Johns Hopkins University SAIS, Center for Transatlantic Relations

Dynamics of Alliance Cohesion and Integration

The Implications of the Eurocrisis on the

European Security Architecture

By Erik Brattberg and Gergely Varga

May 2012

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Contents

Executive Summary ................................................................................................ 2

Introduction ........................................................................................................... 5

Lack of Strategic Cohesion in NATO ....................................................................... 7

Political Stalemate in the CSDP ............................................................................ 11

Competing National Strategies in Europe ............................................................ 14

Dim prospects for European Military Capabilities ................................................ 17

Scenarios for Europe ............................................................................................ 22

Conclusions .......................................................................................................... 26

Bibliography ......................................................................................................... 27

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Executive Summary

Surveying the European security landscape in mid-2012, it seems that the future of European

security, and indeed the entire ‘European project’ itself, is uncertain. The struggles of the European

Union to address the ravaging “eurocrisis” may bring to a halt or even rollback further European

integration, with ensuing political disintegration as a possible consequence. This prospect would also

have severe repercussions on the future course of European and transatlantic security.

This paper argues that the longevity and long-term vitality of the transatlantic alliance is intrinsically

linked to the well being of the ‘European project’. Whatever the actual form and shape of successful

European integration, the EU should transform to meet current challenges. Would a standstill or a

complete collapse of the European integration process take place, Euro-Atlantic security

cooperation would not remain immune. Quite the reverse, if current trends persist, the Alliance will

indeed have to prepare for a ”dim, if not dismal future”. While the United States is increasingly

focused on pivoting towards Asia, U.S. policymakers have continuously sent the message to their

European counterparts that NATO will remain relevant to Washington only as long as it lives up to

certain military expectations.

Unfortunately, most European nations have not paid heed to this message: the current state of

Europe is on a continuous declining path in both absolute and relative terms. While European

leaders reaffirmed their commitment to the Alliance at the recent Chicago summit in May 2012 and

pledged to do more to integrate their defense market – under the rubric of ‘Smart Defense’ – the

real work in this regard has only started. The year 2012 will mark the first time that Asian military

spending will surpass that of Europe. If nothing is changed – and that fast – Europe have no choice

but to continue its downward trajectory towards global strategic irrelevance. In the absence of a

common imminent threat like the one NATO faced during the Cold War, sustaining the Alliance in

the 21st century requires a certain level of convergence of economic, political and security interests

among allied nations.

The question from the perspective of the European project is accordingly whether European

political and economic integration can proceed without any meaningful defense policy integration?

Or, vice versa, whether a common foreign security and defense can evolve in the absence of wider

political and economic integration? In order to answer these questions, this paper outlines four

possible scenarios for the future of European security. These are:

• Further down the current path. Under this scenario Europe will continue to ‘muddle

through’ on defense over the near future. Rather than moving forward towards closer defense

integration through pooling and sharing of resources using either the EU and NATO platforms or

bilateral ad-hoc regional arrangements, the bulk of European defense will here continue to be

primarily a national issue for the individual states. Although occasional bilateral and/or multilateral

initiatives may materialize at times, this will not fundamentally alter the nature of European defense,

which will remain marked by redundancies and unnecessary overlaps. While muddling through with

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defense cooperation can be a feature of other scenarios of the wider political and economic

integration as well, even if the EU would successfully proceed in its economic integration, member

states might still try and maintain as much sovereignty over their defense affairs as possible

according to their traditional security interests.

• Disintegration. As a direct consequence of the eurocrisis, national governments will lack

sufficient resources to invest in defense and the rise of national agendas within European politics

would also likely also result in more divergent security policies across the continent. If Europe were

to be on a path towards loosening integration and increasingly relying on merely some form of

intergovernmental cooperation, this would not only have an effect on not just the cohesion of the

European Union, but on NATO with joint policies and actions becoming less likely. Instead, under

this scenario European nation states with a robust nationalistic agenda would sideline both EU and

NATO, and instead prefer to maintain full sovereignty over security and defense policy.

• Multispeed Europe. A two speed Europe consisting of one core group at the center –

possibly centered around the Franco-German duo – and one on the periphery with looser

integration will materialize. Here, deeper integration in security and defense policy between certain

EU countries could also materialize in various forms, either by creating just one core “CSDP”

group, more groups driven by common regional security interests, or just looser, ad hoc structured

cooperation on certain defense projects or issues without any major drive towards broader common

policies and strategy. Defense cooperation can move forward even in the absence of a common

strategic framework. However, while these initiatives will serve to foster bilateral and multilateral

cooperation on strategic development, capabilities, and training and exercises, they will not

significantly contribute to enhance Europe-wide defense cooperation, let alone integration. Instead,

problems relating to strategic incoherence, duplication and unnecessary overlap, and lack of new

critical capabilities will continue to linger.

• Enhanced defense integration. The final and most optimistic scenario proposes that

European defense cooperation will move towards further integration under the auspices of EU

and/or NATO. In this case, European states will have managed to move beyond the question of

whether more integration in the defense area is a desirable outcome and instead devote their focus

on how to best go about achieving it. A key component of this strategy will be working through the

EU and NATO to achieve a high level of pooling and sharing of resources. In this way, European

states will reduce duplication and unnecessary overlap and achieve greater functional specialization.

However, this will require much deeper cooperation involving the defense industries, cooperative

development of force structures and capabilities, and not least the foreign and security policies of

the member states.

The Way Forward

The question regarding which of these scenarios the future of European security is the most

probable depends on developments in the economic sphere. This, in turn, depends on the

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willingness for further political integration in Europe. Furthermore, European nations can only be

capable of significantly improving their military capabilities in the current financial environment with

enhanced defense cooperation and integration. Since none of the European nations can cope with

the emerging security threats and challenges alone, and each one of them is desperately searching for

ways to keep defense expenditures down, maintaining the Alliance is in each member’s interest.

In response to those who fear the loss of national sovereignty over defense policy, the real question

facing most European nations is not whether to have the most urgently needed capabilities alone or

to share it with allies, but whether to have them at all. While these threats and challenges can be

most effectively and efficiently addressed within the framework of NATO and the EU, the chronic

inattention and underinvestment in the defense sector by many European states is undermining

these organizations’ long-term viability.

Europe is facing a new challenging geopolitical environment, with a changing global power

distribution and with new security threats on the rise, Europe needs to boost its defense not just

because of NATO, but primarily because of itself. With current European defense budgets this is

only possible through increased defense cooperation. Effective and smart defense integration

requires a comprehensive approach. Similar to NATO’s “Smart Defense” concept, which aims to

do more with less, “Smart Integration” should be at the heart of European security policy, involving

coordinated efforts in defense, industrial, economic, social policies, taking into account the unique

features of Europe’s history and diversity.

Erik Brattberg and Gergely Varga are both currently Visiting Fellows at the Center for Transatlantic Relations at

the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University in Washington, D.C.

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Introduction

The ongoing global power shift along with the financial and economic crisis in the West, the U.S.

pivot to Asia and the approaching drawdown of the mission in Afghanistan marks a major turning

point for the Atlantic Alliance and European security. Although Europe can still be considered a

secure and stable continent, the two cornerstones of this security – NATO and the EU – are

currently experiencing a crisis never seen before. The growing challenges of the United States in

other parts of the globe and Europe’s weak performance in terms of providing security and sharing

the burdens foreshadows “a dim if not dismal future for the Alliance”1.

