lay down any

hard and fast rule as to what is the meaning of the word ‘immediately’ in all cases.

Whether there has been such an action is a question of fact, having regard to the

circumstances of the particular case.” Therefore, the context has to be taken into

consideration in order to determine the precise meaning of the word.

4.3.2. Legislation

It is important to point out that in conformity with explanation that follows, the typical

English temporal deictic expressions such as next year, tomorrow, now, as soon as

possible are missing in the legislative discourse for the following reasons. Firstly, the

legislative discourse is prescriptive in nature. It ascribes rights and imposes obligations

on its receivers and its purpose would not be successful with general expressions like

those above. Secondly, from the perspective of authority of legislation in general, it

would also not be viewed as beneficial to use expressions (in this case temporal) with a

low level of formality.

50

From the point of view of tenses, which also encode temporal deixis, law contains

relatively few references to the past (Williams 2013, p. 358). The reason for this may be

that legislation regulates existing situations for the present and the future (Williams

2005: 84-91). Similarly to the private documents, shall represents a particular issue from

the perspective of possible future deictic reference. As Williams (2013) observes, law

uses shall for variety of meanings, from firm obligation to simple declarations, for

example, in definition provisions (p. 359). The latter usage does not have any obligatory

force and Williams recommends present tense as more suitable instead of shall,

because it has been used ubiquitously in legal texts for centuries and it has accumulated

several different meanings which, make shall ambiguous (2013, p. 353). Also, Kimble

claims that shall is the most misused word in legal vocabulary (1992, p. 61). However,

as Williams shows in his study, the usage of shall has either disappeared or else its use

has been drastically reduced with respect to the 1970s (2013, p. 359). Also in the

sample of analysed legislative documents, the most recent such as The Immigration and

Nationality (Fees) Regulations 2014 and the 2005 Australian Film Licensed Investment

Company Act do not use shall at all.

In the analysed sample of legislative documents, shall appears in the following

sentences:

1) (…) the person who published (the banns) shall (has a duty to) (…) give

a certificate of publication.

2) The designated Minister shall cause to be published, on a periodic basis not

less frequently than once each year, a publication (…).

3) No person shall obstruct the Information Commissioner or any person acting

on behalf or under the direction of the Commissioner.

4) Where in a contract of sale the seller is in breach of any term of the contract

(express or implied), the buyer shall be entitled to claim damages (…).

The modal shall typically expresses obligation in legal acts (21.4%), shall is used to

express the illocutionary force of an order (Trosborg 1995, p. 42). The first sentence

51

communicates an obligation towards the person who published the banns, therefore, it is

not relevant for the analysis of temporal deixis. However, the remaining three sentences

are more open to debate. Similarly to the private documents, based on Kimble’s claim

that contracts and legislation apply into the future (Kimble 1992, p. 64), and Biber’s

assertion that example shall can be used to refer to the future time (Biber 1999, p. 484),

it can be concluded that the remaining instances of the usage of shall could be regarded

as temporal deictic, because they point to the future. The three remaining sentences

above certainly do not prescribe an obligation, because shall cannot be substituted by

has a duty to (Kimble 1992, p. 64). However, although it seems that all three instances

of shall could be replaced by will, the situation is more complicated. According to

Trosborg’s study, the modal shall is also used widely in directives to state rules

according to which the law in question operates without mentioning an agent or shall is

used in constitutive statements with non-human subjects (Trosborg 1995, p. 42).

Additionally, Kimble points out that shall is employed in statements describing legal

results, in false imperatives, imposing duties on wrong persons, or making unclear

statements about where the duty falls (1992, p. 64-6). The phrase Minister shall cause

to be published is an example of imposing duty on the wrong person, since Minister

should only initiate the publication, he does not publish anything. No person shall

obstruct is a phrase in which false imperative is employed, because it only describes the

legal result – the work of Information Commissioner should not be obstructed in any

way. The phrase stating that the buyer shall be entitled makes an unclear observation

about who should pay the damages to the buyer, i.e. the statement is ambiguous as far

as where the duty falls. Therefore, assuming that these sentences represent the variety

of usage of shall in the analysed legislative documents, it can be concluded that shall,

despite Biber’s claim that shall can be used to indicate future, does not encode temporal

deixis in written legislative documents.

