DEPUTY EDITORS

Social Psychology Quarterly

March 2009

Vol. 72 No. 1

pp. 1–93

Volume 72 • Number 1 • March 2009

A Journal of the American Sociological Association

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A Journal of the American Sociological Association


Volume 72 • Number 1 • March 2009

Social Psychology QuarterlyFormerly SOCIOMETRY


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Social Psychology QuarterlyVolume 72, Number 1 March 2009

CONTENTS

A JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

OPENINGS

MICHAEL IAN BORER 1The Symbolic Economy of Gendered Sports Fandom

BIN XU 5Durkheim in Sichuan: The Earthquake, National Solidarity, and the Politics of Small Things

TWO ON IMMIGRATION

JEREMY HEIN AND CHRISTOPHER D. MOORE 9Race Relations Stories: How Southeast Asian Refugees Interpret the Ancestral Narration of Black and White Peers

SAMUEL PEHRSON, VIVIAN L. VIGNOLES, AND RUPERT BROWN 24National Identification and Anti-immigrant Prejudice: Individual and Contextual Effects of National Definitions

ARTICLES

MONICA KIRKPATRICK JOHNSON AND STEFANIE MOLLBORN 39Growing Up Faster, Feeling Older: Hardship in Childhood and Adolescence

KARA JOYNER 61Justice and the Fate of Married and Cohabiting Couples

SARA SHOSTAK, JEREMY FREESE, BRUCE G. LINK, AND JO C. PHELAN 77The Politics of the Gene: Social Status and Beliefs about Genetics for Individual Outcomes


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It is increasingly apparent that social scien-tists need to engage the rapidly accumulat-ing developments in human genetics

research. This imperative has been advancedby several decades of provocative reports frombehavioral genetics, enormous media atten-tion given to the Human Genome Project, theincreasing availability of genetic testing toassess individuals’ risk for myriad illnesses,and multiple initiatives to include genetic

assays in ongoing large-scale social surveyprojects. One critical area for social scientiststo engage is the assessment of people’s beliefsabout the causal importance of genes for indi-vidual and group differences. For while bio-logical and social scientists debate the impor-tance of genetic differences for importanthealth and social outcomes, people outside theacademy have their own views about the roleof genes in creating individual and group dif-ferences. These public conceptions may besociologically important in their own right,particularly as a way of understanding howpeople interpret social problems and respondto policy initiatives regarding genetics(Schnittker, Freese, and Powell 2000). Indeed,many such policy issues—including publicsupport for genetic testing programs or for

Social Psychology Quarterly2009, Vol. 72, No. 1, 77–93

The Politics of the Gene: Social Status and Beliefsabout Genetics for Individual Outcomes

SARA SHOSTAKBrandeis University

JEREMY FREESENorthwestern University

BRUCE G. LINKColumbia University

JO C. PHELANColumbia University

Social scientists have predicted that individuals who occupy socially privileged positions orwho have conservative political orientations are most likely to endorse the idea that genesare the root cause of differences among individuals. Drawing on a nationally representativesample of the US population, this study examines belief in the importance of genes forunderstanding individual differences in a series of broad domains: physical illness, seriousmental illness, intelligence, personality, and success in life. We also assess whether thebelief that genetics are important for these outcomes is more common among those in rela-tively advantaged positions or among those who are more politically conservative. Finally,we consider whether such beliefs predict attitudes toward genetics-related social policies.Our analyses suggest that belief in the importance of genetics for individual differences maywell have a substantial effect on attitudes toward genetics-related policies, independent ofpolitical orientation or other measures. Our study identifies high levels of endorsement forgenes as causes of health and social outcomes. We describe a cultural schema in which out-comes that are “closer to the body” are more commonly attributed to genetics. Contrary toexpectations, however, we find little evidence that it is more common for whites, the socioe-conomically advantaged, or political conservatives to believe that genetics are importantfor health and social outcomes.

77

This research was supported by National HumanGenome Research Institute grant HG01859, NationalInstitute of Mental Health grant MH 65330, YoungInvestigator Award from the National Alliance forResearch on Schizophrenia and Depression, and theRobert Wood Johnson Foundation. Please address corre-spondence to Sara Shostak, Department of Sociology,Brandeis University, 415 South Street, MS 071, Waltham,MA 02454; [email protected].

78 SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY QUARTERLY

funding large projects like the HumanGenome Project and the InternationalHapMap Project—may be intimately connect-ed to how important individuals believe genet-ic differences are to understanding differencesin individual fates.

To date, social psychological research onthe public consequences of genetics hasfocused predominantly on individual and fam-ily experiences of receiving results fromgenetic testing (Babul et al. 1993; Cox andMcKellin 1999; Koehly et al. 2003; Lafayetteet al. 1999; Lerman et al. 1994). However, forsocial psychology, genetic attribution providesan intriguing vantage point because of themultiple ways in which genes may be under-stood as causes of individual and group differ-ences (Freese 2006). One issue is whetherpeople construe genes as causes that are inter-nal to individuals (and therefore subject toindividual control) or external to the individ-ual (and therefore beyond individual control).Genes are physically internal, however theyotherwise share characteristics of externalattributions and therefore may be interpretedas influencing outcomes in ways that mitigateperceptions of individual responsibility. A sec-ond issue raised by the prevalence of geneticinformation is how genetic and biologicalvariation may enter into processes of systemjustification, whether through explanationsfor health disparities (Sankar et al. 2004) orideologies of social group dominance (Jostand Hunyady 2005). A third, and related ques-tion, is under what conditions individuals gen-eralize information about individual biologi-cal and genetic variations to defined socialgroups (Sternthal, Jayaratne, and Feldbaum,N.d.), a process that reasonably might beanticipated to reify social categories.

Indeed, social scientists are particularlyconcerned with the rising influence of genet-ics in shaping the public’s views about indi-vidual and group differences (Duster 2006;Geller et al. 2004). History clearly warrantssuch concerns; it is tragically replete with sit-uations in which genetic explanations havebeen used to designate some groups as genet-ically (or constitutionally) inferior and to jus-tify oppression and discrimination (Duster2003a; Kevles 1985; Nelkin and Lindee 2004;

Reilly 1991; Rothman 1998). The potentialconsequences of genetic information for reify-ing racial classifications (Omi and Winant1994) have been of particular concern tosocial scientists (Duster 2005; Reardon 2004).Certainly, these concerns are reasonable, asbeliefs about genetic variation among racialgroups still may be used to promote discrimi-natory programs (for reviews, see Condit andBates 2005; Condit et al. 2004; Duster 2003a).

