'7902 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

Pending amendments are not exactly to my liking. I would change them. But first things must come first. And from a financial standpoint the matter of high­est priority is the soundness of our econ:­omy, the value of the dollar, the preven­tion of inflation.

ORDER FOR RECESS TO TOMOR­ROW AT 11 A.M.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it stand in recess until 11 o'clock tomor­row morning.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

TAX ADJUSTMENT ACT OF 1968

The Senate resumed the considera­tion of the bill (H.R. 15414) to continue the existing excise tax rates on communi­cation services and on automobiles, and to apply more generally the provisions relating to payments of estimated tax by corporations.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I hope that Senators will think over these issues during the night, and that all Senators will read the RECORD tomorrow morning. We shall rest our case with the rollcall vote early tomorrow afternoon.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I would hope that we could vote about 1 o'clock tomorrow. I have discussed this matter with the Senator from South Dakota, the principal sponsor of the amendment. Personally, I would be in­clined to vote for it. I am not wedded to all the details, but I think the Senator has a worthwhile purpose in mind.

I would certainly hope that the House would take as much of it as it could agree to. I should like t~ urge the House to accept it.

I discussed this matter with members of the committee prior to the time the Senator called up his amendment. I re­gret that I was not in the Chamber at the time. I was in the Chamber all day but had missed my lunch and I wanted to get a snack, and did so.

I had been under the impression that we intended to accept the amendment and would take it to conference. A mis­understanding arose, I understand, be­cause the Senator wanted a rollcall vote. I would have had no obj~ction to it.

UNANIMOUS-CONSENT AGREEMENT

With the understanding that we would have the yeas and nays ordered on the amendment when we vote on it, I would hope that we coUld agree, by unanimous consent, to a vote on the amendment to come at 1 o'clock tomorrow.

Mr. President, I so ask unanimous con­sent.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, reserving the right to object, let me suggest to the Senator that he amend the consent re­quest to read, "No later than 1 o'clock tomorrow." Perhaps we can save some time.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Yes. That will be fine.

Mr. MUNDT. That is because it will de­pend on the requests I get for time on my side of the arg1¥I1ent, and what requests the Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] receives, so that we may need that much time.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the vote come no later than 1 o'clock tomorrow, that there be a brief period for morning business, with statements limited to 3 minutes for each Senator when we meet tomorrow, that at the conclusion of the routine morning business, the amend­ment be made the pending business, and that the vote occur no later than 1 o'clock, with the time to be equally di­vided between the Senator from South Dakota and a Senator in opposition to the amendment, to be designated by the Senator in charge of the bill, the chair­man of the committee.

Mr. MUNDT. Reserving the right to object-and I shall not object-I think the Senator should spell out the dimen­sions of that very elusive term, "brief period for morning business."

I would suggest that we have a period for the transaction of morning business of no longer than 15 minutes. I could get myself crowded out otherwise. Is that satisfactory?

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. That is fine. I accept that.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection to the request of the Senator from Louisiana? The Chair hears none, and it is so ordered.

The unanimous-consent request was subsequently reduced to writing, as fol­lows:

Ordered, That the Senate proceed to vote not later than 1 p.m. on March 28, 1968, on

the Amendment by the Senator from South Dakota, numbered 671, a.s modified, to H.R. 15414, an Act to continue the existing excise tax rates on communication services and on automobiles, and to apply more generally the provisions relating to payments of estimated tax by corporations.

Provided further, ·That there be a 15-min­ute period for the transaction of routine morning business after approval of the Jour-· nal, .and that the remaining time before 1 p.m. be equally divided and controlleJ. by the Senator from South Dakota [Mr. MUNDT] and the Manager of the bill [Mr. LONG] or someone designated by him.

Mr. MUNDT. Mr. President, I should like to express my appreciation to the assistant majority leader. I am forti­fied by the fact that I know he will be a member of the conferees. I am further gratified by his support of this approach. The Senator from Virginia [Mr. BYRD] and I recognize that 'this is not a perfect answer. However, I think the time has come to establish a policy and to let the world, our fighting men, their mothers and fathers--all of us as Americans-­know where we stand on the basic priori­ties of this cruel war.

Because of the great legislative archi­tect that the Senator from Louisiana [Mr. LONG] is, I am sure langUage can be written in conference which will achieve the job and answer the techni­cal criticisms we have had pointed out to us today. I shall be happy to cooperate toward that objective.

I thank him for his support. · Mr. President, I yield the floor.

RECESS UNTIL 11 A.M. TOMORROW Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President,

if there be no further business to come before the Senate, I move, under the order previously entered, that the Sen­ate stand in recess until 11 o'clock to­morrow morning.

The motion was agreed to; and (at 6 o'clock and 27 minutes p.m.) the Senate took a recess until tomorrow, Thursday, March 28, 1968, at 11 o'clock a.m.

WITHDRAWAL Executive nomination withdrawn from

the Senate March 27, 1968: POSTMASTER

The nomination sent to the Senate on Oc­tober 3, 1967, of Mr. John P. Hanley to be postmaster at Wilmette in the State of Il­linois.

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES-Wednesday, March 27, 1968 The House met at 12 o'clock noon. The Chaplain, Rev. Edward G. Latch,

D.D., offered the following prayer: Man shall not live by bread alone, but

by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God.-Matthew 4: 4.

Almighty God, our heavenly Father, make us conscious of Thy presence as we enter upon the work of another day that we, the Members of this body, shall be led in the ways of righteousness and jus­tice and good will. May what we do be in accordance with Thy holy will and for the welfare of our Nation.

We pray that the dignity of the laws of our land may be respected by all our people, upheld by all our citizens, and obeyed by every individual. Only so can life and liberty and the pursuit of hap­piness be secure in these United States of America.

Above the din of discordant voices may we take time to listen to Thy voice, and hearing, give heed to it, remember­ing that man does not live by bread alone but by every word that proceedeth out of Thy mouth.

In the -Master's name we pray: Amen.

THE JOURNAL

The J oumal of the proceedings of yes­terday was read and approved.

MESSAGE FROM THE SENATE A message from the Senate by Mr.

Arrington, one of its clerks, announced that the Senate had passed without amendment a bill of the House of the following title:

H.R. 1308. An act to establish the Saugus Iron Works National Historic Site ln the

March '!J7, 19'68 CONGRESSIONAL 1lECORD- HOUSE 7903 State of Massachusetts. and for other purposes.

The message also announced that the Senate had passed a bill of the following title, in which the- concurrence of the House is requested:

S. 3033. An act to increase the authoriza-tion for appropriation for continuing work in the Missouri River Ba.sin by the Secretary of the Interior.

The message also announced that the Vice President, pursuant to Public Law 86-420, appointed Mr. GRIFFIN to attend the Mexico-United States Interparlia­mentary Conference to be held in Hono­lµlu, Hawaii, on April 11 to 17, 1968, in lieu of Mr. HANSEN, excused.

The message also announced that the Vice President, pursuant to Public Law 90-226, appointed Mr. BIBLE and Mr. PROUTY to the Commission on the Re­vision of the Criminal Laws· of the Dis­trict of Columbia.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON-A PROVEN LEADER

Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to ad­dress the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my remarks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection. Mr. ROONEY of Pennsylvania. Mr.

Speaker, the time has come when I must speak out to add my voice, my support, and my· commitment for the reelection of Lyndon B. Johnson as President of the United States.

During the 4% years Lyndon Johnson has served as our President, our Nation has prospered and progressed despite some of the most severe tests and most serious challenges our Nation and the free world ever have encountered. With inspiring determination .. Lyndon John­son has confronted these face-to-face without being deterred from his goal of a better and fuller life for our citizens.

Unless we close our eyes to the hostile forces at work in many parts of the world, we can recognize that we are liv­ing in a period of increasing challenge and testing. I am convinced we can best face and overcome these obstacles by re­taining as our President the determined and able leader Lyndon Johnson has proven himself to be.

President Johnson recognizes that the isolationist policies of decades ago can­not sustain the freedom which we- Amer­icans and our free world allies have cherished and protected until now. He has steadfastly ref used to slip through already-open doors to avoid confronting new challenges. Instead, he has stood his ground and strived diligently to open new doors-doors of opportunity, under­standing, and cooperation among the people of our own Nation and the people of the world. His key is .hard work-not some magic formula.

Determined leadership holds the great­est promise to end international hostility . and create a workable peace throughout the world. President Johnson's reelection offers the continued application of his

CXIV--498-Part 6

determined leadership to deal with the future's challenges . .

SHOCKING PLAN TO DELIVER F-104 . SUPERSONIC STARFIGHTERS AND PATTON TANKS TO JORDAN Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani­

mous consent to address the House for 1 minute.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection. Mr. VANIK. Mr. Speaker, I was

shocked to learn yesterday that our Gov­ernment will deliver 18 F-104 supersonic Starfighters and 100 Patton tanks to the Government of Jordan.

How can our Government justify this action at the very time the Soviet Gov­ernment has moved to slow down arms sales to the Arab world in fear that such action might lead to a strike against Israel? How can more guns iri the Mid­dle East insure peace?

It is deplorable that our Government should engage in this type of armament sale. It is folly to believe that these weapons will not be used.

What a shameful role we have under­t aken as gunmaker to the kings of the Middle East and to the dictators of Latin Ameriea.

WHO ARE OUR FRIENDS? Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, I think

it .is sometimes important for us to take stock of who are our friends in this world and who are not. I think it is fair to say that we should measure perform­ance and not just rhetoric in making this judgment. I would like to point out that during the long-term balance-of­payments crisis, as wen as during the re­cent run on gold, Israel has shown itself to be a good friend indeed. Israel has not increased its dollar holdings in 3 years. More important, it holds only $50 mil­lion in gold, out of a total of $700 mil­lion in dollar reserves. To help the United States, the Israel Government recently bought $2.50 million in American securi­ties, so that these dollars could stay in this country. Finally, it should be noted that among the- people of the developed countries, Israelis responded with the greatest calm to the gold stampede, re­fusing to be rushed into the wave of dol­lar sales. Mr. Speaker-, these facts are the index of loyal friendship, of the as­sistance of a friend in need. I think it is not too much to ask that we keep these gracious actions in mind when we deal with this country, under seige by all its neighb~rs.

for 1 minute, to revise and extend ·my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of· the gentleman from Tennessee?

There was no objection. Mr. EVERETT. Mr. Speaker, there

appeared in the Washington Post this morning, in th~ financial section on page E-8, the following article: CRIME RISE ALARMING, DRUG CHAIN HEAD SAYS

(By S. Oliver Goodman) Holdups and burglaries of Peoples Drug

Stores increased at an alarming rate last year, President George B. Burrus told share­holders at the annual meeting yesterday afternoon.

There were 144 "incidents" in 1967, he said, amounting to some $158,000. This compared With 123 criminal acts in the previous year, amounting to $141,000.

The am-0unt of money taken was equal to about 12 per cent of the Washington-based chain's net income of $1,349,921 last year.

Asked if the company . had insurance against such a loss, Burrus said the "cost of insurance is prohibitive" and the company found it cheaper to set up reserves.

This is a most appalling situation that exists, not only in our .Nation's Capital, but the Nation as well. It certainly seems that a large number of our courts, in­cluding the Supreme Court, should try to assist in preventing crime by meting out strong punishment rather than pa­ro.Ies and probations. Some of the deci­sions of the Supreme Court have certain­ly been repulsive to the law enforcement agencies over this great Nation of ours.

Mr. Burrus is an outstanding business­man, coming from one of the finest fam­ilies in our home county of Obion. He started with the Peoples Drug Stores chain as a clerk and now is president and chairman of the board. We are certain­ly proud of his record. He has certainly brought honor, not only to the Eighth Congressional District, but to our State, and the Nation as well.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS TO FILE A REPORT Mr. HOLIFIELD. Mr. Speaker, I ask

Uhanim-0us consent that the Committee on Government Operations may have until midnight tonight to file a report.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Cali­fornia?

There was no objection.

PERSONAL EXPLANATION Mr. DENT. Mr. Speaker, on rollcall No.

67 I was erroneously paired against the bill H.R. 13541, which I cosponsored, called the Agricultural Fair Practices Act.

Had I been present I would have voted for the bill.

THE "PUEBLO"-HOW LONG, MR. PRESIDENT?

Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, I ask CRIME RISE ALARMING unanimous consent to address the House

- for 1 minute and to revise and extend my Mr. EVERETT. Mr . . Speaker, I ask remarks.

unanimous consent .tD address the House The SPEAKER. Is th~re objection

7904 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection. Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. Speaker, on Jan­

uary 23, 1968, North Korea, a fourth rate power, seized the intelligence ship Pueblo and her crew and forced them into Won­san Harbor. This outrageous action was contrary to all customary procedures of international law.

Today, 2 months and 4 days larter, the Pueblo and her crew still are prisoners of North Korea. Have they been forgot­ten?

Because of the delicate situation, Mem­bers of Congress and the people of America watched pa..tiently for the return of the men and the Pueblo.

However, concerned Americans have not been silenit during the long wait. My office has received dozens of letters and telephone calls from throughout the United States reflecting grave concern with the Johnson administration's ap­parent willingness to tolerate the seizure of a U.S. ship and the abduction of her crew. All have expressed impatience with President Johnson for not taking firm, decisive, and immediate action.

Many of the letters questioned whether the Pueblo and her crew are ,to be written off because of our prior commitment to Vietnam. Are the wives and children of the crewmembers to reshape their lives, permanently omitting their loved ones?

The crewmembers, like all servicemen, tOOlk an oath to def end the United Startes. Do not they deserve the same protection from their country?

The Johnson administration has failed the Pueblo's crew, i1t has failed their families, and, by its inability to face the Communist global threat, it has failed every single American.

It is time that Lyndon Johnson took firm, positive a..ction to bring the crew of the Pueblo home to their f,amilies and to America. How about it, Mr. President?

IMMIGRATION HEARING Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to add·ress the House for 1 minute, to revise ·and extend my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There WBS no objection. Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, I wish to

announce that on April 3 the Subcom­mittee on Immigration and Nationality, Committee on the Judiciary, will meet in executive session to commence a series of hearings on the operation of the Im­migration and Nationality Act, as amended.

On July 1, 1968, the last vestige of the national origins concept as the means of selecting immigrants to the United States will be repealed and immigrants will henceforth be admitted on a flrst­come, first-served basis within existing preference categories. This system is a new approach in our immigration policy. My subcommittee has been, and will continue to study all fa..cets and aspects of this new approach to insure that a fair and equitable immigration policy will be a..chieved.

The Secretary of State has been in­vited to delegate witnesses from the De-

partment to appear before the commit­tee on April 3 to analyze the present and future trends in immigration to the United States. Officials from the Depart­ment of Justice and the Department of Labor will appear before the committee on future dates to be announced.

Many Members of Congress and many nationality groups have expressed their concern about the change in the pat­tern of immigration. Their views will be welcomed and carefully considered.

PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON PUBLIC HEALTH TO SIT DUR­ING GENERAL DEBATE TODAY Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent that the Subcommit­tee on Public Health of the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce may be permitted to sit during general debate today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR SUBCOMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTS TO SIT DURING GENERAL DEBATE TODAY Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent that the Subcommit­tee on Accounts of the Committee on House Administration may be permitted to sit during general debate today.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

PERMISSION FOR COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS TO HA VE UNTIL MIDNIGHT, APRIL 1, TO FILE A RE­PORT ON H.R. 16241 Mr. MILLS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani­

mous consent that the Committee on Ways and Means may have until Monday midnight, April 1, 1968, to file a report on the bill, H.R. 16241.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Arkansas?

There was no objection.

MR. SCHWEIKER JOINS SPONSOR­SHIP OF MIDDLE EAST RESOLU­TION Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute -and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection. Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, the name

of our distinguished colleague, RICHARD s. SCHWEIKER, of Pennsylvania, is a wel­come addition to sponsorship of House Concurrent Resolution 738, which I in­troduced yesterday, to declare it the sense of Congress that diplomatic rela­tions with the United Arab Republic should not be resumed unless certain conditions were met. This makes a total of 25 members of this .House who have joined in sponsoring this concurrent resolution. Unfortunately, House Con-

current Resolution 738 already had been submitted, and it was too late to place the able gentleman's name on the bill it­self. However, I am delighted to learn that he has introduced an identical reso­lution today, and his support is greatly welcomed.

Mr. SCHWEIKER has long been a vocal force on the subject of pea..ce and justice in the Middle East, and his participation in this declaration is most meaningful.

BENEFITS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS NOT EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED STATES WHO ARE KILLED OR INJURED WHILE APPREHEND­ING VIOLATORS OF FEDERAL LAW-CONFERENCE REPORT Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Speaker, I call up

the conference report on the bill (H.R. 11816) to provide certain benefits for law · enforcement officers not employed by the United States who are killed or injured while apprehending violators of Federal law, and ask unanimous consent that the statement of the managers on the part of the House be read in lieu of the report.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. The SPEAKER. Is there objection to

the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection. The Clerk read the statement. The conference report and statement

are as follows:

CONFERENCE REPORT (H. REPT. No. 1187) The committee of conference on the disa­

greeing votes of the two Houses on the amendment of the Senate to the blll (H.R. 11816) to provide certain benefits for law enforcement officers not employed by the United States who are killed or injured while apprehending violators of Federal law, hav­ing met, after full and free conference, have agreed to recommend and do recommend to their respective Houses as follows:

That the House recede from its disagree­ment to the amendment of the Senate and agree to the same with an amendment as follows: In lieu of the matter proposed to be inserted by the Senate amendment insert the following:

"SECTION 1. (a) Chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Oode is amended by adding the following new subchapter at the end: " 'SUBCHAPTER llI.-LA W ENFORCEMENT

OFFICERS NOT EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED STATES

"'§ 8191. Determination of eligibility " 'The benefits of this subchapter are

available as provided in this subchapter to eligible law enforcement officers (referred to in this subchapter as "eligible officers") and their survivors. For the purposes of this Act, an eligible officer is any person who is determined by the Secretary of Labor in his discretion to have been on any given oc­casion-

" ' ( 1) a law enforcement officer and to have been engaged on that occasion in the apprehension or attempted apprehension of any person-

"'(A) For the commission of a crime against the United States, or

"'(B) who at that time was sought by a law enforcement authority of the United States for the com.mission of a crime against the United States, or

"'(C) who at that time was sought as a maiterial witness in a criminal proceeding instituted by the United States; or

"'(2) a law enforcement officer and to have been engaged on that occasion in pro­tecting or guarding a person held for the

March 27; 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7905 com,mission of a crime against the United States or as a material witness in connec-tion with such a crime; or ·

"'(3) a law enforcement officer and to have been engaged on that occasion in the lawfW. prevention: of, or lawful attempt to prevent, the commission of a crime against the United States; and to have been on that occasion not an employee as defined in section 8101 ( 1), and to have sustained on that occasion a. personal injury for which the United States would be required under subchapter I of this chap­ter to pay compensation if he had been on that occasion such a.n employee engaged in the performance of his duty. No person otherwise eligible to receive a benefit under this subchapter because of the disability or death of an eligible officer shall be barred from the receipt of· such benefit because the person apprehended or attempted to be ap­prehended by such officer was then sought for the commission of a crime against a sov­ereignty other than the United States. "'§ 8192. Benefits

.. '(a) BENEFITS IN EVENT OF INJURY.-The Secretary of Labor shall furnish to any eligi­ble officer the benefits to which he would have been entitled under subchapter I of this chapter if, on the occasion giving rise to his eligibility, he had been an employee as defined in section 8101(1) engaged in the performance of his duty, reduced or adjusted as the Secretary of Labor in his discretion may deem appropriate to reflect compara­ble benefits, if any, received by the officer (or which he would have been entitled to re­ceive but for this subchapter) by virtue of his actual employment on that occasi~n. When an enforcement officer has contributed to a disability compensation fund, the reduc­tion of Federal benefits provided for in this subsection is to be limited to the amount of the State or local government benefits which bears the same proportion to the full amount of such benefits as the cost or contribution paid by the State or local government bears to the cost of disability coverage for the in­dividual officer.

"'(b) BENEFITS IN EVENT OF DEATH.-The Secretary of Labor shall pay to any survivor of an eligible officer the difference, as de­termined by the Secretary in his discretion, between the benefits to which that survivor would be entitled if the officer had been an employee as defined in section 8101 ( 1) en­gaged in the performance of his duty on the occasion giving rise to his eligibility, and the comparable benefits, if any, received by the survivor (or which that survivor would have been entitled to receive but for this subchapter) by virtue of the officer's actual employment on that occasion. When an en­forcement officer has contributed to a sur­vivor's benefit fund, the reduction of Federal benefits provided for in this subsection is to be limited to the amount of the State or local government benefits which bears the same proportion to the full amount of such benefits as the cost or contribution paid by the State or local government bears to the cost of survivor's benefits coverage for the individual officer. "'§ 8193. Administration

"'(a) DEFINITIONS AND RULES OF CONSTRUC­TION.-For the purpose of this subchapter-

" '(l) The term "Attorney General" in­cludes any person to whom the Attorney General has delegated any function pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

"'(2) The term "Secretary of Labor" in­cludes any person to whom the Secretary of Labor has delegated any function pursuant to subsection (b) of this section.

"'(b) DELEGATION.-" '(l) The Attorney General may delegate

to any division, officer, or employee of the Department of Justice any function con­ferred upon the Attorney General by this subchapter.

