Hard choices in fisheries development

International agencies aneed repeated failures _.” I _ _

have experi- in promotlng

fianersas aeveiopment m Third World nations. A central problem is that projects often have been designed without consideration of the unique resource and institutional characteristics of fisfteries. Ignoring these, fisheries projects typicalfy have followed a produ~tion~ent~ strategy that equ- ates growth with development. Pkn- ner.s have failed to recognize the ne- cessity of making difficult choices between increasing exports, increasing domestic fish supply, raising producers” incomes, and expanding employ mcnt opportunities in a fishery. These choices are fundamentally politlcal and moral rather than technical and econo- mlc in nature because they involve con- siderations of equity and fairness, Choice of target beneficiaries and Ssaues of organfwtfon and control are identffied as factors in~u~f~ dlstrf- butional equity.

Conner Bailey is with the Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Socioi- ogy, Alabama Agricultural Experiment Sta- tian. Auburn Universitv, AL 36849, USA; Svein Jento? is with the Institute of Social $ien;;, Unrversity of Tromse, Tromse,

Preparation of this paper was supported by the Alabama Agricultural Experiment Sta- tion at Auburn Unjversj~ and the Norwe- gian Council for Fisheries Research which made possible Jentoft’s sabbaticat leave at Auburn University.

’ H. Josuneit. ‘A survey of external assistance to the fisheries sector in developing countries. 1978-1985’. FAO Fisheries Circular No 755, No 2, -April 1987, FAO, Rome, 1987. ‘World Bank, ‘Harvesting the waters - a review of Bank experience with fisheries development’, Report No 4984, Opera-

continued on p 334

Hard choices in fisheries development

Conner Baiky and Svein Jentoft

Fisheries development projects over the years have experienced so many failures that, after rapid growth during the 1970s funding has levelled off and may have declined during the mid- and late 1980s.” A recent World Bank2 review concluded that ‘the overall performance of the fisheries portfolio has not been good’. A report of the Food and Agricuftural Urganisation of the United Nations reached a similar conclusion: ‘Review of the performance of past fisheries investment projects during the Iast decade indicate that they have often encoun- tered significant problems during their implementation’.”

In many cases, lack of project success can be traced to a lack of understanding and respect for social and cultural characteristics of the target populations.4 Those responsible for fisheries projects often placed too much faith in new technologies as the key to development. However, international agencies have not been alone in promoting technological solutions to development problems. This conviction often has been even more apparent among government officials and local elites within Third World countries, whose individual and class interests are served by this form of development5

However, probtems associated with fisheries development projects cannot be attributed solely to the practices and policies of development agencies and government institutions. In this article we argue that the special characteristics of fishery resources themselves are crucial ex- planatory factors.

This paper, aimed primarily at international development agencies and domestic fisheries planners, starts with a review of the biological and institutional characteristics of fisheries resources. This serves as the foundation for understanding development issues unique to fisheries, which are presented in the following sections. Next we address the problems of goal specification in fisheries developments drawing attention to the frequent practice of justifying projects on the basis of mutualfy antagonistic goals. We argue that development agencies are confronted with hard choices which are fundamentally moral and political rather than economic and technical. This perspective leads us to consider equity issues and conflicts of interest among those affected by fisheries development projects. We conclude by arguing that fisheries development projects need to emphasize organizational rather than technical factors in promoting socially and biologically sustainable development.

03~3-597~9~/~~3-~ 2 @ 1996 E~a~o~b-Heinemann Ltd 333

Special characteristics of fishery resources

To appreciate the opportunities and constraints involved in fisheries development, it is necessary to understand certain unique resource characteristics. Foremost among these are: (1) the biological renewability of fish stocks, (2) the uncertainty of scientific data regarding the state of fish stocks, and (3) the absence of property rights governing access to

these stocks.

Biological renewability

Fisheries resources in most parts of the world are heavily exploited and offer limited potential for increased harvests.” Marine fisheries can be continuously exploited up to a certain level without adverse effect on the stock. Beyond the level of fishing effort which produces maximum sustainable yield (MSY), increased investment in boats, engines, fishing gear, and labour will not result in further increases in the catch.

continued from p 333 tions Evaluation Department, 13 March

Excessive fishing effort can lead to the catastrophic collapse of an entire

1984, World Bank, Washington, DC, 1984. fishery.’ More frequently, however, in the multispecies context of most

3 Food and Agriculture Organisation of the tropical fisheries, increasing levels of fishing effort beyond MSY does UN ‘Report of the FAO World Conference on Fisheries Management and Develop-

not result in dramatic collapses.x Rather, it leads to changes in the

ment’, Rome, 27 June to 6 July 1984, species composition of the catch because long-lived commercially FAO, Rome, 1984. 4 C. Bailey, D. Cycon, and M. Morris,

valuable species generally are replaced by short-lived, less valuable

‘Fisheries development in the Third World: species.” The quantity of fish harvested may remain constant but the

the role of international agencies’, World value of the catch will decline. In short, levels of fishing effort beyond

Development, Vol 14, Nos 1 O/l 1 October/ those necessary to achieve MSY either deplete the resource or degrade November 1986, pp 1269-l 275; C. Bailey, ‘The political economy of fisheries de-

its value.

