This article was downloaded by: [University of Nevada - Reno] On: 27 March 2014, At: 14:24 Publisher: Routledge Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK Sociological Spectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usls20 Friendship and Conformity in Group Opinions: Juror Verdict Change in Mock Juries Clayton D. Peoples a b , Alexandra E. Sigillo b , Morgan Green b & Monica K. Miller b c a Department of Sociology , University of Nevada, Reno , Reno , Nevada , USA b Social Psychology Program, University of Nevada, Reno , Reno , Nevada , USA c Department of Criminal Justice , University of Nevada, Reno , Reno , Nevada , USA Published online: 09 Feb 2012. To cite this article: Clayton D. Peoples , Alexandra E. Sigillo , Morgan Green & Monica K. Miller (2012) Friendship and Conformity in Group Opinions: Juror Verdict Change in Mock Juries, Sociological Spectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association, 32:2, 178-193, DOI: 10.1080/02732173.2012.646163 To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02732173.2012.646163 PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content. This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
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This article was downloaded by: [University of Nevada - Reno]On: 27 March 2014, At: 14:24Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registeredoffice: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Sociological Spectrum: Mid-SouthSociological AssociationPublication details, including instructions for authors andsubscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/usls20
Friendship and Conformity in GroupOpinions: Juror Verdict Change in MockJuriesClayton D. Peoples a b , Alexandra E. Sigillo b , Morgan Green b &Monica K. Miller b ca Department of Sociology , University of Nevada, Reno , Reno ,Nevada , USAb Social Psychology Program, University of Nevada, Reno , Reno ,Nevada , USAc Department of Criminal Justice , University of Nevada, Reno ,Reno , Nevada , USAPublished online: 09 Feb 2012.
To cite this article: Clayton D. Peoples , Alexandra E. Sigillo , Morgan Green & Monica K. Miller(2012) Friendship and Conformity in Group Opinions: Juror Verdict Change in Mock Juries, SociologicalSpectrum: Mid-South Sociological Association, 32:2, 178-193, DOI: 10.1080/02732173.2012.646163
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/02732173.2012.646163
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis,our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as tothe accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors,and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Contentshould not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sourcesof information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims,proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever orhowsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arisingout of the use of the Content.
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Anysubstantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing,systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms &
FRIENDSHIP AND CONFORMITY IN GROUP OPINIONS:JUROR VERDICT CHANGE IN MOCK JURIES
Clayton D. Peoples,1,2 Alexandra E. Sigillo,2 Morgan Green,2
and Monica K. Miller2,31Department of Sociology, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno, Nevada, USA2Social Psychology Program, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno,Nevada, USA3Department of Criminal Justice, University of Nevada, Reno, Reno,Nevada, USA
Social psychological research on group processes has consistently shown that group members
adjust their views to conform to dominant and/or socially desirable stances. Studies are less
clear, though, on how friendships within groups impact this tendency. Some studies suggest
greater group cohesion leads to more conformity; other studies suggest friendship lessens the
pressure to agree on certain issues. In this study, we use mock juries to test the impact of
varying levels of friendship on jurors’ propensities to change their verdicts to the dominant
position (in this case acquittal, or a ‘‘not guilty’’ verdict). Our findings show that distant
friendships among jurors increase the odds of conforming to acquittal; but close friendships
decrease the odds of conformity. We discuss the implications of our findings for understand-
ing group processes and conformity as well as for jury research.
INTRODUCTION
It is well established in social psychology that people adjust their opinions (andsometimes even behaviors) to conform to the dominant view and=or socially desir-able position. Conformity can occur in a number of different spheres of social life,as with the oft-noted ‘‘Hawthorne Effect’’1 (French 1953) in the workplace or therecently publicized ‘‘Bradley Effect’’ (Henry 1987) in the electoral arena. This tend-ency is so entrenched that it can even sway survey results in the form of respondent‘‘social desirability bias’’ (Phillips and Clancy 1972).
A social realm in which conformity is particularly salient is in small groups.Beginning with the famous Asch (e.g., 1951, 1956) studies, research has consistentlyshown a propensity toward conformity in groups. Moreover, research suggests thatthe greater the group cohesion, the greater the conformity (e.g., Festinger et al. 1950;Lott and Lott 1961; Sakurai 1975). However, this does not necessarily apply to all
1The general impression management, or observer effect, often associated with the ‘‘Hawthorne
Effect’’ is generally accepted as a social reality, but whether or not there was such an effect in the actual
Hawthorne study is frequently questioned (e.g., Jones 1992).
Address correspondence to Clayton D. Peoples, Department of Sociology, University of Nevada,
situations and groups. For instance, research suggests friendships within somegroups actually decrease conformity (McKelvey and Kerr 1988). What is unknownis how the closeness of friendships may impact the propensity to conform.
