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Egyptian Foreign Policy – The Yom

Kippur War

IPC 4803

Assignment 2

Topic 5

Unique Number: 812506

By: A’shiq Osman

Student No. 46701389

University Of South Africa

I declare that this assignment is my own original work. Where secondary material

has been used, this has been carefully acknowledged and referenced in accordance

with departmental requirements. I understand what plagiarism is and am aware of

the department’s policy in this regard. I have not allowed anyone else to copy my

work

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Table of Contents

1. Assignment Brief ............................................................................................................................. 2

2. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3

3. Pre-Conflict ..................................................................................................................................... 4

3.1 Nasser Politics ........................................................................................................................... 4

3.2 Legacies of the 6 Day War ......................................................................................................... 5

4. Conflict, Behaviour &Foreign Policies ............................................................................................. 6

4.1 Political Behaviour .................................................................................................................... 6

4.2 Foreign Policy Focuses .............................................................................................................. 8

4.3 Complacency ............................................................................................................................. 9

4.4 Conflict .................................................................................................................................... 10

5. Outcomes ...................................................................................................................................... 12

6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 13

7. Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 14

1. Assignment Brief

Analyse the foreign policy, behaviour and outcomes of the foreign policy decisions of

any state of your choice in respect of any ONE of the following foreign policy crises

or event: The Yom Kippur War

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2. Introduction

The Yom Kippur or Ramadan war of 1973 staged between Egypt & Syria against

Israel, is a significant event which took place in the 70’s, the event reshaped the geo-

political climate of the middle east region. The 1973 conflict is best understood as a

by-product of the 6-day war between Arab Nations against Israel, in which the Arab

forces suffered a devastating defeat, as well as the 1970 War of Attrition.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is complex multi-layered, contrary to popular belief is not

centred on the Palestinian Struggle for Self-determination. This Struggle is in fact

misrepresented and often used as a political means of promoting self-interests of

regional actors.

To accurately understand the and assuage the multi-layered conflict – each situation

needs to be broken down into the sum total parts of foreign policies implemented as

well as behaviour of actors involved – rational logic is not always applicable when

interpreting foreign policy as will be argued below

The Conflict highlights the complacent paradigm in which Israel perceived its

neighbours’ in lieu of the its overwhelming victory in 1963, as well steps taken by the

Egyptian executive and policy-makers in order to restore the imbalances created by

the 1963 conflict as a means of addressing unfavourable socio-economic factors

such as the annexure of the Arab territories.

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Economic factors such as the inactivity of the Suez Canal, failing domestic economy

and the occupation of the Sinai region are factors that influenced both Egyptian

behaviour and Foreign policy in the regional context.

3. Pre-Conflict

3.1 Nasser Politics

Arab-Israeli conflict stems back to 1948 with the declaration of a Jewish State by the

UN and the Balfour Declaration. The Partition of the State of Palestine was rejected

by Arab actors in the International Arena. Since the focus of this study is on Egyptian

Foreign Policy and behaviour, emphasis will be placed on Egyptian developments,

leading up to the conflict of 1973. It is important to bring into contrast the behaviour

of preceding President to the 1973 conflict Gamal Abdel Nasser.

Following a military coup, Head of the ‘Free-officers movement’ President Nasser’s

behaviour towards the west regarding the Suez Canal crisis of 1956 placed Egyptian

foreign policy in a radical revolutionist light. Considered a victory against western

imperialism – with the withdrawal of British & French diplomacy, Nasser sought to

instil a socialist structure which was frowned upon by the west. (Kamrava 2005, 108)

Nasser was a Pan-Arabist, and supported the Notion of Arab Unity. Perhaps ahead

of his time, or the prevalent conditions unsuitable to such ideology – it was ultimately

under his presidency that foreign policy and behaviour led to the 1963 defeat, it is

important to highlight his formation of the Arab Socialist union – A union with Syria

between 1958-1961 as well as Egyptian involvement in the Yemeni Civil War

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between 1962-1967 left his military forces weakened which can be attributed to the

crushing defeat of 1963. (Seale 1986, 148)

3.2 Legacies of the 6 Day War

The 6 Day war of June 1963 is often viewed by scholars as the culmination of

unresolved Arab-Israeli disputes (Stansfield 2012, 404). Unresolved events of this

conflict gave rise to later tensions and eventually the 1972 conflict. The root causes

of the conflict lie in the annexure of Arab territories namely; The Sinai, Golan

Heights, West Bank & Gaza Strip all in insubordination to the UN Security Council

Resolution 242 which refers to "inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war

and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East in which every

State in the area can live in security." (UNSC 1967)

For Egypt the defeat prompted a national re-evaluation of its foreign policies, political

alliances as well as an understanding of need for major socio-economic reform.