Drawing on these examples, social scien-tists have speculated that beliefs about geneticcausation will promote “essentialism” (Alperand Beckwith 1993; Lippman 1992; Nelkinand Lindee 1995), “naturalize” differentialtreatment, (Condit and Bates 2005; Duster2003a, b; Nelkin and Lindee 1995), and pro-vide “legitimating myths” that justify existinginequalities (Jayaratne et al. 2006). Some ana-lysts have argued that beliefs in genetic causa-tion are likely to resonate most strongly withthe world views of people who occupy social-ly privileged positions or who have conserva-tive political orientations (Jayaratne et al.2006; Nelkin and Lindee 1995). Accordingly,social scientists who favor progressive socialchange may worry that genetics researchmight someday put us in a position not farfrom that expressed by Darwin’s contempo-rary Lady Ashley upon learning of his theoryof natural selection: “Let’s hope that it is nottrue; but if it is true, let’s hope that it doesn’tbecome more widely known” (Buss et al.1999:443).

At the same time, speculation about thepossible causes or consequences of beliefsabout genetics has run far ahead of empiricalanalysis with general population samples. Inthis study, we examine beliefs concerning theimportance of genes for understanding indi-vidual differences in physical illness, mentalillness, intelligence, personality, and successin life. We consider whether beliefs in theimportance of genetics are more commoneither among people in relatively advantagedsocioeconomic positions or among those whoare more politically conservative. We alsoconsider whether such beliefs predict attitudestoward genetics-related social policies, inde-pendent of political orientation or other mea-sures. Our analyses suggest that belief in the

SOCIAL STATUS AND BELIEFS ABOUT GENETICS 79

importance of genetics for human outcomesmay well have a substantial independent rela-tionship to attitudes on genetics-related policyquestions, but there is little reason to regardsuch beliefs as more common among whites,the socioeconomically advantaged, or politicalconservatives.

BACKGROUND

There is neither extensive data on publicbeliefs about genes as causes of human health,behaviors, abilities, and social outcomes in thegeneral US population nor on the conse-quences of such beliefs for policy orientations.However, what data are available suggest vari-ation in genetic attributions by both sociode-mographic characteristics and outcomes ofinterests. This highlights the importance ofpopulation-based studies that can betterdescribe these patterns of attribution and theirrelationships, if any, to attitudes towards pub-lic policies.

Much of the empirical research on beliefsabout genes as causes of individual outcomesconsiders attitudes towards genetic testing forspecific conditions. Because many studies ofattitudes towards genetic testing are clinicallyoriented, they tend to rely on highly selectednonprobability samples of individuals fromfamilies affected by illnesses with genetic eti-ology (e.g., Babul et al. 1993; Lafayette et al.1999; Lerman et al. 1994). While these stud-ies provide important insights about how peo-ple in families affected by specific illnessesconceptualize genetic risk for those illnesses,they do not assess uses of genetic attributionsmore broadly.

Research on attitudes towards genetictesting also has examined whether racial/eth-nic differences in use of genetic testing reflectdifferences in beliefs and values or differencesin access to care (Singer, Antonucci, and VanHoewyk 2004). This research indicated thatAfrican Americans and Latinos are moreeager than whites to avail themselves of bothprenatal and adult genetic testing (Singer et al.2004). One might infer that endorsement ofgenetic testing reflects underlying beliefsabout genes as causes for these traits.Importantly, however, the study questions

asserted the importance of genes for the dis-ease outcome as a premise to the question,and therefore this work does not speak direct-ly to beliefs about the importance of genes forindividual health or social outcomes (Singer etal. 2004).

A few recent studies have endeavored toassess sociodemographic variation in geneticattributions for specific traits. In a telephonesurvey of 1,200 black and white respondents,researchers found that whites were signifi-cantly more likely than blacks to report genet-ic attributions for group differences in traitssuch as athleticism, math performance, driveto succeed, tendency toward violence, intelli-gence, and sexual orientation (Jayaratne2002). A special topical module of the nation-ally representative General Social Survey(GSS) presented respondents with a vignettefeaturing an individual suffering from symp-toms consistent with one of four mental ill-nesses (schizophrenia, major depression, drugproblem, alcohol dependence). An analysis ofthis data found that blacks endorse geneticexplanations of mental illness significantlyless than do whites (Schnittker et al. 2000).Also, African-American respondents did notsummarily reject biological explanations ofmental illness; there was no significant racialdifference in endorsement of “a chemicalimbalance in the brain” as an explanation ofmental illness. This suggests that “black skep-ticism of biological explanations may be con-fined to those explanations that attribute men-tal health problems to genetic origins”(Schnittker et al. 2000:1114). These findingshighlight the importance of analyses to ascer-tain whether similar patterns of attributionexist for different individual health and socialoutcomes.

The importance of attending to differ-ences in patterns of attribution for differenthealth and social outcomes gains additionalsupport from research that indicates that “peo-ple do not make a global ‘deterministic’ eval-uation of the role of genes in human charac-teristics, but rather understand that the relativerole of genes and other factors varies for dif-ferent traits” (Parrott et al. 2003:1103). Forexample, when asked to partition pie charts torepresent the relative contribution of genes,


the physical environment, the social environ-ment, and personal action, participantsassigned to genes 71 percent of etiologicresponsibility for height, 41 percent forweight, 54 percent for breast and prostate can-cer, 26 percent for talent, and 40 percent formental abilities (Parrott et al. 2003; see alsoCondit et. al 2004). Additionally, when askedto compare the role of genes and individualbehaviors in determining health outcomes,generally people assigned a greater role topersonal behavior (Condit et al. 2004). Focusgroup data in which participants discussed avariety of personality traits, including alco-holism, bullying, nurturing, and loudness,suggest also that genes are less often seen asthe cause of human behavior (Condit et al.2004). Poll data similarly provide evidencethat endorsement of genetics as an explanationfor health and social outcomes varies by theoutcome of interest and, possibly, perceptionsof individual responsibility for specific out-comes. For example, in a 1995 Harris poll (n= 1005), 90 percent of respondents attributedsuccess in life to learning and experience (vs.8 percent to “genes you inherit”) while 63 per-cent of respondents attributed being substan-tially overweight to genetics (vs. 32 percentwho chose learning and experience) (Singer,Corning, and Lamias 1998).

