Emotional and moral evaluations

METAPHILOSOPHY Vol. 23, No. 3, July 1992 0026-1068 $2.00

EMOTIONAL AND MORAL EVALUATIONS*

AARON BEN-ZE’EV

Introduction The evaluative component is highly important in emotional attitudes. Every emotion entails a certain evaluation. Thus, hate implies the negative evaluation of a certain person, whereas pride implies a positive evaluation of oneself. Evaluating something to be dangerous underlies the emotion of fear; a highly positive evaluation of someone underlies the emotions of love and admiration. Similarly, pity entails a negative evaluation of another’s suffering; remorse involves evaluating what one has done as being wrong. The presence of an evaluative component is what distinguishes the emotional attitude of hope from that of expectation: we do not hope for something unless we evaluate it as being somehow favorable; but our expectation of something entails no comparable evaluation. For similar reasons surprise, when considered merely as a cognitive state, is not an emotion.’ In an attitude devoid of an evaluative component (or in which its weight is marginal), the subject is indifferent to other agents. This is not typical of emotions.

We are often unable to describe the exact details of our evaluative patterns, but we usually know the type of evaluation involved - at least if it is positive or negative. Thus, we may be unable to describe the circumstances in which our jealousy is aroused, although the proto- typical evaluative patterns causing us to become jealous are there. On the whole emotions are easily identified, even though their underlying evaluative patterns may be hard to describe.

The evaluative component alone is not sufficient for the emergence of emotions. Evaluating the death of someone as bad is far from experiencing the emotion of grief. The two attitudes may share an identical cognitive and a similar evalutive component, but they often differ with regard to their feeling and motivational components.

* I am grateful to Alan Brinton, Jonathan Dancy, Lisa Frank, Invin Goldstein, Ronald Polanski, and Stephen Toulmin for helpful comments and discussions. The work on this article began while I was on sabbatical leave at the Department of Philosophy at Camegie- Mellon University and the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh. Their hospitality and support is gratefully acknowledged.

See A. Ben-Ze’ev, “The Nature of Emotions,” Philosophical Studies, 52 (1987), 393409. See also A. Ortony, G. L. Clore, G. L., and A. Collings, The Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1988); and E. Bedford, “Emotions,” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 57 (1957), 281-304.

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EMOTIONAL AND MORAL EVALUATIONS 215

The evaluative component is also essential for moral attitudes. To assume a moral attitude is to make some evaluation. However, while a moral attitude may consist merely of some knowledge of the situation and a certain evaluation, an emotional attitude is more complex and also entails a certain feeling and a motivational component. There are various aspects according to which we can compare emotional and moral evaluations. In this paper I focus on their degree of generality which I believe is important for understanding various major issues - for example, the nature of emotions and moral behavior and the dispute about ethical universalism and ethical particularism. While discussing the matter of generality, I will refer to other aspects of the comparison between emotional and moral evaluations.

At the end of the day I would like to claim that the disparity in generality between emotional and moral evaluations is a disparity in degree: moral evaluations are more general than emotional ones. Specifying the exact nature of that difference is difficult for several reasons. First, there is no consensus among philosophers concerning the generality of either type of evaluation. Thus, it has been claimed that there are no general moral principles and our ethical decisions are made case by case. It has been claimed on the other hand that emotional evaluations are general in the sense of being objective and rational.2 Second, there are various aspects of generality and it is not clear whether emotional evaluations differ from moral ones in all respects. Third, there are numerous types of emotional and moral evaluations. Distinguishing between them requires a subtle (and sometimes tedious) description. Doing justice to all these complexities is far beyond the scope of this work; however, I will briefly refer to them in the course of my discussion.

I begin by discussing the various aspects of generality which are relevant to our comparison. A certain evaluation can be regarded as general in light of the following major aspects:

(1) Relevancy. The particular evaluation demands considerations relating to other cases beyond the one in question.

(2) Equality. The particular evaluation is general in the sense of treating everybody as being of equal importance.

( 3 ) Inclusion. The particular evaluation should be compatible with a certain general norm in order to be included in this type of evaluation.

(4) Zmpurtiully. The particular evaluation does not presuppose certain proximity between the subject and the object.

