Executing the Innocent and Support for Capital Punishment: Implications for Public Policy

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EXECUTING THE INNOCENT AND SUPPORTFOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT:IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY

JAMES D. UNNEVERRadford University

FRANCIS T. CULLENUniversity of Cincinnati

Research Summary:The issue of whether innocent people have been executed is now at

the center of the debate concerning the legitimacy of capital punish-ment. The purpose of this research was to use data collected by theGallup Organization in 2003 to investigate whether Americans whobelieved that an innocent person had been executed were less likely tosupport capital punishment. We also explored whether the associationvaried by race, given that African Americans are disproportionatelyaffected by the death penalty. Our results indicated that three-quartersof Americans believed that an innocent person had been executed for acrime they did not commit within the last five years and that this beliefwas associated with lower levels of support for capital punishment,especially among those who thought this sanction was applied unfairly.In addition, our analyses revealed that believing an innocent personhad been executed had a stronger association with altering AfricanAmerican than white support for the death penalty.

Policy Implications:A key claim of death penalty advocates is that a high proportion of

the public supports capital punishment. In this context, scholars oppos-ing this sanction have understood the importance of showing that thepublic’s support for executing offenders is contingent and shallowerthan portrayed by typical opinion polls. The current research joins thiseffort by arguing that the prospect of executing innocents potentiallyimpacts public support for the death penalty and, in the least, createsideological space for a reconsideration of the legitimacy of capitalpunishment.

KEYWORDS: Capital Punishment, Death Penalty, Public Opinion, Inno-cence, Race Punishment.

Acknowledgments: We thank the anonymous reviewers and Lydia Saad of the GallupOrganization for their insights on an earlier draft.

VOLUME 4 NUMBER 1 2005 PP 3–38 R


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As has the been the case for over three decades, a recent Gallup Pollindicates that a strong majority of Americans (66%) endorse the deathpenalty (Jones, 2000). This seeming enduring reality has provided a con-text that is favorable to the retention and use of capital punishment in theUnited States. Although the actual dynamics of crime-related policymak-ing are complex (see, e.g., Becker, 1997; Beckett and Sasson, 2000), legis-lators have argued that they have a public mandate to enact capitalpunishment legislation—that the death penalty is a case of “democracy atwork” (Scheingold, 1984). United States Supreme Court Justices havealso noted the results of public opinion polls in their rulings (e.g., Furmanv. Georgia, Atkins v. Virginia). Polling data may, therefore, be central tothe argument that the death penalty is constitutional based on a “norma-tive standards” argument under the Eighth Amendment of the UnitedStates Constitution (Bohm et al., 1991; Boots et al., 2003; Bowers, 1993;Scheingold, 1984; Young, 1992). In turn, it is possible that a markedchange in public opinion could alter the Court’s position on the constitu-tionality of capital punishment (Wright et al., 1995; Zeisel and Gallup,1989). In short, public sentiments toward capital punishment have playeda role in legitimating both continuing legislative support for death penaltystatutes and the Supreme Court’s embrace of the constitutionality of capi-tal punishment (Bohm et al., 1991; Bowers, 1993; Bowers et al., 1997; Nor-rander, 2000; Sims and Johnston, 2004; Zeisel and Gallup, 1989).

However, the real possibility exists that public support for the deathpenalty could be moderated if people came to believe—or were per-suaded—that innocent people have been executed. This possibility takeson significance in light of revelations that demonstrably innocent offend-ers have been released regularly from death row. According to the DeathPenalty Information Center (2004), “since 1973, 115 people in 25 stateshave been released from death row with evidence of their innocence.”The rate of such releases also is rising: from a yearly average of 3.08 exon-erations from 1973 to 1998 to a yearly average of 7.00 exonerations since1998 (Death Penalty Information Center, 2004). Further, Radelet andBedau (1998) have published accounts of more than 400 cases in whichpersons were wrongfully convicted in capital cases (or potentially capitalcases). Barlow (1999) argues that the number of death row inmatesreleased from prison is equal to nearly 15% of those actually executed.Notably, nearly half (46%) of the individuals who were exonerated since1973 have been African Americans (Dieter, 1997).

The possibility that innocent people have been and may be put to deathhas resulted in a national movement spearheaded by the American BarAssociation for states to pass legislation placing a moratorium on execu-tions. According to Equal Justice USA (2004), half of the states that


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authorize capital punishment have considered legislation calling for a mor-atorium on executions; “48 cities, towns, and counties nationwide havepassed resolutions calling for a temporary halt to executions”; and as ofAugust, 2004, 3,500 groups have called for a moratorium on executions.This movement gained particular notoriety in Illinois when the state’s(now former) Governor, George Ryan, called for a moratorium on execu-tions. Governor Ryan’s action was prompted by the disclosure that “13 ofthe 25 inmates sent to death row between 1977 and 2000 were subse-quently exonerated” (Young, 2004:152).

The issue of whether innocent people have been executed is now at thecenter of the debate concerning the legitimacy of capital punishment. Thepurpose of this research is to use data collected by the Gallup Organiza-tion in 2003 to investigate whether Americans who believe that an inno-cent person has been executed are less likely to support capitalpunishment. We also explore whether this relationship varies by race,given that African Americans are disproportionately affected by the deathpenalty. Finally, this investigation has the potential to generate resultswith meaningful policy implications. In particular, it sheds light onwhether the issue of innocence is likely to be a profitable argument thatopponents of capital punishment might choose to use in their efforts toreshape public opinion on this enduring policy debate.

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY ANDTHE EXECUTION OF THE INNOCENT

Discretion is an inherent part of the criminal justice system. Criminaljustice professionals from police officers to sentencing judges can wiselyexercise their discretion and at the same time treat like cases similarly.Discretion does not undermine the legitimacy of the criminal justice sys-tem—that is, equality under the law. However, arbitrariness—uncon-strained discretion—can undermine the legitimacy of the rule of law(Carter and Beth, 1978). The arbitrary application of the rule of lawbecomes particularly disquieting when innocent people are punished andwhen specific groups are discriminated against (Nathanson, 1985).Clearly, the legitimacy of the legal order becomes tenuous when it is per-ceived to be discriminatory in its application, particularly among thosewho believe they have been unfairly targeted.

The death penalty is the ultimate punishment used by the criminal jus-tice system of the United States. The death penalty is also its most defini-tive punishment because there is no remedy for executing innocentindividuals. The legitimacy of the death penalty has long been tied to theissues of whether it is applied arbitrarily and capriciously and whetherinnocent people have been executed. Indeed, the Supreme Court in 1972


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struck down existing death penalty statues (Furman v. Georgia) because itdeclared that the death penalty was too arbitrary to be constitutionallyacceptable as it was being administered (Bowers, 1993).

Since 1972, 38 states have revised their death penalty statutes in aneffort to eliminate arbitrariness. As a result, at year-end 2002, 37 statesand the Federal prison system held 3,557 prisoners under sentence ofdeath (Bonczar and Snell, 2003). However, despite the tremendous effortindividual states have made to eliminate arbitrariness and the ultimateconsequence for failing to do so—the execution of innocent inmates—there are almost weekly revelations that another death row inmate hasbeen exonerated. The specter of failing to eliminate arbitrariness in theapplication of the death penalty and killing an innocent person has had itstoll on those closest to making life or death decisions—Supreme CourtJustices. In 1994, Supreme Court Justice Blackmun stated in a dissentingopinion (Callins v. Collins 511 US 127, 114 S. Ct 1127 1994):

Twenty years have passed since this Court declared that the deathpenalty must be imposed fairly, and with reasonable consistency, ornot at all, see Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), and, despitethe effort of the States and courts to devise legal formulas and proce-dural rules to meet this daunting challenge, the death penalty remainsfraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice, and mistake . . .From this day forward, I will no longer tinker with the machinery ofdeath. For more than 20 years I have endeavored—indeed, I havestruggled—along with a majority of this Court, to develop proceduraland substantive rules that would lend more than mere appearance offairness to the death penalty endeavor. Rather than continue to cod-dle the Court’s delusion that the desired level of fairness has beenachieved and the need for regulation eviscerated, I feel morally andintellectually obligated simply to concede that the death penaltyexperiment has failed.