In this study, we examine how distant and close friendships impact the likeli-hood of conforming to a dominant opinion. Our study emulates a group decision-making context that has significant consequences—the jury setting. In our mockjuries, the dominant stance is that of shifting toward acquittal (by switching to a‘‘not guilty’’ verdict from pre- to post-deliberation). We find that distant friendshipsamong our mock jurors increase the likelihood of conforming to acquittal, but closefriendships decrease the likelihood. Processes such as impression management(Goffman 1959), ‘‘idiosyncrasy credit’’ accumulation (Hollander 1958), and cogni-tive dissonance (Festinger 1957) may help explain these findings.
SOCIAL INFLUENCE IN NETWORKS/GROUPS
A social network involves relations, or ties, between individuals=entities(Felmlee 2003). The network ties among jurors ought to matter greatly for the deci-sions they make—yet few studies have investigated jury decisions through a socialnetworks approach (for review see Devine et al. 2001). Plenty of research, however,shows that networks matter for other types of decisions. For instance, studies showthat social ties among lawmakers influence their decisions on bills (Peoples 2008).Among ordinary citizens, social ties affect decisions to participate in social activism(Kaysen and Stake 2001; McAdam 1986); and engage in (or cease) risky health beha-vior such as smoking (Christakis and Fowler 2008; Hoffman et al. 2007; Kleinjanet al. 2009), drinking alcohol (Jamison and Myers 2008), or taking drugs (Buchananand Latkin 2008).
Research shows that in small groups, network ties—and the patterns of rela-tions within the groups—have a pronounced influence on opinions and groupdecisions. An individual’s opinion concerning a specific issue is modified as the indi-vidual assesses the opinions of others in the group (Friedkin and Johnsen 1997).Consequently, attitudes and opinions are formulated and changed as one analyzesthe weighted averages of the positions of others (Friedkin 2001).
The juror setting in the criminal justice system is a prime social setting that pro-vides ample opportunity for social influence within networks. Isolating a small groupof individuals together under the pretense that a judgment must be made could cer-tainly make them susceptible to group influence. Opinions between jurors are sharedwith the intention of coming to a group consensus. Individuals with a conflicting opi-nion may feel the need to modify their opinion in order to reach unanimity.
Prior work suggests that jurors do modify their opinions. Often, this takes theform of ‘‘polarization.’’ Polarization is a process whereby ‘‘the average post groupresponse will tend to be more extreme in the same direction as the average of thepregroup responses’’ (Myers and Lamm 1976, p. 603). Thus, an individual’s pre-deliberation preference will become stronger during discussion. It is generallybelieved that discussing one’s viewpoint with the group strengthens one’s supportof that viewpoint. A host of mock jury experiments have demonstrated that jurydeliberations polarize already existing opinions (e.g., Bray and Kerr 1979; Kerret al. 1979; Kaplan, 1977; Myers and Kaplan 1976).
In a similar vein, research shows that when jurors do change their verdicts, theytend to change toward the dominant opinion and=or toward leniency=acquittal(MacCoun and Kerr 1988; Devine et al. 2004). As such, jurors do sometimes changetheir opinions, often to conform with others (and often in the direction of leniency).Not as much research indicates when and why jurors conform. Social networkinfluence likely explains part of this—but this may vary according to the strengthand nature of the social ties in the network.
NETWORK COHESION, FRIENDSHIP, AND CONFORMITY
Social network studies have often referenced cohesion as a source of influencewithin networks. A traditional definition of cohesiveness focuses on ‘‘closeness’’among members of a group (e.g., Lott and Lott 1961). A more network-specificdefinition of cohesion refers to strong, direct relations among individuals within a net-work (Mizruchi 1993)—particularly relations involving interactions that produce=maintain ‘‘positive membership attitudes and behaviors’’ (Friedkin 2004, p. 410).Members of a cohesive network share similar beliefs, values, attitudes, and behaviors.Thus, individuals are more likely to be influenced by peers within a cohesive networkin part because of the shared similarity between them (Burt 1987; Friedkin 1993).Research on conformity in social groups demonstrates this.
Research has consistently shown a tendency toward conformity in socialgroups, dating back to the famous Asch (e.g., 1951, 1956) experiments. As earlyas the 1950s, researchers were already suggesting that greater cohesiveness in groupsshould lead to greater conformity (e.g., Festinger et al. 1950). Subsequent work inboth psychology (e.g., Lott and Lott 1961) and sociology (e.g., Sakurai 1975) hasconfirmed this. But some aspects of cohesiveness—for instance, friendship—maynot always result in greater conformity.
Research shows that groups of friends are less likely to exhibit conformity thangroups of strangers (McKelvey and Kerr 1988). At first glance, this seems to counterthe findings pertaining to cohesiveness (see above), but friendship may not be theonly source of cohesiveness in groups. Moreover, friendship can vary considerablyin strength (e.g., distant friends versus close friends). This could impact the degreeto which conformity occurs. Various interactional and cognitive processes likely helpexplain the impact of friendship level on conformity. We discuss a number of theseprocesses in the paragraphs that follow.