See the first claim in J. Dancy, “Ethical Particularism and Morally Relevant Properties,” Mind, 92, (1983), 53&547; the second claim can be found in R. DeSousa, The Rationality of Emotions (Cambridge: MIT, 1987).

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These cognate aspects of generality refer to major relations partici- pating in evaluations. Generality in the sense of relevance refers to the relation between the particular circumstances in which the evaluation is made and other possible circumstances. The second aspect of generality refers to the status of the evaluated object in comparison with other possible objects. Generality in the sense of inclusion refers to the relation between one particular and other possible evaluations. The fourth aspect of generality refers to the relation between the subject and the particular object. These types of generality are often interrelated and in some cases it is hard to distinguish clearly between different aspects. There may be other types of classification, but since these refer to the major relations involved in evaluations, they seem to cover the major aspects of generality.

In this paper I describe each aspect of generality, and demonstrate that moral evaluations are more general than emotional evaluations on all counts. I conclude by referring to some attempts to reconcile the particularistic and universalistic aspects of morality.

Relevancy This aspect of generality refers to whether a particular evaluation has general relevance beyond the particular case. Moral evaluations are clearly general in this sense. Primarily, morality is not concerned with a particular agent in isolation, but with relations among a number of creatures. It presupposes that other creatures besides the agent have moral rights which the agent should respect. Considering the impact of the agent’s action upon other creatures is essential to morality.

The difficult task of moral theory in this respect is not to determine whether moral evaluations entail considerations beyond a particular case, but rather to pinpoint the nature (or degree of generality) of such considerations. One principle in this respect is the universalizability principle. This principle may be formulated as follows: If, in uparticular case, something is judged to have a certain value, this and other similar things (in relevant respects) would be-judged to have the same value (in relevant respects) in similar cuses. In one sense this formulation is trivially true: in two identical (in every detail) situations, we will have identical evaluations. The trouble is that there are no two identical situations - only situations similar in some respects and different in others. And the problem is to determine which differences are morally relevant. There is no general theory of moral relevancy (and probably cannot be). But some criterion of relevancy is implied in our moral behavior even if we cannot specify the relevant features. We know, for example, that a difference in hair color is not relevant (at least in most cases) for evaluating the moral behavior of two murderers. On the other hand, the issue of self-defense is a relevant factor (at least in most cases)


in evaluating the moral behavior of someone who killed a burglar. There are, of course, many cases in which determining moral relevancy is difficult. However, there is no doubt that moral evaluations should address (implicitly or explicitly) the possible implications for other creatures who may be influenced by the result of such an evaluation.

An extreme formulation of this type of generality is found in Kant. Kant demands that our moral rules be as general as possible. It should be possible for the moral precept underlying any particular moral action to become a universal law, not merely governing this particular deed but the actions of all agents in similar circumstances. I am duty bound to perform an action only if it is also possible for all others to act on the same precept. One need not adopt Kant’s approach. However, in the light of the fact that morality entails respect for the moral rights of other creatures, the need for general considerations beyond a particular case is obvious.

Are emotional evaluations general in this sense? Do emotional evaluations involve considerations beyond a particular case? Emotional evaluations naturally have an impact beyond the particular case with which they are concerned. Thus, Adam’s love for Karen has implications beyond those concerning only Adam and Karen. His love may affect the life of Karen’s husband, their children, their friends, etc. However, taking into account such general implications is basically a moral rather than an emotional task. Thus if Adam decides not to pursue his love for Karen, his decision will be primarily based upon moral rather than emotional considerations. The considerations involved in emotional evaluations themselves are of a more limited nature: they are usually limited to those with whom we have contact. Moral evaluations commit the agent to general considerations far beyond those concerning the people with whom we have contact.

The generality of evaluations in the sense of relevancy is bound up with sensitivity to contextual attributes. Greater sensitivity to contextual attributes implies less relevancy to considerations beyond the particular case. Emotions seem to be sensitive to personal and contextual attributes more than most other mental capacities. Thus, seeing a certain person remains more or less the same in various contexts and is fairly (though, not entirely) independent of the perceiver’s personality. Our memory and thinking are usually more sensitive to contextual and personal attributes, but not in the way emotions are. The sensitivity of emotions to such attributes is clearly exemplified in the case of the woman whose prerequisite for falling in love with a man is that he be a widower still in mourning for his deceased wife. Limitations of this kind are in varying degree characteristic of emotions in normal cases as well as in such pathological instances. Thus, an object that arouses curiosity tends to inspire fear in an unfamiliar or menacing context. The manner in which we conceive of the emotional object plays a crucial role in the

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emergence of emotion^.^ This susceptibility to contextual and personal attributes makes it difficult to define the characteristics common to all emotions. Although emotions are sensitive to contextual attributes, they are not sensitive to every change in the context. There are various degrees and types of emotional sensitivity to contextual features. Thus love may continue despite contextual changes (including changes in the beloved person), and grief may arise in most cases where people close to us die (despite the different contexts in which these deaths occur).