Despite Justice Blackmun’s pained declaration, the majority of the pub-lic supports capital punishment for convicted murderers (Ellsworth andGross, 1994). However, this statement needs to be qualified. Polls showthat public support for the death penalty has recently waned. Data fromthe General Social Survey (GSS) reveal that support for the death penaltydiminished from 1990 (74.2%) to 2000 (62.6%)—a decline of 11.6 percent-age points.1 It is possible that this decrease resulted from highly publi-cized cases of innocent death row inmates being exonerated, the American

1. Notably, the most recent Gallup polls indicate that general support for capitalpunishment has increased since 2000. According to the Gallup polls, in May 2003, 74%of Americans were in favor of the death penalty for a person convicted of murder. Thispercent is the highest support level Gallup has obtained on this measure since 80%



Bar Association’s moratorium movement, and the publicity generatedfrom Governor Ryan’s moratorium in Illinois. Indeed, recent Gallup datasuggest that this might be the case. According to Gallup polls, a growingproportion of opponents raise the issue of incorrect convictions: 25% in2003 compared with 11% in 1991 (Jones, 2003).

This recent convergence of disclosures of innocent defendants releasedfrom death row with declining support for capital punishment is, in theleast, suggestive that beliefs about innocent offenders being executedmight be implicated in public views on the death penalty. Surveys furtherreveal that “innocents being executed” is given by the public as a consider-ation that would make them more likely to oppose the death penalty orfavor its suspension (Doble Research Associates, Inc., 2004; Longmire,1996). In addition, recent research indicates that among whites, supportfor the death penalty was associated with a preference for convicting aninnocent person over letting a guilty person go free (Young, 2004). Takentogether, these disparate findings point to the need for further researchthat carefully explores—using national data and multivariate models thatincorporate the known predictors of death penalty attitudes—this possibil-ity that public support for capital punishment may be attenuated by thebelief that innocent people have been executed. As noted, the currentproject attempts to advance the extant research by undertaking such aninvestigation.

In so doing, we further endeavor to build on the extant literature byinvestigating this innocence thesis in the context of the “racial divide” insupport for the death penalty. The generic statement—which is oftenvoiced in public and scholarly discussions on capital punishment (includingours)—that the majority of “the public” supports the death penalty mustbe qualified: Research indicates that although the majority of whites sup-port the death penalty, the majority of African Americans oppose it(Bobo and Johnson, 2004; Roberts and Stalans, 1997; Unnever and Cullen,2004). Recent studies also show that many social forces that should bridgethe racial divide in support for the death penalty—including political ori-entation, being a native southerner, belonging to a fundamentalist denom-ination, and confidence in the federal government—fail to do so (Unneverand Cullen, 2004). Indeed, some of these social forces exacerbate theracial divide. For example, Unnever and Cullen (2004) show that beingfrom the South decreases African American support and increases whitesupport for the death penalty.

It is possible that the racial divide in support for the death penalty is, in

reported that they favor capital punishment in 1994; the lowest was 42% in 1966. Jones(2003) speculates that this upward trend could be related to the death penalty not beingas prominent of an issue in the news as it was during the year 2000.


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the last analysis, a result of how African Americans and whites perceive itsapplication. The racial divide may exist because African Americans aremuch more likely to believe that innocent people have been executed andthat the death penalty is capricious, arbitrary, and unfair. Certainly, a pre-ponderance of evidence exists that, if taken at face value, indicates that theapplication of the death penalty manifests itself along racial lines. Forexample, African Americans are substantially overrepresented amongthose currently awaiting execution. At year-end 2002, nearly 44% of thoseunder a sentence of death were African American (Bonczar and Snell,2003). And, as we mentioned earlier, nearly half, 46%, of the individualswho were exonerated since 1973 are African Americans (Dieter, 1997).Perhaps even more poignant, the Supreme Court in McCleskey v. Kempassumed the validity of the research that systematically showed that therewere racial disparities in capital sentencing (Bowers, 1993).

Two critical questions need to be addressed regarding the racial dividein support for the death penalty. First, is it likely that the relationshipbetween race and support for capital punishment is mediated by theeffects of believing that innocent people have been executed and that theapplication of the death penalty is unfair? The second question is whetherthe association between race and support for capital punishment variesacross the belief that innocent people have been executed and whether theeffect of race on support for capital punishment varies across the beliefthat the death penalty is applied unfairly. Do African Americans andwhites equally weigh the possibility that innocent people have been exe-cuted and that the death penalty is applied unfairly when consideringwhether to support capital punishment? It is possible that white supportfor the death penalty may be minimally affected by believing an innocentperson has been executed, whereas African American support may hingeon their belief “that by the Grace of God” it “was not me” who waswrongly arrested, convicted, sentenced to die, and executed (see, however,Bobo and Johnson, 2004). The current research addresses these questions.

RESEARCH STRATEGY

Using 2003 Gallup poll data, we test whether people are less likely tosupport capital punishment if they believe that innocent people have beenexecuted. We also include as an independent variable of interest whetherrespondents believe that the death penalty is applied unfairly. To assessthese effects, we incorporate in the analysis controls for a range of factorsshown or hypothesized in the previous research to influence death penaltyattitudes. These covariates include age, sex, educational level, income,urbanicity, living in the South, membership in a Christian fundamentalistdenomination, belonging to the Catholic Church, religiosity, confidence in



the executive branch of the federal government, and political ideology.We also explore whether the effect of believing an innocent person hasbeen executed on support for capital punishment varies across whetherpeople perceive that the death penalty is applied unfairly. In addition, weinvestigate whether a racial divide exists in support for the death penalty.We examine whether the racial divide in support for the death penalty ismediated by believing innocent people have been executed and the deathpenalty is applied unfairly.

In our last analysis, we test whether the association between race andsupport for capital punishment varies across believing that innocent peo-ple have been executed and the perception that the death penalty isapplied unfairly. Testing for whether these interactions are significant willallow us to assess whether African Americans and whites equally take intoconsideration whether innocent people have been executed and whetherthe death penalty is applied unfairly when considering their support forcapital punishment.

THE CAUSALITY QUESTION

Although this research strategy has strengths (e.g., national data, con-trols that reduce the likelihood of a misspecified model), the analysis islimited by the use of cross-sectional data. As a result, we cannot establishdefinitively the causal ordering of the central variables (i.e., those whooppose capital punishment might rationalize this position by believing, expost facto, that innocent defendants are executed, rather than vice versa).Still, even if exploratory to a degree, the current project potentially makes,at minimum, a contribution in one of two ways. First, if no significantfindings are reported, then the thesis that a connection exists betweenbelief in innocence and support for the death penalty would be provision-ally falsified (as would a hypothesis that a reverse causal ordering occursbetween these two variables). Second, if a relationship is found to exist,then further research would be manifestly called for that, building on thecurrent project, probes the origins, nature, and policy implications of thelink between beliefs in innocents being executed and levels of support forcapital punishment.

METHODS

SAMPLE

The data analyzed were collected by the Gallup Organization. The Gal-lup Organization interviewed, by telephone, 1,005 adults (aged 18 yearsand over) in May 2003. The margin of sampling error was ±3 percentagepoints. We analyzed the weighted survey. Each respondent was assigned


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a weight so that the demographic characteristics of the total weighted sam-ple of the respondents matches the latest estimates of the demographiccharacteristics of the adult population available from the U.S. CensusBureau. The data were weighted to match the characteristics of the adultpopulation living in households with access to telephones. The standardGallup Poll matrix weighting design takes into account sex, age, level ofeducation, geographic region, and race of each respondent, as well as thenumber of telephone lines in the household. The characteristics of thesample are presented in Table 1.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Table 1 shows the coding of the variables included in this analysis. Thevariable names are in the first column, the coding categories are in thesecond, and the descriptive statistics are in the last columns.