INTERACTIONAL AND COGNITIVE PROCESSES
While social network concepts (e.g., cohesion, friendship ties) explain how net-work characteristics impact social influence, interactional and cognitive processesexplain how social influence works within the network. There are three processesin particular that may help explain patterns of influence toward conformity: (1)impression management, (2) idiosyncrasy credits, and (3) cognitive dissonance.
Impression management is a concept emerging from the work of Goffman(e.g., 1959). Just as its name suggests, it refers to the interactional process of attempt-ing to affect how others view us. This important concept likely helps explain (at leastin part) some of the more well known cases of conformity. Take, for instance, the
two examples noted earlier: the Hawthorne Effect and the Bradley Effect. Workersare likely more productive when being observed because they wish to be viewed ashard workers. Similarly, voters are probably more apt to openly express supportfor a minority candidate because they wish to be viewed as unprejudiced.
Impression management may vary, however, depending on who is observing—or, to put it in Goffman’s dramaturgical terms, who comprises the actor’s ‘‘audience.’’If the audience is composed of strangers—or even distant friends of the actor—onecan imagine that the actor would engage in careful impression management becauseof a desire to shape the audience’s fledgling perceptions. If the audience is composedof close friends of the actor, however, impression management may be less salientbecause the actor may believe that the audience members already have a relativelystable, positive view of him or her.
‘‘Idiosyncrasy credits’’ is a similar sort of idea. The term itself refers to ‘‘credits’’an individual accumulates that allow for deviation from group norms (e.g., Hackman1992; Hollander 1958; Estrada et al. 1995). When enough credits have been accumu-lated, one is less likely to be sanctioned for deviation from the group (e.g., by support-ing an innovation instead of the status quo). The extent to which a person can earnthese credits is, in the very least, an indirect function of friendship level. As such, astranger is unlikely to have any idiosyncratic credits built up and thus would be morelikely to be sanctioned by the group for deviating. However, a friend has likely built upsome idiosyncratic credits that would allow them to deviate without sanctions. Put dif-ferently, this suggests that people allow friends to ‘‘get away with’’ more than strangers.
Cognitive dissonance is a concept stemming from the work of Festinger (e.g.,1957). It refers to a cognitive process whereby individuals experience psychologicaldiscomfort when two cognitions (e.g., thoughts, behaviors, attitudes, values, beliefs)are inconsistent with one another (Festinger 1957). Consequently, individuals aremotivated by this discomfort to reduce the dissonance. One way of reducing thedissonance is to change one of the discrepant cognitions (Olson and Stone 2005).From classic work (e.g., Festinger and Carlsmith 1959) to more recent research(e.g., Joule and Martinie 2008), studies have shown that cognitive dissonance servesas an explanation for an individual’s change in attitude, opinion, or belief. Cognitivechange, however, is dependent upon situational context, especially regarding towhom the opposing action is directed.
Regan and Dekar (1976) investigate the magnitude of dissonance experiencedwhen individuals engage in counter-attitudinal advocacy toward persons whom theylike (e.g., close friends) versus those they dislike. Individuals experience less dissonanceand are thus less likely to support their counter-attitudinal action (e.g., change theirattitude) when the advocacy is directed at a liked person. Presumably, individualsmay believe they will be able to explain to the person whom they like why they exhibitthe counter-attitudinal action, which thenmitigates the dissonance-induced discomfort.
Most theorizing and research has focused on dissonance caused by individual-level inconsistency. However, this cognitive process has also been theorized at thegroup level. For instance, in his foundational work on the topic, Festinger (1957)writes, ‘‘The open expression of disagreement in a group leads to the existence of cog-nitive dissonance in the members. The knowledge that some other person, generallylike oneself, holds one opinion is dissonant with holding a contrary opinion’’(pp. 261–262). Subsequent research has demonstrated this at the group level (Cooper
and Mackie 1983) and within jury decision making (Matz and Wood 2005). It istherefore likely relevant for our study.
DATA
We obtained our data via a study we ran in classrooms at a mid-sized public uni-versity in the western United States. We ran a number of pilot studies before estab-lishing our final study protocol.2 Participants (or mock jurors, referred to simply as‘jurors’ hereafter) in the study were undergraduate students in social science classes;they received extra credit for their participation. A total of 304 jurors completed thefinal study, 266 (87.5%) of whom provided data on all of our independent variables.3
Jurors were grouped into juries of approximately six people each, for a total of 51juries.4 We chose six-person juries because the study on friendship and conformity byMcKelvey and Kerr (1988) utilized six-person groups. Moreover, many studies of jurydecision-making utilize six-person mock juries. On a related point, some courts utilizea six-person jury, indicating that this procedure is relevant to courtroom settings.