"'(2) The Secretary of Labor m ay delegate

to any bureau, officer, or employee of the Department of Labor any function conferred. upon the Secretary of Labor by this sub­chapter ..

.. '(c) .APPLICATIONS.-An application for any benefit under this subchapter may be made only-

" • ( 1) to the Secretary of Labor '"(2) ~ "'(A) any eligible officer or survivor of an

eligible officer, "'(B) any guardian, personal representa­

tive, or other person legally authorized to act on behal-f of an eligible officer, his estate, or any of his survivors, or

"'(C) any association of law enforce­ment officers which is acting on behalf of an eligible officer or any of his ~urvivors;

"'(3) within five years after the injury or death; and

" • ( 4) in such form as the Secretary of Labor may require.

"'(d) CONSULTATION WITH ATTORNEY GEN­ERAL AND OTHER AGENcms.-The Secretary of Labor may refer any application received by him pursuant to this subchapter to the Attorney General for his assistance, com­ments and advice as to any determination required to be made pursuant to paragraph (1) , (2), or (3) of section 8191. To insure that all Federal assistance under this sub­chapter is carried out in a coordinated man­ner, the Secretary of Labor is authorized to request any Federal department or agency to supply any statistics, da ta, or any other materials he deems necessary to carry out his functions under this subchapter. Each · such department or agency is authorized to cooperate with the Secretary of Labor and, to the extent permitted by law, to furnish such materials to him.

" ' { e) COOPERATION WITH STATE AGENCIES.- · The Secretary of Labor shall cooperate fully with the ?.ppropriate State and local officials, and shall take all other practicable measures, to assure that the benefits of this subchapter are made available to eligible officers and their survivors with a minimum of delay and difficulty.

.. ' ( e) APPROPRIATIONS.-There are author­ized to be appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this subchapter.'

"(b) The table of sections at the begin­ning of chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Code is amended by adding at the end: "SUBCHAPTER IlI.-LA W ENFORCEMENT

OFFICERS NOT EMPLOYED BY THE UNITED STATES

"'Sec. " '8191. Determination of eligibility. " '8192. Benefits. " '8193. Administration.'

"SEC. 2. The amendments made by section 1 of this Act are effective only with respect to personal injuries sustained on or after the date of enactment of this Act."

And the Senate agree to the same. , Amend the title so as to read: "An Act to

provide compensation for law enforcement officers not employed by the United States killed or injured while apprehending per­sons suspected of committing Federal crimes, and for other purposes."

And the Senate agree to the same. ROBERT T. ASHMORE, WILLIA:i',i L. HUNGATE, HERBERT TENZER, JOSHUA EILBERG, HENRY P. SMITH Ill, THOMAS J. MESKILL, CHARLES W. SANDMAN, Jr.,

Managers on the Part of the House. JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, JAMES 0. EASTLAND, SAM J . ERVIN, Jr., PffiLIP A. HART, EDWARD M. KENNEDY, RoMAN L. HRUSKA, HUGH ScOTT, STROM THURMOND,

M anagers on the Part of the Senate.

STATEMENT The managers on the part of the House·

at the conference on the disagreeing votes of the two Houses on the amendments of the Senate to the b111 (H.R. 11816) to pro­vide certain benefits for law enforcement officers not employed by the United States who are killed or injured while apprehending violators of Federal law, submit the follow­ing statement in explanation of the effect of the action agreed upon by the conferees and recommended in the accompanying con­ference report:

The conference report recommends that the House recede from its disagreement to the Senate amendment and agree to the same with an amendment. The amendment is to insert the language agreed to by the con­ferees in lieu of the matter inserted by the Senate in its amendment to the House bill.

The bill H.R. 11816 passed the House sub­stantially in the form set forth in the con­ference report, that is, the bill provided for the amendment of chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Code by the addition of a new subchapter III providing for benefits to law enforcement officers. Section 8191 of the new subchapter provides for the determination of eligibility. This section adopts the House language in providing that the benefits of the subchapter are to be available to eligible law enforcement officers and their survivors and these benefits are those defined in subchap­ter 1 of chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Code, which provides for compensation for work injuries suffered by employees of the United States. The conference substitute provides that the Secretary of Labor is to make the determination of eligibility for benefits. At the time of injury the individual must have been a law enforcement officer en­gaged in the apprehension or attempted ap­prehension of any person (a) for a commis­sion of a crime against the United States or (b) at that time was sought by a law enforce­ment authority of the United States for a commission of a crime against the United States, or (c) who at that time was sought as a material witness in a criminal proceed­ing instituted by the United States. An eli­gible officer would also be an individual in­jured while protecting or guarding an in­dividual held for the commission of a crime against the United States, or as a material witness in a criminal proceeding instituted by the United States. Similarly, an officer in­jured in the lawful prevention of or lawful attempt to prevent the commission of a crime against the United States will be entitled to the benefits authorized under the new sub­chapter. The balance of the provisions of section 8191 substantially retains the pro­visions originally approved by the House in that an eligible officer is one not an employee of the United States as defined in section 8101(1) of title 5 and shall be an individual who on the particular occasion referred to in the above categories shall have sustained a personal injury for which the United States would be required under su.bchapter 1 of chapter 81 of title 5 to pay compensation if he had been on that occasion an employee en­gaged in the performance of his duty. The effect of these provisions is that the stand­ards and benefits of chapter 81 of title 5 will provide the basis for compensation for such law enforcement officers. This will assure that a common standard will be followed for bene­fits paid by the Federal Government for Fed­eral officers and to State and local officers as is provided in the conference substitute.

Section 8192 in the conference substitute is identical to the section as originally ap­proved by the House.

Section 8193 was modified by the deletion of a requirement that the Secretary of Labor refer any application to the Attorney Gen­eral. This change was necessitated by the change to section 8191 which vests in the Secretary of Labor the responsibility of de­termining eligibility. The authority for con­sultation with the Attorney General is pro­vided in a new subsection (d) which provides

7906 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 authority to the Secretary of Labor to con­sult with the Attorney General or to consult with any other affected department concern­ing matters relevant to persons' compensa­tion under the new subchapter.

The balance of the conference report re­tains the language of the House passed bill with an amendment to the title of the biil revising the language of the title, and re­flects the changes agreed to in conference.

The conference report in following the language of the House bill has the effect of incorporating definitions and standards fully set forth in the Federal employee compensa­tion provisions of chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Code. The Senate amendment included several definitions which are there­fore not included in the language of the con­ference report since title 5 contains standard definitions of the same terms. As has been noted, the conference substitute refers to the law enforcement officers who would .be eligi­ble for benefits in the event of injury as law enforcement officers not employed by the United States. The intent is to cover law enforcement officers employed by various governmental subdivisions and to avoid an attempted enumeration of the particular sub­divisions involved. The conferees felt that an attempted enumeration might result in an unintended limitation. In the course of the debate on the bill H.R. 11816 on the floor of the House on September 11, 1967, this point was emphasized. For example, it is intended that the provisions will cover officers em­ployed in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico as well as those by States and by local juris­dictions.

RoBERT T. ASHMORE, WILLIAM L. HUNGATE, HERBERT TENZER, JOSHUA EILBERG, HENRY P. SMITH III, THOMAS J. MESKILL, CHARLES W. SANDMAN, Jr.,

Managers on the Part of the House.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. ASHMORE] is rec­ognized for 1 hour.

Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. SMITHJ, the ranking minority member of our committee, such time as he may consume.

Mr. SMITH of New York. Mr. Speaker, this conference report is on H.R. 11816, which will provide compensation for local law enforcement officers who are killed or injured in the course of apprehending criminals who have violated U.S. law and for those who are killed or injured while otherwise aiding in the enforcement of U.S. laws. The bill passed this House on September 11, 1967, under suspension of rules, by a vote of, I believe, 311 to 0.

The Senate bill adopted a different philosophy, and in the conference, by and large, H.R. 11816, which had passed this body, was accepted with some im­provements which came out of the con­ference. The bill, H.R. 11816, which 1s substantially here today, was sponsored by all the members of Subcommittee No. 2 of the Judiciary Committee and also by other interested Members of the House of Representatives.

The conferees and managers on the part of the House were all of the mem­bers of Judiciary Subcommittee No. 2, and they have unanimously approved this conference report.

Mr. Speaker, this bill will give, we feel, encouragement to local law enforcement officers who aid in the enforcement of U.S. laws and in the apprehension of

criminals who violate U.S. law and who otherwise aid Federal law enforcement.

We feel this bill represents but a small measure of the great appreciation we in the U.S. Congress feel for our local law enforcement officers who need, at this time in our history, all the encour­agement they can have. This bill sym­bolizes in a small way the recognition by the people of the United States of the effort of all our local law enforce­ment officers in aiding Federal law en­forcement.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to recom­mend to this body that this conference report which is before us today be ac­cepted.

Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Speaker, the gen­tleman from Virginia [Mr. POFF] has been very active and diligent in bring­ing this measure to its present point. I yield such time to him as he may con­sume.

Mr. POFF. Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished chairman of the subcom­mittee.

The gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. BYRNE] introduced the first bill on this subject. The Byrne bill authorized death benefits to the survivors of a State or local police officer killed while at­tempting to apprehend a Federal law­breaker. I introduced a bill expanding the thrust of the legislation to include disability benefits for the dependents of such a police officer. The House Repub­lican Task Force on Crime endorsed this bipartisan approach. As the legislation passed the House, both types of benefits were authorized.

The legislation recommended in the conference report represents an im­provement over both the House version and the Senate version. First, it gears benefits to the benefit formulas defined for Federal officers in chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Code. Second, it awards benefits not only when the injury was sustained in active pursuit of a Fed­eral lawbreaker, but when the fugitive was being sought by a Federal law en­forcement agency as a suspect or a ma­terial witness in a Federal criminal case or when he is in custody for such pur­poses. Benefits are also authorized when the injury occurred in the course of an attempt to prevent the commission of a Federal crime. ·

In America's multijurisdictional scheme of law enforcement, officers at every governmental echelon must be en­couraged to cooperate in the discovery and apprehension of Federal law viola­tors. The safety of society is at stake. Considering the nature, extent, and value of the services rendered by local law enforcement officers, the Federal Gov­ernment is buying a bargain.

I hope that this bipartisan legislation will win the unanimous support of the Congress and the early approval of the President.

Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from Missouri [Mr. HUNGATE], a member of our subcommit­tee, such time as he may consume.

Mr. HUNGATE. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of this legislation.

Mr. Speaker, crime does not observe neat jurisdictional lines between city,

State, county, and Federal Governments. Fortunately, it is also true that neat jurisdictional lines are not observed in the task of law enforcement. Frequently the apprehension of a Federal criminal offender is the result of cooperation be..; tween local and Federal law enforcement officials. The assistance received from non-Federal officers in the enforcement of Federal law has a pronounced effect on the Federal budget, for without it we would be faced with the necessity of maintaining a much larger Federal law enforcement establishment.

Unfortunately, in the course of render­ing assistance to Federal officers, local law enforcement officers are occasionally killed. or disabled. It would seem fitting, when this does occur, for the Federal Government to provide some form of compensation to the deceased officer or his family for the tragic loss suffered.

The enactment by Congress of a pro­gram to provide such compensation to the disabled non-Federal officers or their survivors would serve as an official acknowledgment of the debt the Fed­eral Government owes for the assistance given by local law enforcement person­nel. The individual compensatory awards made under the program would, of course, constitute public recognition of the individual officer's contribution in those public cases where it is so obvious­ly deserved.

Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of the conference report.

Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Speaker, I yield to the gentleman from New York [Mr. TENZER], another member of our sub,­committee, such time as he may con­sume.

Mr. TENZER. Mr. Speaker, I rise in support of H.R. 11816. I ask my col­leagues to join in accepting this confer­ence report, because it would provide for compensation to local law enforcement officers who are engaged in assisting Fed­eral law enforcement officers, not only in the apprehension of violators of Federal law but also in the protection of wit­nesses held in connection with violations of Federal law, and also the detection and prevention of crime.

Another very important point I should like to make for all my colleagues is that this may be a way of saving a large amount of money for the Federal Gov­ernment, in that it will make it unneces­sary to establish a Federal law enforce­ment agency when we can call upon all the local officers of all the States and political subdivisions who have such forces to assist our Federal officers in · the apprehension of criminals, in the protection of witnesses, and in the pre­vention of crime.

Mr. Speaker, the bill-H.R. 11816-as amended by conference, provides bene­fits for State and local law enforcement officers when they are injured while ap­prehending, protecting witnesses, or pre­vention of crimes, in connection with or relating to violations of Federal law. The bill also provides compensation to the survivors of an officer if he should be killed while attempting to apprehend an individual wanted for violating a Federal law, or while protecting a witness or prevention of a crime. The legislation

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE. 7907 would provide State and local police officers with some measure of :financial security in recognition 'of the risks and danger they assume in assisting in the enforcement of the laws of the United States. The enactment of this bill would make it possible for the United States, to this degree at least, to recognize its responsibility to the local law enforce­ment officer for his part in the enforce­ment of Federal law. The benefits pro­vided in the bill would be equivalent to those provided in the Federal Employees Compensation Act with the provision that the amounts so paid would be re­duced by the amount of benefits pro­vided and paid for by a State or local government.

The bill (H.R. 11816) was introduced as a revised bill, following consideration by Subcommittee No. 2 of the House Judiciary Committee of a group of bills proposing similar benefits for law enforcement officers. The pres­ent bill was introduced by Mr. BYRNE of Pennsylvania, for himself, Mr. POFF, Mr. RoDINO, Mr. DOWDY, Mr. FEIGHAN, Mr. EILBERG, Mr. BIESTER, Mr. ASHMORE, Mr. HUNGATE, Mr. TENZER, Mr. SMITH of New York, Mr. MESKILL, and Mr. SANDMAN.

At the hearing on April 5, 1967, As­sistant Attorney General Fred M. Vin­son's statement included the following comment:

President Johnson, in his 1966 crime mes­sage to Congress noted that "Crime does not observe neat jurisdictional lines between city, State, and Federal Governments." Fortu­nately, it is also true that neat jurisdictional lines a.re not observed in the task of law en­forcement. Frequently, for example, the ap­prehension of a Federal criminal offender is the result of cooperation between local and Federal law enforcement officials. The as­sistance received from non-Federal officers in the enforcement of Federal law has a pro­nounced effect on the Federal budget for, without it, we would be faced with the neces­sity of maintaining a much larger Federal law enforcement establishment.

Unfortunately, in the course of rendering assistance to Federal officers, local law en­forcement officers a.re occasionally killed. It would seem fitting, when this does occur, for the Federal Government to provide some form of compensation to the deceased officer's family for the tragic loss which it has suffered.

Then enactment by Congress of a program to provide such compensation to the non­Federal officer's survivors would serve as an official acknowledg·ment of the debt the Fed­eral Government owes for the assistance given by local law enforcement personnel. And the individual compensatory awards made under the program would, of course, constitute public recognition of the individual officer's contribution in those cases where it is so ob­viously deserved.

In the report of the Justice Depart­ment on a similar bill, H.R. 339 and com­panion measures, the Attorney General also noted that local law enforcement of­ficers throughout the United States supplement the activities of Federal law enforcement personnel. In rendering this service, the local law enforcement officers obviate the need for a larger force of Federal law enforcement officers. The Attorney General further indicated his support for the aim of the legislation in providing for benefits for local officers in the following language:

The enactment of legislation authorizing compensation to the :families of such non-

Federal officers who are killed while aiding in the enforcement of the Federal laws would appear to be an appropriate recognition of the contribution made by local forces.

In considering this legislation (H.R. 11816) , the committee was guided by the comments of the Department of Justice in its report on H.R. 339. In that report, the Attorney General noted that the bills originally ref erred tv the committee failed to spell out the standards for de­termining whether a law enforcement officer's death resulted from a given in­jury as well as other guidelines for the program contemplated by the legisla­tion. In this connection, the Attorney General also suggested that there be provision for regulations and rulemaking to implement such a program. In con­nection with the administration of the program, the Department of Justice noted that it would be appropriate to place responsibility in the Department of Labor due to the experience of that Department in the administration of compensation laws.

Under H.R. 11816 the actual adminis­tration of the compensation program is vested in the Secretary of Labor. In order to provide for guidelines and standards in the administration of the program, the bill prov:ides that the officer or his sur­vivors will be paid in the manner pro­vided in the recently codified provisions of the Federal Employees Compensation Act as if he had been an employee of the United States at the time of the occa­sion which caused his disability or death and was engaged in the performance of his duty. These changes are provided for in the bill by providing for direct amend­ment to chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Code. Chapter 81 of title 5 of the United States Code is the chapter pro­viding for compensation for work in­juries in revised title 5, as approved on September 6, 1966, as a revised title of the United States Code.

The bill provides for a reduction of the Federal payment to local law enforce­ment officers where comparable benefits are payable as the result of their State and local employment.

The :figures available to the committee indicate that it has been determined that approximately 13 local policemen in the period from 1960 through 1965 diea as the result of attempting to enforce Fed­eral laws. Of this number, five officers were killed while attempting to appre­hend bank robbery suspects and two offi­cers were killed attempting to apprehend a suspect for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution. It was further indicated that two officers were killed while investigat­ing illegal liquor traffic, and one officer was killed while attempting to apprehend a prisoner absent without leave from the Armed Forces. In the same period on a countrywide basis, 278 police officers were killed in the line of duty. In 1966, 48 offi­cers were reported killed in the line of duty, and of those only two would be in­cluded within the coverage of this bill. It is readily apparent that the number of potential claimants under this legis­lation can be contemplated to be small in any given year. However, the impor­tance of the recognition by the Federal Government of responsibillty in this situ­ation is not to be discounted. The At­torney General has referred to the im-

portance of cooperation by State and local law enforcement officers in the en­forcement of Federal laws. It is only right that the Federal Government recognize an equivalent responsibility to those dis­abled or killed while cooperating with the Federal authorities.

The provisions of H.R. 11816 provide for benefits due to the disability incurred while attempting to enforce a Federal law. One estimate based on the number of officers reported to have lost their lives in the 1960-65 period indicate that the officers disabled while attempting to enforce Federal laws in the same period could be expected to number approxi­mately 78.

Mr. Speaker, I feel that the facts dis­cussed in the report on this bill and in the statement of the managers on the part of the House, adequately and fairly summarizes the testimony offered at our subcommittee hearings, that there is a clearly defined need for the system of compensation provided in the bill. It is only just that the Federal Government recognize its responsibility in this con­nection.

The report submitted on this bill, House Report 567 of the 90th Congress, concludes with the observation made by Assistant Attorney General Fred M. Vin­son as to the basis for approval of the bill, and I feel that his words in a clear and direct way summarize the basis for the bill:

The purpose being commendable, the C06t being small and the resulting benefits being great, the enactment of a program to com­pensate the survivors of non-Federal law en­forcement officers who are killed while ap­prehending Federal criminal offenders would be both appropriate and praiseworthy.

Mr. Speaker, I urge all of my colleagues to vote to accept the conference report and thereby adopt the legislation under consideration.

Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.

I move the previous question on the conference report.

The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER. The question is on the

conference report. The question· was taken; and the

Speaker announced that the ayes ap­peared to have it.

Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there wer~yeas 376, nays 0, not votin& 57, as follows:

Abbitt Abernethy Adair Adams Addabbo Albert Anderson, Ill. Anderson,

Tenn. Andrews, Ala. Andrews,

N.Dak. Annunzlo Arends

[Roll No. 71] YEAS-{376

Ashbrook Ashmore Aspinall Ayres Ba.ring Barrett Bates Battin Belcher Bell Bennett Berry Betts Bevm

Biester Bingham Blackburn Blanton Blatnik Boggs Bolling Bolton Bow Brademas Brasco Brinkley Brock Brooks

7908 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March ·27, 1968

Broomfield Gude Mosher Brotzman Haley Moss Brown, Caltf. Hall Murphy, N.Y. Brown, Ohio Halleck Myers Broyhill, N.C. Halpern Natcher Broyhill, Va. Hamilton Nedzi Buchanan Hammer- Nelsen Burke, Fla. schmidt Nichols Burke, Mass. Hanley · Nix :· Burleson Hansen, Idaho O'Hara, m. Burton, Caltf. Hardy O'Konski Burton, Utah Harrison Olsen Bush Harsha O'Neal, Ga. Byrne, Pa. Harvey . O'Neill, Mass. Byrnes, Wis. Hathaway Ottinger Carter Hawkins Passman Casey Hays Patman Cederberg Hebert Patten Chamberlain Hechler, W. Va. Pelly Clancy Heckler, Mass. Perkins Clausen, Henderson Pettis

Don H. Herlong Philbin Clawson, Del Hicks Pickle Cleveland Holifield Pike Cohelan Holland Pirnie Collier Horton Poage Colmer Hosmer Podell Conable Howard Poff Conte Hull Pollock Corbett Hungate Pool Corman Hunt Price, Ill. Cowger· Hutchinson Price, Tex. Cramer lchord Pryor CUiver IrwJn Pucinski Cunningham Jacobs Purcell Curtis Jarman Quie Daddario Joelson Qu1llen Daniels Johnson, Cali!. Railsback Davis, Ga. Johnson, Pa. Randall Davis, Wis. Jonas Rarick Dawson Jones, Ala. Rees de la Garza Jones, Mo. Reid, Ill. Delaney Karth Reid, N.Y. Dellenback Kastenmeier Reifel Denney Kazen Reinecke Dent Kee Reuss Derwinskl Keith Rhodes, Ariz. Devine Kelly Rhodes, Pa. Dickinson King, N.Y. Riegle Diggs Kleppe Rivers Dingell Kornegay Roberts Dole Kupferman Rodino Donohue Kuykendall Rogers, Colo. Dorn Kyl Rogers, Fla. Dow Kyros Ronan Dowdy Laird Rooney, N.Y. Downing Landrum Rooney, Pa. Dulski Langen Rosenthal Duncan Latta Roudebush Dwyer Leggett Roybal Edmondson Lennon Rumsfeld Edwards, Ala. Lipscomb Ruppe E.dwards, La. Lloyd Ryan Eilberg Long, Md. St Germain Erl en born Lukens Satterfield Eshleman McCarthy Schade berg Evans, Colo. McClory Scherle Everett McCloskey Schnee bell Evins, Tenn. McClure Schweiker Fallon McDade Schwengel Farbstein McDonald, Scott Feighan Mich. Shriver Findley McEwen Sikes Fino McFall Sisk Fisher McMillan Skubitz Flood Macdonald, Slack Flynt Mass. Smith, Cali!. Foley MacGregor Smith, N.Y. Ford, Gerald R. Machen Smith, Okla. Ford, Madden Snyder

William D. Mahon Springer Fraser Mailliard· Stafford Frelinghuysen Marsh Staggers Friedel Martin Stanton Fulton, Pa. Mathias, Caltf. Steed Fulton, Tenn. Mathias, Md. Steiger, Ariz. Galifianakis Matsunaga Steiger, Wis. Gallagher May Stratton Gardner Mayne Stuckey Garmatz Meeds Sullivan Gathings Meskill Talcott Giaimo Michel Taylor Gibbons Miller, Ohio Teague, Calif. Gilbert Mills Teague, Tex. Gonzalez Minish Tenzer Goodell Mink Thompson, Ga.. Goodling Minshall Thompson, N.J. Gray Mize Thomson, Wis. Green, Pa. Monagan Tiernan Griffin Montgo~ery Tuck Griffiths Moorhead. Tunney Gross Morgan Udall Grover Morris, N. Mex. Ullman Gubser Morse, Mass. Utt

VanderJagt Vanik Vigorito Waggonner Waldie Walker Wampler Watkins Watson Whalen

Whalley White Whitener Whitten Widnall Wiggins Williams, Pa. Willis Winn · Wolff

Wright Wyatt Wydler Wylie Wyman Yates Young Zion Zwach

NAYS-0

NOT VOTING-57 Ashley Hagan Boland Hanna Bray Hansen, Wash. Brown, Mich. Helstoski Button Jones, N.C. Cabell Karsten Cahill King, Calif. Carey Kirwan Celler Kluczynski Clark Long, La. Conyers McCulloch Eckhardt Miller, Calif. Edwards, Cali!. Moore Esch Morton Fa.seen Murphy, Ill. Fountain O'Hara, Mich. Fuqua Pepper Gettys Resnick Green, Oreg. Robison Gurney Rostenkowski

Roth Roush St.Onge Sandman Saylor Scheuer Selden Shipley Smith, Iowa Stephens Stubblefield Taft VanDeerlin Watts Wilson, Bob Wilson,

CharlesH. Zablocki

So the conference report was agreed to. ·

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

Mr. Murphy of Illlnois with Mr. Bray. Mr. Boland 'With Mr. Cah111. Mr. Celler with Mr. McCulloch. Mr. Clark with Mr. Moore. Mr. Hanna with Mr. Robison. Mr. Miller of California with Mr. Brown of

Michigan. Mrs. Hansen of Washington with Mr.

Morton. Mr. Pepper with Mr. Sandman. Mr. Rostenkowsk1 with Mr. Gurney. Mr. St. Onge with Mr. Button. Mr. Selden with Mr. Esch.

. Mr. Carey with Mr. Roth. Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Saylor. Mr. Zablocki with Mr. Taft. Mr. King of California with Mr. Bob

Wilson. Mr. Resnick with Mr. Conyers. Mr. Gettys with Mr. Fuqua. ·-... , Mr. Fountain with Mr. Cah111. Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Charles H. Wilson. Mr. Watts with Mr. Hagan. Mr. Helstoski with Mr. O'Hara of Michigan. Mr. Van Deerlin with Mr. Long of

Louisiana. Mr.·Smith of Iowa with Mr. Scheuer. Mr. Stubblefield with Mrs. Green of

Oregon. Mr. Shipley with Mr. Stephens. Mr. Edwards of California with Mr. Ashley. Mr. Roush With Mr. Eckhardt.

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The doors were opened. A motion to reconsider was laid on

the table.

PROVIDING FOR CONSIDERATION OF H.R. 4282, ELIMINATING CER­TAIN REQUffiEMENTS FOR OB­TAINING MARKETING ORDERS FOR CHERRIES Mr. ANDERSON of Tennef-.~ee. Mr.

Speaker, by direction of the Commit­tee on Rules, I call up House Resolu­tion 1103 and ask for its immediate con­sideration.

The Clerk read the resolution, as fol­lows:

H.Res.1103 Resolved, That upon the adoption of this

resolution it shall be in order to move that the House resolve itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4282) to amend the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as reenacted and am.ended by the Agri­cultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, so as to eliminate certain re­quirements with respect to effectuating mar­keting orders for cherries. After general de­bate, which shall be confined to the bill and shall continue not to exceed one hour, to be equally divided and oontrolled by the chairman and ranking minority member of the Oommittee on Agriculture, the b1ll shall be read for amendment under the five­minute rule. At the conclusion of the con­sideration of the blll for amendment, the Committee shall rise and report the bill to the House with such amendments as may have been adopted, and the previous ques­tion shall be considered as ordered on the bill and amendments thereto to final pas­sage without intervening motion except one motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Tennessee is recognized for 1 hour.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr .. Speaker, I yield 30 minutes to my dis­tinguished colleague from Tennessee [Mr. QUILLEN], pending which I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, House Resolution 1103 provides an open rule with 1 hour of general debate for consideration of H.R. 4282 to amend the Agricultural Adjust­ment Act so as to eliminate certain re­quirements with respect to effectuating marketing orders for cherries.

H.R. 4282 would permit the establish­ment of a marketing order for cherries for canning or freezing without t:Pe ap- : proval of the processors of cherries. It would place cherries for canning or freezing in the same position as the great majority of other commodities eli­gible for marketing orders.

The purpose of the bill is to establish more orderly marketing conditions of cherries for canning or freezing and to improve the economic status of pro­ducers. For this reason, it is felt that the producers themselves should be the ones to determine whether a marketing order for the commodity should be established.

GENERAL LEAVE Mr. Speaker, I urge the adoption of . Mr. ASHMORE. Mr. Speaker, 1 ask House Resolution 1103 in order that H.R.

unanimous consent that all Members 4282 may be considered. Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, I yield

may have .5 days in which to revise and myself such time as I may consume. · extend their remarks and include ex- Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from traneous matter on the conference Tennessee [Mr. ANDERSON] has st;ated, report. - House Resolution 1103 provides an open

The SPEAKER. Is there. objeotion to rule with 1 hour of general debate for 'the request of the gentleman from the consideration of H.R. 4282, eliminat-South Carolina? ing certain requirements for obtaining

There was no objection. marketing orders for cherries.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7909 The purpose of the bill is to permit the

establishment of a marketing order for cherries for either canning or freezing without the approval of the cherry proc­essors, as is now required by the Agri­cultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937.

The purpose of a marketing order is to assist producers in marketing their crops. Before one can be issued, a public hear­ing is required to determine the need for it. At least two-thirds of the producers by volume of production must support such a marketing order.

Four products-cherries among them­can have a marketing order only if proc­essors also approve its issuance. H.R. 4282 woulci remove this additional re­quirement for obtaining a marketing order for cherries.

This bill was previously on the suspen­sion calendar, and it failed by a vote of 180 to 168.

Mr. Speaker, I am at a loss to know why the processors are eliminated from the measure. By this elimination, their vote has been taken away.

Because the election the last time did not go according to plan, I see no reason the Congress of the United States should be asked to pass legislation to prevent any group from participating in any elec­tion, particularly since their business is so interlinked with that of the growers.

I would take the same position had the other group been eliminated from the measure.

Now to present some arguments against H.R. 4282 when it is discussed in the Committee of the Whole House. I feel it is important that I make these remarks.

No doubt few Federal statutes are as complex and as devoid of clarity as is the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 and its various amendments. Nevertheless, few statutes have a more direct impact on the prices we, as con­sumers, pay for the agricultural prod­ucts which form the essential parts of our daily diet.

What is clear is that H.R. 4282 pre­sents a fundamental change in the con­sistent congressional policy of coupling marketing orders for canning crops with prior processor approval.

The importance of a marketing order under the act is not limited to those di­rectly regulated-it extends to all pur­chasers of agricultural commodities. A marketing order is more than a produc­tion control technique. It affects quality, grade, size, and source of the raw agri­cultural commodity involved, and it may allocate raw materials among the vari­ous marketing mediums-canning, freez­ing, drying, or the fresh market. It may also affect the establishment and distri­bution of surpluses and reserve pools. Without question it affects prices-not only the prices paid to the farmer, but also the prices paid by the American consumer. At a time when American consumerism is becoming an important force nationally, it would be well for this House to recognize that the interest of the consumer as well as that of the farmer and processor must be given fair and orderly consideration.

As most of you are well aware, each

marketing order must be administered, and administration is not without its costs. However, these costs are borne by the processors alone. Thus the very group that stands to lose its voice and its vote in the market order adoption process gives that process its financial support. We must also realize that while the ad­ministration process provides for penal­ties for noncompliance, processors alone are subject to these penalties. Conse­quently, processors now face the prospect of being placed in this vulnerable position upon the vote of producers alone.

Without question removal of the proc­essor approval provision for cherry mar­keting orders represents a change in basic agricultural policy. And it is a change that cannot be called consistent with the act's congressional history. We must not take this step without first pausing for ·a long, hard look at the pro­posed legislation and without assuring ourselves that such a procedure will re­bound to the best interests of the three major groups involved-producers, proc­essors, and consumers.

Mr. Speaker, when this measure was before the House Committee on Rules the proponents linked it to the increase in farm labor prices. I say to you that this is just the beginning. If you are going to take away the vote of the proc­essors of cherries, why not take away the vote of the processors of cranberries, grapefruit, and apples, which are also covered under the same 1937 act.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, I urge the House to reject this bill.

Mr. Speaker, I am opposed to the rule, but I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speak­er, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. QUILLEN I shall be happy to yield at this time to my distinguished col­league, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. ANDERSON].

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, am I not correct in my under­standing that with respect to the mar­keting orders that are dealt with in this bill they would apply to and would regu­late not only the quantity but also the quality, the grading, the size of the raw product that will be handled by the processor and, thus, in effect, a market­ing order of this kind has an impact upon the market that is then available to the processor of the raw product?

Mr. QUILLEN. The gentleman from Illinois is entirely correct.

Mr. ANDERSON of Illinois. Mr. Speaker, if the distinguished gentleman from Tennessee will yield further, I wish to associate myself with the remarks which have been made by the distin­guished gentleman in the well.

Mr. QUILLEN. I thank the gentleman for his contribution.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, I wonder if the distinguished gentleman from Illinois would yield 5 minutes to me at this point during the course of this debate?

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, I am most happy to yield 5 minutes to the distin­guished gentlemen from Iowa [Mr. KYL].

<By unanimous consent, Mr. KYL was allowed to speak out of order.)

SGT. ROBERT JAMES COMSTOCK

Mr. KYL. Mr. Speaker, Army Sgt. Robert· James Comstock, age 22, whose parents, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Comstock live in Lovilia, Iowa, was killed in action in Vietnam March 9. The sergeant had sent a letter to his parents with a request that it not be opened unless he became a Vietnam casualty. This month Ser­geant Comstock's parents were notified that he had been killed in Vietnam. His letter has now been opened. That letter is a great message for all Americans:

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH VIETNAM,

February 26, 1968. To All My Loved Ones:

This letter is not merely intended for my parents, whom I love dearly, nor for my girl, whom most of my thoughts go out to as I spend my time here. It goes instead to my fellow citizens of the greatest country on earth.

I realize that I am a very small portion of all Americans. And, if the Lord should see fit that I die here, my death will only be a small contribution to our struggle here.

But to prepare for just such an event, I would like to say something about my oountry.

To me, the United States of America stands as a family. Every family has its black sheep, its family differences, its treasured memories. The same is true of this country. We have men and women capable of crime violence, and disrespect for her colors. Just as some people have no regard for (their} family's name, certain citizens of this coun­try possess the same (lack of} spirit for (their} homeland.

We of the military services in +,his conflict and conflict,i throughout American history are taught to serve under three small, yet large, words. These are Duty, Honor, Coun­try. We are all bound by these three mighty chains.

Our first and foremost command is devo­tion to duty. This is not merely doing our duty as ordered by an immediate superior, al­though this is where it starts. We are bound to serve our country ·in whatever way we can to defend her shores.

Honor is the next step. Above all, we must preserve the honor of this country brought about by the hardship and suffering of so many before us, an_d to insure that wher­ever we go we can say, "I am an American" with a strong note of pride.

The third, and I believe the most impor­tant, is country: to defend this country so dearly paid for by the lives of our fighting men before my time and at the present time here (in Vietnam}.

Many people undoubtedly ask: "Why send me to die in a small country so far from our shores?" I don't know, but maybe the same question was asked in the first World War, the second, and Korea. But the answer re­mains the same, to keep the inevitable fight from our shores. As long as man is ambitious there will be we.rs.

It is my dream to return some day to the shores of America and start a family of my own. This is what I'm striving for over here-­that my children will have the chance to say, "I'm a free American." I:!: I must give my life over here so that my brothers and sisters may say this, then I feel in the deepest part of my heart that I have not died in vain.

This letter is not to be read by my family a.lone. I believe they realize what I am here for. But I would rather that some of the so­called American citizens who seem to feel that we are only fighting for some principle that is entirely un-American (would read it}.

To them I dedicate this letter and my life. If I should die, please look in a mirror and say, "I am a. true American."

Sgt. ROBERT J. COMSTOCK.

7910 ·coNGRESSIONAL RECORD-· HOUSE March 27,- 1968

Mr. -PA'ITEN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. KYL. I will be happy to yield to the gentleman from New Jersey.

Mr. PATI'EN. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, it would appear to me the letter the gentleman has just read is of sufficient interest to receive wide publicity, and some of us, I am sure, would be gratified if our news media such as the television, radio, and news­paper outlets, would use this letter, as widely as some of the other material they use on Vietnam. And I would sug­gest that any steps the gentleman might be able to take in that direction would be appreciated.

Mr. KYL. I thank the gentleman for · his observations.

Mr. QUILLEN. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time, but I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. ANDERSON of Tennessee. Mr. Speaker, I have no further requests for time.

Mr. Speaker, I move the previous question on the resolution.

The previous question was ordered. The SPEAKER. The question is on

the resolution. The question was taken, and the

Speaker announced that the ayes ap­peared to have it.

Mr. FULTON of Pennsylvania. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order th~t a quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER. Evidently a quorum is not present.

The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will call the roll.

The question was taken; and there were--yeas 316, nays 45, not voting 72, as follows:

Abbitt Abernethy Adams Addabbo Albert Anderson,

Tenn. Andrews, Ala. Andrews,

N.Dak. ·Annunzio Ashbrook Ashmore Aspinall Ayres Barrett Bates Bell Berry Bevill Bi ester Bingham Blackburn Blanton Blatnik Boggs Bolling Bolton Bow Brademas Brasco Brinkley Brooks Broomfield Brotzman Brown, Ca.llt. Broyhill, N.C. Broyhill, ·Va. Buchanan Burke, Fla. Burke, Mass.

[Roll No. 72] YEAS-316

Burleson Burton, Calif. Burton, Utah Bush Button Byrne, Pa. Carter Casey Cederberg Chamberlain Clancy Clark Clausen,

DonH. Clawson, Del Cleveland Colmer Conable Conte Corman Cowger Culver Daddario Daniels Davis, Ga. Dawson dela Garza Delaney Dellen back Dent Derwin ski Devine Dickinson Dole Donohue Dorn Dow Dowdy Downing Dul ski Dwyer

Eckhardt Edmondson Edwards, Ala. Edwards, La. Eilberg Erlenborn Evans, Colo. Evins, Tenn. Fallon Farbstein Fascell Feighan Fino Fisher Flood Flynt Foley Ford, Gerald R. Ford,

WilliamD. Fraser Fulton, Tenn. Galifianakis Gallagher Garmatz Gathings Gettys Giaimo Gibbons Gilbert Gonzalez Goodell Goodling Gray Green, Pa. Griffin Griffiths Grover Gubser Gude Halleck

Halpern Ma.1111ard Ronan Hamilton Marsh Rooney, N.Y. Hammer- Martin Rosenthal

schmidt Mathias, Call.1'. Roybal Hanley Mathias, Md. Rumsfeld Hansen, Idaho Matsunaga Ruppe Hansen, Wash. May Ryan . Hardy Mayne St Germain Harsha Meeds Satterfield Harvey Meskill Schade berg Hathaway Michel Scher le Hays Miller, Ohio Scheuer Hebert Mills Schneebeli Hechler, W. Va. Minish Schweiker Heckler, Mass. Mink Schwengel Henderson Mize Scott Hicks Monagan Shriver Holifield Montgomery Sikes Horton Moorhead Slack Hosmer Morgan Smith, N.Y. Howard Morris, N. Mex. Smith, Okla. Hull Moss Snyder Hungate Murphy, N.Y. Stafford !chord Myers Stanton Irwin Natcher Steed Jacobs Nedzi Steiger, Ariz. Jarman Nichols Stuckey Joelson Nix Talcott Johnson, Calif. O'Hara, Ill. Taylor Johnson, Pa. O'Hara, Mich. Teague, Calif. Jonas Olsen Tenzer Jones, Ala. O'Neal, Ga. Thompson, Ga. Jones, Mo. O'Neill, Mass. Thompson, N .J. Karth Ottinger Tiernan Kastenmeier Passman Tuck Kazen Patman Tunney Kee Perkins Udall Kei~h Pettis Utt Kelly Pike Van Deerlin King, N.Y. Pirnie Vander Jagt Kleppe Poage Vanik Kupferman Podell Vigorito Kuykendall Poff Waggonner Kyl Pollock Walker Kyros Pool Wampler Landrum Price, Ill. Watkins Leggett Price, Tex. Whalen Lennon Pryor Whalley Lipscomb Pucinski White Long, La. Purcell Whitener Long, Md. Quie Whitten Lukens Railsback Widnall McCarthy Randall Wiggins McC1ory Rarick Williams, Pa. McCloskey Rees Willis McClure Reid, N.Y. Winn McDa.de Reifel Wolff McDonald, Reinecke Wright

Mich. Reuss Wyatt McEwen Rhodes, Ariz. Wydler McFall Rhodes, Pa. Wylie Macdonald, Riegle Wyman

Mass. Rivers Yates ·MacGregor Roberts Young Machen Rodino Zion Madden Rogers, Colo. Zwach Mahon Rogers, Fla.

NAYB-45 Anderson, Ill. Baring Battin -Belcher Bennett Betts

Dingell Lloyd Duncan McMillan Eshleman Minshall Everett Mosher Fulton, Pa. O'Konski Gardner Patten

Brock Byrnes, Wis. Collier Corbett Cramer Cunningham Curtis

Gross Pelly Haley Quillen Hall Reid, Ill. Harrison Roudebush Hunt Steiger, Wis. Hutchinson Stratton Laird Thomson, Wis.

Davis, Wis. Denney

Langen Waldie Latta Watson

NOT VOTING-72 · Adair Friedel Arends Fuqua ·Ashley Green, Oreg. Boland Gurney Bray Hagan Brown, Mich. Hanna Brown, Ohio Hawkins Cabell Helstoski Cahill Herlong Carey Holland Celler Jones, N.C. Cohelan Karsten Conyers King, Calif. Diggs . Kirwan Edwards, Calif. Kluczynskl Esch Kornegay Findley McCulloch Fountain Miller, Calif. Frelinghuysen Moore

Morse, Mass. Morton Murphy,Ill. Nelsen Pepper Philbin Pickle Resnick Robison Rooney, Pa. Rostenkowskl Roth Roush St.Onge Sandman Saylor Selden Shipley S isk

Skubitz Stubblefield Wilson, Bob Smith, Calif. Sullivan Wilson, Smith, Iowa Taft Charles H. Springer Teague, Tex. Zablocki Staggers Ullman Stephens Watts

So the resolution was agreed to. The Clerk announced the following

pairs: Mr. Kirwan with Mr. Arends. Mr. St. Onge with Mr. Cahill. Mr. Fountain with Mr. Springer. Mr. King of California with Mr. Saylor. Mr. Miller of California with Mr. Bob Wil-

son. Mr. Kornegay with Mr. Nelsen. Mr. Celler with Mr. McCulloch. Mrs. Sullivan with Mr. Moore. Mr. Pickle with Mr. Bray. Mr. Kluczynski with Mr. Findley. Mr. Cabell with Mr. Gurney. Mr. Fuqua with Mr. Taft. Mr. Boland with Mr. Morse. Mr. Herlong with Mr. Brown of Michigan. Mr. Charles H. Wilson with Mr. Morton. Mr. Zablocki with Mr. Adair. Mr. Philbin with Mr. Frelinghuysen. Mr. Karsten with Mr. Robison. Mr. Teague of Texas with Mr. Smith of

California. Mr. Hagan with Mr. Watson. Mr. Watts with Mr. Brown of Ohio. Mr. Pepper with Mr. Sandman. Mr. Rostenkowski with Mr. Skubitz. Mr. Rooney of Pennsylvania with Mr. Roth. Mr. Ullman with Mr. Esch. Mr. ·Jones of North Carolina with Mr.