Support for the death penalty. The respondents were asked whetherthey favor capital punishment or life imprisonment with absolutely no pos-sibility for parole for murderers. A dichotomous measure, Death Penalty(1 = favors the death penalty, 0 = life imprisonment without the possibilityof parole), was constructed. The respondents who reported that they“don’t know” were deleted. Fifty-four percent of the respondentsreported that they favor the use of the death penalty for persons convictedof murder rather than life imprisonment with no possibility of parole.

The Gallup Poll analyzed here also includes a measure of whether therespondents supported the death penalty, Capital Punishment (1 = sup-ports the death penalty, 0 = does not support the death penalty). How-ever, only a random half-sample of survey respondents (Form A—part ofa split ballot) was asked this version of the death penalty question. Havingboth questions included in the survey allowed us to test whether the effectof believing innocent people have been executed and the death penalty isapplied unfairly on support for the death penalty depends on how thedeath penalty question was worded. Too few African Americans (n = 39)were included in the split sample to reproduce the analyses we subse-quently present regarding the racial divide in support for capital punish-ment on the question that asked whether the death penalty was supported.

PERCEPTIONS OF JUSTICE

Innocent executed. We based our measure of whether the respondentsbelieved that innocent people have been executed, Innocent, on the ques-tion: “How often do you think that a person has been executed under thedeath penalty who was, in fact, innocent of the crime he or she wascharged with — do you think this has happened in the past five years, ornot?” Individuals who responded “yes, in the past five years” were coded



TABLE 1. CODING OF VARIABLES

StandardVariable Names Coding/Range Mean Deviation

Age In years (18–90) 47.85 16.73Male 0 = female 0.47 0.49

1 = maleEducation 2–8 (8 = college graduate) 6.59 6.59Income 1–8 (8 = more than $100K) 5.06 2.05Urban 0 = other 0.26 0.44

1 = urbanSoutherner 0 = other 0.33 0.47

1 = SouthernerFundamentalist 0 = other 0.06 0.25

1 = fundamentalistdenomination

Catholic 0 = other 0.24 0.421 = Catholic

Attend 1–5 (5 = never) 2.69 1.45Religiosity 1–3 (3 = not very important) 1.57 0.72Confidence in 0 = other 0.69 0.45Government 1 = approveLiberal 1−5 (5 = very liberal) 2.68 0.92African Americans 0 = white 0.09 0.29

1 = African AmericansApplied Unfairly 0 = other 0.36 0.48

1 = unfairlyInnocent Executed 0 = other 0.74 0.43

1 = yes, in the past five yearsDeath Penalty 0 = life imprisonment without 0.52 0.49

the possibility of parole1 = favors the death penalty

1, and others were coded 0. Seventy-four percent of the respondentsreported that they believed that an innocent person has been executedwithin the last five years.

Death penalty applied unfairly. We constructed our measure of whetherthe respondents perceived that the death penalty is applied unfairly,Unfairly, by using the question: “Generally speaking, do you believe thedeath penalty is applied fairly or unfairly in this country today?” Individu-als who responded “unfairly” were coded 1, and others were coded 0.


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Thirty-six percent of the respondents believed that the death penalty isapplied unfairly.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

We selected the following variables based on extant research. For thepurposes of this project, we primarily consider these measures as con-founding variables whose effects we need to control. For example, with-out controlling for political orientation, it could be argued that the reasonwhy African Americans are less likely to support capital punishment isbecause, in general, they have a more liberal outlook on social issues.

Race. We included a measure of the respondent’s race, African Ameri-can (1 = African American, 0 = whites). Respondents who were neitherAfrican American nor white were deleted. Race is one of the most consis-tent predictors of support for capital punishment (Unnever and Cullen,2004; Young, 1992).

Income. We used a single item to measure the respondent’s income,Income. Income was a summary scale ranging from 1 to 8, where the mini-mum category denotes an income of “less than $10K” and the maximumcategory denotes “more than $100K.” Some researchers have argued thatfamily income should be negatively related to support for the death pen-alty because low-income people have greater direct and indirect contactwith the costs of punitive sentences (Soss et al., 2002).

Urban location. The Gallup Poll indicated whether individuals residedin an urban area (1 = urban, 0 = other). Their measure of urban residencyis derived from the respondents’ telephone numbers, using Census esti-mates of population density according to telephone area codes/exchanges.Researchers have argued that residents in urban areas, particularly thoseliving in inner cites, should be less likely to support punitive crime controlpolicies such as the death penalty (Hagan and Albonetti, 1982; Sampsonand Bartusch, 1998).

Southerner. We created a variable, Southerner (1 = southerner,0 = other), that assessed whether the respondents resided in the Southwhen the interview was conducted.2 Past studies (e.g., Borg, 1997;Unnever and Cullen, 2004) have reported regional differences, with south-ern fundamentalists expressing higher levels of support for the death pen-alty and African Americans living in the South being less likely andsouthern whites more likely to support capital punishment.

Fundamentalists. We used the classification scheme developed by Smith(1990) denoting whether the respondents belonged to a fundamentalist

2. Southern states included Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas,and Virginia.



denomination to construct our measure, Fundamentalist (1 = fundamen-talist denomination, 0 = other).3 The association between being a Chris-tian fundamentalist and support for capital punishment has generatedmixed results. Some studies report that Christian fundamentalists aremore likely to support capital punishment (Grasmick and McGill, 1994;Young, 1992, 2000), whereas other research reports a null relationship(Applegate et al., 2000; Baumer et al., 2003; Sandys and McGarrell, 1997;Soss et al., 2003; Unnever and Cullen, 2005; Young and Thompson, 1995).

Catholic. We created a measure, Catholic, indicating that the respon-dent reported that their religion was Catholic (1 = Catholic, 0 = other).Soss et al. (2003) found that white Catholics were less likely to supportcapital punishment.

Church attendance. Our measure of church or synagogue attendancewas based on the following question. “How often do you attend church orsynagogue?” The response categories ranged from (1) “at least once aweek” to (5) “never.” Church attendance, along with race, has been foundto be one of the more robust predictors of support for capital punishment,with individuals who often attend religious services being less likely tosupport the death penalty (Unnever and Cullen, 2005).

Religiosity. We used the following question to construct our measure ofreligiosity, Religiosity: “How important would you say religion is in yourown life—very important, fairly important, or not very important?”Higher values on Religiosity indicate that religion was less important. Theeffect of religiosity on support for the death penalty has generated incon-sistent results, with some research reporting that it negatively predicts sup-port (Grasmick and McGill, 1994; Unnever and Cullen, 2005) and otherresearch reporting a null effect (Britt, 1998; Sandys and McGarrell, 1997).

Confidence in government officials. We used a single item to measurethe respondent’s level of confidence in government officials. Our mea-sure, Confidence in Government, was based on the response to a questionregarding the executive branch of the federal government. “Do youapprove or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling his job asPresident?” Individuals who responded “approve” were coded 1, andothers were coded 0. Researchers have argued that support for the deathpenalty is most likely found among Americans who trust the federal andstate governments (Soss et al., 2003; Zimring, 2003).

Political orientation. We use a single item, similar to one extensivelyused in prior death penalty research, to measure political ideology, Liberal(scale of 1 to 5, with the maximum category denoting “very liberal”

3. Denominations assigned to the fundamentalist category were Southern Bap-tist, Pentecostal Church, Church of the Nazarene, Assembly of God, Church of Christ,and other fundamentalist/charismatic denominations.