Jordan who had also been a participant in the 1963 was also affected by the

outcome of the conflict; it turned its focus from Pan-Arabism to domestic matters, it

previous empathy for Palestinian Liberation Movements quickly dissipated as it fell

into a civil war with Palestinian insurgents over control and certain territories. It

expelled the Palestinian Liberation organisation (PLO) to Lebanon and focused on

matters of consolidating its authority within its own territory.

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4. Conflict, Behaviour &Foreign Policies

Anwar Sadat came to power after the death of Gamal Abdel Nasser in September

1970. He was Nasser’s elected successor being one of the original free officers, a

staunch opposer to Israeli legitimacy. He is the main component of Egyptian Foreign

policy development and implementation, as under authoritarian regimes Egyptian

political inputs were managed almost exclusively by the Ruling elite and military. He

was Nasser’s vice president following crack down on internal dissenters, formerly

served as the secretary General of the Arab Socialist Union.

4.1 Political Behaviour

It is important to denote the motivations behind the behaviour of representative

actors, Since Egypt at the time was a totalitarian regime with most power being

concentrated in the hands of the ruling Elite. It is important to understand the

rationing behind how Sadat conducted affairs. He faced an array of challenges when

he ascended to power, Egyptian Nationalism waned in lieu of the Defeat of 1963, the

economy was also stagnant with the closure of the Suez Canal, the displacement of

Palestinian and their refugee status. Direct objectives and immediate goals of Sadat

early on was to consolidate his authority in the vacuum created by Nasser’s passing.

In order to consolidate his power centres, he slowly, yet methodically began a series

of reforms which occurred throughout the 1970’s, such as the dismantling of

Nasser’s policist state, as well as the liberalisation of the economy and the

dismantling of socialist structures in place. There was an evident need to revitalise

the economy as well as ‘take back’ occupied lands held as an outcome of the 6 day

war, which instilled a sense of psychological defeatism amongst the Arab Nations,

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particularly the Egyptians as their armed forces where held in high regard. If this

could not be achieved through means of diplomacy, then war was necessarily

apparent I the rationing of political actors.

The 1970 war of attrition formed the ‘framework for Sadat’s ensuing diplomacy’.

(Kamrava 2005, 125). There was a national for vindication, in contrast Sadat

diplomacy and foreign policy can be likened to that of Adolf Hitler post 1933 in his

endeavours to vindicate the Germans of harsh realities of the treaty of Versailles.

(Osman 2012, 2) – The focus of Foreign policy for both the Syrian & Egyptian

regimes shifted away from the Palestinian liberation struggle towards avenging the

loss of earlier conflicts as well as reclaiming occupied territories, this is not to say

that the Palestinian liberation struggle was not used to justify political behaviour.

Sadat made clear his intention of ending the Stale-mate that existed between Egypt

& Israel, and declared that 1971 would be “the year of decision towards war or

peace…[the] problem cannot be postponed any longer…[T]his is neither America’s

nor the Soviet’s war, but our war, deriving from our will and determinism” (El-Sadat

1978, 109).

It must be asked, why did Egypt go to War with Israel in 1973?

Sadat’s immediate Goal was to see the re-opening of the Suez Canal under

Egyptian authority, and restore the much needed lifeline to an ailing Egyptian

Economy. Additional impetus was given by the need to avenge the defeat of 1963

against which the backdrop a myth of Arab incompetence developed. The

Palestinian struggle although taking a back seat to the national interests of Egyptian

Nation State was also rationed as a justification. Finally it was when diplomacy

conclusively failed – and Israel annexed part of the Sinai region and began

developing settlements as to set up a permanent establishment for its citizens – in

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contravention of UN resolution 242 – a move condemned by the UN yet condoned by

the US, did policy makes realise that the land could only be returned with the

decisive use of military force.

4.2 Foreign Policy Focuses

It is important for the focus and contextual understanding of this study to focus

specifically on the prevalent foreign policies of the main actors of the 1973 Yom

Kippur/ Ramadan War.