Only a very few studies examine the rela-tionship between genetic attributions and ori-entations to specific policies. Those studiesthat do examine such relationships tend tofocus on genetic attributions for specific traits(e.g., race or sexual orientation) and measuresof prejudice and traditional or modern formsof discrimination (Jayaratne et al. 2006).Taken together, these studies provide evidenceof a positive relationship between geneticattributions for perceived racial group differ-ences and greater prejudice towards blacks, asmeasured by respondents’ orientation to a(hypothetical) son or daughter dating or mar-rying a black person (Jayaratne et al. 2006;Keller 2005). Genetic attributions for per-ceived racial group differences are associatedalso with measures of modern racial preju-dice, as assessed by responses to statementswith clear policy implications, including“Many groups of Americans overcame preju-

dice and made it on their own; blacks shoulddo the same” and “blacks are too dependent ongovernment help to get ahead” (Jayaratne2006:83). In contrast, genetic attributions fordifferences in sexual orientation are associat-ed with greater tolerance towards homosexualmen and women, as measured by attitudestowards gay marriage, adoption by gay cou-ples, and whether “homosexuals should beallowed to teach in elementary schools”(Jayaratne et al. 2006:84; see also Tygart2000). These studies also suggest that manysociodemographic factors shape the associa-tion between attributions and attitudes; theseinclude education, political conservatism, age,gender, residence in the South, and religiosity(Jayaratne et al. 2006). However, despite spec-ulation in the sociological literature indicatingthat biological explanations for human differ-ences are shaped by “the values of the conser-vative right” (Nelkin and Lindee 2004:132),we are unaware of any studies which explicit-ly investigate possible relationships betweenpolitical orientation and the likelihood ofmaking genetic attributions in explaining indi-vidual differences in outcomes.

Insofar as they provide evidence that thelikelihood of attributing individual differencesto genetics is increasing, data from polls high-light the timeliness of these concerns. Forexample, in 1979, 36 percent of respondentsreported that heredity was more importantthan the environment in determining whetheror not a person was overweight; in 1995, asnoted above, 63 percent of respondents attrib-uted “being substantially overweight” togenetics (Singer et al. 1998: 637–8).1 Giventhe pertinence of such attributions to a widevariety of health and social policies, popula-tion-based, empirical analyses of beliefs aboutthe importance of genes in causing differencesin individual fates and how these beliefs relateto attitudes on genetics-related policy ques-tions are critically important.

1 Changes in the wording of the question and the struc-ture of responses also may have contributed to this change(Singer et al. 1998:638).


HYPOTHESES

Our analysis takes up three lines ofinquiry, focusing on: (1) variation in geneticattributions for different types of outcomes;(2) associations between individual sociode-mographic characteristics and likelihood ofmaking genetic attributions; and (3) relation-ships between genetic causal attributions andendorsement of specific policies, includingsupport for the Human Genome Project andmandatory genetic testing before marriage.We develop hypotheses for each of these inturn.

First, as noted above, both polling andfocus group data suggest that individuals seethe greatest role for genetics when it comes tophysical characteristics, followed by psycho-logical characteristics, with social attainmentbeing seen as the least likely to be stronglyinfluenced by genetic causes (Condit et al.2004; Parrott et al. 2003; Singer et al. 1998).From a sociological perspective, this wouldseem to raise the idea of a cultural schema, atleast in the United States, where individualcharacteristics are perceived as more geneticthe more closely they are identified with thebody.2 Such a schema could be seen as rootedin the legacy of Cartesian dualism, whichinsists that the causes of bodily states, such asphysical illness, are located in the body(Scheper-Hughes and Lock 1991). A closelink between genetics and physical conditionsalso receives support from popular and scien-tific rationales for genetic research, whichemphasize the potential of genetic informa-

tion to prevent and cure common diseases(Collins and McCusick 2001; Guttmacher andCollins 2005).

In the data we examine, respondents wereasked for generic judgments of the importanceof genetics to: (1) physical illness, (2) seriousmental illness, (3) intelligence, (4) personality,and (5) success in life. Applying to these itemsthe idea of a cultural schema in which individ-ual characteristics perceived as closer to thebody more often are seen as caused by genet-ics, we can make the following predictions.

Hypothesis 1a: Genetic makeup will be per-ceived as more important for physical illnessesthan for the psychological characteristics (mentalillness, personality, intelligence).

Hypothesis 1b: Genetic makeup will be per-ceived as more important for psychological char-acteristics than for success in life.

Meanwhile, considering the aforementionedpsychological characteristics, we posit thatserious mental illness, at least since the 1990s“decade of the brain,” will be perceived ascloser to physical characteristics and thus morelikely to be seen as genetically caused than per-sonality or intelligence (Horwitz 2003).Accordingly, we predict that

Hypothesis 2: Genetic attributions for mental ill-ness will be greater than for personality or intel-ligence.

In sum, we hypothesize that genetic makeupwill be perceived as most important for phys-ical illnesses, then for mental illness, followedby personality and intelligence, and leastimportant for success in life.

Second, we earlier discussed historicaland contextual literature that highlights theuses of genetics as a legitimating rationale forextant inequalities. Social psychological liter-ature on the tendencies of individuals toexhibit self-serving cognitive biases mightthen lead us to expect that genetic explana-tions of outcomes will be most appealing tothose already in positions of privilege. Adiverse literature indicates that individualsmore commonly attribute positive outcomes toaspects of themselves and (less consistently)negative outcomes to aspects of their circum-stances (e.g., Bradley 1978; Duval and Silvia2002). Moreover, we predict that groups

2 This idea obviously is at best a characterization ofdomains in genetic terms rather than specific variables;that is, presumably no one would claim that all physicalvariables would be perceived as more genetic than all psy-chological variables. Additionally, we note that Condit etal. (2004) and Parrott et al. (2003) use a forced-choicestyle method of asking respondents to allocate percent-ages to causes of outcomes including not just genes andtypes of environment, but also personal action. While howrespondents understand the etiology and consequence ofindividual will is of obvious interest, this methodologycollapses the cause and consequence of behavior into per-sonal action in a way that makes the meaning of respons-es hard to interpret (i.e., causal narratives of the influenceof genes—and, for that matter, environments—on humanoutcomes often involves genes as a cause of the individ-ual action which is a cause of the outcome.)


which have historically been denigrated, mar-ginalized, and disenfranchised based onalleged genetic inferiority will be less likely tomake genetic attributions. This leads to twospecific hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: People of higher socioeconomicstatus will regard genetic makeup as moreimportant for individual outcomes than people oflower status.