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respondents). The extant research on support for capital punishment hasconsistently found that individuals who hold conservative political viewsare more likely to endorse capital punishment (Applegate et al., 2000;Borg, 1997; Nice, 1992; Stack, 2000, 2003; Unnever and Cullen, 2004;Young, 1992, 2004). Notably, political conservatives are more likely tosupport the use of the death penalty for both adults and juveniles (Moonet al., 2000; Vogel and Vogel, 2003). Our measure was constructed usingthe question: “How would you describe your political views?”

Gender. We include gender (Gender, 1 = male, 0 = female) becauseprior research has indicated that males are more likely to support punitivecrime control policies (Applegate et al., 2000; Soss et al., 2003; Stack,2000). It is noteworthy that Stack (2000) tested for gender interactionsand reported that men and women did not significantly differ in their rea-sons for supporting the death penalty.

Age. We control for Age (measured in years) because it has beenhypothesized to positively predict support for capital punishment (Stack,2000).

Education. Education is included because it has been shown to nega-tively predict support for capital punishment (Britt, 1998; Grasmick andMcGill, 1994; Halim and Stiles, 2001; Payne et al., 2004; Sandys andMcGarrell, 1995; Tyler and Boeckmann, 1997; Young, 1992).

We used binary logistic regression because our dependent variable isdichotomous (1 = support for the death penalty, 0=life imprisonment with-out the possibility of parole). For each regression analysis, we report logodds ratios and standardized logistic regression coefficients. Two-tailedtests of significance are reported. Listwise deletion of missing data wasused.

RESULTSTHE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BELIEVING INNOCENTPEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND SUPPORT THEDEATH PENALTY

As noted, this research explores whether the belief that innocent peoplehave been executed is inversely related to support for the death penalty.We also assess whether believing the death penalty is applied unfairlypredicts support for capital punishment. Additionally, we explore possibleinteraction effects. The presentation of the results begins with cross-tabu-lar analyses and then proceeds to the multivariate analysis.

As a prelude to this analysis, it is first necessary to note that it appearsthat a strong majority of Americans suspect that innocent defendants havebeen subjected to the death penalty. In our data, 74.6% of the respon-dents stated that they believed that an innocent person has been executed



in the last five years. Belief that the death penalty is applied unjustly alsowas expressed by the respondents. In the current study, 36.9% stated thatthe death penalty was “applied unfairly,” as opposed to fairly, “in thecountry today.”

Table 2 presents a series of cross-tabulations examining whether statisti-cal associations exist between our dependent variable (Question 1—sup-port for the death penalty versus life imprisonment without the possibilityof parole) and two perceptions of justice: whether Americans believe thatinnocent people have been executed and whether people believe that thedeath penalty is applied unfairly or fairly. We also examine whether astatistical association exists between a yes–no version of the death penaltyquestion (Question 2—support for capital punishment versus does notsupport the death penalty) and the innocent and unfair measures. Thelatter analysis was included to ensure that our results do not depend onhow the death penalty question was asked.

TABLE 2. CROSS-TABULATIONS OF PERCENT OFSUPPORT FOR CAPITAL PUNISHMENT BY

WHETHER INDIVIDUALS BELIEVE INNOCENTPEOPLE HAVE BEEN EXECUTED AND WHETHER

THE DEATH PENALTY IS APPLIED UNFAIRLY

Innocent Death PenaltyPeople Have is Applied

Death Penalty Questions Been UnfairlyExecuted

Question 1 Yes No Yes No

Support for the death penalty 47.6 67.4 30.1 65.8versus life imprisonmentwithout the possibility ofparole

Question 2

Support for the death penalty 68.6 86.9 50.3 87.8

Table 2 indicates that individuals who believed that innocent peoplehave been executed were significantly less likely to support the death pen-alty (Question 1, chi-square = 27.31, p = .0001, n = 918). Under 48% ofthe respondents who believed that innocent people have been executedsupported capital punishment over life imprisonment without the possibil-ity of parole. In comparison, 67.4% of the respondents who believed that


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innocent people have not been executed supported the death penalty—adifference of nearly 20 percentage points.

Table 2 also indicates a statistical association between support for thedeath penalty (yes–no) and whether Americans believed that innocentpeople have been executed (Question 2, chi-square = 15.26, p = .0001,n = 440). Thus, 68.6% of the respondents who believed that innocent peo-ple have been executed supported the death penalty, whereas 86.9% ofthe respondents who did not believe that innocent people have been exe-cuted supported capital punishment—a difference of 18.3 percentagepoints.

Table 2 further reports that individuals who believed that the death pen-alty is applied unfairly were significantly less likely to express support forthe death penalty (Question 1, chi-square = 109.63, p = .001, n = 921).Thus, 30.1% of the respondents who believed that the death penalty isapplied unfairly supported capital punishment over life imprisonmentwithout the possibility of parole. In comparison, 65.8% of the respondentswho believed that the death penalty is applied fairly supported the deathpenalty over life imprisonment without the possibility of parole—a differ-ence of 35.7 percentage points.

Similarly, Table 2 indicates that individuals who believed that the deathpenalty is applied unfairly were significantly less likely to support thedeath penalty when offered the yes–no response (Question 2, chi-square = 74.81, p = .001, n = 441). Thus, 50.3% of the respondents whobelieved that the death penalty is applied unfairly supported the deathpenalty. In contrast, 87.8% of the respondents who believe that the deathpenalty is applied fairly supported capital punishment—a difference of37.5 percentage points. These results indicate that regardless of the word-ing of the death penalty question, Americans who believed that innocentpeople have been executed and those who believe that the death penalty isapplied unfairly were less likely to support capital punishment.

Notably, Table 2 indicates that the wording of the death penalty ques-tion affects the percentage of people who report that they support capitalpunishment. Consistent with past research, Americans were substantiallyless likely to report that they support the death penalty if they wereoffered, as an alternative, life imprisonment without the possibility ofparole (Bowers et al., 1997; Moon et al., 2000; Niven, 2002; Vogel andVogel, 2003; Whitehead, 1998; Wright et al., 1995). The overall level ofsupport for the death penalty decreased from 75% to 53% when respon-dents were offered the option of choosing between support for capitalpunishment or life imprisonment without the possibility of parole.4

4. The decrease in support for the death penalty was not equal across AfricanAmericans and whites. When African Americans were asked whether they supported



The cross-tabulations reported in Table 2 show that support for capitalpunishment was related to believing that innocent people have been exe-cuted and believing that the death penalty is applied unfairly. However,other confounding variables need to be controlled. Table 3 presents a fullregression equation that regressed our dependent variable, support forcapital punishment versus life imprisonment without the possibility ofparole, on believing that innocent people have been executed and that thedeath penalty is applied unfairly while controlling for our independentvariables.

Table 3 indicates that support for the death penalty was directly relatedto whether individuals believed that innocent people have been executed.The results show that individuals who believed that innocent people havebeen executed were significantly less likely to support the death penalty.The predicted odds of supporting the death penalty for those who believedthat innocent people have been executed were nearly half the predictedodds of those who did not believe that innocent people have been exe-cuted. The results also show that individuals who believed that the deathpenalty was applied unfairly were significantly less likely to support capitalpunishment over life imprisonment. The predicted odds of individualssupporting the death penalty if they believed that it had been unfairlyapplied were approximately one-third the predicted odds of those whobelieved that the death penalty was applied fairly. The standardized logis-tic regression coefficients presented in Table 3 indicate that believing thedeath penalty is applied unfairly was the most robust predictor of supportfor capital punishment. Note that when we conducted the same analysison the question that asked whether respondents supported capital punish-ment (yes–no), the results were substantially the same for the variables ofbelief in innocents being executed and belief that the death penalty isapplied unfairly.