Moral evaluations are also sensitive to context, but in emotions this sensitivity is much stronger. There are more attributes relevant to emotional evaluations than to moral ones. Thus, whereas all (or at least most) moral evaluations are not sensitive to the hair color of the agent, many emotional evaluations are sensitive to this contextual feature. I can think of no contextual feature which is relevant in the moral, but not in the emotional domain. There are, however, many contextual attributes relevant in the emotional, but not the moral domain. The subject’s emotional evaluations are typically directed at a particular person and concerned with the relation of this person to the subject. The subject’s moral evaluations are also typically directed at a particular person. However, they are often not merely concerned with the relation between the subject and this person, but also with the relation with other people. Accordingly, the role of considerations referring to other cases is greater in moral evaluations, and they are therefore less sensitive to contextual features. Consequently, if the universalizability formulation is adequate at all, it is more relevant to moral than to emotional evaluations. It seems that all types of evaluation are context- dependent, but the scope and significance of relevant contexts differ.

Emotional evaluations seem not to be repeatable in the strong Kantian sense of universalizability . Thus, because my beloved happens to be tall, blonde and attractive, I would not therefore consider it a universal law of my behavior to fall in love with every tall, blonde and attractive woman I happen to meet. For it is in the very nature of romantic love not to be repeated by being directed at everyone. One can argue that from a strictly logical point of view, emotional evaluations are also general in some manner of universalizability. Thus, if in a particular case something has a certain emotional value, this and other similar things would have the same emotional value in similar cases. This may be true in the trivial sense that two identical situations are identical in their emotional aspects as well. However, since emotional evaluations are very sensitive to contextual attributes, there are many attributes whose presence makes two situations dissimilar from an emotional viewpoint. Accordingly, even if the universalizability principle is adequate, it has little significance for the emotional domain. Consider

See, e.g., N. H. Frijda, The Emotions (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1986), chap. 5.


again the case of the blonde woman. If indeed the present circumstances were similar (in the relevant respects) to those prevailing at the time I met this woman, I may indeed fall in love with every similar woman I meet. But the circumstances are not similar (in the relevant respects) because my own situation has changed; for example, I am in love now, and I have an intimate history (which was absent befsre) with a particular woman.

Moral evaluations are then more general - in this sense of relevancy - than emotional evaluations: they entail considerations beyond the particular case to a greater extent, and they are less sensitive to contextual attributes.

Equality Generality with regard to equality refers to the status of the evaluated object and is concerned with whether the status of this object (or at least some of its relevant attributes) are similar to that of other objects. Are moral evaluations general in this egalitarian sense? One may argue that the answer to this question depends upon the kind of moral theory one adheres to and not upon the nature of the moral evaluations themselves. It is true that in some moral theories the egalitarian element is very important whereas in others it seems to be of little significance. My claim, however, is that even the latter theories presuppose some kind of a (limited) egalitarian principle. Although moral norms may differ in various societies, the very fact that morality deals with activity toward other creatures suggests that these creatures have certain moral rights. The very notion of morality implies concern for others. Hence, the importance of reciprocity in moral evaluations. Each society may ascribe different rights to different creatures, but some basic rights are common to all creatures that constitute moral objects. In this sense moral evaluations presuppose some egalitarian principle. It is hard to imagine a moral framework that accords no moral rights to any creatures except a simple subject. Even extreme opinion - like ethical egoism - needs to assume the existence of contracts presupposing some (though very limited) egalitarian principles that refer to all people embraced by the contract.

Emotional evaluations are basically discriminative and non-egalitarian. The intensity of emotional attitudes is achieved by their focus upon a very limited group of objects. Thus, one cannot love everyone; romantic love is directed at very few people. Since love, like other emotions, necessitates limiting parameters such as time and attention, its objects must be limited as well. The particular object of love has emotional value no other object has (or at least not all objects have).

