Examensarbete i Hållbar Utveckling 70

Fishing the Future

A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions

Fishing the Future A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions

Jorge Ueyonahara

Jorge Ueyonahara

Uppsala University, Department of Earth SciencesMaster Thesis E, in Sustainable Development, 30 creditsPrinted at Department of Earth Sciences,Geotryckeriet, Uppsala University, Uppsala, 2012.

Master’s ThesisE, 30 credits

Fishing the future A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs

through the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’

perceptions

Master thesis in Sustainable Development

Jorge Ueyonahara

Institutionen för geovetenskaper

Uppsala Universitet

2012

TITLE: Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers and key

stakeholders‟ perceptions

Jorge Ueyonahara

Supervisor: Associate professor Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández, CSD-CEMUS, Uppsala University

Credits: 30 HEC

Level: Advanced E

Course title: Degree Project in Sustainable Development

Course code: 1GV038

Program: Master Program in Sustainable Development

CONTENTS

Abstract .............................................................................................................................................. 4

Summary ............................................................................................................................................ 5

Acknowledgments .............................................................................................................................. 6

Abbreviations ..................................................................................................................................... 7

1. Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 8

2. Purpose, delimitation and methodology ........................................................................................ 11

3. Conceptual framework on discourse and environment ................................................................... 14

4. Background .................................................................................................................................. 16

4.1 Chile: country‟s profile ...................................................................................................... 16

4.2 The artisanal fisher ............................................................................................................ 18

4.3. The benthic resource Loco (Chilean abalon) ....................................................................... 19

4.4. Historical overview before the arrival of the TURFS .......................................................... 20

5. The new Chilean Fishing Law and the AMERB or Chilean TURFs .............................................. 21

5.1 In the light of new challenges .............................................................................................. 21

5.2 TURFs‟ main social actors .................................................................................................. 22

5.3 TURFs‟ application process................................................................................................. 23

5.4 Current situation of the TURFs ............................................................................................ 24

6. Empirical findings ........................................................................................................................ 25

7. Analysis and discussion ................................................................................................................ 31

8. Conclusions .................................................................................................................................. 36

Epilogue ........................................................................................................................................... 38

Appendix ......................................................................................................................................... 39

References........................................................................................................................................ 40

List of Figures

Figure 1. Map of Chile ..................................................................................................................... 16

Figure 2. Basic port infrastructure for artisanal fishery ...................................................................... 17

Figure 3. Distribution property rights in the coastal border in cases of private properties ................... 18

Figure 4. Loco (Concholepas concholepas) ....................................................................................... 19

Figure 5. Loco extraction (illustration) .............................................................................................. 20

Figure 6. Loco landings and export prices (1957-2010) ..................................................................... 20

List of Tables

Table 1. Interview list ....................................................................................................................... 12

Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through

the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions

JORGE UEYONAHARA

Ueyonahara, J., 2012: Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers

and key stakeholders‟ perceptions. Master thesis in Sustainable Development at Uppsala University,

No. 70, 43 pp, 30 ECTS/hp

ABSTRACT

Overfishing is not an exclusive topic of big fishing industry. Overfishing by small-scale fishers is also

happening. The Territorial Use of Rights – TURFs was implemented in Chile to protect the Chilean

abalone from overfishing. Through the implementation of the TURFs Chilean abalone are no longer

threatened by overfishing. The challenge to protect the resource thus seems to be solved. However,

while some problems are solved others persist or new ones arise.

The thesis explores the discourses of the Chilean social actors in regard to the development and

challenges of the TURFs. The empirical data is formed by a group of interviews, where social issues

such as TURFs accomplishments, resource availability, diversification, tenure issues, access to the

coast, lack of infrastructure, competition for the space and future expectations, are milestones arising

from the empirical material. These issues are analysed through the lens of fishers and stakeholder‟s

perception.

The paper confirms what other studies such as Cereceda and Czischke 2001, Gallardo 2008, Gallardo

and Friman 2012, González et al. 2006, and Meltzoff et al. 2002 have found. Fishers organised

nationally through confederations, regional federations and local associations have become active

social actors in the artisanal fisheries arena. Similarly, it is also corroborated that through good

leadership some fishing organisations are diversifying related and no-related fishing activities to

secure better living conditions, thus, constantly evolving, encapsulating more and more benthic

fishers‟ social and economic needs. The study concludes that the fishers, even though the difficulties

and challenges encountered (heterogeneity of the richness of the seabed and different land issues)

during the co-management of some TURFs and due to the fact that they are working in the same

designated and exclusive place, they have developed a collective sense of permanent attachment and

sense of „property‟ or tenure to the water body where the TURFs are located. Due to their

development, the TURFs seem to be more than temporary, raising the question of the land tenure and

associated infrastructure development where fishers place their activities, especially in rural areas

where settlements do not exist.

Keywords: Concholepas concholepas, Chile, environmental discourse, small scale fisheries,

sustainable development, territorial use right for fisheries, TURFs.

Jorge Ueyonahara, Department of Earth Sciences, Uppsala University, Villavägen 16, SE- 752 36

Uppsala, Sweden

Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through

the lens of fishers and key stakeholders’ perceptions

JORGE UEYONAHARA

Ueyonahara, J., 2012: Fishing the future. A snapshot of the Chilean TURFs through the lens of fishers

and key stakeholders‟ perceptions. Master thesis in Sustainable Development at Uppsala University,

No. 70, 43 pp, 30 ECTS/hp

SUMMARY

It is common knowledge that one of the major problems of the modern world is the depletion of non

renewal resources. This can be exhibited in many different ways, such as the extraction of gas, oil and

minerals, deforestation, the intense use of agricultural land and overfishing; all of this is done in order

to satisfy our consumer needs. We can naively state that depletion only occurs when big enterprises

do so. However, the exhaustion of natural resources can be done by small social actors as well.

Overfishing by small-scale fishers is a common occurrence today. In order to protect the Chilean

abalone from overfishing, the Chilean Government implemented several measures-seasonal fishing

limits and a quota system such as the Reproductive Seasons, Global Quota and the Benthic Extraction

Regime Measures. Unfortunately these measures were unsuccessful. A few years later, the Territorial

Use of Rights – TURFs was implemented. Fishing associations signed a temporal agreement with the

fishing authorities for the co-management of benthic resources. Through this measure the Government

could stop the overexploitation of the Chilean abalone and they were no longer threatened by

overfishing. At this point, the challenge to protect the resource seemed to have been solved. However,

while some problems are solved new ones arise.

This thesis explores the diverse discourse of the main Chilean social actors who are involved in the

development and challenges of the TURFs, namely fishers, fishing authorities and scientists. The

empirical data that support this study is taken from a group of interviews where social issues such as

TURFs accomplishment, resource availability, diversification, tenure issues, access to the coast, lack

of infrastructure, competition for space and future expectations are explored. These issues are

analyzed through the lens of fishers, fishing authorities and scientists‟ perceptions.

The conclusion that the study shows is that the fishers, even though overcoming difficulties and

challenges encountered (heterogeneity of the richness of the seabed and different land issues) during

the co-management of some TURFs and due to the fact that the fishers are working in the same

designated and exclusive place, they have developed a collective sense of permanent attachment and

sense of „property‟ or tenure to the body of water where the TURFs are located. Due to their

development, the TURFs seem to be more than temporary, raising the question of the land tenure and

associated infrastructure development where fishers place their activities, especially in rural areas

where settlements do not exist.

Keywords: Concholepas concholepas, Chile, environmental discourse, small scale fisheries,

sustainable development, territorial use right for fisheries, TURFs.

Jorge Ueyonahara, Department of Earth Sciences, Uppsala University, Villavägen 16, SE- 752 36

Uppsala, Sweden

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I wish to thank many people who have been involved in varying degrees during this journey. First of

all, thank you to Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández, my supervisor from the Uppsala Center for

Sustainable Development for providing invaluable guidance in the thesis work. Special gratitude to

my friends and classmates who helped me out with proofreading the drafts and for their advice:

Andrew Enomoto, Alan Jay, Matthew Fielden, Friedel Geeraert, Olivier Gervais and Justin Makii.

Thanks also to my mother, my father and my brother for their constant support.

ABBREVIATIONS

AMERB Área de Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos (Management and

Exploitation Areas for Benthic Resources)

CONFEPACH Confederación Nacional de Federaciones de Pescadores Artesanales de Chile

(National Fishermen's Union Confederation)

CONAPACH Confederación Nacional de Pescadores Artesanales de Chile (Chilean National

Confederation of Fishers)

CORFO Corporación de Fomento de la Producción (Chilean Development Corporation

Agency)

DOP Dirección de Obras Portuarias (Direction of Harbour Works)

FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations

FEPEMACH Federación de Pescadores Artesanales y Buzos Mariscadores de la Provincia del

Choapa, IV Región (Federation of Artisan Fishers and Divers of the Choapa

Province, Region IV).

FFPA Fondo de Fomento para la Pesca Artesanal (Development Fund for Artisanal

Fishing)

MA Management Area

Sernapesca Servicio Nacional de Pesca (National Fisheries Service)

Subpesca Subsecretaria de Pesca (Fishing Subsecretary)

SSF Small-scale fisheries

TURFs Territorial Use Right for Fisheries

UCN

Universidad Católica del Norte Coquimbo

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1. INTRODUCTION

Fishery is an ancient practice that had its start in inland waters such as rivers, wetlands, ponds and

lagoons, long time before people started to cultivate crops or raise livestock. Fishing in open waters

came much later and it took several centuries until the marine fishery (fishing in open waters) took

over the inland fishery as the larger supplier of fish protein (FAO - Food and Agriculture

Organization of the United Nations 2010).

The fishing sector can be divided into two majors‟ types of fisheries, the large-scale fisheries

(industrial, commercial) and the small-scale fisheries-SSF (subsistence, artisanal, commercial). The

large-scale fisheries or industrial fisheries land the largest proportion of the globe‟s fish catch and use

large technological equipment and vessels, being highly mechanised and technically sophisticated.

They usually exploit large stocks of productive areas widely distributed around the globe. In regard to

SSF, there is no universal definition, but they embrace artisanal, subsistence and commercial fishers.

The majority of the fisheries use traditional fishing gear such as traps, nets, spears, lines and by hand,

but some of them use a mechanised methods. Many of the SSFs exploit the same target species of the

large-scale commercial but also catch smaller fish stocks and invertebrates such a molluscs or

crustaceans (Berkes et al. 2001).

The Fishing sector provides livelihood, jobs and income for millions of people around the globe.

According to the FAO (2010), in 2008, about 45 million of people were directly employed in fisheries

(large-scale and small-scale fishers). It should also be noted that postharvest activities, which involve

buyers, market intermediaries and processors, is also part of the sector. Consequently, the FAO report

also estimated that for every person directly engaged in this activity, 3 job positions are created in

secondary activities. There is then more than 180 million people working within the fishing sector. In

addition, every jobholder supports livelihoods for an average of 3 family members. Thus, 540 million

people, about 8% of the planet population are dependent on the fisheries. Therefore, the fishing sector

has biological, technological, cultural, economic, social and political aspects (Berkes et al. 2001).

Considering only small-scale fisheries, the population depending on this activity is larger than the one

depending on industrial fishing. Out of 45 million people employed in the fishing sector, 35 million

are from the SSF. The SSF employ another 84 million people in secondary activities; therefore, more

than 110 million people are dependent of the small scale fishery sector. The SSFs are found around

the globe, and more than 95% of them live in developing countries. In the majority of cases, they face

vulnerable and precarious working and living conditions, where poverty is the norm rather than the

exception (FAO 2010). Moreover, small-scale fishers are crucial actors for the livelihood of the

coastal communities and for local food security (Gallardo 2008).