The results presented in Table 3 additionally indicate that three otherfactors—being older, a Catholic, and a liberal—negatively predicted sup-port for capital punishment over life imprisonment. Males and Americanswho had more confidence in the executive branch were more likely to

the death penalty, 49% responded affirmatively. However, this percentage was sub-stantially reduced when African Americans were asked whether they preferred thedeath penalty over life imprisonment without parole. One-fifth of African Americanspreferred the death penalty over life imprisonment without parole, a 29% decrease. Onthe other hand, when whites were asked whether they support the death penalty, 75%responded affirmatively. When whites were offered the choice between the death pen-alty and life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, the majority of whites(55%) chose capital punishment—a 20% decrease in comparison with a 29% decreaseamong African Americans.


18 UNNEVER & CULLEN

TABLE 3. BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSIONANALYSIS OF SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

VERSUS LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OFPAROLE (n = 899)

Variables Model 1 Model 2

Age .987** .987**−.119 −.013

Male 1.421* 1.422*.098 .352

Education .953 .96−.039 −.041

Income .984 .981−.018 −.019

Urban .951 .984−.012 −.015

Southerner 1.027 1.035.006 .034

Fundamentalist 1.245 1.221.031 .199

Catholic .695* .697*−.087 −.360

Attend 1.028 1.028.022 .027

Religiosity 1.269 1.264.095 .234

Confidence in Government 1.753** 1.721**.142 .543

Liberal .723*** .716***−.168 −.333

African Americans .427** .446**−.150 −.806

Applied Unfairly .368*** .809−.267 −.212

Innocent Executed .518*** .691−.162 −.369

Innocent × Unfairly — .363**1.013

Model Chi-square 193.91*** 200.58***Max rescaled R2 0.26 0.26

Two-tailed tests of significance are reported: *** p < 0.001; ** p < 0.01; *p < 0.05



support capital punishment over life imprisonment without the possibilityof parole.

Innocent times unfair. We explore an additional question: Does theassociation between believing that an innocent person has been executedand support for capital punishment vary depending on whether Americansperceive the death penalty is applied unfairly or fairly? Model 2 of Table 3tests this hypothesis by including an Innocent × Unfair interaction term inthe full regression equation. The regression equation with the Innocent ×Unfair interaction term is presented in Model 2 of Table 3. The resultspresented in Model 2 of Table 3 indicate that the interaction term wasstatistically significant.

To investigate how the effect of innocence on support for capital punish-ment varied across whether the respondent believed that the death penaltyis applied unfairly or fairly, we generated predicted probabilities of sup-port for capital punishment for those who did or did not believe that aninnocent person has been executed and whether they believed that thedeath penalty is applied unfairly or fairly. To generate predictedprobabilities, we deleted variables that were insignificant in the full regres-sion equation presented in Model 2 of Table 3 (Education, Income, Urban,Southerner, Fundamentalist, Attend, and Religiosity) and reestimated theregression equation with the interaction term included. We included thevariables that make up the interaction term in the reestimated regressionequation.5 We assigned mean values to Liberal, and Age and values of onewere assigned to Black, Male, Catholic, and Confidence in Government.6

The predicted probability of supporting capital punishment for Ameri-cans who believed that innocent people have not been executed and thedeath penalty is applied unfairly was 0.81, and the predicted probabilityfor Americans who believed that innocent people have not been executedand the death penalty is applied fairly was 0.84, a difference of 3%. Incomparison, the predicted probability of supporting capital punishmentover life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for Americanswho believed that innocent people have been executed and the death pen-alty is applied fairly was 0.78 and the predicted probability for individualswho believed that innocent people have been executed and the death pen-alty is applied unfairly was 0.51, a difference of 27%. These results showthat the relationship between believing that an innocent person had beenexecuted and support for capital punishment was more substantial whenAmericans thought the death penalty is applied unfairly than fairly.

5. We used the following equation to generate the probabilities:Predicted probability of supporting capital punishment = 2.021+ Age (−.014) + Male(.363) + Catholic (−.358) + Confidence (.499) + Liberal (−.312) + African American(−.943) + Unfair (−215) + Innocent (.379) Black × Unfairly (−1.021).

6. The average age was 47.92, and the mean for Liberal was 2.69.


20 UNNEVER & CULLEN

THE RACIAL DIVIDE IN SUPPORT FOR THEDEATH PENALTY

Our review of the literature suggests that African Americans and whitesmay significantly differ in their perceptions of whether innocent peoplehave been executed and whether the death penalty is applied fairly. It isalso possible that these differences can account for the racial divide insupport for capital punishment. We test these hypotheses.

We first investigate whether there was a racial divide in support for thedeath penalty. We expected to find that African Americans were lesslikely to support capital punishment over life imprisonment without thepossibility of parole, while controlling for other covariates. Model 1 ofTable 4 regressed support for the death penalty versus life imprisonmentwithout the possibility of parole on race while controlling for the othervariables in the equation. The results show that African Americans weresignificantly less likely than whites to support the death penalty. The pre-dicted odds of African Americans supporting the death penalty instead oflife imprisonment without the possibility of parole were less than one-thirdthe predicted odds of whites. The standardized logistic regression coeffi-cients indicate that race was the second-most robust predictor of supportfor capital punishment.

The results from Model 1 of Table 4 show that the most robust predictorof supporting the death penalty was the level of confidence respondentshad in the executive branch of the government. Americans who had confi-dence in the government were more likely to support the death penalty.The results also indicate that older individuals and liberals were less sup-portive and males were more supportive of capital punishment.

Model 2 of Table 4 assesses whether the racial divide in support for thedeath penalty results from whether individuals perceive that innocent peo-ple have been executed and believe that the death penalty is appliedunfairly. The results show that after including whether Americans believethat innocent people have been executed and that the death penalty isapplied unfairly, African-Americans were still less likely to support capitalpunishment. The predicted odds of African-Americans supporting thedeath penalty were less than half the predicted odds of whites. However,the results from Model 2 of Table 4 show that over one-fourth (29%) ofthe racial divide in support for capital punishment can be attributed todifferences in the degree to which African Americans and whites believethat innocent people have been executed and the death penalty is appliedunfairly.7

7. In separate analyses not reported here, we found that the predicted odds ofAfrican Americans believing that innocent people have been executed were two timesgreater than the predicted odds of whites while controlling for the other variables



TABLE 4. BINARY LOGISTIC REGRESSIONANALYSIS OF SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

VERSUS LIFE WITHOUT THE POSSIBILITY OFPAROLE (n=899)

Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4

Age .984*** .987** .987** .987**−.156 −.119 −.119 −.121

Male 1.369* 1.421* 1.420* 1.483**.087 .098 .097 .109

Education .930 .953 .952 .942−.059 −.039 −.039 −.048

Income .997 .984 .984 .986−.002 −.018 −.018 −.015

Urban .901 .951 .953 .971−.026 −.012 −.012 −.007

Southerner .970 1.027 1.026 1.063−.007 .006 .006 .016

Fundamentalist 1.336 1.245 1.248 1.202.041 .031 .031 .026

Catholic .725 .695* .694* .654**−.077 −.087 −.088 −.102

Attend 1.057 1.028 1.028 1.025.045 .022 .022 .020

Religiosity 1.209 1.269 1.269 1.255.075 .095 .095 .090

Confidence in Government 2.447*** 1.753** 1.750** 1.770**.228 .142 .142 .145

Liberal .697*** .723*** .722*** .728***−.187 −.168 −.169 −.164

African Americans .307*** .427** .407** 1.907−.211 −.150 −.158 .113

Applied Unfairly — .368*** .372*** .382***−.267 −.265 −.258

Innocent Executed — .518*** .520*** .596**−.162 −.161 −.127

Race × Unfairly — — 1.119 —.010

Race × Innocent — — — .146**−.316

Model Chi-square 143.50*** 193.91*** 193.95*** 201.55***Max rescaled R2 .19 .26 .26 .27

Two–tailed tests of significance are reported: *** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05


22 UNNEVER & CULLEN

INTERACTION EFFECTS

Race times fair. Our review of the literature suggested that the relation-ship between race and support for capital punishment may vary acrosslevels of whether the respondent believed that the death penalty wasapplied fairly. We explore whether perceptions of fairness had a lessereffect on white than African-American support for capital punishment.We test this hypothesis by including a Race × Unfairly interaction term inthe full regression equation. The regression equation with the Race ×Unfairly interaction term is presented in Model 3 of Table 4. The resultspresented in Model 3 of Table 4 indicate that the interaction term wasstatistically insignificant. This null result indicates that believing the deathpenalty is applied unfairly equally decreased African-American and whitesupport for capital punishment.