In terms of the specific procedure, when students came into the classroom theywere instructed to take their seats as normal. We then asked them to break up intogroups of three with their neighbors, the only stipulation being that the groups couldnot consist of members who were all the same gender (to ensure some gender balanceon the juries, much like real juries). We then paired each group of three with anothergroup of three from a different part of the classroom. This was to attempt to formgroups with a variety of relationships. It is possible that some students sit next totheir friends, or have formed a friendship with some of the people who sit next tothem. However in a large classroom, it is less likely that students would be friendswith someone who sat across the room.
After groups of three were paired to form six-person juries, as above, we sepa-rated them into distinct, quiet parts of the room and gave each juror a packet thatincluded a trial summary and a questionnaire. The 1,200-word trial summarydepicted an attempted bombing at a train station.5 The summary contained a pictureof the defendant (a dark-haired Caucasian man), case facts, summaries of testimo-nies by both defense and prosecution witnesses, closing arguments by both attorneys,and judge’s instructions. After reading the trial summary, they were asked via ques-tionnaire to express whether or not they felt the defendant was guilty (individualpre-deliberation verdict) and then stop and wait for further instructions.
After jurors had read the trial summary and indicated their pre-deliberationverdict on the questionnaire, we instructed them to deliberate and discuss their views
2The University Institutional Review Board approved the study (protocol SB06=07-082).3The 38 participants who did not furnish data on some of our independent measures are not
significantly different from others in terms of their answers to other questions, minimizing potential
sample bias.4The mode for jury size was 6; occasionally juries were a little smaller or larger, resulting in a range
of 4–7.5Participants read one of three scenarios that differed only on the defendant’s alibi: engaged in a
Christian prayer, engaged in a Muslim prayer, or watching TV (control condition). The manipulation
of alibi is not the focus of this paper, but it is statistically controlled in the analyses to ensure any effects
with other jurors. We allowed them approximately 15 minutes of deliberation. Wethen instructed them to continue with the questionnaire, which asked them to againexpress whether or not they felt the defendant was guilty (individual post-deliberationverdict). Additionally, it asked them to provide the jury’s verdict as a whole.
Later in the questionnaire, jurors were asked a number of questions concerningtheir friendships and relationships with other jurors, as described below in the‘‘variables’’ section. They were also asked a number of demographic questions thatincluded things such as gender, ethnicity, and age. Additionally, jurors were askeda number of questions tapping their level of legal authoritarianism and their religiousbeliefs (e.g., devotionalism, fundamentalism) with Likert-type (1 [strongly disagree] to5 [strongly agree]) responses.
VARIABLES
Descriptions of each of our variables—including specifics of measurement,sources of original measures where applicable, etc.—follow in sequence addressednext (dependent variable, main independent variables, and control variables). Briefdescriptions of the variables as well as descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1.
Dependent Variables
We created two dependent variables (for use in two separate models) tapping dif-ferent dimensions of change in individual jurors’ verdicts. Before describing these vari-ables, though, it is worth discussing the general patterns in pre- and post-deliberationverdicts to give a better sense of where our jurors stood before and after deliberating.
Pre-deliberation, 38% of our jurors felt the defendant was guilty, 62% felt he wasnot guilty. This shows a clear majority toward acquittal. This may be because they didnot want to appear mean or punitive even in their individual pre-deliberation verdicts,
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for variables used in analyses
Variable name Brief description n Mean SD
Dependent variable(s)
General verdict change 4 to guilty¼� 1, no 4¼ 0, 4 to not¼ 1 266 .102 .338
Change to acquittal Dummy: 4 to not guilty¼ 1 101 .297 .459
Friendships w=jurors
Chat informally Number on jury with whom you . . . 266 .790 .927
Hang out Number on jury with whom you . . . 266 .260 .527
Discuss important matters Number on jury with whom you . . . 266 .300 .589
Note. 4¼Change.yAlso included in analyses, but not presented in the table for the sake of brevity, are control variables for
condition (trial summary read) and number of people on jury (range 4–7; mode¼ 6).
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or it may be that the trial stimuli did not provide strong enough evidence to compeljurors to believe he was guilty. Either way, this clear pre-deliberation majoritymeans that the dominant stance to which jurors could conform after deliberationwas acquittal, or a ‘‘not guilty’’ verdict.
While jurors were not persuaded to change their verdicts in huge numbers (just12% changed), most of the change that did occur was toward acquittal, as the post-deliberation verdict breakdown across all jurorswas 28% ‘‘guilty,’’ 72% ‘‘not guilty.’’ Putdifferently, nearly 30% of our jurors who initially felt the defendant was guilty switchedto ‘‘not guilty’’ verdicts after deliberation; just 2% of those who initially felt the defend-ant was ‘‘not guilty’’ switched to ‘‘guilty.’’ This reflects a general tendency to conform tothe dominant stance, which is consistent with the broader literature on conformity.
