Demosthenes—Pitfalls of Democracy†Narve Strand, 03/24/14

ABSTRACT Demosthenes, I’ll show, has a realistic, non-ideological sense of the

elemental flaws of democracy: The ambition and cunning of the few (politicians, etc.)

(F1); the want of courage and smarts in the many (ordinary citizens)(F2); the

general imprudence and equal fallibility of all (F3); the basic lack of human self-

sufficiency (F4). Given the last two, he would find the idea of basing politics on the

sufficiency of either moral virtue or expertise dangerous—blue-eyed anyway. Because

the first two could be said to be inherent traits in all majorities and elites, any

straightforwardly authoritarian or paternalistic scheme is ruled out in fact. Instead, the

defects are to be counteracted by making sure all citizens have the best information

available and by strengthening their basic capacity for critical thinking and ethical choice.

Demosthenes is that rarest of creatures: An intellectual who actually believes popular

rule is better than other forms of government.

1. The Basics

It used to be thought that looking for a defense of majority rule in Ancient Athens

is a waste of time; that no thinker in Greece—or Antiquity for that matter—was

ever in favor of such a thing anyway; that trying to reconstruct a theory, or even a

good working model, of democracy before and/or in opposition to Classical

political philosophy (Plato et al.) is doomed to fail.1 Though the general scholarly

† Pre-refereeing version. Please do not quote or cite without author’s permission.

1 Strauss’ review (1969, 26-64) of Havelock’s book (1957) is classic.

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community has moved on since then,2 a full-blown systematic statement has

yet to be worked out. I’d like to contribute towards this end by offering the

following sketch. Demosthenes (384-322 BCE), a contemporary of Plato and

Aristotle, was a well-known orator and participant in Athenian politics. His public

speeches, above all, allow us a rare look at democratic theory in action. I’ll begin

by setting out, in schematic form, the nodal points:

(F1) Elite citizens (politicians (politeumenoi), orators (rhêtores), generals

(stratêgoi), the rich (hoi plousioi), their advisors (synêgoroi), and so on)

tend to be driven by (A) cleverness and (B) ambition in their dealings with

ordinary citizens and the state as a whole

(F2) Ordinary citizens (the people (ho demos), the many (hoi polloi), the

mass (to plêthos)) tend to lack these traits, making them easy targets of

the manoeuvring and aggression of elite citizens again

2 The pioneers here: Arendt (1968, 1978, 1996), Dodds (1973), Finley (1985, 1991),

Jones (1986) & Kagan (1965a, 1965b). For the best recent takes: Farrar (1988, 1992) and

Ober (1989, 1993, 1994). There are plenty of excellent anthologies and work on Athenian

democracy and “ideology” and on Greek political “thought” or “thinking” in general (Balot 2009a,

2009b; Boardman, Griffin & Murray 1986; Cartledge 2009; Davies 1993; Forrest 1966; Gagarin &

Woodruff 1995; Hansen 1999; Morris, Raaflaub & Castriota 1998; Ober & Hedrick 2009;

Ober, Raaflaub & Wallace 2008; Robinson 2003; Rowe 2000; Salkever 2009; Woodruff 2005).

The general lack of interest (or belief) in reconstructing explicit theories or systematic models in

the non-Socratic vein, seems to have stuck though.

2

(F3) Neither tend to show careful reflection or prudence (phronêsis)

in political life. Besides, as humans, both elite and ordinary citizens

are prone to miscalculate; to make mistakes (dia)hemartein), as well

as to be tricked (exapatasthai)

(F4) The human condition itself—sheer luck (tykhe)—sets clear limits

to what anyone can hope successfully to achieve.

These are fix-points, I claim, informing Demosthenes’ writings as a whole. It’s

these, too, that keep him honest; making him the rare apologist of majority rule.

2. Elite Citizens

(A) Elite citizens, Demosthenes thinks, are clever-clever (deinatatôs)3: Great

experts (deinois; tekhnitês)4 at manoeuvring or subterfuge (aposthrophês)5, i.e. in

tricking others with words (exapatein legôn);6 outwitting (parekrousasthai)7 and

cheating them (phenakizein)8—leading the city astray (hypêkhthête).9 There’s

3 Ag. Androiton 601:25; Ag. Timocrates 705:16.

4 Ag. Androition 494:4; Ag. Aristocrates 622:5.

5 Ag. Timocrates 702:9.

6 Ag. Aristocrates 651:92; 673:161.

7 On the Embassy 443:318; Ag. Timocrates 711:37; 725:79; 760:194.

8 Ag. Androiton 604:35; Ag. Aristocrates 673:159; Ag. Timocrates 760:194. They’re not above

deliberately giving a wrong twist to their arguments to achieve bad ends even (kakourgôn…tous

logous metapherê)(Ag. Leptines 491:114; 494:125).

9 Second Philippic 73:31. An autocrat like Philip behaves in this way too (First Olynthiac 20:7).

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nothing they’re not willing to say or pull basically to get what they want—

Demosthenes’ whole argumentation in his public speeches aims to show this.

(B) Elite citizens aren’t just daring (thrasos)10 and in love with honor (philotimía)11

or with winning (philonikia).12 These aren’t dirty words to Demosthenes and the

Athenians at all.13 No: They tend to be driven by narrow self-interest or greed

(pleonexia)14 and willful, reckless, violent disregard (tolmê; hekousiôs; hybris;

bia)15 for the person (soma),16 belongings (khrêmata)17 and interest (sympheron;

epitêdeios)18 of their fellow citizens (politai) and freemen (eleutherioi)—the

whole city and its financial system (tên diaoikoisin).19 At their worst,

they’re like lawless, ferocious beasts of prey (thêrioi),20 the implication clearly

10 Ag. Androiton 601:25.

11 Ag. Meidias 566:159; Ag. Androiton 597:13; Ag. Timocrates 729:91.

12 Ag. Meidias 525: 66.

13 Cf. e.g. Ag. Timocrates 729:91.

14 Ag. Androiton 610:56; Ag. Aristocrates 658:114; 666:139.

15 Ag. Meidias 514:2; 518:11; 527:42; 528: 43; Ag. Aristocrates 647:81; 660:120; 662:127-8; Ag.

Timocrates 707:24; 721:66; 741:130; 757:182.

