HEALTH AND SAFETY IN THE TREE PLANTING WORKPLACE

Jordan Tesluk B.A., Simon Fraser University, 2003

THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

In the School

of Criminology

O Jordan Tesluk 2006

SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY

Spring 2006

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APPROVAL

Name:

Degree:

Title of Thesis:

Examining Committee:

Chair:

Date Approved:

Jordan Tesluk

M. A.

"Health and Safety in the Tree Planting Workplace"

Wendy Chan, Ph.D.

Senior Supervisor

Neil Boyd, LL.M. Member

Melody Hessing, Ph.D. External Examiner Instructor, Department of Sociology/Anthropology Douglas College

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Abstract

This thesis examines health and safety regulation in the tree planting industry of British

Columbia, which is characterized by high levels of work-related injury and a young

transient workforce. A research project conducted in cooperation with the industry

revealed varying levels of health and safety performance. Key attitudinal and

behavioural patterns among workers and supervisors point to important problems that

must be dealt with if the industry is to be successful in navigating an evolving

deregulatory framework without increasing safety risks to its workforce. However, the

influence of the occupational culture and the structural variables that characterize the

industry create obstacles to achieving successful reform. Observations of deregulation in

other jurisdictions indicate that changes must penetrate all levels of the workforce, and

the state may still need to play a key role in ensuring compliance in the new regulatory

environment.

Keywords: corporate culture, industrial safety, occupational health and safety

regulation, organizational crime, tree planting

iii

For the industry I love

And for the families of Julia James, and all others lost in the woods

Acknowledgements

The research behind this thesis could not have been done without the

contributions of the hundreds of workers throughout the forests of British Columbia who

took time at the end of exhausting workdays to complete lengthy and detailed

questionnaires and to participate in prolonged interviews. These contributions came

despite exhausted bodies, blistered hands, and the presence of scorching sun and

driving rain. There was a degree of concern at the beginning of the research that it would

be difficult to convince people to participate after toiling through their days in one of the

hardest jobs in the country. However, the overwhelmingly positive response to the

research demonstrated the generosity of these people, and their keen interest in

improving the conditions of a job that is not just a form of labour, but also a lifestyle and

a rite of passage for thousands of youth. Without the time they provided, this thesis

would not exist; and it is for the benefit of these workers that I hope this research may be

used in the future. Additionally, I would like to observe the good faith and trust of all the

company owners and contractors that generously invited me into their workplaces to

survey and interview their employees. I hope that the information from this research will

contribute to the greater success of their industry and assist them in protecti~ng the

welfare of their employees.

The research for this thesis was supported by a Master's scholarship from the

Social Sciences and Humanities Resource Council. I would also like to recognize the

Forest Industry Safety Association (FISA, which has been supplanted by the British

Columbia Forest Safety Council) and the Western Silviculture Contractors Association

for their cooperation, which was a key element in the success of the research and the

breadth it was able to achieve. Special contributions were made by John Betts, Joachim

Graber, Tony Harrison, and other members of the FlSA Silviculture Advisory Committee.

Additional valuable input on this thesis was provided by my fellow graduate students in

Criminology 1000.

Special thanks go to Melody Hessing for providing me with valuable insight and

advice for future endeavours. I would also like to thank the many faculty members in the

Simon Fraser University School of Criminology that influenced me during m.y time here,

in both personal and academic ways. Neil Boyd was especially supportive in

encouraging me to pursue my research, and steering me in the right direction when

guidance was required. The most important of all of these people has been my senior

supervisor Joan Brockman, whose contributions to both my research and my education

went far beyond what any student could expect from a supervisor. Her incre'dible

dedication and amazing attention to detail were not only guiding forces throughout all of

my studies at Simon Fraser, but also vital ingredients in the writing of this thesis.

Table of Contents

. . Approval ......................................................................................................................... 11

... Abstract ......................................................................................................................... 111

Dedication ..................................................................................................................... iv

Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................... v . .

Table of Contents ................................................................................................. VII

List of Figures .............................................................................................................. ix

List of Tables ................................................................................................................ xi

Chapter One: Introduction .......................................................................................... 1

Death in the Woods ..................................................................................................... 1 ......................................................................................................... About the Author 5

Chapter Two: Literature Review ................................................................................... 8

Health and Safety Regulation ...................................................................................... 9 ........................................................................................ The Tree Planting Industry 14

The History of the Tree Planting Industry ................................................................... 20 The Occupational Culture of Tree Planting ................................................................ 33

....................................................... Occupational Culture and Industry Comparisons 36 .......................................... Occupational Health and Safety as Organizational Crime 41

.............................................. Other Studies of Regulation and Organizational Crime 45 .................................................................................................... Research Questions 53

Chapter Three: Methodology ....................................................................................... 58

................................................................................................... The Questionnaires 58 ................................................................................. Questionnaires: Section One 60 .................................................................................. Questionnaires Section Two 61

............................................................................... Questionnaires Section Three 66 .................................................................................................................. Interviews 66

............................................................................................................... The Sample 67 ........................................................................................................................ Ethics 74

Chapter Four: Findings ............................................................................................... 77

Findings: Section One ............................................................................................... 77 ........................................................................................ Research Question One 77 ........................................................................................ Research Question Two 77

........................................................................................................................ Age 78 ............................................................................................................ Experience 78

........................................................................................................................ Sex 80

Days Worked in Season ........................................................................................ 80 .............................................................................................................. Residency 82 .............................................................................................................. Education 83

.......................................................................................................... Classification 84 General Workplace Attitudes and Perceptions ....................................................... 85

................................................................................................ Findings Section Two 90 ...................................................................................... Research Question Three 90

Likelihood of Planters to Engage in Unsafe Behaviour ........................................... 90 Likelihood of Supervisors to Engage in Unsafe Behaviour ..................................... 92

........................................ Expectation of Planters to Engage in Unsafe Behaviour 94 Expectations that Unsafe Planter Behaviour would be Corrected .......................... 97

......................................... Likelihood of Supervisors to Correct Unsafe Behaviour 98 ................. Importance for Supervisors to Correct Unsafe Behaviour By Planters 100

......................... Importance of Correcting Unsafe Behaviour Among Supervisors 101 ..................................................... Likelihood of Planters to Refuse Unsafe Work 102

Likelihood of Planters to Report Unsafe Behaviour .............................................. 105 ................................ Health and Safety Performance Based on Type of Worksite 109

Differences in Attitudes Between Planters and Supervisors ................................. 111 ...................................................................................... Research Question Four 115 ...................................................................................... Research Question Five 118

Chapter Five: Discussion ......................................................................................... 122

............................................................................................ Research Question Six 122 ................................ Top Eleven Health and Safety Program Recommendations 123

Research Question Seven ....................................................................................... 130 .............................................................................................................. Conclusion 140

Bibliography ................................................. ............................................................. 145

............................................................................................................... Works Cited 145 ............................................................................................................. List of Cases 150 .......................................................................................................... Statutory Law 150

................................................................................................................ Appendices 151

Appendix A Appendix 6 Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G Appendix H Appendix I Appendix J

................................................................ Questionnaire for Workers 152 Questionnaire for Supervisors .......................................................... 163

............................................................. Interview Guide for Workers 174 ..................................................... Information for Company Owners 175

Subject Participation Feedback ........................................................ 176 .............................................................. Letter of Support from FISA 177

..................................................... Letter of Support from the WSCA 178 ................................................. Statistics for Refusing Unsafe Work 179 ................................................ Statistics for Reporting Unsafe Work 181

............................................................................... Supporting Data 183

viii

List of Figures

Figure 1:

Figure 2:

Figure 3:

Figure 4:

Figure 5:

Figure 6:

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Figure 8:

Figure 9:

Figure 10:

Figure 1 1 :

Figure 12:

Figure 13:

Figure 14:

Figure 15:

Figure 16:

Figure 17:

Figure 18:

Figure 19:

Figure 20:

Figure 21 :

Figure 22:

Figure 23:

Figure 24:

Figure 25:

Figure 26:

Example scenario ....................................................................................... 62

Map of research sites .................................................................................. 70

Age of workers ............................................................................................ 78

Years of experience planting ....................................................................... 79

Years of experience with current company ................................................. 80

.......................................... Days worked in season at time of questionnaire 81

................................ Days expected to have worked by the end of the year 82

.................................................................................................... Education 83

............................................................................................... Classification 84

Time spent by supervisors ensuring compliance ......................................... 85

Time spend discussing health and safety .................................................... 85

Likelihood of self being injured .................................................................... 86

Likelihood of someone else being injured ................................................... 86

Friendliness of planters and supervisors ..................................................... 86

........................................................................ Competitiveness of planters 86

.............................................................. Satisfaction with accommodations 87

............... Satisfaction with earnings ............................................................. 87

................................................................................. Closeness of planters 87

........................................................................ Competitiveness of planters 88

General index for unsafe behaviour by planters .......................................... 91

General index for unsafe behaviour by supervisors .................................... 93

General index for expectation of planters to behave unsafely ..................... 95

General index for expectation of supervisors to behave unsafely ................ 97

General index for expectation of correction of planters ............................... 98

General measure for likelihood of supervisors to correct unsafe .................................................................................................... behaviour 99

General index for importance of correcting unsafe behaviour by ............................................................. ....... planters ................................... I01

Figure 27:

Figure 28:

Figure 29:

Figure 30:

Figure 31 :

Figure 32:

Figure 33:

Figure 34:

Figure 35:

Figure 36:

Figure 37:

Figure 38:

Figure 39:

Figure 40:

Figure 41 :

Figure 42:

Figure 43:

Figure 44:

Figure 45:

Figure 46:

Figure 47:

Figure 48:

Figure 49:

Figure 50:

General index for importance of correcting unsafe supervisor .................................................................................................. behaviour 102

Likelihood of planters to refuse to work in unsafe terrain ........................... 103

Likelihood of planters to refuse to work with hazardous substances ......... 103

Likelihood of planters to report a supervisor for speeding ......................... 106

........................ Likelihood of planters to report co-worker too close to cliff 106

Planter health and safety performance by worksite ................................... 110

Difference in expectations of planters to be unsafe ................................... 112

Difference in attitudes towards importance of correcting planters .............. 112

Difference in expectations of planters to be corrected ............................... 114

Difference in attitudes towards importance of reporting unsafe .................................................................................................... behaviour 114

Correlation of behaviours and perceptions among planters ....................... 115

Correlation of behaviours and perceptions among supervisors ................. 117

Correlation of age and unsafe behaviour among planters ......................... 119

........................................................................... Accountability flow chart 132

................................................................................................... Statistics 183

................................................................................................... Statistics 183

................................................................................................... Statistics 184

Statistics ................................................................................................... 185

................................................................................................... Statistics 186

................................................................................................... Statistics 186

.................................................................................................. Statistics 1 8 7

................................................................................................... Statistics 187

................................................................................................... Statistics 188

................................................................................................... Statistics 189

List of Tables

Table 1:

Table 2:

Table 3:

Table 4:

Table 5:

Table 6:

Table 7:

Table 8:

Table 9:

Table 10:

................................................................................................. The sample 73

Summary of "Yes-No" questions ................................................................. 88

Unsafe behaviour by planters ..................................................................... 90

Unsafe behaviour by supervisors ................................................................ 92

Expectation of unsafe behaviour by planters ............................................... 94

Expectation of unsafe behaviour by supervisors ......................................... 96

Expectation of unsafe by planters to be corrected ....................................... 97

Likelihood of supervisors to correct unsafe behaviour ................................. 99

.......................................... Importance for supervisors to correct planters 100

Importance of correcting unsafe behaviour by supervisors ........................ 101

Chapter One: Introduction

We inherit the previous practices of our industry and accept them

without questioning them even when they are inappropriate, or the

industry has outgrown them. It is not until tragedy strikes that we shine

a spotlight on our culture. (James, 2004)

Death in the Woods

On May 2oth, 2003, a young woman named Julia James climbed into the back

seat of a company truck to have a drink and socialize with her co-workers alter a long

week of planting trees for a large contractor in the forests of central British Columbia.

She was only 20 years old, and the job had lured her far from home with the prospect of

earning enough money to pay for college through the following winter. The c.amp where

she was staying was located on the shores of Tibble Lake in the heart of the wilderness,

approximately one hour away from the town of Quesnel. For reasons unexplained, one

of her co-workers decided to start the truck that Julia was sitting in, and began driving

away. Unfortunately, his judgment was clouded by alcohol, and he steered the truck into

the lake. The driver and another passenger were able to escape, but Julia drowned,

unable to free herself from the back seat of the vehicle. Several of Julia's co-workers

tried to save her by diving into the frigid waters, but they were forced to abandon their

efforts due to the cold. Unfortunately, they had neither the training nor the equipment to

perform such a rescue.

Two days later, the James family flew into the town of Quesnel to identify the

body of their daughter, a moment that marked them with a tragedy that may never fade.

Another life forever altered by this event was that of the 30 year old driver, Trevor

Wishart, who was sentenced to 4 years in jail and a 10 year driving prohibit~~on. The

sentence for his part in the tragedy was not out of place for the nature of the offence. In

a remarkable demonstration of remorse during his guilty plea, Wishart instructed his

counsel not seek a conditional sentence, signifying his willingness to accept

responsibility for the incident and accept the consequences of his action (R. v. Wishart

[ZOO31 B.C.J. No. 2865).

Despite the punishment handed out to Wishart, the conditions that led to the

death of Julia James left questions as to whether or not all responsible parties were

identified and forced to shoulder their share of the blame. These conditions included an

isolated camp run by a large contractor that depends heavily on young workers to

complete a gruelling job that pushes the mental and physical limits of those that fill the

ranks. Many of these young people have never worked away from home before, and are

unfamiliar with the dangers of their work environment, an environment that continually

places workers in confrontations with the dangers of the wilderness. It is questionable

whether or not the workers in the Quesnel incident had enough education about the

dangers of their environment, or adequate training and equipment to deal with

foreseeable emergencies. Furthermore, the presence of alcohol and motor vehicles in

the workplace formed a combination that would be dangerous in any situation, and in

Julia James' case it proved deadly.

Despite these failings, WorkSafeBC (formerly known as the Workers'

Compensation Board of British Columbia) did not take any corrective action against the

employer, and the charges produced by the RCMP investigation were limited to those

laid against Wishart. Surely a diligent employer could have foreseen the potential for

such an accident and taken steps to prevent it by restricting the presence of alcohol in

the workplace or removing the keys from the company vehicles when al~oh~ol is present.

However, such measures are not the standard practice in an industry characterized by

an emphasis on workers' discretion and moderation rather than strict policies and

procedures. These characteristics are indicative of an occupational culture that may be

poorly suited to the protection of the worker population it influences.

The story of Julia James is an unfortunate case of workplace conditions

converging in a tragic ending. However, the conditions of the workplace in which she

died were anything but unusual. They were in fact a typical portrait of life and labour in

the woods for thousands of workers, many of them similar to Julia James in terms of age

and experience. While the conditions of the tree planting workplace rarely result in

workers being killed in drunk-driving accidents, they are implicated in a larger pattern of

behaviours tied to the occupational culture of the workforce, the material cor~ditions of

the industry, and the corresponding sets of choices presented to its members. It must

therefore be asked if a share of the responsibility for her death should be apportioned

not only to the company that employed her, but also to the industry as a whole.

Silviculture has long suffered from injury rates far above that of other occupations

(Ellis, Morford, & Turner, 2003). An industry so heavily dependent upon yourlg untrained

and inexperienced workers must surely possess an increased responsibility for their

protection when the risk of injury is so high. A new regulatory environment is developing

in British Columbia, with an emphasis on deregulation and performance-based

requirements. More responsibility is being allocated to employers, and during the

transition new opportunities are arising for the development of better practices and

improved standards of performance in health and safety regulation. However,

opportunities are also emerging for groups of workers to fall through the cracks of

regulatory protection if regulators do not take effective action to help industries such as

tree planting to successfully evolve in the new environment.

In 2002, the forestry industry as a whole, including the silviculture sector and the

tree planting industry, embarked on a cooperative venture with WorkSafeBC to reduce

injuries and increase compliance through the formation of the Forest Industry Safety

Association (FISA). After two years of operation, FISA was given a new set of clear

directives and reborn in the fall of 2004 as the British Columbia Forest Safely Council

(BCFSC).' This agency adopted a mandate of moving towards fulfilling the role of self-

regulation within forestry, and assuming responsibility for better health and safety

performance in the field.

Although self-regulation is a term that has not been explicitly stated or officially

acknowledged by the BCFSC and WorkSafeBC, the creation and direction of the council

nonetheless corresponds with a delegation of regulatory responsibility to the private

sector. The BCFSC is funded by the industry through the insurance premiums paid to

WorkSafeBC. The BCFSC has developed a separate wing called the BC Safe

Silviculture Project to deal with the specific needs of the silviculture industry.

Development of health and safety programs under this wing is subject to the guidance of

the Silviculture Advisory Committee, which is composed of volunteer members from the

industry.

A major obstacle to the success of the new council, however, has been the lack

of a comprehensive understanding of the behaviours in need of change. At the time of

the BCFSC's inception, there was a lack of information regarding the state of compliance

with occupational health and safety regulations and the basic characteristics of the

1 Thus, references to activities associated with this organization prior to the fall of 2004 refer to the body named FISA, whereas activities following this time refer to the BCFSC.

workforce. This gap in the data posed obstacles to the development of effective health

and safety programs and meaningful compliance assurance initiatives by WorkSafeBC

and the BCFSC. There was an obvious need for detailed information regarding the

population of interest and its behaviours in order to act as a general compass for the

activities of the agency. However, the unique nature of the industry and the influence of

its culture and its history demand that any study of these phenomena be done in a

qualitatively informed manner. The research behind this thesis was conducted in part to

help fulfill this need in the hope of improving conditions for workers and hopefully saving

lives and preventing injuries.

The main task in the research was to design a qualitatively informed quantitative

method of inquiry that could provide insight to the knowledge that the industry lacks.

However, the success of the BCFSC in its quest to reform health and safety in the

industry will depend upon more than just the collection of accurate and meaningful data;

it will also hinge upon the collective ability and willingness of industry leaders to execute

their mandate and to ensure compliance initiatives filter down through every level of the

workforce. Thus, this thesis engages in an in-depth examination of what the industry

needs to do in order to improve health and safety performance. Ultimately, tlhis will

require contributions from both workers and employers. As such, both the and the

way to improve health and safety in the industry will form an important part of the

discussion at the end of this thesis. Additionally, some recommendations have been

made regarding the use of the collected data.

About the Author

The author of this thesis has thirteen years of experience working in the tree

planting industry. His interest in occupational health and safety stems from his eleven

years as a first aid attendant in the field. He has also spent the past two years working

as a volunteer on the Silviculture Advisory Committee for FlSA and the BCF'SC. These

experiences have provided him with insights from both the frontlines where the trees are

planted, and the boardrooms where the direction of the industry is negotiated. He has

had extensive contact not only with hundreds of workers in the field, but also with many

of the contractors and company owners who have taken tree planting from iI cottage

industry of eclectic individuals, to a multi-million dollar industry that is developing

networks throughout Canada and other parts of the world. An important component of

informal knowledge has been drawn from these sources during the shaping of this

thesis.

The insider perspective possessed by the researcher was instrumental in

identifying and gaining access to appropriate research sites. It was also a crucial

element in obtaining the trust and cooperation of the research respondents, and

articulating the research instruments in their common idiom. Knowledge of occupational

habits was instrumental in arranging personal interviews, and familiarity with industry

jargon was a vital resource during these discussions. Without these tools, the researcher

would have been severely hindered in obtaining the input supplied during these

sessions.

However, there were also obstacles posed by the insider perspective that had to

be dealt with in order to protect the integrity of'the research. While some researchers

may claim that research can never be truly ob,jective, there is still a general belief that

one's own personal perspective of the research issue should not be allowed to obscure

the findings. Most of the precautions recognized in maintaining the integrity (or

objectivity if you will) of the research were taken during the design of the research

instrument. Consultations were held with members of the industry to ensure that the

construction of the research instrument was representative of their collective perceptions

of occupational health and safety issues, rather than solely those of the researcher.

Input was also gathered on how to arrange the sampling method; a complicated matter

that will be discussed in greater detail later. Once the data was collected, it consisted

mostly of quantitative data. However, commentary was still gathered from the

respondents following collection of the questionnaires regarding their opinion on the

validity of the questions answered, and how the data should be utilized.

Chapter Two: Literature Review

In developing the research that fueled this thesis, a number of bodies of

information first needed to be consulted. The first concern is identifying the relevant

health and safety laws and the state of regulation in the province of British Columbia.

This helps focus the research on the specific behaviours that need to be exemined and

the legal environment in which reform is being pursued. Secondly, the tree planting

industry requires an introduction along with a brief summary of the limited research that

has thus far been conducted upon the industry. This leads into an examination of the

occupational culture of the job and the influence it has on the workforce.

Examining the culture of the industry requires an understanding of the historical

and material conditions that have produced it, and a brief summary is provided of the

industry's origins. This helps create an understanding of the origins of the c~~rrent state

of the industry and the forces that shaped the character and culture of the workforce.

Following the contextualization of tree planting against a wider backdrop, the

characteristics of the industry and its unique culture are compared with other primary

resource occupations, and an examination is undertaken of literature related to these

industries' respective cultures and conditions. This route provides an illustration of the

conditions, motivations, and relevant parties associated with occupational health and

safety (OHS) regulation in the tree planting industry and allows the subject to be situated

within the wider study of organizational offending. Finally, criminological studies of

compliance and regulation are examined in order to explain the approach taken to the

problem and the issues that will guide the use of the data. Comparisons with other

industries and other areas of regulation help frame the issue of health and safety

compliance in the tree planting industry within a wider criminological perspective.

Health and Safety Regulation

In British Columbia, the main piece of legislation governing health arid safety in

the workplace is the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA). Under this act, WorksafeBC

formulates the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation (OHSR), which governs the

specific requirements that must be met by all workplaces within its jurisdiction. The

OHSR contains a variety of requirements for both workers and employers. A violation of

the OHSR can produce a number of different legal responses under Part 3 Division 15 of

the WCA, ranging from orders to fix equipmerit or cease operations to monetary

penalties and even prosecution. The OHSR contains separate sections to deal with the

activities of employees, supervisors, and employers in accordance with the :specific roles

they play in the workplace.

There are other bodies of law that apply to health and safety in the workplace,

and the term "regulation" effectively includes rnore than just provincially developed

legislation. For example, there is a separate act to cover workers under federal

jurisdiction in the Canada Labour Code (CLC). Workers involved in helicopter-based

forestry operations (such as "heli-logging"), for example, are subject to the CLC because

their occupation is primarily classified under aviation, which is subject to federal

jurisdiction. However, such workers comprise a very small portion of the forestry industry

and there are not @ any tree planting crews who conduct exclusively helicclpter-based

operations2.

2 With an increase in helicopter logging, it is possible that such crews could exist in the near future.

9

The Criminal Code may also come into play, especially in the case of workplace

fatalities. In March of 2004, Bill C-45 came into force (Government of Canada, 2004),

ostensibly making it easier to prosecute companies and individuals who are responsible

for the deaths of workers. These laws are now found in sections 22.1, 222, and 21 7.1 of

the Criminal Code. Like the OHSR, the Criminal Code can be applied to either

individuals or the organizations responsible. However, the most important set of

regulations for day-to-day activities in the tree planting workplace is the 0cc:upational

Health and Safety Regulation. As such, the types of offences examined in this thesis are

related directly to this set of requirements.

In May of 2001, a new Liberal government was voted into power in British

Columbia, introducing what was called "The New Era" in the administration of the

province. The government immediately created a Deregulation Office and in November

of 2001, the Red Tape Reduction Task Force was created and put in charge of a policy

that demanded the reduction of "red tape" and regulation by one third by 20104. The

government defined red tape in the following manner:

Red Tape is non-essential procedures, forms, licences, and regulations that add to the cost of dealing with government. This includes anything obsolete, redundant, wasteful or confusing that diminishes the province's economic competitiveness, and stands in the way of job creation or wastes taxpayers' time and money. Red Tape does NOT ir~clude measures that are demonstrably effective and necessary for the protection of public health, safety, the environment and consumers. (Province of British Columbia, 2004)

This agenda of deregulation has spread into many areas, including the

administration of occupational health and safety. Deregulation as a policy movement is

distinguished from traditional "command and control" approaches that rely on strict

standards-based rules that prescribe exactly how certain activities must be undertaken.

Command and control methods of regulation are also associated with design-based

standards, such as those that require specific: pieces of equipment to be used in specific

situations (Coglianese, Nash, & Olmstead, 2002:4). Kenneth Hanf explains that

deregulation essentially possesses two components:

... the reform of traditional regulatory instruments (especially the system of conditional permits) and measures to promote effective internalization of environmental responsibility as the basis for greater reliance in 'self- regulation' by industrial firms. (1 989: 193)

In contrast, following the implementation of a policy of deregulation, there is an

emphasis on performance-based standards under which goals are set by the regulating

body and the means (i.e., choice of equipment) of reaching them is left to the regulated

bodies (Coglianese, Nash, & Olmstead, 2003:742). The basic theory behind

deregulation is to provide regulated bodies with the economic incentive of avoiding

costlier traditional methods of regulation, in exchange for their voluntary cooperation in

pursuing a set of goals in the way most efficient for their business. Hanf explains that

this strategy is useful for "re-establishing the market as the chief-mechanism for guiding

and rewarding entrepreneurial activities" (1 989: 195).

In occupational health and safety, greater onus is being placed upon employers

and industry leaders to determine the best way of regulating their workplaces. Long lists

of detailed regulations and technical stipulations are being replaced by performance-

based requirements that require employers to find the most appropriate method of

achieving a certain level of health and safety practices. For example, in March of 2004

WorkSafeBC repealed Part 33 of the OHSR, which contained specific requirements

regarding the type of first aid equipment that must be present in the workplace based on

the number of employees present and the distance to medical aid. First aid equipment

requirements are now dealt with under section 3.16 of the new regulation, which allows

employers to supply whatever equipment they deem necessary based upor1 their

evaluation of the workplace circumstances.

This new method of determining first aid equipment requirements may produce

dramatically different interpretations depending upon the way in which WorkSafeBC

chooses to conduct enforcement activities. The new standard may be viewed as more

stringent if employers are held responsible for failing to supply appropriate equipment

following an accident. However, such a decis~on would require WorkSafeBC: to review

the employer's evaluation of workplace circumstances and reach a finding t.hat the

employer's evaluation was faulty. Such a course of action by WorkSafeBC rnay result in

employers becoming increasingly diligent about their equipment standards and erring on

the side of caution by supplying more equipment than previously required under the

former regulations. However, a difference in opinion regarding the requiremlents of the

workplace may have to be settled in court in the case of a serious accident that results in

charges.

Thus, the new regulation may also be viewed as less stringent in that employers

may choose to adopt lower standards of equipment requirements and either hope that a

serious accident does not occur, or count on WorkSafeBC to be unable or unwilling to

demonstrate that the employer's evaluation was faulty. Choosing a lower standard of

equipment would be a more economical choice if WorkSafeBC demonstrates a soft

approach to enforcement following serious accidents. The former regulation in Part 33 of

the OHSR was explicitly clear, and allowed WorkSafeBC to take corrective action

regardless of any difference of opinion in regard to workplace activities. Thus, the exact

impact of the new regulation will not be known until the response of industry and

WorkSafeBC are observed in the wake of workplace incidents.

Corresponding with this change in regulatory style has been the development of

the British Columbia Forest Safety Council (BCFSC). Several members of industry have

recognized the development of the BCFSC and the newly emerging policy regime as an

opportunity to have a hand in the development of performance standards that will not

only be effective in reducing injuries, but also better suited to the unique needs of the

industry. While the former means-based strategy of regulation (as illustrated in Part 33 of

the OHSR) made universal requirements regardless of the needs of particular industries,

the new approach may foster the development of industry-specific standards if a degree

of consensus can be established amongst employers.

When the subject of regulation is something as tangible as first aid equipment, it

may be relatively straightforward to achieve a consensus on what appropriate standard

of performance should be. However, when the subjects of regulation are the policies that

govern workplace relations and rules that govern worker training and behaviour,

agreement on appropriate standards may be more difficult to establish.

One of the first obstacles hindering this process is a comprehensive

understanding of what is actually going on in the field in regard to health and safety

compliance. This research was designed to provide insights that reveal some of the

challenges for regulating the industry, and to help company owners and supervisors

identify the ways in which their own attempts to ensure compliance can break down

within the workplace. During the spring of 2004, an agreement was reached between

FISA, the WSCA and the author of this thesis to cooperate on a research pr,oject that

would help fulfill the needs of the industry and the academic interests of the author.

Administrative support and a statement of recognition were supplied by the industry in

order to assist the researcher in gaining access to industry worksites. Both FISA and the

WSCA provided the researcher with letters that detailed this arrangement in order to

assist him in obtaining cooperation from company owners. Copies of these letters are

provided in Appendix F and Appendix G. In return, the industry was granted access to

information regarding the characteristics of the industry and the state of OHS

compliance in the workforce.

The Tree Planting Industry

The industry and occupation of tree planting possess distinctive characteristics

that not only affect its relationship with health and safety regulation, but also create

specific demands to conducting an in-depth examination of its members and their

workplace behaviours. Tree planting has historically been somewhat of a maverick

industry, rolling along on the frontiers of our society; its operations generally isolated

from public view and shielded from the gaze of regulating agencies such as

WorkSafeBC. There has been little quantitative information gathered from the workforce

by either industry or academia other than a report on types and frequencies of injuries

(Ellis, Morford, & Turner, 2003), and a limited survey of company activity and employee

profiles (Coopers & Lybrand, 1997). Due to these limitations in existing data and the goal

of this project, some aspects of the research design for this thesis were relia'nt upon the

two studies mentioned, estimates from members of the industry, and the personal

experience of the researcher, including his informal conversations with many people in

the industry. This influence was most evident in the design of the sampling method,

which will be discussed in detail later.