Even if one concedes that the egalitarian status of moral objects is disputable, the difference between the moral and the emotional


domains is in this connection still obvious: whereas in the moral domain an egalitarian principle makes sense but is disputable, in the emotional domain it hardly makes sense, and hence there is no room for a general theory of egalitarian emotions. It is hard to conceive of a theory of emotions in which all objects have equal status.

Some theories describe various general and egalitarian attitudes as emotions. For example, there is a moral norm recommending loving everyone. This type of moral, idealized love is egalitarian. It should take place without any particular reason beside the trivial fact that the object is a human being (or even merely a living creature). This is indiscriminate love for humanity: all human beings deserve to be loved. It is clear that such a general attitude of love is far from being a typical emotional attitude. It demands a recommended moral rather than a particular emotional evaluation. This type of egalitarian love is significantly different from romantic love whose nature is discriminative. We are even frequently told that romantic love should be mainly based upon the unique intimate history the lovers have shared, and not upon general and repeatable characteristics of the object (such as beauty and intelligence). Whereas romantic love often ignores repeatable characteristics because they are too general (compared with the particular shared history), moral love is supposed to ignore them because they are too particular (compared with the general nature of human beings). This gives some indication of the significant disparity between the two attitudes. Moral love is not an emotion but a general moral attitude. Here, as in other cases, when the emotional attitude becomes quite general it turns into a moral attitude. (It should be admitted that romantic love does take account of the mate’s general characteristics - otherwise, there would be no divorces; but it is far from being an egalitarian attitude .)

Inclusion

This type of generality refers to the relation between a particular evaluation and a more comprehensive set of evaluations. It is concerned with whether the particular evaluation is compatible with the general framework. In this connection we should distinguish between what may be termed psychological as against normative inclusion. The psychological sense refers to whether the agent, when making the actual evaluation, first considers a general principle and then deduces the particular evaluation. Normative inclusion refers to whether a particular evaluation should be compatible with a general normative framework in order to rate as a certain type of evaluation. 1 will argue that although it is disputable whether moral and emotional evaluations are general in the psychological sense, it is obvious that only moral evaluations are general in the normative sense.


Concerning the psychological sense of inclusion, we should make a distinction (following Wittgenstein) between rule-following and rule- discribed behavior. That is, we should distinguish between behavior that follows rules and behavior that merely satisfies rules. I n other words, the difference is between being guided by a known rule and simply being in accordance with a rule, or between intentional rule-following and non-intentional forms of mere lawful connection. The phenomenon of understanding, so typical of intelligent behavior, may be entirely absent when one merely behaves in accordance with rules. Relevant to this idea is Kant’s distinction between doing what reason dictates because reason dictates it (acting on a given rule), and merely doing what reason dictates (acting in accord with a given rule). This is the difference between having the power to be affected by reason, and just happening to do the reasonable deed. Only in the first case does the agent appreciate the relevant data and order before rationally deciding to act accordingly.

It is quite clear that the agent’s behavior in making emotional evaluations is not rule-following behavior. When one falls in love, or becomes angry, one does not deduce the evaluation from a general principle since (among other things) in most cases one cannot even describe such a relevant principle. Typical emotional evaluations are not deliberative. Deliberative evaluations involve conscious rational processes, whereas non-deliberative evaluations are spontaneous responses depending on a more elementary evaluative system. The two types may clash. Thus, we sometimes persist in being afraid when our conscious and deliberate judgment reveals that we are in no peril. We may explain such cases by assuming that certain non-deliberative evaluations become habitual to a degree where no deliberative evaluation can change them. This corresponds to situations in which deliberative thinking, or knowledge acquired by such thinking, fails to influence illusory perceptual content. Spontaneous evaluations are either the result of evolution (in which case they are innate) or the result of personal development. In both cases they reflect certain structures of our personality. They are ready-made mechanisms of appraisal. The evolutionary emergence of many spontaneous evaluations would indicate that they have a positive survival value as exigency evaluations of uncommon situations. Deliberative evaluations are more recent on the evolutionary tree: they entail conscious deliberation, characteristics only of human beings. The spontaneous nature of emotional evaluations does not imply that deliberative thinking has no role in the emergence of emotions. We may think about death and become frightened; or we may think about our mate and become jealous. Similarly, we may decide not to curb our anger but rather to intensify it. In such cases deliberative thinking brings us closer to the conditions under which evaluative

See A. Ben-Ze’ev, The Perceptual System, Peter Lang. 1993.


patterns are spontaneously activated. Deliberative thinking may be the immediate cause for the activation of an evaluative pattern, but the emotional evaluation itself remains in most cases non-deliberative.