Hypothesis 4: African Americans and Latinoswill regard genetic makeup as less important forindividual outcomes than do whites.3

We might expect to observe the above espe-cially with regard to hypotheses regardingintelligence and success in life.

In addition to differences by socioeco-nomic status and race, speculation about thestatus of belief in genetic influence as anessentializing ideology or system “legitimat-ing myth” (Jayaratne 2006)—might also leadus to expect, net of other characteristics, thatgenetic explanations will be regarded mostfavorably by those whose broader political ori-entation is more conservative:

Hypothesis 5: People who identify as politicalconservatives will perceive genetic differences asmore important for determining individual out-comes than those who are politically liberal.

In posing Hypotheses 3–5, we recognize thatone can imagine reasons to expect other rela-tionships between either socioeconomic privi-lege or political orientation and beliefs aboutgenes as causes. Indeed, as already discussed,Singer et al. (2004) found that blacks andLatinos express greater enthusiasm for genet-ic testing, even though their study did notdirectly address the question of beliefs in theimportance of genetics. Nonetheless, thehypotheses we articulate reflect potential rela-tionships invoked by scholars who have beenparticularly concerned with negative socialimplications of public belief that genetics areimportant for explaining differences in human

outcomes (Duster 2006; Hubbard and Wald1999; Nelkin and Lindee 2004).

Finally, we predict that those individualswho attribute differences in individual out-comes to genetics will be more favorably dis-posed to policies that support the productionof genetic information and/or seek to integrateits uses in health and social policy. That is, netof whatever relationship beliefs about geneticetiology may have with broader political ori-entation, we propose that such beliefs may beindependently relevant for predicting policyattitudes.

Hypothesis 6: Greater belief in the importance ofgenetics for human outcomes will be positivelyrelated to support for policies that are predicatedon genetic causes being important.

In this study, we consider specifically attitudestowards: (1) support for the Human GenomeProject; (2) requiring genetic testing beforemarriage; and (3) knowing a partner’s familyhistory of mental illness. Such a relationship,if observed, would support the proposition thatunderstanding variation in beliefs about genet-ics has broader relevance than a simple acade-mic interest in belief formation.

DATA AND MEASURES

The Genetics, Disease, and StigmaSurvey (GDS) is a telephone interview of1,241 respondents conducted in 2002–3. Thesample was drawn from a list-assisted randomdigit-dialed method, with individuals random-ly selected within households that werereached. Puerto Ricans, Chinese Americans,and people with a family history of mental ill-ness were intentionally oversampled. Thesample is reweighted to reflect these oversam-ples as well as differences between therace/ethnicity of respondents and nationalcensus information. The response rate was 62percent. Weighted sample estimates indicatedisproportionate nonresponse by males and bypeople with less than a high-school education(Phelan 2005). Interviews were conducted inSpanish, Mandarin, and Cantonese in additionto English, they averaged 20 minutes inlength, and respondents were offered $10 fortheir participation.

3 While there can be no question that AfricanAmericans have borne the greater burden of allegationsabout purported genetic and biological inferiority, similarclaims have been made about the intergenerational trans-mission of “low IQ” among Latinos (Herrnstein andMurray 1994:366–7, 688).


Beliefs about genetic causation are mea-sured by five items that share the commonstem “How important do you think a person’sgenetic makeup is in influencing [attribute]?”Items complete the stem by asking about “themajor illnesses they will develop in life,”“whether or not they will develop a seriousmental illness,” “their personality,” “theirintelligence,” and “their success in life.” Itemswere presented to respondents in randomizedorder. Response categories were “very impor-tant,” “somewhat important,” “not very impor-tant,” and “not at all important.” The factorstructure of these items will be presented inthe results section.

Covariates in the study include age (inyears); sex; education (here measured using afour-point scale from less than a high-schooldegree to a bachelor’s degree or higher);race/ethnicity; family income (measured byfive categories; recoded based on the midpointof the categories); and political orientation(assessed on a five-point scale from 1 = veryliberal to 5 = very conservative).4 Reportedrace/ethnicity of respondents are combinedinto the categories of white (not Latino), black(not Latino), Latino, and other. As noted, theLatino category is disproportionately PuertoRican due to the oversample and the other cat-egory is disproportionately Chinese, although

weighted analyses are used except where spec-ified. Multiple imputations based on the othercovariates were used for item nonresponse onincome (16 percent of all cases) and politicalorientation (4 percent).

Unweighted summary statistics for thecovariates used in models are included asTable 1.

RESULTS

Table 2 presents frequencies for the fiveitems regarding the importance of genetics.Taken together, respondents were most likelyto regard genetic makeup as very importantfor physical illnesses and least likely to regardit as very important for success in life.Respondents were more likely to regard genet-ic makeup as very important for mental illnessthan for intelligence, and more likely for intel-ligence than for personality. The same order-ing of items for the likelihood of regarding anattribute as very important was observed inreverse for the likelihood of regarding theattribute as not at all important, suggestingthat none of these items elicit an obviouslymore polarized reaction than the others.Differences in relative frequencies betweenadjacent columns are each significant exceptfor the difference between intelligence andpersonality. The pattern supports the culturalschema developed as Hypotheses 1 and 2.Additionally, the results emphasize the overallimportance now granted to genetic causes inthe United States: over 90 percent of allrespondents regard genetic makeup as at least

Table 1. Unweighted Proportions and Means for Explanatory Variables Used in Study

All Respondents Whites Blacks Latinos

Age 47.5 50.1 43.0 41.8Female .64 .65 .63 .64Education 2.75 2.86 2.82 2.02Family Income 2.84 2.98 2.45 2.44

(� $10,000)Liberal .25 .23 .28 .29Conservative .42 .44 .43 .44Black .09Latino .16Other Race/Ethnicity .09N 1281 832 113 209

Reference groups for nominal independent variables are moderate (political orientation) and white (race/ethnicity).

