Saint Louis University - Madrid

School of Political Science: POLS 300

EXPERIMENT 1: TENSION TEST ENGINEERING STRESS – ENGINEERING STRAIN

Presented To: Dr. Simona Rentea

Presented By:Ahmed El Leithy

Date: 8th of May 2015

RESEARCH PAPER COMPARATIVE STUDY

EGYPT VS SYRIA

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Table of Contents

INTRODUCTION 3

PROPOSAL COMPONENTS 4

QUESTION 4

HYPOTHESIS 4

METHODOLOGY 5

LITERATURE REVIEW 5

ANALYSIS 8

BEFORE SPRING 8

SPRING 10

AFTER SPRING 13

CONCLUSION 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY 19

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Introduction

Post colonialism represented a-not-so bright period for Middle Eastern

civilization, producing a period full of conflict, political battles, dictatorship and

oppression. Following decades of authoritarian dictatorships in the Middle

East, about four years ago came a period of hopeful change; a period now

known as ‘The Arab Spring’. This period began in Tunisia in 2010, where

thousands flocked the streets and demanded the resignation of their twenty-

year dictator, Ben Ali. The uprising in Tunis was kick-started by the action,

similar to what theorists describe as the butterfly effect, of one man, a middle

aged man named Bouazizi. Bouazizi burned himself alive and took his own

life, in protest on his deteriorating and hopeless living conditions. The

Tunisian uprising successfully removed Ben Ali from power sending the Arab

world into hysteria. What followed throughout the Middle East was a dynamic

similar to that of the domino effect, a dynamic nourished by hope of replicating

the Tunisian Revolution. Revolutions in Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen

followed the Tunisian model.

Democracy, prosperity and equality were the goals of the Arab Spring,

however, we in fact do not live in an ideal world. Different outcomes emerged

for different countries; in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood ‘hijacked’ the

revolution and assumed power through parliamentary and presidential

elections, but were then removed from power by the army exactly a year later.

Meanwhile, Syria has been engulfed in a civil war between Al Assad and

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different Sunni Islamist parties, whereas similarly Libya and Yemen have also

been engulfed in civil wars as a consequence of power vacuum left due to the

removal of their respective leaders.

Proposal Components

Question

How similar were the causes of both the Egyptian and Syrian

Revolution? And why was their resultant completely different?

The significance of the question briefly being that finding out the causes of the

disparities between both uprisings is the first step towards solving their

problems.

Hypothesis

I believe that the causes of the uprisings in Syria and Egypt, and all the Arab

World were all due to extremely similar reasons. I believe both countries

suffered from the dictatorship imposed on them, with regards to freedom and

social equality. However despite the similarities, the outcome was completely

different due to the difference in power between both military institutions.. I

also believe the sectarian divide in Syria is a big contribution in the escalation

of the Syrian crisis.

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Methodology

Using the comparative method, I will examine the events taking place before,

during and after the Egyptian and Syrian uprisings, analyzing primary sources

such demographics and laws that fueled the revolution, Al Assad’s and

Mubarak’s speeches and interviews, and I plan to analyze the international

communities statements on the matter as well to get a clearer picture on the

events that unfolded. I also plan to compare how the law was used to control

both situations.

Literature Review

Research and opinions of the Arab Spring spread like wildfire since the

movement began in 201, with scholars from within the region and beyond

all offering their opinions on why the uprisings were caused and why have

some of the revolutions succeeded to an extent and why some of them

failed miserably.

Jacqueline Ismail and Shereen Ismail argued that the root causes of the

Arab Spring were specifically due to post-colonial oppression, “refining the

techniques of colonialists reinforcing their subjugated status within the

international system” (235). Meanwhile, Yasmine Mather in “The Arab

Spring and its Unexpected Consequences” (74), blames the economic

system as the fuel for all revolutions. Thomas Pierret, in his book Religion

and state in Syria, argues the fact that the Syrian revolution has been in

the making since the days of Hafez Al Assad, with the Sunni “Ulama” or

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scholars building underground networks aimed at influencing the masses.

Although I believe that this is definitely a cause of why the Syrian

revolution became a crisis, however I do believe that the ignitions of the

uprisings were more populist than Islamist, that were then hijacked by the

Islamists only.