Both of our dependent variables attempt to measure the change in individual jurorverdicts.We constructed our first dependent variable, general change in verdict, as an ordi-nal measure of change, if any, in an individual juror’s verdict pre- to post-deliberation(change to guilty¼�1, no change¼ 0, change to not guilty¼ 1). Given that most ofthe change was toward acquittal, though, we also created a second dependent variablefor those jurors whose pre-deliberation verdict was ‘‘guilty.’’ We constructed it as adummy measure of change to acquittal (change to not guilty¼ 1, no change¼ 0).
Main Independent Variables: Friendships with Jurors
As noted earlier, the main theses we wish to test revolve around the effect ofpre-existing juror friendships on individual verdict change, with emphases on boththe number of people on a jury with whom a juror has friendships as well as the close-ness of those relationships. We created multiple variables to measure the number andcloseness of juror friendships.
In our questionnaire, we asked jurors to list who on the jury, if anyone, they dothe following with: chat informally, hang out, or discuss important matters. These threequestions get at different levels of friendship. Chatting with a person informally is not aparticularly close type of relationship, but is a ‘‘friendship’’ nonetheless. Hanging outwith people represents a little closer friendship, but still a bit distant. Finally, discussingimportant matters with someone represents a very close, personal friendship, and hasbeen used in sociological research on homophily and social ties (e.g., Marsden 1988).
From their answers to these questions, we constructed variables measuring thesum of people on a jury who fit those types of friendships for each juror. The mostcommon type of pre-existing social relationship was chatting informally, with amean sum of .790 people per jury fitting this category for a given juror. Hangingout and discussing important matters were each less than half as common as chattinginformally, with mean sums of .260 and .300, respectively.
Control Variables6
There are a number of individual demographic differences that can affectindividuals’ decision making. Previous research has indicated that women (Miller
6Also included in analyses is a control for condition (trial summary read), as noted earlier, as well
as a control for the number of jurors on a given jury.
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and Hayward 2008; O’Neil et al. 2004), nonwhites (O’Neil et al. 2004), and olderindividuals are less punitive (Lester et al. 1997; O’Neil et al. 2004).
We created a control variable for female gender (yes¼ 1, no¼ 0); exactly 50%of our jurors were female. Similarly, we created a variable for ethnicity. We collapsednonwhite (black, Hispanic, Native American, Asian American, etc.) into a category(yes¼ 1, no¼ 0); approximately 29% of our jurors were nonwhite, which mirrorsU.S. society well. Finally, we created a control variable for age; the mean age forour jurors was approximately 22 years old.
In terms of beliefs, individuals who are more authoritarian tend to be morepunitive than their counterparts (Boehm 1968; Cowan et al. 1984). Individuals whosubscribe to fundamentalist religious beliefs are more punitive (Miller and Hayward2008; Vogel 2003). In contrast, those who are more devotional are less punitive.Specifically, individuals who report that they pray and read the Bible more frequently(Young 1992) or reported having strong religious experiences (Unnever and Cullen2006) are less supportive of the death penalty. We thus created a number of controlvariables to statistically account for the above-noted factors.
In terms of beliefs, we created one control variable to get at jurors’ legalattitudes, and two to tap the religious beliefs of jurors. We constructed scales forbeliefs from a number of individual items, each item providing Likert-type options(1 [strongly disagree] to 5 [strongly agree]).7 We averaged jurors’ answers to theseitems to develop the scales.8
In terms of legal attitudes, we constructed a measure of legal authoritarianismutilizing a 23-item scale adapted from Kravitz et al.’s (1993) ‘‘revised legal attitudesquestionnaire’’ (RLAQ23). Our jurors averaged 2.984 on this scale. For religiousbeliefs, we adapted a measure of fundamentalism from Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s(2004) ‘‘revised fundamentalism’’ 12-item scale. Our jurors had a mean fundamental-ism of 2.838. We also adapted a measure of devotionalism from Putney andMiddleton’s (1961) classic work on religious ideology (this is what they termedreligious ‘importance’). Our jurors averaged 2.911 on this scale.
METHODS
To test the relative effects of our main independent variables on general verdictchange—and to assess their contribution to explaining a change to acquittal amongthose who initially felt the defendant was guilty—we ran two separate regressionmodels. First, we ran an ordinal logit regression (‘Model 1’) of general verdictchange on friendships and control variables.9 We kept significance thresholdstwo-tailed in this model since the specific directions of variable relationships wereyet unknown.