velopment in the Third World’, Agriculture The limited nature of fisheries resources and their vulnerability to

and Human Values. Vol V. Nos 1-2. overexr>Ioitation necessitate proper management to ensure sustainable Winter/Spring 1988, pp 3548; J.P. PIat: teau, ‘The dynamic of fisheries develop-

harvesis. The costs of non-&stainable fishYeries development for Third

ment in developing countries: a general World societies are very real and include reduced domestic food supply, overview’, Development and Change, Vol the squandering of limited capital resources, and the dissipation of 20, No 4, October 1989. ’ R.B. Pollnac, ‘Social and cultural charac-

resource rents available to society as a whole. Within the fisheries sector

teristics in small-scale fishery develop- itself, overexploitation has a particularly serious effect on employment

merit’. in M.M. Cernea. ed. Puttina Peoole oDDortunities and standards of living for small-scale fishing households, First: ‘Sociological Variables in &al be- ’ 1. velopment, Oxford University Press, New

which represent the vast majority of the people who depend on fishing

York, 1985. for their livelihood.

6 M.A. Robinson, ‘Prospects for world fisheries to 2000’, FAO Fisheries Circular No 772, Revision 1, June 1982, FAO,

Uncertainty of scientific data

Rome, 1982. Few governments have been successful in managing fisheries resources 7 G.J. Paulik, ‘Anchovies, birds and fishermen in the Peru current’, in M.H. Glantz

largely because there is little recognition among national leaders that

and J.D. Thompson, eds, Resource Man- these limits do in fact exist. This misconception is traceable to the nature

agement and Environmental Uncertainty; of the resource and to the difficulty involved in obtaining accurate data Lessons from Coastal Upwelling Fisheries, on the state of marine fish stocks. Unlike terrestrial resources, which John Wiley & Sons, New York, 1981, pp 334-356.

can be seen, counted and observed over time, fish are a fugitive

a D. Pauly, Theory and Management of resource moving unseen and in unknown numbers below the surface. Tropical Multispecies Stocks; A Review Scientific stock assessment methods depend on quantities of time-series with Emphasis on the Southeast Asian Demersal Fisheries, ICLARM Studies and

data and the capacity to analyse such data, both-of which are absent in

Reviews No 1, International Center for most Third World nations. Living Aquatic Resources Management, Manila, 1979.

Uncertainty regarding the status of fish stocks has two negative

’ F.T. Christy Jr, ‘A re-evaluation of consequences for fisheries development. Anticipating the impact of a

approaches to fisheries development: the fishery development project on the resource is restricted to guesswork special characteristics of fisheries and the need for management’, Paper prepared for

and unreliable extrapolation from past experience elsewhere. This

the Agriculture Symposium, The World problem has bedevilled many fisheries projects, some of which have

Bank, %9 January 1987. failed because the resource could not sustain increased levels of fishing

334 MARINE POLICY July 1990


lo K.A.J. Hay, ‘Post evaluation of the Riau fisheries development proiect in the Re- public of Indonesia’; External Post- Evaluation Report PE-20 (EX), March 1979, Asian Development Bank, Manila, 1979; R. Lawson, Economics of Fisheries Development, Frances Pinter, London, 1984; World Bank, op dt, Ref 2. ” C. Bailey, ‘The political economy of fisheries development in the Third World’, Agriculture and Human Values, Vol V, Nos l-2, Winter-Spring 1988, pp 35-48; Indo- Pacific Fishery Commission, ‘Report on the Symposium on the Exploitation and Management of Marine Fishery Resources in Southeast Asia. Darwin, Australia, 16 19 February 1987’, RAPA Report 1987/g, FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok, 1987. ” H.S. Gordon, ‘The economic theory of a common property resource: the fishery’, Journal of Political Economy, Vol62, 1954, pp 124-42. i’ G Hardin, ‘The tragedy of the commons’, Science, Vol 162. 1968. too 1243 48. l4 F T Christy, op cif, Ref 9. l5 W.F. Royce, Fishery Development, Academic Press, New York, 1987.

effort and, as a consequence, produced lower than expected 1andings.n’ The second problem with uncertainty is that it provides opportunities for political manipulation of official estimates of resource potentials, which are then used to justify further developments.”

Property rights

The third characteristic of fisheries resources is the lack of enforceable property rights that restrict access to the fish stocks. Unlike agricultural land, around which clear boundaries can be set, fisheries resources generally are open access resources where no boundaries exist and no restrictions are imposed on who may become a fisher or how the resource may be exploited. The absence of enforceable property rights over the resource results in a competitive scramble among users, all of whom may be expected, if they are economically rational, to maximize personal advantage even at the expense of resource sustainability and long-term societal good. l2 This dismal conclusion is the essence of Hardin’s ‘Tragedy of the Commons”” and reflects what has occurred in many Third World fisheries. l4

Fisheries development projects may well produce such an outcome,

even in areas where stocks initially were not heavily exploited. There are numerous examples from Third World countries to verify this. Therefore, proactive efforts to increase fish production must go hand in hand with reactive measures to protect fish resources from overexploitation.‘5 Licensing systems, quotas or exclusive territorial use rights are practical solutions to the open access problem. Such schemes, however, tend to stir tensions and conflicts among various user groups on the question of distributional equity. These are problems that development agencies somehow have to confront with the knowledge that there is no easy solution to what is fundamentally a political and moral issue.