Jamie Allinson, in his publication, “Class forces, transition and the Arab

uprisings: a comparison of Tunisia, Egypt and Syria” he argues that the

political theories that attempt to explain why the democratic transition failed

miserably in Syria, and less so in Egypt misses the role of the working

class” (300), and the strong correlation between the strength of labor

movements and the winning of minimal democratic rights in the region.

Allinson argues that the state with the weakest and least independent

workers’ movement, which is Syria, has descended into counter-revolution

and civil war. Meanwhile Tunisia, the state with the strongest workers’

movement had the most successful revolution, reaching a constitutional

element, and Egypt lies between both.

Yassamine Mather blames the failure of the revolution in both Egypt and

Syria entirely on the Islamists and the way they were able to hijack both

revolutions. She stresses the fact that if there was any other party as

organized as the Muslim Brotherhood; Egypt would not have been left in

the political “merry-go-round” (90) following the revolution. Meanwhile she

states that the Syrian ‘revolution’ was hijacked to such an extent that now,

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there is a proxy war between Iran’s Islamic Republic and Saudi Arabia.

Radwan Ziadeh, in his chapter in John Davis’s book Arab Spring and Arab

Thaw: Unfinished Revolutions and the Quest for Democracy, agrees with

Mather with regards to the hijacking of the Syrian revolution, however he

blames Assad’s history of using violence to quell demonstrations as the

main reason why events turned out the way did (95). His opinion is that if

Assad would have used some extent of diplomacy it could have been

different, a notion that I agree with since.

I do agree with Mather’s analysis as well, but I also believe that the

strength of the Egyptian military as an institution, compared to the Syrian

military, made the difference when it came to preventing the country from

descending into chaos. This is the same theory that Mohamed El Khawas

argues in the same chapter of the book, highlighting the army’s role in

quelling protests both after Mubarak’s reign and Mursi’s and arguing that it

was bittersweet, since it prevented people from voicing their opinions but

at the same time prevented Egypt from spiraling into a civil war.

In an article in The Economist, and an opinion peace by Scott Stewards,

both argue that the extent of the crisis in Syria is due to indirect

intervention. Steward criticizes the way that the rebels are being supplied

with non-military and logistical aid, but “a review of the weapons spotted on

the battlefield reveals that the rebels are also receiving an increasing

number of lethal supplies” Stewart 1. The Economist believes that the

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Syrian moderate rebels vs. ISIS only escalates the conflict as both sides

are fighting forces on Assad’s side as well.

Analysis

Before Spring

Both Egypt and Syria have been suffering for decades under simultaneous

dictatorships; by 2010 Egypt’s President Hosni Mubarak has been in power for

nearly thirty years, meanwhile Syria has been ruled by the Assad family since

1971. Both dictatorships relied on characteristics of authoritarian rule; an iron fist

police state, nationwide oppression and mass inequality. These characteristics of

the rule were the reasons why in 2011, mass demonstrations took place in Egypt

and Syria demanding the ousting of both Presidents.

Syria consists of a Muslim majority, and within the majority about 64% are Sunnis

and about 20 percent are Shiias (“The World Factbook”, 2014). The Assad family,

Hafez, and now his son, Bashar Al Assad belong to an Alawite minority, which is

a branch of Shiism and therefore their grip on Syria could not be softened

throughout their forty years on the throne. Although the Syrian population has

always been known for its religious tolerance, many Sunnis resented the fact that

a minority had gained total control over the country. To maintain complete

control, Syria adopted a constitution that gave the president a monopoly on

power and preserved the Baath party as “the leader of state and society” (Syrian

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Const, art. 8.) as per article 8 in the 1973 Syrian constitution. Meanwhile article

105 of the 1973 constitution appointed the President as the ultimate commander

in chief and in control of the four intelligence agencies and hence giving the

Assad family complete and undisputed control.

Both Hosni Mubarak and previously Hafez Al Assad had planned handing the

presidency to both their sons, Gamal Mubarak and Bashar Al Assad. Bashar Al

Assad successfully assumed power following the death of his father in 2000, by

amending article 83 in the constitution by changing minimum age for a president

from a minimum forty years to thirty-four years in order to allow Bashar to

assume power. On the other hand, Mubarak was not able to do so before his

resignation in 2011, but his plans were already in place. Mubarak altered articles

76 and 77 in the constitution to stipulate that the president to follow Mubarak will

not be the vice-president but must be elected. The mass opinion was inclined

towards the fact that Mubarak only amended the constitution to pave the way for

his son to lead the country in his succession. In a protest in Alexandria in 2010,

prominent rival to Mubarak, Mohamed El Baradie, who formerly ran the

International Atomic Energy Agency was quoted saying “we are a republic not a

kingdom” (Shenker, 1) implying his rejection of Mubarak’s plans pave the way for

his son to assume power.