Meanwhile, the notion of the EU as a major source for promoting global stability and solutions for

challenges of the international system has been cast into question over the last two years. As the

European Foreign Policy Scorecard2 of the Council on European Foreign Relations sums up in its

findings for the year 2011, the EU has increasingly become a problem rather than a solution as it

struggles to overcome the challenges of its economic and financial crisis. The eurocrisis has

strengthened the political divisions among member states as tensions have risen especially between

the more competitive and fiscally strict EU’s center and the southern periphery struggling with debt

and uncompetitive economies. But it has also brought forth the United Kingdom’s traditional

skepticism towards European integration, resulting in London’s drifting away from Brussels as it

opted out of the new fiscal deal reached at the EU summit in late 2011. The future of the euro, and

with it the whole EU, remains uncertain with fundamental political, structural and competitiveness

problems within the EU still not addressed, makes the prospects for long term economic growth in

the whole European Union seem gloomy. The basic problem of the creation of a monetary union

without a fiscal union, together with the huge difference in economic productivity and

competitiveness among member states, has still not been solved by the measures taken so far,

including the fiscal pact3, the bailout funds4, or the European Central Banks indirect monetary

stimulus packages.5

The economic and fiscal crisis has taken a serious toll on European nations’ defense expenditures,

which were already in need of a boost even prior to the current crisis. Austerity has already had

significant effects on Europe’s military capabilities and overall defense posture, as numerous

previous studies have highlighted.6 But when one surveys the European security landscape in mid-

1 “Gates rebukes European allies in farewell speech”, The Washington Post, June 10 2011. Available online at http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/gates-rebukes-european-allies-in-farewell-speech/2011/06/10/AG9tKeOH_story.html 2 “European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2012”, European Council on Foreign Relations. Available online at http://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR_SCORECARD_2012_WEB.pdf 3 The Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union was signed by the member states, except for the United Kingdom and the Czech Republic, on March 2, 2012. 4 i.e. The European Financial Stability Facility and the European Financial Stabilisation Mechanism 5 “ECB provides 530bn euros of cheap loans for banks”, BBC News, 29 February 2012. Available online at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-17203134 6 See, for example, Valasek, Tomas, “Surviving Austerity: The case for a new approach to EU military cooperation”, Centre for European Reform, April 2011; Witney, Nick “How To Stop the Militarization of Europe, European Council

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2012 something more fundamental than just simple defense austerity seems to be in process, as the

effects of the geopolitical changes highlighted above are starting to trickle down into European

politics. This paper is concerned with the question of how much Europe’s political-economic

integration and security integration correlate with each other. This question is all the more complex

with two existing, parallel structures in security – NATO and CSDP – both undergoing considerable

changes at the moment.

Historical examples show that deep security cooperation can exist in the absence of political and

economic integration among nations, especially in times of a serious common security threat. This

was the case from the early days of the Cold War, where NATO was already in place while

European integration was just making its first footsteps. Defense integration, however, involves not

just shared threat perceptions, common doctrines, strategy, but also a qualitative cooperation and

expanding interdependencies in the whole defense sectors of the respective nations. This includes

cooperation in procurement, investments, pooling and sharing of capabilities, common framing of

defense posture and force structure, etc. Where as in an alliance a member state in theory has the

option of taking action independently, a nation which has its military capabilities embedded within

an integrated defense and military structure, has far less room to maneuver.

The objective of this paper is to unfold the implications of the current economic and financial crisis

in Europe through analyzing the main political and strategic developments of our time within the

European security realm. As prosperity and security are vital preconditions for each other, our main

thesis is that the continued viability of NATO and the EU – both center pillars of the secure and

prosperous post-war Europe – are deeply interconnected with each other. Maintaining the relevance

of the North-Atlantic Alliance is at the core security interest of its members, and for Europe as

whole. In order to maintain continued American interest in NATO, however, Europe has to deliver

more. In the current challenging economic environment this can only be achieved through

qualitatively enhanced defense cooperation. But due to the various national political, economic,

social obstacles which currently stand in the way, this can only be achieved through a comprehensive

effort involving various dimensions of European integration. Hence, the threat of an unsettled,

sudden disintegration of the EU, which is not an unrealistic scenario anymore, should be a cause for

concern for NATO, and not just because of delivering military capabilities, but because of the

overall political cohesion of European nations.

Based on the above outlined train of thought, our paper will proceed as follows: First, it looks at the

wider strategic picture of Europe through the lens of the political cohesion of NATO and CSDP,

the two bedrocks of the European security architecture. We will then analyze the interests and

policies of major European states, as those are crucial in our understanding of the future of

on Foreign Relations Policy Brief, November 2011; Flanagan, Stephen, J. (et al.) “A Diminishing Transatlantic Partnership?: The Impact of the Financial Crisis on European Defense and Foreign Assistance Capabilities”, Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, May 2011; Brattberg, Erik “Europe Must Enhance Defense Integration To Avoid Strategic Decline”, World Politics Review, 27 January 2012. At the same time, a few European countries (e.g. Greece) faced with the prospects of austerity have chosen to maintain previous defense spending levels. See “Greece’s austerity does not extend to its arms budget”, The Guardian, 21 March 2012.

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European integration. Third, in order to identify the challenges and opportunities of European

defense, a section of our paper will focus on the current state of European military capabilities and

the efforts to maintain and improve these. Fourth, as the future of European integration, and with it

the security and defense structures, is very uncertain at the moment, we then outline the different

scenarios of integration and security policy. With the help of these scenarios it is then possible to

outline the risks Europe faces, and the ways and opportunities to mitigate these.

Lack of Strategic Cohesion in NATO

The emergence of other power centers around the world is already a reality, and with it, the

distribution of global power has altered to the disadvantage of the Euro-Atlantic region, especially

Europe and, to a lesser degree, the United States. Although there is widespread disagreement among

scholars as to whether the U.S. actually is in a state of decline relative to other powers, and if so,

with what implications7, it is hardly arguable that it is facing growing domestic challenges as well as

challenges in other regions of the world, namely in the Pacific. Furthermore, the interests of the

United States and Europe, whether only some European nations or the entire EU, will not always

coincide with each other. As recent developments in the Middle East and North Africa have

illustrated, peace and stability cannot be taken for granted in Europe’s neighborhood. Conflicts and

crises of even larger scale and greater impact than the ones seen in Libya or Syria cannot be ruled

out in Europe’s vicinity in the years to come. A whole host of new security challenges – ranging

form the growing competition in the global commons and their vulnerability from various state and

non-state actors to piracy in the Gulf of Aden to increasing cyber-attacks – should also be a concern

for European nations, as the United States might not always be willing or able to provide the

security in these critical domains that Europe so heavily relies upon. Having the proper military

capabilities in times of crisis is essential in order to have a real choice, whether for real use or merely

for the sake of credibility. The implications of NATO’s premier mission of the last decade, the war

and stabilization operation in Afghanistan, and NATO’s recent intervention in Libya, should

therefore be measured in the above described geopolitical context.

To draw an appropriate balance on NATO’s recent wars, a broad spectrum of aspects have to be

taken into consideration, ranging from military capabilities and readiness to wider political and

strategic implications. Both missions brought both positive and negative developments for the

Alliance. The ISAF mission developed itself from a small peacekeeping-like mission into a fully-

7For academic works featuring the relative decline of the United States, see Zakaria, Fareed, The Post American World, and the rise of the Rest W.W. Norton & Co., New York, 2008; Kupchan, Charles A., No One's World: The West, the Rising Rest, and the Coming Global Turn. Oxford University Press, 2012; Friedberg, Aaron L., A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in Asia. W. W. Norton & Company. New York, 2011 For works arguing against the decline of the US, see Kagan. Robert, The World America Made, Alfred A. Knopf, 2012; Beckley, Michael (2011), “China’s Century? Why America’s Edge Will Endure”, International Security, 36:3, pp. 41–78.

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fledged stabilization effort unlike anything NATO has ever seen before. In some respects, this

“mission creep” could be taken as a major accomplishment given the serious caveats (including

when, where and how troops could engage the enemy in combat), which many member states had in

the early years of the engagement. As a proof of Alliance solidarity, the commitment and the

mandates of the national forces on the ground widened considerably especially after 2008, with the

change of administration in the White House. Given the extreme challenges the stabilization of

Afghanistan has brought to bare, ISAF has proved to be relatively effective in adjusting to the

changing environment and the overall complexity of the mission. The military engagement has also

clearly had positive effects on the Allies’ capabilities, force readiness, and interoperability.8

Afghanistan is the first major protracted military operation most European nations have been

involved in since the Second World War. The experience, knowledge and expertise the militaries

have also gained through conducting the mission is a valuable asset for the future.9 European allies

have also made some progress on certain procurement and capabilities and the nations invested in

the most needed tools for conducting the operations. Furthermore, under the “comprehensive

approach” framework, civilian-military cooperation has reportedly improved.10 NATO’s complex

command and control system has proved to be effective and has adjusted quite well to the

broadening requirements, as the mission has grown larger and more complex over the past decade.