Friedel. Mr. Cohelan with Mr. Diggs. Mr. Hawkins with Mr. Helstoskl. Mr. Smith of Iowa with Mr. Conyers. Mr. Murphy of Illinois with Mr. Ashley. Mr. Carey with Mr. Edwards of California. Mr. Hanna with Mrs. Green of Oregon. Mr. Stubblefield with Mr. Staggers. Mr. Resnick with Mr. Stephens. Mr. Shipley with Mr. Sikes. Mr. Selden with Mr. Roush.

Mr. OTTINGER changed his vote from "nay" to "yea."

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

The doors were opened. A motion to reconsider was laid on the

table.

ELIMINATING CERTAIN REQUffiE­MENTS FOR OBTAINING MARKET­ING ORDERS FOR CHERRIES Mr. POAGE. Mr. Speaker, I move that

the House resolve itself into the Commit­tee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consideration of the bill (H.R. 4282) to amend the Agricul­tural Adjustment Act, as reenacted and amended by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, so as to eliminate certain requirements with respect to effectuating marketing orders for chenies.

The motion was agreed to. IN THE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE

Accordingly the House resolved itself into the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union for the consid­eration of the bill H.R. 4282, with Mr. MOORHEAD in the chair.

The Clerk read the title of the bill. By unanimous consent, the first read­

ing of the bill was dispensed with. The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the

gentleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE] will ·be recognized for 30 minutes and the

March. 27t 1968 . CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7911 gentleman fr.om Oklahoma [Mr. BEi:;- tion was made. It was then presented on CHER] will be recognized for 30 minutes. the Suspension Calendar, and received

The Chair recognizes the gentleman a majority of the votes, but not the nec-from Texas [Mr. EoAGE]. essary two-thirds majority; so it now

Mr. POAGE. Mr. Chairman, I. yield comes to the floor of the House under myself such time as I may consume. this rule.

Mr. Chairman, this is the third time Mr. Chairman, I hope that the House that this bill has· been before this House ·will adopt this bill. and I hope that the third time is the I reserve the balance of my time. proverbial charm. Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, will

Mr. Chairman,. this bill is so simple the gentleman yield? and relatively minor, it seems to me that Mr. POAGE. I yield to the gentleman the House is spending an undue amount from Virginia. of time in its discussion. But,. I suppose Mr. DOWNING. I thank the chairman every measure has long and. far-reaching for yielding to me. implications. I suppose that is true. with Mr. Chairman, I am very much in­reference to the bill now under consid- · terested in this legislation, and I would eration. like to ask the distinguished chairman

Mr. Chairman, what this bill would of the Committee on Agriculture one do, if passed, is to change the law with question. respect to canning cherries so as to al- Mr. POAGE. The gentleman would low the processors to adopt a marketing perhaps be better advised to ask the au­quota upon the basis. upon which most thor of the bill any questions he might marketing orders are authorized to be have since I am not an expert on cherries, adopted. but go ahead.

There are only four commodities in the M.r. I~O~NING. Why is.this l~islat~on United States at the present time that so dis~rmunatory? Why did you Just pick require the concurrence of processors :i:n cherries? . . . order to adopt· a marketing order. I do Mr: POAGE. We did not Just pick not know why that provision was placed cherries. If ~he gentleman had followed in the bill years ago, and I do not know the <;>ibserva.t1ons I made a moment ago, why these particular commodities were I sa~d t1:13,t there. are only four com­singled out. The four commodities are mod1~ies m the United States at the pres­cherries, apples, cranberries, and grape- ent trme where the pro~essors havE: a fruit, for processing or freezing. If they veto over th~ producers m a marketmg are not for processing or freezing the order. Chernes happen to be o?e of those concurrence of the processors is not re- four. The others are cranbernes, apples, quired. and .grapefruit,. all for proce~~g ~r

Of course, the existing law simply gives freezmg. Th~re is no such prohib1t10_n if the processors an absolute veto as the produc~ IS ~ol~ f~sh. I have n~ idea against any kind of marketing order. So why. the d~cnmmat10? was ori.gmally I believe that it comes down to the prop- put m the bill, and I said so a while ago, osition that possibly those who do not and I do not know why Vfe let the proces ... believe in any· marketing orders would sors con~r?l the marketmg of ~he~e ~our oppose this proposal, but if on the other c?mmodities, but ~s to th~ d1~ci::rm11:a­hand you believe that a marketing order t1on, we are removmg the d1Scr~~mat1on is an acceptable and usable tool fn order on one of the fou:r c?mmod1t1es, a~d to bring about the so-called muscle in t~r~ ar~ three that still have the d1s­the marketplace, why, I would assume cnmmation. that you would be disposed to support Mr. DOWNING. Why- do you not take this legislation. the other three now?

. . . Mr. POAGE. We cannot take the other The comrmttee passed the legISla~on three now, because they are not before

with only one adverse vote. I belleve the House there were possibly some who did not Mr. VIGORITO. Mr. Chairman, will vote. It was a voice vote,. but. only one the gentleman yield? vote was reported as against it. Mr. POAGE. I yield. to the gentleman

There are some who feel that market- from Pennsylvania. ing orders .are not goo~. but most every- Mr. VIGORITO: The reason this bill body in this House belleves that we need contains only cherries is because the to ~o something to i~prove the status of cherry industry in my district and the agricultural marketmg, and most of five states surrounding the Great them speak. fn br?ad terms a~out how Lakes--and since I am a member oi the they are gomg to improve the market- Committee on .Agriculture-they the ing ability" ~f. the farmer. The most gen- producers, approached me to ha.v~ the eral suggestion that has . been made is cherries removed so that the processors the further use of marketmg orders. cannot block the marketing order. It is

Now, there are no cherries produced that simple. in my district, and there are no cherries Mr. POAGE. I believe that is a simple produced in my State. We are solely con- answer to the gentleman from Virginia sumers of cherries. We like them in our too-if the gentleman from Virgini~ ice cream and like them in cans, but we would hear me--I think. this probably do not produce them. But it does seem to is the answer to his question, that prob­me that these people-and there are only ably back there when this original legis­a few hundred of them, I understand, lation was passed, the processors of these who do produce these cherries--should commodities were on the· ball, and were have some right to determine for them- before the Congress, and succeeded ip selves the methods that they would use getting their type of legislation passed, in marketing. That is what this bill does. whereas the other processors were not so

The bill was presented to this House diligent-and that probably explains on the Consent Calendar, and an objec- it---just as the gentleman explained-

why cherries, rather than other com­modities, were involved here. . Mr. TEAGUE of California. Mr. Chair­man, I yield myself such time as I may

. consume, and suca: time as I may con­sume will not be very much.

Mr. Chairman, I support ·thi-s · legisla­tion. I would like to tell you very briefly why. I like this because it is a self-help program for a nonsubsidized segment of American agriculture.

I would like to be sure that we· all un­derstand this. The· canned and frozen cherry business, as is almost wholly true of fruits and vegetables in other areas, and other types, are not subsidized.

It is difficult for me to see how any Members of the Congress, coming from an area which receives agricultural sub­sidies, could be against an attempt by farmers-farmers of an unsubsidized segment of agriculture-in organizing themselves to try to improve their lot at no cost to the Government.

I repeat also for the benefl t of the city Members here that this is not a sub­sidy program. It is an attempt on the part: of the farmers to help themselves.

I hope the bill will be approved and adopted.

I now yield 5 minutes to the gentle­man from Michigan [Mr. HUTCHINSON].

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE of California. I will yield first to the gentleman from California.

Mr. McFALL. I wish to associate my­self with my friend, the gentleman from California, in his remarks about the ne­cessity for this bill, and as to how it will provide the producers of cherries, I be­lieve, the same fair treatment that is provided other commodities in market­ing order legislation, and will permit them to have an opportunity for a better bargaining position to get a fairer share of the consumer's dollar.

One of the problems that producers have is to get a larger share of the dollar that is spent by the consumer. All of the other marketing orders provide this op­portunity, but when it comes to cherries, it can be vetoed by the processor. I be­lieve that that is unfair treatment for the cherry growers. It is imperative that the farmer be given more bargaining power in the marketplace.

Mr. KYL. Mr. Chairman, would the gentleman yield?

Mr. TEAGUE of California. I yield to the gentleman from Iowa.

Mr. KYL. I believe it might be helpful if the gentleman would explain to the Committee the nature of the marketing orders which are involved here. He said that there is no subsidy. There is some question among the membership as t'.:l just what kind of marketing order is involved.

Mr. T.EAGUE. of California. I would say to the gentleman I believe it is im­possible, certainly for me, or for any­one to answer that question.

A marketing order has not yet been formulated. When it is proposed. by the Secretary of Agriculture it will have to be subjected to public hearings, and then before it is adopted it will have to be approved by two-thirds of the producers or farmers voting. So I cannot tell you what the provisions of the marketing or-

7912 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968

der will be, and I do not think that any­body else can.

Po~ibly the gentleman from Pennsyl­vania can answer your question, and you might direct your question to him when he speaks later.

Now, Mr. Chairman, before I yield to the gentleman from Michigan I would like to make clear that I, like the gen­tleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE], have no canning or freezing of cherries in my district at all. So I do not have any per­sonal interest in this bill whatsoever.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I yield to the gen­tleman from Michigan [Mr. HUTCHIN­SON] 5 minutes.

Mr. HUTCHINSON. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to this measure. In reading the committee report and listen­ing to the remarks of the chairman of the full committee, one would get the im­pression that no one can quite under­stand why it is that in the cherry busi­ness, the cherry processors were ever given a vote on marketing orders. I think it is important to remember that there are only four processing fruits that are subject to marketing orders under the present law. They have been enumerated before. They are grapefruit, cranberries, cherries, and apples.

The history of it is that grapefruit were subject to marketing orders prior to 1961. In the omnibus agriculture bill of 1961 the other three fruits-cranber­ries, cherries and apples-were made subject to orders.

The provisions of the law prior to 1961 relative to grapefruit provided that in the makeup of the grapefruit marketing order the processors would have a vote. So when these others were added, the same procedures were oarried forth.

But, Mr. Chairman, I think that of these four fruits, perhaps cherries are a little bit unique in that, so far as I know, the red tart cherries are wholly a process­ing fruit. I do not know of any, or a very, very small portion of the red tart cherry market which is in fresh fruit. It is a processing fruit. So since producers are entirely dependent for a market upon processors-upon freezers and canners­this matter, so far as the cherry business is concerned, is perhaps more of a part­nership effort than even the other three; that is to say, the producers are depend­ent upon the processors as are the proc­essors dependent upon the producers.

The present arrangement whereby each of these groups has a voice, that is, a voting voice in the approval of a mar­keting order simply assures that what­ever marketing order is worked out will be worked out to the mutual benefit of both par~ of this more or less unit sys­tem, as I have said, because one part is so dependent upon the other. That is the reason, that is the justification for per­mitting cherry processors a vote in the makeup of a marketing order.

I recognize that the report includes a letter from the Secretary of Agriculture in which the Department points out, rightfully, that the promulgation of a marketing order in cherries requires a public hearing on the proposed program, and that any order that is finally sub­mitted to the industry must be based upon evidence submitted at the hearing.

Most marketing orders also provide that there will be some processors repre­sented on the administrative committee, and that the composition of the commit­tee is a subject to be considered at the hearing.

So the Department of Agriculture­and apparently a majority of the Agri­culture Committee of this House-be­lieves that is enough protection for proc­essor interests, and that they do not need a vote. But I submit in answer to that argument, so long as the processor has a vote in this matter, it will be an equal assurance that whatever marketing or­der is actually worked out, it will be for­mulated with a view that it has to get the approval of the processors as well as the producers.

My recollection of the debate on the bill when it was brought up under a sus­pension of the rules is that the propo­nents said they had a Federal cherry marketing order once and it failed of adoption because the processors did not vote for it. The fact is, neither did the producers oarry that particular market­ing order. And that was the only Federal marketing order on cherries that has been formulated and submitted to ref­erendum.

The processors did not carry that par­ticular marketing order either. The pro­ducers failed to carry it by approximately 6 or 7 percent, if I recall it correctly.

The statement on the floor of the House during the previous debate was that the processors supported it only to the extent of about 35 percent. As a mat­ter of fact, if there is any validity to the argument that processors are just ab­solutely opposed to the ;dea of any mar­keting order and never would support any at all, what is inte:i:esting indeed is that 35 percent of the processors voted in favor of the one that was submitted.

In my State of Michigan this spring, a State marketing order in cherries was submitted under a law which I believe does not provide for any processor vote, but interestingly enough the producers themselves did not carry it.

We have to remember that this par­ticular bill does not have anything to do with whether or not we have a marketing order. This bill is not going to provide for or against marketing orders. This bill simply and admittedly has to do with the very narrow question-the gen­tleman from Texas, the chai.rman of the committee says it is a very minor ques­tion, and I think it is more than minor, but I will agree it is a narrow question­which is simply whether, if there is to be a marketing order submitted for ap­proval in this particular processing fruit, cherries-and they are totally a process­ing fruit-there ought not to be a recog­nition that the producers and processors just have to work together. The thing is not going to work until we can get an order that can have support of both groups. I submit this bill should be voted down, and I ask the Members to vote against it.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 4 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to cover briefly two of the points just mentioned by the gentleman who was in the well.

We have had a slight misunderstanding on the number of processors voting in the marketing order the gentleman de­scribed. My information was that in that particular marketing order 26 percent of the processors voted for it, and 74 per­cent voted against it. Th~ following year, when a proposal was made for another marketing order, the Secretary of Agri­culture ruled that the overwhelming op­position of the processors made a second election virtually useless.

We come to the essential question: Are we interested in giving cherry producers an opportunity to organize or not? We g-ave them a specious offer in 1961, when we gave them a right to have a market­ing order but tagged on an improbable requirement of processor approval. There are six processors that control a quarter of the industry by themselves. As the chairman of the full committee has said, virtually everyone has some interest in seeing the lagging farm economy as­sisted. As the gentleman from Cali­fornia [Mr. TEAGUE] pointed out, we can assist it this way without Government subsidy, letting people help themselves, but we are not really being fair with cherry producers of this country if we give them a right to organize a market­ing ordeT when, in fact, practically no such possibility exists under present law. This bill represen~ a rather rare occur­rence in this House.

It is supported by every major farm organization in the United States. It is supported by the National Grange, the American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Farmers Union, the National Farmers Organization, and every other farm group which has addressed itself to this legislation. It has no opposition from any organized farm group that I know of.

The total number of marketing orders exceeds 100. There are 121, as a matter of fact. They cover 34 separate commod­ities. Seventy-one of them involve milk. Forty-seven of them involve fruits.

There are only four that have any re­quirement of processor approval. It is that discrimination against one of those who raise commodities for canning and freezing we are trying to eliminate in this bill.

The gentleman from Virginia [Mr. DOWNING] asked why we do not propose similar amendments for canning grape­fruit, apples, and cranberries. The an­swer is that it has been the tradition of the Committee on Agriculture-and I be­lieve a proper one-to undertake these marketing order questions commodity by commodity. We deal with them sepa­rately, because milk marketing orders are different from cherry marketing orders. We do not attempt to decide all the mar­keting order questions in the United States in one piece of legislation. That is the reason why this bill deals specifi­cally with cherries.

Mr. McFALL. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. FOLEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. McFALL. The gentleman from Michigan pointed out there should be a partnership in this industry. Would not the gentleman agree one cannot have a

March 27, _1968 CONGRESSIONAL .RECORD- HOUSE 7913 partnership if one of the parties in­volved has a complete. vete over ·whether or- not there should be some kind of cooperative arrangement?

Mr. FOLEY. The. gentleman is quite correct. It is not a partnership. It is not even fairly offering- any opportunity to­the prodUcers. They are offered a false invitation which purports to say "you can have a marketing order if you elect to do so," when in reality a veto is there which cannot be overcome.

We deal only with the question of who should be a qualified elector in these marketing order elections.

· I point out to the committee that in almost every marketing order there is an administrative committee, which in­cludes processors or handle .. s as well as growers, whether they have any part in setting up the marketing order or not. Where there is not the processor or handler representation on the adminis­trative committee there is almost always an advisory committee of the processors to assist in the administration of the order.

Mr. TEAGUE of California. Mr. Chair­man, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from California [Mr. GUBSER].

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, each one of us, in discharging his responsibility as a Member of this body, makes an earnest attempt to shed his prejudices and to be as objective as possible. But all of us, being human beings and subject to human frailties, do not always succeed.

So I confess, frankly, if I am prejudiced and if there is a lapse in my objectivity it is on the side of the farmer, because th-at is my second occupation. I am a pro­ducer of canned fruits; though not cher­ries. I raise Bartlett pears for canning.

Because of that prejudice and for sound unprejudiced reason I am whole­heartedly in opposition to this bill.

Members have already heard from other speakers as to what brought this bill about. We have a regulation under which two-thirds of the farmers have to vote for a marketing order, and 50 per­cent of the processors must do likewise. In this case 50 percent of the processors­did not vote favorably, but neither did the farmers. So this bill would impose upon a very substantial minority of farmers something which is against their will. That is not American, in my opin­ion.

The implication has been made here that this cherry marketing situation which allows a processor a vote is some­thing unique.

Let us remember that we are only talk­ing about fruits and vegetables for can­ning and freezing. Just six commodities, used in canning and freezing, asparagus, olives, grapefruit, cherries, cranberries. and apples---in just three States---are under marketing orders. So all we are talking about here are six crops. This is not the great, unique exception that some would have you believe it is.

Growing and processing of canned fruits are both a part of the orderly marketing process and you simply can­not separate the two. What the farmer gets for what he raises is determined by what the housewife will pay when she picks that can of fruit up- on the super-

market shelf, and the processor is very definitely involved in this chain of events. We simply cannot separate grow­ing and processing. Yet, that is exactly what this bilI would ask you to do. In the marketing of fresh fruit, growing and handling can be separated. But a canner must· have some control over his raw product if he is to produce a product the housewife will buy.

This bill is unfair. The processor is going to have to pay most of the costs of the marketing order. He is going to have to pay many of the bills. He is going to be subject to all of the penalties of a marketing order program and he will receive no guarantee that he will have any representation whatsoever on that board which is going to determine what happens to his investment in the product that he offers for sale~ This amounts to taxation without representation.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. Could I finish my state­ment? I have so short a time. I will try to save some time to yield to the gentleman.

Now let us talk about marketing orders themselves for just a moment. I have been engaged in specialty agriculture all my life. One of the things that has helped to make ours a healthy industry, is that we have stayed away from Government regulation. We believe in freedom of competition in the marketplace. We have not subjected ourselves to regulations made by someone else. We have let the laws of supply and demand operate and we have had a successful industry. I hope we can keep it up.

Marketing orders are not the panacea for every agricultural marketing pro­gram. You cannot ignore the fact that a farm product can be sold only in such quantities and at such prices as the housewife will pay for and buy in the supermarket. You cannot escape the laws of supply and demand.

Now, Mr. Chairman, let me give you just a few quotations from an expert on the subject of marketing orders. This appears in volume 6, No. 2, the year 1966, for the Food Research Institute study published at Stanford University by Dr. John R. Jamieson, who is on the staff of the food research industry. I shall read you only a few sentences from his report regarding the cling peach State market­ing order in California:

There are a number of similarities between agricultural producer marketing order groups and industrial cartels.

That prices and revenues can be raised in the short-run seemed evident in the first years_ of the cling peach order. Evidence pre­sented in this article suggests that until about 1959 technical developments on the farm and in the cannery allowed the indus­try to main-tain higher than competitive raw product prices in the face of declining prices for the canned product. Little structural ad­justmen-t of the industry took pla:ce until that. time. However, since about 1959, many changes have occurred which seem. to indi­cate that some fundamental shifts are tak­ing place in the industry. In general, these changes have been in the direction of in­creased integration between fewer and larger growers and processors. Less efflcient growers were maintained in production as long as cling peach returns were attractive relative to available alternatives.

The small, high-cost producers who seem to be the perennial intended beneficiaries of legisla:tive favor- have largely left the cling pee.ch industry as they have most other sim.11ar agricultural industl'.ies.

Under these oonditions, producer cartels that attempt to exert monopoly control over their product a.re likely to find their markets eroded by competitive substitutes.

The evldence presented here suggests that governmentally enforced authority to control supply is a potent weapon in the hands of a commodity-industry. In the cling peach industry exertion of available market power seems to have provided an incentive for some producers to expand capacity beyond that justified by competitive conditions. As production increased many higher-cost pro­ducers were eventually forced to leave the indus,try.

I.t is a defensible asse.rtion that in Ameri­can agricultural policy "controls beget con­trols." Marketing order supply restrictions are generally intended to overcome problems arising fom excessive annual fluctuations in yields of perishable crops. In the cling peach industry they have more recently been used to dampen the effects of a chronic oversupply which the controls themselves have appar­ently enoouraged.