16 Ag. Meidias 516:7.

17 Ag. Timocrates 737:117; 753:172.

18 Ag. Androiton 596:11; Ag. Aristocrates 625:15; Ag. Timacrates 700: 1.

19 Ag. Meidias 516:8; Ag. Aristocrates 626:18; Ag. Timocrates 730:96. This isn’t only the case in

democratic regimes either (Second Philippic 67:7; Third Philippic 118:28-30; 154:7).

20 Ag. Aristocrates 639:61; 647:81; Ag. Timocrates 745:143.

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being that they can’t be kept on a leash and that they don’t belong in a

democracy at all—in any political society.21

3. Ordinary People

Ordinary citizens have plenty of good judgment (polla gignôskontes orthôs).22

They’re not that greedy or immoral either, so there’s nothing that

makes them basically unfit to rule in Demosthenes’ eyes.23 It’s just that

they’re not very good at seeing through the schemes of elite citizens. That makes

them easy prey.24 And since they don’t have the same level of aggressiveness

(self-confidence (andreía) and resolve (prothymôs; errômenôs)25 as the elite

citizens, they’re easily cajoled (paragein) by them;26 terrorized into silence (esiga 21 See also Aristotle’s Politics 1253a, 28-30, and Homer’s Odyssey (Odysseus’ run-in with the

Cyclops in book 9).

22 Ag. Aristocrates 668:145-7.

23 Demosthenes hints in places that the people can be tricked by appealing to their

sense of self-importance and eagerness to have enough cash for the state treasury.

To flatter (kolakeuein) them would be the major tactic here (e.g. Ag. Aristocrates 680:179).

This isn’t the whole story, or even the most important part of it however. He never says

(or implies) that absolute authority (kyrios) ought to be taken away from them. Quite the contrary:

For Demosthenes, the people should be the absolute ruler (dêmos despotês; demos kyrios)

(Third Olynthiac 36:30; On the Embassy 450:341-342; Ag. Leptines 489:107; Ag. Meidias

586:224-225; Ag. Timocrates 747:151).

24 Ag. Leptines 457:3-458:4.

25 First Olynthiac 16:24, 27; Third Olynthiac 29:3; 32:14-16; 36:30; 37:32; First Philippic 52:41-42;

For the People of Megalopolis 208:24-5.

26 Ag. Aristocrates 692:215.

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katepeplêkto);27 trained to think little of themselves (synethizontes…

kataphronein).28 They’re too good-natured (euêtheías) and humane

(philantrôpían) almost. It not only makes them pliable (rhathymías),29 but

reluctant to work for their own best interest and the glory (doxa) of the state30—

Demosthenes’ whole project as a public citizen and writer is to help change this.

4. Human Weakness—Fate.

In Demosthenes’ view then, neither ordinary nor elite citizens tend to show

careful handling or prudence (phronêsis) in political life.31 For him, as we saw,

ordinary citizens have plenty of good judgment so there’s nothing that says

they’re any worse off than elite citizens when it comes to learning how to cultivate

it.32 The latter is equally far from the middle path—extreme. This general lack of

prudence or careful reflection alone explains why mistakes are so easily made in

politics: Unrealistic, or the wrong, goals are set up to begin with and/or means

are chosen that aren’t sufficient to realize them. Mistakes, human folly, are rife in

27 Third Philippic 126:61.

28 Ag. Aristocrates 690:210.

29 On the Embassy 374:107; Ag. Androiton 618:78; Ag. Aristocrates 671:156; Ag. Timocrates

716:51; 758:186; 761:196.

30 Ag. Aristocrates 689:208.

31 Third Olynthiac 29:3; 34:21-23; 37:32; First Philippic 58:5; On the Chersonese 98:33;

106:68-107:70; Third Philippic 110:2; On the Navy Boards 180:7-9; 187:34; On the Liberty of the

Rhodians 200:32; On the Crown 291:189; Ag. Timocrates 737:117.

32 Cf. Second Philippic 71:24; On the Chersonese 101:46.

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all forms of human government, Demosthenes believes.33 But human fallibility,

ultimately, runs much deeper than that for him.

Demosthenes isn’t a very religious writer.34 But there’s one pair

of ideas going back to the old, Homeric religion that are key to his whole vision of

political life: Error of judgment (gnômê diamartôn)35 and chance or fate (tykhê).36

No one has perfect information of everything that happens obviously; of the

shifting, inner motives of other people—no one knows the future.37 Great events

may hang on small chances and the fact that there are other free agents out

there means we can’t survey, plan for or control every possible contingency. This

exposes us humans to real risk (kindynos),38 chance (potamois êtykhêsamen)

and failure (apotykhein), even disaster (kakai).39 Unforeseen, bad things may

happen either because of my own actions or because of the interaction between

33 Second Olynthiac 23:18; Third Philippic 117:35.

34 Of course he invokes the Gods (usually to brand his adversaries their enemies (theois

ekhthron) and violators of divine justice (e.g. Ag. Meidias 563:150)). But they’re not crucial to his

arguments, unlike for a Christian thinker like Augustine, say. Then again, politics is basically a

human activity-form for Demosthenes and the Greeks (see e.g. Arendt, 1968, 1978, 1996).

35 Ag. Meidias 526: 38; 581:209; Ag. Aristocrates 621:2; Ag. Timocrates 716: 49; 734:110. In

Homer, the Gods can even cause people to make mistakes by inducing delusion or madness

(atê) in them, and so bring about their ruin. See Dodds (1951, 1-27).