The temporal expressions can be further divided according to the purpose they fulfil. The

first category sets periods within which it is possible to achieve something (e.g. Human

52

Rights Act Sec. 16 subs. 6 paragraph b. or Sec. 7 subs. 5). From the pragmatic

perspective, the periods are set very precisely, in most cases by determining the exact

date on which they begin, plus and exact temporal delimitation of how long they last. For

example, Sec. 33 subs. 3 of the Marriage Act states:

The applicable period, in relation to a marriage, is the period beginning with the

day on which the notice of marriage was entered in the marriage notice book

and ending—

(a) in the case of a marriage which is to be solemnized in pursuance of section

26(1)(dd), 37 or 38, on the expiry of three months; and

(b) in the case of any other marriage, on the expiry of twelve months.

From the pragmatic point of view, this category is also well-specified for the prescriptive

purposes of legislation, because it is possible to identify an accurate beginning and end

of the period and assess the situation correspondingly. It seems that, in these particular

cases, no context for interpretation is needed.

The only point of possible dispute can lie in the four days mentioned in the Human

Rights Act in Section 16 subs. 6 paragraph b or seven days from the Marriage Act, Sec.

27 subs. 1 paragraph a) or seven months, twelve months as mentioned in the Sec. 33

subs. 3 of the Marriage Act above. Sometimes, it may be uncertain whether the initial

day of the actual even should be counted as well or not, especially if the respective

House is adjourned in the afternoon, for example. However, legal theory provides

a solution, because it prescribes principles on how time should be counted. If the legal

theory fails to provide such principles, then, in the common law legal system, the

precedents follow as a source of such information. Thus, the temporal expression four

days may be regarded as not exact enough. However, the solution for its interpretation

and specification lies in the context of legal studies and practices.

The third category aims at setting a particular moment in time. Pragmatically speaking,

the coming to force on the passing of this Act in the Human Rights Act points to

a particular date. Context may be needed to determine what passing (of the Act) means.

53

It can be a moment when the Queen signs the Act or when the Act is officially published.

These dates can, but may not, carry the same significance. Although passing is not

a temporal expression standing in isolation, in the entire phrase it is essential to fill it with

context to be properly understood. Again, the context is well-known to educated lawyers,

who would not hesitate as to the meaning of passing of the Act. On the other hand,

perhaps lay people would not understand so easily and a short research would be

necessary for them to comprehend the whole phrase properly and arrive successfully at

a date on which the Act came into force. Similarly, the Sale of Goods Act (Sec. 17 subs.

1) states: where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods the

property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract

intend it to be transferred. Again, the transfer of the goods should be performed at

specific time and this expression designates the point in time by making the intention of

the parties a relevant factor. The intention of the parties, however, may be a disputable

term, and so subs. 2 of Sec. 17 specifies how the aim of the parties should be

ascertained. Therefore, it can be concluded that expressions designating to point to

a particular moment in time are decontextualized either by the application of general

concepts of legal theory or by providing explanations and guidelines for their

interpretation in textual endophoric manner.

To summarize, the temporal expressions are either independent on context and

pragmatic inference, or, in some cases, is the context relevant as a source of

information needed for the full understanding, but it remains always within the scope of

legal profession, sometimes it is even the knowledge of an educated lawyer.

4.4. Discourse deixis

Huang describes discourse deixis as concerned with the use of a linguistic expression

within some utterance to point to the current, preceding or following utterances in the

same spoken or written discourse (2007, p. 172). Discourse deixis “has to do with the

encoding of reference to portions of the unfolding discourse in which the utterance

54

(which includes the referring expression) is located” (Levinson, 1985, p. 62). Put simply,

discourse deictics are expressions and phrases that navigate the reader or hearer

through spoken or written text.

4.4.1. Private documents

Discourse deixis is the most prominent deictic category in written private documents. It

occurs in all examined documents and mostly in large numbers. Discourse deixis in

private documents can be further divided into four types.

The first type is also one of the most often cited characteristics of legal language as

a whole: the here- and there- words. Interestingly enough, they are used exclusively

deictically. Crystal and Davy (1969) describe these expressions as consisting of an

adverbial word or place to which preposition-like word has been suffixed (p. 207).