According to FAO reports (2010), since 1976 the growth of commercialisation of fish and fishery

products has been growing constantly. This rise is due to globalisation of the fishing and aquaculture

industry, the liberalisation of trade policies, the increase of consumption of fish and the technological

improvement in processing, packaging and transportation. Other factors include population growth, an

increase in living standards, rapid urbanisation and a change in dietary patterns. In contrast with rural

areas, people living in urban areas, due to a higher living standard, eat better and eat more outside

which demands larger quantities of food. Supermarkets offer a wider choice of fish products and

minimise the seasonal fluctuation of availability. All these aspects aided to move from production and

consumption for local markets to production and consumption to global markets.

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Tuna, for example, has been on the table for thousands of years, but the influence of Japan‟s taste for

the fish and health consciousness has increased the demand for tuna in the United States, Western

Europe, Australia, and in urban cities in China and Russia. Consequently, the tuna is the world‟s most

priced commercial fish and due to high demand for consumption, specially for sushi, leading to

exploitation far beyond its sustainable limits (Campling 2008; Courchamp et al. 2006; Mahr 2009;

Marsh and Danner 2010; Seafish 2010). A study by Collette et al. (2011) showed that three major

species of tuna1 are seriously threatened, therefore, the tuna, as a result of the high demand found in

international markets is driving the fishing industry to overfishing, which consequently puts it in

danger of extinction.

Even though some species are in decline, other species take over, most of them are from inland

production – farming, which gives an increased amount in the total seafood supply (Kent 1997). The

decline of capture fisheries is not only due to overexploitation for fishing but also due to

anthropogenic influences and climate change. Consequently, coastal areas are also being affected

negatively where the natural habitats of some coastal species have been modified or have even

disappeared completely (FAO 2010; Gallardo 2008).

The link between atmosphere and oceans is inextricably connected. Climate change alters

precipitation, temperature and wind patterns and these changes are reflected in unpredictable ocean

currents (PISCO - Partnership for Interdisciplinary Studies of Coastal Oceans 2010). In addition,

climate change will bring significant changes to the seas, which are becoming warm. However, this

warming is not homogenous around the globe. The combined effects of salinity and temperature

minimise the nutrients in the surface layer, which will affect the production processes in plankton and

fish population and the interrelation of predators and prey. In general, it is expected that fishes will

move towards the poles and some species are expected to migrate to deeper waters to avoid surface

warming waters (FAO 2010).

Climate change will also affect coastal communities in several ways including: migration and

displacement of human populations, effects on coastal infrastructure due to rising sea levels and salt

intrusion, intensity or frequency of storms, waves, floods and alteration in the availability of fish for

food (FAO 2010; Nicholls et al. 2007).

Traditionally large commercial industrial fisheries, focusing on larger fish stocks, have received

attention from the scientist community; by contrast, only some small-scale fisheries (SSFs) are well

studied when, geographically, they coincide with the large stocks used by the industrial fisheries.

Thus, most data available are for the large fisheries (Berkes et al. 2001). The majority of the world‟s

fishery science has largely been devoted to the assessment of the stocks focusing mainly on countries

in the Northern hemisphere. Biology has been the disciplinary focus and, to some extent, economics.

As those studies focus on the North, are not useful for the countries in the South where fishery-

management is different and depending primarily on small stocks. In addition, those studies have not

included social sciences, therefore conventional approaches have not addressed the socioeconomic

needs of the fishing communities and the potential advantage of a cooperative way of governance

(Berkes et al. 2001).

1 The three major endangered tuna species are southern bluefin (critically endangered), the atlantic bluefin

(endangered) and the bigeye tuna (vulnerable), the study was assessed using the IUCN (International Union for

Conservation of Nature) Red List of Threatened Species (Collette et al. 2011).

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As a consequence of the economic globalisation, target marine-life species in industrial fisheries are

not the only ones in danger of extinction. Small-scale fisheries have been included as well into the

international fishing market, contributing specialty high valued fishing species (Gallardo 2008). High

demand of these species can also drive small-scale fishers to overexploit their resources eventually

leading to localised species extinction and habitat degradation. The South African abalone is an

example of a species in crisis. As a result of its high value price in the 1990s in the international

market, mainly in China, droves of abalone were sought and unsustainably harvested. Thus, the

combinations of several threats such as the entry of black markets in the fishery, the focus-on short-

term gains and lack of coordination of the state, the lack of legitimacy of the fishery management and

the influx of the predator coast rock lobster into the abalone ecosystem have affected the previously

stable abalone stocks. These several threats turned down the stabilised management system of quotas

of the early 1990s that ended up in the closure of the fishery in 2008 to protect the abalone resources

(Hauck and Kroese 2006; Raemaekers et al. 2011).

In Chile, locos – Chilean abalone (further information in chapter 4) were cheap, popular and tasty

seafood that abounded along the coast. In Asia, for many Japanese and Chinese, abalone is a delicacy

that was enjoyed in family meals and served on special occasions. The scarcity of abalones in the

Asian market such as Japan and Taiwan, found a perfect substitute in the Chilean locos. Since then,

Japan and Taiwan started importing locos in large amounts converting them in scarce and expensive

seafood, depriving most of Chileans from their traditional seafood (Long 2003). Because of the high

demand in the mid 70‟s, the locos became the single highest value mollusc in Chile and consequently

a very important source of income for artisanal fishers. The loco has been caught for decades but due

to its high economic value, the stocks of locos began to decline quickly until been “prompted by an

overfishing crisis in the loco” (Bonzon et al. 2010; San Martin et al. 2010, 324).

To prevent the overexploitation of species and to provide fishers with a more sustainable and

responsible way of subsistence, governments around the world, have opted to empower the fishers to

protect, extract and to benefit from resources in area-based catch and share programs. This is the case

with Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries (TURFs); fishers are given exclusive privileges or rights

allowed to catch certain species within a specific area. The TURFs have been applied informally and

formally in several countries and due to its applicability to successfully manage fishing resources are

gaining more attention internationally (Bonzon et al. 2010). Consequently, TURFs have been created

to provide a place where coastal fishers can manage fish extraction within their „own‟ sea territory.

Examples of this application can be found in Japan, Canada, New Zealand, Peru, and Denmark among

others (Bonzon et al. 2010; Gallardo 2008).

The territorial use rights for fisheries refer, according to the theory, to a clearly distinguishable and

limited territory. The TURF can be granted to a person or a group of persons (i.e: unions or

associations). There are four rights related to the TURFs, the right to: (1) exclusion, which determines

or control the access to the area, (2) specification of the kind of use of the territory, (3) generate

returns from the extraction of the resources within the territory, and (4) future benefits from the use of

the area (Christy 1982).

The Chilean authorities have a political will to achieve sustainable management of the benthic

fisheries by applying ecological and fishery concepts, providing the artisanal fishers and their families

with a viable way of living (Castilla and Defeo 2001; Meltzoff et al. 2002). Thus, the government

implemented the TURFs in order to, on the one hand, ensure the subsistence of the marine resources

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and on the other hand, secure the subsistence of the fishers, and find a balance between these two

somehow opposed values.

To protect the benthic resources2 from over exploitation, in 1991 Chile implemented the Área de

Manejo y Explotación de Recursos Bentónicos – AMERB (Management and Exploitation Areas for

Benthic Resources), locally known as Management Area (MA); a similar concept to what

internationally is known as TURFs (Territorial Use Rights for Fisheries). Benthic resources includes

species such as lapa (key-hole impets), erizo (sea urchin), piure (sea squirt), machas (machas clam),

seaweeds and the high value loco (see below for further explanation). A decade after the MAs‟

implementation some goals were met, particularly, the conservation of the resources and the

improvement of knowledge of hydrobiological resources (Bonzon et al. 2010). AMERBs are given,

upon application, but only to fisher organisations. By December 2010, 31,497 artisanal fishers were

registered in more than 726 TURFs along the Chilean coast (Sernapesca 2011a). Throughout this

thesis, the terms TURFs, AMERBs and MAs will be interchangeable, referring to the same matter.

The implementation of the TURFS in Chile seems to be based on precautionary approach (Gallardo

2008). Such approach considers the uncertainties in the fisheries system, which involves the

application of the cautious prediction and the necessity to take action with insufficient information

and knowledge. A precautionary approach not only focuses on fishing resources but also includes the

protection of the fishing communities as well. The limited focus on fishing resources results in the

loss of the real aim of fishery management, which is to achieve long-term sustainable fishing practices

that provide food, jobs, economic opportunities and stable communities. Thus, the implementation of

a precautionary approach implies the use of risk management to minimise the risk of collapse of

fishing communities (Hilborn et al. 2001).

Therefore in light of the 15 years of development of the Chilean TURFs hitherto, this paper will try to

analyse how their factual development agrees with their official goals.

2. PURPOSE, DELIMITATION AND METHODOLOGY

The purpose of this thesis is to analyse the Chilean TURFs in light of their developments hitherto by

trying to compare their official goals (law decree) and discourse (fishing authorities) with their factual

development. Thus this paper will try to answer the following research questions:

1) Do the fishers‟ practices and perceptions differ from the official goals set by the government,

if so how? Is there a contradiction?

2) Are the MA's evolving to something else than the original purpose?

Therefore, the study will focus on the perception of the MAs seen from fishers and key stakeholders‟

perspective in regards of the MAs‟ purpose, achievements and future expectations.

The ambition of this project is to constitute a base for an article on the Chilean TURFs with associate

professor Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández and her Chilean colleagues, around the issue of what are the

2 Benthos refers to all aquatic organisms which live near, on, or in the bottom of water bodies. Benthos can be

subdivided by size in macro invertebrates and microbenthos. The large benthic organisms or macroinvertebrates

are visible without microscopes and group species as snails, clams, worms, crayfish, etc. These benthic animals consume algae and prey organisms, and they are part of the food chain for many fishes (North American

Benthological Society 2009). The Chilean artisanal fishers harvest approximately 50 benthic species (fishes,

invertebrates and algae) (González et al. 2006).

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MA evolving to and whether their factual development agree with authorities goals, this conforming

the framework within which, guided by my supervisor, I developed my questions. For this purpose

Gloria Gallardo allowed me to use a picture from PRA tool exercise, email communications and part

of her already existing empirical material. This empirical material (set of qualitative interviews) was

already transcribed and translated from Spanish into English for its immediate use, which facilitated

my work considerably. Thus the empirical material consists of primary sources mainly parts of a

series of open-ended and semi-structured interviews, which were analysed through discourses, both as

an approach and method (see Chapter 3). The Appendix provides a list of selected questions used as a

guide during the interviews regarding the topics discussed in this paper. During the interviews some

sub questions arose to clarify a specific argument or to get deeper answer.

The interviews were performed principally within a FORMAS (the Swedish Research Council for

Environment, Agricultural Sciences and Spatial Planning) financed project for years 2007-2010 (No.

211-2006-2207), assigned to associate professor Gloria L. Gallardo Fernández. Thus, all these

material (marked with *) in this thesis are part of the research material pertaining to her project. The

title of Gallardo‟s FORMAS project was “Beyond private and public property. Territorial use rights to

fisheries (TURFS) as a sustainable solution to manage threatened sedentary marine resources. The

Chilean case”. Some of the interviews were performed in situ together with PhD Eva Friman and are

thus shared with another project to which both Gallardo and Friman belong to with other researchers.