36 Ag. Meidias 575:186; Ag. Aristocrates 633:42; 671:155.

37 On the Liberty of the Rhodians 196:21; Ag. Leptines 507:162; Ag. Meidias 575:186; Ag.

Aristocrates 633:42; 671:155

38 Ag. Aristocrates 672:157.

39 Third Olynthiac 28:1; Ag. Leptines 508:106; Ag. Aristocrates 691:212; On the Crown 295:200.

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me and other people. It doesn’t matter how smart I am, how well our institutions

are set up, or how good your intentions were.40 You even have scenarios where

everyone is in the wrong.41 No one is in absolute control of his or her own fate

(tês tykhês kyrios). Bad luck and mistakes are as much things we suffer as

something we’re actively responsible for. So: Error of judgment isn’t at bottom a

moral “sin” we humans have to atone for or an intellectual weakness we can

somehow hope to overcome by practical or “spiritual” reform either of ourselves

or the society around us.42 There’s bad will in the world and everyone makes

mistakes—it’s the human condition.43

Our basic insufficiency, as humans, is a hard truth to live by. If we

combine this with the shaky, high-stakes game of politics between elite and

ordinary citizens, we see how quickly miscalculation can come about and just

how costly it can get. Not that effort (errômenôs; prothymôs) and good counsel

40 On the Liberty of the Rhodians 196:22; 200:31-2; Ag. Aristocrates 670:152-673:159;

678:173. Even the cleverest autocrat makes mistakes and/or is ruined by fate (Second Olynthiac

20:9-21:11). On top of all this comes the human being’s general capacity for

self-deception (phenakizein heautous), and for being willingly deceived (hekontes exapatasthai)

(First Phillipic 51:38; Third Philippic 114:13. Cf. Second Philippic 73:33). This is a really advanced

topic and can’t be dealt with here.

41 For the People of Megalopolis 202:1.

42 On the Crown 292:191-293:194. It also means security (sotêría; asphaleian) isn’t a given either,

but an ideal—something normative. Cf. Sagar 2009, 1402.

43 He calls bad judgment a misfortune too (gnomê diamartôn apotykhein)(ag. Timocrates 716:49).

Sophocles’ King Oedipus is a prime example of error and bad luck happening to the most moral,

wisest of us. See also Adkins (1966), Burckhardt (1999); Dodds (1973, 64-77); Nietzsche (1962,

1966); Nussbaum (2001) and Williams (1993, 2007). Cf. Ag. Leptines 476:65.

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(tou kalôs bouleuesthai) are worthless, Demosthenes says, but he knows what

he would have chosen if he had his pick: Good luck (eutykhía).44

5. What’s at Stake

There are two things above all that matter to Demosthenes and which he thinks

are worth fighting for despite the risks and the overhanging chances of failure:

(P1) The democratic constitution (politeia) of Athens and its laws (nomoi)

that are meant to safeguard and promote the good of every free citizen

equally. It’s the ultimate standard (paradeigma) for any public action or

decree (psephisma), as well as a basic check on any arbitrary,

self-interested behavior by elite and ordinary citizens alike. Even men

of the highest character (spoudasanta) should be bound by it.45

44 Second Olynthiac 24:22; Third Olynthiac 30:8; On the Peace 59:11-60:12; Answer to Philipp’s

Letter 156:15; On the Embassy 424:259; Ag. Aristocrates 658:113; 672:157; On the Crown

292:191-293:194 This is the basis, I think, for the dialectics between fate (fortuna) and manly,

political skill (virtú) in Machiavelli (The Prince, ch. 25). Demosthenes though wouldn’t put

much stock in his idea of using manly virtue to struggle against fortune (a woman), beating her

into submission. For him, fate can’t be forced or tricked. The best we can do is using our own

institutions and skills to try to work with it (First Olynthiac 10:6-7; Second Olynthiac 18:2-3;

First Philippic 43:12; 50:37; 51:39-40; Ag. Leptines 471:49-472:50; 490:111; On the Crown

291:189; 292:192-293:194; 297:208).

45 Ag. Androition 610:57; Ag. Aristocrates 649:86-87; 692:217-693:219; Ag. Timocrates 742:135;

744:142. See also Woodruff 2005.

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(P2) The basic values of freedom (eleutheria) and equality (is-) that

are enshrined in the constitution—they’re its heart and soul

(ethos) basically.46 These together ensure stability and

success in a democracy, and that public interest (dêmosía sympherei)

and the common good (tou koinê beltistou) prevail here.47

(P3) For only in a democracy (dêmokratía) does everyone have an actual

stake, an equal share, in government; only here is public business decided

by deliberation (boulesthai), reflection (skopein; logizesthai)

of all the citizens actually affected.48 It’s by increasing real

participation and by minimizing actual inequality basically that rule of

law and the common good are secured. Oligarchy (olikarkía)

and despotic government (tyrannía), by reducing freedom and

equality more within their citizen family, are less characterized

by prudence. They’re inferior forms of government therefore, based

much more on special interest—mere whim.49

This thought-line makes perfect sense in light of F1-4 (over). It can't be written off

as mere ideology or propaganda. It goes without saying, given the self-seeking

ambition and cunning of elite citizens in general (F1), that the situation for

46 On the Embassy 426:260-261; Ag. Meidias 536:67; 555:124; Ag. Timocrates 753:171.

47 Ag. Leptines 490:110; Ag. Meidias 516:8; 526:37; Ag. Timocrates 701:4-5.

48 Ag. Meidias 536:67; 538:73; Ag. Aristocrates 649:86; Ag. Timocrates 751:163.

49 Ag. Leptines 461:15-462:17; 490:110; Ag. Aristocrates 642:66; Ag. Timocrates 724:75-6.

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ordinary citizens (F2) (and so for the state in general) isn’t made better by limiting

their level of participation, much less by excluding them from the political scene

altogether. Quite the contrary: Giving elite citizens free reign is a sure way of

ruining public business (i.e. to arbitrary rule and private interest prevailing).50 You

might object here that we have to separate between “good” and “bad” elite

citizens. The former, if they’re truly more enlightened and benevolent than the

rest of us, might actually end up ruling more justly and effectively (enlightened

despotism). But that’s exactly Demosthenes’ point: Given the basic fact of human

insufficiency and chance (F3-4), there’s no guarantee this will ever work. It might

seem a bad gamble even: Why would we entrust the running of the state to

“superhuman”, “godlike” beings if we have no reasonable hope they’ll ever be

any different essentially?51 Like it or not: Democracy is our best bet.52

6. What has to be Done

Demosthenes, having diagnosed political life and its basic limitations, goes on to

give us the cure. Just, constitutional rule based on the spirit of freedom and

equality doesn’t come about all by itself, namely:

50 Ag. Androition 613:65-614:67; Ag. Aristocrates 625:15-626:18; 651:92-3; Ag. Timocrates

710:31; 739:123-124; 747:152-748:154

51 Demosthenes, it seems, never really ponders the possibility. Cf also Sagar 2009, 1400-01.

52 Men prefer to live under a democracy when all is said and done (Ag. Androiton

608:51; 609:52).

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(P4) Ordinary citizens must be active and do their duty, i.e. uphold

the constitution and its spirit; imitate the example and sound judgment

(phronein) of their forebears.53 In a word: They must have the will

(dynêtheis; thelein; prothymôs) to do what is just and right.54

(P5) Ordinary citizens too must take part in political life, and they

must do so in the right way. Every good (agathos), useful citizen

(khrêsimos politês) must cultivate careful handling of the issues

(phronêsis) and courage in himself and others, but also a greater

understanding of the machinations of their bad, useless

counterparts. Ordinary citizens must become more realistic; learn to

trust their own judgment more—act!55

(P6) Only then are elite citizens kept responsible; their aggression and

cunning truly checked;56 and the state safe (sotêria) from the curse

53 On the Embassy 427:269-70; Ag. Meidias 586:224-225; Ag. Androition 610:57; 613:

64; 618:78.

54 First Olynthiac 16:27; Third Olynthiac 32:14; For the People of Megalopolis 208:24-5.

55 Second Olynthiac 21:12-13; On the Chersonese 106:68-109:77; On the Navy Boards 180:8; On

the Embassy 416:241; 426:267; 430:277; Ag. Leptines 471:49-472:50.

56 Ag. Meidias 517:9-518:11; 532:57-533:58.

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of money and the tyranny of self-interest.57 The many (hoi polloi), then,

are the only true safeguard of democracy and good government.

Reading Demosthenes’ public speeches is both enlightening and fun. They’re

basically a kind of education for grownups.58 They’re meant, as much by showing

as by telling you, how to strengthen the basic capacity for good judgment and

ethical choice of ordinary citizens that Demosthenes is convinced they already

have. Just the most basic elements:59

(D1) Close analysis: He engages in this in order to bring out the true

import of the words and deeds (legein kai prattein; logoi kai ergoi) of his

fellow elite citizens. He might go carefully into the details (kath’ hekaston

akribôs)60 of a proposed law, for example, in order to expose it as not

being in the equal interest of all because it violates both the letter and 57 Ag. Timocrates 711:37-712:38. Though Aristotle and Aristophanes show some understanding

of the weight of money in political life, it’s only with Demosthenes that we get a real sense of how

the rich use their wealth and connections to get their will at the expense of public interest and the

common good (i.e. by embezzling (kleptontes), bribing (dôrodokountas), tricking, threatening,

evading, using henchmen, etc. (On the Chersonese 109:76; On the Embassy 425:263-426:266;

Ag. Meidias 547:102-103; 552:112; 555:123-125; Ag. Timocrates 700:2; 719:60). Politics in

Athens was a predatory game between elite citizens too (Ober 1989, 1993, 1994).

58 I’ve borrowed the phrase from Cavell (1999, 125).

59 I take “element” to be more explicit and general (systematic) than a mere commonplace

(cf. Sagar 2009, 1395; Wooten 1983, 23-24), but less so than a principle again (stating an

exceptionless rule of logical inference, say). See also under.

60 On the Chersonese 99:38.

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spirit of the law and the democratic constitution.61 He may then ask us not

to pay too much attention to the mere phrasing (rhêmasin) of the proposal

itself, but to the probable consequences (symbêsomen) rather.62 Or he

might fix on the proponent’s words and deeds in the past (or the lack

thereof), seeing if they form a coherent pattern or contradict each other,

building a character-sketch of the person in question and his probable

motives for offering his case or proposal on that basis.63

This may all be linked up with the proposal or case itself. The

thought is that this will allow the ordinary citizen to reflect carefully

(skopein; phronein) on the proposal or case, scrutinizing it (logizesthai)

in the right light, seeing it for what it really is.64

(D2) Detecting fallacious and devious reasoning: During this analysis he

might draw our notice to pretexts, evasions (prophaseis), or diversion

tactics (epikheirêseie) of his elite opponent.65 Or he may ask us

61 Ag. Meidias 515:5; Ag. Androition 594:4; Ag. Aristocrates 631:36-632:37; 639:59-61; Ag.

Timocrates 708:28-709:29.

62 Ag. Aristocrates 621:2; 622:3.

63 On the Chersonese 92:8; On the Embassy 441:311; Ag. Leptines 483:86; Ag. Meidias 552:115;

Ag. Androition 595:8; Ag. Aristocrates 670:153;680:178; Ag. Timocrates 725:79; 734:110.

Gauging the character (tropos) of non-citizens can be useful in deciding foreign policy too

(Second Phillppic 67:6-70:19; 72:29).

64 Ag. Meidias 525: 34; 538:73; 576:185; 581:208-09.

65 On the Chersonese 93:13; Ag. Leptines 462:18; Ag. Meidias 527:41; Ag. Androiton 608:38;

607:46; 608:48; Ag. Aristocrates 652:95-96; 693:219; Ag. Timocrates 705:16; 724:85; 728:87.