The Coopers & Lybrand study revealed some basic characteristics of the

workforce that corresponded with commonly held perceptions of the industry as

possessing a young workforce, a slightly higher ratio of women than other industrial

resource jobs, and a high percentage of students (close to one third of the total

workforce) (1 997:15-17). The study also indicated that despite the high turnover rate,

workers identifying silviculture as a career form the majority of the workforce

accompanied by a minority of transient temporary workers (ibid). However, the study

was mostly concerned with the financial characteristics of the industry at the company

level of analysis, and did not include a sufficient number of individual workers in its

survey to provide a high degree of reliabil it~.~ Despite the limited scope of the research,

the results were not dissimilar from commonly held beliefs regarding the characteristics

of the workforce.

There have also been a few studies on the physical nature of the job, focusing on

such issues as human performance (Trites, 1992) and exposure to pesticides

(Robinson, 1992). Studies on the physical demands of the job have recently become

popular again in the wake of work by Ellis et al. which revealed that a staggering portion

of workforce experiences are related to repetitive strain and over-exertion. The recent

findings are unsurprising in light of a study by a Simon Fraser University Kinesiology

student who reported that,

... the physical exertion level and work efficiency of treeplanters is amongst the highest ever recorded in human occupational performance studies. In fact they measured treeplanters with relative exertion levels that were 75 percent of an Olympic Marathoner. (Trites, 1992 summarized by the Western Silviculture Contractors Association in Cyr, 1 998:70)

Physical breakdown is not the only hazard that tree planters face, anld workers

have struggled at times to have their concerns recognized as legitimate threats to their

health. Robinson's master's thesis on pesticide exposure concluded that although the

risk of pesticide exposure is small, it is nonetheless a legitimate threat to the health of

tree planters and appropriate safeguards should be taken to minimize exposure (1992).

A front page article in the Georgia Straight newspaper in 2005 examined the experience

of several tree planters who had suffered serious adverse affects associated with

Only 50 workers were interviewed by telephone.

exposure to toxic chemicals, not from the pesticides but from the fertilizers that are

applied to the trees (Findlay, 2005). One worker reported debilitating toxic affects that

required several years of recovery, and recounted a lack of cooperation from

WorkSafeBC in investigating the problem. Most recently, the Silviculture Advisory Board

of the BCFSC has recognized the potential risk associated with toxic substances and

agreed to support further research examining the exposure of tree planters 'to hazardous

materials contained within fertilizers. This development suggests that it may be possible

to bring workers and employers together in finding solutions to other health and safety

problems that plague the industry.

The search for better practices must first start with a basic understanding of the

industry itself. Tree planting occupies a unique niche in the silviculture sectolr of the

forestry industry in British Columbia. This sector includes all activities surrounding the

growth and maintenance of young forests, including the planting, pruning, arid spacing of

young seedlings. Silviculture functions as a counterbalance to the harvesting sector,

which includes activities surrounding the cutting and processing of timber. The Provincial

Ministry of Forests grants licences to private forestry companies in the harvesting sector

to cut trees in certain locations. These private companies then invite tree planting

contractors to bid on the planting jobs, and generally award the job to the lowest bidder.

The Ministry of Forests also oversees a number of tree planting contracts on lands for

which the province has assumed responsibility. Planting contracts administered by the

Ministry are bid upon in the same manner as contracts with private logging companies.

The bids are usually tendered based on a price per tree to be planted. Prices can

vary according to a number of factors, including terrain, location, and technical

complexity. Contractors then hire workers to provide the physical labour for the contract.

The workers are generally paid strictly by a commission that corresponds wit:h a portion

of the bid, generally in the neighbourhood of 40 to 60 percent. There are two companies

known to utilize a day-rate system of pay. However, even these companies ultimately

base worker pay upon production and simply include other factors into the pay scale and

take overall company or crew production into account when calculating wages. Thus, the

profits of the companies and contractors are based upon the difference betvveen how

much they pay the workers and how much they bid upon the contract. This difference

must also be able to account for overhead such as worker accommodation, vehicle

rentals, and health and safety related expenses.

The tree planting sector contains several hundred contractors, and forms the

workplace for a population whose numbers fluctuate as the seasons change (Ellis et al.,

200352). Ballpark estimates from the industry range between 1,500 and 2,500 workers

in the spring to between 6,000 and 10,000 in the peak of the summer. Exact figures are

not known as companies are generally classified by payroll size, and not by number of

employee^.^ This method of calculating company size complicates the task of assessing

the needs of the industry and creating an appropriate sample.

One of the problems associated with this recording practice is that it 11s not

possible to equate the number of employees in a company with the size of the payroll

because some companies operate for only a few months of the year while others may

operate for the entire year. Also, companies exhibit widely varying average rates of pay,

making it problematic to use an industry average wage to determine the number of

employees. Furthermore, planters often work for more than one company over the

course of a year,5 thus creating an overlap between company rosters that further

confounds accurate assessment of the workforce population.

4 Information in records held by WorkSafeBC and the WSCA. Some planters work for as many as 4 or 5 (or even more) companies throughout the course of the year.

17

The work is also seasonal; it begins in early February on the coast and spreads

to the interior as the snow melts, before finishing up on the coast in the fall. Crews

constantly move between different work locations as the season progresses, making it

difficult to contact or locate individuals, and even harder to determine the status of the

workforce as a whole.

The worker population has generally been known to include an eclectic mix of

individuals, including many university and college students and other transient groups,

combined with a more static group of older experienced workers for whom the job is a

way of life. It is also known that a large portion of the workforce only spends one or two

seasons in the industry before moving on to other careers. The high turnover and the

seasonally mobile nature of the work create difficulties in tracking the charac:teristics of

the industry and its workers.

The number of employers in the industry is also undetermined. A list provided by

the Western Silviculture Contractors Association (WSCA) identified 239 certi,fied

contractors for the year 2003. Other lists of employers exist in records from the Ministry

of Forests and internet-based resources for workers. Some employers appear to cease

operations one year, but reappear several years later, making it difficult to determine

who is actually in operation at any given time. In fact, one of the company owners drawn

from the available lists during the sampling process turned out to have been !deceased

for several years.

The lists included large companies with offices throughout Canada, m~edium-

sized companies based in single locations, smaller operations run from homes, and

other organizations such as city councils and first nations groups that may only

occasionally obtain a small piece of work. Some of the contractors on the list are no

longer active, and many are simply unable to obtain contracts over the course of the

18

year. Individual contractors that work alone or with only one or two partners also appear

on the list, but many similar individuals work in the industry without belonging to the

WSCA or appearing on the list. Due to these factors, there is neither an exh~austive list of

all employees in the industry, nor an accurate list of all employers.

The actual mechanics of the job involve filling a set of hip-bags with young

seedlings and manually inserting them into the ground with a shovel at appropriate

distances apart as to completely cover harvested areas. It is known to be one of the

most gruelling jobs in North America. WorkSafeBC reported that an average planter puts

in about 1600 trees per day, lifts a cumulative load of more than 1000 kilograms, and

bends over and slams his or her shovel into the ground more than 200 times per hour

(Cyr, 1998:38).

Over the last several years, an important concern has arisen in the industry; the

workers are getting hurt too often, in numbers up to eight times more frequent than other

members of the workforce (Larsson and Field in Ellis et al., 2003:77). The Canadian

Centre for Occupational Health and Safety (CCOHS) reported that 90 percent of all tree

planters experience an illness or injury during the course of their job (CCOHS, 2002).

The most common injuries are repetitive strains and sprains, slipping and falling, and

being struck by objects (Ellis et al., 2003:12).

Other significant threats to tree planters' safety include exposure to the elements,

encounters with wild animals, and contact with potentially harmful chemicals. However,

the majority of fatalities are associated with work vehicles and driving on dangerous

roads. The CCOHS reported that 15 planters died on the job (within Canada) between

1987 and 1991 (2002). Calculation of a precise death or injury with which to

compare tree planting with other industries is problematic due to the lack of information

concerning the number of workers in the industry. The exact number of fatalities in the

industry over the last 14 years has also been difficult to determine due to WorkSafeBC's

practice of including tree planting statistics in the same category as other silviculture

sectors. The forestry industry as a whole exhibits higher rates of work-related death than

any other industry in British Columbia, and although the tree planting industry suffers far

fewer casualties than the harvesting sector, it shares the high rates of serious injury and

is an important contributing component to the most dangerous industry in the province.

The lack of more precise and recent figures on the number of tree planters killed

in British Columbia is an indication of how tree planting has remained relatively insulated

not only from the institutions designed to govern workplace activity and collect data on

such matters, but also from other forms of examination such as academic review. To

address some of the gaps in the data, a comprehensive study of injuries in the

silviculture sector was undertaken by an industry consultant in 2003. Although the report

supplied detailed information about the frequency of injuries, it concluded that there is a

discernable lack of information in WorkSafeBC records about the causes of accidents in

the workplace (Ellis et al., 2003:ll). The report also was unable to address the

relationship between deaths and injuries, and compliance with health and safety

regulations. However, the report did recognize that there is a unique occupational culture

in silviculture (especially in tree planting) that can affect group norms and influence

health and safety-related behaviours (ibid:6).

The History of the Tree Planting Industry

An understanding of the culture of the tree planting industry requires an

examination its historical development and sorne of the material conditions that have

shaped its evolution. The history of the forestry industry has been well documented in

books such as "Logging: British Columbia's Logging History" (Gould, 1975) and "West

Coast Logging 1840-1 91 0" (Shakespeare, 1977). Detailed explorations of the logging

culture can be found in sources such as "The Lumberjacks" by Donald MacKay, in which

he describes the exploits of legendary loggers such as Dirty Dan McKlusky and Big

Swede Hand-Logger Johnson (1 988).

Unlike the logging industry, there has been very little written about the history of

tree planting and how it acquired the culture it now exhibits. However, the lineage of tree

planting is relatively recent, and its oral history is still alive in the minds of th'e people

who pioneered it. Many of the most prominent pioneers of the industry are still directly

involved in its operations, and play an active role in the direction of the Western

Silviculture Contractors Association and the BC Safe Silviculture Project. They have not

only assisted the researcher in gaining cooperation from other employers for data

collection, but they have also generously provided their knowledge of tree planting

history. In a series of interviews, they assisted in piecing together the origins of their

industry. Their input was also compared against a small collection of records from an

early tree planting organization6 in order to identify key dates and important

developments. These records consisted mostly of photocopied meeting minutes, and

correspondences between various forestry organizations and members of the industry.

The historical background that follows is therefore an amalgamation of the best sources

of information available on the tree planting industry. This history has been included in

order to provide a detailed background to the research questions that will be explored

during this thesis, and a deeper context to the challenges that face the industry.

Prior to the 1960s there was relatively little tree planting done in the forest

industry of British Columbia. The first seedlings are believed to have been planted

around 1930, and a small amount of planting has historically been undertaken by

forestry companies (mostly those that conduct their operations on private land).

The Pacific Reforestation Workers Association (PRWA)

2 1

However, most of the land was left to regenerate naturally, and it was not until the 50s

and 60s that a growing understanding of the environmental impact of logging prompted

more concerted efforts to help the forests regenerate. It became apparent that the long-

term survival of the forestry industry relied upon a healthier supply of timber and a more

active program of restocking the forests.

Tree planting was originally undertaken by employees of the harvesting (logging)

industry, but the job was not popular among the unionized workers of the Industrial

Wood and Allied Workers of Canada (IWA).7 The harvesting sector of the forestry

industry was sufficiently prosperous that there was little organized resistance from the

unions when small groups of transient individuals began undertaking the work as

independent contractors in the late 1960s and early 1970s, and the first private tree

planting contract is believed to have been handed out in 1969. The forestry companies

welcomed this development as an opportunity to pay workers according to th~eir

production instead of by the hour, and it provided a small degree of freedom from the

contracts that bound the forestry companies to the union locals. This marked the birth of

a whole new industry that eventually evolved into the form that tree planting holds today.

The evolution of the tree planting industry was essentially defined by two

dominant models of business: smaller cooperative-oriented companies and larger

conventional operations. I will generally refer to these two influences as the conventional

movement and the cooperative movement. While there are groups and companies that

overlapped these categories and exhibited features of both archetypes, it appears that

the values underlying the two movements, the methods of their organization, (and the

Formerly known in Canada as the Industrial Woodworkers of America. A Canadian organization developed and became official in 1986 and changed its name in 1991. The history of this union is long and complicated, and its perspectives on the tree planting industry would likely yield an additional valuable perspective.

segments of the population they incorporated helped form the two main pedigrees of the

occupational culture as it exists today.

The cooperative movement started first and included the small independent

contractors that made the initial foray into the forest industry. Many of the workers in this

movement were self-described hippies, draft-dodgers, and outdoors adventurers looking

for an alternative model of labour that would allow them to stay close to the earth and

outside the sphere of urban living. One member reported that, "they were in a sense

dropping out of society, but to go to work." (Anonymous, 2004) Their appearance in the

woods was confusing for the traditional occupants of the forestry industry, and in the

words of one participant, represented one of the first of several contradiction~s in the

culture, "The Loggers didn't understand us: Hippies that work." (Anonymous, 2004) This

description is an indicator of the age of disaffection that characterized the 601s and 70s

for a particular segment of the population. The Canadian context of this age included

strong themes of women's liberation, anti-establishment protests, and public outcry

against increasingly punitive drug laws (Verzuh, 1989).

Many members of the population were seeking to escape from traditional

employer-employee relationships and find ways of getting back to the land. 'Tree

planting represented a wilderness adventure that could accommodate radical social

beliefs, while at the same time provide a source of income. One of the main

characteristics that distinguished tree planters from logging crews was the presence of

women who did not simply work in the camps, but also on the front lines along with the

men. This aspect of tree planting was indicative of a different approach to work that

involved more democratic methods of decision-making and a move towards c;ollective

labour efforts. Dominant hierarchies were rejected in favour of forms of activity that

suited the needs of the group as a whole. These colourful and anti-conventional themes

continue to exhibit themselves in the culture of the occupation today.

Early tree planting camps consisted of rudimentary shacks and shelters, and

most interviewees report that health and safety was a non-issue back then. "The only

concern we had for the Workers' Compensation Board," one member recalled, "was to

ensure our camp was located in a place where they couldn't find us." (Anonymous,

2004) Several members noted that it seemed like a miracle that more of them did not

die, and yet none of them could recall of any instances of major accidents in the early

days of the industry. This is not to suggest that injuries never happened. Rather, it points

to an apparent lack of a structured approach to occupational dangers in the early days of

the job. The Workers' Compensation Board (WCB) was generally not involved with the

industry, as most planters operated as independent sub-contractors and were exempt

from the coverage that the WCB provided other workers. Furthermore, the industry

network was at such a young stage of development that news of serious incidents was

unlikely to spread throughout the industry as quickly as it does in today's age of modern

media and communication technologies.

Protection from the dangers of the job was dependent upon the skill set brought

to the workplace and the ability within each group to care for its members. Acicident

prevention was regulated by common sense and the ability of the group to discourage

"cowboys". (Anonymous, 2004) The passion for the outdoors is also still characterized

today by those that see the job as a way to explore the province and visit areas of

wilderness that other people will generally only see in pictures. The influence of the

cooperative movement also remains visible in the colourful and diverse groups of people

attracted to the industry because of the freedom it offers from modern society. The

emphasis on sharing and collectivism continues to echo in contemporary accounts of

camp life, and is a commonly cited reason for the annual return of many members to the

industry.

By the mid 1970s a number of tree planting cooperatives had sprung up

throughout the province, mainly concentrating in the Kootenay (southern interior) and the

coastal regions of the province. The largest of these was the Western Reforestation

Cooperative in Nelson, which formed in 1978. The pooling of resources and abilities

offered a promising way for motivated groups of workers to obtain a substantial contract

with a logging company, without submitting to a conventional employer-employee

relationship. Western Coop was based on the two core principles of worker ownership

and worker control. It depended upon democratic management, and received a strong

leadership contribution from radically minded individuals from East Vancouvler, a hub of

social activism in the 1970s. One member fondly recalled his involvement in the

Gastown riot, a moment in Vancouver counterculture that was precipitated by a

confrontation between the police and the participants of an organized "smoke-in" to

protest increasingly punitive drug laws. The use of marijuana among tree planters

remains a feature of stereotypical depictions of the occupation today. It also presents a

thorny health and safety issue for the industry, along with any other substances that may

be relied upon as coping mechanisms, regardless of their origins or level of acceptability

in the workplace culture.

In 1978 an industry association called the Pacific Reforestation Workers

Association (PRWA) was formed, consisting of both workers and company owners. The

PRWA included many members from Western Reforestation Coop (Cooperative), as

well as entrepreneurial-minded conventional contractors and representatives from the

logging companies. There was a brief period of struggle for control of the association,

culminating in a takeover by the Cooperative-led workers in 1981 in which the owners

and other representatives were voted out. The contractors in turn formed the Western

Silviculture Contactors Association (WSCA) to represent the interests of employers,

including the increasing number of conventionally oriented tree planting companies. The

WSCA still exists today and is the dominant organization in the silviculture industry,

accounting for upwards of 80% of the trees planted in the province, but including

membership from only 25% of all contractors. The PRWA never became an actual union

structure, but it continued to represent tree planters and their co-operatives, and it

played an important role for the tree planting industry in the years that followed.

The IWA mounted a strong union drive to take over the tree planting industry in

1984 in an effort to assimilate the growing tree planting workforce, and solidify its ability

to dictate the terms of employment in the woods. One of the main grievances the IWA

claimed to have with the tree planting industry was the lack of health and safety

organization, and the poor conditions of many of the camps. At the beginning of the drive

in the early 1980s, the PRWA opposed the IWA's assimilative intentions, and decried

their concern for health and safety as a poor veil over a blatant effort to increase the

union's leverage on the logging companies. However, other developments within the

industry later prompted the PRWA to seek an alliance with the IWA in an effort to

prevent the bottoming out of tree prices that was being fuelled by bidding walrs between

private tree planting contractors. Ultimately, the two sides were unable to develop a

long-term working relationship. This was largely due to tree planters' rejection of the

wage-labour model in favour of the production model and the opportunity to dictate one's

own earnings. Furthermore, several union locals had opposed the drive as they

perceived the introduction of piece-rate oriented labour as a threat to their conventional

wage structures, and did not want such models invading their workplace. Attempts were

made to devise a piece-rate system that would be acceptable to both the planters and

the IWA, but neither group was able to agree upon a definitive formula.

Interview comments, however, indicate that part of the decision to avoid the

union also flowed from historical animosity and distrust between planters and loggers

based on the clash between their cultures. Early attempts by the IWA to bring tree

planting into the union had included heavy-handed methods such as blocking roads, and

sneaking into camps to take pictures of conditions. Such tactics only served to create

distance between planters and the IWA, and further compromised any chance of

unionization. There was another weaker attempt at takeover in the early 90s, and the

IWA has since appeared to abandon attempts at drawing tree planters into their

organization. However, there is a continuing rift between the IWA and the silviculture

industry that occasionally manifests in union demands for planting work when logging

jobs are scarce, and an uneasy (but not unbroken) truce exists between the different

segments of the forestry workforce that share common roads, towns, and taverns. The

PRWA eventually fizzled out in 1991, but the ideological spirit of its founders was

nurtured in the workforce by numerous members who went on to start their own

contracting operations. Many of the ringleaders of this movement remain in the industry

today and have since joined the ranks of the WSCA as employers, or remain within the

industry as employees.

Another effort to organize tree planting was mounted by workers in the late

1990's under the label of CREWS (Canadian Reforestation and Environmental Workers

Society). However, the organization never achieved the membership it desired, and it

has essentially disappeared from the front lines of the industry. To this date, tree

planters remain non-unionized, and lack an organized voice to represent their interests

to the industry and regulating agencies.

A vital moment of transformation in the industry occurred in 1984, when the

Minister of National Revenue ordered a tree planting contractor named Likely

Reforestation to pay for unemployment insurance premiums that had not been deducted

from the pay of several tree planters. Likely Reforestation appealed the Minister's

decision in the Federal Tax Court of Canada, claiming that the company was not

responsible for making such deductions because the planters were independent sub-

contractors (Likely Reforestation Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [ I 9861

T.C.J. No. 209 (T.C.C.)).

The contractor's counsel asked the court to follow a previous decisio~n involving a

contractor called Workgame Reforestation, in which Judge Milar recognized tree

planters as independent subcontractors and denied their claim to employee :status

(Workgame Reforestation Ltd. v. M.N.R., 83-471(UI)). However, in Likely, Deputy Judge

Baryluk departed from the finding in Workgame, and dismissed the contractor's appeal

by affirming the Minister of National Revenue's decision that the planters we~re indeed

employees of Likely Reforestation and entitled to unemployment insurance c.overage.'

Until this decision there had been a level of independence between planters and

contractors that prevented either from fully committing to the needs of the other. Many

contractors and planters alike had rallied in favour of excluding tree planters from the

employee-employer relationship, hoping to remain insulated from the related obligations

and responsibilities that would follow. However, there was a lack of consensus on the

issue, and tree planters were becoming increasingly active in asserting their rights as

employees.

8 Deputy Judge Baryluk ruled on a similar case less than one month later, and affirmed the presence of an employer-employee relationship (Coast Range Silvicultural Services Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [I9861 T.C.J. No. 315).

Two years after the Likely decision, Workgame Reforestation reappeared in the

Federal Tax Court of Canada during an appeal by two tree planters on a decision by the

Minister of National Revenue that supported the contractor in defining the planters'

earnings as uninsurable (Carter v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [1988] T.C.J.

No. 925). Deputy Judge Baryluk allowed the planters' appeal and reversed the decision

of the Minister, once again recognizing the tree planters as employees of the contractor,

and his decision became the crucible in which the future relationship between planters

and contractors was forged. The employee-employer relationship was cast and the

modern tree -planting industry as we know it today was born.

Several of the cooperative companies laboured on for a number of years, but

eventually succumbed to the division of employer and employee responsibilities in the

industry. A second crucial moment of transformation occurred between 1979 and 1984,

when a federal-provincial fund of $50 milliong was injected into forestry in BC to replant

the areas of the province that had not regenerated adequately in the wake of logging.

These funds, referred to as Forest Renewal Partnership Agreements (FRPA':;) ignited

an explosion of entrepreneurial expansion.1•‹

Many of the former tree planter members of the PRWA left the co-op system

behind to start their own companies and take advantage of the sudden glut of' work that

was available. When the employee-employer relationship became solidified in the mid

80s, and the money from the federal-provincial fund began filtering into the hands of

planting companies, business began to boom.

The industry was a tempting opportunity for free enterprise as it demanded little

initial investment and utilized the raw force of a generally unskilled labour pool that

This amount represents only the first of several FRPA's, the total amount of which was not recalled by the industry source. 10 A similar development may be facing the industry today in the wake of deforestation due to mountain pine beetle infestations and impending federal intervention to support increased planting programs.

lacked union solidarity or a strong relationship with the government structures that

control employers treatment of workers. Even prior to the Workgame decision and the

arrival of the FRPA's, several entrepreneurial-minded members of the industry seized on

the opportunity and began actively recruiting young people to come out and work during

their summer holidays.

Early contractors in the conventional movement were able to invite out large

numbers of young people for a chance to make some money, and provide them very

little in terms of camp resources besides sandwiches and transportation to and from the

worksite, thus keeping their overhead costs to a minimum. This model of business

eventually acquired a more sophisticated level of organization as contractors expanded

their business, and gave birth to several mega-companies of hundreds of workers that

dominate parts of the industry today. Initially these companies focused on a

concentrated burst of activity surrounding the shorter northern planting season, and

generally focused on the larger contracts on the vaster clearcuts of the interior.

The style of their management and their contributions they made to the

occupational culture were partially products of a smaller biological window due to the

northern climates offering a shorter period of time between spring thaw and winter

freeze-up in which the trees must be planted.

An almost military style of management emerged in several companies, and

some came to operate on a system where a quota had to be met in order to retain

employment priority. Whereas the older and smaller coastal companies were mostly

stocked with veterans who needed little instruction, a new style of management was

needed to give direction to the throngs of young people that were being drawn into the

market. Theories of modern business and management, conventional corporate

hierarchies, and semi-military work atmospheres were among the themes that influenced

these new companies.

There was little regulation of the exact, way in which business was done in these

companies, and the enormous emphasis on high production in a short period of time

introduced exploitive elements into the industry. The use of supervisors paid according

to crew productivisty was introduced, adding an additional financial pressure that created

potential motivation to put other concerns such as safety on the back burner.

Underbidding rival companies to obtain a planting contract became a method of breaking

into the market and created an unwanted source of competition within the industry for

the cooperative operations. Complaints about underbidding tactics continue today, from

both underpaid workers and disgruntled contractors. Workers with less scrul~ulous

companies were not even given a reliable guarantee of their wages until the Ministry of

Labour introduced rules in the late 1990s that ensured regular payment and placed

limitations on the contracts that workers could be forced into signing. These rules were

in fact developed by the industry and supported by many prominent contractors, who

saw the maintenance of employment standards as a means to prevent lower quality

operations from underbidding planting contracts. The most infamous of these limitations

remedied by the new rules was the feared "bonus" clause that required workers to stay

until the completion of a contract or forfeit a large portion of their earnings. Such an

arrangement potentially allowed contractors to pressure workers to remain on1 contracts

where conditions deteriorated below what the workers would endure by choice.

The roots of tree planting as a short summer stint or escape for younger students

revolved around the larger contracts in the north of the province, and still exists as a

structural feature of the industry. There was a rite of passage involved in both the

conventional and cooperative models of the industry, but the college and university

cohorts took it to another level, and injected their own set of values into the broiling

cultural milieu. Tree planting offered not only a method of raising money for education,

but also an escape from the university routine and an opportunity to enjoy a sense of

freedom and adventure prior to committing to future careers in conventional workplaces.

One worker explained, " I came here to buy tirne, to keep away from the clutches of the

bureaucracies that want to get a hold of you as you become an adult." (Vaughan, 1999).

Furthermore, as the industry grew, it became necessary for planters to pay their dues

with a large conventional interior company for several years before being ablle to gain a

position with smaller companies that held the more lucrative contracts on the coast. For

those that endeavoured to put in more than one or two years of work, the journey to the

north represented a trial by fire that eventually could grant them entrance to ian older,

more revered circle of the industry.

There was also collectivism in the conventional camps, but it was of a different

nature than that of the cooperative groups. The former centred more upon team

structure, crew membership, and the peer pressure to fall into line with fellow workers.

Eventually, the conventional groups and the cooperative groups came to mingle, as the

older workers from the cooperative companies began passing out of the industry and

smaller companies began recruiting from the ranks of the conventional companies.

There still exists a subtle divide between the conventional companies and the

cooperative companies in terms of whom they employ and how they operate, but the

division seems to becoming muddier with each passing year. Although the two sources

of culture are becoming increasingly intermingled, the workforce seems to resist

homogenization, and continues to foster diversity not only in the workers but EIISO the

owners. One senior member likened the situation to a system of feudal states in which

the owner or supervisor is the shogun lord, and the workers are his or her sub,jects

(Anonymous, 2004). Companies are still known to have personalities reflective of those

who founded them, and there is a finite genealogy in the industry that traces the birth of

dozens of today's companies to either the PRWA or the larger players in the

conventional movement. Historical feuds between different parts of the industry continue

today, and frequently pose obstacles to reaching a consensus on the best way of

managing the challenges within the industry. Achieving change in attitudes a~nd

behaviours in industry and its workforce will likely require achieving change in attitudes

and behaviours among the individuals that founded the industry and continue to shape it.

In a speech addressing these people, the father of Julia James had these words:

Elders have a responsibility. You people here today are the elders of your industry. I can see people around here the same age as me, but there are many of you that are a lot younger than me, you are still the elders. And it is for you to gather. For you to get together, to talk about these things and to find solutions. Because one death is too many. (James, 2004)

The Occupational Culture of Tree Planting

The influence of the occupational culture has become a primary focus for the

BCFSC (2005) and has been identified as an irnportant focus for safety program

development by its Silviculture Advisory Committee. However, there is a limited

understanding of exactly how the occupational culture affects the workforce, and an

even more limited understanding of how it might be altered to mitigate its potentially

harmful attributes. Some members of the industry believe the culture has a moderating

influence on risk-prone behaviour through the acquisition of situational knowledge

specific to workplace conditions as opposed to inflexible directives on behaviclur as

imposed by rules and regulations. Others have suggested that the culture is one of non-

compliance, due to its focus on personal gain and crew production rather than

recognition of appropriate rules.

Thus, there is a lack of consensus in understanding how occupational culture

affects the workforce, and an even more limited understanding of how it might be altered

to mitigate any of its potentially harmful attributes. Trice, in his study of occupational

cultures, found they usually possess a distinct ideology that imposes a pattern on the

behaviours of their members (1 993: 143). He described these ideologies as

"emotionalized, action-oriented beliefs held by members of an occupation about their

work."(ibid:48) Although occupational cultures have functional components that assist

groups in negotiating their environment, Trice warns that these ideologies can also be

dysfunctional, that they can block co-operation in the workplace, and they can support

fictional accounts about the role of the members of the occupation (1993:25).