Race times innocent. Extant research also indicates that the effect ofrace on support for the death penalty may vary across whether Americansbelieved that an innocent person had been executed. We test this hypoth-esis by including a Race × Innocent interaction term in the full regressionequation. The regression equation with the Race × Innocent interactionterm is presented in Model 4 of Table 4. The results presented in Model 4of Table 4 indicate that the interaction term was statistically significant.

To investigate how the effect of race on support for the death penaltyvaried across whether the respondent believed that an innocent personhad been put to death, we generated predicted probabilities of support forcapital punishment for African Americans and whites. To generate pre-dicted probabilities, we deleted variables that were insignificant in the fullregression equation presented in Model 4 of Table 4 (Education, Income,Urban, Southerner, Fundamentalist, Attend, and Religiosity) and reesti-mated the regression equation with the interaction term included. Thevariables that make up the interaction term were included in the reesti-mated regression equation.8 We assigned mean values to Liberal and Age,and values of one were assigned to Male, Catholic, Confidence in Govern-ment, and Unfairly.

The predicted probability of supporting capital punishment for whiteswho believed that innocent people have been executed was 0.38 and thepredicted probability for whites who did not believe that innocent people

included in Table 2. These analyses also show that the predicted odds of African Amer-icans believing that the death penalty is applied unfairly were three times greater thanthe predicted odds of whites while controlling for the other variables included in Table2.

8. We used the following equation to generate the probabilities:Predicted probability of supporting capital punishment = 2.040+ Age (−.014) + Male(.405) + Catholic (−.422) + Confidence (.534) + Liberal (−.301) + African American(.526) + Unfair (−.981) + Innocent (−.530) + Black × Innocent (−1.926).



have been put to death was 0.51, a difference of 13%. In comparison, thepredicted probability of supporting capital punishment over life imprison-ment without the possibility of parole for African Americans who did notbelieve that innocent people have been executed was 0.64 and the pre-dicted probability for African Americans who believed that innocent peo-ple have been put to death was 0.13, a difference of 51%. These resultsshow that believing that an innocent person had been put to death had lessimpact on altering white support than African-American support for capi-tal punishment. Notably, African Americans and whites who did notbelieve that innocent people have been executed had nearly similarprobabilities of supporting capital punishment. However, African Ameri-cans were substantially less likely to support the death penalty than whitesif they believed that an innocent person had been executed.

DISCUSSION

INNOCENCE AND THE SUPPORT FOR THE DEATH PENALTY

In terms of the death penalty, it is a time marked by conflicting trends(Zimring, 2003). On the one hand, states are passing new legislation thatincreases the likelihood that additional defendants will be more quicklyexecuted (Niven, 2002). In addition, legislators have cut deeply into indi-gent defense funding and have placed restrictions on prisoner appeals(Langbein, 1999; Sarat, 2001). These actions are poignantly captured bystatutes such as Texas’s future dangerousness provision, Alabama’s judi-cial override provision, and Virginia’s 21-day rule that prohibits felonsfrom introducing new evidence three weeks after sentencing has occurred(Lofquist, 2002). These policies have resulted in an unprecedented num-ber of defendants awaiting execution. Indeed, Texas, under GovernorGeorge W. Bush, executed “40 in 2000, the highest number in one year inany state in the nation’s history,” and in the last 10 years, 14 juveniles havebeen executed, more than all other countries combined that permit theexecution of individuals under the age of 18 who have committed a capitalcrime (Platt, 2001:149).

States are not acting in isolation. The federal government has alsotaken actions that may result in the increased use of the death penalty.Most recently, the Attorney General of the United States, John Ashcroft,issued a mandate that has curtailed the legal discretion of local prosecu-tors, directing them to eschew plea bargains in favor of the death penalty.Ashcroft reasoned that heinous capital crimes should result in the deathpenalty regardless of where the crime was committed—that there shouldbe uniformity in the application of the federal death penalty (Gleeson,2003). At face value, the spread of these new “get tough” initiatives may


24 UNNEVER & CULLEN

be taken as evidence that the American public wants more murderersexecuted.

On the other hand, although “get tough” legislation continues to beexpeditiously passed, anti-death penalty advocates have initiated morato-rium campaigns with the intent of suspending the execution of convictedmurderers (Harry, 2000; Lilly, 2002). The impetus for such moratoriums isthe specter of executing an innocent defendant. In 2000, just days afterIllinois’s thirteenth death row inmate was exonerated, the Governor ofIllinois, George Ryan, declared: “I cannot support a system, which, in itsadministration, has proven to be so fraught with error and has come soclose to the ultimate nightmare, the state’s taking of innocent life” (Ryan,2000). Illinois is not alone; 3,500 groups representing nearly every state inthe union have joined the call for a moratorium on executions (Equal Jus-tice USA, 2004). In addition, legislation has been introduced in the Senateand the House of Representatives calling for a national moratorium, andthe Innocence Protection Act was introduced in the U.S. Senate withbipartisan support (Equal Justice USA, 2004; Lilly, 2002; Sarat, 2001). Itappears that the debate over the legitimacy of the death penalty has trans-formed itself into a debate over whether inmates should be executed ifinnocent people may be among those killed by the state (Harry, 2000).

Our research addressed the issue of whether public support for thedeath penalty is associated with the belief of wrongful executions. Wefound that three-quarters of Americans believe that an innocent personhas been put to death for a crime he or she did not commit within the lastfive years—a result consistent with other opinion polls (Doble ResearchAssociates, Inc. (2004). We also found that support for the death penaltywas related to whether Americans believe that an innocent person hasbeen executed. The data indicated that the predicted odds of supportingthe death penalty for individuals who believed that innocent people havebeen executed were nearly half the predicted odds of those who believedthat innocent people have not been killed by the state.

Although we cannot definitively establish the causal ordering of thewrongful execution-attitude relationship (an issue we return to below),related correlational studies lend credence to our general findings. Wein-stock and Schwartz (1998) summarize three studies that show that Ameri-cans oppose the possibility of executing innocent people and disapprove ofdiminishing procedural safeguards that could increase the probability ofinnocent people being executed. Our results are also supported byYoung’s (2000, 2004) findings that white Americans with a preference forconvicting innocent people over acquitting someone who is guilty aremore likely to support capital punishment. Data from the 1995 NationalOpinion Survey on Crime and Justice are also relevant. Among those whoinitially expressed support for capital punishment, 77% stated that they



would be “more likely to oppose the death penalty” if they “learned thatinnocent people receive the death penalty” (Longmire, 1996:102–103).The prospect of innocents being executed had more impact on the willing-ness of death penalty opponents to consider altering their views than eightother considerations (e.g., learning that the death penalty “is not a deter-rent” or that a “life sentence without parole” is an option). Similarly, arecent statewide survey in North Carolina explored what “arguments”respondents believed were “strong” reasons for favoring a “temporarysuspension on executing people on death row.” Among the argumentsevaluated as the strongest were “DNA tests prove innocence” and “fourdeath row inmates recently found innocent” (Doble Research Associates,Inc., 2004:9).9

POLICY IMPLICATIONS

Our findings have clear policy implications. In this regard, we offer sixinterrelated observations.