Specifying goals

In fisheries development, the question of ‘development for whom?’ is inescapable. Development is here defined as a process of change through which sustainable and equitable improvements are made to the quality of life for all or most members of a society. In practice, however, fisheries development efforts have frequently failed to satisfy such criteria. Fisheries development policies have frequently led to the establishment of a dualistic structure characterized by large numbers of small-scale producers using simple technologies in direct competition with a newly established large-scale subsector. Powerful fishing technologies give the latter group a disproportionate share of the total catch. Unequal competition in the context of limited resources has led to serious erosion of incomes and standards of living in small-scale fishing. At the same time, the power of new fishing technologies poses a serious threat of resource depletion. Such policy outcomes represent neither socially sound nor biologically sustainable development.

Despite the finite nature of fisheries resources and the threat to overexploitation and social disruption posed by powerful modern fishing technologies, all too frequently policy makers are reluctant to acknowledge the need to make hard choices. Instead, they design projects which attempt to provide all things to all participants, often specifying project goals which are mutually antagonistic and irreconcil-

MARINE POLICY July 1990 335


I6 C. Bailey, A. Dwiponggo, and F. Mara- hudin, lndonesian Marine Capture Fishef- ies, ICLARM Studies and Reviews 10, Directorate General of Fisheries, Marine Fisheries Research Institute and the Inter- national Center for Living Aquatic Re- sources Management, Manila and Jakarta, 1987. I7 G. Kent, Fish, Food and Hunger: The Potential of Fisheries for Alleviating Mal- nutrition, Westview Press, Boulder, CO, 1987. I8 C. Bailey, et al, op cit. Ref 16; C. Bailey, op tit, Ref 4; J.P. Platteau, op cit. Ref 4. l9 V.D. Kaczynski, ‘Foreign fishing fleets in the subsaharan West African EEZ: The coastal state perspective,’ Marine Policy, Vol 13, No 1, January 1989, pp 2-15.

Figure 1. Trade-offs in fisheries de-

velopment.

able. The following list of goals is commonly used to justify particular fisheries projects.16 1. Increase exports of fish and fish products. 2. Increase the supply of fish to domestic markets. 3. Increase the level of fishermen’s incomes. 4. Provide new employment opportunities in the fisheries sector.

Each of these are valid goals in that they reflect real needs. The problem is that they are often mutually exclusive. There is, of course, great diversity in biological, social and economic circumstances among fisheries nations, which may make some of these goals less urgent or relevant. Nevertheless, we contend that they need to be addressed in fisheries development policy making and implementation.

The incompatibility of goals in fisheries development is illustrated in Figure 1. In this section, we will argue that there are direct trade-offs between promoting fishery exports and increasing supply of fish to domestic consumers (axis 1). We will argue too that, due to a combina- tion of technological and demographic factors, it is not possible simultaneously to generate expanded employment opportunities and to increase fishermen’s incomes (axis 2). The same applies to efforts to increase production for either domestic or export markets (axes 4 and 5). Finally, efforts to promote expanded production for either of these markets may have adverse consequences for employment (axes 3 and 6).

Increase exports as well as domestic supply of fish

Fisheries development frequently is seen as a means of improving the health and dietary well-being of domestic consumers. In many Third World nations, fish is the most important source, and for the poor the only affordable source, of animal protein.”

As a matter of urgent national priority, many Third World nations are seeking ways to increase foreign exchange earnings. Third World nations face a constant shortage of the hard currencies needed for debt payment and the purchase of essential imports. Therefore, many Third World nations are enthusiastically promoting exports as a central element of their fisheries development policies.” As a means of channelling revenue directly to government treasuries, many countries sell the right to fish to foreign distant water fleets. Typical in this respect are countries of subsaharan West Africa.”

This export-orientation is fully consistent with the priorities of international development assistance agencies such as the World Bank

EX PO

4

/ 1

Producers’ t

rt..; Employment

Domestic

consumption



and the Asian Development Bank, which are seeking to solve the current Third Word debt crisis. ‘” Fisheries projects are strongly affected

by these pressures, with the ironic result that development efforts have led to greater abundance and diversity of fisheries products to consumers in Japan, North America and Western Europe, but have done little or nothing to alleviate the protein malnutrition among the populations of Third World nations. A couple of examples may illustrate this: In Thailand, for example, per capita supply of edible fish declined 4.8% between 1970 and 1981 because of steady increases in fishery exports. Thailand exported over 20% of its total supply of edible fish products in 1981.*l In Kerala, India, the export-oriented approach as an integral part of the Indo-Norwegian Project in the 1950s and 1960s turned prawns into a luxury product out of reach of local consumers.**

Export-oriented projects affect domestic fish supply both directly through the shipment of food to overseas consumers as well as indirectly because the high prices offered by export markets encourage overexploitation of fishery resources. This is particularly the case where trawlers operate in shallow coastal waters to catch shrimp, the most valuable tropical fisheries export commodity. In the process of trawling for shrimp, large quantities of undersized juvenile food fish are caught and either dumped overboard or turned into animal feed.*” The effect is to reduce the biological renewability of the resource and limit the supply of fish available to local consumers. This, for instance, has happened in Kerala,24 in Tanzania, and Sri Lanka.*’