7Inter-item reliabilities for our scales are all well within acceptable ranges (Cronbach’s alpha
> .700).8The rule for case inclusion with all scales was that the juror must have provided an answer to at
least one of the items composing the scale—but jurors typically answered most or all items.9Ordinal logit regression is the most appropriate type of regression in this case because our depen-
dent variable, general verdict change, is an ordinal variable with three categories (�1¼ change to guilty,
Then, once directions of variable relationships were generally known (gleanedfrom Model 1), we ran a logistic regression (Model 2) of change to acquittal in thetruncated set (only those who decided ‘‘guilty’’ in pre-deliberation) on friendshipsand control variables.10 This important model allowed us to assess the extent ofconformity to the more dominant stance (acquittal) for those whose initial viewsdissented from the dominant view. We used one-tailed thresholds in this case sincewe now knew expected directions of relationships.
RESULTS
General Verdict Change11
The findings from our models are presented in Table 2. Model 1 shows theresults for the general verdict change analysis. Our friendship variables have interest-ing effects on the likelihood an individual will change verdict. More distant forms offriendship among jurors, such as chatting informally and occasionally hanging out,significantly increase the likelihood of change (p< .05, two-tailed). Alternatively,close friendship—discussing important matters—significantly decreases movement(p< .05, two-tailed).
In more specific terms, the greater number of people on a jury with whom ajuror chats informally, the more likely the juror is to shift opinion. The odds ratioscore suggests that having more people on the jury with whom one chats informallyincreases the odds of movement by approximately 77%. The same pattern is true forhanging out—the greater number of people on the jury with whom a juror hangs out,the more likely the juror will change verdict; having more members on a jury withwhom one hangs out increases the odds of shifting by about 130%.
The opposite is true for close confidantes—the greater number of people on ajury with whom a juror discusses important matters, the less likely the juror is tochange opinion. As the odds ratio score suggests, having more people on the jury withwhom one discusses important matters decreases the odds of movement approxi-mately 59%.
Change to Acquittal, Specifically
Model 2 presents findings from our model of change to acquittal (this is for thetruncated set of respondents who had a pre-deliberation verdict of ‘‘guilty’’). Thefindings in Model 2 generally mirror the findings in Model 1. Distant friendships sig-nificantly increase the odds of switching to acquittal (changing to a ‘‘not guilty’’ ver-dict after deliberation); close friendships significantly decrease the likelihood. Onedifference from Model 1 to Model 2 is that one of the types of friendship—hangingout—is no longer significant; but this may be due to the lower N of respondents in
10Logistic regression is the most appropriate type of regression here because our dependent
variable, change to leniency, is a dichotomous measure (dummy variable where 1¼ change to not guilty,
0¼no change).11As noted earlier, general verdict change is measured such that change to guilty¼� 1, no
change¼ 0, and change to not guilty¼ 1. As such, in the section discussing results of the general verdict
change model, ‘‘change,’’ ‘‘shift,’’ or ‘‘movement’’ is in the direction of acquittal.
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this truncated set of data, as its relationship direction and effect magnitude is quitesimilar to Model 1.
In more specific terms, the greater number of people on a jury with whom ajuror chats informally, the more likely the juror is to switch to ‘‘not guilty’’ afterdeliberation—and the odds of doing so increase by about 80% with more (asopposed to fewer) informal chat partners on the jury. In terms of closer discussionpartners, though, the relationship is in the negative direction: The greater numberof people on the jury with whom a juror discusses important matters, the less likelythe juror is to change to ‘‘not guilty’’—the odds of switching to acquittal decrease byaround 67% with more close confidantes on the jury.
DISCUSSION
As far back as the famous Asch (e.g., 1951, 1956) conformity studies, scholar-ship has tended to assume a linear relationship between group cohesion and conform-ity to socially desired stances—the greater the cohesion among network ties, thegreater the conformity (e.g., Festinger et al. 1950; Lott and Lott 1961; Sakurai1975). By extension, it would seem to follow that friendships within a group wouldcreate conditions conducive to conformity—the greater the degree of closeness offriendships, the greater the conformity. But research by McKelvey and Kerr (1988)suggests that friendship may actually decrease conformity.
The findings of our study illuminate how various levels of friendship relate to con-formity in opinions. Our findings suggest that some types of friendship tend to increase
Table 2 Unstandardized coefficients from ordinal logit regression of general change in individual verdict
(Model 1) on friendships among jurors, controlling for juror characteristics, and logistic regression of
change in individual verdict to acquittal (Model 2) on friendships among jurors, controlling for juror
characteristics
Model 1: general verdict change Model 2: change to acquittal
Unstandardized
coefficients Odds ratios
Unstandardized
coefficients Odds ratios
Friendships w= jurors
Chat informally .574� 1.775 .590� 1.803
Hang out .833� 2.300 .623 1.865
Discuss important matters –.883� .414 –1.099� .333
Control variablesy
Female .124 1.132 .075 1.077
Nonwhite –.810 .445 –1.690� .185
Age .055 1.056 .256� 1.291
Legal authoritarianism .261 1.298 –.980 .375
Devotionalism –.365 .694 –.136 .873
Fundamentalism .382 1.465 .509 1.663
Cox and Snell R2 .087 .214
Nagelkerke R2 .156 .304
N 266 101
Model 1: �p< .05 (two-tailed test). Model 2: �p< .05 (one-tailed test).yAlso included in analyses, but not presented in the table for the sake of brevity, are control variables for
condition (trial summary read) and number of people on jury (range 4–7; mode¼ 6).
the odds of conformity, while other types of friendship actually decrease the odds. Inparticular, we find that distant friendships increase the likelihood of conforming to acquit-tal (the dominant stance) among jurors, but close friendships decrease the likelihood.