Overall, the Alliance served as a useful platform for various types of cooperation between the allies

in order to meet their commitments to the ISAF mission.

Another critical stress test for NATO was the Libya operation in 2011, which brought similar

positive lessons. NATO was the only international organization capable of providing the necessary

military capabilities to conduct such a complex operation. Apart from the obvious military hardware

and expertise needed for the actual execution of the mission, the politically sensitive issue of a

proper command and control could only be addressed effectively through NATO structures.11 Even

though a large number of the member states did not participate in Operation Unified Protector12,

the Alliance was still able to provide the necessary tools and capabilities, with European nations

taking the lead in the campaign.

The Libya campaign also highlighted some positive elements on the political and strategic front.

Although political support for the mission was never high in most European countries13, nor in the

United States14, it could be seen as an achievement for NATO that even in today’s highly casualty

8 Mattelaer, Alexander (2011) “How Afghanistan has Strengthened NATO”, Survival, 53:6, pp.127-140. 9 Anthony King: The Transformation of Europe’s Armed Forces: From the Rhine to Afghanistan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 10 Chaudhuri, Rudra and Farrell, Theo (2011), “Campaign disconnect: operational progress and strategic obstacles in Afghanistan, 2009–2011”, International Affairs, 87:2, pp. 271–296. 11 Brattberg, Erik (2011) “Opportunities Lost, Opportunities Seized: the Libya crisis as Europe’s Perfect Storm”, European Policy Centre Policy Brief, June 2011. 12 For a list of participating states, see http://www.jfcnaples.nato.int/resources/24/Documents/110406-placemat-libya.pdf 13 Financial Times, “Public opposes wider Libya campaign”, 20 June 2011. 14 A Rasmussen poll in March 2011 found that 45 percent of Americans approved of the Libya intervention while a Rasmussen poll from October 2011 support had dropped to 32 percent. For more information, see

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sensitive Europe, the Allied governments essentially accepted the use of military force as a foreign

policy tool. To some extent, as NATO functions increasingly as a security network among the

member states where coalitions for various tasks can be formed on a ad hoc basis, a certain amount

of flexibility is provided in terms of commitments, making action on behalf of the willing and able

more possible. While non-NATO members such as Sweden made significant contributions to the

Libya mission15 (as it also has in Afghanistan), the fact that countries from the region, such as Qatar

and the UAE also participated must be seen as a remarkable achievement for the legitimacy of the

operation.

On the other hand, the experiences in both Afghanistan and Libya placed significant burdens on the

cohesion and the overall posture of the Alliance. While it is true that the ISAF mission enhanced

modernization of the armed forces, these focused exclusively on the requirements of the Afghan

mission. Long needed reforms and investments were postponed and capabilities abandoned in other

areas of the defense sector in many European allies because the ISAF mission absorbed these

resources.16 Even after over a decade in Afghanistan, most European nations’ militaries remain

mostly prepared for traditional defense roles. The often used figures of the total number of men in

arms in Europe and the percentage that can actually be deployed to oversees complex missions17

presents a valid picture on Europe’s operational preparedness and core defense posture. But as the

Libya operation (which was much more so a traditional military operation from NATO’s

perspective) has demonstrated, even European nations with the most advanced and capable

militaries, such as France and the UK, lack critical capabilities and assets (e.g. surveillance,

reconnaissance, communications, precision targeting, etc.) that are crucial in any future military

operation, including traditional territorial defense.18

On average, it seems fair to say that the core political implication of the Afghan mission holds more

negatives for the Alliance than positives. The decade long military engagement, with lacking

conviction among many allies that the future of Afghanistan is a core national security interest, and

with the ultimate outcome there looking uncertain at best, has put Alliance solidarity to an extreme

test. Above all, the engagement in Afghanistan, notwithstanding the war in Kosovo, then in Iraq,

and recently in Libya along with other smaller scale missions in between, have together created an

http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/general_politics/october_2011/new_low_32_support_obama_s_decision_to_take_military_action_in_libya 15 During the Libya campaign, Sweden sent 122 personnel and eight Gripen aircraft, at a cost of roughly $22 million a month. 16 Dobos, Edgár and Tálas, Péter (2011) “Védelmi és haderõreformok Európában: a cseh és lengyel példa” [Defence and military reforms in Europe: the Czech and the Polish examples], Nemzet és Biztonság, 2011/6, pp.39-49; Csiki, Tamás, Béla Háda and Gergely Varga (2011) “Védelmi és haderõreformok Európában: a belga, holland és brit példa” [Defense and military reforms in Europe: the Belgian, the Dutch and the British examples], Nemzet és Biztonság, 2011/5, p.51-63. 17 It is estimated that between 3-5 percent of Europe’s troops are currently deployed on overseas missions. 18 “Early military lessons from Libya”, IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 17, Comment 34, September 2011, International Institute For Strategic Studies. Available online at http://www.iiss.org/publications/strategic-comments/strategic-comments-2011/ See also “Short War, Long Shadow: The Political and Military Legacies of the 2011 Libya Campaign”, RUSI Whitehall Report, pp.1-12. Available online at http://www.rusi.org/publications/whitehallreports/ref:O4F631FBA20DF9/

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impression of endless “state of alert” among several NATO members – something that these

countries are not prepared for militarily or politically. This has ultimately resulted in a sense of

“strategic fatigue”. Of course, some members, especially the United States, would perceive that

NATO had no other option but to address these new threats and challenges. While true in the sense

that if NATO wanted to remain relevant in the post-Cold War world it also had to transform its

posture accordingly, however, the question of “how”, taking into account the members’ various

perceptions within the Alliance, and the tough experience of Iraq and Afghanistan, is an equally

decisive element.

The tensions (like the ones caused by the transatlantic burden sharing problem) generated by the

engagement in Afghanistan and Libya will not disappear without trace. The formal approval of the

Libya operation by the NAC and the non-participation of a majority of member states in the actual

execution of the operations pushes the Alliance further on towards making “coalition of the willing”

within NATO a general norm in the absence of unanimous political agreement on the need for

action. This might not only be a negative development. As some experts point out, this “a la carte”

approach is still better than the alternative where the Alliance would be not capable of doing

anything because there would be always disagreement among the 28 allies on the specific objectives,

scope and costs of a certain mission.19 At the same time, ad hoc coalitions will strengthen the risk of

moral hazard, “free riding” and undermine solidarity within the Alliance.

The burden sharing problem and the political fragmentation of the Alliance is also heavily affecting

the prospects of pooling and sharing, which is at the core of NATO’s Smart Defense initiative.

Although numerous projects have begun under this concept, most of them involving several

members and/or partner countries, the experience of Afghanistan and Libya did not strengthen the

notion that the allies could take the critical capabilities of other nations for granted in times of

contingencies. Hence, the member states will continue to be careful concerning specialization and

giving up of certain capabilities for the sake of greater overall efficiency, even if a more cooperative

approach would provide better and more capabilities on the whole. Although even the current level

of cooperation does have potential benefits and can have a positive impact, without a significant

change in the scope and scale of cooperation, it will likely not produce on the scale of what is

necessary for global strategic relevance.