Crystal and Davy further assert that these words are used for precise references,

especially to documents or its parts (1969, p. 208).

Another use discourse deixis identified in the private documents is the reference to

external documents. Although discourse deixis is said to only navigate the reader

through written or spoken text, a reference to external texts in written legal discourse

can be included. The reason is that the references to external documents incorporate

the text into the document. The Employment Agreement incorporates the Internal

Revenue Code by prescribing the Executive to defer receipt of a bonus pursuant to an

arrangement that meets the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code. To comply with

the contract, the Executive has to take into consideration also the Internal Revenue

Code, even though only in the issue of the receipt of a bonus. Similarly, in the Product

Sales Agreement, the Terms and Conditions are made a part of the Agreement by

incorporation by attachment and reference in the Agreement. Therefore, the reference to

external documents becomes only a reference to a part of the contract, because, by the

discourse deictic reference, the external documents become parts of the contracts.

55

The third category consists of phrases that Trosborg terms “legal concretes” (1997, p.

119). These deictic expressions such as this Agreement, this section, the following

clauses, this Will also navigate the reader through the text by making reference to the

entire document or to its sections or parts.

Finally, the fourth category features items that establish a shorter term or expression for

complex phrases. Such expressions can be viewed also in Halliday and Hasan’s terms

of textual endophora. They claim that textual endophoric expressions refer to a thing as

it is identified in the surrounding text (1992, p. 33). An example of this is a “collective”

identification of ideas, manuscripts, books, drawings, pictures, scripts, playscripts,

treatments, stories, poetry, dramas, or any other fiction or nonfiction writings, whether

published or unpublished, created in whole or in part by me as “Writings” in the Will. The

long list of items is probably the result of legal drafter’s attempt at precision. However,

the effort not to forget anything made the phrase inapplicable later in the text, therefore,

an alternative noun is employed to comprise the complete phrase. The “Writings,” is

repeated, refer to the long enumerative phrase and as a result, can be considered to

navigate through the text and represent the discourse deictic expressions. Additionally,

under the fourth category includes one of the most prominent and typical features of

contracts – the specifications of the parties to the contract in the introduction of the

respective contract. In the analysed contracts, after the identification of the parties by

name and address or registered office, a common noun is chosen to represent the party

(Seller, Customer, Lender, Borrower, Executive, Company, my Attorney). Not only is this

a personal reference (see the section on personal deixis), but also if used further in the

text, the common nouns refer to the introductory section of the contract and, therefore,

navigate the reader through the text.

4.4.2. Legislation

The discourse expressions serve the purpose of navigating the reader through the text.

The most significant difference lies in the fact that as opposed to the expressions in the

56

private documents, legislative documents do not include as many here-, there- words.

While especially in contracts they are numerous, in some legislative documents they do

not occur at all, for example, in the Human Rights Act. However, some of the legislative

documents use expressions containing an adverbial word or place to which preposition-

like word has been suffixed (Crystal and Davy 1969, p. 207). Among these are thereof,

thereto, therein, therefor, hereby. The most frequent discourse expression in the

contracts, hereto, used in the phrase the parties hereto, does not occur in written

legislative discourse. Taking into consideration that there are no parties to legislation,

hereto is not relevant for legislative documents and indeed does not occur in any of

them. Additionally, the abovementioned linguistic items are almost exclusively used

anaphorically, making reference to previously mentioned item in the text, such as in the

following sentences:

1) The designated Minister shall cause the publication referred to in subsection (1)

and the bulletin referred to in subsection (2) to be made available throughout

Canada in conformity with the principle that every person is entitled to

reasonable access thereto.

2) Where the head of a government institution refuses to give access to a record

requested under this Act or a part thereof, the head of the institution shall (…).

3) Any person may enter a caveat with the superintendent registrar against the

issue of a certificate for the marriage of any person named therein.

4) In this Part of this Act, except where the context otherwise requires, the following

expressions have the meanings hereby respectively assigned to them (…).

Resulting from the sentences above, those expressions that are used for discourse

deictic function in private documents are anaphoric in the written legislation. In the first

sentence, thereto refers to the bulletin, thereof in the second sentence makes reference

to the Act, therein denotes the certificate and finally, hereby is concerned with this Part

57

of this Act. Consequently, discourse deixis is not encoded in the same expressions as in

the private documents, especially in contracts.