Increase both employment and fishermen’s incomes

” C Bailey, op tit, Ref 4. ” J.M. Floyd, ‘Political economy of fisher-

Ocean fisheries play an important role in providing employment oppor-

ies development in Indonesia, Malaysia, tunities for landless agriculturalists and other people living on society’s

the Philippines and Thailand’, PhD dis- margins. The open access nature of fishery resources, and the ease with sertation, University of Hawaii, 1985. ” J. Kurien, ‘Technical assistance projects

which people can enter a fishery with limited experience or capital

and socio-economic change - Norwegian investment, means that there are few obstacles to seeking a livelihood at

intervention in Kerala’s fisheries develop- sea. Such labour mobility serves to indicate the close connection ment’, Economic and Political Weekly, 20(25-26):A-70-88, 1985.

between fisheries and other sectors of the national economy and

23T Azhar, ‘Some preliminary notes on suggests that problems of fisheries development cannot be solved by

the by-catch of prawn trawlers off the West reference to the fisheries sector alone. The role of fisheries as employ- Coast of Peninsular Malaysia’, Report of the Workshop on the Biology and Re-

ment source of last resort underscores the importance of employment

sources of Penaeid Shrimps in the South generation as a relevant development goal not only for the fisheries

China Sea Area - Part 1, SCS/GEN/80/26, sector, but for Third World societies generally. South China Sea Fisheries Development and Coordinating Programme, Manila,

Fishermen and their families are generally among the poorest strata

1980, pp 64-69. l?;ithin Third World societies. Fisheries development projects frequently

24 J. Kurien, op tit, Ref 22. are justified on the grounds that they will provide additional income 25 B Hersoug, Laxer NORAD av et-faring? Norwegian College of Fisheries/University

opportunities for small-scale fishing households. The favoured means of

of Tromsa, 1990, forthcoming. accomplishing these goals is through the introduction of new production

26 C. Bailey, et al, op tit, Ref 16; D. technologies that are capital- rather than labour-intensive. The easiest Thompson, ‘Conflict within the fishing industry’, /CXARM Newsletter, Vol 3, No 3,

way to increase the income of a fisherman is to provide him (or her) with

1980, pp 3-4. better technology. Typical small-scale fishing units have limited produc-

27 I.R. Smith and A.N. Mines, eds, Small- tivity (generally less than 2 tonnes/year) and provide limited incomes to Scale Fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philip- pines: Economics of Production and

owners and crew alike.26 In contrast, large-scale units of the type

Marketing, ICLARM Technical Reports 11, encouraged by many development programmes are far more productive

Institute of Fisheries Develooment and Re- (50-200 tonnes/year) and profitable for their owners. Moreover, crew search, College of Universiiy of the Philip- pines in the Visayas, International Center

on such vessels typically earn higher incomes than those employed in the

for Living Aquatic Resources Manage- small-scale subsector.*’

ment, and the United Nations University, However, there are problems with such a development strategy. In Manila and Tokyo, 1982. the context of limited resources, increasing the technological power of

MARINE POLICY July 1990

certain fishing units means reducing employment opportunities in the fishery as a whole. Trawlers, to pick the most common example, typically employ a crew of five to harvest what it takes SO people to catch using small-scale gear.2” This may be a positive development

where alternative employment opportunities are available. As sug- gested above, however, fisheries often absorb surplus labour from other sectors of the economy. In fisheries development, the standard efficiency argument favouring technological innovation has profound consequences for social welfare.

Increase both employment and exports

Fisheries development projects commonly promote expansion of fisheries exports while simultaneously claiming to promote increased employment opportunities. However, export oriented fisheries development projects generally involve the introduction of new fishing technologies that are capital-intensive compared with the more labour-intensive technologies found within the small-scale subsector. In the case of tuna fisheries, where offshore stocks are essentially beyond the reach of small-scale producers, larger and more seaworthy ships are necessary to exploit the resource. Under such circumstances, a capital-intensive strategy may be justified to develop a fishery, but relatively little can be expected of such projects in terms of employment generation.

For example, during the 197Os, Indonesia established a number of capital-intensive parastatal fishing enterprises to exploit tuna resources. Total capital investment was US$S9 million, including loans from the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank, and the Japanese government. *” For this investment, only 3 400 jobs were created, meaning the average cost per job was US$17 000. This figure is roughly 100 times the average investment cost per fisherman employed in Indonesia’s small-scale subsector.

Consideration of the impact of export-oriented development on employment opportunities would not be complete without considering the jobs created in the fish processing industry. Women provide most of the labour in the processing of fish and shrimp for export, which usually occurs in major urban fishing ports. Wage rates are low and women are usually hired on a daily basis depending on supply of product. Opportu- nities for advancement are essentially nil. That said, processing for export markets has created new, albeit low-paying, employment opportunities for women. Whether these new jobs are being created at the expense of rural women, traditionally employed in the processing and marketing of fish landed in small coastal fishing communities, is a matter deserving future consideration.