Providing a detailed description of tree planting culture faces the sarne

challenges as explaining the history of the industry, as there has been very little written

about the subject. The most common sources of information are qualitative by nature,

and are found in stories, photographs, personal recollections, and records from early

industry organizations. Combined with additional commentary directly from members of

the industry, these sources are useful in understanding the nature of the occupational

culture and providing more detailed information on specific issues. They also help

establish the identity of the occupation to some degree as depicted in "A Tree Planter's

Lament," by Robert Leo Heilman who wrote:

Tree planting is done by outcasts and outlaws - winos and hillbillies and hippies, for the most part. It's brutal mind-numbing, underpaid stoop labor. Down there in Hades, Sisyphus thinks about tree planters and thanks his lucky stars because he has such a soft gig. (1 996)

Understanding why tree planters endure such demanding conditions requires a

more intimate understanding of the cultural pressures that influence the workc?rs. A

variety of explanations emerge from the "blogs" and bulletin boards that occupy the

internet, ranging from a desire to test one's self against the elements, to a deep bond

with the one's co-workers and a feeling of belonging to an exclusive group that

possesses a special bond that outsiders cannot appreciate (Grandoni, 2006).

Members of the industry often fondly reported how a crew can function as a

family, and how the moral support of the group can ease the feelings of isolation

associated with the distant wilderness locations where they often end up. The

remoteness of the job and its heavy physical toll seem to be mitigated by the spirit and

camaraderie that exists among the members. "I don't mind the isolation," one member

recalled, "it's okay because everyone's in the same boat together." (Anonymous, 2002)

However, the collectivism of tree planting also emerges in the form of group pressures to

conform and submit to expected roles. One planter explained:

And, there's always this weird guilt by the other people. If you're working in a situation that you think is unsafe and you quit ... And you stop planting, then there's this sort of like what's your problem? The rest of the people get through the day cut, battered, and bruised but they made it-no major injuries. So it's like the foremen looks at you like what was your problem? (Anonymous, 2002)

Along with these forms of collectivism there are also countervailing thlemes of

individualism. The production nature of the job spurs fierce competition, and many

workers admit that this forms an essential part of their motivation to plant faster. The

financial motivations of the mode of production are intrinsically connected to this

characteristic of the culture. There are several individuals who have acquired almost

mythical status within the industry based either on their superhuman accomplishments,

many of which now occupy the "tree planting hall of fame" at tree-planter.com

(Chisholm, 2006).

There is also another individualistic type of freedom inherent in the workplace;

personal style and expression are uninhibited in an environment with fewer concrete

rules than other workplaces, and the long periods of time away from conventional

society supply ample time for introspection and personal development. Workers often

speak of "shutting off the mind" to deal with the repetitive nature of the work, and

developing the most orderly and efficient way of covering a piece of land. There is a

common fixation on numbers among many planters, and breaking a personal record is

often a story repeated with great frequency, especially if it surpasses a specific barrier

such as 2000 trees. The freedom from constant supervision is also an attractive aspect

of the job as reflected in one member's words:: "There's a sense of independence ... You

make your own decisions. You're given a sense of empowerment . . . you're never in

doubt of your own work.. ." (Anonymous, 2002).

The main observation that flows from observations of these sources is that there

are marked similarities between the occupational culture of tree planting and other

industrial resource occupations that involve a high probability of physical harm. There is

an emphasis on the strength and endurance of the individual and the willingr~ess to

endure unduly harsh situations, combined with a form of collectivism in which

membership in the group not only assists in coping with the presented hazards, but also

paradoxically conditions the members of the occupation into normalizing the dangers of

their profession and adopting potentially dysfunctional definitions of what is acceptable

behaviour. Tree planting is not altogether unique in exhibiting these qualities, and the

emerging picture of the occupation bears striking resemblances to the culture of other

high-risk occupations.

Occupational Culture and Industry Comparisons

Studies of occupational culture in industries such as coal mining have focused on

the concept of the normalization of risk. Although there has been little detailed study on

this subject in a tree planting context, other industries such as logging and mining have

attracted the attention of researchers that have been interested in developirlg a deeper

understanding of how workers' attitudes and beliefs can affect their behaviour in this

fashion. In their examination of the Westray coalmine disaster, Hynes and F'rasad

compared the two industries and wrote that, "Loggers, like miners, are confronted with

harsh economic conditions, they often lack a collective voice and are influenced by an

occupational culture of danger." (1 999: 132)

This comparison would apply equally to tree planters, who may actually face

more severely marginalized economic conditions than loggers, and have had to adapt to

the dangers of their work environment without the benefit of a union to stand up for their

interests. The material conditions of tree planters should in fact provide a warning sign

for their vulnerability to failures in OHS regulation. Aronsson (1 999) observed that

contingent, or temporary (otherwise not permanent full-time), workers are more likely to

suffer from dangers at work due to their relative inability to take action against or

participate in the solution of workplace hazards. Similarly, Herbert and Landrligan have

reported that immigrant workers display significant fear of reporting health and safety

problems in comparison with other workers (2000:542). This lack of perceived power

may lead to fatalistic attitudes and a reluctant acceptance of undesirable conditions. A

veteran tree planter explained the issue succinctly in a Georgia Straight article about the

exposure of planters to hazardous substances:

As migrant and itinerant workers, they're in a more disempowered [sic] position with their employer. Workers felt unable to speak out and take a firm stand on many issues because of the nature of their employmlent, fear of reprisal. Right away, that excludes a huge percentage of the work force from willing to speak out about organizing or about associa1:ion. (Tan in Findlay, 2005)

Another important aspect of the tree planting industry is the esprit de corps that

exists among the workers. This quality has been similarly cited among miners by

journalist Tom McDougall, who described a "soldier-like pride" and a "spirit of

brotherhood" that allowed them to persist in a job prone to conditions that they felt other

people could never endure (in Glasbeek & Tucker, 1999:99). A participant observation

conducted by John S. Fitzpatrick (1980) examined the functional aspect of r~isk

normalization as a method of adaptation to the working conditions of the coal mining

industry. This interpretation of the occupational culture focused on the group cohesion

and social support that is fostered by shared informal reactions to imminent .threats to

worker safety. Fitzpatrick explains that the dangers of the industry actually stimulate the

production of positive adaptive behaviour patterns among the workers, and that there

are specific attitude and behaviour patterns associated with commonly occurring

hazards (1 980: 134). However, he also acknowledged dysfunctional affects associated

with informal coping strategies, including failure to develop comprehensive contingency

plans for disasters (such as cave-ins and explosions) that, although statistically unlikely,

are particularly dangerous to the lives of the workers (ibid: 141).

This fatalistic attitude has also been the subject of examination in studies of the

Westray disaster, which claimed the lives of 26 Nova Scotia coal miners in 1!392. Hynes

and Prasad explained that the occupational identity of the miners is construci:ed by

glorifying the heroism and masculinity of those whose lives have been sacrificed to the

industry in the past (1999:130). The ability to face danger and overcome it assumes a

greater value in the wake of such imagery, and confronting hazards becomes a rite of

passage instead of a burden. This emphasis leads to a normalization of risk in which

immersing oneself in danger becomes an accepted (and even encouraged) practice that

becomes manifest in workers violating health and safety regulations and turning a blind

eye to the violations of others.

Thus, analyses of the Westray disaster pay attention not only to the violations of

senior officials and supervisors, but also the complicity of the workers by their continued

participation in a work environment they knew to be dangerous (Glasbeek & Tucker,

1999; Hynes & Prasad, 1999; Wilde, 1999). Glasbeek and Tucker observed that there

are not only cultural considerations to be evaluated in understanding why workers

expose themselves to dangerous conditions, but also financial considerations in the

forms of wages and production incentives provided to those that continue to endure the

worksite surroundings (1 999: 105).

It would be presumptuous to believe that workers and employers possess an

equal freedom of choice in the decisions they make to participate in dangerolus work, as

the socio-economic position of the workers often provide few viable alternatives for

making a liveable wage. Furthermore, the acquiescence of workers involves a different

level of decision making than that of the supervisors and employers who possess the

power to dictate the conditions of the workplace. However, there is an emerging pattern

of behaviour in these studies of dangerous industrial environments that identifies a

certain amount of agency among both front line workers and those above them in the

labour hierarchy. The shared complicity (no matter how imbalanced it may be) requires

an examination of all parties in determining the reasons for breakdowns in health and

safety in these environments.

The tree planting industry contains marked similarities to the coal mining

industry, both in terms of the occupational culture and material conditions of the workers.

There is a high value placed upon endurance and the ability to push the body beyond its

limitations. The production nature of the job spurs competition, and increases the

motivation to plant faster and place production above other concerns such as safety.

The financial motivations of the mode of production are intrinsically connected to

important facets of the culture. There are several individuals that have acquired almost

mythical status within the tree planting industry based on their superhuman

accomplishments and the incredible numbers of trees they have been able to plant.

Such workers are known as "highballers" and one internet site had an entire section

devoted to stories that other planters had posted about one particular legend of the

woods (Stolz, 2004).

The emphasis on production and endurance in a demanding and dangerous

environment produces rewards not only for the worker, but also for the employers who

collect greater yields from more production-oriented workers. These arrangements

create the conditions for the production of "indulgency patterns" in which both workers

and employers are immersed in an occupational culture that discourages appropriate

reactions to dangers in the workplace. Tony Watson describes indulgency patterns as,

"the ignoring of selected rule infringements by supervisors in return for those being

supervised allowing supervisors to call for co-operation on matters which, strictly

speaking, they could refuse." (1995:269) In the tree planting industry, such a pattern

might be characterized by supervisors that fail to reprimand workers for neglecting the

use of appropriate personal protective equipment such as appropriate footwe.ar

corresponding with workers that fail to refuse work in unsafe conditions such as extreme

weather.

Although there is not necessarily an explicit acknowledgement of each other's

acquiescence in specific situations, the general tendency for workers and supervisors to

avoid confronting each other on health and safety matters contributes to an environment

in which decisions are made based on unspoken understandings and cultural norms,

rather than formally stated rules and policies. It is this type of behaviour that allows the

culture of the workplace to continue exerting its influence on the members of the

industry. Such patterns of behaviour suggest that it is necessary to account for the

activities of supervisors, as well as front-line workers in order to understand how OHS

problems develop in the field.

Occupational Health and Safety as Organizational Crime

This thesis adopts the principle that organizational crime includes a number of

different categories pertaining to offences committed in the course of one's job. Glasberg

and Skidmore divide organizational crime into corporate and white-collar crirne, with the

latter defined as, "illegal activities engaged in by individuals against the organization for

their own gain in the course of their occupational duties" (Glasberg & Skidmore,

1998:111). They define corporate crime on the other hand as offences, "committed by

executives and managers acting as representatives of their institutions on behalf of

those institutions" (Calavita and Pontell, 1994::300 in Glasberg & Skidmore, 1998:112).

The previously cited observations of OHS in industrial environments and the role

of occupational culture, however, indicate that the interaction of worker and supervisor

activities makes it difficult to accurately place OHS offences into either of these

categories exclusively. There is often a complex set of relationships in the workplace

that can obscure the lines of agency and responsibility, making it difficult to attribute

offending problems to one party or another. This is even more pronounced in industrial

environments where the incentive to favour production over safety is shared by both

workers and management, thus defying the tidy categories suggested by Glasberg and

Skidmore (1 998).

While employers and supervisors possess the ability to dictate the terrns of

labour and the conditions of the workplace, the workers are often in the position to either

accept such circumstance or reject them, either individually or collectively. However, the

choices of workers are subject to the limitations of their position in the labour market and

there are often other forces compelling them to continue working under conditions they

may otherwise refuse. Furthermore, Reiman rightly notes that blaming workers for their

own accidents fails to account for a history of struggle to compel industries to ameliorate

problems that workers cannot control (1998:76). Reiman, in fact, identifies workplace

deaths as crimes possessing moral culpability equal to murder, and recommends

treating them in a similar fashion in the courts (ibid:183).

Reiman claims that society's fear of street crime, and the focus that the criminal

justice system places on such acts is misplaced, in light of statistics indicating

Americans are far more likely to die as a result of a workplace "accident" than as a result

of an act legally identified as a homicide (1 998:18O). A review of local statistics confirms

that the same pattern of deaths exist in British Columbia. According to Statistics Canada,

there were 501 homicides recorded in the province during the years of 200 through 2004

(Statistics Canada, 2005). During the same time period, WorkSafeBC recorded a total of

1053 work-related deaths (WorkSafeBC, 2001 1; WorkSafeBC, 2002; WorkSafeBC, 2003;

WorkSafeBC, 2004; WorkSafeBC, 2005a). These figures indicate that British

Columbians are more than twice as likely to die as a result of their job than as a result of

homicide." Furthermore, Reiman claims it is a mistake to presume that corporate

executives lack intent to cause harm to workers when they make decisions that place

the interests of the company before those of the worker safety (1 998:65).

Brill includes the state among the parties culpable for workplace death~s and

injuries, and claims that OHS agencies should share the moral and legal responsibility

for such problems due.to historical failures to take appropriate action in the wake of

overwhelming evidence that workers lives are in danger (1992:77-78). However, while

11 This comparison actually underestimates the probability of dying in the workplace due to the fact that not all British Columbians work.

drawing attention to the power exercised by employers and the state, and h~ghlighting

several gross cases of employer and industry negligence, these perspectives tend to

throw all workplace death and injuries under a single category and they fail to

acknowledge circumstances in which workers cause accidents by disobeying orders and

regulations to serve their own interests.

It is important to acknowledge that while employers and supervisors are

responsible for ensuring the safety of their workforce, they cannot always ex'ert total

control over the actions of the workers, or alter the broader economic and cultural

pressures that may influence worker behaviour. Thus, it seems necessary that a

comprehensive conceptualization of OHS offending must account for the actions of both

employers and supervisors, as well as the workers themselves. The responsibility of

employers to ensure the safe conduct of their workers is not to be diminished, and is in

fact highlighted during this thesis, but there nonetheless seems to be some degree of

agency among the workforce that needs to be accounted for in understanding OHS

offending as a form of organizational crime.

The prevailing definitions of the various categories of organizational crime (i.e.,

white-collar or corporate crime) seem unable to account for this consideration without

fracturing OHS offending into a variety of different subcategories. This results in a

diffusion of the subject among different perspectives that only capture one aspect of the

problem, and neglects the quest of developing ia single comprehensive viewpoint that

encompasses the greater context of OHS offending. This incompatibility is likely rooted

in the primacy of corporate activities in the historical study of organizational crime,

beginning with Sutherland's original focus on the crimes of the upper class. Even his

later definitions of white-collar crime focused exclusively on the agency of individuals in

positions of high social power (Brockman, 2006:6).

To be sure, there have been many cases of OHS crime that would fit perfectly

within traditional definition of white-collar crime, such as the infamous Imperial Food

Products fire in which 25 workers died after being locked into their workplace by their

employer to prevent the theft of chicken meat (Wright, Cullen, & Blankenship, 1995).

However, in light of analyses of other accidents such as the Westray Mine explosion

(discussed earlier), to place OHS offending wholly under the rubric of white-collar crime

is probably misdirected, considering that in order to fully understand OHS offending it is

often necessary to pay attention to collars that are decidedly blue.

Following an examination of various typologies and definitions of white collar and

organizational crime, Brockman noted Shapiro's (1 990) suggestion "that we should focus

not on the criminal, but on the way the crime is carried out." (Brockman, 2006:lO). This

idea appears to offer a more practical approach to conceptualizing OHS offe~nding than

vainly trying to fit OHS offending into the different definitions of white-collar and

organizational crime that Brockman evaluates. Instead of trying to define the problem

according to the characteristics of a set group of offenders, the problem may best be

captured by focusing on the process. In her examination of white-collar crime, Shapiro

emphasizes the role of trust, and identified the essence of white-collar offending as

residing within a breakdown of fiduciary relationships (1990). In contrast, OH!; offences

may be understood as a breakdown in the balance of rights and duties assigned to the

various parties in the workplace (including employers, supervisors, and workers) that

compel them to obey the rules stipulated by the regulating agencies and take action

against each other when they fail to uphold their side of the relationship. Viola~tions may

be actions (or inactions) that affect the health and safety of workers or the public. This

conceptualization adequately accounts for the agency of all parties in the workplace at

the centre of this thesis, and avoids focusing exclusively on one set of activities to the

neglect of other important factors.

Only after identifying the types of behaviours leading to the greatest likelihood of

death and injury, should the parties with the ability to control the said behaviours be

placed at the centre of the discussion concerning who is responsible for preventing such

incidents. In order to understand how the subject fits into the existing body of literature

on workplace offending and different forms of regulation, it is important to understand the

specific motivations and relationships that characterize OHS offences, especially those

specific to industrial environments with production incentives. There are a variety of

motivations for an organization or individual to commit an OHS offence including

company profit (in the case of a manager who trims funding for safety equipment),

personal profit (such as an employee who neglects important safeguards to increase his

or her own production), cultural norms of the occupation, or even incompetence. Thus,

the "benefits" accrued in OHS offences may be indirect, difficult to verify, and in some

cases harder to quantify than the financial gains accrued through other types of

organizational deviance. As such, occupational health and safety offending is a form of

organizational offending that should be considered unique from other forms of workplace

deviance.

Other Studies of Regulation and Organizational Crime

The criminological community, largely focussed on street crime, has p.aid too little

attention to understanding how other regulatory systems function, especially in the areas

of occupational health and safety regulation. Hutter's (1993; 2001) and Tombs' (1996)

studies on OHS self-regulation in the United Kingdom stand out among the few in-depth

studies of this particular intersection in criminological literature. Both studies observed

serious problems in the implementation of the new regulatory frameworks, a~nd observed

increases in the death and injury rates corresponding with the transition.

Hutter's research noted problems in ensuring compliance in the wake of

deregulation due to a failure to penetrate all levels of the workforce with the 'elements of

responsibility required to achieve compliance {2001:392). Although Hutter dild not

explore patterns of workplace behaviour in depth, she explained that the success of

deregulation in OHS depends upon a shift in company-wide philosophy towards a

situation where health and safety becomes a central focus for all parties in the workplace

{ibid:381). In her study of OHS in the U.K. she observed that the failure to abide by

minor rules became a norm, and there was a lack of enforcement through the ranks to

curb this cultural assimilation of non-compliance. An overly lenient management

structure was implicated in this failure, and little was done to address the unclerlying

causes (such as production and time pressure) that motivated non-compliance in the

first place (2001 :392.) This pattern of behaviour is again reminiscent of the indulgency

patterns discussed by Tony Watson in "Sociology, Work and Industry" (1995:269), in

which worker non-compliance is overlooked by management because the motivation for

such actions appeals to mutual interests.

The failure to increase responsibility in all levels of the workforce durir~g the

deregulation of health and safety in other jurisdictions draws attention to the rlole that

workers may play through participation of unions, and individuals within the wlorkplace.

To begin with, protection of whistle-blowing activities may become increasingly important

in the wake of reduced state intervention. Howse asserts that increasing the emphasis

on such activities may hold more promise than invoking market pressures or increasing

resources to state-led enforcement (1 993:447). If state inspectors are indeed lexpected

to trade off a reduction in their presence for a corresponding internalization of such

duties by the private sector, workers must have the ability to contact state agents if

company practices do not live up to the requirements set forth by regulation. This

requires providing workers not only with access to appropriate agencies, but also with

the knowledge and information necessary to recognize problems in their workplace

(Howse, 1993:447).

Another key failing observed by Hutter in the U.K. experience was a lack of

coordination in sharing of information and con~munication within the workforce and

throughout the industry. This gap effectively undermined the original goal of the new

framework to involve all levels of the industry. She tied this problem not only to the

aforementioned failure to increase responsibility in all levels of the workforce, but also to

characteristics of the industrial-corporate structure (Hutter, 1993:465). There were too

wide a variety of policies within larger corporate structures to support a consistent

method of management within these organizations (Hutter, 2001:384). This

inconsistency was duplicated between companies, creating a wide range of practices

throughout the industry, making it difficult for workers to know exactly what was

expected in any given situation. In this case, the flexibility that is offered as one of

deregulation's strengths actually emerged as one of its critical flaws. There is clearly a

balance to be reached between remaining flexible to specific industry needs, but

adhering to common standards that facilitate coordination within and between

corporations. The poor distribution of information was characterized by a marked

absence of knowledge within the workforce not only of specific rules, but also of their

responsibilities within the new regulatory environment (Hutter, 2001 :386).

Providing consistency in rules is important in building respect for the purposes of

the rules, and Braithwaite et al. commented on the specific problems that are created if

members of the workforce are alienated through inconsistent treatment and not

successfully reintegrated with the cooperative principles of the new regulatory framework

(Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Gibson, & Makkai, 1994:390). Such problems should be of

specific concern to industries characterized by a high degree of transience within the

workforce, and an opportunity for workers to experience varying levels of Ot i s

standards. The role of coercive measures and penalties in OHS regulation is another

issue that must be considered not only by employers, but also by regulating agencies.

Determining exactly what level of coercive measures are required for both

companies and workers is a delicate matter, and Croall warns that developir~g an

appropriate balance requires accounting for differences in offenders' motivations and

moral status of offences (2003:52). Moore criticizes the assumption of rational decision-

making among corporate offenders, and indicates the need to account for the effect that

organizational subcultures can have on the morality of their members (1987:385).

Paternoster and Simpson found that the value of deterrent measures were contingent

upon the moral inhibitions of the potential offenders in regard to the offence in question

(1996:579). Furthermore, Elis and Simpson found that internal sources of moral

condemnation such as guilt and shame, may have a more powerful influence on

corporate offending than external sources such as bad publicity or demotion within the

workplace (1995:417). OHS offences often involve death or serious injury, arid thus

possess a visceral quality that should distinguish them from other regulatory offences,

fuelling the need to better understand the influence that moral inhibitions and cultural

beliefs may have on decisions to offend. Thus, there is a strong argument that

occupational cultures may play a functional role in ensuring compliance with OHS

regulations, and the best methods of reforming health and safety may involve

enforcement strategies that rely upon informal sanctioning methods. However, such

strategies would only be suitable for individuals who engage in prolonged personal

interaction with other members of the industry, and may not be well suited to encourage

the good behaviour of companies and employers.

Radical reformists have advocated using prosecution via the criminal law as

vigorously for organizational crimes as for street crimes (Reiman, 1998:183). However,

others resist this position claiming that frequent prosecution is counterprodu~~tive

because of prohibitive costs and destructive effects on the relationships between

government agents and regulated bodies (Rees, 1988 and Bardach and Kagan, 1982 in

Hopkins, 1994). Edgar has claimed that the use of prosecutions will not improve

workplace safety because the events warranting such treatment are so rare, that

reliance upon them does little to shape wider patterns of behaviour (2000). He adds that

the use of prosecutions effectively enforces a dominant ideology that accidents happen

because of "bad people" (thus deflecting attention from wider inequality and structural

flaws) (ibid:534). A more frequently touted approach is to include prosecution as an

ultimate coercive tool within a wide range of regulatory tools.

Ayres and Braithwaite's "enforcement pyramid" has attracted considerable

attention in this regard (1992). It involves the use of less coercive tactics such as

negotiation and cooperation at the base of the pyramid where interactions between

enforcement agencies and regulated bodies begin (ibid:35). The coerciveness of the

measures increase as resistance is encountered and the seriousness of the offences

increase, and criminal penalties (and even corporate dissolution) become available as

problems escalate towards the apex of the structure. Ayres and Braithwaite concede that

there is a paradox in their pyramid however, in that the effectiveness of the structure is

dependent upon the size of the penalty at the top (1992:44).12 The absence of a strong

12 Ostensibly the narrowest or smallest point of the pyramid.

49

enforcement and punishment presence provides little impetus for businesses to

internalize responsibilities for their actions (ibid).

This raises an interesting question in regards to deregulation and the role of

enforcement and punishment. If such regulatory reforms are designed to stirnulate

industrial and economic growth, it stands to reason that there should be an expectation

of increases in enforcement activities. In other words, there should be a corresponding

need to increase the enforcement capacity of regulatory agencies in order to handle the

increased activity. However, enforcement activities generally seem bundled in with other

aspects of traditional command-and-control approaches such as licensing and

registration, and do not appear as prominent components of deregulation proposals.

Tombs claimed that failure to emphasize these aspects of regulation was a contributing

factor in problems surrounding OHS deregulation in the U.K. (1996:314).

Kagan and Scholz (1 984) developed a typology that added other explanations for

non-compliance to mere rational calculations (in Braithwaite, Braithwaite, Gibson, &

Makkai, 1994:364). They suggested that offences may also occur due to disrespect for

regulatory agencies. This idea is supported by Gibson who notes that compliance is not

solely a product of reward and punishment, but also related to perceptions of the

relevant rules and the agencies that administer them (1 989:471). Kagan and Scholz's

typology also accounted for non-compliance due to incompetence. In regards to OHS

compliance, Hutter has warned that regulatory reforms need to account for the ability of

companies to meet compliance requirements in terms of both available resources and

information (2001:381). Thus the nature of incompetence may vary according to a

number of dimensions. Braithwaite et al. tested the validity of Kagan and Scholz's theory

in a study of regulatory compliance within Australian nursing home standards, and found

considerable support for the existence of such explanations (1994:369). Such

explanations could certainly be generalized to other regulatory milieus, such as OHS

c~mpliance.'~

Braithwaite and Makkai assert that relationships based on mutual trust are more

effective in obtaining compliance than those based on suspicion and assumption of

wrongdoing (1994b:8). In another article, the same authors examine the utility of

different methods of shaming, and conclude that the most effective methods are those

that are reintegrative and maintain a positive relationship between the inspector and the

regulated body, allowing future collaboration and negotiation (Braithwaite & Ivlakkai,

1994:374). However, this effect is only observed in situations where the regu~lated bodies

and the inspectors display a high degree of interdependency and have adequate

interaction to develop and maintain meaningful relationships (ibid: 379).

The aforementioned studies on deregulation and OHS expose important issues

concerning the development of effective regulatory frameworks. However, they do little

to penetrate micro-patterns of human behaviour implicated in OHS offending, and have

imported little in terms of criminological theory into their examination. Identifying the

pitfalls and promises of regulatory reform in OHS thus requires drawing on studies of

forms of regulation other than OHS. Braithwaite and Makkai examined the utility of four

traditional criminological theories in their study of nursing homes in Australia; they

focused on differential association, subcultural theory, opportunity theory, and control

theory (1991). The methodology of their study involved interviewing nursing hlome

managers within the work setting, and asking them questions about their day-to-day

activities and interactions with regulatory personnel. Without supplying an exhaustive

summary of the results, it suffices to say that opportunity theory received the strongest

support as an explanation for non-compliance, with subcultural theory a close second,

l3 Braithwaite et al. themselves generalized Kagan and Scholz's theory into another milieu.

5 1

and the other two theories receiving negligible support from the data (Braithwaite and

Makkai, 1991: 207). Although the results did not yield any substantially compelling

findings in regard to the theories, it was still noted that subcultural theory was somewhat

effective in explaining resistance to regulatory demands.

The influence of occupational culture is a central focus in this thesis and special

attention is paid to the relationship between individual behaviour and perceptions of

group behaviour within the work environment. This follows the example of Klockars in his

study of police misconduct; a profession well known for its powerful occupational culture

(1 997). Klockars also supplied a useful model for questionnaires appropriate for such

work environments, and it has been relied upon heavily in developing the methodology

for this research. A strong focus has been drawn upon points of contact between

individuals and perceptions of group activity, for (as Trice indicates) dysfunctional effects

of the subculture are often related to fictional accounts of roles (1993:143). Therefore, it

is the perception of the environment that is assumed to be most important, a:; opposed

to the actual environment itself. This approach assumes that there is a relationship

between the material conditions of the workplace and behaviour of the subculture;

attention is also paid to the broader set of environmental conditions that affect the target

population. While immersion in the group will be examined as a correlate with the

behaviour in question, the root cause of such behaviour is believed to be the result of

various environmental pressures to which the culture has adapted. It is also important to

bear in mind that this thesis is not an attempt to test the strength of specific subcultural

theories, but rather an attempt to determine the nature and the level of the activity that

exists. Only after determining the nature of the existence of such activity, would it be

reasonable to seek explanations through application of specific criminological theories.

Reflecting on the work of one of the most influential figures in the study of

organizational deviance, Robert Meier observed the varying theoretical approaches

taken by the late Gilbert Geis and his lack of commitment to a single explanatory

framework for all organizational offending (2001:13). Meier sided with the position that

considerable exploratory work is required on the specific forms of organizational

offending before specific theories can be used to explain their existence.

This thesis has incorporated elements of subcultural theories of offending and is

oriented to examine the relationship between individuals and an influential peer group

that influences their behaviour. However, a specific theoretical framework ha~s not been

imposed upon the issue of concern, as the need to add flesh to the bones is believed to

be a vital step that must precede a more specific explanation for the actor's behaviour.

Once there is a clearer understanding of the problem at hand, it may be appropriate to

follow the example of Braithwaite and Makai (1 991) and test the strength of a more rigid

theoretical structure. In the meantime, this thesis will conduct a general inquiry into the

relationship between individual and group behaviour, in order to construct a rnore

accurate representation of health and safety compliance in the industry and identify

potential sites for intervention and future research.

Research Questions

It should be noted that the first set of research questions (which explore health

and safety performance) are predominantly quantitative in nature. However, the

methodology involved in the development of the instruments used to answer these

questions is founded in a strong foundation of qualitative inquiry. The second set of

research questions, however, are more qualitative in nature, and explore the way in

which the results produced in the first set of questions can be translated into program

and policy directives. As such, the second set of answers must be interpreted through a

detailed understanding of the industry and its occupational culture.

An important issue in the framing of the research questions is the

conceptualization of the term OHS "performance". The literature indicates that attitudes

and behaviours both play key roles in maintaining a safe and healthy workplace. As

such, the term "performance" refers to the collective attitudes and behaviours related to

compliance with OHS regulations. The term "compliance" however, refers scllely to

behaviours.

Another important distinction is the difference between planters and supervisors.