The interview material carried out by Gloria Gallardo and Eva Friman were in Spanish with a further

transcript into English. I have checked both versions. This was a VR financed project for years 2008-

2011 (No. 2007-8409) called “Sustainable global patterns of production and consumption: Current

problems and future possibilities” Those shared interviews marked with two** is shared material

pertaining to both projects.

The interviews represent a sample of some of the major players in the artisanal fisheries sector

involved in the MAs in Chile in 2008: government authority through specialised agencies Subpesca

and Sernapesca, two scientist from the Universidad Católica del Norte, two representatives of national

and regional fishing association and two from MAs members, which are summarised in Table 1. This,

in order to get a holistic view of the studied phenomenon, to provide an overview of the MAs‟

situation. For the purpose of this study, part of these interviews have been used.

The following table describes the name of the interviewees and the organisation where they belong

Table 1. Interview list

Organisation Interviewee / email correspondence

1 Subpesca

Alejandra Pinto (National coordinator of benthic resources) - Nov

11, 2008a*, Nov 11, 2008b*

Max Montoya (Responsibility of MA development and normative

part) - May 11, 2009 * (email Gallardo/Montoya)

Antonio Gonzáles (Responsibility of MA Regime) - Nov 11,

2008a*, Nov 11, 2008b*

Javier Rivera ((Responsibility of benthic resources and fishing in

Northern Chile) - Nov 11, 2008a*, Nov 11, 2008b*

2 Sernapesca

Javier Chávez (regional manager of benthic resources) - Nov 25,

2008*

Gerardo Cerda (regional manager of aqua culture) - Nov 25, 2008*

13

3 UCN. Universidad Católica

del Norte Coquimbo

Jaime Aburto (Marine biologist, consultant) - Nov 26, 2008 **

4 UCN. Universidad Católica

del Norte Coquimbo

Wolfgang Stotz (Professor, marine biologist) - Nov 26, 2008a**,

Nov 26, 2008b**

5

CONFEPACH and

Federación de Pescadores

del Elqui

Luis Durán (President of Federación de Pescadores del Elqui, and Member of the environmental council of CONFEPACH) - Nov 23,

2008*

6 MA Punta de Choros Oscar Avilés (FEPEMACH: Federation of Artisanal Fishers and Divers of the Choapa Province, Region IV) - Nov 24, 2008 **

7 MA Huentelauquén

Segundo Tapia (President of MA Huentelauquén) - Dec 10, 2008*

Luis Rodriguez (“Alcalde de Mar”, representative of the coast

guard in the caleta) - Dec 10, 2008*

Eduardo Alfaro (Secretary) - Dec 10, 2008*

Mariano Godoy (MA member) - Dec 10, 2008*

To analyse and evaluate the empirical material, I tried to identify the themes that could answer the

research questions. From there I made a narrowed selection in those that best could answer my

questions. These became: (a) advantages and achievement of the fishing organisations, (b) challenges

and (c) perception of the future. Finally, all these three topics are highlighted as current practices and

they are contrasted with the objective set by the government.

The literature review had the aim to get deep knowledge of the artisanal fishery sector in Chile before,

during and after the implementation of the TURFs which involved the reading of several scientific

articles, get acknowledged of the Chilean fishing law and governmental Chilean websites for updated

information. Moreover, for the theory part, books and scientific journals were used to provide the

theoretical framework of this paper. Additional readings from artisanal fishery sector and co-

management programs in other regions of the world were also consulted. The present thesis has some

limitations such as being a desk research, and without the possibility to have first-hand experience of

Chile, not being there to collect data and to observe the fishers activities.

Structure of the thesis

The content of this paper is as follow: Chapter 1 introduces the context and background to the

problem area and its importance of research. Chapter 2 is devoted to explaining the research question,

the methodology used and the delimitations of the study. Chapter 3 presents the conceptual

framework for the research based on discourses, with emphasis on the environment. Chapter 4

presents the background of the Chilean MA system. The section starts with a brief description of

Chile, the general profile of the small-scale fisheries, the loco fisheries, the historical overview of the

MA and it concludes with the fishing law. Chapter 5 provides detailed information of the Chilean MA

system, its concept and goals, a description of the main social actors and the current challenges.

Chapter 6 presents the empirical findings of the interviews of several stakeholders divided according

to the chosen themes (see above) in the chosen topics: a) achievement of the organisation, b)

challenges, and c) perceptions of the future. Chapter 7 discusses the results in contrast with the

official objective of the MA (law decree, fishing authorities). Chapter 8 provides the conclusion of the

research.

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3. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK ON DISCOURSE AND ENVIRONMENT

This section will introduce the conceptual framework that the author relies on to build the analysis.

For the purpose of this study, the work of Foucault and other authors will be introduced to

conceptualise the meaning and use of „discourses‟. The French philosopher Michel Foucault (1971, 8)

defines the creation and use of “discourses” in his work „Orders of Discourses‟ as follows:

In every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected,

organised and redistributed according to a certain number of procedures, whose

role is to avert its powers and its dangers, to cope with chance events, to evade its

ponderous, awesome materiality.

In „Archaeology of Knowledge‟, moreover, Foucault (1972) points out that statements are objects that

people create, use, modify, mix and recompose; it is also an element that serves diverse interests or

resist them. Stuart Hall explains in his work „The West and the rest: discourse and power‟ (1992) that

a discourse consists of a group of statements that work together and provide a language for talking

about certain topics, for example in the way of representing a specific type of knowledge. Moreover, a

discourse is also about the creation of knowledge by using language and is intended for influence

social practices. It means that we construct meanings of natural and social phenomena with our

vocabulary. Therefore, many persons and institutions can produce discourses (statements and beliefs)

that serve the interests of a specific group (Hall 1992).

Hall also adds that statements about moral, political or social issues are not simple to classify as true

or false. The facts that we are able to decide the truth or falsehood can be constructed in different

ways. Continuing on that, Hall (1992, 293) said “certain descriptions, even if they appear false to us,

can be made „true‟ because people act on them believing that they are true, and so their actions have

real consequences”. In consequence, the language used to create the discourse has a real effect and the

descriptions become „true‟ (Hall 1992, 293).

In summary, Hall (1992, 295) concludes that the:

[Discourses] produce meaningful knowledge about that subject. This knowledge

influences social practices, and so has real consequences and effects. Discourses are

not reducible to class-interests, but always operate in relation to power – they are

part of the way power circulates and is contested. The question of whether a

discourse is true or false is less important than whether is effective in practice.

Environmental Discourses

During 1970s, environmental problems were acknowledged and were given political importance. It

was the time for the creation of new legislations, administrative bodies and ministries. There was a lot

of optimism: the most threatening problems such as waste, noise and air and water pollution could be

resolved by legislation and technical procedures (Leroy and Tatenhove 2000). An environmental

discourse emerges in and refers to “the relationship between humans and their environment”

(Mühlhäusler and Peace 2006, 458) and has obtained significance in providing models, theories, and

policies under the mark of sustainable development (Haque 2000).

15

Environmental problems are not well-defined and labelled issues such as coral reefs, radiation or

pollution to mention some; moreover they are interconnected in several ways. Their complexity is

associated with a high number of variables and a diversity of elements that interact in the environment.

When an individual or authority makes a decision, they face complex environmental issues because

our knowledge of the ecosystems is scarce and limited. As environmental problems occur in the

intersection of social systems and ecosystems, the degree of complexity is even higher. When an

environmental problem with a high degree of complexity occurs, the number of possible perspectives

to analyse it is higher because it is difficult to prove that any of them are wrong. Thus the increase in

the number of different perspectives on environmental issues is not surprising (Dryzek 2005). With a

more critical perspective, Liu et al. (2007) remarks that coupled3 natural and human system has been

examined extensively but the complexity of the coupled system is still not well understood due to the

traditional division of social and ecological sciences.

Environmental discourses are not created or used exclusively by social and natural scientists, but also

by other social actors who have different values, interests and perspectives which result in

controversies. Some of these actors that manage environmental issues are corporate executives,

journalists, politicians, lawyers, administrative bodies, rational consumers, and ordinary citizens.

Even the adversaries of environmentalism are included in the environmental discourses (Dryzek

2005).

The major actors in society who lead the environmental protection in the society and therefore

produce environmental discourses are the scientist community and the politicians. Inspired by the

work of Ravetz (1984), Rothman (1980) and Nilsson & Sunesson (1988), Lars Lundgren (cited in

Lundgren 2000a, 151) and Sundqvist (2000) said that scientist researchers are not a homogenous

group with identical knowledge and expertise; they have different roles, for which they make

contributions in general terms by formulating and conceptualising the problem rather than solving it.

Moreover, most sciences are increasingly divided into narrow and specific goals and sectors leading

to a specialisation. (Lundgren 2000a; Molander 2000; Sundqvist 2000).

An expert, according to Sundqvist (2000, 52) is defined as “a person who has special knowledge and,

by virtue thereof, is in demand as an adviser and problem-solver in a political context concerned”. In

other words, an expert is a person who is considered competent within a particular area and has

acquired the right to communicate about a particular field of knowledge. The demand of particular

experts merges when there are political and social issues that are research-dependent and some social

actors are in need of a judgment on these issues. Experts are appointed by people in power, but

researchers can turn experts themselves by writing debate articles in major newspapers where most of

the social actors can be reached, i.e. authorities, businessperson and citizens. Due to their knowledge,

those scientists have the privilege to act as authorities within the environmental debate (Sundqvist

2000).

When a researcher chooses to study a problem from a perspective, many other aspects fall out of the

study. While scientists try to separate the areas of investigation, politicians have to treat all matters

simultaneously. Politicians are in a critical position because they have to formulate goals and choose

between different values (i.e. “ecologically necessary” and the “politically possible”) (Lundgren

2000b, 327). Moreover, they are subjected to different expectations and demands from a wide range

3 Coupling “describes how events in one part of a system trigger events in other parts of the system” (McCay et

al. 2011, 1354).

16

of social actors. Politicians must address, cooperate and reach compromises with several stakeholders.

As a result of negotiation and adjustment between different interests, the political language is

frequently contradictory and unclear, and it is meant to be that way. The main political goal is to

combine different goals and interests so that society does not collapse (Lundgren 2000b).

Researchers contribute with knowledge, but politicians are the ones who decide which problems

should be addressed and by which means these problems should be solved (Lundgren 2000b).

Societies and politicians in particular are tempted to use scientific language in their environmental

discourses due to the high status that is attributed to the use of scientific language. Environmental

protection should remain within the scientific field and should not be turned into a “value-free

domain” (Lundgren 2000b, 346).

In this matter, Chileans fishery social actors produce their own discourses. One group could be the

one consisting of the authorities and scientists; a group with social power and control. They have

designed and implemented the legal and formal MA framework which furthermore requires

compliance through laws, regulations, norms, guidelines among others in order to protect coastal

marine resources from overexploitation. The second group is comprised by fishers; the resource‟

users; a less powerful group. The fishers also produce their own arguments and interpretations under

their own realities and knowledge. Thus, in the context of this paper, I will use the discourse analysis

approach to study the relationship between the objectives established by the law, authorities‟ and

fishers‟ discourses respectively; all in contrast/comparison with the everyday practices.

4. BACKGROUND

4.1 Chile: country’s profile

Chile is a country located in the south west of South

America (figure 1) with a coast line of over 18,000 km and

an exclusive economic zone encompassing 200 nautical

miles of territorial sea. Its population is approximately 17

million inhabitants, of which 89% reside in urban areas.

Even though the main Chilean industries are mining

(copper), food, beverage, tobacco, agricultural and forestry,

the fishing industry provides jobs for more than 120,000

people, who are directly involved, including industrial and

artisanal fishers (BCC 2011; CIA 2011; Gallardo 2008;

Sernapesca 2011b; Sernatur n.d.).