Increase both fishermen’s incomes and exports

” C. Bailey, Small-Scale Fisheries of San The willingness of consumers in Japan, North America and Western Miguel Bay, Philippines: Occupational and Geographic Mobility, ICLARM Technical

Europe to-pay high prices for shrimp, tuna, and other fish products is

Reports No 10, International Center for what makes their export such an attractive option. The question here is, Livino Aquatic Resources Manaoement, who cantures the profit from this trade‘? Does the momotion of extort Instit;te of Fisheries Development and Re- search, College of Fisheries, University of

fisheries necessarily mean that fishermen’s incomes will be improved?

the Philippines in the Visayas, and the Fishermen typically are the first link in the distribution chain and they

United Nations University, Manila, 1982; rarely have any control over processing and marketing. They are price C. Bailey, ‘The political economy of marine fisheries development in Indonesia’, In-

takers with little or no ability to hold onto their highly perishable

donesia, Vol 46, October 1988, pp 2538. product until prices rise. Fish products may change ownership several ” C. Bailey, et al, op tit, Ref 16. times before reaching the processor and then will be transferred several


Hard choices in fisheries de~Jelop~er~1

more times before reaching the ultimate consumer.“0 Buyers and sellers at various levels in this distribution chain may be the primary beneficiaries of high market prices for shrimp and tuna. Moreover, we must distinguish between owners and non-owning crew members when considering income. Control over capital, technology, and current information gives these owners considerable power to dictate the special relations of production within the fishery. In the Philippines, for example, it was found that trawler owners were able to impose a series of changes in the sharing system that provided them with a progressively

” larger share of net receipts.. Most of the benefits from this export- oriented fishery flowed to entrepreneurs whose primary contribution is capital.

3o R. Lawson, op tit, Ref 10. 31 ED. Villafuerte, and C. Bailey, ‘Systems of sharing and patterns of ownership’, C. Bailey, ed, Sma~i-Scare Fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines: Social Aspects of Production and valeting, ICLARM Tech- nical Reports 9. International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management, Institute of Fisheries Development and Re- search, College of Fisheries, University of the Philippines in the Visayas, and the United Nations University, Manila, 1982, pf 25-41. 3 M.A. Robinson, op tit, Ref 6. 33 C. Bailey, ‘Government protection of traditional resource use rights: the case of Indonesian fisheries’, in D.C. Korten, ed, Community Management: Asian Experi- ence and Perspectives, Kumarian Press, Hartford, CN, 1986, pp 292-308. 34 J.B. Bert. ‘The imoact of development on Panama’s smalkkale fishermen’, Hu- man Organization, Vol 46, No 3, 1987, pp 233-242: S. Jentoft. ‘Oraanizina fisherv cooperatkes: the case of kcara&a’, Hi- man Organization, Vol 45, No 4, 1986, pp 353-358; J.R. McGoodwin, ‘Mexico’s con- flictual inshore Pacific fisheries: problem analysis and policy recommendations’, Human Organization, Vol 46, No 3, 1987, pp 221-232. 35 R Lawson, op tit, Ref 10; J.R. McGood- win,‘op tit, Ref 34.

increase both domestic consumption and employment in the fishery

Efforts to increase employment may have the unexpected effect of limiting the amount of fish entering market channels. This is most likely

Increase both fishermen’s incomes and domestic consumption

There are basically three ways to improve fishermen’s net incomes: increase the catch, reduce production costs, or increase prices received for the fish. Increasing the catch often is not a viable alternative given the heavily exploited condition of most important fishing grounds.‘2 This, in turn, affects the costs of production; as resources approach full exploitation, costs per unit of harvest increase. The second option is to improve economic efficiency by reducing the costs of production. This can be done by eliminating excess fishing capacity and labour, which would relieve pressure on the resource and make it less costly for those who remain to harvest a given quantity of fish. Few developing countries have attempted even partial restrictions (much less been successful) on access to fishery resources.33 Were restrictions imposed, this probably would have a negative effect on employment, as noted above.

The third alternative is to increase the price of fish. The interests of fishermen and consumers are fundamentally antagonistic concerning price. Setting aside the question of whether fishermen would themselves benefit, an issue discussed above, it is clear that consumers would not. Moreover, higher prices for fish would tend to attract additional investment of capital and labour into the fishing industry. This will lead to greater pressure on a limited resource base, further increasing upward pressure on prices as stocks become fuily or even over- exploited.

To ensure that basic products such as fish become available to low-income consumers, some developing countries have introduced price controls.34 In such instances, rather than letting the market determine the price level, prices are administered by a fishery ministry or some other government agency. In the short run, consumers benefit at the expense of fishermen. In the long run, price controls may discourage additional investments of capital and labour into the fishing industry. This may, in turn, reduce pressure on a limited resource base and so benefit the remaining fishermen. The fundamental problem with price controls, however, is that they have proved difficult to enforce. When scarcity of fish exists, a black market often develops.“’ Govern- ment price control then becomes ineffective, failing to ensure fish as food to low-income groups and turning fishermen into lawbreakers,

GAMINE POLICY July 1990 339


to be true in situations where stocks already are heavily or fully exploited. Beyond a certain point, additional numbers of people chasing fish will not yield any increase in total catch. As the catch per fisherman declines, harvests may do little more than meet the needs of fishing households for food. The result would be a shift towards subsistence fishing with limited trade of fish in the intermediate hinterland.