4 Alternative specifications of education yielded sub-stantively the same result, although analyses using sever-al dummy variables for education had lower statisticalpower, especially for subgroup analyses of blacks andLatinos.


somewhat important for physical illness, andalmost two-thirds do for success in life.

By conventional psychometric standards,one is justified in treating the five geneticscausation items as comprising a single index.The lower-bound estimate of scale reliability(standardized Cronbach’s alpha) for the itemsis .76, and iterated principal factors analysisresolves to only one factor with an eigenvaluegreater than one. For the purposes of testingHypotheses 3–5, therefore, we created anindex of beliefs in genetic causation by stan-dardizing the individual items, summingthem, and standardizing this sum. Higher val-ues on this index correspond to genetic make-up being more important for individual differ-ences in the five attributes taken together. Theloadings of items on the shared factor werequite similar, ranging from .50 (mental illness)to .67 (personality, intelligence). For this rea-son, the summated scale we use correlatesextremely highly with one based on factorscores (r > .99) and yields virtually indistin-guishable results.

Table 3 presents results of an ordinaryleast squares regression of the index of beliefsin genetic causation on age, sex, education,and political orientation. The first column pre-sents results for all respondents and includesalso race/ethnicity. The results contradict theproposition that those in positions of socialdisadvantage are more skeptical of geneticexplanations. Instead, blacks, Latinos, andthose who had not been to college all ratedgenetic makeup on average as more importantfor attributes than did whites and more edu-cated individuals. Income is unrelated to rat-

ings about genetic makeup net of other con-trols. In the remaining three columns of Table3, we report results for separate regressions ofwhites, blacks, and Latinos. These reveal thateducation is not associated with beliefs ingenetic causation for whites. Moreover, whenwe put results together, blacks and Latinos withat least some college education do not endorsegenetic explanations any more than similarlyeducated whites. Instead, it is only among thosewith a high-school education or less that blacksand Latinos report greater belief than whites inthe importance of genetic causes.5

If we look to political orientation, we seethere is no tendency for the importance ofgenetic makeup to be endorsed more by eitherliberals or conservatives, relative to one anoth-er and to moderates. No significant relation-ships between political orientation and beliefin genetic causation were observed when sep-arate analyses were conducted by race/ethnic-ity. Instead, our results indicate that belief inthe importance of genetic makeup appearsindependent of general political orientation, atleast as measured by the simple self-identifi-cation measure included in the survey.

Although the genetic causation items areunidimensional by usual standards, we maystill consider whether respondent characteris-tics are associated with a tendency to regard agiven attribute as more or less strongly influ-enced by genetics than others. For example,

Table 2. Responses to Items Asking How Important “Genetic Makeup” is for Different Life Outcomes (Percentages)

Physical Mental SuccessIllness Illness Intelligence Personality in Life

Very Important 51.4 37.2 32.4 31.7 24.0Somewhat Important 39.5 48.4 48.3 45.9 41.0Not Very Important 6.8 10.3 11.7 14.4 22.2Not At All Important 2.9 4.1 7.5 8.0 12.7Mean/SD (4 = Very, 3.39 3.18 3.01 3.06 2.76—1 = Not At All) (.72) (.78) (.88) (.86) (.96)p for test of equality of —adjacent columns < .001 < .001 NS < .001N 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295 1,295

Significance test for equality of adjacent columns based on Goodman and Kruskal’s gamma statistic for ordinalvariables.

5 This characterization of the result is supported bymodels in which education is measured just as a binaryvariable of whether the respondent has some college ornot (not shown).


those who are more politically conservativemight be especially favorable to genetic expla-nations for success in life, or black respon-dents may be especially averse to geneticexplanations for intelligence. To test this pos-sibility, we estimate a rank-ordered logisticregression model for the five attributes. Thismodel is substantively similar to the multino-mial logit model for nominal outcomes,except that in the multinomial logit model oneonly has information about the most preferredalternative (or, by analogy, the attribute forwhich genetic makeup is regarded as mostimportant), whereas in the rank-ordered logitmodel one has some information on prefer-ence among items beyond the most preferred(for model details see Allison and Christakis1994; Long and Freese 2006). In its estima-tion, the model is equivalent to a Cox propor-tional hazards model for discrete-time sur-vival-analysis data, in which respondents arestrata and the attributes are observations with-in strata. Attributes ranked as more importantare treated as observations with earlier mortal-ity. The model includes (number of outcomecategories – 1)(number of covariates + 1)parameters, for which sample sizes are toosmall to permit subgroup analyses by race/eth-

nicity. Cox models have an extensive literatureon the handling of tied survival times, whichin this study are two attributes for whichrespondents give the same response for theimportance of genetic makeup; the modelassumes outcomes can be ordered eventhough they are not and that the orderings areequally likely (Cleves, Gould, and Guitterez2004). Methods for tied ranks implemented inthe statistical software used (Stata 10.0) can-not accommodate weights and so unweightedresults are presented.