Possible Explanations
We believe our findings can be partially explained with reference to impressionmanagement (e.g., Goffman 1959), and how this process is adjusted depending onthe audience. If the audience is composed of strangers—or even distant friends—conformity is likely to occur. If the audience is made up of close friends, however, con-formity is less likely. As McKelvey and Kerr (1988) point out, this may be becausepeople wish tomake a good impression on thosewhom they do not know very well. Peo-ples’ friends likely already have a favorable impression of them, and, thus, they may feelless compelled to adjust their views to a more socially desirable position. A similar pro-cess is likely at play in our juries.When distant friends appear on the jury, jurorsmay feelcompelled to switch to the dominant, more socially desirable stance. This is likelybecause the friendships are not yet firmly established, and, thus, jurors are still concernedwith making a good impression. When very close friends are on the jury, though, jurorsmay feel freer to dissent from the group and=or express a less socially desirable position(e.g., ‘‘the defendant is a guilty bastard’’) since the friendships are well established.
In a similar vein, we believe our findings can also be partly explained by theaccumulation of idiosyncrasy credits. Being a close member of a group (e.g., an estab-lished person, a friend) means that one has probably accumulated more credits. Withmore credits comes the ability to deviate from group norms (e.g., go against the domi-nant stance) without much fear of negative repercussions. As such, those jurors who hadclose friends on the jury probably felt more able to deviate from the dominant stance.Going against the dominant view was less likely to be met with negative sanctions forthese individuals than for those who had not yet accumulated idiosyncrasy credits.
We believe our findings can also be partly explained by cognitive dissonancetheory (e.g., Festinger 1957), particularly given this theory’s application to groups.Within jury deliberation, jurors may experience dissonance as a result of verdict dis-agreement. In order to reduce this, jurors may change their own views so that the jurycan reach a consensus. This process can vary by friendship level. As research byRegan and Dekar (1976) shows, people experience less dissonance around thosewhom they like (e.g., close friends), probably because they can later explain anyperceived inconsistencies in values=behaviors. Having close friends on the jury maydecrease dissonance-induced discomfort, and thus, produce less desire to change ver-dicts; on the other hand, distant friends on the jury may maintain or even increasedissonance leading to the need to change verdicts.
Limitations
When considering the findings, it is important to note a few limitations of thisstudy. First, the study—like all looking at a mock jury—lacks verisimilitude. Thetrial was not a live trial as would occur in a courtroom setting. Instead, it was awritten summary of a trial. Although the summary was quite lengthy and containeda picture of the defendant, it still lacked the realism of a trial. Additionally, mock
jurors were not making ‘‘real’’ decisions and, thus, may not have taken their task asseriously as actual jurors would. The lack of realism may have blunted participants’reactions to the crime and, thus, affected their ultimate decisions. Because emotionalresponses (e.g., stress, sympathy, boredom) can affect jury decisions, this is the big-gest limitation of mock jury studies.
Second, the sample was fairly homogenous in that all participants were collegestudents; inasmuch as there are differences between students and non-students, thiscould affect the conclusions of the study. For instance, the relationships studentshave with each other may be different from relationships of non-students (e.g., qual-ity or value assigned to friendships). Future studies should investigate whether thesefindings generalize to non-student populations. Despite these limitations, the currentstudy offers some interesting findings about the role of varying levels of friendship ingroup opinions and decision making, and carries implications for both scholarlywork as well as practical work in the courtroom.
Scholarly and Practical Implications
Our findings carry significant implications for understanding how conformity inopinions and group decision making are impacted by friendships. First, they help rec-oncile the apparent discrepancy between the findings of researchers concerning cohesive-ness and conformity (e.g., Festinger et al. 1950; Lott and Lott 1961; Sakurai 1975) andthe findings ofMcKelvey and Kerr (1988) concerning friendship and conformity. It maybe that friendship (or ‘cohesiveness’ of a group, more generally) does, indeed, increasethe conformity in a group . . . to a certain point. When friendships in a group becomeparticularly close (for instance, when all the members of a group are friends, as withMcKelvey and Kerr’s 1988 study; or when the friendships are ‘close’ bonds involvingconfidantes, as in our study), the reverse is likely true. Close friendships decrease the con-formity in a group—or, in the very least, close friendships lessen the propensity to shifttoward the most socially desirable stance on an issue. Granted, there could well be dif-ferences between conformity in opinion and conformity in behavior, but these findingsnonetheless suggest that conformity in opinion varies across levels of friendship.