Although NATO remains the cornerstone of transatlantic security, it faces internal challenges on

multiple fronts: the lack of common strategic assessment, lack of common perspectives on NATO’s

future role, decline of Allied defense capabilities, and gaps in leadership, solidarity and public

support.20 The lack of common strategic perspectives on threats, challenges and the ways to address

them is at the core of NATO’s challenges and is not likely to disappear any time soon. The 2010

Strategic Concept was a noteworthy effort in this regard, and while it did manage to expand the

19 Schake, Kori “US retrenchment is right and overdue” In Valasek, Tomas (2012) “All Alone? What US retrenchment means for Europe and NATO”, Center for European Reform, March 1, 2012. Available online at http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/report/2012/all-alone-what-us-retrenchment-means-europe-and-nato 20 Volker, Kurt and Green, Kevin P. (2011) “NATO Reform: Key Principles”, Atlantic Council Issue Brief, December 2011. Available online at http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/7631/120711_NATO_Reform_Principles.pdf

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scope of the threat environment, it did arguably not foster enough strategic coherence, as the

disagreement among the Allies regarding the Libya intervention illustrated. However, this does not

mean that renewed commitments, reform and initiatives are crucial for the future of the Alliance. As

Europe will increasingly be responsible for its own security, and as the security challenges grow in

number and in complexity, placing the Alliance within a broader framework of strategic transatlantic

cooperation with the inclusion of the European Union, will be a crucial matter.

Political Stalemate in the CSDP

It is not just the Alliance that is lacking cohesion and is experiencing symptoms of crisis; the EU’s

Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) is also undergoing many similar challenges at the

moment. A decade ago, at the height at the transatlantic debate over Iraq, a popular notion was that

the future of European security would lie either in NATO or in ESDP. The decade that followed,

however, increasingly underscored the opposite notion, namely that NATO and ESDP are mutually

reinforcing to each other, as both are vital parts of the current European security architecture. The

EU has carried out a number of both military and civilian missions over the past decade21 – far more

than NATO has. When it comes to civilian crisis management missions the EU is the preeminent

global actor in this area.22 Despite the progress the EU’s Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) made

from its launch in 1999, and its transformation into the Common Security and Defense Policy with

the introduction of the Lisbon Treaty opening further possibilities for cooperation, CSDP has been

stagnating as of late. Although the emergence of bilateral or regional cooperation frameworks, such

as the Franco-British, the Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO), the Baltic Defense

Cooperation, and increasingly the Visegrad Groups’ cooperation23, have the potential to benefit

European defense at large, these initiatives have all emerged outside of the CSDP framework.

Although the debates on whether European defense ambitions within the EU might undermine

NATO are largely a thing of the past, this is mostly due to the last decades’ experience of CSDP

simply not having the potential to question NATO’s supremacy, let alone be a relevant military actor

on its own.

Slow progress on political and institutional issues, disappointing results on various common defense

projects and lacking resources has made member states’ increasingly skeptical about the prospects of

21 As of 2012, there are currently 20 CSDP missions serving on three continents: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations?lang=en According to EU officials, there are currently four additional missions in the pipeline according to EU officals (i.e. Niger, South Sudan, Libya and Somalia). 22 For a helpful assessment of the EU’s civilian crisis management capabilities, see Korski, Daniel and Gowan, Richard (2009) “Can the EU Rebuild States? A Review of Europe’s Civilian Capabilities”, European Council on Foreign Relations, 19 October 2009. 23 Csaba Törő (2011) “Visegrad cooperation within NATO and CSDP”, V4 Papers, The Polish Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 2, 2011. Available online at http://www.kulugyiintezet.hu/doc/files/Projektek/V4_Sec/V4_co-operation_in_NATO_and_CSDP-_V4_Papers_No_2.pdf

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CSDP24, although a few years ago it was considered one of the most fast developing segments of

European integration. For example, while it still remains to be seen what the EDA’s concept of

“pooling and sharing” can do to raise Europe’s capabilities, one might have good reasons to set

expectations low. Previous examples of European cooperation on defense projects, like the

procurement of A400M transport aircraft25 or the Eurofighter Typhoon - both suffered from

technical and financial mismanagement, protectionism resulting in significant delays and ever rising

costs26 - give reasons to be cautious. The EU’s work on pooling and sharing recently took another

step forward, however, when EU defense ministers endorsed a declaration on air-to-air refueling, a

critical capability shortfall as seen during the recent Libya operation. The ministers also expressed an

intent to establish a multinational modular medial unit27. The Lisbon Treaty even introduced the

possibility of “reinforced structured cooperation”, the CSDP version of “coalition of the willing” for

some members ready to go ahead further on defense integration than others. Despite these recent

initiatives, it still remains to be seen what the EU’s sharing and pooling efforts will produce in

practice. The lack of agreement on the precise framework, objectives and political mechanism for

decision making concerning the reinforced structured cooperation has resulted in a stalemate once

again.28

According to the international relations theory of functionalism, European integration was a process

of “spillover effects”, where cooperation between nation states expanded from limited economic to

an ever widening range of other issues. Hence, integration in the security sphere following the

French-British meeting in St. Malo in 199829 was not an isolated event but the result of a long

evolution. However, the security sphere was not just different in the sense that it goes to the heart of

national sovereignty, but that there was already a previously established institution in this realm in

the form of NATO. The debates on the need for an autonomous European defense identity was a

major issue in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, but it faded away once it became clear that Europe

would be in no position to question the supremacy of U.S. or NATO military capabilities. But for

European states the question was never just whether NATO or CSDP should be the cornerstone of

European security, but whether and to what extent they wanted integration in the foreign policy and

security sphere at all. NATO has always been, and will likely remain, a purely intergovernmental

organization with a consensus based decision making system. Although as we highlighted earlier, this

24 Hartley, Keith (2011) “Creating a European Defense Industrial Base” Security Challenges, 7:3, (Spring 2011), pp. 95-111. Available online at http://www.securitychallenges.org.au/ArticlePages/vol7no3Hartley.html 25 “Delayed A400M military transport aircraft needs rescue”. Defensetalk. February 16, 2010. Available online at http://www.defencetalk.com/a400m-military-transport-aircraft-needs-financial-rescue-24215/ 26 DeVore, Marc and Eisenecker, Sandra “The Three Ages of Armaments Collaboration: Determinants of Organizational Success and Failure”, Paper prepared for the SGIR Conference 9-11 September 2010. Available online at http://stockholm.sgir.eu/uploads/The%20Three%20Ages%20of%20%20Collaboration%20SGIR.pdf 27 “Council conclusions on pooling and sharing of military capabilities”, 3157th Foreign Affairs Council meeting. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/esdp/129162.pdf 28 Van Eekelen Willem F. and Kurpas Sebastian “The Evolution of Flexible Integration in European Defence Policy: Is permanent structured cooperation a leap forward for the Common Security and Defence Policy?”, CEPS Working Document No. 296/June 2008. Available online at http://www.ceps.eu/ceps/download/1509 29 “Joint Declaration Issued at the British-French Summit”, Saint-Malo, France, 3-4 December 1998. Available online at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/French-British%20Summit%20Declaration,%20Saint-Malo,%201998%20-%20EN.pdf

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consensus based approach is in reality applied with flexibility as the burden sharing is quite unequal

among the allies during missions. Certainly the major powers of the Alliance, particularly the United

States, has always been in a position to significantly influence the direction of the organization as

well as the behavior of smaller member states. But the question of integration, of giving up national

competences is put forward in a much more direct form within the EU simply because of power and

capabilities. Whether in the global or just in the regional security environment, NATO is a relevant

player because of U.S. military power, to which European nations can contribute. But the only way

Europe could be a similar relevant actor in the international arena is through common policies and

action, requiring a qualitatively deeper cooperation than what exists today; that is real integration in

defense policy from strategy formulation through defense investments to execution of operations.

However, not only the diverging national security and defense perceptions stand in the way of

enhanced integration, but also the current wider political economic environment of the European

Union. As a negative spillover effect, the debt crisis produced a monetary crisis, which then

indirectly brought up fundamental economic tensions between EU members, causing ultimately a

political crisis not just between political leaders of individual countries, but also between the publics

of member states and the EU institutions. This phenomenon can already be seen in the Greek crisis

or in the surge of euro-skeptic parties across Europe.30 There is no reason to believe that in the long

run foreign and security policy would be immune to an unresolved or growing crisis in other

domains of European integration. As U.S. officials have increasingly made clear, NATO will only

remain relevant to Washington as long as it lives up to certain military expectations. But with current

downward-sloping European military budget trends and capabilities, as we will discuss below, this is

only possible through increased European defense cooperation. Given the multiplicity of challenges

European nations would have to face concerning defense integration, such as the diverging strategic,

political, industrial and social interests among the nations, these issues could only be approached

with the involvement of EU structures in order to have a likelihood of some success. Hence, our

assumption is that the future of NATO, CSDP, and to a certain extent that of European integration,

are all in this regard intrinsically inter-connected.