Other factors contributing to the people discontent in both countries were linked

to social freedom and inequality. For example, according to the Press Freedom

Index Report in 2010, Syria ranked 173rd out of 180 countries with regards to

freedom in the media, highlighting one of the main reasons revolutionaries

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flocked the streets in 2011. On the other hand in Egypt, especially during the late

2000s, freedom in the press had improved according to the Press Freedom Index

Report, from being 146th to 127th out of 180 countries. Although significantly better

than Syria, it was still not enough for Egyptians, as they called of complete

removal of censorship in the Egyptian media. Additionally, and similarly, both

Egypt and Syria ranked 85rd and 80th (out of 144 countries) respectively, in terms

of inequality (UNDP Human Development Report, 2010). Both these factors, the

freedom of press and inequality were primary demands of both sets of protestors

during the protests, and therefore obviously primary causes for the people

discontent.

Spring

As argued above, the causes of both the Egyptian and Syrian uprisings were very

similar, where inequality, lack of freedom and dignity were the main reasons for

the explosion of the streets. ‘Bread, freedom and social equality’ was what all the

protesters and I used to chant during the sixteen-day revolution in Egypt.

Although the causes and motivations were similar, the way that both leaders,

Mubarak and Bashar, dealt with the protestors was completely different and in my

opinion was a huge factor in both the outcomes of the uprisings.

As soon as the protests began, Mubarak began a calculated game of defiance

and concessions simultaneously, with the Egyptian public in an attempt to win

their hearts and control the situation. His first speech was on the 28 th of January,

at the end of what was called ‘Angry Friday’. Mubarak was quoted saying that his

orders for the interior ministry were to give the protestors, or his “sons and

daughters” (Mubarak, 28 Jan 2011) their right to peacefully protest, despite

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nearly 800 protestors dying that day alone. He also said that he “took the initiative

of forming a new government with new priorities and duties that respond to the

demand of our youth and their mission”, that he “honestly” did not intend to run

for another presidential period, and that he “will work in the remaining months of

his term to take the steps to ensure a peaceful transfer of power.” (Mubarak, 28

Jan 2011) However Mubarak’s concessions failed and the people remained

defiant.

In a last ditch attempt, Mubarak gave another speech ten days later, on the 10

the tenth of February, where gave even more concessions. Maintaining his

paternalistic tone, he began by admiring his “sons, the youth of Egypt” and how

they are a symbol for a new generation for Egypt. He continued by delegating

powers to Vice President Omar Soleiman, who was appointed a few day earlier

by Mubarak himself, promised constitutional reform (Mubarak, 10 Feb. 2011) with

regards to articles 76 and 77 (articles revolving around presidency and

presidential terms), 88 and 93 (laws regarding the People’s Assembly), and 198

(law regarding the Senate) and finally abolish article 179, also known as the

emergency law (ARE Const). Despite conceding his government, important

articles in the constitution and delegating his powers to the vice president, it was

not enough to erase 16 days of bloodshed. Therefore, with nothing more to

concede Mubarak decided to step down on the 11th of February and leave control

to the Egyptian military.

The domino effect struck Syria a couple of months later, precisely in March of

2011. Mass demonstrations began in Damascus and Daraa calling for an end to

the Assad ‘monarchy’. In contrast to Mubarak, who spoke during the first 3 days

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of protests, President Assad waited one week to “establish a full picture regarding

the events occurring in Syria” (Assad, 30 March 2011). His tone was similar to

that of Mubarak, using the paternalistic tone to address the “children of Syria” and

expressed his admiration for the Syrian people and their choices. He also made

concessions regarding reform of some articles in the Syrian constitution including

the Party Law, introducing a multi-party system and the abolishment of the

Emergency law. However unlike Mubarak, Assad immediately began mentioning

conspiracies regarding his country and how he is concerned that conspirators are

behind the events unfolding in Syria, aimed at “weakening and disintegrating

Syria” and hence removing the “last obstacle facing “Israel’s plans”. His views set

the tone to what followed and how he intended to act in the situation. Following

his speech his response was brutal and vowed what he described as “terrorists”.