There are alternative means of increasing employment in the fishing industry.” Employment can be created in industries which provide inputs to the fishery, such as boat building and manufacturing of diesel engines, nets and other gear. This strategy has the added advantage of reducing dependence on imports for equipment vital to the local fishing industry. Employment opportunities in fish processing also exist, especially if simple labour-intensive methods (eg salting and drying, smok- ing, or pre-cooking) are used rather than freezing and canning, which involve heavy capital investments and yield a more expensive product. Lower processing, storage and transportation costs will tend to keep the price to consumers low without reducing the nutritional value of the product.

In some cases, aquaculture may provide a mechanism for increasing both employment and the supply of fish for domestic consumption. However, most coastal aquaculture, notably pond production of shrimp, is oriented towards export markets. Moreover, coastal shrimp aquaculture is not labour-intensive and generates only limited employment opportunities.a7 Under certain conditions, cage culture of finfish and raft culture of molluscs can provide alternative employment opportunities for coastal residents. However, problems of water quality due to pollution and vulnerability to storms, among other constraining factors, limit the growth of coastal aquaculture. Furthermore, the notion that fishermen can easily shift over to aquaculture production ignores major differences in social and economic organization that differentiate fishermen from agriculturalists.“s None of this is to gainsay the importance of opportunities in aquaculture which do exist. All too frequently, however, policy makers simplistically argue that fishermen’s knowledge of fish in the wild means that they can grow them under controlled conditions and that they have access to the resources to do so.

Equity issues

We have argued that increasing employment may be inconsistent with the goal of raising fishermen’s incomes, and that there is a trade-off between letting some fishermen adopt more powerful technologies and letting more people become fishermen. We also have contended that a policy for increasing exports of fishery products may be incompatible with efforts to generate expanded employment opportunities, especially

36 W.H.L. Allsop, ‘Sustained social bene- in rural fishing communities. These and other trade-offs between fits from diversification of small-scale fisheries’, Proceedings, World Symposium

development goals have to be recognized as inevitable consequences of

on Fishing Gear and Fishing Vessel De- fisheries development, necessitating difficult choices that raise questions

sion. Marine Institute, St John’s, New- of distributional equity. foundland, 1989. 37 C. Bailey, ‘The social consequences of

One may, of course, think of situations where some of these

tropical shrimp mariculture development’, trade-offs are not so urgent. As Lawson points out, ‘it is possible to

Ocean & Shoreline Manaoement. Vol 11, maintain a modern and artisanal sector simultaneously provided that - No 1, 1988, pp 31-44.

38 C. Bailey, The Sociology of Production they sell to different markets, for example, if the modern-sector sells in

in Rural Malay Society, Oxford University an export market whilst the artisanal sector sells in the domestic market,

Press, New York and Kuala Lumpur, 1983. or if they land fish at different seasons of the year or capture different



39 Ft. Lawson, op cit. Ref 10, p 159. 4o S. Jentoft, op tit, Ref 34. 41 P. Alexander, Sri Lankan Fishermen; Rural Capitalism and Peasant Society, Monographs on South Asia No 7, Austra- lian National University, Canberra, 1982. Q L R Yater, ‘The fisherman’s family: economic roles of women and children’, C. Bailey, ed, Small-Scale Fisheries of San Miguel Bay, Philippines: Social Aspects of Production and Marketina. ICLARM Tech- nical Report 9, Interna%nal Center for Living Aquatic Resources Management, Institute of Fisheries Development and Re- search, College of Fisheries, University of the Philippines in the Visayas, and the United Nations University, Manila, 1982, pp 42-50.

stocks so that their operations are complementary and not competitive’.39 Nicaragua, for instance, seems to fit this situation rather

we11.40 However, these situations are more the exception than the rule. We argue in this section that there are two focal areas where project design and implementation have an effect on equity and where governments and development agencies are confronted with hard choices. These are the selection of target groups and the related issues of organization and control.

Target groups

Fisheries development projects are not like new roads or new hospitals, which can be established without having certain individuals or groups in mind. New boats and fishing gear cannot be left on the shore free for whoever wants to make use of them. Either individuals or an organization must have ownership and exclusive use rights. Deciding who these beneficiaries shall be is almost by definition inequitable; some will be included while others are excluded from being part of the project.

Many fisheries projects are justified on grounds that they will provide increased opportunities for the poor. Concern regarding equity does not, however, necessarily mean that projects should be targeted exclu- sively to benefit the poor. The question of what is fair must be considered in relation to what is essential for project beneficiaries to survive as business ventures. The history of small-scale fisheries development projects is littered with failures caused by well-intentioned efforts to benefit the ‘poorest of the poor’. In Sri Lanka, for example, new boats given to poor fishermen quickly fell into the hands of local financiers who had the financial strength to pay for repairs and operating costs.41 The critical issue is not only ownership, but the relations of production between owners and non-owning crew. The goal of equity might best be served by concentrating attention on how sharing systems function rather than on who owns a particular boat or net.