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to bracket the person altogether (the fact that he’s powerful or wealthy,

and so on) and to focus on the issues, deeds or facts (pragmata) alone.66

Or he may ask us to pay no regard to abuse (loidoría), accusation

(aitía), bare assertion (logos) but to the grounds for believing (paraskhetai

pistin)67 them to be true that his opponent has or hasn’t given—stick

to true and just arguments (alêthôs…dikaiois…tous logous).

This will allow us to judge the case on the merits of proofs (elenkhontas;

sêmeion; tekmêria) or to reach an overall evaluation on the basis of a

calculation of probabilities (logon eikotôn; ekeinô logizomenos).68

(D3) Argument by example: If this is getting a bit too complex and

advanced for you; if the case becomes too hard to calculate and

understand (syneiai) then it’s always possible to hold up the constitution,

the laws, and the basic values of freedom and equality as a paradigm

(paradeigma) worthy of being imitated (mimeisthai).69 The words and

deeds of his elite opponent (his case, proposal, character) may

then be compared to this standard to see if they pass muster. This type of

simple comparison alone tend to foster a better understanding (aristh’ ha

66 Second Olynthiac 19:5; On the Chersonese 91:3; On the Embassy 342:3; 373:105; 436:296-

297; Ag. Leptines 474:57; Ag. Aristocrates 682:184.

67 Ag. Androition 600:22.

68 Second Olynthiac 19:5; On the Embassy 343:8; Ag. Leptines 483:88; 485:92; 500:142; Ag.

Meidias 559:135; Ag. Androiton 600:22-23; Ag. Aristocrates 663:128. See also Ag. Androiton

I595:6-7) where he exposes the fallacy of the red herring.

69 Ag. Androiton 613:64; Ag. Aristocrates 656:107; Ag. Timocrates 753:171.

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prosêkei synêsete) of public affairs.70 He might also present signal

examples (paradeigmata) of excellent citizen behavior (arête) from

the past to create a vivid portrait of how good citizen character and

conduct should be.71 This to allow every citizen to take to heart

(euthymeisthe)72 and learn the best possible political practice,

strengthening their basic capacity for good judgment and ethical

choice, as well as their resolve. That way they learn to trust more

in their own judgment too (gnômês).73 Demosthenes’ hope is that

this means they’ll then be less liable to be cowed into not asserting

their own best interest. They might even be more ready to

make an example (paradeigma) out of elite citizens whose

words and deeds are in clear violation of the common

interest and the constitution.74

(D4) Plain speaking (parrhêsía): If all else should fail, there’s always the

honest truth75—and that means telling the people that they’re wrong or

70 Ag. Aristocrates 627:21; 686:196-687:200.

71 Ag. Leptines 476:64; Ag. Androiton 618:78; Ag. Aristocrates 690:211.

72 Ag. Androiton 606:43; Ag. Aristocrates 674:162.

73 Ag. Aristocrates 653:98.

74 Ag. Meidias 546:97.

75 Second Philippic 73:31; Ag. Aristocrates 688:204.

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pointing out their weaknesses and mistakes,76 not just how bad

your opponent is. Every citizen should always aim to say what’s right and

just (dei para panta taut’ eipein ho dikaion). This to spur others on

to choose the best course of action, doing the right thing.77 A policy of

openness is always better than secrecy (phanerôs tou lathra kreitton),

Demosthenes claims. He’s affirming here the notion of fair play:

It’s always better to gain one’s end by victory (nikôntas) than

by trickery (parakrousamenous).78

Demosthenes, then, gives us a kind of crash course in rational,

democratic education. It’s a theory in action: A schematic model or picture, he’s

convinced, of both good citizenship and leadership.79 There’s one basic

assumption running through all this:

(BA): Ordinary citizens have plenty of good judgment (polla gignôskontes

orthôs)80 and a good, ethical disposition (euêtheía)—too good in a way!81

76 Third Olynthiac 37:32; First Philippic 54:51; On the Peace 57:2; On the Chersonese 95:21-22;

Third Philippic 121:36; On the Embassy 373:103; 425:264-426:266; Ag. Aristocrates 688:204.

77 Third Olynthiac 29:3; For the Liberty of the Rhodians 190:1.

78 Ag. Leptines 479:74; 490:111.

79 Demosthenes was extremely popular in antiquity. Just one sign: Finley reports (2002, 11-2) that

out of 1596 books (papyri) of ancient Greek authors that had been found in Egypt and published

by 1963 nearly half were of Homer, Demosthenes coming in second with 83. Plato and Aristotle,

by contrast, are represented with 42 and 8 each.

80 Ag. Aristocrates 668:146-7.

81 Ag. Androiton 618:78; Ag. Aristocrates 671:156; Ag. Timocrates 716:51; 758:186.

17

Very little of what Demosthenes says or does makes sense without it.

Having the basic capacity to know what’s going on and for doing the right thing,

ordinary citizens are more than qualified to judge and decide in matters of law

and justice. With the right experience,82 all they need is for good, useful citizens

to do their duty and give them accurate, reliable information, presenting their

case. Then they must be trusted to trust their own judgment (autôn gnômês) and

reason the matter out for themselves (orthôs logizein; pros autous), arriving at

the right view (orthôs skopê; orthôs egnôkate) and decision.83

82 Ordinary citizens partook on all levels of political life in Athens (council, assembly, law-courts,

most offices) on a regular basis. With a very few exceptions, all offices were assigned by lot

(klêros), with a specially constructed machine (klêroterion) too to make sure selection was

randomized. Given (BA) then, ordinary citizens were educated as much by themselves (learning

by doing) as by their advisors. Cf. Balot 200b; Ober 1989, 1993, 1994.