Table 4 presents results from the rank-ordered logit model. Coefficients indicateexpected change in the log odds of ratinggenetic makeup as more important (vs. lessimportant) for an attribute than for physicalillness; the differences between two columnsindicate the expected change in log odds ofrating genetic makeup as more important forthe first attribute than for the second.Considering results for education first, thedata contradict any supposition that individu-als of lower status would be relatively moreskeptical of genetic explanations for successin life. Instead, relative to the other outcomes,those with no college rated genetic makeup asrelatively more important for success in life

Table 3. OLS Coefficents for Regression of Genetic Beliefs Composite on Age, Sex, Education, Political Orientation,by Race/Ethnicity

All Whites Blacks Latinos

Age .007*** .008*** .007 .000(.002) (.002) (.005) (.005)

Female .196** .237** –.046 .253(.064) (.073) (.195) (.187)

Education –.061† .004 –.181†‡ –.303**‡(.032) (.037) (.099) (.105)

Family Income –.007 .016 –.088 –.002(.027) (.030) (.091) (.092)

Liberal .051 .087 –.055 .014(.078) (.087) (.252) (.243)

Conservative .024 –.043 .151 .112(.070) (.077) (.220) (.213)

Black .192†(.100)

Latino .452***(.100)

Other Race/Ethnicity .018(.142)

N 1281 832 113 209

† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. ‡ indicates p < .05 difference from whites. Robust standard errors in paren-theses. Reference groups for nominal independent variables are moderate (political orientation) and White (race/ethnic-ity).


than did respondents with some college.Similarly, blacks and Latinos were not moreskeptical of genetic explanations for successin life, but rather both groups instead reportedgenetic makeup was relatively more importantfor success in life than the other outcomes (forLatinos, significantly so). However, blacks didreport that genetic makeup was relatively lessimportant for intelligence than did whites,which might reflect the particularly troubledhistory of discussions about genetics and theintelligence of blacks. This result was the onlyinstance in our analyses in which a sociallydisadvantaged group evinced a pattern sug-gestive of greater aversion to genetic explana-tion. Apart from this, we find little evidencefor either Hypothesis 3 or 4.

Looking to political orientation, conserv-atives are significantly more likely than mod-erates to regard genetic makeup as moreimportant for personality than for mental ill-ness or success in life. However, the differencebetween liberals and conservatives is not sig-nificant. Indeed, liberals and conservativeswere not significantly different from oneanother for any attribute. Again, then, self-identified political orientation is not associat-

ed with differences in assessment of geneticcausation, and thus we find no support forHypothesis 5 in these data. Statistical powerwould appear not to be at issue, since the per-tinent coefficients for liberals and conserva-tives are typically in the same direction whencompared to moderates.

Although we did not hypothesize thatgender or age would have specific effects onassessment of genetic causation, we note thatwomen are more likely than men to endorsegenetic explanations for personality, intelli-gence, and success in life, relative to theirendorsement of such explanations for physicalor mental illness. This suggests that, if some-thing like the cultural schema posited abovedoes exist, it has greater support amongwomen than men. Younger respondents aremore like women than are older respondents,insofar as they draw greater distinctionbetween the genetic causes of illness and ofeither psychological characteristics or successin life. Whether the latter result is attributableto developments of aging or is a cohort differ-ence cannot be determined by our data.

We sought also to assess whether theindex of belief in genetic causation was relat-

Table 4. Rank-ordered Logistic Regression Coefficients for Regression of Beliefs about Genetic Etiology on SelectedExplanatory Variables (N = 1,281)

Mental Successillness Personality Intelligence in Life

Age .001b,c,d .012**a .014***a .021***a

(.004) (.004) (.004) (.004)Female –.049c,d –.077d –.343*a –.462**a,b

(.144) (.148) (.146) (.158)Education –.250**d –.246**d –.146†d –.508***a,b,c

(.077) (.078) (.077) (.085)Family Income .025 –.004 .034 –.005

(.025) (.026) (.025) (.028)Liberal –.062 –.079 –.263 –.316

(.182) (.190) (.187) (.204)Conservative –.190b .134a,d –.026 –.223b

(.160) (.164) (.162) (.175)Black –.031 –.033 –.444†d .229c

(.252) (.258) (.263) (.275)Latino .222 .081 .108 .481*

(.209) (.215) (.213) (.225)Other Race/Ethnicity .648** .216 .504* .508*

(.230) (.237) (.231) (.256)

† p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Standard errors in parentheses. Subscripted letters indicate p < .05 forcontrast with (a) mental illness, (b) personality, (c) intelligence, (d) success in life. Reference groups for nominal inde-pendent variables are moderate (political orientation) and white (race/ethnicity).


ed to support for policies that may bepremised on the importance of genetic causes.We considered three items; the first is“Overall, do you think the Human GenomeProject and other research on human geneticsis likely to be helpful or harmful?”, with fourresponse categories ranging from “very help-ful” to “very harmful.” The other two itemshave four categories ranging from “stronglydisagree” to “strongly agree.” These are:“Every person should be required to have agenetic screening test before he or she can getmarried,” and “When thinking about choosinga marriage partner, it is important to knowwhether the person has a history of mental ill-ness in the family.”6

Table 5 presents results for ordered logitregressions of each of these items on the indexof beliefs and the covariates used earlier. Theordered logit model assumes that a categoricaloutcome variable is the observed manifesta-tion of an underlying latent continuous vari-able with a logistic distribution conditional oncovariates (Long and Freese 2006). In eachcase, genetic beliefs are significantly relatedto the policy measure in the expected direc-tion. While effects for other covariates areobserved, they are inconsistent in their direc-tion. For example, education is positivelyassociated with enthusiasm for the HumanGenome Project but negatively associatedwith using genetic information in marital orchildbearing decisions. Moreover, belief ingenetic causation is a stronger predictor ofeach of the policy outcomes than is generalpolitical orientation. These results indicatethat understanding beliefs about genetic cau-sation may be independently important forunderstanding attitudes toward policy ques-tions related to genetics.

Table 5. Ordered Logit Coefficients for Regression of Genetic Policy Variables on Genetic Beliefs and OtherExplanatory Variables

Partner’s familyHuman genome Require genetic history of mental

project is helpful not test before illness important toharmful marriage know

Genetic Attribution 0.435*** 0.646*** 0.706***(.076) (.068) (.066)

Age .001 .017*** .013***(.004) (.004) (.004)

Female –.309* .228† .373**(.132) (.130) (.122)

Education .109 –.323*** –.143*(.070) (.072) (.067)

Family Income .086 –.112* –.074(.056) (.053) (.047)

Liberal .262 –.139 –.381*(.180) (.164) (.152)

Conservative –.263† .086 –.148(.149) (.136) (.138)

Black –.295 .776*** .747***(.224) (.202) (.204)

Latino .070 1.300*** –.234(.208) (.182) (.197)

Other Race/Ethnicity .219 .356 .301(.275) (.260) (.260)

N 1176 1253 1266

† p <.10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Reference groups for nominal inde-pendent variables are moderate (political orientation) and white (race/ethnicity).