Mostly this and that encode discourse deixis in legislation. Phrases such as this section,

this Part, this Act occur regularly in all documents. From a pragmatic perspective, the

inclusion of such references is a deliberate decision of legal drafters, who aim at smooth

orientation in Acts and full comprehension resulting in an appropriate interpretation and

application. Indeed, as Trosborg (1995) observes, these phrases are the most frequent

subjects of regulative Acts (p. 108), therefore, their importance is not negligible.

Apart from discourse expressions pointing to different parts of the text, the analysed

legislation also contains seven references to other Acts. As a common practice in

legislative drafting it mostly serves the purpose of making certain terms or offices

clearer. For example, the office of the Minister of the Crown is used in the Human Rights

Act and a reference is made to the Ministers of the Crown Act 1975 in order to specify

the position. Additionally, for example, also in Sale of Goods Act reference is made to

Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977; The Immigration and Nationality (Fees) Regulations are

based on the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006. Thus, in these cases the

Acts are connected by references and one provides explanation, context and further

information to the other and consequently.

If a term is not explained by reference to another Act, the legislation often includes

clarification in the relevant section or subsection. Similarly, the legislation also operates

with concepts that the relevant section or subsection includes or does not include,

applies to or does not apply to and affects and does not affect. To put it simply, by

making reference to the relevant section or subsection, the discourse expressions

restricts or broadens the range of situations on which the section should be applied.

Again, as in the previous cases, these references are made within the scope of the Act

and can be properly understood and applied even without additional context, meaning

that the discourse expressions in written legislative documents are not deictic.

58

59

5. Conclusion

The paper attempted to define the specifics of deixis in written legal discourse. The aim

of this chapter is to provide a discussion of the findings and to summarize the analysis.

5.1. Summarization of the findings

The analytical part has been divided into four categories according to the type of deictic

expressions investigated and the conclusions will be presented in that order.

5.1.1. Personal deixis

The category of private documents proved to be further differentiated. Contracts appear

to share features, which the will and deed do not possess and consequently can be

viewed as a subgroup of private documents as far as personal deixis is concerned. The

contracts use neither personal nor possessive pronouns and the reliance on context is

visible in common nouns instead. The absence of pronominal system shows that even

though labelled as the representatives of deictic expressions, pronouns are not deictic

exclusively and other linguistic items can perform deictic role as well. The other group

(consisting of the Quitclaim deed and the Will) uses personal pronouns more frequently,

but the realization is not deictic, because they are used anaphorically.

Legislative documents showed even higher level of personal reference

decontextualization. Whereas at least the common nouns in contracts required context

for their proper interpretation, Acts and regulations use decontextualized anaphoric

personal and possessive pronouns and common nouns referring to persons and entities

are firmly set in the text or are regulated in other documents.

5.1.2. Temporal deixis

The decontextualization in private documents is illustrated by the usage of exact dates

and accurately defined periods of time. However, context is taken into consideration in

60

what Mellinkoff defines as expressions with flexible meanings (such as immediately) and

in the temporal usage of shall.

As opposed to private documents, shall is not employed in temporal deictic references in

legislation. Overall, the Acts and regulations do not use any temporal deictic references.

5.1.3. Spatial deixis

In the private documents an accurate spatial determination by geographical indication

dominates, therefore, the spatial expressions are decontextualized.

Spatial references in legislation are likewise decontextualized, because the geographical

delimitation of territorial scope of the Acts and regulations does not require context, or

because the phrases encoding spatial directions are explained in the text.

5.1.4. Discourse deixis

Discourse deixis is the most prominent deictic category in written private documents.

The most frequent discourse markers in private documents are here- and there- words.

In legislation, the discourse deictic expressions here- and there- are missing, because

they appear scarcely and are used anaphorically. On the other hand, legislation employs

this and that as deictic references usually connected with common nouns such as Act,

section, part.

5.2. Discussion of the findings

To summarize the abovementioned findings, although the scope of this work does not

allow for general conclusions and broad generalizations due to the low amount of text

studied compared to the text available, the degree of decontextualization of the studied

documents appeared to be relatively high.