In this thesis, the term "workers" refers to both planters and supervisors, and some

general observations are made regarding their collective characteristics. However,

planters and supervisors are distinguished from each other in other instances due to the

different roles they play in the workforce and their differing responsibilities under the

OHSR. This distinction is especially important during examination of the health and

safety performance data. The term "supervisors1' includes forepersons, supe~visors, and

checkers.I4 While each of the positions involve a different set of duties in the tree

planting workplace, they all revolve around organizing company operations, monitoring

the activities of workers, and ensuring the quality of their work. The questions at the

heart of this research are divided into two sets and cover the following seven lines of

general inquiry.

Set One: This set of research questions are focused on quantitative issues. These

questions will be answered as the findings are presented in order to give a clear

illustration of the link between the data and the conclusions.

14 Checkers are workers responsible for inspecting the trees planted by other workers.

54

What are the qeneral characteristics of the industry workforce?

This includes examining such issues as the average age and experience level of the

workforce, level of education, and other similar features.

Do these characteristics conform with aeneral perceptions of the population and

previous research on the industry?

This involves comparing the observations from the data with the qualitative sources that

were used to establish the nature of the occupational culture and piece toget:her the

history of the industry. The data will also be compared with the findings from the

Coopers & Lybrand study (1 997).15

What is the state of occupational health and safetv performance in the workforce?

This involves identifying valid indicators of how closely workers obey OHS regulations,

and their attitudes towards these rules.

Is there a stronq relationship between individual choices and perceptions of g m

behaviour that corresponds with the influence of a powerful occupational culture?

Given the importance that has been attached to the role of the occupational culture by

both members of the industry and research on OHS in other industries, it is important to

determine if data supports the assertions that have been made.

l5 Despite its limitations, this study provides the only previous quantitative source of information on the issue.

Given the vulnerabilitv of younq workers, is age or ex~erience a siqnificant risk factor for

health and safetv performance?

Without prescribing to a traditional subcultural theoretical perspective, one would expect

that deeper involvement in the industry would correspond with stronger attachment to

the occupational culture. However, due to disagreement over the nature of this influence,

it is not clear if new members of the industry should be at a higher or lower risk for

unsafe behaviour. If the occupational culture plays a functional role by moderating

unsafe behaviour, one would expect that new workers may be at a higher risk for unsafe

behaviour than those with a longer immersion in the industry. However, if the

occupational culture encourages disregard for OHS regulations, one would expect that

newer workers may be less prone to engage in unsafe behaviour. Admittedly, this

approach to the issue is rather simplistic and does not account for a more sophisticated

analysis of the issue. However, the point of examining this issue in this thesis is to

determine the presence of any markedly high-risk groups so that appropriate courses of

action can be recommended.

Set Two: This set of research questions deal with program and policy implications of the

previous set of questions, and are linked to issues within the bigger picture of the

industry. The answers to these questions will be contextualized within the same

qualitative sources that gave shape to the culture of the industry and informe'd the

development of the first set of questions.

What immediate recommendations can be made in regard to occupational health and

safetv practices in the industw?

This thesis was written with praxis in mind, and has been designed to produc,e practical

applications of what is learned. The main foci for the development of recommendations

are the tree planting employers as they are in the best position to affect change in the

industry, and have been assigned an increased expectation for doing so under the

developing regulatory framework. As such, the data will be examined to determine what

courses of action would be appropriate for the training and education of the workforce.

Given what is known of the industrv and the occupational culture, how might

occupational health and safety reform best be pursued in the industrv?

Continuing with practical concerns, this thesis is also concerned with the bigger picture

of the industry and understanding how any problems uncovered in the research can be

addressed within the current economic and regulatory environment. It has been

observed that the success of regulatory reforms is subject to the influence of structural

variables beyond the control of individual workers and employers. Therefore, it is

prudent to evaluate what courses of actions may best serve the industry as a whole in

the pursuit of legitimate OHS reform.

Chapter Three: Methodology

The Questionnaires

Two questionnaires, designed to explore behaviours and attitudes among

planters and supervisors, were the main instruments used in this research. The

questionnaires were 11 pages long, including approximately 90 different items

(questions). The length of the questionnaires and the number of issues cove~red was

limited in order to ensure that respondents would be able to complete the forms in a

reasonable amount of time. However, an effort was made to include a range of health

and safety issues that would address the concerns of all members of the workplace.

Both supervisors and employees were consulted in order to determine which issues they

felt posed the greatest dangers to health and safety in the industry. Different parties

reported different interests, and relying upon only one perspective would have provided

a limited view of health and safety issues. Thus, the issues examined in the

questionnaires represented a balance of the interests of all parties in the workplace.

More details about how the specific questions were developed will be supplied as each

section of the questionnaire is explained.

Supervisors (including forepersons and checkersq6) were issued a questionnaire

that was slightly different from the one issued to planters in order to accommcldate their

distinct role in health and safety compliance in the workplace, and their respective rights

l6 All of these positions were included under the general term "supervisor". This distinction was made clear to the respondents and printed in bold on the front page of the questionnaire. It is acknowledge'd that supervisors and forepersons may play distinctively different roles in various workplaces. However, this research chose to distinguish these positions from that of planters based on their general role in the workplace and their duties under the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation.

and duties according to the OHSR. For example, while workers were asked "how likely

would a supervisor be to correct a planter who fails to wear a seatbelt", supervisors were

asked "how likely would you be to correct a planter for failing to wear a seatbelt". This

method approached compliance issues from rnultiple perspectives and corresponded

with the conceptualization of OHS offending as a breakdown in the balance of rights and

duties assigned to different parties in the workplace. It is acknowledged that company

owners (employers) were not sought out with a special questionnaire,'' and ,that planters

and supervisors were the only two groups covered in the research. However, the owners

were not neglected in this thesis, and their role is explored during the discussion section.

The planter questionnaire is reproduced in Appendix A and the supervisor questionnaire

in Appendix B." A pre-test with 18 respondents was conducted in order to obtain

feedback on how closely the content of the instrument applied to real workplace issues.

Several revisions were made following the pre-test, including the removal of several

questions that were not easily understood, and a substantial shortening of the

questionnaire.

The questionnaires were divided into three general sections that covered a

variety of different issues. The first section of the questionnaire dealt with dernographics

and industry involvement. The second section (the main section) presented workers with

a number of different detailed scenarios related to health and safety practices in the

workplace and sets of corresponding questions. The third section asked questions

related to general attitudes and additional health and safety questions that did not fit the

format used in section two. Additionally, respondents were provided with a section at the

17 However, occasionally owners also work as supervisors and they were asked to identify theniselves on the questionnaire if this was the case. Eight of the 88 supervisors who responded identified themselves as owners of partial owners of their companies. " The font and formatting of the questionnaires were altered in order to accommodate them within this thesis. However, the content and order of the questionnaires remain identical to the forms that were used in the field.

end of the questionnaire to provide additional comments about the questionnaire or any

other health and safety related issues that they felt were omitted.

Questionnaires: Section One

The first section of the questionnaire assessed the general characteristics of the

respondent and their level of involvement in the industry. Several of the demographic

questions in the Coopers & Lybrand study were duplicated in the current research as it

supplied the only source of quantitative data on the subject available for comparison.

Age, gender, and years of experience were requested along with the amoun't of

experience with the current employer in order to determine workforce turnover. Age was

an important variable to examine because of concern regarding the vulnerability of

young workers and their active presence in the industry. Workers were also asked to

classify themselves according to their attachment to the industry, using a typlology

included in the Coopers & Lybrand study (1997):

Career Silviculturalist: silviculture is your main source of employment. You return each year to the silviculture industry and work for more than 4 months per year.

Regular seasonal: you return each year, working 4 months or less.

Student: you are working to put yourself through school and will leave the industry upon graduation.

Occasional worker: you take the occasional job in the silviculture industry when they are available- silviculture is not your preferred occupation but you work in it when you need employment.

This typology seemed appropriate considering general understandings regarding

the populations that make up the workforce. It supplies an indication of the st,ability of the

workforce based on the number of workers that identify the job as a career, and an

indication of the lifestyles of the other various transient or temporary worker groups. It

must be reiterated that the Coopers & Lybrand study did not cover a large enough

number of respondents to make substantially accurate observations about the worker

pop~lat ion, '~ and it was further limited by its sampling method. However, the data

collected in the current research was still compared against the older data in order to

identify indications of any substantial shifts in the worker population.

Workers were also asked to identify their official position within the company, and

approximate the number of days they had worked thus far in the season, and the

number of days they expected to work by the end of the year. These data were desirable

in order to examine possible relationships between the number of days work.ed and

other variables in order to explore the relationships between seasonal burn-out and

health and safety performance.

Questionnaires Section Two

The second section of the questionnaires presented workers with a r~umber of

different scenarios related to health and safety practices in the workplace. A series of

questions were then presented that assessed various attitudes and behaviours related to

these scenarios. The general design of the questions followed the example set by

Klockars in his study of police misconduct (1997). Klockars' model provided a useful

foundation because it too was designed for investigating workplace offending amongst a

population with a powerful occupational culture. The questions asked respondents to

report not only their own likelihood of engaging in certain behaviours, but also the

likelihood of other workers. For the purpose of this research, it was believed that asking

respondents about the behaviour of others first would make them more comfortable and

forthcoming in describing their own behaviour. An example of a scenario and the

accompanying questions has been included in Figure 1.

19 The focus of the study was the characteristics of companies and not workers.

6 1

Figure 1: Example scenario

A How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would b~e to do this:

( VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I p p p p p -

6 How likely would YOU be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I C How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen

doing this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I D How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen

doing this?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMP0F:TANT I

Driving and vehicle safety was one of the primary issues dealt with in the study,

with 5 of the 15 scenarios based on safe use of automobiles or all terrain vehicles. The

questionnaire included 15 different scenarios involving health and safety issues in the

workplace. The specific behaviours identified as "unsafe" in this study are based upon

the range of most frequent concerns mentioned by respondents during informal

interviews prior to this project. In the final design, the types of unsafe behaviour chosen

for the questionnaire were based upon three different factors.

The first factor was the types of hazards that are considered to be the most common,

and most important, in the industry, according to prior interviews and industry input. For

example, many workers expressed their concern over pesticide exposure and a question

on this issue was developed.

The second factor was the most frequent types of injuries suffered by tree planters as

noted by Ellis et al. in their Needs Analysis Regarding Silviculture Industry Health and

Safety in British Columbia (2003). For example, the high number of all-terrain vehicle

related injuries prompted the inclusion of several questions related to the use of such

vehicles in the workplace.

The third factor in selecting and developing the scenarios related to unsafe behaviour

was tying them to the OHSR. For example, figure 1 illustrates a scenario involving a

violation of section 17.3 (3) of the OHSR.

It is acknowledged that some members of the industry may argue that some of

the scenarios do not indicate unsafe behaviour. Furthermore, it has been suggested that

how individuals react to the scenarios presented may be dependent upon situational

circumstances and other factors in the workplace. However, there can be little argument

as to whether or not the scenarios amount to violations of the OHSR, no matter how

trivial the infraction may seem to the individual. The questionnaire was an assessment of

how closely individuals abide by the regulations in principle, despite what other factors

may be affecting them in the workplace. The scenarios are listed below, along with the

corresponding section of the OHSR that applies to the situation. Some of the behaviours

may be subject to multiple sections of the OHSR, and in some cases other bodies of

legislation. However, only the relevant sections of the OHSR corresponding with the 15

different scenarios used in the questionnaire have been listed on the following page in

order to provide a simple and concise connection to the regulations of the workplace that

were the primary focus in this research.

1. Planter failing to wash hands before dinner with the crew Section 5.83b: Personal Hygiene, Worker's Responsibility

2. Planter running downhill through a cutblock in a reckless manner Section 4.25: Workplace C O ~ ~ I J C ~ , Prohibition

3. Planter smoking marijuana while working Section 4.20: lmpairment by alcohol, drug, or other substance

4. Planter failing to wear a seatbelt while traveling in a company vehicle Section 17.3(3): Transportation of Workers, Seatbelts.

5. Planter failing to wear protective gloves while handling chemically treated seedlings

Section 5.83a: Personal Hygiene, Worker's Responsibility

6. Planter failing to wear caulks in conditions requiring such footgear Section 8.23: Slippery Surfaces

7. Planter drinking and driving from company worksite Section 4.20: lmpairment by alcohol, drug, or other substance

8. Planter refusing unsafe work on steep unstable terrain Section 3.12: Refusal of Unsafe Work

9. Planter refusing unsafe work with hazardous substances Section 3.12: Refusal of Unsafe Work

10. Planter reporting supervisor speeding while driving company vehicle Section 3.10: Reporting Unsafe Conditions

11. Planter reporting another worker recklessly endangering self near cliff Section 3.1 0: Reporting Unsafe Conditions

12. Supervisor operating all-terrain vehicle without wearing proper helmet Section 8.12: Safety Headgear: Use with all-terrain vehicles.. .

13. Supervisor recklessly endangering self near cliff Section 4.25: Workplace Conduct, Prohibition

14. Supervisor transporting workers as passengers on all-terrain vehicle Section 16.31: Rider Restriction

15. Supervisor ignoring danger tree conditions Section 26.1 7: Weather Conditions

In some cases, respondents may not necessarily identify the behaviours as

violations, or even as unsafe for that matter. However, the purpose of the research was

not to gauge the workforce's technical knowledge of the regulations, but rather to

ascertain their opinions on the frequency and seriousness of the said activities. This

research focuses on how closely workers follow the regulations. Whether or not the

regulations are valid is to be determined by WorkSafeBC, those that supply input to their

decisions, and perhaps in the near future, the BCFSC

The scenarios presented in the questionnaires covered a variety of health and

safety issues that reflected a balance of employer and employee concerns identified

during the preliminary research. These issues included the following types of scenarios:

Workers engaging in unsafe behaviour

Workers reporting unsafe behaviour

Workers refusing unsafe work

Supervisors engaging in unsafe behaviour

Respondents were asked a series of questions related to the scenarios including some

(but not all) of the items below:

How likely they think others would be to engage in such activities

How likely they would be to engage in such activities

How likely they think supervisors would be to engage in such activities

How likely they think supervisors would be to correct such activities

What they think supervisors would do to correct such activities2'

How important they believe it is for supervisors to correct such activities

How likely they think other workers would be to report such activities

How likely they would be to report such activities

How important they think it is to report such activities

This spectrum of inquiry provided a wide range of information related to OHS

performance in the industry. These indicators are combined in various formulations in

20 Although this question was asked in regard to 7 of the scenarios, the results were not included in the final data collection. The reason for this is that the question was open-ended and garnered an extremely limited amount of feedback from the respondents.

order to derive a series of indexes that measure health and safety performance. Only a

portion of the data is examined and dealt with in detail within this thesis. However, the

research was exploratory in nature and it was hoped that the depth and breadth of the

data might provide a potential springboard for additional future studies.

Questionnaires Section Three

The final section asked workers about their general attitudes towards health and

safety and their job in general. This included a number of "yes and no" questions and an

additional series of Likert-type items related to general attitudes and beliefs. These

questions were aimed at examining key features of the occupational culture such as

collectivism and competition. Workers were also provided with an opportunity to make

additional commentary at the end in order to address any important issues not covered

in the questionnaire, or to comment on any other matters of personal interest.

Interviews

A small number of informal interviews were conducted with workers follo\ning the

distribution of the questionnaires. Respondents were asked about their opinions

regarding the questionnaires and how appropriate the questions were in relation to their

work environment. The respondents were also asked to identify issues that may have

been omitted from the questionnaires, and what they felt should to be done to improve

health and safety in the industry. The interviews followed a semi-structured format, in

which workers are asked about a number of general issues. This input was later

reviewed and used to provide a supplementary source of information in order to

elaborate on the findings from the questionnaires. The interview guide used for this

component of the research is reproduced in Appendix C. The issues that were explored

in the interviews included the following items:

Opinions about the design of the questionnaire

Opinions on what should be done to improve health and safety in the workplace

Opinions on what makes it difficult to make the workplace safer

Health and safety issues that the workers feel were missing from the

questionnaire

The Sample

The goal of this research was to obtain a representative sample of all workers in

the tree planting industry. However, obtaining a truly random sample of all workers in the

industry is not possible because there is no available list containing all such individuals.

Furthermore, it would be very difficult to create such a list due to the high turnover rate in

the workforce and the movement of workers between companies. As such, it was

determined that the best method of sampling from the workforce would be to select

companies from a list of active tree planting contractors. This list was provided by the

WSCA, and it included contractor names, locations, and contact information.

The operating practices of the industry and the seasonal transitions of the work

from area to area of the province made it problematic to select the companies and then

visit them in the field. The opportunity to make contact with the crews while they are

operating is subject to a variety of industry pressures. Contracts tend to begin and end at

different times in different parts of the province according to the unique climatic

conditions that characterize the area. For example, due to differences in rates of

snowmelt, summer contracts in the north typically extend into August while those in the

southeast are often finished by early June. This restriction coupled with other

considerations made it necessary to adopt a different method of selecting companies to

visit. The various factors affecting the sampling process include:

Production: The unpredictable nature of shift scheduling and seasonal windows of

operation would make it difficult, if not impossible, to arrange appropriate times to

meet with crews in advance. Companies often change their shift schedule at the last

minute to accommodate production needs based upon getting packaged seedlings

into the ground before they expire. Changing weather and limited access to

worksites can also change a company's activities on a moment's notice. Contacting

crews in the field as their season unfolded was the best method of overcoming this

obstacle. The most practical method of doing this was to travel throughout the

province and contact companies based upon who was operating in the area at the

time of the research. As the researcher moved from area to area, companies were

contacted based upon what order they appeared on the list, which appeared to have

no specific order other than alphabetical. At other times, companies were contacted

in person as they were encountered in the field. The researcher's familiarity with the

industry made it easy to identify the most likely locations to contact companies. This

included inquiring at gas stations, laundromats, and forestry offices about the

presence of tree planting companies in the local area.

Size: The combined ranks of the larger cornpanies account for a much larger portion

of the workforce than most of the smaller contractors combined. Althoug~h different

sized companies may have different methods of health and safety management,

there was not sufficient information available to conduct a stratified sample of the

workforce based on company-size.21 Thus, it was deemed important to visit a variety

of companies based on size. Phoning companies prior to the research (and prior to

the operating season) may have given a preference to larger companies that

" Again, this is obstructed by the practice of determining company size according to payroll and not by number of employees. Furthermore smaller companies with longer operating seasons may hawe payrolls similar to larger companies with shorter operating seasons.

68

maintain a permanent office, and return to the same contracts on an antwal basis.

Contacting companies as the season unfolded allowed the inclusion of smaller fringe

operators that operate for only a small part of the year and pick up their \ ~ o r k

contracts as the season unfolds.

Ethical Considerations: The questionnaires had to be administered in person by

the researcher in the field, in order to protect the interests of the participants. It was

not appropriate to ask companies to hand the questionnaires out and allow

supervisors access to information on self-reporting of health and safety activities.

The protection of the identities and contributions of all parties (companies and

workers alike) was a primary consideration in the ethical guidelines of this research.

It was also necessary to visit workers in the actual workplaces, in order to obtain the

most accurate responses possible in relation to the subject matter. Furthermore,

visiting the worksites in person allowed the researcher to establish rapport with the

respondents and gain their cooperation on the research.

Coastalllnterior Divide: Health and safety considerations may vary not only

according to location (relative to the coast and interior of the province) but: also with

the unique demands of each area of the province. As such, several crews were

visited on the coast, albeit a smaller number than in the interior because a greater

amount of industry activity occurs in the interior industry. However, many of the

workers and companies visited in the interior are also active on the coast, and

therefore assisted in bridging potential gaps between these two areas of the industry.

visited in more accessible locations. Although the sample is not truly random in the

purest sense of the word, it is believed that the sample obtained through this strategy

was the most representative sample available based on practical considerations.

Although there is no clear reason to believe that the sample of workers in this study is

not representative of the greater workforce in relation to the variables that were

examined, the limitations of the sampling strategy are acknowledged in regard to

generalizing the results of this study to the entire industry.

The research began in May, 2004 and concluded in October, 2004. Upon

contact, company owners were given information regarding the nature of the research

(contained in Appendix D) and asked if they had a camp or crew available for

participation. On some occasions, companies were simply encountered in the field by

chance (on the road or at motels and gas stations) and asked to participate. \Nark

locations were visited in the interior and on the coast, with a mixture of camp, hotel, and

commuter crews included in the coverage. A general map (see Figure 2) of the research

sites has been provided, but more precise information on location has not been included

in order to avoid identifying any specific companies. Certain areas of the province could

not be visited due to transportation limitations and ongoing wildfires at the time of the

research.

Thirty-five contractors were contacted during the course of the researc:h, and only

one declined to participate. There were seven c:ontractors who offered to participate, but

could not be accommodated in the research schedule that was available. One of these

contractors indicated that language skills might have presented a barrier to completing

the questionnaire. It is known that there are several ethnic groups active in the industry

and some of them are concentrated within the operations of specific companies. Given

the observations of Herbert and Landrigan (2000) concerning the vulnerability of minority

populations, the language limitations inherent in this type of research may mean that

certain high-risk portions of the workforce may have been excluded. This poses a

serious challenge not only to the ability of representing a diverse array of voices within a

single study, but also to the development of health and safety programs that serve the

needs of all workers. This point has not been neglected and it is attended to in greater

detail in the discussion portion of this thesis. However, minorities are also intermingled

throughout the tree planting workforce and are not solely confined to segregated

companies. Therefore, their input is still represented to some degree within the findings

in this research. Twenty-seven different worksites were visited during the research,

including members and non-members of the WSCA. Crew sizes varied from only 5, to

more than 100.

After the company owner granted permission to visit a crew, a supervisor in the

field was contacted to arrange a suitable time. The questionnaires were issued to

workers soon after returning from work, either at dinnertime (in camp-based operations)

or immediately after work (in commuter and hotel-based operations), and took

respondents approximately 20 minutes to complete. Questionnaires were handed

directly back to the researcher and no other parties were allowed to view the responses.

Both workers and employers were given specific assurances that the research would not

reveal any information about any particular company or individual.

Overall, the research was extremely well received, indicating a strong interest in

health and safety issues within the workforce. The participation rate within the worksites

was also very high, with an overall response rate of 84.9% (1 5.1 % non-response). The

response rate was very similar among supervisory personnel and planters, with

participation rates of 86.3 and 84.7 percent respectively. The response rate was

calculated by comparing the numbers of collected responses with the number of workers

present at the worksite according to the supervisor.

However, it may still be possible that workers who declined to participate

comprise a high-risk group that has poor attitudes towards health and safety

requirements and engages in frequent regulatory violations. Some workers were likely

missed because they were busy with other activities at the time the questionnaires were

distributed, or had not yet returned from work. Finally, some workers may have been

missed due to the limited ability of the lone researcher to make contact with every

available individual. As such, there may have been many more workers willing to

participate that were included in the 15.1 % non-response group.

It was exceedingly rare for anyone to explicitly refuse the questionnaire. This

response rate likely understates the willingness of the workforce to participate in the

research, and indicates a smaller volunteer bias than might be derived from the

participation rate.

Table 1: The sample

Worksites visited Motel worksites 1 10

I Camp worksites 1 12 1 Commuter worksites 1 3 CommuterIMotel hybrid worksites 1 2 Total number of worksites visited: 1 27 Workers surveved I

A total of 669 questionnaires were collected, and 8 were omitted from the final

Number of planters su~eyed : Number of supervisors surveyed: Total number of workers surveyed:

results,22 yielding a total of 661 valid responses (see Table 1). Fourteen workers were

-

573 88 661

not issued questionnaires because they had been encountered at previous worksites.

This was not a surprising discovery given the rapid turnover of employees in the

industry. It is possible that workers may have learned about the survey from co-workers

22 Questionnaires were omitted if the respondent had not filled in sufficient information.

73

that had encountered it earlier, but this was not deemed to pose any threat to the

reliability of the research.

If a random sample were to be assumed, the size of the sample would allow for

the observations to be made with a confidence interval of (plus/minus) 4% at a

confidence level of 95%.23 According to the rules of probability, this would mean that any

basic statistics observed in the sample could be assumed to be within 4% of the greater

workforce population. However, due to restrictions in the sampling process discussed

earlier, the sample can only be considered to be theoretically representative, and the

observations may only represent a portion of the industry.

Ethics

This research proposal was submitted to the Simon Fraser University Ethics

Council and was granted approval under a minimal risk classification prior to the

beginning of the research in May, 2004. Among the chief ethical concerns in this

research was preserving the anonymity of the respondents and protecting the

professional reputations of all parties involved. The industry is small and intimate, and

professional reputations can be very important to those who depend upon it for a living.

Furthermore, members of the industry may be concerned about the uncoverir~g of OHS

violations or other infractions in their workplace. As such, important safeguards were

taken to ensure that no respondent's identity was revealed as a result of the research,

the identity of companies participating were protected, and no members of the industry

were identified by the research.

Signed consent forms were not used as they posed a threat to maintaining the

anonymity of the respondents. However, a subject participation feedback form was

- - - - - -- - - - -

23 The ability to make such a claim, of course, is limited by the obstacles encountered during the sampling process

made available to interview respondents, so that they could provide additional

commentary if they choose (see Appendix E). All of the information about the study and

its purpose was included in the introduction sheet for the questionnaire, and therefore all

respondents (including face-to-face interviewees) received the same information.

Workers completing the questionnaires were neither asked nor required to reveal

their identity during the research. They typically handed their questionnaires directly to

the researcher who placed them into an envelope with the rest of the questionnaires).

The questionnaires were later assigned a numerical code that allowed responses from

each worksite to be kept together, but this did not include any identifying information.

The identity of the companies visited was also kept confidential by the

researcher. At the time of the study, the names of participating companies were known

to the researcher as a result of the sampling process, and from interaction in the field.

However, the assignment of a numerical code to represent different worksite:; has since

made it impossible to determine which sets of responses were collected from which

specific company. Certain site characteristics have been retained in the data, but

company names have since faded even from the memory of the researcher.

This research did not ask workers to reveal any specific information about any

individual or company within the industry. The questions referred only to hypothetical

situations and the respondents' opinions about the likelihood of certain activities. Most of

the situations dealt with OHS violations, and some dealt with activities that art? illegal

(such as smoking pot while working or drinking and driving from a work location).

However, no respondent was asked to comment on any of their own past activities that

could be interpreted as violations, or those of any other person. Respondents were given

explicit instructions not to provide such information anywhere on the questionnaire or

during the course of the interview.

All research participants were invited to retain the front page of the questionnaire

which contains contact information for the researcher, his supervisor, and the university

in case there are any questions, concerns, or complaints about the way in which the

respondents were treated during the course of the study.

Chapter Four: Findings

The findings are divided into two separate sections. Section one examines the

general characteristics of the industry and provides a response to the first and second

research questions. Section two presents data related to key indicators of OHS

performance in the industry. This section answers the third, fourth, and fifth research

questions. The sixth and seventh research questions, although strongly connected to the

findings, will be answered in the final discussion section following the findings.

Findings: Section One

Research Question One

What are the qeneral characteristics of the industrv workforce?

Research Question Two

Do these characteristics conform with qeneral perceptions of the population mcJ previous research on the industrv?

The results of the demographics obtained in this research are compared with the

results obtained during a study by Coopers & Lybrand in 1997, and with the general

perceptions of the industry observed in the qualitative sources cited in the literature

review. Due to the methodological limitations of the Coopers & Lybrand report and the

limitations encountered during the sampling process in the current research, it is not

possible to make definitive comparisons of the two studies. However, comparisons are

still made due to the absence of any other previous quantitative data on these variables.

The average age of workers in the sample is 26.5 years. The youngest

respondent was 15 years old, and the oldest was 60. The distribution of age in the

industry is illustrated in figure 3. Previous research observed that 60% of the workforce

was over the age of 24. However, the current study finds that only 55% of the workforce

is over the age of 24, indicating the existence of a slightly younger workforce than may

have previously been believed. The average age of supervisors in the current data is

31.6 years, while the average planter age is 25.7 years.

Figure 3: Age of workers

Age of workers 70 2

Years of age

N = 653 Missing 8 Mean 26.51 L

Experience

Figure 4 depicts the distribution of experience in the industry. There is a defined

drop-off in experience after the fifth year. It is believed that this is due to the likelihood of

workers leaving the industry once their education is finished. Other features of the

78

research support this finding. Approximately 48% of the workers with 5 years or less

experience participate in the industry to fund their schooling, and Dlan to "retire" upon

graduation. The industry is comprised of approximately 15% first-year workers.

Figure 4: Years of experience planting

Years of experience planting

I 2 O 7

Years of experience

The average number of years that the respondents had worked with their

company was 3.34 years (see Figure 5). While approximately 15% of the wclrkforce is in

their first year in the industry, more than twice that number (38%) reported being in their

first year with their current company. This illustrates the high mobility of the workers

between companies and the high rates of employee turnover within the industry.

Figure 5: Years of experience with current company

I Years with current company

300

200

2 100 C 0 3 D 22

LL 0 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 16 20 25

2 4 6 8 10 12 14 18 22 30

Number of years

N = 660 Missing 1 Mean 3.34

Sex

The sample included 467 men and 195 women. This amounts to a ratio of 2.34

men for every woman, or a mix of 70% men and 30% women. This was higher than the

expectations and estimates expressed during exploratory research prior to this project.

This also reflected a slightly higher number of women than were recorded in the

Coopers & Lybrand study, which observed 3.34 men for every woman, or a mix of 77%

men and 33% women.

Days Worked in Season

Respondents were asked how many days they had worked at the time of the

survey. The average response was 49.97 days, and the most common response was 40

days. Less than 3% of the respondents were in their first week of and the range

24 A total of 2.5% had worked 7 days or less so far in the season.

80

extended from 1 to 200 days worked in the season. The distribution of this measure can

be seen in Figure 6.