83 Third Philippic 116:20; On the Navy Boards 184:24; On The Embassy 342:4-5; 347:19; 349:25-

26; Ag. Leptines 475:71; 488:103; Ag. Meidias 538:73; Ag. Aristocrates 623:7; 628:25; 653: 98;

678:174; Ag. Timocrates 705:17-19; 748:155. Demosthenes recognized that there might be many

good proposals on an issue (not just his own). The key thing is to put forward the proposal that

seems best to you (beltiston apophainesthai) and then trust that the best argument wins in an

open contest (First Olynthiac 9:1; Second Philippic 66:5; On the Chersonese 90:1; On the Navy

Boards 180:8; Ag. Leptines 489:108-490:109).

18

7. Democracy and its Discontents

The rise of the city-state, and especially democratic rule, in the archaic age 84 was

a cause of great concern, and even horror, to the great majority of Greek

intellectuals.85 For most of its known history Greece had been ruled by “the best

men” (hoi aristoi; khrêstoi), men of good birth (eugênes) and wealth with

supposedly superior intellectual and moral-ethical virtue, with privilege and

patronage playing the major role in dealings of law and justice.86 With the

changing socio-economic circumstances due to war and trade came greater

social mobility and expansion of active citizenship, as well as a greater

institutionalization and formalizing of it (written law-codes, etc.).87 This drive

towards equality and enfranchisement88 meant that in Athens even the

poorer citizens had equal rights by the mid 450s BCE (radical democracy). The

Golden Age of Athens (ca. 479-406 BCE), as well as the restoration of

democracy after the unsuccessful and violent oligarchic coups of 411 and 404,

had shown that democracy—ordinary citizens—was a force to be reckoned

with. Somehow you had to come to grips with this success-story.89 There

were a few typical responses:

84 Cf. Ober 1989, 1993.

85 Cf. Kagan 1965a, 1965b; Ober 2001.

86 Cf. Finley 2002; Forrest 1966; Kagan 1965a, 1965b.

87 Boardman, Griffin & Murray 1986; Forrest 1966; Hansen 1999; Morris, Raaflaub & Castriota

1998; Ober & Hedrick 2009; Ober, Raaflaub & Wallace 2008.

88 Forrest 1966, 1986.

89 Ober 2001.

19

(1) There’s the deeply resentful reaction of someone like Theognis

(6th century BCE) who objects to the very idea that the “empty-headed

people” (keneophroni dêmô), the “worthless brains” (khrôntai deilais)

should take part in public life. Going into a kind of inner exile, he’s

half-dreaming of a better time and place when natural virtue (ta eonta

noon) and wisdom (gnômê) of the good (hoi agathoi; esthloi)

and well-born (eugeneas) might rule yet again.90

(2) Then there’s the later, grudging acknowledgment that, if nothing

else, the scoundrels (hoi ponêroi) and madmen (mainomenoi) at

Athens are clever at promoting rogues (leaders) who are pleasant

(epitêdeios) and useful (symphorous) to themselves. Or at undermining

good government elsewhere by always taking the side of the lower

classes—they have rat-like cunning! (Pseudo-Xenophon, second

half of the 5th century).91

(3) Others again tend to look at the past in an almost wistful way,

wishing that radical democracy hadn’t come about at all; or that politics

had been kept as much as possible out of the hands of the “naval mob”

(nautikos okhlos).92 Ordinary citizens are driven by nothing but lust

90 Elegies, 27-68; 161; 184; 190; 233-4; 315; 319; 635-6; 668; 675-6; 699-700; 813; 847-850; 893-

4; 947-8; 1029-30; 1109-14; 114ab; 1135-50; 1171-2; 1186-6.

91 Constitution of the Athenians, I.1-2, 5, 9-10, 14-19; II.10, 17, 19-20; III.1, 10. Cf. Ober 2001.

92 Thucydides, Peloponnesian War, 8.72.

20

for power (arxai; dynamis; ikhys; kratos) and gain (khrêmata); lawlessness

(anomía). They couldn’t care less about real justice (dikê) and virtue

(aretê), or what can be achieved by human arguments (anthrôpeiô logô).

That’s why they need the great man too to keep them on a tight leash

(Thucydides, second half of the 5th century).93

(4) This low view of ordinary citizens as inherently incapable of ruling

themselves, craving for benevolent despotism, easily tips over

into a fantasy of replacing democracy root-and-branch. One way to do

this would be to get rid of political life and the existing economy altogether,

having the state (polis) be run like a household (oikos) and giving ordinary

citizens what they “really” want, i.e. a simple, hedonistic life (food, sex,

peace, no real competition or exposure to expert knowledge or

93 It’s important to pay attention not only to what Thucydides says, but also to what he shows:

Pericles’ glowing words about Athenians in the funeral oration (Peloponnesian War, 2.35-46) and

the way he portrays their actual behavior right after that (the plague (2.47-54), the Mytilean

debate (3.36-51), and the Melian dialogue (5.84-116) above all). Thucydides ultimately had a

static, reductionist view of ordinary citizens—human nature (anthrôpeían physin). For him, it’s the

universal, necessary cause underlying and steering all human events, rearing its ugly head when

all external impediments and fear of punishment have been removed. He’s a moralist; a believer

in human self-sufficiency, paying lip service to chance or fate at best (see also Collingwood 1993,

§§5-6; Farrar 1992; Finley 1972, 48-59; Ober 2001; Reinhold 2002). This is worlds away from

anything Demosthenes ever says or does.

21

education (Aristophanes).94 Or you could do all that but establish

ownership over how ordinary people think and act also by controlling the

information (stories, myths, intelligence, etc.) they’re exposed to. That

way, you might even make them virtuous in a limited way—show more

self-restraint (sôphrosynê). To top it all off, you could draw up a plan

for how to educate the benevolent despots in your fair city (Plato).95

94 You often see ordinary citizen participation thwarted, and the socio-political order being partially

or temporarily overthrown, in his earlier plays (Acharnians, Lysistrata, Clouds, Wasps, Peace,

Birds, Women at the Thesmophoria). In his last plays (Assemblywomen, Wealth), this suspension

seems to have become permanent, affecting everyone in the state. This genre originated with the

sophists apparently. Hippodamus (latter half of the 5 th century), for example: He not only wrote

works on how to create the ideal state but he’s also said to have become the first city planner in

history, founding cities on the grid plan (the new city of Rhodes, e.g.). (See also Aristotle’s

reference to his theories in the Politics, 1267b-69a). See also Ober 2001.