6 We also looked at the item “If a couple has a one-out-of-four chance of having a child with a serious geneticdefect, they should not give birth to any children of theirown.” This item takes genetic etiology as a premise.Nonetheless, beliefs about genetic causation were posi-tively associated with agreement, suggesting the value ofsubsequent research on how genetic causation as anexplicit premise affects responses to such items.


DISCUSSION

Many social scientists identify with liber-al political positions (e.g., Rothman, Lichter,and Nevitte 2005), especially regarding poli-cies toward helping the disadvantaged. Socialscientists commonly perceive their work asstanding against (as well as potentially threat-ened by) the recent surge of interest in genet-ics (Duster 2006). It might therefore be tempt-ing to infer that laypersons who are politicallymore liberal or who belong to disadvantagedgroups are likewise more broadly skeptical ofthe importance of genetics. That notion, how-ever, is not supported in this study.

Instead, disadvantaged respondents, whe-ther in terms of education or race/ethnicity,regard genetics as more important to the deter-mination of life outcomes than members ofadvantaged groups. Moreover, the most disad-vantaged respondents, in terms of educationand ethnicity, regard genetics as most impor-tant. The only exception to this pattern is thelower importance given to genetic makeup forintelligence among blacks. Political orienta-tion appears unrelated to assessments of theimportance of genetics. While our study doesnot address the consequences of changes inbeliefs, it does suggest that the idea of a nat-ural affinity between belief in the importanceof genetics and either social privilege or con-servative politics should not be taken forgranted. At the same time, our findings raisethe possibility that belief in the importance ofgenetics may indeed be important for howgenetics policy issues are evaluated in waysthat crosscut traditional predictors of attitudes.

To be sure, arguments about genetic cau-sation can be deployed to undermine supportfor programs that attempt to address existinghealth or social inequalities. In fact, respon-dents to our survey endorsed genetic causes ofthe specified health and social outcomes to aremarkable degree. Over 90 percent of allrespondents regard genetic makeup as at leastsomewhat important for physical illness, andalmost two-thirds do for success in life, thetrait that received the lowest level of geneticattribution. Consequently, there is good reasonto be concerned that essentializing ideologieswould resonate strongly with the beliefs of

substantial proportions of the US population,including those who historically have beenharmed and disadvantaged by policies predi-cated on invidious assumptions about genes ascauses of differences among individuals andgroups.

Various explanations can be offered forwhy blacks and Latinos with lower levels ofeducation may regard genetics as more impor-tant to explaining individual outcomes thanwhites and people with more education. Onepossible explanation is offered by the classicsocial psychological concept of locus of con-trol, which is intended to reflect, among otherdimensions, the extent to which individualsregard their fates as caused by their agencyversus external circumstances and events.Genes are “inside” us but otherwise sharecharacteristics of external attributions—theycan be attributed to outcomes in ways that mit-igate perceptions of the responsibility of indi-viduals—and external locus of control hasbeen consistently associated with social disad-vantage (e.g., Shaw and Krause 2001; Bruceand Thornton 2004).

A second explanation is offered by systemjustification theory, which holds that “peopleare motivated to justify and rationalize theways things are, so that existing social, eco-nomic, and political arrangements tend to beperceived as fair and legitimate” (Jost andHunyady 2005:260; see also Della Fave 1986;Della Fave 1991). Studies have shown thatendorsement of system justifications is associ-ated with increasing positive affect and satis-faction with one’s situation and reductions inmoral outrage, guilt, and frustration, especial-ly, though not exclusively, among the disad-vantaged (Jost and Hunyady 2005: 262).Insofar as system-justifying ideologies serve a“palliative function,” members of disadvan-taged groups may be more likely to endorsethem (Jost and Hunyady 2005). To date, ide-ologies that center on genetic and biologicalvariation have not played a prominent role inthe literature on system justification, thoughbeliefs about genetics underlying group differ-ences may be implicit in ideologies of socialgroup dominance (Jost and Hunyady 2005).However, both the broad endorsement ofgenetics in our study population as a whole


and the exceptional endorsement of genes asthe cause of individual “success in life” byAfrican-American and Latino respondents,are consistent with the notion that geneticexplanations for individual differences mayfunction as a system justifying ideology, espe-cially among socially disadvantaged groups.7

A third explanation emerges from ourobservation of a pattern by which those withless education, Latinos, and African Ameri-cans were less likely to endorse a pattern ofbelief in which broad physical conditions areperceived as more genetically based than morepsychological conditions, which in turn areseen as more genetically based than socialattainments (with the exception of attributionsfor intelligence by African Americans). If thispattern generally reflects a prevailing culturalscript, the divergence in responses by less edu-cated African American and Latino respon-dents may reflect their lower adherence to(and perhaps lower exposure to) this prevail-ing schema. We see some evidence for thisexplanation in our finding that income is not asignificant predictor of genetic attributions,either independently or in interaction withrace/ethnicity. This suggests that having lesseducation, especially for African-Americansand Latinos, may be particularly consequen-tial for beliefs about genes as causes of indi-vidual fates, precisely because institutions ofhigher education are central to the socializa-tion of individuals to dominant cultural beliefsabout the causes of individual health andsocial outcomes (c.f. Phelan et al. 1995).8

The above are neither exclusive norexhaustive possibilities. Our findings may beinterpreted as diverging from other work thatindicates that genetic explanations for groupdifferences can be associated with negativeopinions of the subordinate group (Jayaratneet al. 2006; Schneider 2004). A commonlymade point in discussions of genetic differ-ences is that evidence of the heritability ofindividual differences does not imply thatgenetics are important for understandinggroup differences (e.g., Plomin et al. 2001;Fischer et al. 1996). However, availableresearch indicates that individuals who usegenetic explanations for individual differencesare significantly more likely than others to usegenes to explain perceived group differencesfor that same trait (Sternthal, Jayaratne, andFeldbaum, N.d.: 13).9 Importantly, the itemswe considered neither ask about group differ-ences nor explicitly invoke group identities.An implication of our work for those interest-ed in combating prejudice is the importance ofemphasizing the difference between causes ofindividual and group differences, especially asour data make clear that the public overallconsiders genetic makeup important across arange of broad individual life outcomes.