Israel: Israeli foreign policy, overwhelmingly shaped by the idea of security, this is

relatively easily enough understood, The IDF is widely regarded as the most superior

military force in the region, outfitted with American patronage and effective

intelligence services, Mossad & Shabak (Stansfield 2012, 403)

Egypt: Egyptian Foreign Policy focus up until the signing of the Camp David Accords

(Lasting Peace agreement between Egypt & Israel) had been focused on military

superiority, Economic Stability and Hegemonic influence over the region. (El-Gamasi

1973, 43)

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4.3 Complacency

After emerging from the 1963 6 Day as the overwhelming victor, a sense of

complacency over took Israeli policy makers. The aggrandisement of the Israeli

Defence Force (IDF) gave rise to the notion of Israeli invincibility. “Israeli victory in

1967 was to sweeping that it is understandable that Israel did not follow its military

victory with a searching examination of it remaining military weaknesses”

(Cordesman and Wagner 1990, 17) highlights the complacent nature of Israeli

politicians and generals after the June War. Comfortably secure behind the Bar-Lev

line and with the once united Arabs disunited in defeat, Israel underestimated Arab

threats made, even against the warning of the United States and their intelligence

agency the CIA (Stansfield 2012, 408)

Israeli swagger led to a sense of obstinacy regarding negotiations, it viewed Arab

States as being in too weak of a position to warrant negotiations on a lasting peace-

settlement (Shlaim 2001, 289) – this can be seen as seemingly contradictory to the

its prevalent foreign policy motivations of ‘security’, this proved to be a grave error in

Israeli foreign policy. Israeli overconfidence led to the presumption that an Arab

threat would only need to be faced later on in the decade, subsequently, military

spending was cut and mandatory IDF conscription was made lax. The effort of many

senior officers in the 1963 war instilled a sense of heroism and complacent nature of

the political climate, many senior political offices retired from service.

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4.4 Conflict

Hostilities broke out on the 6th of October 1973, Code named ‘Operation –Badr’ a

pre-emptive strike on dual fronts by both the Egyptian Armed Forces at the East

Bank of the Suez as well as Syrian Armed Forces in the Golan Heights The lighting

fast attacks overran Israeli defensive positions within a few hours.

The coordination and timing of the strikes was of crucial importance. The Day being

the Jewish Holiday of Yom Kippur – considered to be the holiest day in the Jewish

religious year, meant that only a small amount of forces would be manning strategic

defensive positions. Here the Arab foreign policy had surprised the Israelis as – the

period was also during the Muslim Holy month of Ramadan, and Israelis had never

expected that the Arabs would attack mid-day in the heat as they were observing the

compulsory fast.

Sadat used methods of diplomatic cunning leading up to the war in order to deceive

Israeli analysts; in July 1972, Sadat had expelled some 15000 soviet advisors who

were mandated with helping Egypt to rebuild its military in wake of the 1967 defeat,

as well as severed relations with King Hussein of Jordan over a diplomatic spat. The

Israelis perceived both these developments to have in fact weakened Egyptian

positions in the regions, however on the contrary this freed Sadat’s hand to

manoeuvre his attack. (Kamrava 2005, 128)

Important developments to the Egyptian Armed forces must be noted, the increasing

professionalization of the Armed Forces under the guidance of Soviet Advisors, The

increasingly sophisticated weaponry made available to Arab armed forces by the

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Soviets anti-aircraft weaponry almost neutralised previous Israeli Air superiority as

well as the introduction of siege weaponry manifest of the strategic planning and

coordination of these strikes (Ties into the Arms Race of the Cold War). The

heightening of discipline amongst the armed forces following the purge of

incompetent commanders. (Kamrava, Military professionalization and Civil-Military

Relations in the Middle East 2000)

Over-coming the initial shock of such brazen attacks, the Israelis quickly regrouped,

this is in part due to the failure of the Egyptians failed to exploit the fact that the

enemy was fighting on 2 separate fronts (Golan Heights in the West & Sinai in the

East) and having used up the element of surprise, the Israelis repelled attacks and

focussed their efforts on the Egyptian Armed Forces (Stein 1999, 74-75)

The tide of the War changed primarily upon the intervention of the United States to

assist its Regional ally Israel. It airlifted Supplies to the Middle East from small arms

to aircraft and tanks were put to use almost immediately upon landing. Reports

indicate that between 700-800 tonnes of military equipment was airlifted daily to

sustain the Israeli war efforts. (Allen 1982, 208-209)

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5. Outcomes

By 16th of October 1973 the Arab advances had much been repelled, with Syrian

forces now evicted from the Golan almost as far back as Damascus itself. Israel

launched a counter- Offensive aimed at destroying Syrian infrastructure and crippling

its economy, Oil refineries and ports were destroyed. The 17th saw the Egyptian

Third Army Battalion surrounded and under threat of total destruction. Yet Sadat still

saw the conflict as an Arab victory as twin myths of Israeli invincibility and Arab

incompetence had been dispelled in one fell swoop. (Kamrava, The Modern Middle

East 2005, 132) Egypt and Syria signed the UN brokered cease fire agreement

UNSC Resolution 338, on the 22nd October 1973.