One of the core barriers to increased defense cooperation is the chronic national defense industrial

protectionism characterizing the European defense market. The EU defense industry remains highly

fragmented along national lines with 75% of defense equipment in the EU being procured within

national boundaries in 200931. Without addressing this problem, the prospects for significantly

improving efficiency in defense procurement and investments will remain small. The European

Union’s Defense and Security Procurement Directive, which took effect in August 2011, is a

positive development in the long process of creating a liberalized framework for defense equipment

30 The recent presidential election in France is a clear sign of the growing public antipathy towards the EU, where the candidates of the political far right and the far left together gained 30% of the votes. 31 “Defence Data 2009”, European Defence Agency, 2010. Available online at http://www.eda.europa.eu/WebUtils/downloadfile.aspx?fileid=1252

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contracts and exports within the EU,32 but is only a step towards further integrating the European

defense market. The CSDP framework of pooling and sharing might be too narrow to overcome the

complex political and economic challenges facing European defense integration and the

comprehensive compromises involving EU institutions and nation states; instead, a “smart

integration” approach may be necessary to energize both pooling and sharing and smart defense.

The primary challenges facing Europe today are primarily economic ones with the main focus of

European politics being to preserve the European way of living. As there is no imminent security

threat in sight, security and defense policy issues are by definition subordinate to economic and

social issues. Therefore, in the absence of a major unanticipated event, progress in European

defense integration will likely trail developments in the political-economic realm. However, as in the

case of NATO, the future of the EU overwhelmingly still rest in the hands of individual nation

states, especially the more powerful ones, and the complex political-strategic interactions among

them. The current state of affairs in NATO and EU described above is to large extent a reflection of

the relations among the member states; therefore, it is worth having an overview of the different

national strategies and perceptions of some key European states.

Competing National Strategies in Europe

Alongside the obvious leadership and influence of the United States and the threat perception

regarding Russia, since the Cold War NATO and the European security structure has

overwhelmingly been determined by the three most powerful European nations Germany, France

and the United Kingdom. Growing German political and economic power vis-à-vis other European

states based on its competitive export oriented industries has been one of the key features of the

current crisis in Europe. But Germany’s policies are still driven by geo-economics rather than by

geopolitics, as it has been ever since the foundation of post-war Germany.33 The main implications

of this strategic posture for its foreign and European policy is to maximize German economic

advantages, while minimizing the international political and security responsibilities Germany would

have to take on. Recent developments in international security underscored this position, such as

Berlin’s absence on the UN vote on Libya and non-participation in the campaign, its low interest in

French-British security cooperation, the continued relatively low political and financial investments

in its own and European defense compared to its economic and financial activism on the

international stage.

32 Edwards, Jay “The EU Defence and Security Procurement Directive: A Step Towards Affordability?”, International Security Programme Paper, 2011/05, Chatham House. Available online at http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/0811pp_edwards.pdf 33 Bolsinger, Eckard “A Great Power in Denial: Bringing Germany Back to Reality”, World Security Network. Available online at http://www.worldsecuritynetwork.com/showarticle3.cfm?article_id=10508

15

The Franco-British defense pact of 2010 stemmed partially from a growing frustration by these two

nations towards the disappointing performance of other allies and EU members.34 Especially the

British defense establishment has increasingly favored only cooperating with those European

nations that they consider take defense seriously.35 Even France has become more disillusioned with

the prospects of CSDP, as support for military operations and improving capabilities increasingly is

lacking in most EU member states.36 Without British and French active engagement, whether in

NATO or the EU, there is considerable loss on the strategic impact of any European defense

initiative. But France itself is having difficult economic times, with considerable effects on its

defense forces and capabilities. While its cooperation with Brittan might fill in some of the vacuum

created by the shrinking national resources on both side of the Channel, overall, these two leading

European powers will likely end up with less capabilities, and therefore will also have to do less.

Furthermore, their relative global military power compared to other emerging powers and the

United States will continue to shrink. Britain’s absence from the new EU fiscal treaty also carries the

risk that it will hurt the overall political and strategic relations between Europe’s three leading

powers.

Poland’s recent pro-European turn, including its new-found activism in European security,37 such as

listing CSDP as one of the priority during the Polish EU Presidency in 2011, or its support for the

Weimar Initiative38 is rare positive development for European integration recent years. The reason

behind the new Polish security policy of opening up towards CSDP is creating as many options as

possible while the United States is decreasing its European presence. However, Poland’s current

favorable position and influence seem challenging to maintain in the long run due to long term

domestic pressures together with the change of external economic and political circumstances. But

even more importantly from a European perspective, Poland does not have the weight and influence

comparable to Europe’s three leading powers, and is therefore not in a position to lead European

security policy efforts. The Visegrad Group, under Polish leadership, would have some potential to

play a more active role in European security initiatives, but the cooperation has still a long way to go

among the members, even if we compare the grouping to the Nordic Cooperation or the Baltic

Defense Cooperation.

As for these three regional cooperation frameworks, the driving force for enhancing regional

defense primarily concerns boosting the credibility of NATO and CSDP, but it also carries a sense

34 Kempin, Ronja and von Ondarza, Nocolai “CSDP on the Brink”, SWP Comments. German Institute for International and Security Affairs, May 13, 2011. Available online at http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2011C13_kmp_orz_ks.pdf 35 O’Donnell, Clara Marina (2011) “Britain’s coalition government and EU defense cooperation: undermining British interests”, International Affairs 87:2, pp. 419–433. 36 Michel, Leo G. “Cross-currents in French Defense and U.S. Interests”, Strategic Perspectives, Issue 10, Center for Strategic Research Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. Available online at http://www.ndu.edu/inss/docUploaded/Strategic%20Perspective%2010.pdf 37 O’Donnell, Clara Marina “Poland’s U-turn on European defense: A missed opportunity?”, Center for European Reform, Policy Brief, March 2012. Available online at http://www.cer.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/attachments/pdf/2012/pb_poland_9march12-4791.pdf 38 The foreign ministers of the “Weimar Triangle”, an informal cooperation between France, Germany and Poland, launched an initiative in 2010 to strengthen the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy.

16

of creating as many security options as possible for an uncertain future. The main priority of these

regional frameworks will continue to be enhancing European security and defense integration

through NATO and the EU since their security, particularly as relatively smaller and more

vulnerable nations, is still ultimately influenced by strategic trajectories of the larger powers and

Europe’s overall stability and cohesion. In this respect, smaller nations have even more at stake in

enhancing European integration than the big ones. Although for the time being one of the main

driving forces for enhancing their military capabilities through joint efforts are improving capabilities

for “out of area” operations, both regional groups have only the potential to play a complementary

role alongside the major European powers when it comes to power projection in Europe’s

neighborhood or further away. Another less openly acknowledged reason of both of these regional

frameworks is shared security concerns vis-à-vis Russia. Here, their strategy, given their strategic

location, has a more weight concerning the future of NATO or EU security policy. As a great power

in the East, Russia will also have an indirect say on the future development of both NATO and EU,

and it will likely continue to pursue policies giving preference to bilateral relations with distinct

strategies towards countries within its former sphere of influence and Western European nations.