Along the extensive Chilean coastline there are coves

commonly referred to as “caletas” in Spanish, which serve

as operational bases for artisanal boats, being place more

or less protected from winds and currents. These caletas

and their adjacent fishing grounds form the geographical,

social and ecological model of artisanal fishery (González

et al. 2006). These caletas are located within state and

private lands (Gallardo 2008).

Figure 1. Map of Chile

Source: University of Texas Libraries

(2011)

17

According to Caballol E., P. Latorre & C. Martinez (2006), the average privately owned land on the

Chilean coast is 44% but in central regions (from Region IV to X) the proportion of private ownership

land are between 88% to 100% (in Gallardo 2008). Although beaches are public goods, access to the

caletas has to be done through private properties when land is private. Many rural caletas are located

within private lands, where permission to access, imposed by the landowner, for officials, researchers,

merchants, tourists and fishers and their families to the fishing grounds is required. A permission to

build fishing and working facilities is also needed; in such situations, even the state cannot build any

infrastructure to support the development of the fishers. Other caletas are situated in urban areas

where the land is owned by the government or municipality in which cases fishers enjoy some

infrastructural facilities, and more important, enjoy tenure security in the form of commodatum

(Gallardo et al. 2011). The figure 2 shows the fishing facilities usually associated to a cove but that

the coves in private land, do not normally enjoy (created by Dirección of Obras Portuarias - DOP).

Figure 2. Basic port infrastructure for artisanal fishery

Source: Subpesca-Sernapesca-DOP 2008 (pag 11, my translation)

The figure 3 shows the distribution of property rights in the coastal border in cases of private

properties. By Chilean law the beaches are national good of public use, and it is measured from the

open waters to the highest tide water level, after that point it is considered private land. In addition to

that, the Art 614 of the Chilean Civil Code, 2006, specify that fishers are entailed to eight meters of

easement within the private land, but they are not allowed to build any fishing facilities. The

landowner is also prohibited to build fences, buildings and farming within the eight meters (Gallardo

2008).

18

Figure 3. Distribution property rights in the coastal border in cases of private properties

Source: Gallardo (2008, 59) (originally from Oficina Borde Costero, Subsecretaria de Marina,

Ministerio de Defensa Nacional) (minor modification).

4.2 The artisanal fisher

According to Chile's General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture, the artisanal fisher “is a person who

acts as a master or crew on a boat whatever remuneration system” (Ley No 19079 1991, Art 2:14).

Moreover, the Chilean law requires that the natural or legal person be registered in the Artisanal

Fishing Register (Registro Pesquero Artesanal – RPA) (Ley No 20437 2010; Sernapesca 2011c).

The artisanal fishing sector in Chile bases its importance on its role as a supplier of fresh seafood and

fish to the national population and contributes significantly to supply resources for the export

industries (Cereceda and Czischke 2001). From the employment point of view, this sector provided

jobs for 81,157 registered artisanal fishers as of December 2010, and considering that another three

job positions are created to attend secondary activities, this implies that more than 320,000 people are

dependent on the artisanal fishery sector. Moreover, every jobholder supports livelihoods for three

family members, giving a total of nearly 1 million people, which represent about 5% of the Chilean

population (FAO 2010; Sernapesca 2011a, 2011b).

Of these 81,157 artisanal fishers, 31,497 have integrated themselves to the TURF system as

collectives, those being working with benthic resources. The rest are fishers who target non-sedentary

marine resources in deeper waters within the 5 nautical miles destined to artisanal fisheries (see

below). The number of women participating in the TURF system is equal to 4,451. The size of the

AMERBs is small, as most of them comprise of less than 250 hectares, but they hold the majority of

the best Chilean fishing grounds (San Martín et al. 2010; Sernapesca 2011a, 2011b).

19

Historically, the loco fisher-divers were self-employed divers who worked in groups of three or four,

and migrate from one region to another “following the resources” along the Chilean coast (Gallardo et

al. 2011, 468; Gallardo and Friman 2011). They used the migration process and multi-species

catching as a strategy for survival (Meltzoff et al. 2002). In terms of education level, there is a great

diversity throughout the country among artisanal fishers, which in many cases suffer from a lack of

formal education; diverse settings of geographical accessibility; availability of network and lobbying

powers (Cereceda and Czischke 2001; Gallardo and Friman 2011).

4.3. The benthic resource Loco (Chilean abalon) The Locos (figure 4) are carnivorous sea snails and belongs to the benthic specie: marine organisms

which live in the bottom of water bodies (Bonzon et al. 2010; North American Benthological Society

2009). The Locos live in rocky, hard ground surfaces or in crevices and rock walls to a depth of 40

meters on average and tend to cluster in order to ensure their breeding and feeding. They can be found

in southern Pacific Ocean from Lobos de Afuera Island, northern Peru, to the Strait of Magellanes in,

Southern Chile (IMARPE 2003). Its scientific name is Concholepas concholepas, is also commonly

referred to south pacific abalone or abalone. In Chile it is known as loco and in Peru as chanque

(Dauphin et al. 2003; Gallardo 2008). The time to reach the minimum legal size of extraction of 10

cm, takes around 4 to 5 years, which can vary depending on the location, shorter time is needed in the

north while longer in the south due to the temperature of the marine environment (Aquaconsultores

2001 in Mardones 2008).

Figure 4. Loco (Concholepas concholepas)

Source: Cisandina Chile (nd)

In Chile, traditionally, the harvest was done by artisanal fishers, and still is performed from open

wooden boats (5-20 meters length). The crew generally consist of 3 members: the boatman or patron,

an auxiliary or helper and the diver. The auxiliary tends the air compressor that supplies air to the

diver and lift and sink of the collector bag in collaboration with the patron. The diver wears a wetsuit

and collects the locos by hand and which deposit in the collector bag attached to his waist. The

artisanal fishers are granted exclusive fishing privileges or rights within the first five nautical miles

from the coastal border (Gallardo 2008). The figure 5 shows an overview of the harvesting process,

illustration done by the fisher Luis Alfaro from MA Huentelauquén.

20

Figure 5. Loco extraction (illustration)

Source: Gloria Gallardo collection

The principal destination of the loco export is concentrated in three Asian countries: Taiwan, Japan

and Hong Kong, they hold more than the 80% of the total export (Gallardo 2008). The figure 6

represents the evolution of the landings from 1957 until 2010 and the export value (in US$) from

1987, when data started to be systematised. The production of locos after reached its higher peak in

1980 showed an abrupt decline in the landing after 1981 and up to 1985 leading then government to

take several measures to protect the loco such as bans. The sharp increase of export in 1993 denotes

the end of the ban and the opening of another system (Benthic Extraction Regime) that started before

the TURFs.

Figure 6. Loco landings and export prices (1957-2010)

Source: adapted from Hauck M. and Gallardo F. G. L., forthcoming 2012)

4.4. Historical overview before the arrival of the TURFS

In the late 1970s, the locos found new markets for export, in Japan and other Asian countries.

Consequently the pressure to increase loco production rose sharply and with a policy of open access

to fishing grounds there were no incentives to promote conservation (Cereceda and Czischke 2001;

González et al. 2006). In order to supply the increased demand, traditional independent fishers were

21

hired by entrepreneurs and middlemen who took them and their boats across the country on trucks to

look for new potential production sites, frequently using illegal fishing methods. The landing of the

locos therefore increased dramatically, followed by fluctuations in the catches, some of them

revealing great decrease in landings, a situation which was interpreted as overexploitation (Gallardo et

al. 2011; Gallardo and Friman 2011).

In response to the rapidly declining loco fish stocks, the fishing authorities implemented a traditional

management system, which includes season limits and a quota system (the Reproductive Seasons

(1981-1984), Global Quota (1985-1989) and the Benthic Extraction Regime (1993-1997) measures),

but with little success. The quotas were continually exceeded by amounts larger than the specified

quotas and seasons catch had to be reduced after every season. Even with the enforcement of these

regulatory measures to prevent overexploitation of the loco, illegal fishing, in practice, did not stop. In

1988, some fishers, together with marine biologist, instituted informal prototype „MAs‟; they

implemented harvest rotation in experimental zones, which the fishers themselves regulated. In 1990

the authorities had implemented a total closure for the locos for 2 years; however, the fishers working

in these experimental areas were exempt of this measure (Bonzon et al. 2010; Cereceda and Czischke

2001; Gallardo 2008). The critical situation aggravated by the bans put pressure on the fishing

authorities to implement a new system, one which was already proven to be efficient and had obtained

support from the scientist community and the benthic fishers: This was the MA system. The

authorities had to design and implement a process for the introduction of the MAs which had not

existed by tradition. This action required the replacement of a system of individual permits with a new

system that would grant fisher organisations exclusive rights to catch benthic resources in determined

areas of seabed. Finally, in 1997, the MA system was implemented, just at a time when the failure of

the quota system had become evident and the stocks were at a historically low level (González et al.

2006; San Martín et al. 2010). As a consequence of the implementation in the entire Chilean coast, the

MA bring the possibility to enforce a regulation in benthic fisheries with catching and landings in

remote locations by granting exclusive rights to the fisher organisation to use and protect their

resources (González et al. 2006).

5. THE NEW CHILEAN FISHING LAW AND THE AMERB OR CHILEAN TURFS

5.1 In the light of new challenges

The milestone of the fishing law in Chile is Law 18892 from 1989, implemented when the

government realised that free access to fishing grounds, combined with the fact that the catch quotas,

which had been put in place by law since 1931, had resulted in a race to extract resources. The

situation above shows that even the introduction of quotas as a conservation measure for

hydrobiological resources is inefficient if open access policy is maintained; a new legal framework

was therefore needed in order to achieve the goals of the fishing sector (Historia de la Ley 18892 -

Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura 1989).

Law 18892, enacted in 1989, replaced the 1931 law, and has since been modified by Law 19079 and

Law 19080, both in 1991, which introduced some corrections and re-orders of paragraphs and articles.

The objective of Law 18892 (General Law of Fishing and Aquaculture - Ley General de Pesca y

Acuicultura in Spanish) was to provide a legal framework in the fishing sector, while at the same time

protecting efficiently the hydrobiological resources. As a general principle, the law maintains a

system of freedom of access to fishing stocks, since only a registration to the National Fishing

Registry is needed (Historia de la Ley 18892 - Ley General de Pesca y Acuicultura 1989). However,

fishers can only fish in the region where they are registered, and are not allowed to migrate as they did

before the 1991 registration rule (Gallardo 2008).

22

The premise of the government in the implementation of the MA system was to partially delegate to

the artisanal fisher the responsibility over the management of the resources, creating benefits for the

fishers as well as for the government, by maintaining order in the management of this sector

(Subpesca 2005).

“The specific goals of the MA in Chile are to:

- Contribute to the conservation of benthic resources

- Contribute to the sustainability of artisan economic activity

- Maintain or increase biological productivity of benthic resources,

- Increase knowledge of the functioning of benthic eco-system, generating useful information

for management, and

- Promote a participative management” (Gallardo 2008, 93).

From these five goals, three are related to the resource and two to the resource users. However, the

TURFs system entails a complex nomenclature of stakeholders, above fishers.

5.2 TURFs’ main social actors The Fishers and their organisations are the resource users and consequently the key actors of the MAs

(San Martín et al. 2010; Gallardo 2008). In Chile, there are several stakeholders involved in the

development of MAs and around the MAs, the most important ones are briefly described below, and

are grouped according to their social role.