Our findings have implications for jury decision making as well. Jurors some-times know one another before entering a jury. This is especially common in smallertowns=communities. Jury researchers have noted this pattern. For instance, Abbott(1999) writes, ‘‘In many cases it is not so clear [when to challenge jurors for cause ifthey know one another]. In small towns, for example, many of the citizens areacquainted with each other.’’ Jury consultants also acknowledge this (e.g., Winegar2006). Even judges in rural districts readily admit that this is commonplace.
A recent query to the Jur-E Bulletin (Hurley 2010)—a publication of theNational Center for State Courts (NCSC) that is read by judges—yielded severalilluminating statements. For instance, a judge in Wood County, Ohio (population:125,000) noted that about 10% of prospective jurors know one another, and wrotethat as long as their pre-existing relationship ‘‘will not deter frank, honest, and opendeliberations, there is no problem of seating [them] on the jury’’ (Hon. Kelsey 2010,in response to query in Hurley 2010). In smaller jurisdictions, pre-existing relation-ships are even more common. For instance, a judge handling rural jurisdictions inAlaska (multiple towns of approximately 1,000 residents each) noted that ‘‘most’’
jurors know one another (Hon. Torrisi 2010 in response to query in Hurley 2010). InMaine, a judge even remarked that in his jurisdiction, he has ‘‘had husband and wifeserve on the same jury without objection by counsel’’ (Hon. Marden 2010, inresponse to query in Hurley 2010).
Our findings suggest that if jurors know one another beforehand—a commonfeature of rural courtrooms, as above—this could impact their opinions, which, inturn, could affect trial outcomes. Jurors who are distant friends may feel compelledto conform to the dominant view of the jury (typically, but certainly not always,toward acquittal). Jurors who are close friends will probably not feel similarly com-pelled, and, thus, may be more willing to deviate from the group.
CONCLUSION
It is well known in social psychology that people adjust their views to conform toa socially desirable position. Even the research process itself can be impacted by thistendency, as respondents to questionnaires can exhibit a ‘‘social desirability bias’’ intheir answers to questions (Phillips and Clancy 1972). Conforming to a dominant orsocially desirable position is a common feature of group life. While it was traditionallyassumed that friendship fosters greater conformity in groups, this is not always thecase—sometimes friendship lessens conformity (McKelvey and Kerr 1988). But whatwas previously unknown was how varying degrees of friendship affect conformity.
In this study, we looked at mock juries to examine how distant and closefriendships impact the likelihood of conforming to a dominant and=or socially desir-able stance (in this case, shifting toward acquittal by switching to a not guilty verdictpost-deliberation). We find that distant friendships increase the likelihood ofconforming to a not guilty verdict among jurors, but close friendships decreasethe likelihood. These are important findings for both our understanding of conform-ity in groups as well as jury research.
In terms of conformity in groups, our findings suggest that friendship levelwithin groups matters greatly in determining whether or not individual group mem-bers feel compelled to conform to dominant group opinions. Distant friendships leadto greater conformity in opinion, while closer friendships lead to less conformity.This is a new finding that illuminates how friendship matters for group decision-making processes and conformity. In terms of jury research, our findings suggest thatwhen jurors know one another before a trial—a common circumstance in ruralareas—distant friends may feel compelled to conform with the group, whereas closefriends will not feel similarly compelled, which could carry significant implicationsfor trial outcomes. Hopefully, future research will continue to illuminate these pat-terns to help better understand the interplay between friendship and conformity ingroups and social life more generally.
AUTHOR NOTES
Clayton D. Peoples, PhD, is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Universityof Nevada, Reno, where he is also a faculty affiliate of the Interdisciplinary DoctoralProgram in Social Psychology. His interests span social influence=social networks,
social stratification, political sociology, and courts. His current research examinesnetwork effects in legislatures.
Alexandra E. Sigillo, PhD, earned her doctorate degree in social psychologyfrom the University of Nevada, Reno in 2011. Her dissertation investigated indivi-duals’ attitudes and support toward in-vitro fertilization and the factors that influencesuch perceptions. Her research interests lie within the intersection of psychology,health, and law with particular emphases in sexual and reproductive health, juvenileand family court proceedings, and policy development.
Morgan Green, MA, earned a master’s degree in sociology as well as a master’sdegree in social psychology from the University of Nevada, Reno. Her interests lie injuries, rehabilitation counseling, and religion, among other topics.
Monica K. Miller, JD, PhD, is Associate Professor for the Department ofCriminal Justice and the Interdisciplinary Doctoral Program in Social Psychologyat the University of Nevada, Reno. She is also associated with the Grant SawyerCenter for Justice Studies at the University. She received her PhD in 2004 and herJD in 2002, both in the University of Nebraska-Lincoln system.
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