Although it is not always possible or even preferable to design fisheries development projects only for the poor, neither can their special needs be ignored. At the very least, development projects should not prove harmful to the interests of the poor. A solution to the problem of selecting target groups is to let projects encompass several groups and then deal with the distributional problems as an integral part of the projects themselves, rather than as externalities. As long as ocean fisheries function as a societal safety valve for surplus labour, development efforts to improve incomes through technological innovation are likely to benefit a few at the expense of the many. The only way out of this conundrum is to improve economic opportunities outside the fishery as a means of drawing off surplus labour and allow for its replacement by capital. Fisheries development projects need to be broadened to incorporate more than harvesting, processing and marketing of fish. They must also include ‘integrated’ projects which have broader impacts at the community and regional levels.

Probably the most overlooked group in fisheries development projects has been women. Since fishing generally (but not always) is a male occupation, production-oriented development projects have tended to focus on men as fishermen, ignoring the important roles that women and children play in fish processing and marketing.42 The general assumption has been that what benefits fishermen will eventually


43 M.D. Chapman, ‘Women’s fishing in Oceania’, Human Ecology, Vol 15, No 3, 1987, pp 267-288. 44 V. Broth-Due, and E. Storas, ‘Aid to fisheries at Lake Turkana. Evaluations and recommendations’, Norwegian Agency for Development, Oslo, 1980; J.B. Christen- sen, ‘Motor power and woman power: technological and economic change among the Fantic fishermen of Ghana’, M.E. Smith, ed, Those Who Live From the Sea: A Study in Maritime Anthropology, West Publishing Company, New York, 1977, pp 71-95; E.A. Hammel, and Y.D. Haase, ‘A survey of Peruvian fishing communities’, Anthropological Records, Vol 21, No 2, pp 21 l-229, 1962. 45 S. Jentoft, ‘Fisheries co-operatives: lessons drawn from international experi- ences’, Canadian Journal of Development Studies, Vol VII, No 2, 1986, pp 198-209. 46 S. Jentoft, ‘Models of fishery development: the cooperative approach’, Marine Policy, Vol 9, No 4, October 1985, pp 322-331; R.B. Pollnac, Evaluating the Potential of Fishermen s Organizations in Developing Countries, International Center for Marine Resource Development, Uni- versity of Rhode Island, Kingston, 1988. 47 C. Bailey, ‘Managing an open-access resource: the case of coastal fisheries’, D.C. Korten and R. Klauss, eds, People- Centred Developmenf, Kumarian Press, Hartford, CN, 1984, pp 97-l 03; S. Jentoft, op cit. Ref 45. 48 C. Bailey, ibid. 49 F. Berkes, ‘Local level management and the commons problem’, Marine Policy, Vol IO, 1986, pp 215229. 5o S. Jentoft, ‘Fisheries co-management: delegating government responsibility to fishermen’s organizations’, Marine Policy, Vol 13, No 2, 7989, pp 137-l 54. ” B.M. McCav. ‘A fisherman’s coooerative limited: indigenous resource management in a complex society’, Anthropological Quarterly, Vol 53, No 1, 1980, pp 29-38. 52 E. Pinkerton, ‘Co-operative management of local fisheries; a route to development’, in J.W. Bennet and J.R. Bowen, eds, Production and Autonomy: Anthropo- logical Perspectives on Development, Society for Economic Anthropology and University Press of America, Lanham, MD, 1987, pp 121-142. 53 Y. Hirazawa, ‘Coastal fishery and fishery rights’, Paper presented at the Symposium on Development and Manage- ment of Small-Scale Fisheries, Indo- Pacific Commission, Kyoto, May 1980; K. Ruddle, and T. Akimichi, eds, Maritime institutions in the Western Pacific, National Museum of Ethnology, Osaka, 1984.

benefit women as household members. At best, this assumption has proved to be superficial. In many instances, women are themselves directly involved in the fishing industry, sometimes in harvesting operations, 43 but more often in processing and marketing.“’ In many rural fishing communities, the ‘middleman’ is in fact a woman. Fishery projects designed to make fish processing and distribution more effi- cient by replacing private fish buyers with a formally organized, male-dominated cooperative undercuts the primary source of independ- ence for women in fishing communities.‘5

Organization and corltrol

Equity not only concerns distribution of material benefits, but also certain qualitative aspects of development, such as the opportunity for project beneficiaries to maintain or increase their ability to control their own lives. Promotion of self-reliance and participant control is central to the development process and to the question of whether a project can be characterized as successful.

Active participation in project design and implementation requires that beneficiaries be organized and that a clear division of responsibility exists between central authorities and local communities. Individually, fishermen and other members of fishing communities are powerless to influence government officials and their programmes. Only as an organized group can project beneficiaries deal with government officials on anything approaching an even plane.

The cooperative often is regarded as an ideal organizational model for fisheries development.Jh In theory, cooperatives fulfil most criteria for sound development. They provide economies of scale and economic leverage both in production and marketing, they operate according to participatory decision-making principles. and they are effective in promoting education and technology transfer. In spite of these advantages, however, fisheries cooperatives have more frequently failed than succeeded.

In practice, as distinct from rhetoric, governments have been more anxious to establish local organizations that they can control rather than to create viable cooperatives that have local autonomy and independ- ence. Fisheries cooperatives generally are dominated by government agencies, which create organizations that are little more than rosters of names for disbursing development largess.“’

Despite the many failures of fisheries cooperatives, the fact remains that strengthening the organizational capacity of fishermen is vital to strategies of participatory development. The question is, how to establish viable organizations in fishing communities.