Because the MAs are related to the exploitation of marine resources and to the use of the costal border

for fishing practices, there are therefore two different ministries involved in the context of the Chilean

MAs.

With regards to the exploitation of marine resources, the Ministry of Economy, Development and

Tourism, through the Fishing Subsecretary authority (Subpesca), is responsible of fishery

administration. The function of Subpesca is the promotion of sustainable aquaculture and fishing

practices, encouraging the conservation of hydrobiological species by providing policies and

regulations for the sector. It has the authority over both industrial and artisanal fisheries. Sernapesca is

the National Fisheries Service (Servicio Nacional de Pesca), a governmental authority under Subpesca

and its mission is to enforce the law and get catch and compile landing statistics data. Also under

Subpesca, the National Fishing Council seeks to facilitate the stakeholders‟ participation at a national

level. Under Sernapesca are Regional Directorates (13), Provincial Offices (45), as well as the

Institutional Coordination Office in Santiago, the Chilean capital city (Gallardo 2008; Subpesca

2011).

The Ministry of Defense through its Marine Subsecretary is responsible of the administration and use

of the marine territory. It defines the areas available for the development of MAs. The Marine

Subsecretary in conjunction with Sernapesca are the authorities that finally grant the MA to the

fishing organisation. At the national level there are 2 agencies: (1) Directemar (the General Direction

of Maritime Territorial and Merchant Marine supports the Marine Subsecretary in the control tasks

such as concessions on marine areas and aquaculture, and (2) The National Commission for the Use

of the Costal Borders (proposes to the President of the Republic the use of the coastal border. There

are 14 regional commissions at the regional level (Gallardo 2008; SSFFAA-Subsecretaria para las

Fuerzas Armadas 2011).

23

In addition to the government authority, there are other public institutions with the function to

promote and stimulate economic development, among others the Development Fund for Artisanal

Fishing (FFPA), Direction of Harbour Works (DOP), and CORFO (Gallardo 2008).

Regarding research bodies at the national level there are the Fishing Promotion Institute (IFOP –

Instituto de Fomento Pesquero), the Fishing Research Fund (FIP – Fondo de Investigación Pesquero),

and several universities such as Universidad Católica del Norte and Universidad Austral de Chile. In

addition, there are private consults firms providing technical support (Gallardo 2008; San Martín et al.

2010).

5.3 TURFs’ application process To apply, each organisation is required to present a baseline study that includes a detailed map of the

area, the type of sea bottom, a description of the target species as well as secondary species, and an

estimate of the abundance of the target species. Moreover, they must formulate a management and

exploitation plan to be approved by Subpesca (Fishing Subsecretary), and later sign an agreement

with Sernapesca (National Fisheries Service). The organisation is required to present yearly follow-up

reports of its management performance, which include the survey of the fishing grounds and direct

assessment of the abundance of the resources, projecting its future trends. To prepare the baseline

studies, the management plans and the annual reports, a certified consultant must be hired. The

Chilean state, through different programs and agencies, has been subsidising these studies. A

territorial tax, patent or rent is stipulated, as well as the conditions to cancel the privileges over the

MAs (in the event of non-compliance with the tax payments or the management plan arises). The

MAs are granted for four years, after which the contract can be renewed. The MA cannot be rented or

alienated to the benefit of third parties (Gallardo 2008; González et al. 2006; San Martín et al. 2010;

Subpesca 1997).

In case of premature termination or resignation of the MA, the fisher‟s organisation cannot reapply for

three years, counting from the date of the notification (Ley No 20437 2010). One of these cases can

occur when the organisation doesn‟t pay their annual tenure fee, as a result the fishing organisation

loses its right (Gallardo 2008).

When two or more fishing associations aspire to get the same territory, an allocation selection process

is applied. The criteria for fair allocation according to the fishing law and in decreasing order are:

nearness to the required MA, number of members and the age of the organisation (Gallardo 2008; Ley

No 20437 2010). Moreover, Max Montoya remarks that the “MAs are established is there is no other

alternative use of the desired zone such as tourism, private concessions or others, meaning that those

coastal spaces that have not been planned for other activity can eventually become a MA” (Email

comm. Gallardo-Montoya 2009*).

In addition, the MAs, as a new formal institution, require its members to organise themselves, recruit

members, choose a leader, and decide on how to run the MA collectively. The internal organisation

thus varies between MAs. They have to discuss internal rules (such as procedures of entry and exit of

the organisation), enforcement of norms, penalties and fees. Moreover, they must agree on harvesting

methods and revenue distribution, often they also implement a basic welfare system (assistance to

widows, elders, work-related accidents, medical care, etc.), manage social funds (vigilance,

maintenance, economic support for celebrations, etc.), among other organisational tasks (Gallardo and

Friman 2011; González et al. 2006; San Martín et al. 2010). Given these internal regulation and

structure, fishers work as a collective, and interact as such with the commercial sector, the

24

government authorities and the legislative system (Gallardo and Friman 2011). After the introduction

of the MA system, the small-scale fisheries started to organise themselves regionally and nationally

more deeply, becoming an important actor within the fishery system where their voice and opinions

are heard and they have achieved legitimacy in the sector (Gallardo 2008).

5.4 Current situation of the TURFs Almost fifteen years have passed since the TURFs have been put in practice in Chile in 1997. Despite

many challenges, fishing authorities, the scientist community, and leaders of fishing organisations

have on average a positive perception of the MAs (San Martín et al. 2010). Among the challenges

counts continued illegal fishing, low economic benefit, “one-size-fits-all” approach, and to some

degree access and infra structure problems in privately owned land.

Since the implementation of the TURFs, the status of the resources seems to be secured in the MAs

giving fishers the incentive to protect their resources in common (Gallardo et al. 2011; Montoya 2006;

San Martín et al. 2010). However, fishers continue to practice illegal fishing. The poaching within and

outside of the MAs is the result of the fisher's livelihood needs to complement their income. The

illegal fishing estimated by González et al. (2006) is around 50% of the total catches of locos. The

depletion in open access area, outside of the MAs, is likely to affect in the long term the normal

productivity in the MAs since both areas are not biologically separated; the action of one area will

affect the other no matter the status of the area (Gallardo and Friman 2011).

The resources extracted from MAs goes mainly for export, and revenues are highly dependable of the

fluctuations of the international market. Low economic benefits are likely to affect the balance of the

MA system with regards to the social and ecological aspects as well. Price being one of the most

important factors for the benefit calculations, and considering its fluctuations since 2000, with a

tendency to lower prices, the result is lower revenues for the fishers (Gallardo and Friman 2011; San

Martín et al. 2010). Even with the tendency of lower prices, the operational costs of MAs are still high

in comparison to income from MAs, including consulting fees, assessment studies and taxes; other

costs to take into account are the location and the distance from urban areas to the fishing grounds and

availability of the resources (Gallardo 2008; Gallardo and Friman 2011; Montoya 2006; San Martín et

al. 2010).

The MA system, which originated and was successful in central Chile, was reproduced along the coast

for other regions and resources. Nevertheless, the “one-size-fits-all” approach often neglects

geographical and local characteristics, accessibility to the fishing grounds, and availability of

resources, among other considerations (San Martín et al. 2010). Among the less positive aspects count

for example that the historical diving method and traditional practices and behaviours are declining

since the divers, who traditionally dove all year are diving less as all available resources are extracted

in a matter of a few days rather than throughout the year (Dietz et al. 2003; Gelcich et al. 2005).

The inland areas adjacent to the MAs are in some cases privately owned (mostly in rural areas) while

others are state owned (frequently in urban settings). Therefore among the challenges mentioned

above, a major concern for fishers in some rural areas remains unsolved: the rights to access to the

fishing grounds and to hold an adequate infrastructure, issue which is related to land tenure and

ownership. The restricted access to the fishing grounds and the lack of opportunity to develop

adequate fishing facilities are halting the smooth development of the TURFs in some rural areas

(Gallardo 2008).

25

6. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS

In this chapter, the transcripts of the interviews were analysed and the different occurrences were

divided into three categories. The first one is related to the accomplishment of the fishing

organisations, the second one talks about the challenges of the fishing organisations and their TURFs

(richness of the seabed, land tenure and infrastructure issues) and the third one about the future

perceptions – future expectations. It is worth to remark, that not all stakeholders have comments over

each particular theme.

a) Accomplishment of fishing organisations

The accomplishment of fishing organisation theme will highlight the perception of the different social

actors in regards of the organisation and its interaction with other stakeholders within the MA system.

In this regard, two issues emerged during the analysis: negotiation power and leadership.

The MAs system brought some advantages and according to the interview they all converge together

in the empowering of the fishers through their collective organisation. These well organised and

legitimised groups of fishers in some cases have provided important amendments, regarding MAs, to

the fishing laws. Thus, an effective organisation on the fishers side, has opened the necessary

channels for effective communication with government, Gerardo Cerda said (Interview Sernapesca

2008*). For instance, Jaime Aburto and Wolfgang Stotz (scientists and consultants from the UCN -

Universidad Católica del Norte Coquimbo) have a similar view on the benefits of the organisation for

the fishers. They highlight that the MAs are strengthening the collective work and organisations,

which provide them more attention from the authorities (Interview Aburto 2008**; Interview Stotz

2008b**).

Wolfgang Stotz adds that the formalisation of the MAs brings interaction as second benefit:

… all people are interacting, the authorities, the scientists, the fishermen…

we are all talking, we are all interacting, which was not [the situation]

before (Interview Stotz 2008b**).

Luis Durán (President of Federación de Pescadores del Elqui and Member of the environmental

council of Confepach (National Fishermen's Union Confederation) comments that his fishing

federation participate in national instances, for example in the III and IV Region Fishing Zone

Council, where the laws for the fisheries are revised. During the meeting they have been participating

and their opinions were listened (Interview Durán 2008*).

In the same line, Oscar Avilés from FEPEMACH (Federation of Artisanal Fishers and Divers of the

Choapa Province, Region IV) concluded that the “MAs are really local development organisations”

(Interview Avilés 2008**), meaning that the potential of the fishing organisations in the social sphere,

by influencing fisher members, local communities and local authorities.

Javier Chávez from Sernapesca said that nowadays the fishing organisations count with very good

leaders. If those leaders act in a good manner they will be listened. Thus through the good leadership,

artisanal fishers have got political pressure power, and achieved important amends within the Fishing

Law and within specific regulations (Group Interview Sernapesca 2008*).

26

In regards the MA‟s internal organisation and leadership, Luis Durán said that the leader‟s vision and

quality of management are essential for the well-functioning of each MA. On a question of the quality

of leadership, he says that whether it is hierarchical or democratic “depends on the leader‟s quality,

the leader‟s education, and the leader‟s vision of the cove‟s future projections, if they [the fishers]

don‟t have future projections or conviction over their people, they are not going to make it” (Interview

Durán 2008*).

The MA as a legitimate entity has negotiation power that together with a good leadership can ask and

demand to be listened to. Moreover, they can influence other stakeholders, not been seen before.

b) Challenges of the fishing organisations and their TURFs

The challenges of fishing organisation theme will highlight some unexpected outcomes as a result of

the allocation of MAs and how these are interpreted by different stakeholders. Six sub-themes arisen

during the analysis: low barrier entry, race for places, richness of the seabed, right to access, tenure

issues and infrastructure problems.

Max Montoya from Subpesca (Email communication Gallardo-Montoya 2009*) notes that the

artisanal fishery presents low barrier entry which make this activity easy too to work with.

Unemployed people from different industries find that extraction of marine resources is a good way to

receive an income, as an example “due to a decrease in the price of copper, nearly 700 people

working with small-scale mining began instead to extract algae”. Max Montoya further notes that if

the fishers cannot register to get access to the primary species, they find the way to at least access

them:

even if registration remains closed for the main species, there are still some

species, called secondary species, of low interest, that have open access.