The nature of moral evaluations is less clear in this respect. It is not obvious whether moral evaluations are essentially deliberative (or involving rule-following behavior) or spontaneous (or merely involving rule-described behavior). Some argue that in this respect moral evaluations are usually similar to emotional evaluations. Thus, when we see an adult severely beating a small child we immediately think that this is unjust; we need no rational calculation to reach this conclusion. Similarly, it has been claimed that a virtuous person does in general not engage in balancing reasons for and against each action he or she wishes to take.5 I am inclined to accept this view as reflecting typical moral cases. There are, however, cases in which the agent is actually referring to general moral principles in order to morally evaluate given situations. Such cases consist of complex moral situations or novel situations concerning which no stable moral codes have been established. Moreover, there are situations in which morality requires us to give up the spontaneous emotional evaluation in favor of a more deliberative and calculated evaluation. Thus, sexual attraction to a person married to someone else is often condemned on a moral basis and we are required to replace it by a more deliberative evaluation. No doubt, if there is some use of deliberate calculations and general principles in the emotional realm, it is rarer.

The difference between moral and emotional evaluations is more evident with regard to the normative sense of inclusion. A distinction between moral and immoral evaluations can be made; there is no similar distinction in the emotional domain. There are moral, immoral and non- moral evaluations: there are, however, only emotional and non- emotional evaluations. There is no emotional category corresponding to that of immoral evaluations. Not every evaluation concerning moral issues is a moral evaluation; some are immoral evaluations. Praising torture of a baby for the fun of it pertains to the moral realm, but in the light of most moral theories it involves an immoral evaluation. Being glad about such a murder involves an emotional evaluation. There is no emotional norm that requires us to be sad about every unjustified murder, but there is a moral norm requiring us to morally condemn each unjustified murder (and not to enjoy such occurrences). Similarly, being angry with one’s spouse while knowing that the anger stems from having been insulted by one’s boss is unjustified but nevertheless real anger. Although we may criticize emotional attitudes, in doing so we do not deny their reality as emotions. When we morally criticize a certain behavior, we deny its moral status. There are many moral “ought to’s” but very few emotional “ought to’s.’’ Nevertheless, it is less strange to

J. McDowell, “Virtue and Reason,” Monist, 62 (1979), 331-350.


say that an emotion ought to emerge in certain circumstances than to say that an event ought to occur in certain circumstances. This suggests that we have some normative responsibilities for our emotions. However, this normative aspect is less pronounced in the emotional than in the moral domain.

Concerning emotional evaluations, the attitude of “I can’t help it” is both common and acceptable. Regarding moral evaluations (in contrast to moral behavior which will be discussed below) such an attitude is neither common nor acceptable. The normative aspect of moral evaluation is also shown by the fact that when I am convinced that my moral evaluation is wrong, it will have to be changed. In the emotional domain this does not have to be the case. Thus, moral evaluations have a general normative aspect which is largely absent from emotional evaluations.

Impartiality

The principle of impartiality examines whether the particular relation between agent and object of the evaluation should play any role in forming the agent’s evaluation. Denying such a role constitutes generality with regard to impartiality. The principle of impartiality may be formulated as a normative requirement of our evaluations: The proximity (or affinity) of the subject to a certain person should play no role when the subject comes to evaluate the activity of that person. Formulated this way, the principle of impartiality seems to be adequate from a moral point of view: my proximity to, or historical association with a criminal should not change my negative moral evaluation of this person’s activity. The issue of the subject’s future behavior toward this person (to be discussed below) is separate from the issue of the subject’s moral evaluations of this person’s behavior discussed here. Consider the following example. A crime is committed by two people whose background and current situation are identical except for the fact that one of them is my friend. Although my behavior toward the two may be different, my moral evaluation of their crime should be similar. My evaluation may be somewhat different if the crime is committed against myself (for instance, stealing from my house). Here the moral evaluation will still be negative in both cases, but it may be even more severe in the case of my friend. The reason is not that the principle of impartiality is being violated, but that here we are dealing with two different crimes. The crime of my friend involves not merely stealing but betraying my trust as well.