Figure 6: Days worked in season at time of questionnaire

Days worked to date 140

120

100

80

60

40 C 0 g 20 !I'

L L 0 _1

1 12 25 36

7 19 30 41 52 69 83 102 140

Number of days

1

Missing 10 Mean 49.97

Respondents were also asked to estimate how many days they expected to work

by the end of the year (see Figure 7). The average was 72.49 days. The most common

response was 60 days. The range of 5 to nearly 2510~~ days of work indicates a wide

spectrum of the workforce was captured, including coastal planters that work

significantly longer seasons than those that limit themselves to the interior season. Only

13% of the workers in this study expect to work over 100 days, compared to 39%

indicated in the previous research. If this difference in the data reflects reality, it may be

that fewer workers are relying upon the industry as a career. Another explanation may

also lie in other seasonal variables (such as weather) or long-term shifts (such as

climate change) that may affect industry schedules.

25 The respondent who reported having worked 200 days in the year so far, was a supervisor who also reported they expected to work approximately 250 days in the year in total. Supervisors generally accumulate far more days of work than planters, and this response was an outlier in relation to the rest of the data.

Figure 7: Days expected to have worked by the end of the year

Days expected by year end 120

100

80

60

40 0 C a, 3 20 D 2 LL 0

5 30 38 48 56

20 34 42 52 60 75 95 118 153

Number of days

N = 627 Missing 34 Mean 72.52

Approximately 54% of the workforce reported being a year-round BC resident,

with the rest of the workforce spending their off-season in other provinces or countries.

The proportion of workers originating outside of British Columbia actually understates

the transience of the workers, as even workers who live within the province must travel

to the various locations where their companies operate.

The number of workers arriving from out of the province appears to be much

higher than the 25% observed in the Coopers & Lybrand study. However, this is likely

due to the fact that the previous research relied upon telephone surveys, and the current

research was done in the field. It is important to note that the language barrier created

by the use of questionnaires, and the absence of any companies distinguished

specifically by minority ethnic status from the sample, may understate the participation of

out-of-province workers. However, it was not possible to incorporate a questicmnaire that

met the linguistic needs of the one company that identified its workforce as

predominantly immigrant workers, and there were no other companies of this nature

encountered during the research.

Education

The industry is characterized by surprisingly high levels of education, for a

manual labour occupation. Approximately 80% of this workforce possesses some

universitylcollege schooling or a degree (see Figure 8). This is likely due to the

large number of students that depend upon the industry to fund their schooling. The level

of Education appears to be much higher than observed in previous research, in which

only 42% of the respondents reported having some college or university schooling. This

difference may be due to limitations in the samples, or differences in the methodology.

Coopers & Lybrand study may have included fewer students in its sample by relying on

telephone interviews, potentially excluding certain sections of the p~pulation.:?~

Figure 8: Education

Education

Valid Some highschool

Highschool Vocational training

Some University/College University/College Degree Total

Missing No Answer

Total

I I I ( Cumulative

If the statistics do indicate a true shift in the workforce, one possible contributing

factor to this increase in student workers is the Forest Renewal BC (FRBC) program,

Frequency 24

26 For example students may be less likely to have permanent phone numbers than career-oriented workers.

83

Percent 3.6

Valid Percent 3.6

Percent 3.6

which was initiated by the New Democratic Party in the late 1990s. Under this program,

many forestry workers (including those of the silviculture sector) received funding for

education and retraining, but remained in the industry following the program However,

some members of the industry also believe the FRBC program was responsible for

culling many of the older more experienced workers, who utilized the program as a way

of exiting the industry permanently to pursue another career, potentially reducing the

average age of the workforce.

Classification

As shown in Figure 9, there is a relatively even mixture of students, regular

seasonal workers, and career silviculture workers in the industry, with a smaller number

of people who identify themselves as occasional workers. The number of workers

Figure 9: Classification

Classification

describing themselves as career silviculturalists is much lower in this study

(25.5%) than observed in previous research (64%). Also, the proportion of students is

Valid Career Silviculturalist Regular seasonal Student Occasional worker Total

Missing No Answer Total

much larger at 32.7% compared to the previously observed 12%. There are also a larger

number of workers identifying themselves as regular seasonal workers. Overall, this

indicates that a lower portion of the industry identifies silviculture as their career, and a

Frequency 168 198 216

78 660

2 662

Percent 25.4 29.9 32.6 11.8 99.7

.3 100.0

Validpercent ' 25.5

30.0 32.7 11.8

100.0

Cumulative Percent

25.5 55.5 88.2

100.0

higher portion of the industry is comprised of transient and temporary workers and

students.

General Workplace Attitudes and Perceptions

Workers were asked about their attitudes and perceptions regarding workplace

relations and general safety issues. These included questions concerning job

satisfaction and health and safety activities. The questions were also intended to provide

an illustration of the occupational culture and to assess the validity of the descriptions

that emerged in the literature review. A summary of these questions and their results has

been included below along with charts to illustrate the average response throughout the

industry.

1) In your opinion, how much TIME do supervisors in your workplace spend to ensure

that everyone is following appropriate health and safety requirements? The *average

response for this question was 3.0, with 1 representing "Too much time" and 5

representing "Not enough time".

Figure 10: Time spent by supervisors ensuring compliance

Too much 4 Not Enough 1 2 3 4 5

2) In your opinion, how much TIME is spent discussing health and safety in your current

workplace. The average response for this question was 2.95

Figure 11 : Time spend discussing health and safety

Too much 4

1 2 3 4 5

i

3) How likely do you think it is that YOU will be injured while working this year?

The average response for this question was 3.45.

Figure 12: Likelihood of self being injured

Very Likely 4

1 2 3 4

4) How likely do you think it is that SOMEONE! ELSE at your workplace will be injured

while working? The average response for this question was 2.40.

Figure 13: Likelihood of someone else being injured

Very Likely 4 b Very Unlikely 1 2 3 4 5 1

5) In your opinion, how FRIENDLY are relations between supervisors and planters in

your workplace? The average response for this question was 1.58.

Figure 14: Friendliness of planters and supervisors

Very Friendly + Very Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5

6) In your opinion, how COMPETITIVE are the planters in your workplace wilh each

other? The average response for this question was 2.75.

Figure 15: Competitiveness of planters

Very Competitive Very 1 2 3 4 5

?

7) How SATISFIED are you with the camp or accommodations supplied to you by your

company? The average response for this question was 2.19.

Figure 16: Satisfaction with accommodations

Extremely Satisfied Extremely Dissatisfied 1 2 3 4 5 1

8) How SATISFIED are you with the wages you are currently earning? The average

response for this question was 2.86.

Figure 17: Satisfaction with earnings - - -

Extremely Satisfied 4 xtremely Dissatisfied 1 2

9) In your opinion, how CLOSE are the planters in your workplace as a group? The average

response for this question was 2.17.

Figure 18: Closeness of planters

Very Close 4

1 2 3 4 5

Respondents were also asked several "yes or no" questions about their general

experiences in the workplace. A summary of these questions and their results is

included on the following page (see Table 2).

Table 2: Summary of "Yes-No" questions

Do you usually work with a partner? )+I

Question Has a supervisor in your current workplace ever !:orrected you during this season for an activity related to health and safety? Has a supervisor in your current workplace checked on you during this season to ensure that are complying with a health and safety requirement? Do you usually carry an emergency whistle?

Have you ever suffered any type of injury while planting and had to miss work?

51.6

61.5

A high level of group cohesion is observed in the workforce, as demonstrated by

a strong feeling of closeness being reported amongst the workers. Varying levels of

competitiveness were also reported amongst the workers. However, perceptions of

competition and group cohesion appeared to be independent of each other, ,and there

was no substantial relationship observed in either a correlation or cross tabulation

analysis of the two attitudes.

Figure 19: Competitiveness of planters

Competitiveness of planters

300 I

Very Competitive Neutral Very Uncompetitive

Competitive Uncompetitive Mean 2.75 Missing 17

Although the perceived level of competitiveness among the planters was not

extremely high on average (2.75 out of 5), examination of the distribution of scores

reveals that it was still more likely for planters to characterize their crews as competitive

or very competitive rather than uncompetitive or very uncompetitive (see Figure 19).

Therefore, it may be suggested that tree planters exhibit both individualistic and

competitive traits, while possessing strong collective ties. Previous understandings

regarding the collectivist features of the occupational culture of the industry appear to be

supported by the data, and the qualitative sources that informed this research appear to

be reflected in the attitudes and beliefs of the workers.

Expectations of physical danger appear to be common among the workforce.

Over 20% of all workers felt they were likely or very likely to be injured during the work

season. Furthermore, over 50% of all workers expected that someone else in their

workplace was likely or very likely to be injured. In fact, 44% of all workers report

suffering an injury serious enough to prevent them from working at some point in their

career. Despite these beliefs and experiences, workers on average felt that an adequate

amount of time was being spent discussing health and safety in the workplace, and

supervisors were spending an appropriate amount of time ensuring health arid safety

compliance.

Additional correlative and cross tabulation analyses indicate that there is no

substantive relationship amongst these variables and expectations of injuries do not

appear to be related with the amount of time spent on health and safety in the

workplace. Instead, it appears that physical danger is acknowledged as a na.tural feature

of the workplace and an integral part of the occupation. Further observations of

behaviours and attitudes reflective of the occupational culture emerge later in

examination of the data produced from the sec.ond section of the questionnaires.

Findings Section Two

Research Question Three

What is the state of occupational health and safetv performance in the workforce?

Likelihood of Planters to Engage in Unsafe Behaviour

Planters were asked, on a scale of 1 to 5, how likely they would be to engage in

7 different forms of unsafe behaviour presented in the scenarios. These scores reflect

answers from planters only. The likelihood of supervisors engaging in unsafe behaviour

was assessed using a different set of questions based on a set of scenarios specific to

supervisor activities. The lower the score, the more likely the planter was to enqaqe in

the unsafe behaviour. Table 3 contains the average response for how likely planters

would be to engage in particular unsafe behaviours.

Planter smoking marijuana while working Planter failing to wear a seatbelt in companv vehicle

Table 3: Unsafe behaviour by planters

I Planter failing to wear gloves while working with pesticides 3.:58 1

Type of Unsafe Behaviour Planter failing to wash hands before entering common meal area Planter runnina downhill throuah a clearcut

Planter failing to wear caulked (spiked) safety boots on steep terrain Planter drinking and driving

Average Score

3.31

By adding the responses to each question together, a general index was created

that expresses how likely planters are to engage in unsafe behaviour in general.

Combining the seven scales of 1 to 5 produces a set of scores on a scale of 7 to 35.

Again, the lower the score, the more likely the planter would be to engage in ~ ~ n s a f e

behaviour in general.

Figure 20: General index for unsafe behaviour by planters

Likelihood of unsafe behaviour among planters

60 1

< Very likely Very unlikely > Mean 25.47 hAissing 25

This index is the primary measure of health and safety compliance arnong

planters, as it represents planters' likelihood to engage in or avoid behaviour that is in

contravention of the OHSR. The average score for all planters was 25.47, based on a

total of 548 valid responses.'' Figure 20 illustrates the distribution of scores related to

planters' likelihood of engaging in unsafe behaviour in general. It shows that there is a

wide distribution of scores, ranging from planters who are very likely to engage in many

unsafe forms of unsafe behaviour, to those that are very likely to avoid most unsafe

behaviours.

27 Supervisors were not asked this question. Secondly, any worker not replying to any one of the seven questions included in the index were excluded from calculation of the general measure.

91

Likelihood of Supervisors to Engage in Unsafe Behaviour

Supervisors were also asked, on a scale of 1 to 5, how likely they would be to

engage in unsafe behaviour in the workplace, based on 4 different scenario:; specifically

suited to their common tasks. The lower the score, the more likely the su~ervisor would

be to ennane in the unsafe behaviour. Table 4 contains the average response

throughout the industry for how likely supervisors would be to engage in particular

unsafe behaviours.

Table 4: Unsafe behaviour by supervisors

Type of Unsafe Behaviour Su~ervisor o~eratina all-terrain vehicle without wearina DroDer helmet

Supervisor recklessly endangering self near cliff Supervisor transportina workers as Dassenaers on all-terrain vehicle

I Supervisor ignoring danger tree conditions 3.91 1

By adding the response for each question together, a general index was created

that expresses how likely supervisors are to engage in unsafe behaviour in general.

Combining the four scales of 1 to 5 produces a set of scores on a scale of 4 to 20. The

lower the score, the more likely the supervisor would be to engage in unsafe behaviour

in general. This index is the primary measures of health and safety performance among

supervisors, as it deals with their likelihood to engage in or avoid behaviour that is in

contravention of the OHSR. The average score for all supervisors was 13.26 out of 20,

based on a total of 84 valid response^.^^ Figure 21 illustrates the distribution of these

scores on the following page. As with the planters, the chart shows that there is a wide

range of scores, from supervisors that strictly avoid unsafe behaviour to those that

apparently engage in it quite frequently.

28 Planters were not asked these questions. Secondly, any supervisor not replying to any one of the seven questions included in the index were excluded from calculation of the general measure.

92

Figure 21: General index for unsafe behaviour by supe~isors

Likelihood of unsafe behaviour among supervisors

6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

7 9 I 1 13 15 17 19

< Very likely Very unlikely > Mean 13.26 Missing 4

The data indicate that there is a wide range of attitudes and behaviours in the

industry related to health and safety, for both planters and supervisors. Although there is

no external standard against which the compliance measures in this study can be

evaluated, the data nonetheless suggests a substantial lack of compliance with OHS

regulations throughout the workforce. The bell-curve shape observed in the clompliance

scores among planters (see Figure 20) illustrates a natural distribution of scores for their

likelihood to engage in unsafe behaviour. In consistency with a natural distribution, there

are only a small number of scores at either extreme of the health and safety compliance

continuum. This indicates that there are relatively few planters that are extremely safe

extremely unsafe. Instead it appears that most workers are likely to engage in some

form of unsafe behaviour, and strict adherence to the regulations of the workplace is

rare.

Supervisors on the other hand exhibited a more widely distributed array of

compliance scores based upon their reported likelihood to engage in unsafe behaviour

(see Figure 21). However, the number of supervisors included in the study is far smaller

than the number of planters, and the distribution of their scores might assume the form

of a normal curve with additional sampling. The smaller sample size also means that the

confidence interval for the mean is considerably larger for supervisors than it: is for

planter^.^' Nonetheless, the relatively large number of low scores near the bottom of the

scale is alarming because if it is a true indication of the health and safety performance

among supervisors, there would appear to be a substantial problem with supervisors

with unacceptably low levels of health and safety compliance.

Expectation of Planters to Engage in Unsafe Behaviour

All workers (including s~perv iso rs )~~ were asked how likely they felt other planters

would be to engage in 7 different forms of unsafe behaviour. Table 5 includes the

answers from planters and supervisors. Their answers were given on a scale of 1 to

5.The lower the score, the more likelv the worker ex~ected other planters would be to

enaane in the unsafe behaviour.

Table 5: Expectation of unsafe behaviour by planters

1 Type of Unsafe Behaviour 1 Average !=I I Planter failina to wash hands before enterina common meal area I 3.51 I

Planter running downhill through a clearcut Planter smoking marijuana while working

Planter failina to wear a seatbelt in com~anv vehicle 3.12

Planter failing to wear gloves while working with pesticides Planter fail in^ to wear caulked (spiked) safety boots on steep terrain 2.54

) Planter drinking and driving 3.74 1

29 And therefore less reliable. 30 A comparison between planters and supervisor responses for this measure is conducted later.

94

As with the data regarding individual behaviour, the responses for each question

were added together to create a general measure that expresses how likely workers

believed other planters would be to engage in unsafe behaviour in general.

Once again, combining the seven scales of 1 to 5 produces a set of scores on a

scale of 7 to 45. The lower the score, the more likely the worker would be to engage in

unsafe behaviour in general. The average score for this index was 21.31 out of 35,

based on 630 valid response^.^' Figure 22 illustrates the distribution of scores for this

measurement.

Figure 22: General index for expectation of planters to behave unsafely

I Expectation of planters to be unsafe

I < Very likely Very unlikely >

N= 630 Mean 21.31

AS in all other index measures, any worker not replying to any one of the questions included in the index were excluded from calculation of the general measure.

95

Expectation of Supervisors to Engage in Unsafe Behaviour

All workers (including planters) were asked, on a scale of 1 to 5, how likely they

felt supervisors would be to engage in unsafe behaviour, based on the 4 different

scenarios. These scores reflect answers from planters and supervisors. The lower the

score, the more likely the worker expected supervisors would be to engage in the

unsafe behaviour. Table 6 contains the average response throughout the industry for the

specific scenarios.

Table 6: Expectation of unsafe behaviour by supervisors

1 T v ~ e of Unsafe Behaviour I Averaae score

1 Trans~ortina workers on an all terrain vehicle I 3.34 I

Operating all terrain vehicle without wearing a helmet Workinn too close to a steep cliff

I Ignoring dangerous conditions and allowing work to continue 3.46 A 3.19 -I

The responses to each question has were added together to create a

general index that expresses how likely workers believed supervisors would be to

engage in unsafe behaviour in general. The lower the score, the more likely workers

expected supervisors would be to engage in unsafe behaviour. The average score for all

workers was 13.08 out of 20, based on a total of 620 valid responses. Figure 23

illustrates the distribution of the scores for this measure.

Figure 23: General index for expectation of supervisors to behave unsafely

I I Expectation of supervisors to be unsafe

4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20

5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19

< Very likely Very unlikely >

Expectations that Unsafe Planter Behaviour would be Corrected

N = 620 Mean 13.08 Missing 41

The following set of scores represents how likely, on a scale of 1 to 5, planters

believe a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen engaging in an unsafe

beha~iour.~' In this case, the lower the score, the more likely the worker would expect a

supervisor to correct the unsafe behaviour. Table 7 contains the average response of

planters throughout the industry.

Table 7: Expectation of unsafe by planters to be corrected

I Type of Unsafe Behaviour I ~ v e r a g e s l 1 Planter failina to wash hands before enterina common meal area I 3.46 I

Planter running downhill through a clearcut Planter smokina mariiuana while workina Planter failing to wear a seatbelt in company vehicle Planter failing to wear gloves while working with pesticides Planter failina to wear caulked (mikedl safetv boots on s t e e ~ terrain

I Planter drinking and driving I 2.09 1

32 A comparison is later done between how likely planters believe a supervisor would be to correct unsafe behaviour and how likely supervisors claim they would be to correct unsafe behaviour.

The responses to each question were added together to create a general index

that captures how likely planters expected supervisors would be to correct unsafe

behaviour. This measure is useful for determining how closely planters expect to be

supervised in the workplace. As illustrated in Figure 24, the average score for this

measure was 23.1 9 out of 35, based on 537 valid responses.

Figure 24: General index for expectation of correction of planters

Expectation that planters will be corrected

< Very likely Very unlikely >

Likelihood of Supervisors to Correct Unsafe Behaviour

The scores in Table 8 (shown on the following page) represent how likely

supervisors reported they would be to correct a planter who engages in unsafe

behaviour. Their answers were given on a scale of 1 to 5. The lower the score the more

likely the supervisor would be to correct the unsafe behaviour.

Table 8: Likelihood of supervisors to correct unsafe behaviour

Type of Unsafe Behaviour I ~ v e r a ~ e m I Planter failina to wash hands before enterina conimon meal area I 2.99 I

Planter running downhill through a clearcut Planter smoking marijuana while working Planter failina to wear a seatbelt in comDanv vehicle Planter failing to wear gloves while working with pesticides Planter failing to wear caulked (spiked) safetv boots on steep terrain

I Planter drinking and driving 1.67 1

The responses to each question were added together to create a general

measure that expresses how likely supervisors would be to correct unsafe behaviour in

general. The average score for this measure was 18.9 out of 35, based on 812 valid

responses.

Figure 25: General measure for likelihood of supervisors to correct unsafe behaviour

Likelihood of supervisors to correct planters

lo 1

< Very likely Very unlikely > Mean 18.9 Missing 6

Figure 25 shows that there is a wide range of supervisory approaches,

ranging from those that are very likely to correct unsafe behaviour with scores as low as

7, and those that are extremely unlikely to do so with scores as high as 31. Ttlis

measure is useful for determining how well supervisors are fulfilling their duty under Part

3 Division 3 section 11 7 (a) (ii) of the Workers' Compensation Act to ensure that workers

under their supervision comply with the requirements of the OHSR.

Importance for Supervisors to Correct Unsafe Behaviour By Planters

The following scores represent how important workers felt, on a scale of 1 to 5, it

was for a supervisor to correct unsafe behav iou r~ .~~ These scores represent answers for

supervisors and planters. The lower the score the more important workers felt it was for

a supervisor to correct the unsafe behaviour.

Table 9: Importance for supervisors to correct planters

1 T v ~ e of Unsafe Behaviour 1 Averaae !a Planter failing to wash hands before entering common meal area Planter running downhill through a clearcut

I Planter smokina mariiuana while workina I 3.79 I Planter failing to wear a seatbelt in company vehicle Planter failing to wear gloves while workina with pesticides

1 Planter failina to wear caulked Is~ iked) safetv boots on s t e e ~ terrain I 3.23 I I Planter drinking and driving 1.61 1

The responses to each question were added together to create a general index

that expresses how important workers felt it was for a supervisor to correct unsafe

behaviour in general. The average score for this general measure was 19.86 out of 35,

based on 612 valid responses. Figure 26 illustrates the distribution of scores for this

measure. This measure is useful for determining the general attitude that workers have

towards safety in the workplace, and how important they believe it is for supervisors to

correct planters that engage in unsafe activities.

33 A comparison between planters and supervisors is done on this measure later.

100

Figure 26: General index for importance of correcting unsafe behaviour by planters

I I Importance of correcting planters

< Very important Very unimportant >

lmportance of Correcting Unsafe Behaviour Among Supervisors

rd = 612 Mean 19.86 Missing 49

All workers (including planters) were asked how important they feel, on scale of 1

to 5, it is to correct supervisors who engage in unsafe behaviour. These scores reflect

answers from planters and supervisors. The lower the score, the more important the

worker felt it was to correct supervisors who engage in unsafe behaviour. Table 10

contains the average response throughout the industry for the particular scenarios.

Table 10: Importance of correcting unsafe behaviour by supervisors

1 T V D ~ of Unsafe Behaviour I Averaae Operating all terrain vehicle without wearing a helmet Workina too close to a s tee~ cliff

The responses to each question were added together to create a general

index that expresses how important workers feel it is to correct supervisors who engage

3.1 7 Transporting workers on an all terrain vehicle Ignoring dangerous conditions and allowing work to continue 3.22

in unsafe behaviour in general. The lower the score, the more important workers felt it

was to correct supervisors. The average score for all workers was 1 1.09 out of 20,

based on a total of 620 valid responses. Figure 27 illustrates the distribution of the

scores for this measure.

Figure 27: General index for importance of correcting unsafe supervisor behaviour

Importance of correcting supervisors

< Very important Very unimportant >

N = 620 Mean 1 1.09 Missing 41

Likelihood of Planters to Refuse Unsafe Work

Planters were asked, on a scale of 1 to 5, how likely they would be to refuse

unsafe work based on two different scenarios. The first involved working in steep and

unstable terrain where there were sliding logs. The second scenario involved using

fertilizing chemicals that cause the planter to have allergic reactions. The lower the

score, the more likely workers would be to refuse the unsafe work detail. The average

score for refusing to work in the steep unstable terrain was 3.97 out of 5, based on 557

valid responses. The average score for refusing to work with the fertilizer was 2.59 out of

5, based on 547 valid responses.

Figure 28: Likelihood of planters to refuse to work in unsafe terrain

Likelihood of refusing work in unsafe terrain

300 7

Very Likely Neither Very Unlikely

Likely Unlikely

Figure 29: Likelihood of planters to refuse to work with hazardous substances

Likelihood of refusing work with hazardous substances

Very Likely Neither Very Unlikely

Likely Unlikely

Missing 16 Mean 3.97

Missing 26 Mean 2.59

The figures on the previous page illustrate that the difference between these

scores is accounted for by a large number of planters that were very unlikely to refuse to

work in the steep unstable terrain with sliding logs (see Figure 28), compared to a large

number of workers that were very likely to refuse to work with the fertilizer when it is

causing a toxic reaction (see Figure 29).

Workers (both planters and supervisors) were also asked how likely they

believed other planters would be to refuse unsafe work. The average score for the steep

unstable terrain was 3.8, and the average score for the fertilizer was 2.9.34 Generally, the

average scores and the difference between the two scenarios were similar to how likely

planters would be to refuse unsafe work themselves.

Based on the difference in the two scenarios, there appear to be other situational

or conditional factors that influence workers w~llingness to refuse unsafe work, and

workers may have attached a different degree of seriousness to the two scenarios.

While workers generally reported a strong willingness to refuse to work with fertilizers

that cause serious adverse health effects, they appeared reluctant to refuse to work on

an unstable slope where moving debris posed a hazard.

At first this may seem surprising as one might expect workers to be more

responsive to immediate threats to their well being than to long term health hazards and

industrial disease. However, the exposure of planters to toxic substances in !he form of

pesticides and fertilizers has long been a source of grievance for planters, but a low

point of emphasis among employers. It is important to note that injuries associated with

scenarios involving falling debris and unstable slopes are common among recognized

WorkSafeBC claims. However, there is no indication in injury data of successful claims

associated with exposure to hazardous substances (Ellis et al., 2003), and an extreme

34 Frequency statistics illustrating these results are located in Appendix H

case documented in the Georgia Straight ultimately resulted in a rejection of'the worker's

appeal by WorkSafeBC (Findlay, 2005). Thus, the threat associated with one hazard

(working on an unstable slope) represents a significant financial cost to the industry,

while the other (working with hazardous substances) has not yet obtained such a status.

It may be that the immediate threat created by unstable logging debris may simply fall

into the category of hazards that planters have "normalized" as a natural component of

their occupation.

Workers may fail to refuse unsafe work for reasons other than those already

mentioned: two particular reasons seem relevant to the current situation given the

characteristics of the workforce and the conditions of the industry. First, workers may

simply be unaware not only that regulations exist to protect their right to refuse unsafe

work (section 3.12 (1) of the OHSR), but also that these same regulations require that

they do so if they feel there is a substantial risk of death or serious injury. The second

reason is the potential for supervisors and employers to penalize workers that invoke

such a right. Although section 3.13 (1) of the OHSR prohibits employers and supervisors

from taking discriminatory action against workers who exercise their right to refuse

unsafe work, the temporary contract nature of the industry allows employers to simply

blacklist troublesome workers from future hiring opportunities. In industry jargon this is

often referred to as being "Nabbed" (Not Asked Back).

Likelihood of Planters to Report Unsafe Behaviour

Planters were asked how likely they would be to report unsafe behaviour based

on two different scenarios. The first involved a supervisor who is speeding while driving

a loaded crew vehicle to the jobsite, and the second involves a planter that is working

dangerously close to the edge of a high cliff. The answers were given on a scale of 1 to

5. The lower the score, the more likely the planter would be to report the unsafe

behaviour. The average score for how likely a planter would be to report a supervisor

speeding was 2.85 out of 5, based on 556 valid responses (see Figure 30).

Figure 30: Likelihood of planters to report a supervisor for speeding

Likelihood of reporting supervisor for speeding

Very Likely Neither Very Unlikely

Likely Unlikely

Figure 31: Likelihood of planters to report co-worker too close to cliff - - - -- - - -

Likelihood of reporting planter too close to cliff

Likely Unlikely

Missing 17 Mean 2.85

N = 555 Missing 18 Mean 3.81 -

The average score for how likely a planter would be to report another planter

working too close to a cliff was 3.81 out of 5, based on 555 valid responses (see Figure

31). There were very few planters reporting that they would be very likely to report

another planter for working too close to a cliff. This may have been due to the way in

which the scenario was presented in the questionnaire, and many respondents

commented on this particular question. There was a strong indication in the interview

commentary that this type of hazard fits in with other dangers that have been normalized

within the occupation. However, there was an even distribution of answers to how likely

planters would be to report supervisors for speeding (see Figure 31), indicating that

workers indeed may vary greatly in regards to how likely they would be to report unsafe

behaviour.

In an isolated work environment such as the silviculture industry, it is important

for the workers on the front lines to play an active role in observing and reporting unsafe

behaviour so that it can be corrected before it results in serious injuries to members of

the workforce. However, the ability to report unsafe behaviour may vary for workers in

different situations. While workers in large companies may be able to report problems to

a person higher up the company hierarchy, workers in smaller companies may only have

a single supervisorwho also happens to be the company owner. In such situations,

workers may be reluctant to report their supervisor to the next level of authority, which

may be WorkSafeBC.

Workers (both planters and supervisors) were also asked how likely they

believed other ~lanters would be to report unsafe behaviour. The average score for the

supervisor speeding was 2.9 out of 5, and the average score for the planter working too

close to the cliff was 3.9.35 Again, the difference between the two scenarios is similar to

how likely planters would be to report unsafe behaviour themselves.

Finally, workers (both planters and supervisors) were asked how important they

believe it is for planters to report unsafe behaviour. The lower the score, the more

important the worker believed it is for planters to report unsafe behaviour. The average

score for the planter working too close to the cliff was 3.1, and the average score for the

supervisor speeding was 1.9 out of 5.36 The latter figure is interesting because it

indicates that although planters would often be reluctant to report a supervisor for

speeding, they nonetheless feel there it is somewhat important for such acts to be

reported. An examination of a cross tabulation of likelihood to report a supe~~isor for

speeding and the perceived importance of doing so reveals that 17% of all pllanters

would be unlikely or very unlikely to report a supervisor for speeding, but feel that doing

so is either important or very important.37 This indicates that many workers m~ay adopt

hazardous habits that are contrary to their personal beliefs.