In other regions within the Euro-Atlantic space, in South East Europe, or the Mediterranean, one

could also find common security challenges for the member states concerned. In South East

Europe, it is primarily challenges originating from continued political instability and weak state

institutions in the Western Balkans. In the Mediterranean, it is the challenges from the Maghreb and

the Middle East, from maritime security to the unpredictable developments of the Arab Awakening

which the allies in the region share. However, regional security initiatives in these regions have been

falling short. It is true that the countries of Southern Europe and of the Balkans are overwhelmed

with their economic problems, but this should be one more reason for enhancing joint, more

efficient initiatives in defense. The main challenge to overcome here is political rather than

economic. The emergence of Turkey as a regional power will be an increasingly defining feature for

the future of the Alliance, but it is uncertain whether for the better. On the one hand, its increasing

geopolitical clout is a huge asset for NATO especially when it comes to approaching the challenges

and opportunities of the transforming Middle East. At the same time, Turkey’s future regional

trajectory might also hold some political-strategic tensions among the allies as well as. Another

crucial dimension of the Alliance’s future, NATO-EU relations, is to a large extent held hostage by

Turkey’s policies regarding the Cyprus issue.

The lack of strategic coherence in Europe is a serious problem to be reckoned with indeed.

Different strategic threat perceptions are deeply rooted in the geography, history and culture of

European nations. Although they may change over time, integration may have an impact, but the

diversity in political and security identities in Europe are not going away soon. While national and

regional differences in threat perception is to some extent inevitable, fostering more widespread

agreement among European nations regarding the prioritization of security threats and how to best

manage these is a precondition for a stronger transatlantic relationship, whether within an EU-U.S.

context or a NATO one. The EU’s foreign and security policy is at least in theory guided by the

2003 European Security Strategy (ESS). This document, which emerged out of the context of the

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9/11 attacks and the Iraq war debate, is today outdated on many accounts and in splendid need of

revision, taking into account institutional changes within the EU following the Lisbon Treaty and

events around the globe such as the Arab Spring and the changing geopolitical power distribution

from the West to the East.39 While agreeing on a strategic document was cumbersome in 2003 with

only 15 member states, doing so today with 27 is a whole other ballgame. Europe has no choice,

however, but to work towards fostering more strategic coherence as the security challenges are

getting more complex and the military capabilities for addressing these scarcer.

Dim prospects for European Military Capabilities

First and foremost, the current financial and economic crisis in Europe means that shrinking

defense budgets is to be further expected. Of course, this is not a new trend. Since the end of the

Cold War, European NATO countries’ defense spending has fallen by close to 20 percent even

though the combined GDP has risen by nearly 55 percent. What is different now is the share

magnitude of the ongoing and planned defense cuts. Military spending among European countries

has steadily declined from around 2 percent of GDP in year 2000 to 1,74 percent in 2009, despite

the ongoing operation in Afghanistan. As a result, the United States now account for about three

fifths of all NATO defense spending. In 2009, only five out of 28 NATO member states (i.e.

Albania, Britain, France, Greece and the United States) fulfilled the alliance requirement to spend 2

percent or more of national GDP on defense. According to fresh data gleaned from the EDA

overall EU defense expenditure (excluding Denmark) amounted to €194 billion in 2010, down from

€209 billion in 200640 (see graph below).

39 Andersson, Jan Joel et al. “The European Security Strategy: Reinvigorate, Revise or Reinvent?” Policy paper published by the Swedish Institute of International Affairs as UI Occasional Paper No. 7. June 2011. 40 “Defense Data 2011”, European Defense Agency. Available online at http://www.eda.europa.eu/Libraries/Documents/Defence_Data_2010.sflb.ashx

185

190

195

200

205

210

215

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

EDA participating Member States Defense Expenditures

Defense expendituresin constant prices(2010 values).Source: EDA.

(In billions of euros)

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Planned cuts in defense budgets are projected to be substantial and widespread, affecting the

capabilities of many countries. For Europe’s two biggest defense spenders, the UK and France, the

defense budget in 2010-2011 amounted to 2,26 and 2,59 percent of GDP, respectively. Although

this is higher than the European average, it still represents a reduction from previous levels.

In 2009 four countries provided around 70 percent of EU defense spending (the UK, France,

Germany and Italy) (see graph below). They were followed by the Netherlands, Spain, Greece,

Poland, Sweden and Belgium – combined accounting for close to 90 percent of Europe’s aggregated

defense spending. If nothing is done, these future cuts will likely further undermine Europe’s ability

to provide for its own defense, not to mention for security in its own neighborhood.

It is highly probable that the eurocrisis and the ensuing cuts in European defense budgets cuts will

render further downsizings in the European force structure. In fact, this process has already started,

and is in many ways a necessary one. In 1999, 27 EU governments had close to 2.5 million military

personnel in 1999. Ten years later this number had shrunk to about 2 million.41 In 2010, for the fifth

year in a row, the number of personnel continued to decline with three percent to 1.62 million,

according to the EDA. In 2010, personnel costs still accounted for 51 percent of aggregate

European defense spending. By comparison, the United States only spent about a fifth on personnel

costs in 2010, thus leaving it with far more resources to devote to other priorities. This piece of the

pie could be made slimmer without shrinking the size of the entire pie. Case in point: the average

number of troops deployed out of the total military personnel in 2010 was only 4 percent. While a

slimmer and leaner European defense force is preferable, it simultaneously behooves European

leaders not to cut too deeply into the force structure on an unilateral and ad hoc basis without first

considering what other states are cutting and how critical capabilities can be maintained.

41 Keohane, Daniel and Blommenstijn, Charlotte “Strength in numbers? Comparing EU military capabilities in 2009 with 1999”, European Union Institute for Security Studies Policy Brief, December 2009. Available online at: http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/PolicyBrief-05.pdf

UK 23%

France 20%

Germany 17%

Italy 11%

Others 29%

EU Defense Expenditure 2010

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Furthermore, it is important that European governments refrain from the obvious temptation of

cutting into procurement programs and R&D of new defense capabilities, as these are less politically

sensitive to cut. If all countries think according to the same logic, this does not bode well for

Europe’s future capabilities. Those countries with the biggest national armies (such as Britain,

France, Germany, Greece, Spain and Sweden) might have the most to save by cutting in personnel

levels. (At the same time, doing so however should not be an excuse to reduce the overall defense

expenditures; rather the money saved up by cutting in personnel costs should be allocated elsewhere

such as procurement and R&D). Conversely, other countries with relatively smaller personnel might

instead want to maintain current levels, or invest in making these forces more expeditionary.

Moreover, there is an apparent lack of key capabilities, including strategic airlift, strategic sealift, air-

to-air refueling (AAR), air-to-ground surveillance (AGS), deployable logistics, UAVs, CBRN

defense, precision munitions, special operations, deployable follow-on forces, etc. The lack of some

of these capabilities were highlighted in the recent Libya operation, particularly the air-to-air

refueling; intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR); precise munitions; and the availability of

air transport.42

In terms of developing new capabilities, things have been improving somewhat, albeit not fast

enough. Moreover, countries should be careful not to quickly abandon certain programs just because

it does not make sense on a national level without coordinating first with other states – similar to the

Dutch decision to get rid of its battle tanks without consulting Germans and Poland. Still, European

governments can save considerably by cutting capabilities that do not serve a modern security

purpose. In this regard, there is room for significantly reducing defense capabilities such as main

battle tanks and artillery without jeopardizing Europe’s ability to defend itself or respond to crises

globally. At the same time, this must be done in a joint fashion, involving consultation of other

member states as well as the EU and NATO.

Some prominent examples of pooling and sharing include the Franco-British security and defense

cooperation treaty. Aimed at achieving greater coordination between Europe’s two largest defense

players, the treaty has so far allowed for the development of a Combined Joint Expeditionary Force

that may be deployed in a wide range of scenarios including high intensity operations. The two

countries have also agreed to pursue bilateral cooperation on the procurement of UAVs, complex

weapons, submarine technologies, and satellite communications, and to develop cooperation on

counter-terrorism, and a joint expeditionary force. They are also to take steps toward aligning

logistical arrangements including providing spares and support to the A400M. Regarding maritime

capabilities, the UK and France have set the goal to by around 2020 develop an integrated carrier

strike group drawing on resources from both countries. While Europe certainly needs access to

carriers, developing new such capabilities is simply not currently on the table. Better then is to bring

together the existing French and British carrier capabilities (as is already underway) while also

42 “NATO commander: EU could not do Libya without US”, EU-Observer, 20 March 2012. Available online at http://euobserver.com/9/115650

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making provisions for other European nations to rely on these assets in the event of joint

operations.43

Another notable example is the significant progress on pooling resources made by the Nordic (and

Baltic) countries. This model deserves to be carefully studied by other regional groupings in Europe.