The principle of impartiality is not applicable in emotional evaluations since emotions presuppose a certain proximity between subject and emotional object. Not everyone and not everything is of emotional significance for us. Emotions are of discriminative and partial nature.


This partiality is compatible with the great subject-object proximity typical of emotions. When we look at someone from a short distance our vision of this person is often distorted. In the extreme case that there is no distance at all, namely, when one places the object upon the eye itself, one does not see the object at all. We need some distance in order to achieve a perspective which encompasses multiple aspects of the object and thereby makes the perspective less fragmentary. But keeping one’s distance is contrary to the very nature of the involved and intimate perspective typical of emotions. The partiality of emotions is clearly demonstrated by theirvarious intentional components, namely, cognitive, evaluation and motivation. The cognitive field of emotions does not involve varied and broad pespectives of our surroundings but a narrow and fragmentary perspective focussed upon the emotional object and the subject-object relation. Thus, love limits the subject’s range of interest, focusing almost exclusively on the beloved and the beloved’s relationship with the subject. Similarly, the cognitive field of the envious person is limited to some (often petty) aspects of the envied person and to the subject’s own inferiority. The evaluative field of emotions is narrow owing to its highly polarized nature. In comparison with other people, the emotional object is often characterized as either highly positive or highly negative. The motivational field is narrow in the sense that the desired activity is often clearly preferred to any alternative. Even in emotions (such as love) where the range of activities toward or with the emotional object is wide, these are clearly preferred to other activities unrelated to the object; the latter are hardly considered at all. Partiality is not an accidental feature of emotions but an essential one. Partiality is typical of all emotions, though varying in degree. It is more evident in negative emotions, where the immediate situation is of great concern to the subject. In positive emotions, where the subject worries less about the immediate situation, there is greater openness.

Emotions then presuppose a certain subject-object proximity. We cannot assume an emotional attitude toward someone completely unrelated to us. Thus, when we hear of the death of thousands of people in an earthquake occurring in a remote (that is, from our vantage point) part of the world, our emotional response comes nowhere near the intensity of our grief at the death of someone close to us, nor does it approach the level of feeling we experience in watching the death throes of a single victim of that same earthquake on television (thereby establishing some affinity with this particular victim). This example elucidates the discriminative nature of emotional evaluations.6

Adhering to the principle of impartiality may be psychologically See also A. Ben-Ze’ev, “Why did Psammenitus not Pity his Son? Analysis, 50 (1990),

118-126); A. Ben-Ze’ev, “Envy and Jealousy,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 20 (1990), 487-516.


difficult, but it is essential for moral evaluations. This is why an affinity between a defendant and a judge is a good reason for changing the judge. The factor of “for old times’ sake” is morally irrelevant, but it carries emotional relevance. A partisan evaluation made by a judge is not a moral evaluation - it is immoral - but it can be an emotional evaluation. Whereas moral evaluations are made by an impartial agent, emotional evaluations are made by a partial one.

The claim that typical emotional evaluations are essentially partial does not imply that they are arbitrary. If emotions can be rationally criticized or justified, they cannot be completedly arbitrary. As suggested earlier, we do indeed justify or criticize some of our emotions.

The principle of impartiality can also be formulated as a normative requirement of our behavior: The proximity of the subject to a certain person should play no role in the agent’s behavior toward the person. It is clear that this formulation does not apply to emotional attitudes - since it entails a stronger requirement than that which merely concerns our evaluations (and even the latter is not applicable to emotions). I believe that, by and large, this formulation is inapplicable to moral behavior either. It is not feasible to require a completely equal distribution of one’s limited resources. Thus, I devote more resources to my son than to other children without necessarily assuming that he is in greater need than they. Nor does this formulation have any moral justification. Moral behavior presupposes that agents have moral responsibility toward each other. But one cannot be responsible for everyone. Responsibility requires resources, and if one’s limited resources are equally divided among all people, there is no room for genuine responsibility. Like other kinds of responsibility, moral responsibility is limited by its nature. Like emotional attitudes, but unlike moral evaluations, moral behavior needs resources and cannot be impartial.