First, on a broad level, the data suggest that anti-death penalty advo-cates may possibly alter public opinion about the death penalty if theyinform the American public that carrying out the death penalty can resultin innocent people being executed. This general conclusion is not uncom-plicated because, as noted previously, our data are cross-sectional.Accordingly, we cannot rule out the possibility that part of the wrongfulexecutions-capital punishment support relationship is because those whooppose the death penalty are more likely to form beliefs—such that inno-cent people are executed—that justify their death penalty sentiments (andnot vice versa). This possibility would be consistent with Bohm andVogel’s (2004:324) argument that positions on capital punishment aremostly based on emotion; in turn, reasons that support the person’s posi-tion on capital punishment are embraced (after being “assimilatedbiasedly”), whereas reasons that contradict it are ignored or minimized.

However, experimental evidence suggests that support for the deathpenalty may decrease if people are exposed to information about capitalpunishment, including the issue of innocent people on death row. Wrightet al. (1995), for example, report significant reductions in support for the

9. We highlight an additional finding. Most Americans believe that an innocentindividual has been executed; however, only a third believe that the death penalty isapplied unfairly. How can Americans believe that the death penalty is applied fairly ifthey believe an innocent person has been executed? We suggest that this dissonance isresolved by rationalizing that an innocent being executed is an aberration—it is a statis-tical anomaly. Believing executing innocent people is a “mistake” that is unintentionaland rarely if ever happens allows the majority of Americans to rationalize that, by andlarge, the death penalty, even though it has human error, is applied fairly—that is, theapplication of the death penalty is not intentionally unfair.


26 UNNEVER & CULLEN

death penalty after college students took a course on the death penalty,which in part exposed them to information about wrongful executions.Notably, they report that a substantive change occurred (from 39% to75%) in support for life imprisonment without the possibility of paroleafter students became more knowledgeable about the death penalty.

Similarly, Lambert and Clarke (2001) studied whether college studentswere susceptible to changing their support for the death penalty afterreading an essay suggesting that little empirical evidence exists that thedeath penalty deters and an essay discussing the possibility and frequencyof sentencing the innocent to death. Students also read a control essay.Lambert and Clarke’s (2001) experiment found a significant reduction insupport for capital punishment only among the students who read thewrongful execution essay. It is instructive that they did not find a signifi-cant reduction in support for the death penalty among students whoreported that they strongly or very strongly supported capital punishment.Thus, the extant research suggests that Americans who are “undecided” intheir opinion about the death penalty may be particularly swayed by infor-mation that suggests innocent people may be executed (Unnever, Roberts,and Cullen, 2005).

In the 2001 Race, Crime and Public Opinion Poll, Bobo and Johnson(2004) explored experimentally whether respondents would be more orless likely to vote for a candidate for governor who “opposed the deathpenalty because there was too great a risk that innocent people might beexecuted.” In the treatment condition, the respondents were firstinformed that “Since 1976, seventy-nine people convicted and sentencedto death were later found to be innocent and to have now been releasedfrom prison.” Although the exposure to this information on wrongful con-victions had minimal influence on African-American respondents, whiterespondents were seven percentage points more likely to vote for a candi-date for governor who opposed the death penalty if they were presentedwith the information on offenders released from prison.

It is further instructive that Gallup poll data show that support for thedeath penalty steadily declined from 1994 to 2000. By 2000, 62.6% ofAmericans supported capital punishment—a decline of 17.4 percentagepoints. It is also instructive that this decrease coincided with more than adoubling of the percentage of Americans who raised the issue of incorrectconvictions as a reason why they oppose capital punishment (Jones, 2003).Further, during this time, the issue of whether innocent people were beingexecuted was under intense media scrutiny—at the apex of this coveragewas Governor Ryan’s moratorium on executions in Illinois. In this regard,Fan et al. (2002) examined 39,472 newspaper articles on the death penalty.Notably, they found that the best predictor for the recent decline in public



support for capital punishment was increased coverage of the possibility ofjudicial errors that could result in executing innocent people.

The role that Governor Ryan’s moratorium may have in shaping publicopinion about the death penalty cannot be underestimated. Niven (2002)argues that when elites consensually agree about an issue, the media tendsto uncritically report their sentiments; they only report the elite’s side ofthe story. However, when elites disagree, Niven (2002) argues that themedia covers both sides of the issue. He further contends that elites con-sensually support the death penalty and, therefore, that the media uncriti-cally covers the issue of capital punishment (Niven, 2002). We would addthat actions taken by Governor Ryan and others (e.g., Governor ParrisGlendening of Maryland and Nebraska’s Legislature) on the moratoriumissue signal a divergence in elite consensus, which has caused increasedmedia scrutiny regarding the legitimacy of the death penalty particularly interms of innocent people being executed (Equal Justice USA, 2004; Lilly,2002).

These considerations thus suggest that exposure to information thatinnocent defendants are on death row and have likely been executedpotentially lessens support for the death penalty. Even so, we recognizethat this conclusion is best seen as provisional and as providing a rationalefor further systematic research on the innocence-death penalty supportconnection. This line of inquiry would be most profitable if it continued inthree directions.

First, the findings should be replicated with cross-sectional data thatallow for multivariate analyses and the inclusion of a range of measures.Establishing the stability of an inverse relationship between belief in inno-cence and death penalty attitudes remains important. Second, to assesscausality more clearly, a range of experimental studies need to be con-ducted that vary the type and dose of the “stimuli” (information aboutinnocence), consider the impact of innocence information on respondentswho embrace capital punishment with varying levels of intensity, andassess different policy outcomes (e.g., abolish capital punishment; suspendthe use of the death penalty). Preferably these studies would be con-ducted not only with college students—who understandably are used fortheir convenience—but also with community samples that are sufficientlysocially diverse to allow for race effects to be assessed. Third, there issimilarly a need for a longitudinal cohort study that can examine, overtime, the nature of attitude formation on crime and punishment issues andthat can assess how naturally occurring events—such as the moratorium inIllinois—impact views on the death penalty. One possible option wouldbe for this study to be conducted as a supplement to an ongoing study ofyouths or an ongoing victimization survey (e.g., National Crime VictimsSurvey).


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Let us now turn to the second main point of this section: Educating thepublic can be a difficult task (Indermaur and Hough, 2002). It is not clearthat when presented with rational arguments, people change their minds.This “instrumental” approach to attitude change is compromised by thefact that strong opponents of a policy, such as capital punishment, selec-tively perceive the arguments that are presented and often end up, some-what defiantly, with more vehemently held views (Roberts and Stalans,1997). Even when attitudes are altered, they can decay over time and,through a “rebound” effect, return to their original state (Bohm andVogel, 2004; Roberts and Stalans, 1997). Further, research on changingattitudes toward capital punishment through the presentation of moreaccurate information has yielded, at best, mixed results (for a summary,see Robert and Stalans, 1997).

However, the context surrounding the issue of innocence has beentransformed. The moratorium in Illinois on executions, the media atten-tion to the issue, and the creation of “Innocence Projects” in law schoolsthat regularly produce examples of innocent offenders on death row orspending years incarcerated, taken together, create an environment thatmay be receptive to an unprecedented degree to an anti-death penaltyinnocence argument. Whereas once the idea of innocent people beingexecuted may have been a peripheral, scholarly point, now the prospectthat the state executes innocent people is a “reality” that is harder to dis-miss out of hand.

In this regard, a key issue may be not only what individuals come tothink about the execution of innocent defendants but also what thosearound them come to believe and to share in conversation. Research onthe death penalty does not typically examine such “contextual effects.”However, evoking attitude change may be less an atomistic, individualconversion process but a case of new social norms emerging—either inresponse to sociopolitical events or through conscious campaigns—thatcircumscribe individual beliefs and policy choices (for examples of norma-tive-based interventions in other settings, see Gottfredson et al., 2002;Hoover, 2004).

Third, for anti-death penalty advocates, one challenge is to find ways tomake the wrongful execution argument even more persuasive. Althoughbelief in innocents being executed is associated with a decrease in supportfor capital punishment, it is instructive that, with three-fourths of respon-dents stating that innocent people are executed, many of those who holdthis belief still support the death penalty. In this context, our researchoffers one avenue for opponents of capital punishment to consider: Con-vince the American public that when innocent people are being killed bythe state, then the death penalty is being applied unfairly.