95 Republic (368a-445e). Socrates and his disciples found their perfectly just city inland it seems

(to avoid or minimize long-distance trade and sea-faring); subdivide its population into special-

purpose classes (to pre-empt multi-talented citizens); (iii) make a small number of experts rule the

state (getting rid of general assemblies and every other political institution). A real, “spiritual”

commitment to justice and virtue requires a total inversion of Athenian democracy apparently! The

self-sufficiency of human virtue and the abolishing of political life is basically kept in his later work,

the Laws (see also Farrar 1992, 18, 29-31). Whereas you’re not meant to take the overthrow of

the political order too seriously in Aristophanes, in the case of Plato you’re less sure.

22

(5) Finally, you have the “moderates” (Aristotle,96 early Aristophanes97)

who just want to make the world safe again from radical democracy

by excluding the more “extreme” segments (the farmers, the sea-men,

the “opportunists”, the poor, the superrich). This so that the more

“responsible” element (the “upper middle class”) can rule in peace and

politics be left to wiser heads.98

Though Demosthenes is an intellectual and an elite citizen, his ultimate

sympathies lie with radical Athenian democracy as it was framed and lived in the

5th and 4th century BCE. One might even claim he’s more clear-eyed, having seen

farther and deeper than the thinkers above. All of the responses above (1-5)

96 For Aristotle, radical democracy is unjust on principle and not just in practice (Politics, 1279b).

Like Plato and the others, he assimilates political life to morality (elite virtue), believing ordinary

citizens to be inherently incapable of ruling themselves (adynaton gar ton aporounta kalôs

arkhein kai skholazein)—they don’t know their own good! (dioti krinousin ta peri houtous kakôs)

Extreme democracy, embodying neither expert knowledge nor true virtue, is in the interest of the

have-nots (tôn aporôn) really, not common interest (to sympheron…tô koinô). The “mixed”

government (politeia), on the other hand, excludes poor people (and the superrich) and so is just

again. Here security and stability (sotêría) are safeguarded (1273a25; 1276b-80a; 1291a-1294b).

97 In the earlier plays (Acharnians, Knights, Wasps, Clouds, Peace), Aristophanes paints

Athens as a much happier place with its “bad” elite citizens out of play and ordinary

citizens focusing on living the peaceful life. The implication: The “good”, “respectable”

citizens are left to rule in peace.

98 See also Farrar 1992, 28, 32-38.

23

seem fixated on the shortcomings of non-aristocratic citizens as the root of all evil

in the state (cf. (F2) over), with them being made wholly incapable of rulership. If

they focus on elite citizens at all it’s only on the “bad” ones who cater to the

whims of the voracious, stupid masses and so create faction (stasis) and ruin the

state.99 The hope, clearly, is that the bad traits of elite citizenship (cf. (F1) can be

overcome either by excluding ordinary citizens altogether from the political

process (which is question-begging), or by letting only the “good” leaders rule,

who are thought to be either flawless or vastly superior (which remains to be

seen again). Just because democracies make mistakes it doesn’t follow that

oligarchies are less error-prone, much less that political life itself with its clash of

conflicting interests should be abolished.100 The tacit assumption throughout this

seems to be that moral virtue and expert knowledge of the few are sufficient to

ensure efficient political rule and justice for all (=TA). Yet, if politics is tied down

to human fallibility (cf. (F3) over) and a basic lack of self-sufficiency in general

(cf. (F4), there’s no reason to think this assumption is right at all.101 More than

99 Cf. Finley 1985; A. H. M. Jones 1986.

100 Second Olynthiac 23:18; Third Philippic 117:35; Ag. Leptines 458:3-4. Cf. Farrar 1992.

101 Plato and Aristotle, for example, seem fixated on F2 and TA. Ergo, judgment by ordinary

citizens is made superfluous, with self-interest becoming a dirty word. They wouldn’t

acknowledge recognition as a serious objection to their own theories—how can the rest of us be

sure that our rulers have perfect/vastly superior knowledge and morality to our own? How can

they themselves know? Plato and Aristotle have no real sense of the curse of money, that power

corrupts, or that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. To them, it seems, being really

smart and moral makes you automatically fit to rule, insulating you against any human error or

real failure. See also Nietzsche 1953, 1962, 1966; Nussbaum 2001; Williams 1993.

24

that: To trust elite citizens to take care of the common weal and to police

themselves—no matter their own, best intentions—seems rather reckless. It’s a

highly debatable assumption anyway. To deny the existence or coherence of a

systematic, democratic alternative in Demosthenes, on the other hand, is patently

wrong (BA → F1-4 → P1-6 over).

It might be said that (TA) isn’t ruled out by (F3-4) as such: It’s still perfectly

possible to claim that some elite citizens might be vastly smarter and more moral

than ordinary citizens. And so efficient rule and justice for all are safer, or more

so on the whole, if all power is put into their hands (oligarchy); or if the actual

participation of ordinary citizens is reduced to a bare minimum (republic or

indirect democracy). This is true in principle, though not necessarily in

practice.102 There’s yet another option of course: Hold out, like Plato, for a

wholesale regeneration of the secular, political order by a kind of “spiritual” or

“moral” reform; a reawakening of all citizens to a life of justice. Regardless,

Demosthenes never ponders such “perfect-world”, “eschatological” scenarios.

He’s more interested in here-and-now, flesh-and-blood politics. For him, both as

a participant and a thinker, notions of self-interest, recognition, evaluation and the

102 Which is worse, tyranny of the few or the many? To really answer this, we have to do more

than make assumptions or coming up with a priori principles. We would have to sift

through the respective records of democracy and oligarchy (Athens vs. Sparta and beyond).