Sadat believed now that he had dealt a decisive blow, a display of military prowess

enough to engage the Israelis to that extent would be enough to merit negotiations

with the Israelis as the would again perceive Egyptian military prowess as a security

threat.

With an inclination for ‘going at it alone’ Sadat engaged in what he called ‘Electric

Shock Diplomacy’ (Ajami 1996, 116) where he engaged is bilateral negotiations with

Israel. The first Egyptian –Israeli peace agreement is known as Sinai I and was a

precursor to the signing of the Camp David Accords September 1978, whereby

Sadat negotiated with Israel under the mediation of US President Jimmy Carter for

the return of the Sinai region in exchange for lasting peace. This policy served to

further alienate him from other Arab Nations who met in March to discuss the

“imposition of political, diplomatic and economic sanctions..[against].. Egypt.” (Khouri

2002, 414)

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The signing of the Camp David accords, is tantamount to Egyptian policy shift to

being more accommodating to western influence and policies, in exchange for

lasting peace, the US influence over the IMF (Karawan 2005, 328) to provide loans

and the promise of US aid to stabilise the region, which still faced many socio-

economic factors at home.

Sadat launched major economic reforms known as the intifah or open-door policy.

The aim of this was to liberalise the economy by attracting foreign investors as well

as the regression of state structures (Waterbury 1983, 240)

6. Conclusion

The End of the 1970’s saw the geopolitical landscape of the Middle East change

dramatically. It contrasts the rationing of actions as well as political complacency of

regional actors. The idea of Pan-Arab unity in Egypt seemingly died along with

Gamal Abdel Nasser, and what followed was a shift towards neo-economic

liberalism conceived by the signing of the Camp David Accords. The Yom Kippur or

Ramadan war as referred to by the Arabs represents an important victory in

dispelling the myth of Israeli superiority as well as Arab incompetence. Despite there

being no clear cut winners as in the 1963 war, the psychological victory had a

greater measurable impact amongst the Egyptian Arabs.

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7. Bibliography

Ajami. The Arab Predicament. Cairo: American University of Cairo Press, 1996.

Allen, Peter. “The Yom kippur War.” Charles Scribners Son's, 1982: 208-209.

Cordesman, A, and A Wagner. The Lesons of Modern War Vol 1: The Arab Israeli Conflicts, 1973-

1989. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990.

El-Gamasi, M. The October War: Memoires of Field Marshall El-Gamasy of Egypt. Cairo: American

University of Cairo Press, 1973.

El-Sadat, Anwar. The public Diary of Anwar Sadat: Part 1 The Road to War. Cairo: Leiden, 1978.

Kamrava, Mehran. “Military professionalization and Civil-Military Relations in the Middle East.”

Political Science Quarterly, 2000: 67-92.

—. The Modern Middle East. London: University of California Press Ltd, 2005.

Karawan, I. “Foreign Policy restructuring Egypt's disengagement from Arab-IsraeliConflict revisited.”

Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2005: 325-338.

Khouri. The Arab Israeli Dilemma. Amman: eastern House, 2002.

Osman, A'shiq. “Why did the treaty of Versailles not establish peaceful relations in Europe and

instead resulted in another World War?".” HSY3702 Module Coursework, Pretoria, 2012.

Seale, Patrick. Syria: A study of post war arab politics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1986.

Shlaim, Avi. The Iron wall: Israel and the Arab World. New York: Norton, 2001.

Stansfield, Gareth. “Israeli-Egyptian (In)Security: The Yom Kippur War.” In Foreign Policy: Theories,

Actors, Cases, by Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne, 400-418. Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2012.

Stein, K. Heroic Diplomacy: Sadat, Kissinger, Carter, Begin, and the quest for Arab-Israeli Peace.

London: Routledge, 1999.

UNSC. “Resolution 242.” UNSC Resolution. New York: United Nations Security Council Official

Records, 22 November 1967.

Waterbury, J. The Egypt Of Nasser and Sadat; The political Economy of Two Regimes. Princeton:

Princeton University Press, 1983.