Mr. Chairman, the processor of cling peaches in California has only one al­ternative today and that is to become the grower. Marketing orders fly in the face of the laws of supply and demand by artificially separating growing from processing and often imposing condi­tions on a raw product which conflict with the requirements of processing and marketing.

So the small farmer is squeezed out to be replaced by the processor himself. That is exactly what has happened in the State of California under a State marketing order for cling peaches.

There has been talk about the "veto power" which the canners would be able to exercise against growers. But there is another side to the coin. Actually a mar­keting order like that proposed in this bill grants dictatorial powers to the grower. The processor knows what his raw product should be if he is to sell it at a profit to both himself and the farmer. Though he has invested mil­lions of dollars in plant and equipment, his operation is severely limited and al­most completely limited by the few growers who say, "You cannot can apri­cots of this size and pears of that size. We control your final product because we control the raw material which goes into it.•r

Mr. Chairman, is it fair for the grow­ers, without a cent invested in process­ing plant and equipment t;o be able to dictate the terms under which the proc­essor shall can his product and sell it? Is it fair that the procesor does not even have a voice in what kind of r.aw product he shall process?

Mr. Chairman, I say that if there is a veto power granted to one facet of this industry, there is a dictatorship granted to another facet of the industry. This bill should be defeated.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. GUBSER. I yield to the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I am sure that the gentleman from California [Mr. GuBSERl, the gentleman now in the well,

7914 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

does not mean to imply that the admin­istrative cost will be paid for by the processors and that this will ultimately wind up as a part of the financing of the production? .

Mr. GUBSER. I am sorry that I did not quite hear the gentleman's question.

Mr. FOLEY. Is it not correct that the administrative costs of many of these programs are borne by the Department of Agriculture to the extent of about 25 percent?

Mr. GUBSER. My response to the ques­tion which has been propounded by the gentleman from Washington [Mr. FOLEY] is that I still find that these costs involved with the production of the finished product are passed on as costs which must be borne by the American housewife in the form of higher prices.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gen­tleman will yield further, is it not cor­rect that the administrative cost comes out of tax funds?

Mr. GUBSER. I did not hear the gen­tleman's question.

Mr. FOLEY. Is it not true the the esti­mated cost of $25,000 a year, adminis­trative cost, comes from the Department of Agriculture from tax funds?

Mr. GUBSER. This is very true. How­ever, it is my opinion that the gentleman from Washington will agree that there are certain costs which are borne by the producer as well as by the processor. The $25,000 items covers only the cost of con­ducting the referendum. All other costs are eventually borne by the processor.

Mr. FOLEY. Is it not true that those additional costs can be obtained from the processors which have to be taken into consideration with the prices which they pay to the growers of the product in­volved?

Mr. GUBSER. What I am saying is this: We want to help the grower; we don't want to lower the price he receives. So that alternative is out the window.

Mr. FOLEY: Mr. Chairman, if the gen­tleman will yield further, it is not true. I would ask the gentleman who has been a pear grower himself that did he not, together with the majority of the pear growers, present himself before the Com­mittee on Agriculture and ask for an au­thorization for a marketing order for the canning and freezing of pears?

Mr. GUBSER. I did not appear. I do not favor a pear marketing order, though many growers do. I am in the minority. What I am undertaking is a look 10 years down the road with an eye to keeping the processor from becoming the pear grower and thereby destroying the op­eration of small growers. In other words, if we create cartels, the small grower­producer will cease to exist.

The CHAffiMAN. The time of the gen­tleman from California has expired.

Mr. TEAGUE of California. Mr. Chair­man, I yield the gentleman 1 additional minute during which to continue to re­spond to the questions propounded by the gentleman from Washington.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, if the gentleman will yield further, I wonder if the gentleman would not inform the Committee whether the study from which he quoted, from the Food Institute of Stanford University, is financed in

part by the principal opponents of this legislation?

Mr. GUBSER. I have no knowledge of the financing of the various institutes at Stanford University, which is located in the congressional district which it is my honor to represent. I have confidence in the academic honesty of the Stanford people and will stand up and fight to defend their integrity. There is no finer university in the entire world.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself 2 minutes.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to im­pugn the academic integrity of Stanford University, but I do believe it is fair to have the whole question in perspective, and I would like to read from the hear­ings on this bill at page 58:

The members of this committee have been supplied with copies of a report of a study of marketing orders for processing crops by Profs. John A. Jamison and Karl Brandt of the Stanford University Food Research Insti­tute, financed in part by a grant from the National Canners Association.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back the bal­ance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman from Washington has consumed 1 minute.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. DOWNING].

Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman, I hope my colleagues in the House will vote this measure down. I never thought I would stand up here and say that any bill is discriminatory, but believe me, this one is. There are four fruits which are under the marketing agreement; now for some reason they want to take the cherry processor and take his vote away from him. Do you wonder why? I believe it is pretty evident. Apparently the boys downtown have been having trouble with the cherry processors, and since they cannot touch him in any other way they are going to legislate him out of business.

And I must say in all fairness that the proponents of this legislation have not pulled any punches as to their pur­pose in accomplishing this legislation.

The first sentence of the report under the paragraph entitled "Purpose," says:

H.R. 4282 would permit the establishment of a marketing order for cherries for canning or freezing without the approval of the proc­essors of cherries.

The proponents of this legislation argue that the canner or freezer should not be given the right to vote on grower "self-help" marketing orders for process­ing cherries. What this argument totally ignores is the fact that a marketing order is· nothing more or less than economic regulation of the processor. All of the prohibitions and requirements of a mar­keting order would apply directly to the canner and freezer of cherries. It is the processor, not the grower, who would be required to carry out limitations on the volume or quality of cherries purchased by processors from growers. The act spe­cifically provides that growers are not subject to any of its regulatory controls. Penalties for violation of an order may be imposed only on handlers, not on growers.

Not only could a marketing order regu­late the canner by determining from

whom he may buy, in what amounts, and in what grades, but the canner would also bear the direct cost of the order. A marketing order i~ financed by assess­ments on handlers, which in this case means canners and freezers of cherrieis.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DOWNING. I yield to the gentle­man from California.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I believe the gentleman is making a very fine point here, one that goes right back to the colloquy between the gentle­man from Washington and myself. The $25,000 is paid for by the taxpayers, but this is only the cost of conducting the election; the cost of administering the marketing order is borne partly, at least, by the processors; is that not correct?

Mr. DOWNING. The gentleman is ab­solutely correct, in my judgment.

Mr. GUBSER. I thank the gentleman. Mr. DOWNING. Mr. Chairman,

whether the ultimate cost of the pro­gram is borne by handlers, growers or consumers is a complex question, but it is clear that the handler must initially pay the assessments to finance a marketing order program.

The economic impact of a marketing order undoubtedly is just as significant to a processor as to a grower. Clearly a canner's own production is directly re­lated to the volume and grade of cherries available for processing. If artificial con­trols are imposed upon the volume of cherries that may be purchased, the market for the processed product may be seriously affected both in the short and long run. Undue restrictions on the availability of the product could ·very well drive consumers to competing prod­ucts and seriously injure the long-term demand for canned and frozen cherries, or products made therefrom.

Because marketing order controls on the purchase of the raw product would have a profound impact on the opera­tions of processors, we believe that every principle of equity and fairness dictates thait processors have a right to vote on whether a particular order should be adopted. Congress recognized the fair­ness of this position in 1961, and we hope that it will continue to do so in 1968 and in the future.

I urge you to vote against this bill. If what I have said makes no sense, I

would then go back to the motive for this legislation. Why are these people doing it? They are doing it because they can­not control the vote of the processors. So what do you do? Eliminate the right of these people to vote for an industry in which they are so closely connected and involved.

I do hope that you will vote against the bill.

Mr. TEAGUE of California. Mr. Chair­man, I yield 8 minutes to the gentleman from Minnesota [Mr. ZwAcHJ.

Mr. ZWACH. Mr. Chairman, as a mem­ber of the Committee on Agriculture, as a farmer, and as one who is vitally con­cerned with strength for producers, I want to speak briefly in support of this bill.

A couple of days ago this House per-

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7915 formed an historic act. They passed the Producers Marketing Act, now called the Fair Producers Marketing Act, which basically says that producers of products shall not be interfered with or discrimi­nated against in their effort to cooperate and to work among themselves to receive a better price for their products. That :.s basically what was involved in that act.

Now here we supplement that act. Here today we decide whether we are going to let producers work out their own determination or whether we are going to let the processors veto their decisions.

Who needs protection today? I believe it is the American producer. Look at the parity index. Parity is at 74 percent of a fair return. It was 72 percent just a couple of months ago.

You know, since 1947 the average housewife has paid about $240 a year more for her average food basket. The producers of America got exactly $1.30 out ·of that $240. The producers need bargaining power and they need it very, very badly.

The American farmer has come to the point where he wants to do more for himself.

This House the other day passed an act that heads us in this direction.

To say that the processor shall be able to veto the producer in the producers efforts is to say that the manufacturer shall have a veto of what organized la­bor is doing-and you know where or­ganized labor would be today if that were the situation.

It is the producer who needs bargain­ing strength.

I do not raise a cherry. I am a farmer in the Midwest. But the overriding prin­ciple is important. There are today in the United States 47 marketing orders with regard to fruits and vegetables. None of those have a processor participa­tion. Only in these four does processor participation exist today.

I tell you we have the right to write history so far as the American producer is concerned. He needs strength in his producing and in his marketing.

This is the type of program that will give it to him.

Mr. QUIE. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ZWACH. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. QUIE. I commend my colleague from Minnesota or.. the excellent presen­tation he is making, and I join with him in the declaration that farmers must have an opportunity to develop their bargaining power, the opportnity tone­gotiate for price. I have been involved in the dairy marketing order process for some time, and we do not let the han­dlers vote in relation to those orders: If the producers by their vote under this bill can direct the processors to do any­thing which would be unjust or unwise, we can amend the act later on.

I voted against this bill when it came up under suspension because I wanted this opportunity to have a full debate. If anyone had any disagreement, he would be able to offer amendments. I do not know if there are amendments to be offered, but we have had a full oppor­tunity now to consider the legislation,

and I merely wish to say to my colleague from Minnesota that I join with you in support of this legislation.

Mr. ZWACH. I thank the gentleman. In closing, Members of the Committee, I wish to point out that we have no quar­rel with the canner or the processor. We like them. They need fairness and they need equity. We just have no quarrel with them.· But they do not now need added protection in their dealing with the pro­ducers. It is the producers that need the protection. I would hope that this Com­mittee and the House will support this legislation.

The purpose of this bill is to elimi­nate the approval of the processing in­dustry of a previously approved producer marketing order. The farmer producers are required by the 1937 Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act, as amended, to approve of such a referendum by a two-thirds majority by either number of producers or by the volume of cher­ries produced and marketed. Thus, upon final passage the large requirement in­sures a great preponderance in favor of a marketing program.

In addition, however, a cherry mar­keting order then requires a 50-percent approval- of the handlers or processors of the cherries. The 50-percent require­ment is again based on either number of processors or by volume of total crop handled. There are only four commodi­ties that by law are required to have processor approval. The other three are cranberries, apples, and grapefruit. In all other vegetable and fruit orders the approval by the processor is not required. At this time there are 47 marketing orders now in effect in the United States.

There is a crying need for improving farm income. There has been some 35 years of legislative history with farm programs, and yet the original problem of restoring and retaining a proper share of the food dollar to the producer is still with us. It is necessary that some addi­tional effort be made in other routes to correct this injustice. Therefore, much time and attention has been given to the use of marketing orders by producers to balance production with supply and to provide the framework for producing for the immediate needs of the country.

The passage of this bill, H.R. 4282, is in step with the need for improving pro­ducers' marketing strength and should be supported. This would be a clear in­dication of Congress intent and willing .. ness for producers to handle more of their own problems rather than of pur­suing a dole from the Federal Treasury.

This bill does not provide monopoly power, nor does it in any way mean a planned shortage of cherries. It provides for a democratic way of producers de­ciding which steps they should take to bring about a better income without be­ing curtailed or overridden in their ef­forts by processors of their crops.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield 5 minutes to the author of the bill, the gen­tleman from Pennsylvania, [Mr. VIGO­RITO].

Mr. VIGORITO. Mr. Chairman, I thank the gentleman from Washington for yielding to me. One of the advantages of speaking last is that I can fill in

some important information which up to now has been omitted, and this informa­tion could make tfie' ·difference. between how some of the Members will vote on this measure. Unfortunately, most of them are not present . .

I wish to state that a marketing order would take into consideration some of the following factors, and maybe all of them:

Grading, sizing, the quality standards of fruit, the containing standards, pro­motion and advertising, marketing serv­ice, merchandising research, marketing statistics, economic space analysis, pro­duction problems, handling and engi­neering problems, new products develop­ment, advertising promotion, surplus control, and so forth.

Also I wish to state that we have missed the basic argument or reason why we have to have this measure. This is an industry in which there is a wide :fluctuation in price and in production, and the farmer always gets the short end of the stick.

In 1941, productionwise, 50 million pounds of cherries were processed. In 1964, 430 million pounds were processed. So you can see the difference between those figures. There was a :fluctuation in 23 years between 50 million pounds and 430 million pounds. The per capita con­sumption of red ·cart cherries is less than 2 pounds per person per year. To be exact, in 1965 it was 1.68 pounds per person. The price :fluctuates anywhere from 5 to 15 cents. In 1965 the price was 4.8 cents per pound. So even if each person consumed 2 pounds per year, the most the farmer could receive would be less than 10 cents from each American in the country­less than 10 cents. So if his income from the production of cherries would increase, we will say, 20 percent, it would amount to 1 cent per year per American, but to the farmer it would make a differ­ence of whether this industry is going to survive.

We have mentioned the minority vote. .In 1965, 1,100 farmers voted on the measure. Only 57 percent of them voted :for it.

It was defeated on that basis, because 66% percent had to vote, and only 26 percent by weight of the processors voted and defeated it-but only six processors control over one-fourth of the total cher­ries processed. We cannot have an eco­nomic balance with six processors on one hand and 1,100 cherry producers on the other hand. The farmer is not going to dictate to the processors.

When the cherries are ripe, they have to be picked and they have to move to market. The cherry farmer cannot say, "I want 15 cents per pound or the processor cannot have the cherries to process." They have to strike a balance. The law of supply and demand will be there. The farmer only wants a fair shake for what he produces from all his labor and his investment.

I would like to mention the fact that in addition to this being approved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the following farm organizations have ap­proved this: The American Farm Bureau Federation, the National Grange, the National Farmers Union, the National

7916 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD-- HOUSE March 27, 1968

Farmers Organization, the National Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and the National Cherry Growers Council.

Of course, the canners are against it, because they have an economic advan­tag.e and they do not want to give up that advantage.

Mr. TEAGUE of California. Mr. Chair­man, I yield back the balance of my time.

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Chairman, I yield myself such remaining time as I may consume.

I think the issue is very simple and straightforward, and that is whether or not the producers were and are a proper voice in setting up farmers' bargaining entities such as marketing orders.

The evidence is very strong, in !act overwhelming, that there will not be a marketing order in this commodity as long as the processors have a veto. Removing that veto is all that is in­volved here--notbing more or less. We pointed out there are only four of these veto provisions among all marketing or­ders that are in existence. Some of the gentlemen who took the floor in opposi­tion to this bill made it clear that their opposition goes not only to the cherry marketing order, but goes to all market­ing orders.

I hope members of the committee who have a concern about farmers' bargain­ing will realize that if this bill is de­feated, the statement will be made that the House has rejected the principle of marketing orders as such. That is what lies behind much of the opposition to this bill-an attempt to undercut and destroy -a basis for marketing orders of any kind. There are 121 of them in existence. They include, as I said, 71 for milk and 47 for fruits and vegetables.

There is no real question here of hos­tility to processors or canners. By and large, all marketing orders that have come into existence have been operated rather quietly and without controversy. We do not hear-and I am a Member of the Agriculture Committee and chair­man of the subcommittee that handles this legislation-demands for reversing marketing orders.

Producer and processor have been able to function effectively under these mar­keting orders in the past. All we seek here is an opportunity to give the cherry producers the same opportunity to im­prove and bargain on their marketing conditions.

I hope the House will support this leg­islation. It is one of the few that comes before the House with the unanimous support of those great national organi­zations that represent farmers every­where in this country.

Mr. Chairman, I have no further re­quests for time.

The CHAffiMAN. There being no fur­ther requests for time, the Clerk will read.

The Clerk read as follows: H.R.4282

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representati ves of the United States of America in Congress assem'b.led, That the sec­ond sentence of section 8c(2) of the Agricul­tural Adjustment Act, as reenacted and amended by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 19'37, as am.ended, ls amended by -striking out "cherries, apples, or

cranberries" and inserting in lieu thereof "apples or cranbernes"_,

The CHAIRMAN. Under the rule, the Committee rises.

Aecording]y the Committee rose; and the ·Speaker having resumed the chair, Mr. MOORHEAD, Chairman of the Com­mittee of the Whole House on the State of the Union, reported that that Com­mittee, having had under consideration the bill (H.R. 4282), to amend the Agri­<Cultural Adjustment Act, as reenacted and amended by the Agricultural Mar­keting Agreement Act of 1937, as amended, so as to eliminate certain re­quirements with respect to ,effectuating marketing orders for cherries, pursuant to House Resolution 1103, he reported the bill back to the House.

The SPEAKER. Under the rule, the previous question is ordered.

The question is on the engr:ossment and third reading of the bill.

The bill was ordered to be engrossed and r.ead a third time, and was read the third t ime.

MOTION TO RECOMMIT

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, I offer a motion to recommit.

The SPEAKER. Is the gentleman op­posed to the bill?

Mr. GUBSER. I am, Mr. Speaker. The SPEAKER. The Clerk will report

the motion to recommit. The Clerk read as follows: Mr. GUBSER moves to recommit the bill

H .R. 4282 to the Committee on Agriculture.

The SPEAKER. Without objection, the previous question is ordered on the .motion to recommit.

There was no objection. The SPEAKER. The question is on

the motion to recommit. The motion to recommit was rejected. The SPEAKER. The question is on the

passage of the bill. The question was taken; and the

Speaker announced that the ayes ap­peared to have 1t.

Mr. GUBSER. Mr. Speaker, I object to the vote on the ground that a quorum is not present and make the point of order that a ·quorum is not present.

The SPEAKER . . Evidently a quorum 1s not present.

·The Doorkeeper will close the doors, the Sergeant at Arms will notify absent Members, and the Clerk will c,all the roll.

The question was taken; and there were-yeas 197, nays 185, not voting 51, as follows:

Abernethy Adams Addabbo Albert Anderson,

Tenn. Andrews,

N.Dak. Annunzio Aspinall Barrett Bi ester Bingham Blanton Blatnik Boggs Bolling Brade mas Bra'SCO 'Brooks

IRollNo. 73] YEAS-197

Brown, Calif. B rown.Ohio Broyhill, N .C. Burleson Burton, Calif. Byrne, Pa. Carey Cell er Clark Clausen.

DonH. Colmer Corman Culver Daddario Daniels Davis,Ga. Dawson de la Garza Delaney

Dellen back Den't Dickinson Diggs Dole Dow Dowdy Eckhardt Edwards, La. Eilberg Evans, Colo. Evins, Tenn. Fallon Farbste1n Fascell Feighan Fino Fisher Flood Foley

Ford, .McClure Rees William D. McEwen Reid, N.Y.