The standardized logistic regression coefficients from our analyses indi-cate that the American public was more likely to oppose the death penaltyif they believed that it is applied unfairly than whether an innocent personhas been executed. We also found that believing an innocent person hadbeen put to death had a stronger association with altering support amongAmericans who believed that the death penalty is applied unfairly thanfairly, everything else being equal. Thus, a potentially efficacious strategythat anti-death penalty advocates might employ is persuading Ameri-cans—especially those who believe that innocents are occasionally exe-cuted—that 115 innocent people being exonerated since 1973 istantamount to a system that is inherently unfair (Death Penalty Informa-tion Center, 2004). Phrased differently, using the language of fairness todiscuss the wrongfulness of the execution of innocents may make supportof the death penalty more difficult.

Fourth, our results additionally suggest that anti-death penalty advo-cates may be more successful in altering public opinion about capital pun-ishment among African Americans than among whites (cf. Bobo andJohnson, 2004). We found that believing an innocent person has been exe-cuted had a greater association with African American than white supportfor the death penalty. Our results indicated that African Americans weremore supportive of capital punishment than whites if they believed thatinnocent people have not been executed.10 Everything else being equal,the probabilities of supporting capital punishment over life imprisonmentfor African Americans and whites who believed that innocent people havenot been executed were 51% and 64%, respectively. However, white sup-port for capital punishment decreased by only 13% if they believed thatinnocent people have been executed. This is in sharp contrast to AfricanAmericans, where the decrease for the same group was 51%. Thus, thepredicted probability of whites supporting capital punishment if theybelieved that innocent people have been executed was 0.38, whereas thecomparable predicted probability for African Americans was 0.13. Inshort, the predicted probability of supporting capital punishment wasthree times greater for whites than for African Americans, if they believedthat an innocent person had been executed.

The impact of a belief in wrongful executions on white attitudes shouldnot be fully dismissed. As we have seen, such support for the death pen-alty certainly declined if whites believed that an innocent person had beenexecuted. However, given the racial inequality in political influence in the

10. Twenty eight percent of whites, in comparison with 14% of African Americans,believed that innocent people have not been executed. Notably, 20% of whites, in com-parison with only 9% of African Americans, supported capital punishment over lifeimprisonment and believed that innocent people have not been executed.


30 UNNEVER & CULLEN

United States, a special challenge for anti-death penalty advocates will beto present information on innocents on death row in a way that createsamong whites more of a sense of injustice, empathy, personal identifica-tion, and social responsibility for the plight of those wrongly convicted.We suspect that for African Americans, revelations of innocents savedfrom execution and released from prison are experienced as vicarious vic-timizations. It is easier to imagine that they, someone they know, or amember of their racial group would find themselves wrongly accused andconvicted of a capital crime.11 For whites, there is likely more social dis-tance from innocents who earn release from prison. These innocents areseen as “not them”—as minorities, the poor, or perhaps as unfortunatesouls caught up in some random mistake of the justice system. This line ofreasoning is admittedly speculative, but it is consistent with Young’s (2004)conclusion that white Americans with racial prejudices are more likely tofavor convicting innocent people than freeing the guilty. It is also consis-tent with the view that public opinion reflects not only knowledge aboutan issue but also the extent to which people have an emotional connectionto that issue (Indermaur and Hough, 2002; Lambert and Clarke, 2001). Inthe very least, these possibilities are deserving of further criminologicalinquiry

Fifth, sustained high levels of support for capital punishment can help toconstruct a social reality that the public will always be supportive of thedeath penalty. But research suggests that endorsement of capital punish-ment may be shakier than is commonly imagined (Murray, 2003; Robertsand Stalans, 1997). Current observers often forget that in 1966, a minorityof Americans, 42%, supported capital punishment; change is possible. It isinstructive that Gallup poll data show that a majority of Americans (52%)support the death penalty with reservations (Jones, 2000). These dataindicate that, although many Americans hold definitive opinions, there isalso a substantial percentage of the public who hold their views more tenu-ously and may be candidates for altering their opinions about the death

11. Research indicates that the victim’s race matters in death penalty cases. Forexample, Langbein (1999) found that death row inmates who were executed were sig-nificantly more likely to have killed someone who was white. Langbein (1999:646)adds: “For example, there were 5 executions in Nevada; all of the executees’ victimswere white, compared to 85 percent of the victims of those remaining on death row.Similarly, there were 5 executions in North Carolina; all of the executees’ victims werewhite, compared to 83 percent of the victims of death row inmates. In Missouri, therewere 7 executions; again, all of the victims were white, compared to 77 percent of thevictims of death row inmates. Finally, Georgia had 14 executions; 97 percent of thevictims of those executed were white, compared to 83 percent of the victims of thoseremaining on death row.”



penalty (Roberts and Stalans, 1997; Unnever et al., 2005). Notably, Mur-ray (2003) reports that respondents who exhibited instability in their senti-ments about capital punishment were more likely to change their opinionand believe that the death penalty is applied unfairly after being exposedto a large pool of considerations involving the death penalty (the defen-dant is mentally ill, the defendant had a religious conversion, the defen-dant displays remorse). Accordingly, anti-death penalty advocates mightfocus their efforts at creating reform efforts and media messages that tar-get for persuasion those whose views on capital punishment are looselyheld and more amenable to alteration—the “undecided” (Unnever et al.,2005).

Finally, perhaps the strongest argument underlying public support forcapital punishment is retribution—that there are heinous offenders whosimply deserve to have their lives taken (Roberts and Stalans, 1997). Peo-ple who embrace the retributivist logic are particularly resistant to chang-ing their views because utilitarian arguments (e.g., about cost ordeterrence) are beside the point. The power of the wrongful executionargument, however, is that it threatens the legitimacy of retribution: Howis a system “just” and principled if its process inevitably executes peoplewho have done nothing wrong? This is why supporters of capital punish-ment either deny that any innocent person has ever been executed or sug-gest that adequate safeguards can be devised to make wrongfulconvictions impossible (e.g., DNA testing). These claims—often voiced bypublic officials—may impede shifts in public attitudes by making the issueof wrongful executions seem debatable or impossible to settle. Thus, aspecial challenge for anti-death penalty advocates will be to show the pub-lic that the prospect of innocents being arrested, placed on death row, andexecuted is not prevented by fine-tuning the punishment process butrather is systematic and inevitable.

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Cases Cited

Atkins v. Virginia 536 U.S. (2002).Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141 (1994).McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987).Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).

James D. Unnever is Professor of Sociology at Radford University. His most recentresearch focuses on whether egalitarianism and racial resentment predict support forcrime reduction policies, the racial divide in support for capital punishment, whetherChristian fundamentalists are more likely to support the death penalty, and the rela-tionships among empathy, forgiveness, compassion, and support for the capital punish-ment. His most recent publications investigate Colvin’s differential coercion theory; the



relationships among ADHD, low self-control, and bullying and criminal behavior; thecultural, social, and individual sources of bullying among middle school students; victimreporting of bullying behavior; whether aggressive victims are a distinct group of stu-dents, and weakly–held attitudes toward the death penalty.

Francis T. Cullen is Distinguished Research Professor of Criminal Justice and Sociol-ogy at the University of Cincinnati. His most recent works include Combating Corpo-rate Crime: Local Prosecutors at Work, Criminological Theory: Context andConsequences, and Criminological Theory: Past to Present—Essential Readings. Hiscurrent research focuses on the impact of social support on crime, the measurement ofsexual victimization, public opinion about crime control, and rehabilitation as a correc-tional policy. He is Past President of both the American Society of Criminology and ofthe Academy of Criminal Justice Sciences.


38 UNNEVER & CULLEN

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