The alternatives we face are not whether to be responsible for all people (not to mention other creatures) or merely for some people, but rather whether to be responsible for some people or for none. Our moral responsibility is usually greater toward those close to us: for example, our children, spouse, parents. This does not mean that if we see strangers in danger we should not try to save them. But our everyday moral responsibilities are in general limited to a few people. In the case of people who perform a certain public duty - a judge, a policeman, a building inspector, a tax collector, and the like - the behavioral formulation is adequate while they are on duty. Some people may still consider this formulation - or some modified version of it - as a kind of ideal we should aspire to. Thus, we should try to enlarge the group of people for whom we are responsible. I have no objection to such an ideal.

We see that being morally just is not identical with being impartial.

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Moral behavior sometimes requires partiality. This is one indication of the importance emotions have in the moral domain.

General discussion Both moral and emotional attitudes entail evaluations. The typical moral evaluation is general in the sense of being relevant to other cases, egalitarian (to a certain extent), inclusive (in the normative sense), and impartial. The typical emotional evaluation is not as general (on all counts) as moral evaluations. There are, however, different degrees of generality within emotions themselves. Thus, compassion, envy, hate and love are respectively more general (in most senses) than pity, jealousy, anger and sexual attraction. The more general nature of compassion (in the sense of equality) makes it more similar to a moral attitude than pity.

The more general nature of moral evaluations can be illustrated by the following example. Susan’s father is in a coma and Susan’s husband Tom assumes the moral responsibility of taking care of his needs. Now suppose that a replica of Tom is being made. The replica is identical with Tom in all respects except Tom’s causal history. Should Susan let the Tom-replica make love to her (if Tom is away for a week)? Should Susan let the Tom-replica take moral responsibility for her father (if Tom is away for a week)? It would appear that because of the difference in generality between moral and emotional evaluations the answer is not identical for the two cases. As long as the replica’s moral stance is indistinguishable from Tom’s, Susan (as well as Tom) should be indifferent regarding who takes care of her father. Susan’s emotional stance toward the Tom-replica is not necessarily identical to her stance toward Tom. Here the particular features associated only with Tom (e.g. their shared history) may make a difference. Thus, in many cases Tom would reject the idea that his replica be allowed to make love to his wife, or at least Tom would be jealous in this case - and Susan may respect this negative attitude. Such a negative attitude is absent in the case of whether the replica may take care of Susan’s father. Since emotional attitudes are discriminative in their nature, the shared history (and other particular features) may be the basis for such discrimination. The need for a certain discrimination is implied in the partial nature of emotional evaluations, but the basis upon which the discrimination is made is often bound up with moral principles such as loyalty.

To be sure, I am not saying that Susan should not, or would not, make love to the Tom-replica. I am merely claiming that the group including objects of romantic love - like those of other emotions -is limited. The group often contains only one object; in other cases it is somewhat larger. A choice, however, must be made. If Susan believes that this group should consist of only one object, she will probably choose to


remain with Tom and reject his replica. This choice is often based upon the conviction that it is morally good to be loyal (at least up to a certain degree) to those who are close to us and with whom we have a shared history.

If moral or emotional evaluations are general in any of the above senses, we can assess their consistency. Moral evaluations can be consistent in all four aspects; emotional evaluations can be consistent only in some of them. Although we may speak of consistent emotional evaluations, it is more natural to speak of consistent moral evaluations. In the moral domain the consistency requirement mainly refers to evaluations of different objects, whereas in the emotional domain it often refers to different evaluations of the same person. In the emotional domain, consistency is basically limited to one particular case. Moral consistency can refer to either simultaneous or successive evaluations.

After comparing emotional and moral evaluations, I briefly discuss some implications of this comparison for the philosophical dispute concerning moral universalism and particularism and more generally, for the dispute concerning the nature of moral behavior.

In light of the foregoing comparison, extreme moral particularism, denying the existence of general moral evaluations, is an inadequate position. This is so for the simple reason that moral evaluations are more general than emotional evaluations. I also believe that extreme emotional particularism, denying the existence of general emotional evaluations altogether cannot be entirely adequate - though it is closer to the truth than extreme moral particularism. We have seen that there are various types and degrees of generality among emotional evaluations. Furthermore, it is clear that extreme moral universalism, which assumes that morality consists but of the applications of general principles, is inadequate. Although moral evaluations are more closely bound up with general principles than emotional evaluations, they are not insensitive to particularist, contextual considerations.