Fraser McFall Reuss Friedel Machen Rhodes, Pa. Gallfi.a.ne.kis Madden Roberts Gallagher Mahon Rodino Garmatz Me.thl.as, Md. Rogers, Colo. Gathings Matsunaga. Ronan Giaimo .May Rooney.N.Y. Gllbert Mayne Rooney, Pa. Gonzalez Meskill Rosenthal Gray Miller, Ohio Roybal Green, .Pa. Minish Ryan Griffin Mink Scheuer Griffiths Monagan Scott Gude Montgomery Shipley Hansen, Wash. Moorhead Sikes Harsha Morgan S isk Hathaway Morris, N. Mex. Skubitz Hays Moss Slack Hebert Murphy. N. Y. Snyder Hechler, W. Va. Myers Springer Henderson Natcher Stafford Hicks Nedzi Staggers Holifield Nichols Steed Howard Nix Stuckey Hungate O'Hara, Ill. 'Sullivan !chord O'Hara. Mich. T~lor Jacobs Olsen Teague, C.a.llf. Joelson O'Nea.I. Ga. Tenzer Johnson, Calif. O'NeiH, Mass. Thompson, N . .J. Jones, Ale.. Ottinger Tunney Jones, Mo. Passman Udall Kastenmeier Patten Ullman Kazen Perkins Vanflt Kee Pettis Vigorito Kelly Pickle Waggonner Kirwan Pike Walker Kleppe Poage White Kornegay Podell Whitener K;yi Pool Wlllis Kyros Price, m. Wolff Leggett Puc1nsk1 Wright Lennon. Purcell Wyman Long, La. Quie Yates Long, Md. Randall Young McCarthy Rarick Zwach

Abbitt Anderson, Ill. Andrews. Ala. Ashbrook Ashmore Ayres Ba.ring Bates Battin Belcher Bell Bennett Berry Betts Bevill Blackburn Bolton Bow Brinkley Brock Broomfield Brotzman B royhill, Va. Buchanan Burke, Fla. Burke, Mass. B urton, Utah Bush Button Byrnes, Wis. Carter Casey Cederberg Chamberlain Clancy Clawson, Del Cleveland Cohelan Collier Conable Conte Corbett Cowger Cramer Cunningham Curtis Davis, Wis. Den ney Derwinski Devine Dingell Donohue Dorn Downing Dul ski

NAYS-:-185 Duncan McCUlloch Dwyer McDade Edmondson McDonald, Edwards, Ala. Mich . Erlenborn McMl.Tian Eshleman MacGregor Everett .Mallllard Findley Marsh Flynt Martin Ford, Gerald R. Mathias, CallL Frelinghuysen Meeds Fulton,Pa. 'Michfil Fulton, Tenn. .Miller, Call!. Gardner Mills Gettys Minshall Gibbons Mize Goodell .Morse, Ma.58. Goodling Mosher Gross Nelsen Grover O'Konski Gubser . Pelly Haley Philbln Hall Pirnie Halleck Pofl'. Hamilton Pollock Hammer- Price, Tex.

schmidt Pryor Hanley Qumen Hansen, Idaho Railsback Hardy Reid, :Ill. Harrison Reifel Harvey Reinecke Heckler, Mass. Rhodes, Ariz. Horton Riegle Hosmer Rivers Hull Rogers, Fla. Hunt Roudebush Hutchinson Rumsfeld Irwin Ruppe Jarman St Germain Johnson, Pa. Sa tterfield Jonas Schade berg Karth Scher le Keith Schneebeli King, N.Y. Schweiker Kupferman Schwengel 'Kuykendall Shriver Laird Smith, Ca lif. Langen Smith, N.Y. Latta Smith, Okla. Lipscomb Stanton Lloyd Steiger, Ariz. Lukens Steiger, Wis. McC1-0ry . Stratton Mccloskey Talcott

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7917 Thompson, Ga. Watkins Thomson, Wis. Watson Tiernan Whalen Tuck Whalley Utt Whitten Vander Jagt Widnall Waldie Wiggins Wampler Williams, Pa..

Wilson, Bob Winn Wyatt Wydler Wylie Zion

NOT VOTING-51 Adair Hawkins Arends Helstoski Ashley Herlong Boland Holland Bray Jones, N.C. Brown, Mich. Karsten Cabell King, Calif. Cahlll Kluczynski Conyers Landrum Edwards, Calif. Macdonald, Esch Mass. Fountain Moore Fuqua Morton Green, Oreg. Murphy, Ill. Gurney Patman Hagan Pepper Halpern Resnick Hanna Robison

Rostenkowski Roth Roush St. Onge Sandman Saylor Selden Smith, Iowa Stephens Stubblefield Taft Teague, Tex. VanDeerlin Watts Wilson,

CharlesH. Zablocki

ANTI-JEWlSH CAMPAIGN IN POLAND

Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan­imous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from New York?

There was no obj ection. Mrs. KELLY. Mr. Speaker, during re­

cent weeks, the world's attention has been drawn to :.;ome interesting and po­tentially far-reaching developments in Eastern Europe.

In Czechoslovakia, the repressive Stalinist policies appear to be giving way to 2.. new climate-a climate in which a liberalized internal system and a modi­cum of individual freedom may become a reality.

These dramatic events in Czechoslo­vakia seem to have found some reflection

So the bill was passed. in the activities of thousands of students The Clerk ·announced the following in Poland.

Long held in tight check by a govern­ment which seems to have forgotten all

pairs: On this vote: Mr. Taft for, with Mr. Gurney against. about the promises of Poland's ''Spring Mr. Fountain for, with Mr. Ca.hill against. in October,'' these students have been Mr. St. Onge for, with Mr. Saylor against. d emonstrating against the arbitrary, re-Mr. Stubblefield for, Mr. Fuqua against. pressive policies of Poland's internal Mr. Resnick for, with Mr. Stephens against. security police and demanding some of Mr. Rostenkowski for, with Mr. Sandman

against. the opportunities and rights which are Mr. Kluczynski for, with Mr. Morton of customar ily extended to students in all

Maryland against. - except the most totalitarian countries. Mr. Murphy of Illinois for, with Mr. Robi- The heavy-handed reaction of Po-

son against. land's internal security machine has Mr. Zablocki for , with Mr. Arends against. come as a brutal awakening to the rest of Until further notice: the world. It demonstrated that in spite

of some outward appearances of modera­tion, the rorces governing Poland are much closer to the Stalinist past than to present-day realities in Eastern Europe.

Mr. Boland with Mr. Halpern. Mr. Landrum with Mr. Esch. Mr. Watts with Mr. Adair. Mr. Van Deerlin with Mr. Bray. Mr. Karsten with Mr. Roth. Mr. Macdonald of Massachusetts with Mr.

Brown of Michigan. Mr. Pepper with Mr. Edwards of California. Mrs. Green of Oregon with Mr. Hagan. Mr. Helstoski with Mr. Hawkins. Mr. Selden with Mr. Roush. Mr. Charles H. Wilso:Q. with Mr. Teague of

Texas.

One particularly offensive aspect of this campaign has been the attempt of Polish authorities to put the blame for the unrest among the students on the shoulders of Poland's tiny Jewish minority.

In a series of repressive actions directed against the Jews of Poland, the Polish

Mr. King of California with Mr. Jones North Carolina.

Mr. Herlong with Mr. Cabell. Mr. Conyers with Mr. Ashley. Mr. Smith of Iowa with Mr. Hanna. Mr. Moore with Mr. Holland.

of authorities slandered them in t h e public mass media, fired a number of them from their governmental and aca demic posts, and hounded them in other ways.

Mr. Speaker, when we reca ll the rights and privileges granted to the Jews in

Mr. LONG of Maryland and Mr. Poland during the Middle Ages; and BLATNIK changed their votes from when we remember that nearly 3 million "nay" to "yea."

Mr. CONTE, Mr. POLLOCK, and Mr. FULTON of Tennessee changed their votes from "yea" to "nay,"

The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

Jews perished under the Nazi occupation of Poland, the actions of the Polish Gov­ernment are particularly offensive and out of character with the historical at­titude toward the Jews of the Polish na­tion.

I am today introducing a resolution ex­The doors were opened. A motion to reconsider

the table. was laid on pressing the sense of the Congress that

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. FOLEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani­mous consent that all Members may have 5 legislative days in which to revise and extend their remarks in the RECORD on the bill H.R. 4282, which was adopted by the House this afternoon.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from -Wash­ington?

There was no objection.

the Polish Government, in the name of decency and humanity, cease persecuting Jews and fully permit them and all others within Poland's borders free ex­ercise of religion, the pursuit of culture, and full enjoyment of other basic human rights.

The resolution follows: H. CON. RES. 742

A resolution to express the sense of the Con­gress against the persecution of Jews in Poland Whereas the Congress of the United States

deeply believes in freedom of religion and

other basic human rights and is opposed to the infringement of such rights anywhere in the world; and

Whereas the Government of Poland, dis­regarding the provisions of its own national Constitution, has continued to deny certain basic human rights to its citizens; and

Whereas the Government of Poland, react­ing to the courageous pleas for greater free­dom by the Polish students, has unleashed a vicious campaign of repression directed spe­cifically against the Jews of Poland; and

Whereas during World War II, nearly 3 mil­lion Jews perished in Poland under the Nazi occupation; and

Whereas a deliberate official persecution of any minority or ethnic group is repugnant to the spirit of the Universal Declaration of Hu­man Rights; and

Whereas the General Assembly of the United Nations has designated the year 1968 as the International Human Rights Year: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of the Congress that the denial of human rights to the citizens of Poland be con­demned, and that the Polish Government in the name of decency and humanity cease persecuting Jews and fully permit them and all others within Poland's borders free ex­ercise of religion, the pursuit of culture and full enjoyment of all basic human rights.

MAJ. KENNETH A. CASS DISPLAYS HEROISM, PROFESSIONAL SKILL

Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentlewoman from Connecticut?

There was no objection. Mr. MONAGAN. Mr. Speaker, heroism

is a human quality often associated with war, for it is under the pressure of bat­tle that man's humanity is bared and his instincts for compassion are starkly evident. But heroism is not confined to combat, and is frequently expressed by the fear less gestures of men in support of our battlefield efforts.

Such heroism occurred at a field hos­pital in Chu Lai last Sunday, when an Army doctor successfully removed a live grenade from the leg of a 19-year-old soldier. The doctor, Maj . . Kenneth A. Cass, is a native of my hometown, and I take special pride in his achievement.

As mayor of Waterbury, Conn., I knew his father, the late Patrolman Edmund L. Cass, a capable lawman on the city's police force. His son, Kenneth, gradu­ated from St. Margaret's School and Sacred Heart High School, class of 1947. He served a year at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy, then entered the Army in 1949 and, after attending Officer Candi­date School, was commissioned at Fort Belvoir, Va. He served in Korea, then left military service to study medicine, graduating from St. John's University, Brooklyn, N.Y., and New York Medical College, where he received the Coret Manus Award of Distinction. After in­terning for a year at Greenwich Hos­pital he returned to Army duty in 1964 as a captain. He served in Hawaii on hospital duty and returned to Water­bury last summer for a leave before be­ing assigned to Vietnam in August.

I am proud to relate to my colleagues

7'918 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March - i7, 1968

an account of this doctor's heroism and professional skill and recommend to your attention an article which ap­peared in the Waterbury American, March 25, 1968: ARMY DOCTOR, CITY NATIVE, REMOVES GRENADE

FROM GI's LEG "My hands were steady, but my knees were

sure shaky, .. said Major Kenneth A. Cass of this city, who plucked a live grenade from the leg of an American soldier in Vietnam Sun­day, according to the Associated Press.

Cass, a 39 year o1d doctor who has been in the Army since completing his medical in­ternship in 1963, worked on PFC Warren D. Hillman, 19, of Buckholts, Texas, at the Army's 2nd Surgica1Eospital at Chu Lai.

Advising him as he removed the grenade was Captain James Puckett, a weapons expert from Benton, Arkansas and an anesthetist, Captain Stanley Keating of Hartford.

Hillman was moving in file as his patrol returned to their 198th Light Infantry Bri­gade Company Base camp near Chu Lai.

He was just pulling himself out of a 3tream when another soldier entered the water from the otber side. tripped and fell. The soldier's M-79 grenade launcher discharged as he fell.

The shiny and gold-covered grenade bullet shaped and about the size of a golf ball, struck Rillman's right calf. The grenade did not explode, but it was buried from sight in the chunky soldier's muscle.

Hillman was sped by helicopter to Cass' 2nd Surgical Field Hospital at Chu Lai. Cass was alerted by radio.

Hillman was X-rayed and taken to the operation room. Ten flack jackets were packed around Hillman on the operating table. "There was a good chance he would have lived and we would have been killed if that thing went off,'' Cass said.

Cass told Hillman "Don't sweat it. It's a routine operation." "He seemed relieved," Cass said wryly. "That only left us who were worried."

Cass asked Keating about a spinal ·anes­thetic. Keating advised that a spinal some­times causes temporary minor muscle spasms. In Hillman's case, even a minor twitch of the leg muscle might have ex­ploded the grenade. 1Iillman was put to sleep. A broad incision was made. The gre­nade could then be seen. A retractor, a. sort of pliers in reverse, was used to spread the calf muscle slightly more.

"Then it was loose," Cass said. "I lifted it out with my right thumb and index finger and gave it to Puckett." Puckett took the grenade outside to a safe area and exploded it. It took 35 minutes from the time Hlllman arrived at the Army Division hospital until Puckett blew the grenade. The reason the grenade did not go off was that it must travel about 30 yards before it anns itself. In Hill­man's case, that distance had not been covered.

No bones were broken, Cass said, and Hillman was to be evacuated to the U.S. where he has an excellent chance of com­plete recovery. The operation was not the first in South Vietnam involving a M-79. grenade. Last spring a Navy doctor went after a grenade imbedded in a Marine's neck without knowing what he was seeking. The Navy doctor removed the grenade and showed it a-round the operating room. A_ general shock set in as everyone recognized it. The marine recovered. There have been other grenade operations. "It is something I don't want to do twice," said Cass. During the operation, Cass said he thought, "I won­der if I'm going to get to Hawaii for R&R (Rest and Recuperation leave)."

Dr. Cass, son of the late patro1man and Mrs. Edmund L. Cass, is a graduate of St. Margaret's School and Sacred Heart High School, Class of 1947. After serving a year at the U.S. Coast Guard Academy~ New Lon­don, he entered the Army in 1'949 and was

commissioned later .at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, following a 26-week Officer Candidate School course.

He served in Korea during the Korean conflict after which he left military service · to study medicine. He graduated from St. John's University, Brooklyn, N.Y., and New York Medical College, N.Y., where he re­ceived the Coret Manus award of distinction.

After interning for a year at Greenwich Hospital he returned to Army duty in 1964 as a Captain. He served in Hawaii on hospital duty and returned to Waterbury last sum­mer for a leave before being assigned to Vietnam in August.

His wife is the former Marie Collins. She and their two children are living in Water­bury.

PROGRESS IN CONVERTING MILI­TARY SUPPORT JOBS TO CIVILIAN JOBS Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from North Carolina?

There was no objection. Mr. HENDERSON. Mr. Speaker, the

Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man­power, Hon. Alfred B. Fitt, has just informed me that over 90,000 combat­trained military personnel working in civilian-type positions have been trans­ferred to milltary duties and have been replaced by a lesser number of civilian employees in the four military services since a civilianization program was begun .in October 1965. And, Secretary Fitt has further indicated to me that the Department of Defense has targeted another 24,000 jobs, now held by mili­tary personnel, to be civilianized by the end of June 1968.

The Manpower and Civil Service Sub­committee has been actively interested in this program for many months. Our on-site reviews at military bases across the country have revealed an extensive number of military men, trained for combat, but working as brick masons, carpenters, electricians, stock clerks, draftsmen, bookkeeping machine opera­tors, and even statisticians. These are occupations, of course, that are common to our civilian economy and for which we have able civilian people available to do the work.

All of this information has been given to officials in the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget.

In view of the world situation, especial­ly in Southeast Asia, with a continuing demand for well-trained military men, it appears all the more realistic and. Proper to make the most effective use of our combat potential. I, therefore, com-· mend the Secretary of Defense for a successful continuation of this program:

The i,Jrogram has several benefits for the American people. It means more ef-"'. fective use of the trained man in uniform for military instead of civilian work. Sec-· ondly, there will be a reduced require­ment of some 114,000 military by July 1, 1968, due to this conversion project. There is also the savings in tax dollars. The 114,000 military will actually be .re­placed by 95,000 civilians. Thls means .a very sizable savings to the taxpayers.

Mr. Speaker, I am glad to see this _pro­gram progressing as well as it has -and I plan for ·the Manpower and Civil Service Subcommittee to continue to work close- , ly with Defense officials in this important manpower program. The Comptroller General of the United States also has been most helpful in assisting the sub­committee by revealing to Defense offi­cials areas for more .effective admin­istration. The success of this fine pro­gram reflects to a 1arge degree coopera-tion by all interested parties. -

BOB POAGE ANSWERS SENATOR KENNEDY'S TELEGRAM

Mr. FISHER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan­imous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my re­marks, and to include a letter.

The SPEAKER. Is there o,bjection to the request of the gentleman from Tex.as?

There was no objection. Mr. FISHER. Mr. Speaker, under leave

to extend my remarks I include a letter dated March 20, 1968, written by our col­league, the .gentleman from Texas [Mr. POAGE] to Senator ROBERT KENNEDY. The letter was in response to a telegram. sent by Senator KENNEDY to Mr. POAGE in which the former sought ''consideration, counsel and support" in his campaign for President.

Mr. PoAGE's letter makes a lot of sense. His comments on the war situation and the need for a united-rather than a divided-front during this time of peril, is timely and. appropriate. Every Ameri­can should read Mr. POAG E's comments.

The letter follows: ·

Hon. ROBERT F. KENNEDY, U.S. Senate, Washington, D.C.

MARCH 20, 1968.

DEAR SENATOR KENNEDY: Your wire of last Saturday advising that you wanted me to have advance knowledge of your candidacy against President Johnson was delivered to Mrs. Poage at our Washington residence about eleven o'clock Saturday night.

In that wire you ask for my "consideration, counsel and support." I would not have otherwise volunteered any suggestions. Since you ask my views, I must speak frankly.

In the first place, I have always given a11-out -support to my country whether it was at the moment led by John F. Kennedy, Lyndon -B. Johnson, or Dwight D. Eisen­hower. I shall continue to suppo.rt my coun­try regardless of politics and that, of course, means that I cannot glve any political sup­port to anyone who. in my judgment, ts '!eakening our position in the eyes of our enemies.

There is no need to haggle over respon­sibility for past actions. We are presently engaged in war in Southeast Asit1.. Presi­dent Johnson ls carrying out the · commit­ments of our country, both to the people of Vietnam .and to -the co-signers of the Sea to Treaty. President Johnson has repeatedly and continually offered to negotiate with the Communists any time, any place, they wanted to negotiate. They ignore his offers. He has, three times, stopped the bombing of North Vietnam. Each time the enemy has but Used this opportunity as a means to strengthen its position, witb an unnecessary loss o! American liveE. . The. President has used a minimum of

force. Many Americans feel that he has not used enough force. The President has rec­ognized that any show of weakness or la.ck.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7919 of determination on our part is bound to prolong the war. He has been terribly handi­capped by the intemperate and unfounded criticism of those who have repeatedly en­couraged the Communists to believe that they needed but to hold on a little longer in order to achieve our complete humilia­tion and withdrawal. Without passing upon anyone's motives, I think it is fair to sug­gest that right now the Viet Cong are re­ceiving more effective support from those in Washington who question our determination than they are from those in Moscow who are supplying rockets.

While Lyndon Johnson, the man you asked me to oppose, has been my friend for a great many years, I don't think he is a perfect President, and so long as we must elect mortal men, I don't expect a perfect Presi­dent, but I do want certain qualities of leadership in my President.

I want my President to be able to make decisions and to stand by them. I don't want him to tell us in January that he will not be a candidate and then in March tell us be is a candidate and has evidently been plan­ning his candidacy through the intervening time.

I want my President to be willing to com­mit himself without asking someone else to step out on the thin ice to see if it will support him. If he is lacking in political courage, I fear he will be found lacking in administrative determination.

I want my President to succeed or fail on bis own efforts. I don't want him to appro­priate for himself the results of the efforts of someone else who was more willing to take risks.

I want my President to be realistic enough to recognize the difference between "recon­ciliation" (the term you use in your wire) and dismemberment of his political party. If be does not recognize this, probably be won't be able to draw similar distinctions in the field of our national interests.

Finally, I want my President to look like the leader of a great modern nation. I don't want him to be continually surrounded by a group of long-haired, unwashed beatniks.

Therefore, having, as you requested, thoughtfully considered your wire, I am now accepting your invitation to counsel you, and I suggest your immediate withdrawal from this race.

Thanking you, I am, Sincerely yours,

W.R.POAGE, Congressman.

OUR PRESENCE IS LEGAL IN SOUTH VIETNAM

Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan­imous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Louisiana?

There was no objection. Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker, earlier this

year I was astonished at a statement which was attributed in the CONGRES­SIONAL RECORD to the National Lawyers• Guild, alleging that our presence in South Vietnam was illegal, and that our par­ticipation there subjected the President and the other leaders of the United States-and I presume all Members of Congress-to the same kind of punish­ment as was accorded the Nazi leaders after their convictions following the war crimes trials after World War II.

I took the trouble, Mr. Speaker, to have a very thorough research made on the question of the legality of our presence

CXIV---499-Part 6

there. There is no doubt in my mind that our presence in Vietnam is entirely legal. I include in my remarks a very learned legal analysis of the basis for our being there plus other pertinent documents.

Mr. Speaker, I hope that the Members of the House will take the trouble to read these memorandums, because they set in proper perspective the legal basis for our being in Vietnam, and answer the rather remarkable charge made by the National Lawyers' Guild that the leaders of our Government, including the Members of Congress, would be subject to war crimi­nal trials as the result of our presence there.

Mr. Speaker, recently, Col. Eberhard P. Deutsch, chairman of the standing committee on peace and law through United Nations of the American Bar As­sociation, called to my attention a state­ment prepared by the National LawYers Guild which sought to demonstrate the illegality, under international law, of the actions of the United States in Vietnam. The statement appeared in the daily CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for January 2, 1968, at pages A6580-83 in an extension of remarks of our colleague from Michigan [Mr. CONYERS]. There have been other statements and memorandums, by other groups of lawyers, seeking to demonstrate the illegality of U.S. actions in Vietnam with which Colonel Deutsch would, of course, disagree. What particularly dis­turbed Colonel Deutsch about this state­ment, and what particularly disturbs me now that it has been called to my atten­tion, is the further conclusion of this statement that because U.S. participa­tion · in Vietnam is alleged illegal our leaders are subject to the same kind of punishment as were the Nazi leaders convicted at Nuremberg. Such allegation should concern every one of us in this Chamber. It is within our power to make any further U.S. military participation in Vietnam impossible, and, if -our par­ticipation there is illegal, that is just what we should do. On the other hand, if such allegation does not have a sound legal foundation, it should not be al­lowed to stand unchallenged.