Perhaps the best place to start is to examine basic problems affecting fishermen themselves. Often issues of gear conflict and resource management are central concerns. The potential for cooperatives having a greater role in fisheries management has recently been explored by Bailey,48 Berkes,“” Jentoft,5” McCay” and Pinkerton.” In Japan, cooperatives play an important role in fisheries management through control of access to the resource itself.5’ Whether cooperatives can prove effective for resource management in Third World countries remains to be seen. So far, few cases of cooperatives involved in fisheries management have been reported in developing countries. There are, however, many well-documented cases where indigenous organizations (not formal cooperatives) have effectively managed com-



mon property resources.54 Runge’” has argued persuasively for the advantages of such community-based common property resource management systems in the Third World. Primary among these advantages are long-term resource sustainability and equitable resource allocation decisions.

Governments generally have proved themselves unable to manage fishery resources. Effective fisheries management demands location- specific information because of the great diversity of estuarine, coastal, and oceanic ecosystems. Moreover, there are enormous difficulties involved in enforcing restrictions affecting hundreds of communities along thousands of kilometres of coastline. The costs of enforcement (boats, airplanes, personnel, etc) are also high.

Community-based fishery management systems are not a universal panacea, but they have many advantages. Fishermen have intimate knowledge of local conditions. Those with long involvement in the industry fully appreciate problems associated with overexploitation and are likely to feel that they have a stake in managing the resource for sustained harvest rather than short-term gain. Once organized, local fishermen should be better able to enforce restrictions in their own fishing grounds through the application of social pressure rather than depending on the more costly and less effective methods of government agencies. Their presence on the fishing grounds provides local fishermen with the opportunity to observe illegal or destructive fishing activities by outsiders and to report the violation to enforcement personnel. Involvement of local organizations in fisheries management is likely to be both relatively inexpensive and effective.

Local control over resource management and allocation decisions may provide fisheries cooperatives or other community-based groups with a r&on d’&tre which will attract and hold a solid membership, thereby contributing to the participatory nature of development efforts. In the end, however, the greatest obstacle to local control over fishery resources is the reluctance of politicians and government officials to surrender power to local organizations.

Conclusion

Improving the material conditions of life often is regarded as the central goal of Third World development. We will not argue with this essentially materialist view here, but we do take exception to the notion that such improvements can be achieved primarily through production- oriented development strategies. If our primary concern regarding development is to improve a society’s material standards of living, we must be concerned not only with increasing production but also with how production is organized and controlled, who benefits from develop-

54 ELM. McCay, and J.M. Acheson, eds, The Question of the Commons; The Cultu-

ment, and whether such development is sustainable over time.

fal Ecology of Communal Resources, Uni- We have argued in this paper that failure to balance production-

versity of Arizona Press, Tucson, AZ, oriented fisheries development with resource management is a short- 1987; National Academy of Sciences, Common Property Resource Manage-

sighted approach leading to resource depletion, dissipation of resource

ment, Conference Proceedings, April 21- rents, and missed development opportunities. All too frequently,

26, 1985, National Academy of Sciences, international development agencies have contributed to the failure of

Washington, DC, 1986. fisheries proiects bv failing to recognize uniaue resource and institution- 55 CR. knge, ‘Common property and col-

_ ” 1

lective action in economic development’, al characteristics of the fishing industry. Chief among these are the

World Development, Vol 14, No 5, pp biological renewability of the resource and the common absence of 623-635, 1986. property rights over either fishing grounds or fish stocks. Both factors


make fishery resources vulnerable to overexploitation. Few other industries are based on open access stocks that force individual producers to compete for and collectively risk destroying the resource upon which they all depend. In many countries, internationally-sponsored projects have been a key cause of overexploitation of marine resources and have led to establishment of a dualistic industry structure. Unequal competition in the context of resource limits has led to serious erosion of incomes and standards of living among small-scale fishing households. At the same time, the power of newly introduced fishing technologies controlled by large-scale fisheries projects poses a serious threat of resource depletion. Such policy outcomes represent neither socially sound nor biologically sustainable development.

Failure to recognize resource limitations has encouraged international agencies and their national partners to initiate projects on the basis of overly optimistic and often mutually antagonistic goals. As a consequence, the hard choices that need to be made in fisheries development have been neglected or postponed. These choices are fundamentally political and moral rather than technical and economic in nature.

Development policies need to be made with a clear recognition of possible adverse consequences so that these can be minimized. Failure to do so represents choice by default - inaction becomes action. When important decisions are made in this fashion, the poor and the powerless suffer at the expense of politically well-connected economic elites. To anticipate social problems of equity, fisheries development programmes must be explicit in identifying specific target beneficiaries and must assess the 1ikeIy impact on other groups affected.

Equity in development is also affected by issues of organization and control. We have argued that devolution of responsibility to fisheries cooperatives or other local organizations offers many advantages in establishing an effective fisheries management system. The conclusion of the literature on community-based common property resource management indicates that such systems tend to be supportive of equitable allocation decisions. The key question here is: are governments willing to surrender control over important resources to local organizations’?


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Hard choices in fisheries development

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