An important question that is raised by this issue is what is preventing planters

from reporting unsafe behaviour. A likely possibility is fear of reprisal. Supervisors are in

charge of assigning tasks to planters and distributing the parcels of land to be planted.

The difference between a good parcel of land and a poor parcel of land can have a

substantial impact on how many trees a worker can plant, and how much money they

can make in a day.38 Planters may refrain from reporting supervisors, regardless of the

perceived importance of doing so, in order to avoid receiving unfavourable treatment.

Furthermore, in a manner similar to the process of being "Nabbed", it would be very

35 Frequency statistics illustrating these results are located in Appendix I 36 Frequency statistics for these results are located in Appendix I 37 A complete summary of these statistics is located in Appendix J, Figure 43. Results were significant at the .O1 level of probability. 38 There are many other forms of influence that supervisors can hold over planter that are similar. The example mentioned simply portrays the most obvious and common illustration of this dynamic

difficult verify such discriminatory actions in order to for workers to seek protection under

3.13 (1 ) of the 0HSR.39

The unwillingness of planters to report unsafe work appears to be a serious

problem in the industry. Overall, the responses for questions regarding this issue

indicated reluctance on the part of respondents to involve themselves with the activities

of others. This tolerance of dangerous behaviour appears to characterize the workforce.

Instead of adhering to the regulations that require workers to report such behaviour,

individuals seem more likely to allow others to navigate the hazards of the workplace on

the basis of their own competence. Additional support for this position is found in the

data depicting the likelihood of supervisors to correct planters for unsafe betraviour. The

average score for the index representing this tendency was 18.9 out of 35 (see Figure

25). In general, very few supervisors indicated that they are very likely to correct planters

for engaging in unsafe behaviour, despite the duty to do so according to the OHSR. This

failure may be either a result of limited knowledge of the regulations or a further

manifestation of an occupational culture in which moderation and personal competence

are deemed to better guidelines than the stated regulations of the workplace.

Health and Safety Performance Based on Type of Worksite

An important concern for the industry is whether there are any differences in the

level of health and safety performance based on the type of worksite involved. The

performance of camp-based planters was compared with those working from hotel or

commuter contracts, and a number of significant differences were observed. A set oft-

tests (see Figure 32) were conducted, and camp based workers were observed to be

39 As mentioned earlier, the OHSR prohibits employers from taking discriminatory action against workers that exercise their rights under the regulations.

109

both slightly more likely to engage in unsafe behaviour, and slightly more likely to expect

other planters to engage in unsafe behaviour.

The average score for camp-based planters on the general index of engaging in

unsafe behaviour was 24.93 on a scale from 7 to 35, compared to an average score of

26.91 for commuting and hotel-based workers.40 This yields a mean difference of 1 .98,41

indicating that camp-based workers appear to be slightly more likely to engage in

unsafe behaviour. The average score for camp-based planters on the general index of

how likely they expected other planters to be to engage in unsafe behaviour was 20.67,42

compared to an average of 23.05 among other planters. This yields a mean difference of

2.38, meaning that camp-based planters are also more likely to expect other planters to

engage in unsafe behaviour.

Figure 32: Planter health and safety performance by worksite43

Group Statistics

The comparison of different worksites is of particular concern due to the isolation

Type of operation Likelihood to Camp engage in unsafe behaviour Hotel or Commuter

Expectation of Camp unsafe behaviour Hotel or Commuter by planters

of many camp-based operations, and their relative access to medical aid and other

facilities. Employers and supervisors should therefore take special care to ensure that

N 400

148

461

169

effective compliance assurance programs are implemented in their camp-based

40

41 The lower the score, the higher the likelihood for unsafe behaviour. This difference is significant at the .O1 level of probability.

42

43 This difference is significant at the .O1 level of probability. Complete statistics are located in Appendix J. Figure 44.

Mean

24.93

26.91

20.67

23.05

Std. Deviation

5.191

4.218

4.987

4.506

Std. Error

.232

operations in order to ensure that workers in these locations do not adopt an "out-of-

sight, out-of-mind" approach to health and safety.

Differences in Attitudes Between Planters and Supervisors

The attitudes and expectations of planters and supervisors were compared to

determine the presence of any significant gaps between the strata of the workforce.

Bearing in mind the importance placed on penetrating all levels of the workforce when

attempting to reform health and safety practices, it was important to determine if there

were gaps between the levels that need to be bridged. Observations were made in

regard to four issues where planters and supervisors appeared to differ.

First, there is a significant difference between planters and supervisors in regard

to how likely they believe planters are to engage in unsafe behaviour in general.

Supervisors exhibited an average score of 23.01 for the index indicating how likely they

thought planters would be to engage in unsafe behaviour. Planters meanwhile exhibited

an average score of 21.04 for the same measure. There was a significant difference of

1.97 (on a scale from 7 to 35) between the two groups.44 Planters are somewhat more

likely than supervisors to expect other planters to engage in unsafe behaviour. The

difference between the scores suggests that planters may be more likely than

supervisors to observe health and safety infractions by their fellow planters. This raises

the questions as to whether or not supervisors are aware of all the health and safety

issues under their supervision.

44 This difference is significant at the .O1 level of probability.

111

Figure 33: Difference in expectations of planters to be unsafe45

Group Statistics

Second, there is a difference between planters and supervisors regarding how

important they believe it is to correct unsafe behaviour. Planters exhibited an average

score of 20.32 for the index indicating how important they feel it is to correct unsafe

behaviour in general. Supervisors, meanwhile, exhibited an average score of 16.84 for

the same score, resulting in a mean difference of 3.48 (on a scale of 7 to 3 5 : ~ ~ ~ This

means that supervisors attach more importance to correcting unsafe behaviour than

planters do.47 This difference suggests that supervisors and employers may need to do a

better job of communicating the importance of avoiding unsafe behaviour to planters,

Position Expectation of Planter unsafe behaviour by planters Supervisor

and explain why correcting such behaviours is an integral component in ensuring a safe

workplace.

N

546

84

Figure 34: Difference in attitudes towards importance of correcting planters48

Mean

21 .04

23.01

45 Complete statistics are located in Appendix J, Figure 48. 46 This difference is significant at the .O1 level of probability. 47 The lower the score, the more importance is attached to correcting unsafe behaviour. 48 Complete statistics are located in Appendix J, Figure 45.

Group Statistics

Std. Deviation

4.946

4.833

Position Importance for Planter supervisors to correct planters Supervisor

Std. Error

N

53'1

8 1

Mean 20.32

16.84

Std. Deviation 5.007

5.026

Std. Error

Third, there is a substantial difference between supervisors and planters

regarding how likely they think it is for planters to be corrected for engaging in unsafe

behaviour in general. Planters exhibited an average score of 23.19 (on a scale from 7 to

35) for the index indicating how likely they would be to correct unsafe behaviour by a

planter. Supervisors, meanwhile, exhibited an average score of 18.90 for how likely they

felt supervisors would be to correct unsafe planters. This yields a mean difference of

4.29,49 meaning that supervisors report they are substantially more likely to correct

planters for unsafe behaviour than planters themselves may expect.

This difference in scores suggests several possibilities. First, supervisors may

not be adequately following through on their stated intentions to correct unsafe

behaviour that they witness in the workplace. Secondly, supervisors may not be doing

an adequate job of informing planters that such unsafe behaviour will be corrected.

Third, if supervisors are unaware of a large number of infractions (as suggested earlier),

they may be incorrectly estimating the amount of unsafe behaviour that they are actually

correcting. Whichever the case may be, there appears to be a gap between planters and

supervisors in regard to how they expect unsafe behaviour will be responded to in the

workplace. In order to implement effective compliance assurance programs in the

industry, it is important for supervisors and employers to effectively communicate to

workers the way in which unsafe behaviour will be treated, and for supervisory personnel

to follow through on such mandates.

49 This difference is significant at the .O1 level of probability.

113

Figure 35: Difference in expectations of planters to be corrected9

Group Statistics

Fourth, there are differences between planters and supervisors in regard to how

Position Likelihood of Planter supervisors to correct planters Supervisor

important they feel it is for planters to report unsafe behaviour. Examining the two

scenarios dealing with reporting unsafe behaviour, it was found that supervisors felt it

N

537

82

was more important to report the behaviour than the planters did in both cases. Mean

differences of 0.51 and 0.76 (on scales of 1 to 5) were observed for reporting planters

working too close to cliffs and supervisors speeding, re~pectively.~' This implies that

Mean

23.19

18.90

supervisors and employers may need to better inform planters of their to report

unsafe behaviour and to communicate the message that ensuring health and safety is a

Std. Deviation

5.194

5.372

shared responsibility in the workplace for all parties, not just supervisors.

Std. Error

Figure 36: Difference in attitudes towards importance of reporting unsafe behavioursz

50 Complete statistics are located in Appendix J, Figure 46. 51 Both of these differences were significant at the .O1 level of probability. 52 Complete statistics are located in Appendix J, Figure 4'7.

1 I 4

Group Statistics

Position Importance of reporting Planter planter close to cliff Supervisor

Importance of reporting Planter supervisor speeding Supervisor

N 553

87

554

87

Std. Error

,106

Mean 3.24

2.48

1.98

1.47

Std. Deviation

1.327

1.256

1.142

.986

Research Question Four

Is there a strong relationship between individual choices and perce~tions ofgroup

behaviour that corresponds with the influence of a powerful occupational culture?

One of the central relationships investigated in this thesis is between the

likelihood of workers to engage in unsafe behaviour, and how likely they believe others

are to engage in unsafe behaviour. In other words, are workers likely to make

independent choices and engage in safe work practices, even though they see others

acting differently? Or are workers more likely to follow suit with what they believe others

are doing around them?

Figure 37: Correlation of behaviours and perceptions among planters

The data indicated that there is a moderate relationship amonq planters in this

Correlations

regard. The data exhibited an r-value of .604 for the relationship between how likely

Likelihood of engaging Pearson Correlation in unsafe behaviour Sig. (2-tailed)

N Expectation of other Pearson Correlation planters to be unsafe Sig. (2-tailed)

N

workers are to engage in unsafe behaviour and how likely they believe others are to

engage in unsafe behaviour. The positive value of the score indicates that the more

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Self Likely Index

1

548

.604**

.OOO 545

likely workers believe others are to engage in unsafe behaviour, the more likely they are

to engage in the same unsafe behaviours themselves. In more precise terms, this

Others Likely Index

.604*'

.OOO 545

1

630

means that approximately 36% of the variation in scores for these general measures of

health and safety performance is accounted for by the relationship between the

variables. Each individual question that formed the general indexes used in this

correlation was examined in order to determine whether or not there are any specific

unsafe behaviours that are more strongly related to perceptions of others. However, the

range of correlations were all within the moderate to weak range, indicating that the

general relationship between decisions to engage in unsafe behaviour and perceptions

of others is a relatively consistent trend throughout the individual scenarios that were

presented in the questionnaires.

The significance of these statistics is that there may be a moderate relationship

between planters' likelihood of engaging in unsafe behaviour and their perceptions of

others. However, the relationship is not strong enough to accurately account for more

than a third of the variance in the scores in the workforce. Therefore, it is likely that many

planters engage in unsafe behaviour, regardless of how likely they believe others are to

do the same thing. However, on the flip side, this also means that workers may avoid

unsafe behaviour even though they believe others are unlikely to do the same.

The relationship between individual choices and perceptions of other!; was

somewhat stronger when it came to refusing unsafe work and reporting unsafe work by

other workers. The r-values for the relationships observed for these issues ranged from

.669 to .733.53 In turn, this means that between 45% and 54% of the variance in the

likelihood of workers to refuse or report unsafe work could be accounted for by their

perceptions of how likely they believed other workers would be to do the same. Based

on these observations, there is moderate support for the belief that planter behaviour is

53 Complete statistics for likelihood of refusing unsafe work and expectations of others are contained in Figure 41 in Appendix J. Complete statistics for likelihood of reporting unsafe work and expectations of others are contained in Figure 42 in Appendix J

subject to the influence of the occupational culture. However, it appears that if the

occupational culture does indeed exert an influence on planter behaviour, it affects

certain behaviours more than others.

The pattern of perceptions and behaviours among supervisors, however, is

another story, and a separate set of calculations were made in their regard.

Figure 38: Correlation of behaviours and perceptions among supervisors

t*

Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Correlations

The relationship between the likelihood of supervisors to engage in unsafe

behaviour and their perceptions of other supervisors was far more profound than the

relationship observed among planters. The r-value for this relationship was .851,

meaning that 72% of the variance in how likely supervisors would be to engage in

unsafe behaviour could be accounted for by the relationship with how likely they thought

other supervisors would be to do the same (see Figure 38). In plain terms, the more

likely that supervisors thought other supervisors would be to engage in unsafe

behaviour, the more likely they were to do the same themselves. Perhaps, as more

senior members of the industry and those who spend the greatest amount of time

immersed in it, supervisors are more strongly influenced by the culture of the occupation.

Therefore, it is important for supervisors to set positive examples of appropriate health

Likelihood of Pearson Correlation supervisors to be Sig. (2-tailed) unsafe N Expectation of other Pearson Correlation supervisors to be Sig. (2-tailed) unsafe

N

Likelihood of supervisors to be

unsafe 1

84 .851**

.ooo

84

Expectation of other

620

and safety performance in order to encourage others to do the same and improve the

state of compliance among supervisors in the industry.

Research Question Five

Given the vulnerability of younq workers, is age or experience a siqnificant risk factor for

health and safety performance?

The relationship between age and compliance is of particular importance for the

industry, due to the large number of young workers that participate in tree planting.

Questions have been raised whether workers enter the industry and learn to be

compliant with the rules of the workplace as they gain experience, or if workers enter the

industry and gradually adopt non-compliant patterns of behaviour. The answer to this

question may in fact involve a mixture of these influences, depending upon the

behaviours in question. However, by using the data acquired in this research, any

obvious trends should become apparent.

As indicated earlier, 45% of all workers in the industry are 24 years of age or

younger, and approximately 19% are 21 years of age or younger. In order to investigate

the relationship between age and health and safety performance, two different standards

of age were used. The first involved using the full spectrum of age as a continuum

ranging from the youngest workers to the oldest workers. The full spectrum of age was

also correlated with numerous variables (such as the general measures defined earlier

in this thesis) to determine the presence of any significant relationships. The second

method of examining age involved dividing workers into those that are older than 24

years of age and those that are 24 or younger. The age of 24 was chosen as it is a

division point used in previous research, and it represents an age at which most workers

have less than the industry average of 6 years of experience. It also happens to

approximate the median age among planters, thus producing two groups of similar size

and increasing the ability to make statistical comparisons between them. A series of

independent sample t-tests were conducted to investigate the presence of any

significant differences between workers (over and under 24) on the same variables.

The first step in investigating the role of age was to use the full spectrum of age.

The data indicates the presence of a weak positive relationship between age and

likelihood of engaging in unsafe behaviour in general. (r=.171) (see Figure 39). This

suggests that younger workers may be very slinhtly more likely to engage in unsafe

behaviour. This follows the principle that the lower the score on the "Self Likely" index,

the more likely the planter was to engage in unsafe behaviour. However, at 0.1 71, the

relationship is so weak that there does not appear to be any substantial relationship

between age and likelihood of engaging in unsafe behaviour based on this calculation.

Figure 39: Correlation of age and unsafe behaviour among planters

Correlations

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Likelihood of Pearson Correlation planters to be Sig. (2-tailed) unsafe N Age of workers Pearson Correlation

Sig. (2-tailed) N

Each individual scenario involving unsafe behaviour was examined in addition to

the general measure of engaging in unsafe behaviour, and again no substantial

differences were noted. There were also no relationships noted between age and

refusing or reporting unsafe work.

Self Likely Age of Index workers

1

548 .171**

.OOO 54 1 653

Although using the full spectrum of age did not reveal any substantial

relationships, dividing the workforce between those over and under the age of 24 in the

t-test analysis yielded slightly different findings. There was a tendency for workers under .

24 years of age to be slightly more likely to engage in certain unsafe behaviours. These

included failing to wear caulked (spiked) safety boots in steep terrain, failing to wear

protective gloves when working with pesticides, and failing to wash hands before

entering a common eating area. Although differences on 3 measures were statistically

significant, the sizes of the differences were limited.54 Based on this angle of analysis, it

appears that younger workers may be slightly more at risk only for certain unsafe

behaviours.

Despite the absence of an obvious unitary pattern within the data, the role of age

in workplace health and safety should not be dismissed. Young workers form a large

part of the workforce, and that part may be growing. Therefore, even the slightest

relationship between age and compliance should encourage employers to do everything

necessary to confirm that their young workers are receiving the training, guidance, and

supervision necessary to ensure their safe participation in the workplace. The

discrepancy in scores for certain behaviours among workers under the age of 24

indicates that immediate education is necessary for planters as soon as they enter the

workforce, in order to ensure they are not at risk for hazards they may not fully

understand.

Workers were also examined based on their level of experience in order to

determine whether there are any substantial relationships between experience and

health and safety performance. There were no substantial relationships between

54 Differences of 0.63, 0.42, and 0.34 were observed on average scores out of 5 for the likelihood to engage in 3 different unsafe behaviours. A full summary of these results in contained in Appendix J, Figure 49 and Figure 50.

compliance and level of experience, nor was there any difference in compliance between

workers with more or less than 2 years of experience. Overall, there is no support for

claims that less experienced workers are more likely to engage in unsafe behaviour. If

anything, these findings advocate a consistent program of compliance assurance that

pays equal attention to all segments of the workforce. Companies with predominantly

more experienced workers should not make immediate assumptions that their planters

have safer work habits than their less experienced counterparts.

Chapter Five: Discussion

The discussion section of this thesis is divided into two general areas that deal

with the final two research questions. The first part provides a response to the data in

the form of immediate recommendations to the industry about ways to improve health

and safety performance. Specifically, the recommendations are aimed at employers and

program developers responsible for the training, education, and management of the

workforce. The second part of the discussion looks at the bigger picture of health and

safety regulation in the industry and examines some of the issues that need to be

considered when putting the recommendations into action and integrating them within

the evolving regulatory framework and the structural confines of the industry.

Research Question Six

What immediate recommendations can be made in reqard to occu~ational health and

safetv practices in the industrv?

Several recommendations were made earlier in this thesis as the data were

presented. However, some of these points have been restated in this section in order to

provide a "top eleven55" list of recommendations for health and safety program

development. These particular program recommendations form the core of what is

believed to be important for improving health and safety in the industry on the front lines.

These recommendations are not task-specific statements, such as warning ernployers

that workers may not be wearing their seatbelts or using proper personal protective

55 Admittedly, 10 would be a nice round number, but all of the recommendations were important enough to include.

equipment. Instead, it is assumed that the specific set of task-related scenarios and

behaviours examined in this study are representative of health and safety compliance in

general. Thus, the recommendations are aimed at more general issues of health and

safety program development with a goal of helping members of the industry achieve and

ensure compliance, regardless of the scenario or circumstances they may encounter.

Top Eleven Health and Safety Program Recommendations

(1) Employers and supervisors should take increased measures to ensure that

workers feel free to refuse unsafe work and report unsafe behaviour by other workers.

Due to the influence of the occupational culture, it is also important for workers to

perceive that such refusals are likely to be made by other workers. Workers need to be

aware that certain conditions are too hazardous to endure so that they do not become

adjusted to inappropriate levels of risk and normalize the dangers in their workplace.

Citing examples of situations where members of the crew have refused unsafe work or

reported unsafe work by others may be useful in encouraging other workers to do the

same in future situations.

(2) It is important for supervisors to set positive examples for each other in regard to

health and safety performance in the workplace. Employers and program-developers

need to be aware that supervisors (even more so than planters) have a tendency to

make choices that are consistent with their perceptions of others. The data indicate that

supervisors who perceive other supervisors to be behaving in an unsafe manner are

more likely to behave in an unsafe manner themselves. Examples of supervisors acting

in accordance with health and safety regulations should be recognized and possibly

even publicized in order to encourage others to do the same and improve the state of

compliance among supervisors in the industry. As leaders in the industry supervisors set

an important example not only for the workers, but also for each other.

(3) Employers and supervisors need to ensure that they are doing an adequate job

of monitoring the workers for whom they are responsible. Data indicate that planters

expect more non-compliant behaviour by other planters than supervisors do, and that

considerable risky behaviour among planters may be going undetected. Furthermore,

only half of all planters reported being checked for compliance with health and safety

requirements at any point during their working season. Although such monitoring may

occur without planters being aware of it, there is still a potential problem associated with

allowing workers to believe that their work practices are not subject to review. Due

diligence requires that supervisors and employers take whatever steps are reasonably

necessary to fulfill their duty of ensuring workers under their supervision comply with the

OHSR. This should include checking on workers to ensure compliance with rlecessary

regulations, and also taking appropriate corrective measures when necessary. More

consistency in correcting problems within companies and between companies would be

helpful in improving the performance of an industry where turnover is high and workers

frequently move between crews and companies.

(4) Supervisors and employers need to do a better job of communicating the

importance of avoiding unsafe behaviour to planters, and explain why correcting such

behaviours is an integral component in ensuring a safe workplace. Data indicate that

supervisors attach more importance to correcting unsafe behaviour than planters do,

and there is a gap in the workforce strata in regard to refusing unsafe work conditions.

Developing methods of improving the workforce's understanding of the hazards and

risks of the workplace would be helpful in this regard, and it is important for supervisors

to establish clear lines of communication so that they can make their expectations clear.

However, establishing these lines of communication will require all workplace parties

(including employers, supervisors, and planters) to take time out of their day to discuss

health and safety issues. This demand can be difficult to accommodate in a workplace

where production is a shared incentive among the respective parties, and there is no

immediate monetary benefit for spending working hours dealing with issues such as

health and safety. All workplace parties must be brought to acknowledge the need to

reserve time for discussing such issues, and employers may have to provide some

additional incentives for their commission-based workers to devote time towards

activities not directly related to earning their commissions.

(5) It is important for supervisors and employers to effectively communicate to

workers the way in which unsafe behaviour will be treated, and for supervisory personnel

to follow through on such mandates. Data indicate that supervisors are substantially

more likely to correct planters for unsafe behaviour than planters themselves may

expect. Thus, there appears to be a gap between planters and supervisors in regard to

how they expect unsafe behaviour will be responded to in the workplace. In a fashion

similar to the fourth recommendation, there must be improved communicatiori within the

workplace, and time provided to ensure that higher standards of behaviour are expected.

Employers and supervisors cannot simply promise consequences for unsafe behaviour,

they must also follow through on them. However, they must do so in a fair and consistent

manner. The literature indicated that any sweeping health and safety reform initiative

must penetrate all levels of the workforce on a cultural level. Employers therefore cannot

afford to alienate their workers from the goals of new initiatives. Failure to obtain

cooperation from workers on improving standards of safe behaviour may result in

resistance from the workforce and the creation of obstacles to altering the dysfunctional

aspects of the culture. Freedom from strict supervision is a characteristic of the job that

appears to draw many workers to the industry, and employers need to be aware that

there may be some amount of natural resistance to new standards of discipline.

Therefore, workers should be consulted in determining what appropriate penalties

should be for non-compliance so that values of fairness and respect can be preserved.

(6) Problems with health and safety should not be wholly attributed to younger or

less experienced workers and their particular attitudes and behaviours. Although

younger workers appear to be slightly more likely to engage in certain unsafe

behaviours, age is not a universal risk factor for unsafe behaviour in the workplace.

However, it should be recognized that younger workers do require appropriate training

and need to be provided with the information necessary for navigating their workplace in

a safe and healthy manner. This includes informing them of their rights and duties

according to the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation. Many young workers may

have never worked outside the home before, and may not be familiar with the physical or

legal features of their new work environment. Considering how large a segment of the

workforce they constitute, any substantial change will likely rely upon effective training

and education of future workforce cohorts. The data indicate that the workforce may be

younger than previously believed. Furthermore, recent ecological developmer~ts may

create additional pressure on the industry to expand its workforce, and any large-scale

recruitment effort would likely involve an additional injection of youth into the industry. A

large portion of the province's pine forests has been affected by a mountain pine beetle

epidemic, and massive operations are being undertaken to remove affected timber from

the forests before it loses its market value (Province of British Columbia, 2005). This

increased deforestation will likely result in an increased amount of replanting operations,

and both the provincial and federal governments have committed to supplying increased

funding to reforestation efforts to ensure the long term sustainability of the forestry

industry. Therefore, the industry should be prepared to provide proper education and

training to the people most likely to supplement the ranks of the existing

(7) Employers running camp-based operations need to ensure that they are

committing sufficient energy and resources to compliance assurance programs within

their workplaces. The performance levels of camp-based workers are significantly lower

than those of their motel and commuter-based counterparts. Considering the isolation of

such workplaces and the risks posed by the frequent difficulty of reaching medical aid,

improved performance is a desirable goal. Employers should be able to capitalize on the

ability to bring the crew together for regular meetings in the camp environment. Such

opportunities are less frequent in hotel and commuter-based worksites where workers

go their separate ways at the end of the working day.

(8) Greater consistency in health and safety practices throughout the industry should

be sought in order to assist companies in integrating new workers. This is especially

important in light of the high rates of employee turnover that are apparent. Although this

research did not specifically focus on the individual practices of each operation, a great

range in practice was generally observed. With approximately one third of the workforce

reporting to be in their first year with their company, substantial time and resources could

be conserved if health and safety practices were consistent between workplaces. This

would require information sharing by competing operators, and agreement on best

operating procedures.

56 Some parties believe that the current workforce will be able to accommodate such an increase in planting if more effective scheduling is implemented to optimize planting capacity. However, until the amount of the increase in work is actually known, this issue will remain unresolved.

Having a more uniform state of health and safety practices throughout the

industry in terms of communication, training, and correction of unsafe behaviour would

also assist employers in ensuring the compliance of their workers and avoid confusion

among workers in regard to what is acceptable in any particular location or operation.

However, it may be perceived that the development of standard programs would

clash with the deregulatory goal of allowing employers to make decisions that fit the

unique needs of their own workplaces. While flexibility in achieving performance

standards may be appropriate for requirements such as equipment preparation and

worksite hazard assessment, it may be inappropriate for the training and education of

workers. In fact, certification or licensing of workers may be a more appropriate method

of ensuring health and safety in the industry than leaving such matters in the hands of

individual employers. Such an approach does not have to be incompatible with the

ultimate goals of deregulation if successful completion of the certain programs

corresponds with less stringent and less frequent ongoing intervention by the regulating

agency. Furthermore, less time may be required for workplace orientations if all workers

share the same standard of education and training. Thus, by agreeing on universal

standards, employers could make better use of the resources required for ensuring

compliance in their workplaces, while reducing the need for state intervention.

(9) Both employers and program developers must be aware of the diversity of the

workforce and ensure that certain groups do not fall through the cracks. For employers,

it is important to ensure that all workers have an adequate grasp of the language to fully

understand the rules and policies that govern their workplace. If warranted, employers

should ensure that necessary information is available in a number of different languages.

Program developers (as well as regulating bodies) also need to make sure that certain

portions of the workforce are not left out of their reform efforts. Concern aboul any

section of the workforce or any particular company should be followed by an effort to

ensure that the workers are being supplied with adequate training and information, and

that they receive the same benefit of attention and inspection as the rest of the

workforce. This may require some ambassadorial activities to open communication

pathways with these workers, and ensure that they feel comfortable exercising their

rights and duties according to the regulations.

(10) Employers should ensure that workers have an appropriate standard of

knowledge of the OHS regulations. This ties directly into the previous recommendation.

A lack of regulatory knowledge may be an important contributing factor to issues of non-

compliance. The success of any effort aimed at improving health and safety

performance requires penetration of all levels of the workplace. Planters and supervisors

need to be aware of their specific duties so that they can fulfill their roles appropriately. It

may also be useful to educate the workforce about injury trends throughout the industry

so they can better understand the importance of specific regulations.

(1 1) Employers should do a more thorough job of investigating and recording

accidents and injuries. A historical lack of information regarding the reasons for and

conditions surrounding injuries has contributed to the lack of knowledge concerning the

problems in health and safety in the industry today (Ellis et al., 2003). Employers and

supervisors need to understand the importance of proper record keeping and the value

of including accurate detailed information in the forms they submit to WorkSafeBC. Such

information may also be valuable in developing a better understanding of the relationship

between workplace injuries and violation of the regulations.

Research Question Seven

Given what we know of the industrv and the occupational culture, how might

occupational health and safety reform best be pursued in the industrv?

Thus far, this thesis has explored the nature of the tree planting industry and its

workforce, examined the state of OHS in the industry, and made a series of

recommendations regarding ways of improving health and safety performance in the

workplace. The activities of workers and supervisors have been examined, and a set of

recommendations has been made for the employers and the program developers of the

industry.57 The final issue to be examined is how to develop the regulatory friamework,

given the conditions of the tree planting industry and the direction of current regulatory

changes. The development of the BCFSC signifies an increased level of private sector

involvement in the control of occupational health and safety in forestry, and the agency

has explicitly stated its intention to be an active participant in regulatory change. Section

2(c) of the BCFSC constitution and bylaws states that one of the main purposes of the

council is:

To advocate and promote to applicable government ministries and agencies for changes in the legislative and regulatory framework in the British Columbia forest sector designed to enhance the health and safety of forest workers. (The British Columbia Forest Safety Coimcil: Constitution and Bylaws, 2006)

The BCFSC board of directors is composed of 14 positions, only one of which

represents the silviculture industry. The other directors include individuals from various

employers and business groups in the harvesting industry, one staff member from

WorkSafeBC, and one member of the Steelworkers Union-IWA, which represents the

57 Many of the employers, are in fact responsible for the development of health and safety programs for the industry.

interests of harvesting worker^.^' Collectively, it is up to these representatives to

determine the direction of the BCFSC and the nature of the changes in regulation that

the agency will advocate and promote. An important consideration in the following

discussion is that the BC Safe Silviculture prqject is only a small part of the BCFSC, and

whatever direction the harvesting sector assumes will directly affect the state of

regulation in silviculture and tree planting.