The results also diverge from those of thestudy most comparable to ours. In their analy-sis of data from the 1996 General SocialSurvey (GSS), Schnittker and colleagues(2000) found that blacks endorsed geneticexplanations of mental illness significantlyless than did whites, while we found no suchassociation. The reason for the discrepantfindings is not clear. One methodological dif-ference between the studies is that we askedrespondents a simple question about theimportance of genetic factors in causing “seri-ous mental illness.” In contrast, respondents inthe 1996 GSS were asked about the impor-tance of genetic factors in response to avignette that described a person with symp-toms of schizophrenia, major depression, drug

7 How to extend system justification theory to thedomain of health is an intriguing question, as system jus-tification theorists generally have focused on “control ofthe physical and social environment” through possessionof “wealth, institutional power, and status” (Della Fave1991).

8 An interesting hypothesis suggested by an anonymousreviewer is specifically that majoring in a science in col-lege contributes to greater endorsement of dominant cul-tural beliefs about genetic causation. The same reviewersuggested that among those with less education, sensa-tionalist media coverage of genetic research (Conrad1997) may be more persuasive. The data for this analysiscontain no information about college major or apprehen-sion of media coverage, however these possibilities shouldbe evaluated in future research.

9 In Sternthal et al. (N.d.), endorsement of at least somegenetic influence on individual differences in intelligenceor personality increased the odds of doing so for race dif-ferences by approximately 80 percent.


addiction, or alcohol dependence. One possi-ble explanation for the discrepant finding,then, is that the interpretation of the term“serious mental illness” and its correspon-dence to the four disorders presented bySchnittker et al. differs according to race.

Our study has several important limita-tions that we hope can be addressed in subse-quent research. First, while we think it a virtueof the study that questions about genetic cau-sation are not asked in a forced-choice formatagainst an alternative (e.g., genetics or envi-ronment), asking about environmental causesin a parallel format would allow more infor-mation on how endorsement of genetic causesare related to beliefs regarding other causes,and it would offer a useful check about theissue of differences in respondent’s thresholdsfor, e.g., “very important” versus “somewhatimportant.” Second, although broad questionsabout political orientation are widely used,they also have known limitations (Conoverand Feldman 1981), and full assessment of therelationship between political orientation andbeliefs about genetics would benefit fromconsidering a range of attitudes that distin-guish liberals and conservatives and differ-ences within the two broad orientations. Third,more extensive measures of income andwealth—rather than just one five-categoryquestion about family income—might clarifywhether financial resources truly are as irrele-vant for beliefs about genetic causation as thisstudy indicates. Fourth, asking a broad arrayof genetics-related policy questions—andmore questions that involve trade-offs ratherthan the increasingly criticized agree/disagreeformat (Krosnick 1999)—might allowstronger inferences about the role of beliefsabout genetic causation in shaping these atti-tudes. Finally, while available data do notdemonstrate a consistent relationship betweengenetic knowledge and attitudes towardsgenetics (Condit 2001), we anticipate thatquestions about genetic knowledge wouldaugment our understanding of the underlyinginformedness of different profiles of answersto questions about the importance of genetics.For example, questions about genetic knowl-edge could help to elaborate respondents’beliefs regarding precisely what genes are

(Lanie et al. 2004) and how they act in waysthat may contribute to variations in individualhealth and social outcomes. Likewise, suchquestions could allow us to better ascertainrespondents’ apprehension of contemporarygenetics research, including the HGP, and itsapplications.

We have every reason to imagine thatgenetic and other research will continue toproduce new knowledge claims about humansat a rapid rate. We also expect the merits andimplications of these claims will continue tobe much debated in academia, with manycompeting interpretations offered to thebroader public. Prevailing public interpreta-tions, in turn, may have implications for fund-ing priorities and regulation of research, creat-ing an open-ended co-evolution of geneticinquiry, science discourse, and public opinion.Social scientists have ample historical warrantfor fears that belief in the importance of genesfor life outcomes can be used to justifyinequalities and pessimism about the possibil-ities of social change. We hope social sciencewill maintain its vigilant voice against over-simplified or deterministic views of the influ-ence of genes. However, one common expres-sion of concern—the idea that belief in theimportance of genes is more appealing to priv-ileged groups or to those with more conserva-tive political orientations—is not supported byour data. Broader understanding of variationin individual beliefs about the importance ofgenes awaits future research. Moreover, howsuch beliefs will be affected by developmentsin genetic science is perhaps every bit asunknown as is what those developments willbe. Genetics may thus be expected to beanother exemplification of Hacking’s(1999:108) conclusion that “When we get tothe future, we will renegotiate our concepts asbest we may, in ways we cannot predict.”

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Sara Shostak is an assistant professor of sociology at Brandeis University. Her research focuses onthe relationships between science, subjectivity, and social order. Among her current projects are anethnography of the incorporation of genetics into environmental health research and regulation and ananalysis of how genetics and neuroscience are transforming the experience of living with epilepsy.

Jeremy Freese is a professor of sociology and fellow of the Institute for Policy Research atNorthwestern. Much of his work considers connections among biological, psychological, and socialcausation, especially in the context of technology and policy change. With collaborators, he is alsoworking on methods for combining quantitative and qualitative information in the study of surveynonresponse.

Bruce G. Link is a professor of epidemiology and sociomedical sciences at the Mailman School ofPublic Health of Columbia University and a research scientist at New York State Psychiatric Institute.His interests include the nature and consequences of stigma for people with mental illnesses, the con-nection between mental illnesses and violent behaviors, and explanations for associations betweensocial conditions and morbidity and mortality.

Jo C. Phelan is an associate professor of sociomedical sciences at Columbia University. Herresearch interests include social stigma, conceptions of mental illness, the impact of the “geneticsrevolution” on the stigma of mental illness, attitudes and beliefs relating to social inequality and itslegitimation, and social inequalities in health and mortality.

Knowledge and Attitudes about Genetic

Testing.” Genetic Testing 8 (1): 31–43.

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Genetic Explanatory Style? The Link from

Explanations for Individual to Perceived GroupDifferences.”

Tygart, C.E. 2000. “Genetic Attribution, Causation,and Public Support of Gay Rights.”International Journal of Public OpinionResearch 12: 259–275.

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