Therefore fishers sign up on these alternative species, not with the intention

to operate over them, but to have a way to access main species and operate

illegally, which the regulation has no control over (Email communication

Gallardo-Montoya 2009*).

In the same line, Wolfgang Stotz (scientist and consultant from the UCN) describes that the

application process set the barrier entry to a low level, by allowing entrance to the fishery sector

without major obstacles. He said that “traditional fishermen lost their resources against a lot of other

people” because many “non-fishers, who work in the city, drive a taxi, or whatever” enter to the

fishing system (Interview Stotz 2008b**). Wolfgang Stotz continues that the fact that the system was

only to have an obligation to have a fisher organisation brought or brings people together without

limitation, and he brings as an example describing a MA in the region, where all the members of one

organisation belong to a single family. He says, the MA system:

was too open, so it attracted a lot of people which are now in the system and

which should not be in the system (Interview Stotz 2008b**).

Max Montoya, Subepsca (Email communication Gallardo-Montoya 2009*) and Jaime Aburto, UCN,

(Interview Aburto 2008**) mention that the Fishing Law does not specify the maximum number of

MA in the system. In fact, Jaime Aburto continues, “at least 60% of the IV Region‟s coast is under

MA regime, which are precisely one of the most productive areas, but it is neither enough to make the

living for a whole year, for the fishers” (Interview Aburto 2008**). According to Max Montoya, the

27

maximum number of MA has a limit which is determined by the capacity of the resource to regenerate

itself. However, “No math formula ad-hoc exists in this case”, meaning that there no exist any

mathematical model to calculate the carrying capacity of the benthos ecosystem and the number of

fishing organisations that should be assigned to work within the system (Email communication

Gallardo-Montoya 2009*).

The second challenge covered in this section is the race for places to apply for a MA which reminded

Jaime Aburto (scientist and consultant from the UCN) the „tragedy of the commons‟. A concept

commonly referred to a race for resources, leading to depletion but in this case the fishers started to

struggle to get an MA:

[after the success of some MAs] the race to get resources was transferred

from the resource to the areas... the areas started to become that resource

[the commons] and [the fishers] started to struggle to get an area, another

and another…(Interview Aburto 2008**).

The attractiveness of the MAs created a boom of new fishers as pointed by Wolfgang Stotz, UCN:

“Here are today many more fishermen than never before in the history in Chile: people say, well we

make an organisation and we ask for an area and all the locos are ours” (Interview Stotz 2008b**).

Mariano Godoy from the MA Huentelauquén confirms that there are many fishers per sea hectare,

especially in the IV Region (Group Interview Huentelauquén 2008*). As a consequence, the greater

the number of fishers the lesser [the] income [of each], “the benefits got diluted among a lot of people.

So that makes it difficult to work, said Wolfgang Stotz (Interview Stotz 2008**).

Javier Rivera from Subpesca said that “any MA that is granted will exclude the rest from a [specific

area]. [An area] is granted to those [organisations] who manifest an interest for it. Those

[organisations] who don‟t express an interest remain out of the system (Group Interview Subpesca

2008b*). Antonio Gonzáles from Subpesca as well, expressed that they envisioned that the already

established MAs could embrace those people who were looking for a place to apply. However, this

solution would not bring a fair result for the old members who have been already paying union‟s fee

from the beginning, as their share of income would become reduced with the entrance of new

members (Group Interview Subpesca 2008 a*).

The third challenge that the MAs are facing is the issue of richness of the seabed. Antonio Gonzáles

from Subpesca said, when the government established the MA system, “the first fishing organisations

that entered voluntarily might have been more benefited because they got to choose the most

productive natural banks (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*). As Javier Rivera remarks, “the first

[MAs] that enrolled got the benefit, precisely perhaps there exist an equality problem” because “not

all the [natural] richness [of the sea] is distributed homogeneously [along] the coastal border (Group

Interview Subpesca 2008b*). Antonio Gonzáles continues:

Those [organisations] who participated later had to distribute within

themselves what was left. Some complaints [related to heterogeneity

distribution of the richness of the seabed] arose and these might create a

conflict in the future, because distribution was not equal due to the situation

that the organisations did not enrolled the system at the same time (Group

Interview Subpesca 2008a*).

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In addition to that, Jaime Aburto, UCN, said that “in the first years, the first areas worked very well;

there was a good price for the resource, basically the loco. Therefore the authority basically made a

copy and paste of the model [original well working MAs] in different sectors, but [without

considering that] their realities are different” (Interview Aburto 2008**). In the same line, Antonio

Gonzáles and Javier Rivera indicate that as a result of the success in some MAs, many other fishers

showed interest to also get MAs, but available spaces were occupied for those who did not apply

initially, therefore they have to look for remaining locations where not precisely the best spaces are

(Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).

Even though the MAs are in essence related with water body spaces, the fishing organisation itself

depend on the use of land as well, for the in-land chores such as meetings, storage of fishing tools,

unload resources, land boats and other needs. Land and water bodies are crucial elements for the

development of the MAs; while the water provides the resources, the land provides the basis for

organisation and commercialisation. The land issue results in three connected problems: the access to

the fishing grounds, the tenure of land and the opportunities (or lack) for building fishing facilities

(Gallardo 2008; Gallardo et al. 2011) which became our fourth, fifth and sixth challenges respectively.

In regards of the fourth challenge, the issue of access to the fishing grounds, some rural fishing

organisations located in privately owned land, especially in regions III, IV and VI can create tensions

between the fishers and the landowners regarding the access to the coast (fishing grounds), because

the latter sets the rules of accessibility. If the MAs are adjacent to a public owned land, the problem of

access can be solved “little by little” as in the VIII Region, Alejandra Pinto said (Group Interview

Subpesca 2008a*). However, the land problem cannot be solved and government cannot help fishers

when it comes to private properties. Javier Rivera from Subpesca comments on that:

when (the MAs) are located in state zones, a regularisation of the sectors is

sought. Regarding private land, in case the organisation doesn‟t come to an

agreement with the private sector, generally there is when the problems start

(Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).

Luis Durán (member of Confepach and Federación de Pescadores del Elqui) mentions that in the IV

Region, about 70% of the beaches are adjacent to private property and their owners don‟t want the

development of infrastructure on their land. If the fishing organisation is located on governmental

property, the problem had been solved. However, the issue with private land is complicated and it is a

money issue (Interview Durán 2008*), referring to the power of landlords in relation to fishers.

Even though the right to access to the fishing grounds is of great importance for the MA development,

Antonio Gonzáles from Subpesca comments that the land access is not an issue that belongs to the

MAs:

… it is not related to the MAs, it is related to the organisation. Because it is

the organisation that is established in-land. MAs can either be aside or at

three hours away from the fishing grounds. The organisation is situated on

the caleta (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).

The MA legal framework lacks consistency and clarity as Luis Durán points out with humour: “The

State could say that it owns up to where the highest tide occurs. I could assume that I could transit there

only when the tide is low, but when the tide arises, I will find myself in private property… (laughs) and

29

that‟s the way it is…” (Interview Durán 2008*). In the same line, Eduardo Alfaro from MA

Huentelauquén ironically said that the law guaranty the right to access, but it doesn‟t specify how “by

foot?, by donkey?, on a truck?, on a tractor?” (laughs) (Group Interview Huentelauquén 2008*).

The fifth challenge is in regards of the tenure issue and Javier Rivera from Subpesca said that there is

a misconception of the fishers in regards of the use and tenure of the land in the coastal border. Those

“fishers strongly believe that is an acquired right of them [just] because they are the users of the

coastal border” Javier Rivera said (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).

Gerardo Cerda (Interview Sernapesca 2008*) remarks that we should not prejudge the bad will of the

private landowners, some of them allow providing some areas for the fishing organisations, but

fishers are in some cases abusing or taking advantage of the consent of the landowner. To exemplify

his argument, Gerardo Cerda explains the case of a regional cove: “[the fishers] have installed a stall

there, and another over there, and they occupied effectively a lot of land. Some time ago, the

landowner, who did not use all of the land area, said: „look, I am willing to give you this land, but you

have to group yourselves in a sector‟, and they did not accept”. Javier Chávez (Interview Sernapesca

2008*) brings an example of similar case in a smaller cove where the landowner said: “occupy this

sector, you [the fishers] will use it exclusively as an operative working place‟, and [the fishers] neither

agreed [on the offer]”.

The sixth and final challenge is in regards of the fishing facilities. Antonio Gonzáles from Subpesca

said that the major disadvantage, of the MAs embedded within private properties, is the impossibility

to build any infrastructure for the caleta such as pier or any other facilities (Group Interview Subpesca

2008a*). Luis Durán highlights that all the MA at Los Vilos (IV Region) have problems to overcome

the lack of port facilities and, around 20% have the same problems in the region, maybe more…

(Interview Durán 2008*). Javier Chávez from Sernapesca, said that if the organisation is located on

private land the government cannot do anything about it. However, to overcome this dilemma,

Sernapesca suggests the use of a portable winch when organisations are facing similar situations:

We have proposed for example the use of winch [to draw the boats]

Effectively what... what we have made… is to bow down the law subject,

let‟s say, associate project with mobile winches, or removable winches,

allowing those territories, or those caletas on private land, to install a winch

that can be putted inside, protect and take out, therefore, I might not build a

base, I might not build a pier, but I will be able to support myself at the

border, right?, with a winch, preventing the guys to have their backs broken

when taking out a boat full of locos (Interview Sernapesca 2008*).

The government is taking action to provide a fair outcome. Javier Chávez (Sernapesca) said that

regarding the need of build fishing facilities on private land “that doesn‟t mean that effectively the

State… has not been concerned about handling this issue…. It is a very complex situation” (Interview

Sernapesca 2008*).

Javier Chávez from Sernapesca said that “in Chile there are expropriation regulations, but

…expropriation … [are] associated with a benefit for the [whole society], not for a [particular] group

of persons” (Interview Sernpesca 2008*).

30

At this point, the land issue was focused in land tenure and the restriction of access to the fishing

grounds and the possibility to build fishing infrastructure, but there is an aspect that come out during

the interview that is worth mentioning. Interestingly, the accessibility level to the fishing grounds

come with the issue of security and vigilance of the MAs mentioned by Javier Rivera from Subpesca:

On one hand, the surveillance, of the MAs, there is always a counterside

there because those MAs in front of private land have more capacity of

surveillance than those located in front of state land (Group Interview

Subpesca 2008a*).

Due to the restricted access to private owned land, the caletas and fishing grounds become more

protected from intruders, in contrast with the fishing organisations located in state land without access

problems, an issue that that have been also highligthed by Gallardo (2008) in her empirical analysis of

Chilean TURFs.

Javier Chávez, Sernapesca official said, that even with difficulty of access to the fishing grounds,

none have been thrown out by the landowners; all the fisher organisations are still working:

They all keep operating despite of some access restriction, but still have

access, and still keep their MAs also… Of course there are organisations

that can effectively say that they cannot develop because they are over

private land, which is true at some point… let‟s say…. From their point of

view, that has impact them with less productivity. (…) Anyway they go in,

and they perform their job (Interview Sernapesca 2008*).

c) Future perceptions - future expectations

This section will provide the reader with a series of arguments that motivate some fishing

organisations to keep working on their MAs. The perceptions and expectations of the fishers about

their future is an invaluable source of imagination and creativity that provide the fishers a hope over

the challenges that they face daily. MAs allow fishers to exploit new ways to benefit from these areas,

even though these activities are not specifically allowed by the law, but neither prohibited. The

underlying goal of the benthic fishers is diversify the offer of goods and services and take advantage

of the exclusive use of land and water bodies.