The development of the BCFSC and the shift towards performance-based

regulations by WorkSafeBC represents an important transformation in the way health

and safety is practiced in the industry. Through the BC Safe Silviculture Project of the

BCFSC, the tree planting industry (along with the rest of silviculture) is already moving

towards the development of programs for all members of their industry to help them

achieve desirable levels of performance, including a supervisor certification program that

is expected to address several of the issues identified in this thesis. Tree planting

employers are being presented with a crucial opportunity to take matters into their own

hands and fix the problems that they have had a hand in creating. If the BCFSC is to

fulfill the role of legitimate self-regulation of health and safety in forestry, a number of

challenges will have to be overcome.

Creating a self-regulating agency will involve significant alterations to the former

pattern of accountability for health and safety compliance. The BCFSC (if it evolves into

such a role) will play a key role in moderating the relationships between workers,

employers, and the forestry companies that put the contracts out to tender. New lines of

accountability will be drawn between the various parties involved in ensuring compliance

in the industry (see Figure 40) If the former pattern of accountability has turned out to be

insufficient, the most promising method of ensuring the success of new programs may

5 8 ~ r e e planters and other silviculture workers lack a union to represent their interest in the council. This point will be discussed later.

be to tie them into the market structure of the industry by ensuring that contractors meet

certain standards and are evaluated according to their health and safety performance

while bidding on contracts. Some forestry companies, and the BC Ministry of Forests,

already include health and safety in the bidding process. However, the practice is not

consistent throughout the industry, and the process is not tied to any regulatory structure

or external standard of performance. Fully integrating health and safety regulation into

the market of the industry would require formal recognition of several new vertical lines

of accountability in the industry.

Figure 40: Accountability flow chart

State Agency

WorkSafeBC

4-1 Forestry

Self- ( Companies

regulating Agency

(BCFSC)

Workers

Supervisors

I Planters

While the horizontal lines in Figure 40 illustrate the positions of WorksafeBC and

the BCFSC in the evolving regulatory environment, the vertical lines illustrate the chain

of responsibility that ties workers, employers, and forestry companies together in

maintaining the balance of rights and duties assigned to the various parties involved in

the workplace. Workers would continue to be responsible to their employers to follow the

rules set out by the regulating bodies and the employers themselves. Employers, in turn,

would be responsible for maintaining a level of health and safety performance set out by

the regulating bodies and stipulated in the contract between the employers and the

forestry companies. The forestry companies would be responsible for ensuring that the

contractors they hire adhere to the conditions of these contracts. However, this

uppermost link in the pattern of accountability will be only be strengthened if the forestry

companies maintain their responsibility by refusing to hire contractors that do not

measure up to the standards set out by the BCFSC.

The lines of accountability between forestry companies and contractors are

crucial in ensuring implementation of programs and successful reform in the new

system. Integrating health and safety demands with the market forces can affect the way

in which contractors submit their bids, by ensuring that they provide enough room in their

budget to accommodate the time and resources required for proper health and safety

practices. However, the willingness of the forestry companies to participate in this

arrangement may hinge upon the success of WorkSafeBC in upholding recent

assertions that the forestry companies do indeed posses employer responsibilities for

the employees of the contractors they hire. These responsibilities have been illustrated

in Figure 40 by a white arrow, as it may form the lynchpin for holding the entire system

together. WorksafeBC's assertions represent a significant shift in attitude, and a

departure from previous strategies that WorkSafeBC itself has recognized as insufficient.

WCB enforcement activities have tended to address the obligations and defaults of individual independent contractors and sub-contractors and have tended not to address the role of land owners and large tenure holders and prime contractors in ensuring the occupational health and safety of workers in forestry operations. (WorkSafeBC, 2005b)

However, in the wake of recent deaths in the harvesting sector, WorksafeBC has

publicly declared its intent to ensure that forestry companies fulfill their roles as "prime

contractors" in an industry characterized by multiple levels of employment and

accountability (Hamilton, 2005). Such a designation would recognize the ability of

forestry companies to control the areas in which their contracts occur and affect the

health and safety of all workers and employers in that area (WorkSafeBC, 2005b). This

designation would require forestry companies to become more involved in the

assessment of hazards and the assurance of compliance by all parties within their

jurisdiction (WorkSafeBC, 2005b). It would encourage forestry companies to ensure that

the contractors they hire abide by the standards put forth by WorkSafeBC, and

potentially the BCFSC. However, according to the vice-president of WorkSafeBC,

establishing this line of accountability is likely to encounter legal challenges from the

forestry companies who may be reluctant to assume this level of responsibility (Roberta

Ellis in Hamilton, 2005). The BCFSC Silviculture Advisory Committee has recognized

that this decision will be a crucial factor in the success of the BC Safe Silviculture

Project. It will be very difficult to encourage participation from silviculture contractors that

have not already endorsed the project if the companies in charge of awarding contracts

do not provide an incentive for the contractors to improve their level of health and safety

performance by structuring the bidding process in a manner that recognizes the

standards and programs developed by the BCFSC.

Even if WorkSafeBC is successful in establishing the responsibility of forestry

companies as prime contractors, there are other challenges to reforming the tree

planting industry, including the potential for forestry companies and contractors to pass

increased health and safety demands down to the workers. While the goals of

deregulation include facilitating less costly methods of reaching desired goals, there may

be an initial expenditure required for contractors to adapt their operations to meet the

stated levels of performance. This expenditure will likely vary depending upon how close

the contractor already is to the stated goals. If the expenses required for the time and

resources necessary for health and safety reform are passed down to the workers in the

tree planting industry in the form of reduced tree prices, it is likely that the workforce will

be unreceptive to new programs and the adaptive nature of the occupational culture will

respond to regulatory changes in a potentially uncooperative manner. During the

interviews that accompanied the questionnaires, workers frequently complained that tree

prices have been falling steadily for several years, and they feel pressured to work

harder and take more chances due to reduced prices for the trees they plant. If workers

feel that they are bearing the brunt of new regulatory demands, they may no1 endorse

the values that are promoted through the new regulatory framework. Thus, there is an

inherent economic issue in reforming health and safety that will have to be dealt with by

the industry. However, if performance-based regulations really do offer the superior

efficiency and flexibility that their supporters espouse, it may be possible to achieve

positive change without incurring problematic expenses.

Another problem may emerge if forestry companies fail to hold contractors up to

high enough standards once a contract is awarded, or if individual contractors

undermine the good will of others by taking contracts at prices that are below a level that

can provide a profit for both workers and employers and fail to devote sufficient

resources to health and safety in the field. Prevention of such failures will require an

appropriate system of auditing and inspection, a role that WorkSafeBC has traditionally

fulfilled to only a limited degree in the tree planting industry. While WorkSafeBC will

likely continue to play some role in enforcement and monitoring, the BCFSC will still

need to develop an appropriate auditing progratn to ensure that the standards they

develop for the industry are upheld in the field. Maintaining compliance with health and

safety regulations requires employers to devote considerable time and money,

regardless of the regulatory framework they operate under. However, making these

resources available can be challenging when production is an imperative for success,

and contracts are obtained on a competitive basis. The difference between winning and

losing a contract in the tree planting industry is often measured by a fraction of a penny

per tree, and contractors are under extreme pressure to fit all of their operating costs

within their budgets. Pursuing reform under such pressure will not be easy and the

BCFSC will have to work hard to either gain support from, or force the hand of, all

employers.

Auditing processes should be designed in a manner that maintains cooperative

relationships between employers and inspectors, but not at the cost of failing to punish

those that clearly violate the rules. Recruiting appropriate expertise from the industry

itself will likely be an appropriate starting point in developing the agency's ability to work

with the employers towards safe and healthy solutions. Braithwaite and Makai noted that

such recruitment practices are an important component of developing productive

relationships that result in improved compliance (Braithwaite & Makkai, 1992). With the

high number of college and university graduates that have been observed in the

industry, it should not be difficult to identify individuals with sufficient education and

knowledge of industry to develop a competent auditing body. The content of the auditing

process should also be designed to pay close attention to patterns of commuriication in

the workplace, and the acknowledgement of duties and obligations by all members of

the workforce.

While the focus of this thesis has not been on deterrence or the types of

penalties best suited for ensuring compliance, observations of deregulation in other

environments indicate that this aspect of regulation cannot be neglected when industries

move into new regulatory arrangements. Indeed, it has been noted that a policy of

vigorous enforcement and deregulation are not incompatible mandates, but rather that

the former is vital to the success of the latter. In their review of international practices of

deregulation in environmental management, the Executive Resource Group advised the

Ontario government that, "A credible threat to use enforcement is part of the

government's bargaining power to make voluntary initiatives work." (Executive Resource

Group, 2000:8). WorkSafeBC has adequate tools at its disposal in the form of

administrative monetary penalties that can exceed $500,000 and the ability to prosecute

offenders under the Workers' Compensation Act. WorkSafeBC should be aware of

impending changes in the industry and potential increases in the amountof work in the

forests of British Columbia, and be prepared to increase their enforcement activities in a

corresponding manner if the need for such activities should emerge.

Therefore, it is important that WorksafeBC retains its ability to fulfill thrs role and

not wholly delegate the task of correcting non-compliant companies to the private sector.

Although it is unlikely that such responsibility would ever be completely left to a self-

regulating agency, it is nonetheless important to acknowledge that the development of

the BCFSC should not be heralded as the panacea for all the health and safety ills in the

forests. The market may provide a useful instrument for encouraging higher standards of

health and safety performance by excluding companies that fail to live up to appropriate

standards. WorkSafeBC may even choose to offer additional incentives by lowering the

workers compensation insurance premiums for companies that participate in newly

developed programs. However, there still needs to be a meaningful response to

companies and individuals that do not live up to their side of the bargain and attempt to

take advantage of WorkSafeBC's reduced presence by cutting corners on their health

and safety responsibilities. The increased involvement of the private sector should

reduce the demands on WorkSafeBC resources overall, and make it possible for the

agency to adopt a "lean and mean" position on compliance assurance. Once the majority

of inspection and monitoring activities are undertaken by the BCFSC, WorkSafeBC

should be able to concentrate on only the most serious issues while experiencing a net

decrease in the amount of involvement they have with the industry. Failure to respond to

flagrant violations of the regulations will result in an imbalance between the "carrot" and

the "stick", and the province may well be left with a rather well fed but immobile industry

that has feasted on the positive incentives offered by the new regulatory framework, but

not actually changed or moved due to the absence of meaningful consequences for non-

compliance.

Due to the influence of the occupational culture, it is also important that workers

are given an active role in the implementation of changes. The lines of accountability

depicted in Figure 40 reflect the need to maintain a relationship between workers and

the state agency responsible for their protection, in order to ensure that industry interests

are not placed ahead of those of the w~rkers .~Whi le WorkSafeBC will remain

responsible for providing compensation to injured workers, it should also remain

available to assist in resolving problems that workers experience with health and safety

in the field. For example, when a worker refuses unsafe work and a satisfactory

agreement cannot be reached between the employer and the worker, section 3.12(5) of

the OHSR requires a WorkSafeBC representative to conduct an investigation and pass a

ruling regarding the safety of the activity in question. Even if the responsibility for

conducting such investigations is passed on to the BCFSC at some time in the future,

59 Brockman noted that governments may be able to pass some of their duties over to the private sector, but they cannot neglect their ultimate responsibility to the public (1998:590).

the regulations should allow a final avenue of appeal directly to WorkSafeBC to ensure

that worker grievances continue to be treated in the fairest possible manner.

It may also be appropriate to develop a panel within the BCFSC to represent the

voices of workers, and communicate their needs and input to the individuals responsible

for developing training programs and setting standards for the industry. The BCFSC

Silviculture Advisory Committee has taken some steps in this direction by including

workers as consultants in the development of their training programs. It is unlikely that

company owners would support the development of a worker union and past attempts to

create such a body have met with repeated failure. However, some type of formal worker

organization may still serve an important purpose in drawing the entire industry into the

health and safety project and increasing the ability of the reform effort to percolate to all

levels of the workplace hierarchies. Past research has clearly indicated that s failure to

involve all levels of the workforce in health and safety reform in deregulated

environments has corresponded with a failure to meet the objectives of reducing deaths

and injuries in the industry (Hutter, 2001).

More active worker participation in compliance initiatives may also be desirable,

including some method of encouraging whistle-blowing activities. Because tree planting

operations take place in isolated locations, workers are often the only people with the

opportunity to witness health and safety violations. Therefore, they offer a valuable

source of information that WorkSafeBC and the BCFSC could utilize in ensuring

adherence to new standards of performance. In the wake of a reduced state presence

on the front lines of the industry, such information may be useful in detecting serious

problems.

There also needs to be an emphasis on developing compliance programs that

suit the needs of large and small operations alike. This is especially important in light of

the differential ability and available resources of large and small companies to develop

comprehensive programs. The nature of the tree planting industry, and the wide

distribution of contracts of varying sizes in various locations, means that smaller

contractors will always form a vital part of the overall industry. Smaller contractors are

also often needed to complete smaller jobs that are simply not profitable enough to

attract the attention of larger companies. They also play an important role in the

employment of local populations in many smaller towns. The industry began based on

models of small business efficiency, and its genealogy can be traced through workers

that broke away to develop their own operations once they had acquired sufficient

experience. However, the tree planting family tree has been characterized by fierce

competition, and deep cleavages have developed between various parts of the industry.

Many small contractors have seen their local contracts swallowed up by larger

contractors, and do not support the activities of the Western Silviculture Contractors

Association and the BCFSC. If the BCFSC proceeds in a manner that favours big

business, the existing cleavages will deepen and it will become far more difficult to

pursue reform throughout the entire industry. Therefore, the development of training

programs that fit the needs of different company sizes will be a necessary step in

assuring reform throughout every part of the industry. One might hope that the health

and safety of the workforce would be incentive enough to draw all employers together in

making tree planting a less dangerous occupation. However, programs also need to

appeal to the economic reality of those that control and participate in the industry.

Conclusion

If the tree planting industry and the BCFSC continue down the road they have

started, it will be necessary to develop appropriate ways of gauging their success in

implementing higher standards of health and safety performance. The people in charge

of evaluating reform efforts will need to pay close attention to the statistics they rely

upon. It is possible that an increased emphasis on health and safety may actually

produce an artificial increase in injury rates by encouraging the disclosure of previously

unreported events. The potential for such effects suggest that other measures of OHS

performance are required. This thesis was in fact developed in order to provide a model

for such an instrument. While the goal of the BCFSC is to reduce injuries and deaths,

the way they are pursuing this goal is through attempting to change the behaviour of the

members of the industry. Therefore, it seems logical that attention be paid not only to the

injury rates, but also tothe behaviours that are the target of reform. This affirms the

need for future studies similar to this thesis, so that compliance can be gauged on a

longitudinal basis, and studied alongside other changes in the industry.

This thesis has shed light upon a set of issues that have previously remained

hidden from view. The focus on health and safety offences in the questionnaire was

generally confined to the specific activities undertaken by workers, and little attention

has been paid to the specific offences of employers. However, their accountability and

involvement has not been neglected, and they have been implicated in a chain of

responsibility that starts with workers on the front lines of the industry, passes through

employers to the forestry companies that stand at the top of the industry hierarchy, and

ends in the hands of the state agency in charge of their protection. This perspective has

assumed that WorkSafeBC plays a key role in protecting workers, and that th'e agency is

not subservient to the interests of employers.

This assumption may not sit well with more critical approaches, such as that of

Ian Coneybeer, who defined the development of the Workers' Compensation Board as a

method of protecting the goals of capitalism by shielding employers from the full liability

of their own negligence (Coneybeer, 1990). An even more radical objection is found in

Brill's assertion that past failures by the state to do a better job of protecting workers has

amounted to a criminal act (1992). Such criticisms make it necessary to remain skeptical

of an industry-led endeavour to improve conditions for workers. They also serve a

reminder that an important standard of success for a regulatory system is the detection

and punishment of serious violations.

Experience with deregulation of health and safety in other jurisdictions indicates it

is important to ensure that the motives of regulatory reform are not based solely on

benefits to business. Observing the deregulation of OHS In the United States in the

1980s, Garvin warned that self-regulation undertaken for the purpose of avoiding state

intervention is likely to be less strict, and is only pursued to reduce private sector liability

(1983:43). Furthermore, Gray and Scholz point out that regulations are only one of

many factors that affect death and injury rates in the workplace (1993:180). Therefore, if

the industry is truly concerned about reducing the risks faced by their workforce, it

should examine all the possible influences, including the financial pressures placed on

the workforce to maintain or increase production for lesser amounts of money.

However, it would be incorrect to assume that the goals of the industry are wholly

incompatible with the best interests of the workers. A decrease in deaths and injuries in

the workplace would also benefit employers by reducing the insurance premiums they

pay to the state, and shielding them from negative repercussions associated with serious

accidents. As such, this thesis has recognized the activities of WorkSafeBC in punishing

negligent companies, and the BCFSC Silviculture Advisory Committee's pursuit of

accountability among larger corporate actors. Furthermore, the corporations and

employers involved in tree planting have occupied a variety of positions on the issue of

health and safety, and there have been many changes made to improve conditions for

workers that have originated among the employers, many of whom are not long-

removed from the front lines of the workforce themselves.

Despite the positive steps that have been taken thus far, the compatibility of

deregulation with the goals of protecting workers in the tree planting industry has been

identified as questionable in some circumstances, especially when it comes .to the

development of standards to suit the needs of all workers and increasing program

consistency among different employers. Moreover, critical perspectives may identify this

approach as either an attempt by employers to manipulate regulatory structures into a

form that serves their interests by minimizing state intervention, or a manifestation of

government deferring to the interests of capital over the interests of the public. The

failure of deregulation to achieve positive results in industries such as the railways

(Hutter, 2001) and manufacturing (Tombs, 1996) warns against embracing deregulation

uncritically, and provides a clear illustration of the cost of failure when occupational

health and safety is the subject of reform. To put it bluntly, if industry does demonstrate

the will to follow through on the steps necessary to achieving health and safety reform,

workers will be injured, and some may die. Therefore, it is important that the success of

this approach to regulation is carefully evaluated, and that its architects are held

accountable to make appropriate changes if reduced levels of death and injury are not

achieved. Moreover, if the private sector is to assume a greater share of responsibility

for the health and safety of its workforce, it should bear a corresponding increase in its

share of accountability if things should go awry.

Cases of serious negligence among employers and corporate actors have not

been dismissed as inconsequential in the improvement of health and safety standards in

the industry. Indeed, it is believed that appropriate punishments must be applied to the

most serious of offenders, and the willingness of the state to take action when necessary

may be a key factor in ensuring successful reform. However, serious accidents

accompanied by flagrant violations of the regulations are rare, and the most frequent

hazards that workers face are embodied in day-to-day activities and the neglect of

consideration of health and safety as an integral component in standard operating

procedures. It is important that regulating agencies and the leaders of the industry take

note of dramatic cases such as that of Julia James, but it is equally important that they

do not lose sight of the seemingly less serious problems that characterize the

occupation. Doing so would amount to being unable to see the forest for the trees.

Any serious transformation of the industry cannot occur without the cooperation

and leadership of the people who defined and developed the industry. Therefore, this

thesis has focused on the role of these individuals so that they may better learn about

the problems that plague their field, and develop better ways of ensuring the safety of

the current and future generations of workers they borrow. The problems that the

industry is experiencing are intertwined with the history and culture of the occupation,

and the decisions of the people that continue to control the industry. I would like to

emphasize this point and conclude this thesis by relying once again on the words of

Colin James, a man who knows too well the consequences that await the failure to do a

better job of protecting the workers in the tree planting industry:

No, when we employ someone, we do not own them. When we employ someone we have struck a deal, we have agreed to an exchange, to trade their time, their energy, their talent, their skill, for money. We have borrowed them. They have been lent to us by those that love them, not their owners, for no one can own another. They have been lent to us by wives and husbands, mothers and fathers, sisters and brothers, friends and lovers and we must return them. (2004)

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List of Cases

Carter v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [I9881 T.C.J. No. 925).

Likely Reforestation Ltd. v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue) [ I 9861 T.C.J. No. 209 (T.C.C.)

R. V. Wishart [2003] B.C.J. No. 2865

Workgame Reforestation Ltd. v. M.N.R., 83-471(Ul)

Statutory Law

Canada Labour Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. L-2,

Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46.

Occupational Health and Safety Regulation, B.C. Regulation 296197

Workers' Compensation Act, R.S.B.C. I996 c. 492.

Appendices

Appendix A

Questionnaire for Workers

Appendix B

Questionnaire for Supervisors

Appendix C

Interview Guide for Workers

Appendix D

Information for Company Owners

Appendix E

Subject Participation Feedback

Appendix F

Letter of Support from FlSA

Appendix G

Letter of Support from the WSCA

Appendix H

Frequency Statistics and charts for refusing unsafe work

Appendix I

Frequency Statistics and charts for reporting unsafe work

Appendix J

Supporting Data

Appendix A Questionnaire for Workers

Please read this carefullv before ~roceedinq

Your assistance is requested in this research project on occupational health and safety in the tree planting workplace. This research is an important step in determining the range of activities and attitudes that exist within the workforce, s~ that effective programs can be developed to reduce the number of injuries that are occurring in the industry. Simon Fraser University and those conducting this research study subscribe to the ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, comfort, and safety of participants. This research is being conducted under permission of the Simon Fraser Research Ethics Board. The chief concern of the Board is for the health, safety and psychological well-being of research participants.

Knowledge of your identity is not required. You will not be required to write your name or any other identifying information on research materials. Your identity, and the identity sf your company, will not be revealed to anyone as a result of this research. Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by the law. The results of your questionnaire will be included with the results of hundreds of other questionnaires from other workers at different companies, and used to create an overall description of the industry. The questionnaires will be kept secure within the possession of the researcher and his supervisor, arid not shared with your emp:oyer, other members of industry, or any regulating or government agency.

What follows is a questionnaire that deals with a number of health and safety issues in the tree planting environment. No question will ask you to icentify an individual or company. Please do not include your own name, or the name of anyone else anywhere on the questionnaire.

Your participation will make a valuable contribution to the research. However, your participation is strictly voluntary, and you are under no obligation to participate in this research. Nobody in your workplace will take any action towards you if you decide not to participate.

The head researcher is Jordan Tesluk, a Master's student from Simon Fraser University School who is working in cooperation with the Forest Industry Safety Association (FISA) and the Western Silviculture Contractors Association (WSCA). He has planted trees for 12 years, and will using the information gathered from these questionnaires in his thesis. The information will also be presented to the silviculture industry as a report on the range of activities within the industry so it can be used for health and safety program development

If you have any concerns about this research or want to find out more about it, you can contact the head researcher by email at jdtesluk@sfu.ca. You can also contact his senior supervisor Professor Brockman at brockman@sfu.ca. You can also contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics by email at hweinber@sfu.ca or phone at 604-268-6593.

Please remember that you are only being asked for your PERSONAL OPINIONS on these matters. Your answers do not in any way imply that you have participated in or are aware of any such behaviour in your agency.

The term "SUPERVISOR" in this questionnaire includes supervisors, forepersons, crew chiefs, checkers, or any supervisor-type personnel in your

- I

Please do not discuss the questions on this form with other workers while you are filling i t out. Please answer all of the questions, but feel free to consult with the researcher i f them is anything that you are unsure of.

I The first set history in s i

. - :tion of this questionnaire refers to some basic information about you, and your

- 1 Iviculture. Please fill in the appropriate blank, or check the appropriate boxes. I

How many years have you been working in tree planting7

How many years have you been working with your current company?

How many days have you worked so far this year? ,

How many days do you expect you will have worked in tree planting by the end of the year?

What is your age? - - 1 Are you male or female? 0 Male 0 Female

1 DO you currently have a valid first aid ticket? 0 Yes 0 No

I Are you a year-round British Columbia resident? 0 Yes 0 No

I Have you ever been a foreperson or a supervisor on i a tree planting contract? 0 Yes 0 No

Are you an owner or a partial owner of the company you are working with? 0 Yes 0 No

Do you do any other jobs in silviculture on a regular basis? (check that apply)

1 0 Firefighting 0 Chemical brushing or weeding 0 Chemical tree thinning, or spacing

I 0 Cone-picking 0 Mechanical brushing or weeding 0 Mechanical tree thinning, or sp~cing

I What is your current level of education? (check one)

0 Some high school 0 High !School 0 Vocational training

0 Some UniversityICollege 0 UniversityICollege Diploma/CertificatelDegree

1 How would you classify yourself? (check one)

I 0 Career Silviculturalist: silviculture is your main source of employment. You return each year to the silviculture industry and work for more than 4 months per year.

0 Reqular seasonal: you return each year, working 4 months or less

0 Student: you are working to put yourself through school and will leave the industry upon graduation.

0 Occasional worker: you take the occasional job in the silviculture industry when they are available- silviculture is not your preferred occupation but you work in it when you need employment

uestionnaire deals with specific h

mted with a number of scenarios i l l hn r r l r f i r l 4- - ;ah-r A r . 4 ~ - m. .m

I How likelv do vou think vou will be to plant trees aclain next vear?

I Very likely 1 Very Unlikely

I -

I The second section of this questionnaire deals with specific health and safety-isues inthe lree

workplace. You will be presented with a number of scenarios. Each scenario will be followej by a

I number of questions. You will be asked to either circle a number on a five-point scale, or fill in a blank.

An example of a five-point scale is shown below.

I The response shown for the question would indicate that you think it is quite likely that you will be

planting trees again next year. Circling "5" would indicate you are almost certain you will nol. be planting

trees again next year. Circling "3" would indicate there is about a 50% chance that you will be planting I trees next year.

I Please be sure to read the scenarios carefully. Try not to give the same answer for every question

I automatically. The first 8 scenarios will be followed by tdentical questions. On Question E*, you will be asked what you think you would be done to correct a planter. Please write "nothingn or make an *x" in

the blank space provided if you believe no action would be taken to correct the planter. Please do not

leave the space blank.

How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would be to do this? -- FRY LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 V E R Y ~ ~ ~

How likely would YOU be to do this?

VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY U I \ ~

1

How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen doing this? -- ERY LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERYU~L~KELYI

At the end of the day, a planter returns to camp for dinner. The planter does go! wash their

-

How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen doing

2 3 4 5 VERY UNIWPORTANTI

hands before sitting down to eat with the rest of the crew. 7

What do you think a supervisor would do to correct a planter who is seen doing this several times'?

(Please fill in the blank. Write "nothing" or make an "x" i f you believe no action would be taken to correct the planter)

A How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would be to do this?

2

~ -~

~ E R Y LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERYIJNUKELY~ -- B How likely would YOU be to do this?

A planter finishes a bag-up at the top of a steep hill, and runs at top speed down the hill to the cache, jumping from stump to stump and barely avoids falling down.

~ E R Y LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY 1 C How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

D How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen doing

VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNINPORTANT I --

E* What do you think a supervisor would do to correct a planter who is seen doing this several times7

(Please fill in blank -

B How likely would YOU be to do this?

-

C How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen !doing this?

E~RY LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERYL-K~ET 1 --

- 3

D How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

A planter is smoking pot during the day while tree planting.

~ I R Y IMPORTANT I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT I --

- A

I How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would be to do this?

-- h i ~ ~ LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERYI~NL~KELYI

E* What do you think a supervisor would do to correct a planter who is seen doing this several times?

(Please fill in blank)

A planter is not wearing a seatbelt while traveling as a passenger in a company vehicle on the way to work.

How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I How likely would YOU be to do this?

How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY 1 How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT I -- What do you think a supervisor would do to correct a planter who is seen doing this several times?

(Please till in blank) -

A planter is working without wearing gloves. Although the trees have been treated with pesticides and warnings on the box say that gloves are required, the planter continues to work without gloves on. P A

How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would be to do this?

B How likelv would YOU be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLlKliLY I C How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

-- II KELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY U N L I K I ~

D How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMFORTANT I E* What do you think a supervisor would do to correct a planter who is seen doing this several

times?

(Please till in blank) --

A planter is working on a steep piece of ground (a 45 degree slope) where the ground is littered with many dead trees that were left over by the logging operation. The planter has to walk on the logs to move around the land, and is notwearing caulked (spiked) boots

How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would be to work in this situation without wearing caulked boots?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I -- How likely would YOU be to do this?

IIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIK-

How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

-- IMPORTANT I 2 3 4 5 VERY U N I M F ~

What do you think a supervisor would do to correct a planter who is seen doing this several times'?

(Please fill in blank) --

P It is the last day of the shift and at the end of the day the crew has returned to their camp, which is located 50 km out of town. One planter, who has been drinking (4 beer in 2 hours), decides to drive into town in a personal vehicle.

How likely do you think OTHER PLANTERS at your workplace would be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I How likely would YOU be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I How likely do you think a supervisor would be to correct a planter who is seen doing this?

-- VERY LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY U N L I K I T T ~ --

How important do you think it is for a supervisor to correct a planter who is seen doing

What do you think a supervisor would do to correct a planter who is seen doing this several times?

(Please fill in blank)

P A planter is sent to work on a piece of land that is very steep and covered in loose timber waste. The planter accidentally knocks a log loose and it slides 60 feet down the hill. The planter the supervisor that it is not safe to work there, and to be moved to another piece of land.

A How likely do you think other planters at your workplace would be to ask to be moved?

I VERY LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I B How likely would you be to ask to be moved?

IVERYIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKI-

C How important do you think it is for a planter to ask to be moved?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT I --

fertilizer pellets must be planted along side of the trees. Although wearing gloves, the planter develops an itchy red rash on the h<ands and arms. The planter has also been feeling nauseous since work began with the fertilizer. The planter refuses to work with the fertilizer any longer. 1

A How likely do you think other planters at your workplace would be to refuse to work with the fertilizer?

-- GI KELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY U N L I K I : ~

B How likely would you be to refuse to work with the fertilizer?

)VERY KELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY U N L I K I ~

C How important do you think it is for a planter to refuse to work with the fertilizer? -- IMPORTANT I 2 3 4 5 VERY U N I M P ~

A supervisor is driving a crew to work. The supervisor is driving at 80km per hour on a road where the speed limit is 60 km per hour. One planter asks the supervisor to slow down. The supervisor tells the planter to be quiet and continues driving at the same rate of speed.

How likely do you think other planters at your workplace would be to REPORT behaviour like this?

II KELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKE-

How likely would you be to report behaviour like this?

How important do you think it is for a planter to report behaviour like this?

A ~ lanter sees a co-worker planting very close to the edge of a steep cliff. The planter tells the co-worker that such behaviour is dangerous and to move away from the cliff. The co-worker tells the planter to mind their own business and continues planting along the top of the cliff.

A How likely do you think other planters at your workplace would be to REPORT behaviour like this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I B How likely would you be to report behaviour like this?

EVERY KELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY U N L I K I ~

C How important do you think it is for a planter to report behaviour like this?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT I

PJ A supervisor is using an all terrain vehicle (a quad) and is not wearinn a helmet.

A How likely do you think a supervisor would be to do this in your workplace?

-I KELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY U N L I K I ' ~

B How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected'?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT 1 --

o Check this box if quads are never used in your workplace

P A supervisor is checking the quality of the planters' work and needs to move from one piece of land to another. There is a steep 50-foot high cliff between the pieces and it would take 15 minutes to walk down to the road to get around it. Instead of walking down to the road, the supervisor climbs across the top edge of the cliff.

A How likely do you think a supervisor in your workplace would be to be to do this?

B How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT 1

A small crew of workers must walk into a block that cannot be accessed by truck. The su~ervisor suggests that they can save 45 minutes of planting time if they planters ride o the quad while the supervisor drives. 1

I

A How likely do you think a supervisor would be to do this in your workplace?

B How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected?

IMPORTANT I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMFGGTI

Check this box if quads are never used in your workplace.

A crew is working on a selectively logged block, when a strong wind starts up in the aflernoon. Small branches and bits of greenery are falling from the trees. However, there are only two hours lefl in the workday and the planting has been going so quickly that it I likely the block will be finished by the end of the day. Despite the falling objects, the supervisor decides to let the crew continue working, and urges workers to himy up in order to finish the block

I

A How likely do you think a supervisor would be to let the crew continue to work in your workplace?

B How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected'?

The last section of questions refers to your general experience with health and safety and other matters in the workplace.

16. In your opinion, how much TlME do supervisors in your workplace spend to ensure that everyone is following appropriate health and safety requirements?

TOO MUCH L 1 2 3 4 5 NOT ENOUGH AE3OUT RIGHT

workplace?

1 17. In your opinion, how much TlME is spent discussing health and safety in your current

-- TOO MlJCH r 1 2 3 4 5 NOT ENOUGH

ABOUT RIGHT 1 18. How likely do you think it is that YOU will be injured while working this year?

-- EIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY~

19. How likely do you think it is that SOMEONE ELSE at your workplace will be injured while working?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLlKlLY I -- 20. In your opinion, how FRIENDLY are relations between supervisors and planters in your

workplace?

I VERY FRIENDLY 1 2 3 4 5 NOT FRIENDLY AT ALL I ~ ~~ --

21. In your opinion, how COMPETITIVE are the planters in your workplace with each other?

22. How SATISFIED are you with the camp or accommodations supplied to you by your companfl

I EXTREMELY Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 Extrernelv DISSATISFIED I --

23. How SATISFIED are you with the wages you are currently earning?

-- IMELY s a w e d I 2 3 4 5 Extremelv D I S : ~

24. In your opinion, how CLOSE are the planters in your workplace as a group?

I VERYCLOSE 1 2 3 4 5 NOT VERY CLOSE AT ALL 1

25. Has a supervisor in your current workplace ever corrected you during this season for an activity related to health and safety? (check one)

0 Y e s 0 No

26. Has a supervisor in your current workplace checked on vou during this season to ensure that are complying with a health and safety requirement? (check one)

0 Y e s 0 No

27. Do you usually carry an emergency whistle? 0 Y e s 0 No

28. Do you usually work with a partner? 0 Y e s 0 No

29. Have you ever suffered any type of injury while planting and had to miss work? 0 Y e s 0 No

Are there any important health and safety issues not covered in this research, or any comments that you would like to make about this questionnaire? Feel free to make any additional comments you desire, but please do not mention any company o r individual by name.

This concludes the questionnaire. Thank you very much for your participation in this research. If you have any further questions regarding this research, please refer to the front page of the questionnaire, which you can detach and keep for your own purposes.

Please hand the rest of the questionnaire back to the researcher.

Appendix B Questionnaire for Supervisors

Please read this carefully before proceeding

Your assistance is requested in this research project on occupational health and safety in the tree planting workplace. This research is an important step in determining the range of activities and attitudes that exist within the workforce, so that effective programs can be developed to reduce the number of injuries that are occurring in the industry. Simon Fraser University and those conducting this research study subscribe to the ethical conduct of research and to the protection at all times of the interests, comfort, and safety of participants. This research is beinc conducted under permission of the Simon Fraser Research Ethics Board. The chief concern of the Board is for the health, safety and psychological well-being of research participants.

Knowledge of your identity is not required. You will not be required to write your nams or any other identifying information on research materials. Your identity, and the identity of your company, will not be revealed to anyone as a result of this research. Any information that is obtained during this study will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by the law. The results of your questionnaire will be included with the results of hundreds of other questionnaires from other workers at different companies, and used to create an overall description of the industry. The questionnaires will be kept secure within the possession of the researcher and his supervisor, and not shared with your employer, other members of industry, or any regulating or government agency.

What follows is a questionnaire that deals with a number of health and safety issues n the tree planting environment. No question will ask you to identify an individual or company. Please do not include your own name, or the name of anyone else anywhere on the questionnaire.

Your participation will make a valuable cor~tribution to the research. However, your participation is strictly voluntary, and you are under no obligation to participate in this research. Nobody in your workplace will take any action towards you if you decide not to participate.

The head researcher is Jordan Tesluk, a Master's student from Simon Fraser University School who is working in cooperation with the Forest Industry Safety Association (FISA) and the Western Silviculture Contractors Association (WSCA). He has planted trees for 12 years, and will using the information gathered from these questionnaires in his thesis. The information will also be presented to the silviculture industry as a report on the range of activities within the ir~dustry so it can be used for health and safety program development

If you have any concerns about this research or want to find out more about it, you can contact the head researcher by email at jdtesluk@sfu.ca. You can also contact his senior supervisor Professor Brockman at brockman@sfu.ca. You can also contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics by email at hweinber@sfu.ca or phone at 604-268-6593.

Please remember that you are only being asked for your PERSONAL OPINIONS on these matters. Your answers do not In any way imply that you have participated in o r are awar

-- A

Please note that the term "SUPERVISOR1' forepersons, crew chiefs, checkers, or an

this questionnaire includes supervisors, upervisor-type personnel in your workplace

Please do not discuss the questions on this form with other workers while you are filling it out. Please answer all of the questions, but feel free to consult with the researcher if there is anything

I --

The first section of this questionnaire refers t o some basic information about you, and your history in silviculture. Please fill in the appropriate blank, or check the appropriate boxes. I

I

How many years have you been working in tree planting?

How many years have you been working with your current company?

How many days have you worked so far this year? .

How many days do you expect you will have worked in tree planting by the end of the year?

What is your age? - - - - - - - -- -

Are you male or female? 0 Male (3 Female

Do you currently have a valid first aid ticket? 0 Yes 0 No

Are you a year-round British Columbia resident? 0 Yes 0 No

Have you ever been a foreperson or a supervisor on a tree planting contract? 0 Yes 0 No

Are you an owner or a partial owner of the company you are working with? 0 Yes 0 No

Do you do any other jobs in silviculture on a regular basis? (check that apply)

0 Firefighting 0 Chemical brushing or weeding 0 Chemical tree thinning, or spacing

0 Cone-picking 0 Mechanical brushing or weeding 0 Mechanical tree thinning, or spacing

What is your current level of education? (check one)

0 Some high school 0 High School 0 Vocational training

0 Some UniversitylCollege 0 UniversitylCollege DiplomalCertificatelDegree

How would you classify yourself? (check one)

0 Career Silviculturalist: silviculture is your main source of employment. You return each year to the silvicu1tu1-e industry and work for more tban 4 months per year.

0 Reqular seasonal: you return each year, 'working 4 months or less

0 Student: you are working to put yourself through school and will leave the industry upon graduation.

0 Occasional worker: you take the occasiorial job in the silviculture industry when they are available- silvicultu~~e is not your preferred occupation but you work in it when you need employment.

I of questions. You will be asked to either circle a number on a fivc

I of a five-point scale k shown below.

?-point scale, or fill in a blank. An example

I I EXAMPLE: How likely do you think you will be to work in the tree planting industry again next year? I

I I ne response snow tor me questlon woula lnalcate mat you trim a IS qulte IlKely tnar you WIII pe piantlng 1 trees again next year. Circling '5" would indicate you are almost certain you will not be planling trees

, again next year. Circling "3" would indicate there is about a 50% chance that you will be planting trees

next year.

Please be sure to read the scenarios carefully. Try not to give the same answer for every question

automatically. The first 8 scenarios will be followed by identical questions. On Question D', you will be

asked what you think you would do to correct a planter. Please write 'nothing" or make an Y in the blank

space provided if you would take no action with the planter. Please do not leave the space blank.

At the end of the day, a planter returns to camp for dinner. The planter does _not wash their hands before sitting down to eat with the rest of the crew.

How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to do this?

ERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY ~ h m

How likely would you be to correct a planter that you see doing this?

1 VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I How important do you think it is to correct a planter that you see doing this?

( VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT I

What would you do to correct a planter that you see doing this several times?

(Please fill in the blank. Write "nothing" or make an "x" if you would take no action to correct the planter)

A planter finishes a bag-up at the top of a steep hill, and runs at top speed down the hill to the cache, jumping from stump to stump and barely avoids falling down.

How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to do this?

1 VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY 1 How likely would you be to correct a planter that you see doing this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I

How important do you think it is to c:orrect a planter that you see doing this?

What would you do to correct a planter that you see doing this several times?

(Please fill in the blank) --

El A planter is smoking pot during the day while tree planting.

How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to do this?

How likely would you be to correct a planter that you see doing this? -- 1 VERY LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERYUNLIKELY 1

How important do you think it is to correct a planter that you see doing this?

What would you do to correct a planter that you see doing this several times?

(Please fill in the blank) --

A planter is not wearing a seatbelt while traveling as a passenger in a company vehicle on the way to work.

How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to do this?

-- b y LIKELY I 2 3 4 5 VERYUP.ILIKELY How likely would you be to correct a planter that you see doing this?

How important do you think it is to correct a planter that you see doing this?

What would you do to correct a planter that you see doing this several times?

(Please fill in the blank)-

A planter is working without wearing gloves. Although the trees have been pesticides and warnings on the box say that gloves are required, the planter continues to

, a work without gloves on.

How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I

How likely would you be to correct a planter that you see doing this?

How important do you think it is to correct a planter that you see doing this?

[VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMFORTANT 1 --

What would you do to correct a planter that you see doing this several times?

(Please fill in the blank)-

A planter is working on a steep piece of ground (a 45 degree slope) where the ground is littered with many dead trees that were left over by the logging operation. The planter has to walk on the logs to move around the land, and is not wearing caulked (spiked) boots P 1

How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to work in this situation without wearing caulked boots?

-- IRY LIKELY 1 2 :3 4 5 V E R Y U F J ~

How likely would you be to correct a planter that you see doing this?

~ R Y LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 V E R Y U P ~

How important do you think it is to correct a planter that you see doing this?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMFIORTANT I

What would you do to correct a planter that you see doing this several times?

(Please fill in the blank)-

It is the last day of the shift and at the end of the day the crew has returned to their camp, which is located 50 km out of town. One planter, who has been drinking (4 beer in 2 hours), decides to drive into town in a personal vehicle.

How likely do you think planters at pour workplace would be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I How likely would you be to correct a planter that you see doing this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I

How important do you think it is to correct a planter that you see doing this?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT I --

What would you do to correct a planter that you see doing this several times?

(Please fill in the blank)-

I

Please note that the next sets of scenarios are fc r A planter is sent to work on a piece of land that is very steep and covered in loose timber waste. The planter accidentally knocks a log loose and it slides 60 feet down the hill. The planter the supervisor that it is not safe to work to work there, and asks l o be moved to another piece of land.

- - --

A How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to ask to be moved?

~ R Y LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY U N L I K E L Y ~ --

B How important do you think it is for a planter to ask to be moved?

A How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to refuse to \ ~ o r k with the fertilizer?

A planter is working on a contract where fertilizer pellets must be planted along side of

-- ~ K Y LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY ulrlLlKELYI

9

B How important do you think it is for a planter to refuse to work with the fertilizer?

the trees. Although wearing gloves, the planter develops an itchy red rash on the hands and arms. The planter has also been feeling nauseous since work begian with the

( VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMF'ORTANT I

fertilizer. The planter refuses to work with the fertilizer any longer. 1

A supervisor is driving a crew to work. The supervisor is driving at 80km per hour on a road where the speed limit is 60 km per hour. One planter asks the supervisor to slow down. The supervisor tells the planter to be quiet and continues driving at the same rate of speed.

A How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to report this beheviour?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UhLlKELY I

B How important do you think it is for a planter to report behaviour like this?

1 VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMFORTANT I

I

A How likely do you think planters at your workplace would be to report this behaviour?

A planter sees a co-worker planm working very close to the edge of a

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I

1 1

B How important do you think it is for a planter to report behaviour like this?

planter tells the co-worker that such behaviour is dangerous and to move away from the cliff. The co-worker tells the planter to mind their own business and continues planting

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMF'ORTANT 1

along the top of the cliff.

A supervisor is using an all terrain vehicle (a quad) and is not wearing a helmet. I A How likely do you think another supervisor at your workplace would be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I B How likely would YOU be to do this?

-- FRY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY U F ~ ]

C How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected?

Check this box if quads are never used in your workplace

b A supervisor is checking the quality of the planters' work and needs to move from one piece of land to another. There is a steep 50-foot high cliff between the pieces and i t would take 15 minutes to walk down to the road to get around it. Instead of walking down to the road, the supervisor climbs across the top edge of the cliff.

How likely do you think another supervisor at your workplace would be to do this?

( VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I How likely would YOU be to do this?

I VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY I

How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT 1 --

A small crew of workers must walk into a block that cannot be accessed by truck. The supervisor suggests that they can save 45 minutes of planting time if the planters ride on the quad while the s u p e ~ s o r drives.

A How likely do you think another supervisor at your workplace would be to do tliis?

~ R Y LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNLIKELY

B How likely would YOU be to do this'?

( VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UPJLIKELY 1 C How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected?

-- --- --- I VERY~MPORTANT i 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMFGTANT I Check this box if quads are never used in your workplace

El A crew is working on a selectively logged block, when a strong wind starls up in the afternoon. Small branches and bits of greenery are falling from the trees. However, there are only two hours left in the workday and the planting has been going so quickly that it is likely the block will be finished by the end of the day. Despite the falling objects, the supervisor decides to let the crew continue working, and urges workers to hurry up in order to finish the block

- - - --

A How likely do you think another supervisor at your workplace would be to do this?

1 VERY LIKELY 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UKLIKELY I B How likely would YOU be to do this?

C How important do you think it is for a supervisor who does this to be corrected?

I VERY IMPORTANT 1 2 3 4 5 VERY UNIMPORTANT I

I The last section of questions rerers to your general experience wltn nealtn ana s a r e r v

I and other matters in the workpl 1 16. In your opinion, how much TlME do supervisors in your workplace spend to ensure that

everyone is following appropriate health and safety requirements?

TOO MUCH 2 3 4 5 NOT ENOUGH ABOUT RIGHT

17. In your opinion, how much TlME is spent discussing health and safety in your #current workplace?

TOO MUCH 1 2 3 4 5 NOT ENOUGH AE3OU'T RIGHT

18. How likely do you think it is that YOU will be injured while working this year?

19. How likely do you think it is that SOMEONE ELSE at your workplace will be injured while working?

20. In your opinion, how FRIENDLY are relations between supervisors and planters in your workplace?

21. In your opinion, how COMPETITIVE are the planters in your workplace with each other?

I VERY COMPETITIVE 1 2 3 4 5 NOT COMPETITIVE AT I --

22. How SATISFIED are you with the camp or accommodations supplied to you by yclur company?

IMELY Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 Extrernelv D I S S P ~ I -- 23. How SATISFIED are you with the wages you are currently earning?

Fk Satisfied 1 2 3 4 5 Extrernelv D~SS=I 24. In your opinion, how CLOSE are the planters in your workplace as a group?

25. Has another supervisor in your current workplace corrected vou during this season for an activity related to health and safetjf' (check one)

0 Yes 0 No

26. Has another supervisor in your current workplace checked on vou during this season to ensure that are complying with a health and safety requirement?

0 Yes 0 No

27. Have you ever suffered any type of injury at a planting contract and had to miss work? 0 Yes 0 No

Are there any important health and safety issues _not covered in this research, or any comments that you would like to make about this questionnaire? Feel free to make any additional comments you desire, but please do not mention any company or individual by name.

This concludes the questionnaire. Thank you very much for your participation in this research. If you have any further questions regarding this research, please refer tc the front page of the questionnaire, which you can detach and keep for your own purposes.

Please hand the rest of the questionnaire

back to the researcher.

Appendix C Interview Guide for Workers

In addition to the questionnaires that have been administered in your workplace, I arn conducting a short interview with a small number of workers. The purpose of this interview is to obtain your impression of the questionnaire, and explore any issues that you think are particularly important in regard to health and safety in the tree planting workplace.

Knowledge of your identity is not required. You will not be required to include your name or any other identifying information in the research materials. Your identity, and the identity of your company, will not be not be revealed to anyone as a result of this research. Any information that is obtained during this interview will be kept confidential to the full extent permitted by the law.

Your participation will make a valuable contribution to the research. However, your participation is strictly voluntary, and you are under no obligation to participate in this research. Nobody in your workplace will take any action towards you if you decide not to participate

Question Guide

The first issue I would like to discuss is the questionnaire that you previously completed

Do you have any concerns about the research or the way in which it was conducted?

Do you feel that the questionnaire addressed important health and safety issues in your work environment?

Are there any health and safety issues that were not covered in the questionnaire, that you feel are particularly important?

This research is aimed at understanding problems with health and safety in your industry. What do you see as the greatest obstacles to encouraging safe behaviour among tree planters?

What do you think workers could do to improve health and safety in their workplace?

What do you think supervisors could do to improve health and safety in their workplace?

What do you think company owners could do to improve health and safety in their workplace?

What do you think the government or the Workers Compensation Board could do to improve health and safety in the tree planting workplace?

Appendix D Information for Company Owners

My name is Jordan Tesluk. I am a Simon Fraser University Master's student working in cooperation with the Forest Industry Safety Association and the Western Silviculture Contractors Association. I am conducting research on occupational health and safety in the tree planting workplace and would like your permission to visit your workplace for the purpose of my research. I am distributing questionnaires to workers and supervisors to assess attitudes and behaviours related to health and safety in the workplace. My goal is to obtain a picture of the range of attitudes and behaviours throughout the industry as a whole, and I am trying to ensure that all segments of the industry are represented in my research. No individual or company will be identified during the couke of my research, and the anonymity of all parties will be preserved in the course of the research. No information will be collected in relation to contract details, and no information on any individual company will be shared with any other member of the industry or any other party

The questionnaires I am distributing will take about 15 minutes to fill out, and I will be collecting them from the workers personally to ensure that the information does not become available to any other party. No question in the research will identify any company or individual by name, and no worker or supervisor will be asked to report on any specific illegal activities. They will only be asked to report their opinions on the likelihood of particular health and safety related activities in the tree planting environment. The questionnaires will be distributed and collected at a time that is convenient for you and your crew. This will most likely take place at the end at the working day at the hotel or camp where your crew is staying. I do not need to observe your crew while they are actually working in the field.

The goal of this research is to visit the widest variety of operations possible, and your participation would very valuable in obtaining a comprehensive picture of the industry as a whole. It is my aim to ensure that all members of the industry have an opportunity to be represented within this research. If you have any concerns about this research or want to find out more about it, you can contact the head researcher by email at jdtesluk@sfu.ca or at 604 737-0331. You can also contact his senior supervisor Professor Brockman at brockman@,sfu.ca. You can also contact the Director, Office of Research Ethics by email at hweinber@sfu.ca or phone at 604-268-6593.

Appendix E Subject Participation Feedback

Simon Fraser University: Participant Feedback

Completion of this form is OPTIONAL, and is not a requirement of participation in the study. However, if you have served as a participant in a project and would care to comment on the procedures involved, you may complete the following form and send it to:

Director, Office of Research Ethics, Strand Hall, 8888 University Drive Burnaby, B.C., V5A 1S6, Canada.

If Yes please describe the nature of the deviation, and the date, place and lime. Please make any other comments you may have.

All information received will be strictly anonymous, unless you wish your name to be made known to the researcher, as shown below.

Name of Research Study: Health and safety in the tree planting workplace lnvestigator Name: Jordan Tesluk lnvestigator Department: Criminology

Did you sign an Informed Consent Form before participating in the project? [I Yes No Were there significant deviations from the originally stated procedures? [I Yes oNo I

Completion of the Information Below is Optional Participant Last Name: First Name:

Participant Contact Information1 Address:

Home Telephone:

Work Telephone:

Email:

Do you wish your feedback to be anonymous? Yes o No

Appendix F Letter of Support from FlSA

Forest Industry Safety Association rvwu ).omslsa/P cn

#602 1488 Founh Avenue. Prince George. BC V2L 2Y2 Phone: (2.50) 562 3215 Toll-Free: 1-877 324 1212

Fax: (250) 562 9237 Email fisa@fomstsafe.ca

May 10,2004

To Whom It May Concern:

The Forest Industry Safety Association is aware of Jordan Tesluk's research on occupational health and safety in the tree plant~ng workplace. He has been working in cooperation with FISA's Silviculture Advisory Committee, and has been given a formal statement of support by its members. Several contractors on the committee have invited him to visit their workplaces, and we encourage other contractors to participate so that the entire industry can be assessed and represented in the research.

We acknowledge that the research is being conducted as an academic study through Simon Fraser University, and that the Forest Industry Safety Association has not commissioned Mr. Teshk to gather information on any specific members of the industry. We are aware that his research will take every possible measure to protect the anonymity of those who participate in the research, and no company or individual will be identified as a result of his research.

The results of the research will assist all members of the silviculture industry in identifying better ways to manage health and safety in the workplace. The information obtained will also further assist our organization to identify important issues, and assist us in designing programs to enhance health and safety performance in the industry.

If you wish to veAfy the support of the Forest lnduslry Safety Association on this research. you may contact the undersigned at 250-562-32 15.

Appendix G Letter of Support from the WSCA

$4 c("'%

Western Silvicultural Contractors' Association \ 8 MU Executive Dirtctor's Office, IM#3 9 6 C9, N t h LC. VI1 K(

WSCA Phone: 250-229-4380 Fax: 150429-4366 email hdpulp@notidea.com

7 May 2004

To Whom It l a y Concern:

The Western Silviculture Contractors Association is aware of Jordan TesluKs research on occupational health and safety in the tree planting workplace. He has been working in cooperation with several of our members on the Forest Industry Safety Association Silviculture Advisory Committee. They have given his research a formal statement of support

Several members of the committee have invited him to visit their workplaces and the WSCB is encouraging other contractors to participate. We are committed to assisting Mr. Tesluk in his work so that the entire industry can be assessed and represented in his research. We acknowledge that the research is being conducted as an independent academic study through Simon Fraser University and that the Western Silviculture Contractors' Association has not commissioned Mr. Tesluk to gather information on any specific members of the industry.

We are also aware that his research will take every possible measure to proted the anonymity of those who participate in the research, No company or individual will be identified as a result of his study. The resulk of the research will assist all members of our industry in identtfying better ways to manage health and safety in the workplace. Information resulting from his work will be available to all parties regardless of whether they are members of our association.

If you wish to verify the support of the Western Silviculture Contractors Associition on this research you may contact the me at 250-229-4380.

John Betts, Executive Director Western Sikicultural Contractors' Association

Appendix H Statistics for Refusing Unsafe Work

Statistics

Expectation of others to refuse to work on unstable terrain

N Valid

Missing

Mean

Ex~ecatation of others to refuse to work with hazardous substances

Others refuse fert

Others refuse slash

643

18

3.80

Others refuse fert

634

27

2.90

Others refuse slash

Valid Very Likely Likely Neither likely nor unlikely Unlikely Very Unlikely Total

Missing No Answer

Total

I

Valid Very Likely Likely Neither likely nor unlikely Unlikely Very Unlikely Total

Missing No Answer Total

Frequency 134

113

170 119 98

634 27

66 1

Importance refuse slash

64 1

20

2.66

Percent 20.3 17.1

25.7

18.0 14.8 95.9

4.1 100.0

Importance refuse fert

633

28

1.83

Cumulative Percent -

7.3 14.5 35.1

63.1 100.0

Valid Percent 7.3 7.2

20.7 28.0 36.9

100.0

Frequency 47 46

133 180 237

643 18

661

I Cumulative

Percent 7.1

7.0 20.1 27.2 35.9

97.3 2.7

100.0

Valid Percent +-

lmportance of refusing to work in unstable terrain

Valid Very Important

lmportant

Neither lmportant nor Unimportant

Unimportant

Very Unimportant

Total

Missing No Answer

Total

Importance refuse slash - I Cumulative

Frequency 157

1 I 6

230

64 74

64 1 20

66 1

Percent 23.8

17.5

34.8

9.7 11.2

97.0

3.0 100.0

Valid Percent +-

lmportance of refusins to work with hazardous substances

lmportance refuse fert

Valid Very Important

lmportant Neither lmportant nor Unimportant Unimportant

Very Unimportant Total

Missing No Answer Total

Frequency I Percent I Valid Percent ( Percent 357 1 54.0 ( 56.4 1 56.4

Appendix I Statistics for Reporting Unsafe Work

Likelihood of others to report a supervisor for speedinq

Statistics

Valid Very Likely

Likely Neither likely nor unlikely Unlikely Very Unlikely

Total Missing No Answer Total

N Valid

Missing Mean

Valid Per;;; 1 Per~e;~.~ 1

Others report super speed

644

17 2.92

Frequency 152 117

131 120

124

644

17

661

Likelihood of others to report a planter for workinq too close to a cliff

Percent 23.0

17.7

19.8 18.2

18.8

97.4

2.6 100.0

Valid Very Likely

Likely Neither likely nor unlikely Unlikely

Very Unlikely

Total Missing No Answer

Total

Others report planter steep

643

18 3.80

Frequency 41

65

137 140

260

643

18

661

Percent 6.2

9.8

20.7 21.2

39.3

97.3

2.7

100.0

Importance report super

speed 64 1

20 1.91

I I Cumulative

Importance report planter

steep 640

2 1 3.14

Valid Percent Percent 6.4

lmportance of reportinq a supervisor for speedinq

Valid Very lmportant

lmportant

Neither lmportant nor Unimportant

Unimportant

Very Unimportant

Total

Missing No Answer

Total

Frequency 31 7

159

99

36

30

64 1

20 66 1

lmportance of reportinn a planter for working tc

Important 122

Neither lmportant nor Unimportant

Unimportant

Very Unimportant

Total Missing No Answer

Total

Percent 48.0

24.1

15.0

5.4

4.5

97.0

3.0

100.0

o close to

Percent 13.8

18.5

26.6

16.5

21.5

96.8 3.2

100.0

I Cumulative Valid Percent Percent + 49.5

Valid Percent 14.2

Percent 14.2

Appendix J Supporting Data

Figure 41: Statistics

Correlations

I Self refuse work in Pearson Correlation unstable ground Sig, (2-tailed)

N Others refuse work Pearson Correlation in unstable ground Sig. (2-tailed)

N Self refuse work Pearson Correlation with hazardous Sig. (2-tailed) substances N

Self u;i.vi!el refuse 1 r e E d Self work refuse :;18*] refuse 01!771 work

in unstable hazardous hazardous substances substances

Figure 42: Statistics

Others refuse work Pearson Correlation

with hazardous Sig. (2-tailed) substances N

Correlations

1.77" .207**

,000 ,000

543 630 546

Self report Pearson Correlation supervisor for Sig. (2-tailed) speeding N

Others report Pearson Correlation s~pervisor for - Sig. (2-tailed) speeding

N

Self report planter Pearson Correlation to0 close to cliff Sig. (2-tailed)

N

** . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Others report Pearson Correlation planter to0 close to Sig. (2-tailed) cliff N

- - ~~~ -

tt . Correlation is significant at the 0.01 11

'. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 le

Self report ( Others report I Self report ( Others report supervisor supervisor planter too planter too

for speeding I for speeding ( close to cliff 1 close to cliff 1 I 714*j .202*1 132'

.132* ,169' .733* 1 ,002 5 5 4 4 64;

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