My purpose in taking the floor today is to prove the falsity of that statement and all similar statements which call into question the legality of the military assistance we are giving to the elected government of the people of the Repub­lic of Vietnam.

At the heart of the question of legality is the problem of violations of the Geneva accords. The present military activities of both North and South Viet­nam violate the principles laid down in the accords for the cessation of hostili­ties. Each side, however, claims that its own activities are but a permissible re­sponse to a prior violation by the other side. It is important, then, to determine who violated the accords first. It is at this point that each of the legal memo­randums I have seen, which concludes that the U.S. participation is illegal, falls into a common error. I say falls into a common error although I should say that they contain common distortions.

The first violation of the Geneva ac­cords to be recognized by these memo­randums on 1llegality is the 1956 refusal

of South Vietnam to hold the nation­wide elections which had been contem­plated. There is real doubt that this con­stituted a violation because the purpose of the elections was to obtain "a free expression of the national will," which would have been impossible to obtain under conditions existing at the time in the north. Even if it be assumed that there was a violation, however, anyone who cannot see that there were earlier serious violations of the accords is either blind or biased. Here is a charge made by the Department of State in "Aggres­sion from the North," 52, Department of State Bulletin; 404, 424 (1965) :

While negotiating an end to the Indochina War at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in Southeast Asia. When Vietnam was partitioned, thousands of carefully se­lected party members were ordered to remain in place in the South and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use.

Lest there be any who say that this 1965 statement is but a self-serving dec­laration to rationalize an illegal position, let me quote from a 1955 report:

While the la.st official Vietminh military units have been withdrawn in accordance with the Geneva accord, clandestine elements remain south of the 17th parallel. Agents and propagandists are active in infiltration and subversion. Secret Vietminh village councils­have been set up in many areas and func­tion at night in opposition to the regular administration. Small armed bands even op­erate openly in the mountainous regions. In the event of a breakdown in the present truce, the Vietminh have in · these units a fifth column ready to go into immediate ac­tion.

That observation is not from a Depart­ment of Staite report. It was not made by a biased observer. It was made by Sena­tor MIKE MANSFIELD in a report dated October 3, 1955, to Senator Walter F: George, chairman of the Senate Commit­tee on Foreign Relations. The Vietminh activities it describes were clearly ma­terial violations of the Geneva agreement for a complete withdrawal of opposing forces to either side of the 17th parallel. It is a well-recognized principle of inter­national law that a material breach of a treaty provision by one party justifies the other in withholding performance of an equivalent or related provision.

By 1962, the Legal Committee of the International Control Commission for Supervision and Control in Vietnam, es­tablished by the Geneva agreements, with the Polish member d'issenting, came to the conclusion:

That in specific instances there is evidence to show that armed and unarmed personnel, arms, munitions, and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the object of support­ing, organizing, and carrying out hostile ac­tivities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administra­tion of the Zone in the South ... [ and that) there is evidence to show that the P.A.V. [Peoples Army of Vietnam) has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, encouraging, a.nd supporting hostile activities in the Zone of the South. [These acts and activities are) in violation of Articles (10), 19, 24, and 27 of tb.e Agreements on the Cessation of Hostilities in Vietnam.

7920 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

To meet these acts of aggression from the north, the Republic of Vietnam has requested increased aid and assistance from the United States and had received it. In the same report the Legal Commit­tee of the International Control Com­mission found:

The establishment of a U.S. Military As­sistance Command in South Vietnam, as well as the introduction of a large number of U.S. military personnel beyond the stated strength of the MAAG (Military Assistance Advisory Group), amounts to a factual' mili­tary alliance, which is prohibited under Arti­cle 19 of the Geneva Agreement.

However, the legality of this kind of response to a material breach of a treaty provision by one party is well recognized in international law.

U.S. participation in the war in Viet­nam is not· illegal under the principles of international law, nor does it violate any of its obligations under the United Nations Charter. Far from being engaged in a war of aggression, which is the kind condemned at Nuremberg, the United States is engaged, at the request of the Republic of Vietnam, in a series of con­trolled responses to aggression, launched from the north by Ho Chi Minh's "Demo­cratic Republic of Vietnam." It is en­gaged in an effort of collective self-de­f ense of South Vietnam at the request of the elected Government of South Viet­nam-the Republic of Vietnam.

Whatever doubt anyone might have about U.S. activities in Vietnam, let not the ground for doubt be the illegality of the actions under the principles of inter­national law. Whatever else it is, the American people is a moral people. The American people would not knowingly support an illegal war. To cast doubt upon the legality of American activities in Vietnam, when there is no doubt, is to do a great disservice to the American people.

In order to dispel any doubt about the legality of our actions in Vietnam which may have been created by the memoran­dum of the National Lawyers Guild in­serted in the RECORD earlier this year, I will include at the end of my remarks two papers which answer all of the ob­jections which have been raised to our participation in the South Vietnamese defense effort and which make crystal clear the legality, under all recognized principles of international law, of this response to aggression from the north. The first, entitled "The Legality of United States Participation in the De­fense of Vietnam," was published in the Department of State Bulletin for March 28, 1966, at page 474. The second, en­titled "The Legality of the United States Position in Vietnam," was written by Col. Eberhard P. Deutsch and appeared in the American Bar Association Journal for May 1966, at page 436. The piece by Colonel Deutsch demonstrates the sound­ness of the position taken by the house of delegates of the American Bar Asso­ciation in February 1966-that the posi­tion of the United States in Vietnam is legal under international law and in ac­cordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty.

Third, is an excerpt from the CoNGRES-

SIONAL RECORD of March 7, 1966, on this subject.

The fourth document is the brief filed by the Government in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts, entitled "United States of America against William Sloane Coffin et al." The documents follow:

(From the Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 28, 1966]

THE LEGALITY OF U.S. PARTICIPATION IN THE DEFENSE OF VIETNAM

(The legal memorandum was prepared by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser of the Department, and was submitted to the Senate Com.mittee on Foreign Relations on March 8.) I. THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH VIETNAM

HAVE THE RIGHT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COLLECTIVE DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AGAINST ARMED ATTACK

In response to requests from the Govern-ment of South Viet-Nam, the United States has been assisting that country in defend­ing itself against armed attack from the Com.munist North. This attack has taken the forms of externally supported subversion, clandestine supply of arms, infiltration of armed personnel, and most recently the sending of regular units of the North Viet­namese army into the South.

International law has long recognized the right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. South Viet-Nam and the United States are engaging in such col­lective defense consistently with interna­tional law and with United States obligations under the United Nations Charter. A. South Vietnam is being subjected to armed attack by Communists North Vietnam

The Geneva accords of 1954 established a demarcation line between North Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam.1 They provided for withdrawal of military forces into the respec­tive zones north and south of this line. The accords prohibited the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to "further an aggressive policy."

During the 5 years following the Geneva conference of 1954, the Hanoi regime devel­oped a covert political-military organization in South Viet-Nam based on Communist cadres it had ordered to stay in the South, contrary to the provisions of the Geneva accords. The activities of this covert orga­nization were directed toward the kidnaping and assassination of civilian officials-acts of terrorism that were perpetrated in in­creasing numbers.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961, the North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated an esti­mated 10,000 men into the South. It is esti­mated that 13,000 additional personnel were infiltrated in 1962, and, by the end of 1964, North Viet-Nam may well have moved over 40,000 armed and unarmed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam.

The International Control Commission re­ported in 1962 the findings of its Legal Com­mittee:

"There is evidence to show that arms, armed and unarmed personnel, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in the South with the objective of supporting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, ·directed against the Armed Forces and Admlnistra tion of the Zone in the South.

"There is evidence that the PAVN (Peoples Army of Viet Nam] has allowed the Zone in the North to be used for inciting, en­couraging and supporting hostile activities in

1 For texts, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955; Basic Documents, vol. I, Depart­ment of State publication 6446, p. 750.

the Zone in the South, aimed at the over­throw of the Administration in the South."

Beginning in 1964, the Communists appar­ently exhausted their reservoir of Southern­ers who had gone North. Since then the greater number of men infiltrated into the South have been native-born North Vietnam­ese. Most recently, Hanoi has begun to infil­trate elements of the North Vietnamese army in increasingly larger numbers. Today, there is evidence that nine regiments of regular North Vietnamese forces are fighting in or­ganized units in the South.

In the guerrilla war in Viet-Nam, the ex­ternal aggression from the North is the criti­cal military element of the insurgency, al­though it is unacknowledged by North Viet­Nam. In these circumstances, an "armed at­tack" is not as easily fixed by date and hour as in the case of traditional warfare. However, the infiltration of thousands of armed men clearly constitutes an "armed attack" under any reasonable definition. There may be some question as to the exact date at which North Viet-Nam's aggression grew into an "armed attack," but there can be no doubt that it had occurred before February 1965. B. International law recognizes the right of

individual and collective self-defense against armed attack International law has traditionally recog­

nized the right of self-defense against armed attack. This proposition has been asserted by writers on international law through the sev­eral centuries in which the modern law of nations has developed. The proposition has been acted on numerous times by govern­ments throughout modern history. Today the principle of self-defense against armed at­tack is universally recognized and accepted.2

The Charter of the United Nations, con­cluded at the end of World War II, imposed an important limitation on the use of force by United Nations members, Article 2, para­graph 4, provides:

"All Members shall refrain in their inter­national relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po­litical independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

In addition, the charter embodied a sys­tem of international peacekeeping through the organs of the United Nations. Article 24 summarizes these structural arrangements in stating that the United Nations members: " ... confer on the Security Council primary responsib111ty for the maintenance of inter­national peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this respon­sibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."

However, the charter expressly states in article 51 that the remaining provisions of the charter-including the limitation of ar­ticle 2, paragraph 4, and the creation of United Nations machinery to keep the peace-in no way diminish the inherent right of self-defense against armed attack. Article 51 provides:

"Nothing in the present Charter shall im­pair the inherent right of individual or col­lective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security. Measures taken by Mem­bers in the exercise of this right of self­defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems

2 See, e.g., Jessup, A Modern Law of Nations, 163 ff. (1948); Oppenheim, ·International Law, 297 ff. (8th ed., Lauterpacht, 1955). And see, generally, Bowett, Self-Defense in Inter­national Law (1958). [Footnote in original.]

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7921 necessary in order to maintain or restore in­ternational peace and security."

Thus, article 51 restates and preserves, for member states in the situations covered by the article, a long-recognized principle of in­ternational law. The article is a "saving clause" designed to make clear that no other provision in the charter shall be interpreted to impair the inherent right of self-defense referred to in article 51.

Three principal objections have been raised against the availability of the right of indi­vidual and collective self-defense in the case of Viet-Nam: (1) that this right applies only in the case of an armed attack on a United Nations member; (2) that it does not apply in the case of South Viet-Nam because the latter is not an independent sovereign state; and (3) that collective self-defense may be undertaken only by a regional organization operating under chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. These objections will now be considered in turn. C. The right of individual and collective self­

defense applies in the case of South Viet­Nam whether or not that country is a member of the United Nations

1. South Viet-Nam Enjoys the Right of Self­Defense

The argument that the right of self-de­fense is available only to members of the United Nations mistakes the nature of the right of self-defense and the relationship of the United Nations Charter to international law in this respect. As already shown, the right of self-defense against armed attack is an inherent right under international law. The right is not conferred by the charter, and, indeed, article 51 expressly recognizes that the right is inherent.

The charter nowhere contains any provi­sion designed to deprive nonmembers of the right of self-defense against armed attack.3

Article 2, paragraph 6, does charge the United Nations with responsibility for insuring that nonmember states act in accordance with United Nations "Principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of interna­tional peace and security." Protection against aggression and self-defense against armed attack are important elements in the whole charter scheme for the maintenance of inter­national peace and security. To deprive non­members of their inherent right of -self­defense would not accord With the principles of the organization, but would instead be prejudicial to the maintenance of peace. Thus article 2, paragraph 6-and, indeed, the rest of the charter-should certainly not be con­strued to nullify or diminish the inherent defensive rights of nonmembers. 2. The United States Has the Right to Assist

in the Defense of South Viet-Nam Al­though the Latter Is Not a United Nations Member The cooperation of two or more interna­

tional entities in the defense of one or both against armed attack is generally referred to as collective self-defense. United States par­ticipation in the defense of South Viet-Nam

a While nonmembers, such as South Viet­Nam, have not formally undertaken the obligations of the United Nations Charter as their own treaty obligations, it should be recognized that much of the substantive law of the charter has become part of the general law of nations through a very wide accept­ance by nations the world over. This ls par­ticularly true of the charter provisions bear­ing on the use of force. Moreover, in the case of South Viet-Nam, the South Vietnamese Government has expressed its ability and willingness to abide by the charter, in apply­ing for United Nations membership. Thus it seems entirely appropriate to appraise the actions of South Viet-Nam in relation to the legal standards set forth in the United Nations Charter. [Footnote in original.]

at the latter's request ls an example of col­lective self-defense.

The United States ls entitled to exercise the right of individual or collective self-de­fense against armed attack, as that right exists in international law, subject only to treaty limitations and obligations undertaken by this country.

It has been urged that the United States has no right to participate in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam because article 51 of the United Nations Charter speaks only of the situation "if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations." This argument is without substance.

In the first place, article 51 does not im­pose restrictions or cut down the otherwise available rights of United Nations members. By its own terms, the article preserves an inherent right. It ls, therefore, necessary to look elsewhere in the charter for any obliga­tion of members restricting their participa­tion in collective defense of an entity that ls not a United Nations member.

Article 2, paragraph 4, ls the principal pro­vision of the charter imposing limitations on the use of force by members. It states that they ". . . shall refrain in their interna­tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or po­litical independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."

Action taken in defense against armed at­tack cannot be characterized as falling within this proscription. The record of the San Francisco conference makes clear that ar­ticle 2, paragraph 4, was not intended to restrict the right of self-defense against armed attack.'

One will search in vain for any other pro­vision in the charter that would preclude United States participation in the collective defense of a nonmember. The fact that ar­ticle 51 refers only to armed attack "against a Member of the United Nations" implies no intention to preclude members from par­ticipating in the defense of nonmembers. Any such result would have seriously detri­mental consequences for international peace and security and would be inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations as they are set forth in article 1 of the charter.Ii The right of members to participate in the de­fense of nonmembers ls upheld by leading authorities on international law.0

D. The right of individual and collective self­. defense applies whether or not South Viet-

Nam is regarded as an independent sover­eign state 1. South Viet-Nam Enjoys the Right of

Self-Defense It has been asserted that the conflict in

Viet-Nam is "civil strife" in which foreign

'See 6 UNCIO Documents 459. [Footnote in original.]

5 In particular, the statement of the first purpose:

To maintain international peace and se­curity, and to that end: to take effective col­lective measures for the prevention and re­moval of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity With the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of interna­tional disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace. [ Footnote in original.)

6 Bowett, Self-Defense in International Law, 193-195 (1958); Goodhart, "The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949," 79 Recueil Des Cours, 183, 202-204 (1951, vol. II), quoted in 5 Whiteman's Digest of International Law, 1067-1068 1965); Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 793 (1950); see Stone, Ag­gression and World Order, 44 (1958). [Foot­note in original.)

intervention ls forbidden. Those who make this assertion have gone so far as to compare Ho Chi Minh's actions in Viet-Nam with the efforts of President Lincoln to preserve the Union during the American Civil War. Any such characterization is an entire fiction disregarding the actual situation in Viet­Nam. The Hanoi regime ls anything but the legitimate government of a unified country in which the South is rebelling aganlst law­ful national authority.

The Geneva accords of 1954 provided for a division of Viet-Nam into two zones at the 17th parallel. Although this line of demarca­tion was intended to be temporary, it was es­tablished by international agreement, which specifically forbade aggression by one zone ag~inst the other.

The Republic of Viet-Nam in the South has been recognized as a separate interna­tional entity by approximately 60 govern­ments the world over. It has been admitted as a member of a number of the specialized agencies of the United Nations. The United Nations General Assembly in 1957 voted to recommend South Viet-Nam for membership in the organization, and its admission was frustrated only by the veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council.

In any event there ls no warrant for the suggestion that one zone of a temporarily divided state-whether it be Germany, Korea, or Viet-Nam-can be legally overrun by armed forces from the other zone, crossing the internationally recognized line of demar­cation between the two. Any such doctrine would subvert the international agreement establishing the line of demarcation, and would pose grave dangers to international peace.

The action of the United Nations in the Korean conflict of 1950 clearly established the principle that there is no greater license for one zone of a temporarily divided state to attack the other zone than there is for one state to attack another state. South Viet-Nam has the same right that South Korea had to defend itself and to organize collective defense against an armed attack from the North. A resolution of the Security Council dated June 25, 1950, noted "With grave concern the armed attack upon the Republic of Korea by forces from North Korea," and determined "that this action constitutes a breach of the peace." 2. The United States Is Entitled To Partici­

pate in the Collective Defense of South Viet-Nam Whether or Not the Latter Is Regarded as an Independent Sovereign State As stated earlier, South Viet-Nam has

been recognized as a separate international entity by approximately 60 governments. It has been admitted to membership in a num­ber of the United Nations specialized agen­cies and has been excluded from the United Nations Organization only by the Soviet veto.

There is nothing in the charter to suggest that United Nations members are precluded from participating in the defense of a recog­nized international entity against armed at­tack merely because the entity may lack some of the attributes of an independent sovereign state. Any such result would have a destructive effect on the stability of in­ternational engagements such as the Geneva accords of 1954 and on internationally agreed lines of demarcation. Such a result, far from being in accord With the charter and the purposes of the United Nations, would undermine them and would create new dan­gers to international peace and security. E. The United Nations Charter does not Zimit

the right of self-defense to regional orga­nizations Some have argued that collective self-de­

fense may be undertaken only by a regional arrangement or agency operating under chapter VIII of the United Nations Charter. Such an assertion ignores the structure of

7922 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 the charter and the practice followed· in the more than 20 yeam since the founding of the United Nations.

The basic proposition that rights of self­defense are not impaired by the oharter­as expressly stated in article 51-is not con­ditioned by any charter provision limiting the application of this proposition to collec­tive defense by a regional arrangement or agency. The structure of the charter rein­forces this conclusion. Article 51 appears in chapter VII of the charter, entitled "Action With Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggres­sion," whereas chapter VIII, entitled "Re­gional Arrangements," begins with article 52 and embraces the two following articles. The records of the San Francisco conference show that article 51 was deliberately placed in chapter VII rather than chapter VIII, "where it would only have a bearing on the regional sy,stem." 1

Under article 51, the right of self-defense ls available against any armed attack, whether or not the country attacked is a member of a regional arrangement and re­gardless of the source of the attack. Chapter VIII, on the other hand, deals with relations among members of a regional arrangement or agency, and authorizes regional action as appropriate for dealing with "local disputes." This distinction has been recognized · ever since the founding of the United Nations in 1945.

For ex;ample, the North Atlantic Treaty Or­ganization has operated as a collective secu­rity a,rrangement, designed to take common measures in preparation against the even­tuality of an armed attack for which collec­tive defenses under article 51 would be re­quired. Similarly, the Southeast Asia. Treaty Organization was designed as a. collective de­fense arrangement under article 51. Secretary of State Dulles emphasized this in his testi­mony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1954.

By contra.st, article 1 of the Charter of Bogota ( 1948), establishing the Organiza­tion of American States, expressly declares that the organization is · a regional agency within the United Nations. Indeed, chapter VllI of the United Nations Charter was in­cluded primarily to take account of the functioning of the inter-American system.

In sum, there is no basis in the United Nations Charter for contending that the right of self-defense against armed attack is limited to collective defense by a regional organization. F. The United States has fulfilled its obli­

gations to the United Nations A further argument has been made that

the members of the United Nations have conferred on United Nations organs-and, in particular, on the Security Council-ex­clusive power to act against aggression. Again, the express language of article 51 contradicts that assertion. A victim of armed attack is not required to forgo indi­vidual or collective defense of its territory until such time as the United Nations orga­nizes collective action and takes appropriate measures. To the contrary, article 51 clearly states that the right of self-defense may be exercised "untiZ the security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security." s

1 17 UNCIO Documents 288. [Footnote in original.]

s An argument has been made by some that the United States, by joining in the collec­t ive defense of South Viet-Nam, has violated the peaceful settlement obligation of article 33 in the charter. This argument overlooks the obvious proposition that a victim of armed aggression is not required to sustain the attack undefended while efforts are made to find a political solution with the aggressor. Article 51 of the charter illustrates this by

As indicated earlier, article 61 ls not literal­ly applicable to the Viet-Nam situation since South Viet-Nam is not a member. However, reasoning by analogy from article 51 and adopting its provisions as an appropriate guide for the conduct of members in a case like Viet-Nam, one can only conclude that United States actions are fully in accord with this country's obligations as a member of the United Nations.

Article 51 requires that: "Measures taken by Members in the exer­

cise of this right of self-defense shall be im­mediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security."