An answer to this question isn’t self-evident in other words (cf. e.g. Jefferson’s letter to Edward

Carrington, January 16, 1787; to John Taylor, May 28, 1816, and his letter to Baron Alexander

von Humboldt, June 13th the following year). Either way, Demosthenes’ model shows the

superiority of democracy as a real possibility.

25

common good go hand in hand, being indispensable. Ordinary citizens not only

have the capacity for ethical choice and critical thinking, he thinks: They need to

exercise this capacity if the state is to survive and be a healthy one.

Justice, stability and the common interest are secured by increasing ordinary

citizen participation and by limiting inequality. This is a far cry from, and a much

more affirmative, hands-on vision than, any of the “malcontents” above.

Nothing like it is found in antiquity.103

8. The Bottom Line

One might perhaps be tempted to think of Demosthenes theory or model of

democracy as nothing but self-serving clichés. Wasn’t he a player himself? An

elite citizen—master orator? Didn’t he use the devices (D1-4) and ideals (P1-6)—

weaknesses (F1-4)!—to further his own political ends? Wouldn’t that make him

impartial rather than interested in the common good? And his stance on

democracy merely ideological, or based on the advantage of the situation, rather

than an honest-to-God, principled one?104

Fair enough. But why should real conviction and engagement necessarily

exclude each other? If being partial means having a theory or model of political

life and taking active steps to promote it, then this works as much against an

oligarchic thinker like Plato, as a democratic theorist like Demosthenes. Plato, as

103 Athenian democracy hasn’t fared well among Western intellectuals after that: Roberts 1994.

104 Cf. Ober 1989; Sagar 2009.

26

is well known, had a theory or model of the best society as enlightened

despotism and he believed enough in this vision to travel to Syracuse to try to

realize it.105 But maybe Demosthenes, unlike Plato, didn’t have a theory or

systematic model and so wasn’t all that interested in truth to begin with? First

off, it doesn’t follow. Why should only theoreticians really care about truth in

practice (politics)? Second, the components of Demosthenes’ model of political

life (BA, F1-4, P1-6, D1-4) are general truths (schemas) but with real content and

fitted the concrete situation (kairos).106 Forming a coherent, overall pattern they

defy the easy dichotomy between theory (in the sense of an apodictically stated,

axiomatically closed system of eternal truths) and praxis (as purely context-

bound, stochastic response).107 We might still want to impugn the wisdom or

105 Demosthenes also seems to have had more faith in the power of honestly criticizing

democracy and ordinary citizens (D4) than Plato, who seems to have been content serving up

noble lies (tis an oun…mêkhanê genoito tôn pseudôn en deonti gignomenon, hôn dê nyn

elogomen, gennaion ti hen pseudomenous peisai malista men kai autous tous arkhontas, ei de

me, tên allên pollin)(Rep. 414b-c).

106 Cf. e.g. On the Crown 291:189. Being general truths doesn't mean they’re universal principles

of course (i.e. exceptionless rules). The repeal of an existing law, for instance, might be called for

in exceptional circumstances (Third Olynthiac 31:10-12). Demosthenes isn’t a rigid legalist.

107 As such, they’re more like picture-proofs in mathematics. Take the so-called proof by

rearrangement of the Pythagorean theorem, thought to predate the 4th century BCE

(Maor 2009, 60-2). It requires a grasp of the general, invariant features (ratios) of the

schema but this is only possible by actually varying it, seeing the two versions in the context

of each other. Teaching by schemas or paradigms was quite common in antiquity

(see e.g. Plato’s Meno 75B-77A).

27

prudence in implementing this systematic model in real life of course, but we

can’t really question the consistency with which he does it. Demosthenes’ own

character is borne out by the fact that he followed radical Athenian democracy to

defeat and beyond.108 Finally, if you pay attention to what he’s actually

telling you (to focus on the issue, not the person, and so on (D1-4), then

there’s a way to learn good, rational democratic behavior and thinking from him

108 See e.g. the First Olynthiac, first three Philippics, On the False Embassy, and On the Crown.

Sagar (2009) wants to use this against him. He reads Athenian democracy (and Demosthenes’

thought about it) in light of the final defeat against Macedon. There’s a “structural” flaw, he claims,

in Athenian democracy’s stress on open government and popular rule which can’t possibly be

overcome (1394, 1396, 1399, 1403-4). But this is to have things backwards: You can only turn a

particular historical fact into a universal truth, an “is” into a “must”, by an ex post facto

rationalization. It also means dismissing, without discussion, the real contributions of human error

(not just of Demosthenes, but Aeschines—everyone (On the Chersonese 103:56; Third Philippic

124:53-55); and bad luck or fate (the fact, say, that the new type of warfare is easy to introduce in

an autocratic regime like Macedon, but near-impossible to pull off in a city-state like Athens

without an overthrow of the whole democratic constitution; or the fact that no autocratic ruler can

afford to tolerate real democracy to remain in a conquered state, and so on (On the Chersonese

100:41) (see (F3-4) over). Not that he doesn’t have a point: Democracy does value the norms of

freedom and equality over those of security and discretion when push comes to shove—as

Demothenes himself shows with his own words and deeds (cf. Third Philippic 127:65-128:66; Ag.

Leptines 479:74; On the Crown 295:201; 296:205; and Davies 1993, 232).

28

even if it was partly a sham to him.109 If his basic assumption is right (BA) the

rest follows naturally: If ordinary citizens really are the best advocates of their

own best interest, they ought to take a more active part in politics.

109 There are ad hominem elements in Demosthenes’ speeches for sure (irrelevant stuff,

insinuation, appeal to prejudice or false fellow feeling, etc. (cf. e.g. Ag. Meidias 566:159). See

also Kremmydas 2007 for an account of how Demosthenes compounds and stretches

arguments. Going against D1-4, this means (i) he isn’t wholly consistent, but also (ii) that his

speeches aren’t a total sham. To deny this is to ignore the actual evidence and so fall back on a

metaphysical view of the imprudence of direct democracy.

29

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