The main reasons for the decontextualization and specific realizations of personal,

spatial, temporal and discourse deixis is the nature of written discourse combined with

the generality of legislative documents and the abstract and referential nature of the

61

written discourse. As Svartvik and Leech observe, writers of typical written text do not

share common knowledge of context with their readers, and they have to be more

explicit in making their meaning clear (2006, p. 201). The explicitness in their terms is

connected with the lack of context. Indeed, also as the analysis proved that the context

is not desired in written legal documents and elaborate solutions are created to avoid it.

Therefore, it can be concluded that expressions dependent on context are avoided in

law and in its legal terms (Marmor, 2008, p. 427).

Furthermore, the employment of decontextualization leads to the desired creation of

social distance between the text and the receiver, which is, in turn, based on the

authority of written legal documents (Trosborg 1997, p. 103).

62

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67

Abstract

This paper focuses on pragmatics in legal language, predominantly on the specifics of

deictic expressions. The study aims at a qualitative analysis of written legal texts with an

attempt to determine which representative features are possible to be identified in the

deictic usage.

In the first part, an attempt is made to set a frame of theoretical reference for deixis, its

categories or groups and the expressions used. Different viewpoints are then provided

on legal language as a genre, sociolinguistic variety or jargon and representative

characteristics are described in order to be able to determine how they influence the

usage of deictic expressions.

The second part includes a description of the findings. Two categories of legal

documents were subject to the analysis – legislative documents (Acts and regulations)

and instruments regulating private legal relations such as contracts or a will. The

documents analysed were divided on the basis of their differences.

In each analysed type of deixis (personal, spatial, temporal and discourse) linguistic

items were initially identified which could be used deictically and were further

investigated. The analysis showed that written legal discourse is decontextualized.

Deixis occurred rarely, less frequently in legislation than in private documents, whereas

in both categories, discourse deixis has been widely used.

Although the thesis does not allow for broader generalizations due to the relatively low

amount of the studied text, it is possible to claim that the analysed sample of written

legal documents has been specific in the deictic usage. As a consequence of the

characteristics, functions and authority of written legal discourse, the deictic expressions

were decontextualized.

68

Résumé

Tato práce se zabývá pragmatikou právního jazyka, zejména pak specifickým použitím

deiktických výrazů. Práce si klade za cíl pomocí kvalitativní analýzy psaných právních

dokumentů stanovit, jaké zvláštnosti je v deiktických výrazech možné identifikovat.

V první části je učiněn pokus o shrnutí různých teoretických pohledů na pragmatickou

deixi, deiktické kategorie a používané výrazy. Dále jsou nastíněny různé pohledy na

právní jazyk jako například na žánr, sociolingvistickou varietu, či „žargon“ a jsou

stanoveny jeho typické vlastnosti, které by mohly ovlivnit použití deiktických výrazů.

Druhá část je popisem výsledků kvalitativní analýzy deixe psaných právních dokumentů.

Předmětem analýzy byly dvě kategorie právních dokumentů: legislativní dokumenty

(zákony a vyhlášky) a listiny upravující vztahy soukromého práva jako například smlouvy

či závěť. Analyzované právní dokumenty byly rozděleny do těchto skupin vzhledem

k tomu, že obě mohou mít určité zvláštní vlastnosti.

V každé ze čtyř typů deixe (personální, prostorové, časové a textové) byly v textu prvně

identifikovány výrazy, které by mohly vykazovat deiktické použití, a byly dále rozebrány.

Výsledkem analýzy je, že právní diskurz je ve vysoké míře dekontextualizován. Deixe se

vyskytovala pouze v omezené míře, v legislativních textech méně než v dokumentech

regulující soukromoprávní vztahy, přičemž v obou kategoriích byla významně

zastoupena textová deixe.

Přestože práce s ohledem na malé množství zkoumaného textu neumožňuje širší

zobecnění, je možné tvrdit, že na zkoumaném vzorku právních dokumentů deixe

vykazovala jisté specifické vlastnosti a ve vysoké míře byly tyto výrazy

dekontextualizovány zejména proto, že psaný právní jazyk je díky svým vlastnostem,

funkci a autoritě specifický.