In this regard, Nordic Defense Cooperation (NORDEFCO) demonstrates that not only is it

possible to get better operational capacity but this may also serve to trigger acquisition of

procurement of relevant capacities. Up until recently, cooperation was pursued within three separate

pillars: NORDSUP, NORDAC and NORDCAPS. A Memorandum of Understanding signed

between the Defense Ministers of Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden in Helsinki on

November 4, 2009 reorganized cooperation under a new comprehensive structure.44 Replacing the

previously parallel collaborative arrangements, the new comprehensive structure, NORDEFCO, is a

collaboration effort between the Nordic countries in the area of defense with the aim of

strengthening the Nordic countries’ defense capabilities by identifying synergies and promoting

effective common defense solutions.45 The five areas of cooperation are Strategic Development,

Capabilities, Human Resources & Education, Training & Exercises, and Operations. One of the

great advantages of NORDEFCO is its flexibility. While participation in NOREDFCO is on a

voluntary basis, member states can choose which areas they want to seek to collaborate on and to

what extent. They can also opt for arrangements involving cooperation between two countries or

between all five. Within the scope of the organization is also an opportunity to work with third party

countries, such as for example the Baltic states, when doing so brings added value. In January 2011

the three Baltic states were officially invited to join NORDEFCO.46 Furthermore, the Nordic

countries have already provided the Baltic states with training of troops and in modernization of

equipment, and Denmark and Norway have contributed to the NATO-led Baltic air policing

mission.

The Nordic Defense Cooperation served as a role model for the Visegrad countries as well. So far,

the most notable step towards a more integrated defense cooperation is a commitment to establish

an EU Battle Group for 2016 by the four Central European countries, based on an agreement

signed by the four defense ministers in May 2011. Although one clear objective of the initiative is to

make the group more “visible” in Europe and demonstrate responsibility, the main driving force is

to find ways for pooling and sharing amid the budget pressures. There would be plenty of room for

cooperation.47 NATO’s Strategic Airlift Capability, involving jointly operated of C-17 Globemaster

43 See Jones, Ben “Franco-British military cooperation: a new engine for European defence?”, European Union Institute for Security Studies, Occasional Paper, February 2011, p.88. Available online at http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op88--Franco-British_military_cooperation--a_new_engine_for_European_defence.pdf 44 “Memorandum of Understanding on Nordic Defense Cooperation”. http://www.norden.org/sv/om-samarbetet/avtal/nordiska-avtal/foersvarsfraagor/memorandum-of-understanding-on-nordic-defence-cooperation-nordefco 45 “NORDEFCO – Aims and Objectives”. http://www.nordefco.org/facts-abou/aims-and-o/ 46 “Baltics invited to join NORDEFCO”. The Baltic Times, January, 24, 2011. 47 Kiss, Peter “Eastern European Defense Review: Defense cooperation within the Visegrad Group. Unexplored opportunities?”, Center for Strategic and International Studies”, February 25, 2011. Available online at

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III aircraft by 12 nations, based in Pápa, could serve as a model. On the modernization and

acquisition front, the joint modernization, maintenance of jet fighters and their equipping of

precision guided munitions, targeting pods, helmet mounted cueing is one possible area.

Cooperation in updating land armaments, collaboration on spare parts, munitions, communication

systems would also be possible. Establishing joint education programs, operating training centers,

exercises on civil – military would also be beneficial in terms of future interoperability and more

efficient spending. Initial steps have already been taken specially in the area of sharing experience on

civilian – military cooperation (CIMIC) and human intelligence gathering (HUMINT) in stabilization

operations. However, as the Airlift project demonstrates, the participation of a nation with

significantly larger resources – the United States in particular - in creating any new capability is

crucial. The other obvious main obstacle for cooperation is the lack of necessary political will and

trust among the Visegrad countries.

To summarize the trends in European military affairs, the current state of Europe is on a declining

path in both absolute and relative terms. An equally important observation is that European nations

can only be capable of significantly improving their military capabilities in the current financial

environment with enhanced defense cooperation and integration. There are signs that nations are

increasingly willing to cooperate with each other out of necessity to alleviate the effects of further

reductions in defense expenditures. NATO and the EU are still important instruments in these

efforts, but more flexible, ad hoc, or even permanent regional cooperation structures are also

increasing in relevance. Of course, cross-border military cooperation as such is nothing new under

the sun. Previous examples include the UK-Dutch Amphibious Force, the Belgian-Dutch naval

cooperation, the Franco-German brigade, the Strategic Airlift Capability, and the European Air

Transport Command. What is new, however, is the attempt to form multidimensional, multinational

cooperation initiatives based around pooling and sharing of capabilities, roles, and acquisition, etc.

Here, the Nordic, Franco-British and Visegrad cooperation frameworks offer valuable lessons for

other states.

These ad hoc or “coalition of the willing” arrangements in defense are not unique in European

integration. Other major projects within the EU, such as the European Monetary Union, the

Schengen Agreement or the European Social Act are based on the same logic and necessity. Our

focus research question is how much political-economic integration and security integration

correlate to each other. There are many historical examples of alliances without any meaningful

economic cooperation. The questions from the perspective of the European project is, however, can

the European political and economic integration proceed without a meaningful foreign, security and

defense policy integration, and vice versa, can a common foreign security and defense evolve in the

absence of wider political and economic integration? It is, therefore, pertinent to look at what the

possible future scenarios of European defense integration are and their likely correlation with the

wider political integration.

http://csis.org/blog/eastern-european-defense-review-defense-cooperation-within-visegrad-group-unexplored-opportunity

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Scenarios for Europe

Scenario 1 – Further down the current path

With the above mentioned key European national perspectives, further integration on security and

defense is far from given. Under this scenario Europe will continue to ‘muddle through’ on defense

over the near future. Rather than moving forward towards enhanced defense integration through

pooling and sharing of resources using either the EU and NATO platforms or bilateral ad-hoc

regional arrangements, the bulk of European defense will under this scenario continue to be

primarily a national issue for the individual states. Although occasional bilateral and/or multilateral

initiatives may materialize at times, this will not fundamentally alter the nature of European defense.

On the contrary, redundancies and unnecessary overlaps will continue to persist. Moreover, the

absence of a common strategic framework means that European countries risk cutting critical

capabilities without first consulting each other, hence running the risk of losing key critical

capabilities. Moreover, threat perceptions will likely continue to vary between the individual states,

with some states being more willing to support and contribute to future out-of-area military

missions than others.

Even if the political and economic integration were to continue to drive states toward a

federalization of Europe, the current policies of the EU are not risk-free either. Much depends on

the substance. If the current trajectory of a relatively well performing Germany and Northern

countries vis-à-vis Southern economies like Greece, Portugal, Spain or Italy stagnating or remaining

in depression, continues to hold, political tensions due to public pressure would eventually

undermine the legitimacy and support for EU institutions, and for integration at large in the long

term. Even if the EU would continue to exist, it would remain without a coherent political

leadership.

Muddling through with defense cooperation can be a feature of other scenarios of the wider political

and economic integration as well. Even if the EU would successfully proceed in its economic

integration, member states might still try and maintain as much sovereignty over their defense affairs

as possible according to their traditional security interests. However, the pressures for greater

defense integration might grow due to the increasing convergence of other policy domains under

this scenario. But even with greater fiscal integration, European nations would still have the capacity

and incentives to keep security and defense on the backburner. The high correlation of the

possibility of muddling through in the economic realm and similar prospects in the security realm is

clear. Such a longer stalemate in the integration process, possibly leading to outright disintegration,

would offer slimmer prospects for further “muddling through” in the defense area, as we discuss

next.