What are the implications of the comparison between emotional and moral evaluations for the, nature of moral behavior? The two types of evaluation may be related to two basic types of behavior: that toward our intimates and that toward strangers. Whereas the latter type is based upon general principles, the former allows for more particular attitudes typical of the emotional domain. Toulmin argues that in dealing with our families, intimates, and immediate neighbors or associates, “we both expect to - and are expected to - make allowances for their individual personalities and tastes, and we do our best to time our actions according to our perception of their current moods and plans.” In dealing with complete strangers, “our moral obligations are limited and chiefly negative - for example, to avoid acting offensively or violently.” In the ethics of strangers, Toulmin claims, respect for rules


and absolute impartiality may be a prime moral demand; but among intimates the relevance of strict rules is minimal and “a certain discreet partiality is, surely, only equitable, and certainly not unethical.” We need to recognize, Toulmin says, that “a morality based entirely on general rules and principles is tyrannical and disproportioned, and that only those who make equitable allowances for subtle individual differences have a proper feeling for the deeper demands of ethi~s.’’~ Similarly, Railton argues that being moral is not necessarily being alienated. Abiding by morality, he claims, need not alienate us from the particular commitments that make life worthwhile.’ The care morality suggested by Gilligan and others attempts to incorporate personal concerns typical of the emotional domain into the general moral domain. In this approach, the particularized self has no lesser moral significance than the abstract general self assumed by various impartialist approaches to morality. Sensitivity to particulars, care and concern for individual persons are as central to morality as general principles. This view attempts to integrate particularistic emotional attitudes into the moral domain.’

It should be emphasized that we are dealing here with two paradigmatic cases and not with two clear-cut categories. This is compatible with the existence of a continuum of evaluations; these evaluations range from very particularistic emotional evaluations to universalistic moral evaluations with multiple emotional and moral evaluations with different degrees of generality in between. The absence of a clear-cut borderline does not diminish the importance of the distinction between these two categories.

The difference between emotional and moral attitudes does not imply that they are contradictory: I can have close emotional ties with my intimates and still exhibit moral behavior toward strangers. I would not say that one cannot think of cases in which the two attitudes clash, but the conflict is not inherently unresolvable. The various types of loyalty (to one’s family, friends, group, nation, and so on) usually involve some conflict between the partial emotional attitude and the more general and impartial moral attitude. Thus, patriotism involves a partial preference for the well-being of one’s country which seems to be in conflict with a more universal concern for the well-being of all (human) beings. Nathanson persuasively shows that there is a morally acceptable form of patriotism in the same way as there is a morally acceptable form

’ S . Toulmin, “The Tyranny of Principles,” The Hastings Center Report (December 1981), pp. 35, 38.

P. Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality,” Philosophy & Public Affairs, 13 (1984), 134171.

See, e.g., L. A. Blum, “Gilligan and Kohlberg: Implications for Moral Theory,” Ethics, 98 (1988), 472-91; R. S. Dillon, “Care and Respect,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 22, (1992), 105-132; C. Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Cambridge: Harvard, 1982).


of love or family loyalty. We really do (and should) care more about those “near and dear” than about strangers. But this should not be an exclusive concern that violates the rights of strangers. Similarly, Nathanson argues, one’s partial attitude toward one’s nation is morally recommended as long as it is curbed by other moral principles.” Likewise, Railton argues that one’s love should not be “a romantic submersion in the other to the exclusion of worldly responsibilities.”’ ’ Particularistic commitments should also have general perspectives.

We may conclude that partial emotional attitudes and more general and impartial moral attitudes represent complementary perspectives for the evaluation of various human beings and their activities. A healthy human society needs all these perspectives. Utilizing such different perspectives is not only natural but morally recommendable as well.

University of Haifa Haifa 31 905, Israel

S. Nathanson, “In Defense of ‘Moderate Patriotism’,’’ Ethics, 99 (1989), 535-552. ” Railton, “Alienation, Consequentialism and the Demands of Morality,” p. 151.

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Emotional and moral evaluations

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