From April to July hundreds were killed, tanks and army personnel were deployed

amongst the country.

On the contrary to Egypt, which was supported by the International community, at

least at the beginning of the uprising, the West and the UN immediately

condemned the actions of the Syrian government, with Obama stating that

“President Assad has lost his legitimacy to rule, he should step down” (Ukman,

2011). Additionally, UN Secretary General Bin Ki Moon described the use of force

against protesters by the Syrian authorities as "unacceptable" (UN chief.., 2011).

Despite the protests of the International community Assad was defiant and

maintained his grip on the Syrian government. Subsequently sanctions were

imposed by the US, under the name of “Executive Order 13582” (U.S Department

of State, 1) and European Union on Assad’s governmental officials, with an arms

embargo, asset freezes and travel bans. In an interview in late 2011, by ABC’s

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Diane Walters, Assad maintained his stubborn stance mentioning how he

responded to the people’s demands for freedom by “starting reform quickly”

allowing for “new party laws, new media law, new election law, new local

administration law” and revision of the constitution. However, he negated the fact

that the demonstrations were peaceful citing how over “1,100 soldier and

policemen” were killed and how these actions belonged to “terrorists” being

armed by “West and regional puppets”.

The difference between the actions of both Presidents following both uprisings

was very clear, and in my opinion were deciding factors in the outcomes both

countries are seeing now. Mubarak’s stance, as seen from his speeches, can be

seen as the much more calculated one, offering several concessions and using

rhetoric in a way that would appeal to the public and evoke their sympathy to put

an end to the protests. However, when that didn’t yield its desired results,

Mubarak decided to step down citing the country’s stability and security as his

priority. Meanwhile Assad, was much more defiant and stubborn. Despite his

concessions, such as complete constitutional reform, not being enough for the

protestors who continued to demand his resignation, he remained adamant on

holding his ground. Subsequently he resorted to brutal violence allowing his

country to become a warzone with thousands meeting their deaths and hundreds

of thousands displaced.

After Spring

What followed both uprisings was completely different. Egypt’s rule following

Mubarak’s resignation began with the military, the Security Council of Armed

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Forces (SCAF). The Egyptian military, due its decades in power became the

most powerful institution I the country. Besides its role in producing military

hardware, the industries owned by the military produces domestic hardware and

owns companies that compete for public projects such as construction, 100% self

sufficient in agricultural projects and own private gas stations as well (Harb, 270).

This makes it the most powerful institution, with its income all circulated within the

institution, and is off budget in addition to the budget being completely secretive.

Therefore when the power remained in the hand of military. it remained there

undisputed. They began a series of constitution amendments that they claim

were designed to protect the country “from third party insurgents” (as quoted by

Army General Tantawi in Al Ahram, 1) that were collaborating to destroy the

countries security – notice the similarity in Al Assad’s views as well.

However, these laws and amendments, such as article 13 of the SCAF

Constitutional Declaration of March 2011 enshrines “freedom of the press,

printing, publication and media” and forbids “censorship” – except in times of

national emergency or war”, and the SCAF decreed Law 34 of 2011, which

provides for imprisonment and/or a fine for whomever, during a state of

emergency, “stages a sit-in or takes action that prevents or delays or obstructs

from working any state institution or public authority or a public or private

workplace”, were deigned to quell any unrest and prevent and kinds of criticisms

to the present government at the time. Such laws and decrees suppressed any

public opinion and dissent and allowed SCAF to assert their control over the

country, and simultaneously undoubtedly allowed for a relatively peaceful transfer

of power.

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On the other hand, the Syrian military cannot be considered as powerful an

institution as the Egyptian military and Al Assad was not a military man like Hosni

Mubarak was. It is well documented that mostly the Alawite minority controls the

Syrian army, the same minority Al Assad belongs to. For this reason, defections

throughout the army began to take place and therefore weakened Al Assad’s

position and strengthened the revolutionaries. The highest defecting military

commander Major General Abdelaziz Jassim al-Shalal, who was in fact Sunni,

released a statement and was quoted by The Guardian stating that “the army has

destroyed cities and villages and has deliberately targeted innocent Sunni

population” (Beaumont, 1). His quote shows how the sectarian division in the

army was a direct cause of the escalation of the Syrian war. Hence, we can see

quite clearly the comparison between the roles of both militaries in the conflict,

where the Egyptian army was able to undividedly take control of the situation and

prevent any further escalation, meanwhile the Syrian military took part in a brutal

offensive against the “insurgents that threatened the Syria and its people” (Al

Assad, 2013) escalating the conflict and causing mass divide.