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Scenario 2 - Disintegration

As many “euroskeptics” would argue, it is directly the consequence of the current state of the

European Union that Europe is now in such a grave crisis. As a consequence of the failed

framework and policies and the EU, especially the Monetary Union, national governments lack

sufficient resources to invest in defense, or any other areas for that matter. Even if this economic

argument would hold, and if Europe were to be on a path towards loosening integration and

increasingly relying on merely some form of intergovernmental cooperation, the upswing in national

agendas within European politics would likely result in more divergent security policies. Although it

is unlikely that we might be witnessing the revival of late 19th century balance of power politics

because of Europe’s underlying economic, demographic, historical features48, disagreements between

nations could become more visible and more significant even if these changes would be driven by

“main stream” political parties.

The strengthening of radical, nationalistic parties would clearly accelerate this trend. This would have

an effect on not just the cohesion of the European Union, but on NATO as well. The United States,

with its weakening interests in NATO and in Europe, would likely refrain from any new bold and

costly initiatives for boosting European defense cooperation since it would not have the resources

necessary, although it would remain interested in ensuring the preservation of the current European

stability.

Under this scenario European nation states with a robust nationalistic agenda would sideline both

EU and NATO, and instead prefer to maintain full sovereignty over security and defense policy.

This would entail a higher threshold of what is considered to be vital national interest deserved to be

protected at any price, and with much more of a zero-sum instead of a win-win perspective of

European and international politics. Moreover, declining defense collaboration means that there is

also a risk of Europe falling into a “hub-and-spoke” system where individual European nations

compete with one and another on who can be the closest ally of the United States. Although much

of the common security threats and challenges would persist, continuing to push European

countries towards security cooperation, European nations (just like the United States) will continue

to have interest in investing into the Alliance. The differences between European nations would

likely become much more visible, however, and joint European or NATO policies and action less

likely. This scenario, however, does not rule out the growing significance of regional cooperation

described above. This is especially the case if external security threats emerge and become more of a

concern for the respected nations than divisions among them, and there are no credible trans-

European or transatlantic security structures in place. However, even more pessimistic outcomes

cannot be ruled out at the current phase of the crisis. A sudden and disorganized secession of one or

several EU countries from the Eurozone, or the possibility of a complete collapse of the Euro with

its likely devastating economic and social consequences, could have unforeseeable impact on the

political stability and security of Europe.

48 For example, relatively stagnating economies, shrinking and aging populations, and the still powerfully living traumas of two world wars.

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Scenario 3 - Multispeed Europe

As we highlighted earlier, to some extent, the current European structure is already a de facto

multispeed framework. One possible scenario is that the EU evolves into a so called “regional

state”49, an entity with state-like qualities in ever growing number of policy domains, and with the

member states increasingly differentiated participation in policy communities beyond the Single

Market. Another option is a two speed Europe consisting of one core group at the center – possibly

centered around the Franco-German duo – and one on the periphery with looser integration.

Deeper integration in security and defense policy between certain EU countries could also

materialize in various forms, either by creating just one core “CSDP” group, more groups driven by

common regional security interests, or just looser, ad hoc structured cooperation on certain defense

projects or issues without any major drive towards broader common policies and strategy. The first

two options would not only be signs of the current NATO of 28 members and CSDP’s further

decline, but would accelerate the process. France and Britain might work out ways to further

strengthen their bilateral defense cooperation, even if Britain would remain outside the EU “core”.

In order to remain relevant global security actors, the Nordic countries – which even currently differ

concerning their membership in EU and NATO – might also go along in increasingly depending on

each other for defense. A more assertive Russia under President Putin might press Central European

and Baltic countries to strengthen their defense cooperation, if they feel that the cohesion and

relevance of NATO is eroding.

Under the third option instead of working under shared joint platforms of NATO or/and CSDP,

European countries will choose to work through ad-hoc arrangements, involving constellations of

two or more states, often sharing regional or functional similarities. By forming core capability

groups to develop niche capabilities to ensure a broad variety of capabilities and developing country

clusters to address critical shortfalls in member state capabilities, European defense cooperation can

move forward even in the absence of a common strategic framework. However, while these

initiatives will serve to foster bilateral and multilateral cooperation on strategic development,

capabilities, and training and exercises, they will not significantly contribute to enhanced Europe-

wide defense cooperation, let alone integration. Instead, problems relating to strategic incoherence,

duplication and unnecessary overlap, and lack of new critical capabilities will continue to linger.

Scenario 4 - Enhanced European defense integration

The final and most optimistic scenario proposes that European defense cooperation will move

towards further integration under the auspices of EU and/or NATO. The obvious condition for

this outcome is overcoming much of the current political crisis within the EU. Qualitatively deeper

cooperation among EU member states and continued support from the European publics for

49 Schmidt, Vivian A. “Re-envisioning the European Union” In: Nathaniel Copsey and Tim Haughton JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2008.

25

defense integration can only materialize if there is a general support for European integration. In this

case, European states will have managed to move beyond the question of whether more integration

in the defense area is a desirable outcome and instead devote their focus on how to best go about

achieving it. A key component of this strategy will be working through the EU and NATO to

achieve a high level of pooling and sharing of resources. In this way, European states will reduce

duplication and unnecessary overlap and achieve greater functional specialization. However, as

pointed out above, this will require much deeper cooperation involving the defense industries,

cooperative development of force structures and capabilities, and not least the foreign and security

policies of the member states.

Of course, as history tells us, a common grave threat or enemy, which threatens the core national

security and integrity of states, can force nations relatively quickly to cooperate on their defense in

great depth, even if there is loose general political-economic cooperation among them. However,

this is a development that all European nations want to avoid.

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Conclusions

The current European crisis is primarily and economic and financial one rooted in fundamental

imbalances between the member states. The question regarding to which of the above-described

scenarios the future of European politics will correlate with the most will foremost be determined by

developments in the economic-financial sphere. While economic challenges remain a top priority,

this does not mean Europe might not be facing growing security challenges. As the Arab Awakening

illustrates, unexpected imminent threats could appear anytime, affecting vital security interests of

European nations. While these threats and challenges can be most effectively and efficiently

addressed within the framework of NATO and the EU, the chronic inattention and

underinvestment in the defense sector by many European states is undermining these organizations’

long-term viability.

To a large degree, peace and stability in Europe depends on the achievements of security integration

in Europe, particularly NATO but also, albeit to a lesser extent, the EU’s foreign and security policy

(CFSP). The true value of the “security goods” NATO provides, which a large proportion of

European publics take for granted, could only be determined if NATO were to disappear. Although

this is highly unlikely, the risk of the Alliance fading into irrelevance remains a plausible prospect.

Since none of the European nations can cope with the emerging threats and challenges alone, and

each one of them are desperately searching for ways to keep defense expenditures down,

maintaining the Alliance is in each members’ interest.

However, as highlighted in this paper, this can only be achieved through an increasing level of

European defense integration, where the EU could hardly be ignored. As we discussed earlier,

European defense integration can cut itself adrift from the wider state EU integration, however, a

certain level of convergence of common political-economic interest, and interdependencies among

nations is necessary to uphold even a security alliance, let alone defense integration as such. Hence,

the future of the EU will very much influence the future of security architecture of Europe,

including NATO.

Even if Europeans nations would have a significantly greater will to invest in defense, for most of

them and to an increasing range of military capabilities the real question is not whether to have them

alone or to have a common capability with allies, but to have a common asset or none. Therefore,

smart defense, pooling and sharing should be viewed through the lens of opportunities. This,

however, can only be achieved through an enhanced strategic dialogue within NATO and the EU,

and between the two organizations, along with other key partner nations. The North Atlantic

Council must remain the core security platform for addressing the most vital security threats and

challenges of the Euro-Atlantic region, but it, in turn, also depends on Europe’s ability to transform

itself into a viable region in the 21st century through enhance integration across a wide range of

different policy areas.

27

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