One of the issues found in the empirical material is the fisher‟s desire to use the MA for other

purposes and take advantage of their exclusive rights. For example, Javier Rivera, Subpesca‟s official,

pointed out that after 2002 some areas have been demanded not only because they represent historical

fishing grounds but because they can represent other objectives. These objectives are not only for the

resources itself but for the territorial space. There is a perception that future projects can be

established within the MAs, therefore “I show interest for that sector, to have something to negotiate

with later” (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).

As an example of diversification activities is represented by the case of Punta de Choros MA with

hold an area of 1000 hectares, including 2 islands, is fortunately located within a marine reserve,

where penguins and dolphins are protected. The MA has 30 fibreglass boats, privately own by fishers

(Gallardo and Friman 2012) for tourism which increase the income for the organisation. Boats use gas

instead of oil to prevent contamination of the environment. Its president Oscar Áviles said:

31

We have 5 activities: fishing, tourism, algae, the MAs and now we are starting with

aquaculture. The MAs has allowed us to diversify our activities (Interview Áviles

2008**).

In addition the Punta de Choros MA has started a process factory for loco, lapa and jaiva and are also

looking for participate in the Chinese market via the Chilean export agency (ProChile), for which they

have also produced a video that shows their products (Interview Áviles 2008**).

Another issue found in the empirical material was the use of the MA as a way to compete with other

coast stakeholders, in this case those who work with aquaculture. Javier Rivera adds that the strategy

of some organisations in the south seem to apply for MAs as “a tool to protect their space against

salmon aquaculture”. In this regards Antonio Gonzáles also from Subpesca brings up a case from

southern Chile:

In the X and XI Region, merluza fishers are starting to apply for MAs. …

they are noticing that the merluza austral, which has been their business for

many years, is starting to decline its productivity, so they are anticipating

themselves by reserving a space with a MA (Group Interview Subpesca

2008a*).

Despite all the challenges, with MAs not being as profitable as expected, there seem to be a

conviction to keep the MAs. Antonio Gonzáles comments:

In general, MAs, even if they are not getting good results, we still try to

support them because in general, the people like the measure, and they don‟t

want to lose their MA, even if some of the requisites are hard to comply

with (Group Interview Subpesca 2008a*).

In the same line, Oscar Avilés said that even though there are places that don‟t have abundance of

extractive resources, people tend to stay there (Interview Avilés 2008**). And Luis Durán shares the

same idea:

Many people are saying „this has not been profitable‟, but they are still

working in their MAs, and this is from several years ago. I don‟t know any

case where somebody has quit their MA because it is going bad. I don‟t

know any case, no antecedent on that regard (Interview Durán 2008*).

7. ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

This section is structured as follow: first I present my overall perception of the Chilean TURFs,

second I present the analysis of the empirical material divided in the same three topics: achievement

of the fishing organisations, the challenge of the fishing organisations and their TURFs and the future

perceptions – future expectations. Finally, I answer the two research questions of this study.

The analysis of the empirical material shows that the Management Area system in Chile raises many

concerns and reflections. The main social actors in the Chilean benthic fishery sector have similar and

complementary discourses, perceptions and goals. The central government seeks to protect and

preserve the benthic resources and improve the social and economic situation of the fishers. The

32

scientists perform studies for the future improvement of the practices related to the protection of the

marine species. Finally, the fishers try to obtain better living conditions by securing a more stable and

constant source of income to support the development of their families.

.

The Chilean TURFs, for several reasons, are experiencing difficulties to comply with the system and

to survive. In general, some of the factors that affect the fishers, as well as the performance of the MA,

are resource availability, access to fishing grounds, the use or lack of fishing facilities, location

settings (rural, urban), dependency of international prices, etc. Therefore, as pointed out by Gallardo

and Friman (2012) the empowerment of the fishers and diversification of their activities make them

“less vulnerable to global business cycles”. Nevertheless, every fishing association in Chile is

different, some of them are doing well, while others are not. Even though the government has initially

set the usage of the TURFs for extracting declared resources, extra activities seem to be allowed and

promoted such as fishing or harvesting other resources, aquaculture practices and even business

services such as tourism and catering. Some of these activities are practiced inside the granted areas of

the fishing organisations, whereas others are taking place outside of the TURFs.

As noted by Meltzoff et al. (2002, 92) “Fishermen envision the MA as a platform for increased

earning potential”. Also Montoya (2004, cited in Gallardo and Friman 2012) says that the “MAs are

not an economic solution for fishers, but a complement to their economy, which is consistent with

policy”. The fishing organisation leaders are starting to see the MA as something more than co-

management and marine tenure. They also perceive the MA as an instrument toward facilitating other

business opportunities such as tourism and restaurants (Gallardo and Friman 2012; Meltzoff et al.

2002).

The delegation on the usage of water bodies for small-scale fishers has been a major step by the

government to decentralise the protection of the benthic resources, a resource of great importance for

the economy and for the subsistence of the fishers. However, in theory any fishing organisation can be

formed by any group of people without any particular fishing experience which creates a system that

is too open and prone to misuse.

Below, the empirical material will bring additional components to explain the current practices of the

MA system and for that I will continue with the same structure starting with the achievements of the

fishing organisations, followed by the challenges of the fishing organisations and their MAs and

finally the future perceptions and expectations.

a) Achievements of the fishing organisations

Fisher‟s organise as a collective for the protection and exploitation of the benthic resources in a given

area. This purposive organisation to obtain a MA has allowed them to achieve legitimacy with the

authorities and society at large. Fishers, otherwise, are organised through different regional and

national associations and federations. The fishers‟ voices, through their leaders, are heard in higher

instances and their opinions have provided important insights for the amendments to the fishing rules.

As organised groups, they are bringing to the negotiation table issues that require effective solutions

to their demands in relation to the MAs. For instance, thanks to the fishers, the Law 20347 (2010) has

included an update to the control system and the sanction and infraction regulations; this translates for

instance in an increase of penalties for the theft of benthic resources or for extraction that contravenes

the management plan (Historia de la Ley No 20437 2010). Thus, adaptations to the laws and

regulations within the Chilean fishery management system are clear demonstration that fishers can

push their demands.

33

It is not only the unity that makes an organisation successful, in fact it is the leader‟s vision and

management quality that inspire and influence the entire organisation, as Luis Durán (member of

Confepach and Federación de Pescadores del Elqui) explained (Interview Durán 2008*). Gallardo and

Friman (2011) and Gallardo and Friman (2012) also suggest that a strong leadership is one of the most

important attributes for the success of the TURFs. The MA Punta de Choros exemplify how the

leader‟s vision helps the organisation to diversify their economic activities to restaurants and tourism

and improve the overall organisation‟s welfare, among others with the help of public agencies such as

the Chilean Development Corporation Agency and the Development fund for Artisanal Fishing, who

supported fishers organisation with the implementation of extra activities (Interview Avilés 2008**).

The combination of both organisational and leadership aspects have been a prerequisite for the

development and success of some MAs. The well established social foundation of the organisation

will lead for a better performance of their members, and therefore, an improvement on the economic

and social wellbeing (Gallardo and Friman 2012). These findings also have been confirmed by

different studies (Cereceda and Czischke 2001; Gallardo 2008; Gallardo and Friman 2012; González

et al. 2006 and Meltzoff et al. 2002) that have also highlighted the importance of the social factors

within the development of the MAs.

b) Challenges for the fishing organisations and their TURFs

The Chilean law provides a generous entry for all fishing organisations to obtain a MA. However, the

drawback is that, the higher the number of organisations and fishers, the less amount of money for

distribution among the fishers. Moreover, the high prices of the loco in the international market raised

the expectation of the fishers to get a MA and extract the resources (Gallardo 2008; Gallardo et al.

2011), which probably motivated others to apply for it. This motivation for application is highlighted

by Jaime Aburto (Interview Aburto 2008**), marine biologist and consultant, comparing the concept

of “tragedy of the commons” by ecologist Garret Hardin on the race for exploitation of common

goods, but in this regard for the race for appropriation of the fishing areas.

According to Gallardo (2008), the first group of fishers that was affected and excluded in the MA

system was the fishing organisations that didn‟t show interest in the system and unregistered or

unorganised fishers, therefore one can argue that the equality in opportunity was provided but not

taken. Fisher organisations were free to decide if they wish to participate in the system or not. Some

of them decided to apply immediately but others were not interested or were perhaps suspicious or

cautious to the measure or just decided to do it later.

Some areas in the Chilean coastal border are richer in terms of hydrobiological resources than others

(Javier Rivera Group Interview Subpesca 2008b*), providing some MAs with major advantages in

harvest whereas other MAs have to find alternative ways to improve their economic situation

(Gallardo and Friman 2012). The implementation of the MA system as „one-size-fits-all‟ approach,

perhaps did not fully consider the uniqueness of the different local ecosystems along the extensive

coastline; thus creating situations that would give different outcomes for different MAs (Gallardo et al.

2011).

Among the organisations that were granted a MA are those that are satisfied with their MA. These

MA enjoy healthy resources from the ground to the fish, with fishers and leaders that are improving

their economic and social conditions, thus increasing the motivation to keep working on the MA to

34

help create a sense of attachment to the water but also to the land where they base their fishing

activities. However they do not always have tenure.

There are also those who are not completely satisfied with their MA either due to the lack of resources

or because of access problems or lack of infrastructure (see further below), which worsen their

situation. Even in these cases fishers keep their MAs. Despite economic and social problems, fishers

tend to develop a sense of attachment. Since the scarcity of natural resources does not give them

enough economic income and social welfare, the only few valuable assets they have access to are the

water as a “legitimately” granted resource and the cove or land. Related to this is another critical

challenge for some of the fishing organisations, the land tenure in some rural areas. The MA system is

“a kind of „sea tenure‟; a tenure that does not imply ownership but a right of use in which the

producers control the means of production in a limited coastal sea territory” (Gallardo 2008, 177).

Even though the MA grants rights to use a sea area (fishing grounds), their members, the fishers, are

land based, and consequently the physical conditions that surround the coves are a determinant factor

for the development of many MAs (Gallardo 2008; Gallardo and Friman 2010).

The landowners have to give, by law, an easement to the fishers but they do not need to allow the

construction of port infrastructure within their property (see figure 2). Temporary alternatives to solve

the lack of fishing infrastructure such as pier or ramp have been implemented with the use of a

portable winch that at least provides a safer way to land the boats and prevent back injuries for the

fishers. Nevertheless, the portable winch is a convenient tool for the fishing work within some MAs,

but there are other physical improvements that the fishers needs and demands to ensure safety and

productivity such as a protection wall from waves, a pier, an esplanade, fishing storage room and

basic services like garbage recollection system, electricity, water and sewer (Gallardo and Friman

2010). Thus, it is important to find alternative solutions to provide better working conditions.

As well as the marine tenure, there is great importance for the development of the MA as a whole as

land tenure cannot be disassociated from water and deserves equal importance. Fishers depend on

both territories for exploitation, management and commercialisation activities. These limitations are

“extremely undermining of prospects for the further development of fisheries and enjoyment of

reasonable family and social life” (Gallardo and Friman 2010, 57).