Additionally, Syria’s sectarian divide played a major role in the escalation of the

Syrian conflict, a divide that was not present in Egypt’s overwhelming majority

Sunni population. Sunni militias began facing off with the government controlled

forces since the initiation of the uprising, militias who Al Assad describes as

“takfiris, terrorists, al-Qaeda members” who “streamed from everywhere to

command the combat operations on the ground” (Al Assad, 2013). Al Assad

claims that these terrorists or insurgents, where some of them such as Al Nusra

Front joined ISIS, have been armed by Western powers and some regional

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powers. Meanwhile in Egypt, and due to the conformity of the religious sects of

the population, this religion-fuelled conflict was not present.

In a later interview with El Mayadeen TV in 2013, Assad also mentions how

foreign intervention and the flow of arms into Syria had a major effect on the

escalation of the conflict. He directly attacks the US, France, Qatar, Saudi Arabia

and Turkey implying that these militias were and are in fact armed by these

countries and they are in fact looking for Syria’s instability. In fact in late 2014, the

US congress voted in favor of arming and training ‘moderate’ Islamic rebels with

the White House stating their intentions to “empower the moderate Syrian

opposition, both civilian and armed” (Holland, 1). Although it is claimed that these

armaments are to confront ISIS, the Sunni rebels are also at war with the Syrian

regime, which create a three-way war that can continue to escalate

uncontrollably.

On the other hand, in Egypt, the SCAF maintained the transition from Mubarak to

the presidential elections in 2012, where Muhammed Morsi, member of the

Muslim Brotherhood party was elected as President. However, after a year in

power, his performance was unsatisfactory to the majority of Egyptians and mass

protests began on the 30th of June. A coup was staged by, then Army General,

and now, President Abdel Fattah El Sisi removing Muhammed Morsi from the

presidential palace. A period of riots, protests and terror began by the Muslim

Brotherhood and therefore simultaneously a period of mass political arrests

began.

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To maintain control the interim government immediately issued anti protest laws

(harsh laws that are designed to regulate the time and place of protests) and

exaggerated fines for unconformity. This 25-article law by the government

succeeded in controlling protests and allowed the interior ministry to stage

thousands of arrests. Additionally, in a statement by the government on behalf of

the cabinet read “The cabinet has declared the Muslim Brotherhood group and its

organization as a terrorist organization", since the organization has resorted to in

Sinai and in Metropolitan areas as well. This was the final nail in the Muslim

Brotherhood’s coffin as it swayed public opinion in favor of the interim

government and the following President AbdelFattah El Sisi. How the Muslim

Brotherhood reacted, resorting to violence can be compared with Islamic militia

violence in Syria, however on a much smaller scale. Meanwhile how the military,

Egyptian people and the interim government reacted to the threat of violence

from the extremist Muslim Brotherhood is why the tension was never escalated

as it has now in Syria.

Conclusion

Using my analysis, I can conclusively say that although my hypothesis was

correct, but at the same time lacking. I predicted that the factors that fuelled both

uprisings were due to social inequality and freedom. Despite my analysis also

showing the same, other factors also came into place such as the fact that Hafez

Al Assad paved the way for his son to succeed him (and did in 2000), meanwhile

Hosni Mubarak also planned the same, but stepped down before completing his

plan. Unlike Egypt, the revolution in Syria also stemmed from years of

dissatisfaction and resentment due to the fact that the President belonged to

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minority and not from the Sunni majority. Despite the similarities, the outcomes of

both were completely different due to the way each uprising panned out. I was

correct in my prediction that sectarian division in Syria made the difference when

it came to violence, unlike the inexistence of Sunni-Shiite divide in Egypt. The

power of both military institutions was also pivotal in determining the outcomes.

However, through my analysis of both Mubarak’s and Assad’s speeches, the way

that both calculated their moves was pivotal, where Al Assad chose defiance and

stubbornness, meanwhile Mubarak, after his defiant tone during his first speech,

gave concessions and finally stepped down to avoid bloodshed.

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