In sum, the type of property where the fishing association is located has a direct effect on the

performance and development of the MA, the use or lack to access of adequate infrastructure such as

roads and piers can bring a different results economically and socially. Economically, because it

undermines fishing activities, enlarging the difficulty to produce and sell, and increase transport costs

with an overall result of decreasing the financial benefits. Socially, because the problems of access

arise dispute among the fishing members and landowners, decrease of level of motivation, and the

lack of infrastructure hinder development and even increase chances of physical injuries.

c) Future perceptions – future expectations

Despite all these challenges (richness of the seabed, land tenure and lack of infrastructure), there are

optimistic future expectations. Fishers and authorities are expressing faith in the MA system. This is

reflected in the fact that the fishers are enjoying an exclusive area of work to increase their welfare

while the authorities are perceiving that the production of benthic resources seems secure; therefore

both social actors are focusing their effort on the diversification of activities. It is interesting that

originally, the idea of MA was conceived as a means to protect and exploit, rationally, the benthic

resources, but other activities have started to develop as well. The rules are not explicit in regard to

35

what others activities can be developed within and in connection to the MAs. Thus, providing the

fishers additional skills and facilitating the inclusion of other activities will benefit the fishing

organisation by improving the socio-economic wellbeing. Doing so, the government will protect, at

the same time, the natural resources from overexploitation because the fishers will count with

additional sources for generating their income. Meltzoff et al. (2002) summarise this approach

remarking that the Chilean government wants the fishers to become non-migrant, stable, and self

sufficient entrepreneurs through the management of their MA.

At this point, I can recapitulate the main issues, saying that the MA is a temporal agreement with the

government for the co-management of benthic resources. The richness of the seabed is

heterogeneously distributed along the coast and therefore some places are richer than others. The

restrictions for access to the fishing grounds and for the building of fishing infrastructure are halting

the development of many particular MAs. In sum, the government has provided the fishers with a sea

area for management and exploitation of coastal resources, but an adequate solution to the land issue

is necessary in order to facilitate a smooth development of the MA (Gallardo 2008).

There are indeed different interests among coastal actors. Every actor wants to get the maximum and

exclusive control over a piece of land. The growing middle and higher class in Chile during the last

decades have increased the demand for summer houses (Gallardo 2008). The announcement of future

plans for road infrastructure development and private business such as windmill parks can increase

speculation over the land and its value (Gallardo 2008; Gallardo and Friman 2010). Since many rural

fishing coves are embedded in private property it is expected that those organisations found more

resistance from the landowners, especially to allow the construction of permanent infrastructure. It

could be easier to offer unoccupied land space to potential land speculators, instead of an occupied

land area. Due to the importance of food production, its economic and social potential, the coastal

border could offer a more stable tenure for the fishers to consolidate their livelihoods thus, avoiding

migration to the cities.

The Chilean fishing laws seem, at least to some degree, to be evolving through revisions and

amendments, taking into consideration the artisanal fishery management‟s requirements as well as the

fishers‟ needs. The law seems to be more comprehensive and authorities show concern on fishers‟

conditions. The update of the law and the norms is a prerequisite for a healthy relationship between

actors. Alaskan fisheries have also experienced several updates. According to the National Marine

Fisheries Service Alaska Regional Office (cited in Bonzon et al. 2010), the Alaska Halibut and

Sablefish Fixed Gear Individual Fishing Quota Program is a successful fishing system that has been

modified at least 39 times; some of the amendments include the eligibility rules, changes in the

trading system and modifications in the accounting system for the catches.

Having discussed the most important challenges to bring the reader to a broader picture of the MA

within the sustainable development discourses, we can finally answer the research questions posed at

the beginning.

In relation to my first question: Do the fishers’ practices and perceptions differ from the official goals

set by the government, if so how? Is there a contradiction?

The Chilean government authorities have set clearly the goals of the MA program and the fishers

work under this framework. The fishers have met the MA‟s requirement, accepted its rules and have

adapted their daily practices to the MA fishing system, but in addition to that, they have created and

36

still innovating new ways by diversifying their activities to achieve the MA and the fishing

organisations‟ goals. Despite all of the difficulties and challenges encountered (heterogeneity of the

richness of the seabed and different land issues) during the co-management of the MAs, the fishers are

enterprising with different actions to overcome those. The government authorities are also promoting

the development of related and non-related fishing activities to improve the livelihoods of the fishing

communities. By doing this, both social actors are enriching the MA framework. My perception here

is that the fisher‟s practices and perception in regards of the official goals show that there are

complementarities and therefore there is not a contradiction between the official goals and the

ambitions of the fishers. Nonetheless, illegal fishing outside the MAs seems to continue (González et

al. 2006; Meltzoff et al. 2002; San Martin et al. 2010), which partially debilitates the former assertions

regarding how well the system is working.

Are the MA's evolving to something else than the original purpose?

An aspect resulting from the TURFs development seems to be that the fishers, through working in the

same designated and exclusive place, have been developing a collective sense of permanent

attachment to the MA. The AM also binds the fishers to the caleta more permanently than when

fishers used to migrate (personal communication Gallardo 2012). The sense of „property‟ or tenure to

the water body can hardly be separated form the land, both being inseparable and complementary

elements of the artisanal fishing sector. It seems that fishers also associate the MA tenure to future

uses and potential business.

Thus, the MAs are constantly evolving. The evolution of an institution, like the MA system, is driven

by the needs of their actors in conjunction with their socio-ecological environment. The political

desire for adequate artisanal fishery legislation to better exploitation and manage the resources and to

listen to the fishing organisations are examples of this evolution (Castilla and Defeo 2001). We should

not consider the MA as the starting point of a new fishery management program; instead, the fishery

management program is a whole continuous process. No fishery system guarantees 100% failure-free

operation, consequently, modifications and improvements are constantly needed. Fishers are indeed

establishing an entire social institution based on the MA framework (Castilla and Defeo 2001). Their

inclusion in the social and political arena seems to be more than temporary, they have arrived to stay

and will demand more fair conditions (Gallardo 2008), they have gone beyond the temporary aspect

of the TURFs. Given this complex situation, the authorities must be aware that the TURFs are

evolving from a temporary working scheme to a more permanent one, which will become a new

challenge for the government to face.

8. CONCLUSIONS

“Fisheries management has always been about more than just setting minimum biological limits. It

has been about improving human quality of life from fishing, while having an acceptable level of

environmental impact” (Fletcher et al. 2002, 18). Therefore, fishery is a complex system that not only

depends on the marine life resources being addressed. As FAO (2010) reported the role of the fishing

industry within the society as a source of food security, employment and income generation. These

socially related roles need, primarily, to be addressed with social measures. It is important to

understand the behaviour of the fishers in order to have successful management of the fisheries

(Hilborn 2007).

37

The fishers are the key social actor in the fishery sector, they are the ones who are directly targeted by

the law, they themselves go for fishing and they themselves are in charge of the custody of the

resources and the management of the area. Due to the MA‟s requirement of forming legal fishing

association, the fishers have become proactive actors in the fishing sector sharing chairs in the

negotiation table along with authorities. The fishing organisations that are formed locally have also

extended to the regional and national level becoming a powerful instrument for the fishers where they

can speak out their concerns and demand fair regulation for their activities. Therefore, the MA system

in addition to provide the fishers the right to fish in a given area, they have acquired also a legitimate

position within the fishing management sector, confirming what other studies have found such as

Cereceda and Czischke 2001, Gallardo 2008, Gallardo and Friman 2012, González et al. 2006, and

Meltzoff et al. 2002.

Even though the difficulties and challenges encountered (heterogeneity of the richness of the seabed

and different land issues) during the co-management of some MAs, the fishers, enclosed in an

exclusive and fixed area without migration as an option, are trying to diversify their activities to

increase the income generated by their regular fishing activities such as the implementation of

services in restaurants and tourism. Moreover, they are also developing a permanent sense of

collective attachment and a sense of property to the water body where the MAs are located; senses

that are difficult not to extend to the land as well.

The environmental discourses in the Chilean fisheries was launch by authorities in order to achieve

governmental goals (economic, employability, improve social conditions), scientific goals (protection

of marine life resources), all those under the umbrella of Sustainable Development discourses. Fishers

on their part are not excluded from this process, playing a key role in improving their positions. The

MA system is probably not the perfect program for solving the fishery problems of the loco or other

resources, but its implementation has brought a big impact within the main social actors, the

government has achieved the goal of preserving the locos and other benthic resources, the scientist are

constantly monitoring the availability of resources and the fishers are partially and increasingly

building their livelihood on them as they diversify activities. In spite of the MA‟s original purpose,

that of the protection of the marine resources, this study shows that the MA is evolving, encapsulating

more and more benthic fishers‟ social and economic needs. The inclusion of the fishers in the social

and political arena seems to be more than temporary, they have arrived to stay and they have gone

beyond of the temporary aspect of the MAs.

To the question what are the MAs evolving to? In view of what has been stated, the MAs seem to be

developing from a temporary tenure to more permanent ones, from less fishing oriented production to

embrace other economic activities, some of them beyond fishing and their MAs, including a variety of

small business where fishers are taking the lead. Furthermore, it is clear that the evolution of the MA

system will continue as long as the social actors are engaged in its development and are willing to

work together, and the government does not change policy.

38

EPILOGUE

This paper has been the result of work from an entirely new dimension of knowledge. An unknown

topic, the reality that there is no concern for the artisanal fishers and my lack of a social science

background were some of the challenges that constantly put pressure on my business perspective.

My thesis work has been a unique experience. I have learnt many things that hopefully I will be able

to put into practice in future work. Aspects of writing such as consistency, appropriate word choice

and discipline were some of the most memorable aspects of this journey. Studying and living in

Sweden provided me a great opportunity to explore new ways of thinking, working and retrieving

information from unconventional sources such as cultural and social events. It was definitely an

invaluable life experience. Another interesting aspect I have learnt is about the differences between

Chile and Peru. During my research about the production of loco in Chile, I wanted to compare it with

that of the practices in Peru. However, the Peruvian information available online was old, not well

organised and scarce. In contrast, Chile presents a great amount and updated information online.

There was a considerable amount of documentation, scientific articles and other studies that enables

better studies and a better decision making process for authorities, the scientific community and

hopefully for some fishing organisations as well.

Personally, as a graduate from business administration, working with social issues was a major

challenge that really expanded my knowledge base. My first thought was “it will be easy” since all the

primary information was in Spanish; however, as time passed the work became more challenging for

me. This was due to the fact that the study of social sciences is very focused. I took it as a challenge

and as an opportunity to learn because current practices in the political and business arena have to

consider more social aspects, and I would like to provide a more holistic perspective considering

Sustainable Development as a way to achieve goals.

Education is a marathon and this Master thesis is not the end of my learning race. It was a milestone

for me in that it concludes one of the other several learning stages that I have completed. However,

there are still many more in the future and I am grateful to have had the opportunity to come this far.

39

APPENDIX

Questions to fisher’s leaders:

Artisanal fishers are represented in formal structures, but how much their voice is heard in

practice? How do fishers perceive this?

Do fishers have problems regarding access, infrastructure development and settlements in the

coves?

Questions to authorities:

Christy (1992) means that the major problem associated with the establishment of localised

TURFs is that some users may become excluded, which is an event that may lead to opposition,

who are excluded?

How many MAs were established in already occupied areas? How many has got new grounds?

Which fishing organisations have not yet applied for MAs and what are the reasons behind this?

Regarding access to coastal land it is relevant to identify and systematise the MAs being created

within both private and state property: How many MAs are facing problems of access, infrastructure

and settlement?

What forms do these issues take within private landed properties and state property?

What are the regions where there is a major concentration of MAs and what does land tenure

structure look like?

How many MAs have not got their right renewed after the first four years and what are the main

reasons for their non-renewal?

What are the circumstances of these areas?

40

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