The United States has reported to the Se­curity Council on measures it has taken in countering the Communist aggression in Viet-Nam. In August 1964 the United States asked the Council to consider the situation created by North Vietnamese attacks on United States destroyers in the Tonkin Gulf.9

The Council thereafter met to debate the question, but adopted no resolutions. Twice in February 1965 the United States sent addi­tional reports to the Security Council on the conflict in Viet-Nam and on the additional measures taken by the United States in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam.10 In January 1966 the United States formally sub­mitted the Viet-Nam question to the Security Council for its consideration and introduced a draft resolution calling for discussions look­ing toward a peaceful settlement on the basis of the Geneva accords.11

At no time has the Council taken any ac­tion to restore peace and security in South­east Asia. The Council has not expressed criticism of United States actions. Indeed, since the United States subm.ission of Jan­uary 1966, members of the Council have been notably reluctant to prooeed with any consideration of the Viet-Nam question.

The conclusion is clear that the United States has in no way acted to interfere with United Nations consideration of the conflict in Viet-Nam. On the contrary, the United States has requested United Nations consideration, and the Council has not seen fit to act. G. International law does not require a dec­

laration of war as a condition precedent to taking measures of self-defense against armed attack The existence or absence of a formal dec­

laration of war is not a factor in determin­ing whether an international use of force is lawful as a matter of international law. The United Nations Charter's res,triotions focus on the manner and purpose of its use and not on a,ny formalities of announcement.

It should also be noted that a formal dec­Ia.ration of war would not place any obliga­tions on either side in the conflict by which that side would not be bound in any event. The rules of internationa.l law concerning the conduct of hostilities in an international armed conflict apply regardless of any dec­laration of war.

H. Summary The analysis set forth above shows that

South Viet-Nam has the right in present cir-

making perfectly clear that the inherent right of sell-defense is impaired by "Nothing in the present Charter," including the provisions of article 38. [Footnote in original.]

O For a statement made by U.S. Representa­tive Adlai E. Stevenson in the Security Coun­cil on Aug. 5, 1964, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272.

10 For texts, see ibid., Feb. 22, 1965, p. 240, and Mar. 22, 1965, p. 419.

11 For background and text of draft resolu­tion, see ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 231.

cumstances to defend itself against armed attack from the North and to organize a col­lective self-defense with the participation of others. In response to requests from South Viet-Nam, the United States has been par­ticipating in that defense, both through mili­tary action within South Viet-Nam and ac­tions taken directly against the aggressor in North Viet-Nam. This participation by the United States is in conformity with interna­tional law and is consistent with our obliga­tions under the Charter of the United Nations. II. THE UNITED STATES HAS UNDERTAKEN COM­

MITMENTS TO ASSIST SOUTH VIET-NAM IN DE­FENDING ITSELF AGAINST COMMUNIST AGGRES­SION FROM THE NORTH

The United States has made commitments and given assurances, in various forms and at different times, to assist in the defense o! South Viet-Nam. A. The United States gave undertakings at

the end of the Geneva Conference in 1954 At the time of the signing of the Geneva

accords in 1954, President Eisenhower warned "that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern," at the same time giving assurance that the United States would "not use force to disturb the settlement." 12 And the formal declaration made by the United States Gov­ernment at the conclusion of the Geneva conference stated that the United States "would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security." 13

B. The United States undertook an interna­tional obligation to defend South Viet­Nam in the SEATO Treaty Later in 1964 the United States negotiated

with a number of other countries and signed the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty.H The treaty contains in the first paragraph of article IV the following provi­sion:

"Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unan­imous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations."

Annexed to the treaty was a protocol stat­ing that:

"The Parties to the Southeast Asia Collec­tive Defense Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam."

Thus, the obligations of article IV, para­graph 1, dealing with the eventuality of armed attack, have from the outset covered the territory of South Viet-Nam. The facts as to the North Vietnamese armed attack against the South have been summarized earlier, in the discussion of the right of self-defense under international law and the Charter of the United Nations. The term "armed attack" has the same meaning in the SEATO treaty as in the United Nations Charter.

Article IV, paragraph 1, places an obliga­tion on each party to the SEATO treaty to "act to meet the common danger in accord­ance with its constitutional processes" in the event of an armed attack. The treaty does

12 For a statement made by President Eisen­hower on June 21, 1954, see ibid., Aug. 2, 1954, p . 163.

1a For text, see ibid., p. 162. 14 For text, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

March 27, -1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7923 not require a collective determination that an armed attack has occurred in order that the obligation of article IV, paragraph l, become operative. Nor does the provision re­quire collective decision on actions to be taken to meet the common danger. As Sec­retary Dulles pointed out when transmitting the treaty to the President, the commitment in article IV, paragraph 1, "leaves to the judgment of each country the type of action to be taken in the event an armed attack occurs." 16

The treaty was intended to deter armed aggression in Southeast Asia. To that end it created not only a multilateral alliance but also a. series of bilateral relationships. The obligations are placed squarely on "each Party" in the event of armed attack in the treaty area-not upon "the Parties," a word­ing that might have implied a necessity for collective decision. The treaty was intended to give the assurance of United States assist­ance to any party or protocol state that might suffer a Communist armed attack, regardless of the views or aotions of other parties. The fact that the obligations are individual, and may even to some extent differ among the parties to the treaty, ls demonstrated by the United Staites understanding, expressed at the time of signature, that its obligations under article IV, paragraph 1, apply only in the event of Communist aggression, whereas the other parties to the treaty were unwilling so to limit their obligations to each other.

Thus, the United States has a commit­ment under article IV, paragraph 1, in the event of armed attack, independent of the decision or action of other treaty parties. A Joint statement issued by Secretary Rusk and Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman of Thailand on March 6, 1962,16 reflected this understanding:

"The Secretary of State assured the For­eign Minister that in the event of such aggression, the United States intends to give full effect to its obligations under the Treaty to act to meet the common danger in ac­cordance with its constitutional processes. The Secretary of State reaffirmed that this obligation of the United States does not de­pend upon the prior agreement of all other parties to the Treaty, since this Treaty obli­gation is individual as well as collective."

Most of the SEATO countries have stated that they agreed with this interpretation. None has registered objection to it.

When the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations reported on the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, it noted that the treaty area. was further defined so that the "Free Territory of Vietnam" was an area "which, if attacked, would fall under the protection of the instrument." In its con­clusion the committee stated:

"The committee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully ap­preciates that acceptance of these addi­tional obligations commits the United States to a. course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest interests."

The Senate gave its advice and consent to the treaty by a vote of 82 to 1. C. The United States has given additional as­

surances to the Government of South Viet­Nam

The United States has also given a series of additional assurances to the Government of South Viet-Nam. As early as October 1954 President Eisenhower undertook to provide direct assistance to help make South Viet­Nam "capable of resisting attempted sub­version or aggression through military means." 17 On May 11, 1957, President Eisen­hower and President Ngo Dinh Diem of

1 5 For text, see ibid., Nov. 20, 1954, p. 820. 1° For text, see ibid., Mar. 26, 1962, p. 498. l7 For text of a message from President

Eisenhower to President Ngo Dinh Diem, see ibid., Nov. 16, 1954, p. 736.

the Republic of Viet-Na~ issued a. joint statement 1s which called attention to "the large build-up of Vietnamese Communist military forces in North Vietnam" and stated:

Noting that the Republic of Viet-Nam is covered by Article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, President Eisen­hower and President Ngo Dinh Diem agreed that aggression or subversion threatening the political independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam would be considered as en­dangering peace and stability.

On August 2, 1961, President Kennedy declared that "the United States is deter­mined that the Republic of Viet-Nam shall not be lost to the Communist for lack of any support which the United States Government can render." 19 On December 7 of that year President Diem appealed for additional support. In his reply of December 14, 1961, President Kennedy recalled the United States declaration made at the end of the Geneva conference in 1954, and re­affirmed that the United States was "pre­pared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam to protect its people and to preserve its in­dependence." 20 This assurance has been re­affirmed many times since. III. ACTIONS BY THE UNITED STATES AND SOUTH

VIET-NAM ARE JUSTIFIED UNDER THE GENEVA ACCORDS OF 1954

A. Description of the accords

The Geneva accords of 1954 21 established the date and hour for a cease-fire in Viet­Nam, drew a "provisional military demarca­tion line" with a demilitarized zone on both sides, and required an exchange of prison­ers and the phased regroupment of Viet Minh forces from the south to the north and of French Union forces from the north to the south. The introduction into Viet-Nam of troop reinforcements and new military equipment ( except for replacement and re­pair) was prohibited. The armed forces of each party were required to respect the de­militarized zone and the territory of the other zone. The adherence of either zone to any military alliance, and the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to "further an aggressive policy," were pro­hibl ted. The International Control Com­mission was established, composed of India., Canada and Poland, with India as chair­man. The task of the Commission was to supervise the proper execution of the provi­sions of the cease-fire agreement. General elections that would result in reunltl.cation were required to be held in July 1956 under the supervision of the ICC. B. North Viet-Nam violated the accords from

the beginning From the very beginning, the North Viet­

namese violated the 1954 Geneva accords.

is For text, see ibid., May 27, 1957, p. 851. 10 For text of a joint communique issued

by President Kennedy and Vice President Ohen Cheng of the Republic of China, see ibid., Aug. 28, 1961, p. 372.

20 For text of an exchange of messages be­tween President Kennedy and President Diem, see ibid., Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13.

21 These accords were cOlllposed of a bi­lateral cease-fire agreement between the "Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army of Viet Nam" and the "Commander-in­Chief of the French Union forces in Indo­China," together with a Final Declaration of the Conference, to which France adhered. However, it is to be noted that the South Vietnamese Government was not a signa­tory of the cease-fire agreement and did not adhere to the Final Declaration. South Viet­Nam entered a series of reservations in a statement to the conference. This statement was noted by the conference, but by decision of the conference chairman it was not ln­cl uded or referred to in the Final Declara­tion. [Footnote in original.]

Communist military forces and supplies were left in the South in violation of the accords. Other Communist guerrillas were moved north for further training and then were infiltrated into the South in violation of the accords. C. The introduction of United States military

personnel and equipment was justified The accords prohibited the reinforcement

of foreign military forces in Viet-Nam and the introduction of new military equipment, but they allowed replacement of existing military personnel and equipment. Prior to late 1961 South Viet-Nam had received con­siderable military equipment and supplies from the United States, and the United States had gradually enlarged its M111tary Assistance Advisory Group to slightly less than 900 men. These actions were reported to the ICC and were Justified as replacements for equipment in Viet-Nam in 1954 and for French training and advisory personnel who had been withdrawn after 1954.

As the Communist aggression intensified during 1961, with increased infiltration and a marked stepping up of Communist terror­ism in the South, the United States found it necessary in late 1961 to increase substan­tially the numbers of our military personnel and the amounts and types of equipment in­troduced by this country into South Viet­Nam. These increases were Justified by the international law principle that a material breach of an agreement by one party entitles the other at least to withhold compliance with an equivalent, corresponding, or related provision until the defaulting party is pre­pared to honor its obllgatlons.22

In accordance with this principle, the sys­tematic violation of the Geneva. accords by North Viet-Nam justified South Viet-Nam in suspending compliance with the provision controlling entry of foreign military person­nel and military equipment. D. South Viet-Nam was justified in refusing

to implement the election provisions of the Geneva Accords The Geneva accords contemplated the re­

unification of the two parts of Viet-Nam. They contained a provision for general elec­tions to be held in July 1956 in order to obtain a. "free expression of the national will." The accords stated that "consultations will be held on this subject between the competent representative authorities of the two zones from 20 July 1955 onwards."

There may be some question whether South Viet-Nam was bound by these election

22 This principle of law and the circum­stances in which it may be invoked are most fully discussed in the Fourth Report on th'e Law of Treaties by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, articles 18, 20 (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/120(1959)) II Yearbook of the International Law Com­mission 37 (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1959/ Add.l) and in the later report by Sir Hum­phrey Waldock, article 20 (U.N. doc. A/CN.4/ 166 and Add. 1-3 ( 1963) ) II Yearbook of the International Law Commission 36 (U.N. doc. A/ON.4/SER.A/1963/Add.1). Among the au­thorities cited by the fourth report for this proposition are: II Oppenheim, International Law 136, 137 (7th ed. La.uterpacht 1955); I Rousseau, Principes gen&raux du droit in­ternational public 365 {1944); II Hyde, In­ternational Law 1660 et seq. (2d 1947); II Guggenheim, Traite de droit international public 84, 85 (1935); Spiropoulos, Traite theorique et pratique de droit international public 289 {1933); Verdross, Volkerrecht, 328 (1950); Hall, Treatise 21 (8th ed. Higgins 1924); 3 Accioly, Tratado d·e Direito Inter­nacional Publico 82 ( 1956-67) . See also draft articles 42 and 46 of the Law of Treaties by the International Law Commission, con­tained in the report on the work of its 15th session ( General Assembly, Official Records, 18th Session, Supplement No. 9(A/6809)). [ Footnote in original.]

7924 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27,- 1968 provisions. As indicated earlier, South Viet­Nam did not sign the cease-fire agreement of 1954, nor did it adhere to the Final Dec­laration of the Geneva conference. The South Vietnamese Government at that time gave notice of its objection in particular to the election provisions of the accords.

However, even on the premise that these provisions were binding on South Viet-Nam, the South Vietnamese Government's failure to engage in consultations in 1955, with a view to holding elections in 1956, involved no breach of obligation. The conditions in North Viet-Nam during that periOd were such as to make impossible any free and meaningful expression of popular will.

Some of the facts about conditions in the North were admitted even by the Communist leadership in Hanoi. General Giap, currently Defense Minister of North Viet-Nam, in ad­dressing the Tenth Congress of the North Vietnamese Communist Party in October 1956, publicly acknowledged that the Com­munist leaders were running a police state where executions, terror, and torture were commonplace. A nationwide election in these circumstances would have been a travesty. No one in the North would have dared to vote except as directed. With a substantial ma­jority of the Vietnamese people living north of the 17th parallel, such an election would have meant turning the country over to the Communists without regard to the will of the people. The South Vietnamese Govern­ment realized these facts and quite properly took the position that consultations. for elec­tions in 1956 as contemplated by the accords would be a useless formality .23

IV. THE PRESIDENT HAS FULL AUTHORITY TO COMMJ:T UNITED STATES FORCES IN THE COL­LECTIVE DEFENSE OF SOUTH VIET-NAM

There can be no question in present cir-cumstances of the President's authority to commit United States forces to the defense of South Viet-Nam. The grant of authority to the President in article II of the Constitu­tion extends to the actions of the United States. currently undertaken in Viet-Nam. In fact, however, it is unnecessary to deter­mine whether this grant standing alone is sufficient to authorize the actions taken in Viet-Nam. These action$ rest not only on the exercise of Presidential powers under article II but on the SEATO treaty-a treaty advised and consented to by the Senate--and on actions of the Congress, particularly the joint resolution of August 10, 1964-. When these sources of authority are taken to­gether-article II of the Constitution, the SEATO treaty, and actions by the Congress­there can be no question of the legality under domestic law of United States action in Viet­Nam. A. The President's power under article II of

the Constitution extends to the actions currently undertaken in Viet-Nam Under the Constitution, the President, in

addition to being Chief Executive, is Com­mander in Chief of the Army and Navy. He holds the prime responsibility for the con­duct of United States foreign relations. These duties carry very broad powers, in­cluding the power to deploy American forces abroad and commit them to military opera­tions when the President deems such action necessary to maintain the security and de­fense of the United States.

At the Federal Constitutional Convention

2:1 In any event, if North Viet-Nam con­sidered there had been a breach of obligation by the South, its remedies lay in discussion with Saigon, perhaps in an appeal to the co­chairmen of the Geneva conference, or in a reconvening of the conference to consider the situation. Under international law, North V~et-Nam b,ad . no· right to use force outside its own zone in order to secure its political objectives. [Footnote in original.]

in 1787, it. was originally· proposed that Con­gress have the power "to make war." There were objections that legislative proceedings were too slow for this power to be vested in Congress; it was suggested that the Senate ~ght be a better repository. Madison and Gerry then moved to substitute "to declare war" for "to make war," "leaving to the Ex­ecutive the power to repel sudden attacks." It was objected that this might make it too easy for the Executive to involve the nation in war, but the motion carried with but one dissenting vote.

In 1787 the world was a far larger place, and the framers probably had in mind at­tacks upon the United States. In the 20th century, the world has grown much smaller. An attack on a country far from our shores can impinge directly on the nation's security. In the SEATO treaty, for example, it is for­mally declared that an armed attack against Viet-Nam would endanger the peace and safety of the United States.

Since the Constitution was adopted there have been at least 125 instances in which the Pres-ident has ordered the armed forces to take action or maintain positions abroad without obtaining prior congressional au­thorization, starting with the "undeclared war" with France (1798-1800). For example, President Truman ordered 250,000 troops to Korea during the Korean war of the early 1950's. President Eisenhower dispatched 14,-000 troops to Lebanon in 1958.

The Constitution leaves to the President the judgment to determine whether the cir­cumstances of a particular armed attack are so urgent and the potential consequences so threatening to the security of the United States that he should act without formally consulting the Congress. B. The Southeast Asia Collective Defense

Treaty authorizes the President's actions Under article VI of the United States

Constitution, "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land." Article IV, paragraph 1, of the SEATO treaty establishes as a matter of law that a Communist armed attack against South Viet-Nam endangers the peace and safety of the United States. In this same provision the United States has undertaken a commitment in the SEATO treaty to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" in the event of such an attack.

Under our Constitution it is the President who must decide when an armed attack has occurred. He has also the constitutional re­sponsibility for determining what measures of defense are required when the peace and safety of the United States are endangered. If he considers that deployment of U.S. forces to South Viet-Nam is required, and that military measures against the source of Oornmunist aggression in North Viet-N-am are necessary, he is constitutionally em.­powered to take those measures.

The SEATO treaty specifies that each party will act "in accordance with its constitu­tional processes."

It has recently been argued that the use of land forces in Asia is not authorized un­der the treaty because their use to deter armed attack was not contemplated at the time the treaty was considered by the Sen­ate. Secretary Dulles testified at that time that we did not intend to establish (1) a land arm in Southeast Asia capable of deterring Communist aggression, or (2) an integrated headquarters and military orga­nization like that of NATO; instead, the United States would rely on "mobile.striking power" against the sources of aggression. However, the treaty obligation in article IV, paragraph 1, to meet the common danger in the event of armed aggression, is not limited to particular modes of military action. What constitutes an adequate deterrent or an ap-

propriate response, in terms of military strategy, may change; but the essence of our commitment to act to meet the common danger, as necessary at the time of an armed aggression, remains. In 1954 the forecast of military judgment might have been against the use of substantial United States ground forces in Viet-Nam. But that does not pre­clude the President from reaching a different military judgment in different circumstances, 12 years later. C. The joint resolution of Congress of Au­

gust 10, 1964, authorizes United States par­ticipation in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam As stated earlier, the legality of United

States participation in the defense of South Viet-Nam does not rest only on the consti­tutional power of the President under arti­cle II--or indeed on the power taken in conjunction with the SEATO treaty. In ad­dition, the Congress has acted in unmJs­takable fashion to approve and authoriz;e United States action in Viet-Nam.

Following the North Vietnamese attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin against United States destroyers, Congress adopted, by a Senate vote of 88-2 and a House vote of 416-0, a joint resolution containing a series of im­portant declarations and provisions of law.2,

Section 1 resolved that "the Congress ap­proves and supports the detennination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further ag­gression." Thus, the Congress gave its sanc­tion to specific actions. by the President to repel attacks against United States naval vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin and elsewhere in the western Pacific. Congress further ap­proved the taking of "all necessary meas­ures ... to prevent further aggression." This authorization extended to those meas­ures the President might consider necessary to ward off further attacks and to prevent further aggression by North Vietnam in Southeast Asia.

The joint resolution then went on to pro­vide in section 2:

"The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and se­curity in southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in ac­cordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all neces­sary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re­questing assistance in defense of its free­dom."

Section 2 thus constitutes an authoriza­tion to the President, in his discretion, to act--using armed force if he determines that is required-to assist South Viet--Nam at its request in defense of its freedom. The identification of South Viet-Nam through the reference to "protocol state" in this sec­tion is unmistakable, and the grant of au­thority "as the President determines" is un­equivocal.

It has been suggested that the legislative history of the joint resolution shows an in­tention to limit United States assistance to South Viet-Nam to aid, advice, and training. This suggestion is based on an amendment offered from the floor by Senator [Gaylord 1

Nelson which would have added the follow­ing to the text:

''The Congress also approves and supports the efforts of the President to bring the prob­lem of peace in Southeast Asia to the Security Council of the United Nations, and the Prest-

24 For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24. 1964. p. 268.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7925 dent's declaration that the United States, seeking no extension of the present military conflict, will respond to provocation in a manner that is "limited and fitting." Our continuing policy is to limit our role to the provision of aid, training a.ssistance, and military advice, and it is the sense of Con­gress that, except when provoked to a greater response, we should continue to attempt to avoid a direct military involvement in the Southeast Asian conflict." 25

Senator [J. W.] Fulbright, who had re­ported the joint resolution from the Foreign Relations Committee, spoke on the amend­ment as follows:

"It states fairly accurately what the Presi­dent has said would be our policy, and what I stated my understanding was as to our policy; also what other Senators have stated. In other words, it states that our response should be appropriate and limited to the provocation, which the Senator states as "respond to provocation in a manner that is limited and fitting," and so forth. We do not wish any political or military bases there. We are not seeking to gain a colony. We seek to insure the capacity of these people to develop along the lines of their own desires, independent of domination by communism.

"The Senator has put into his amendment a statement of policy that is unobjectionable. However, I cannot accept the amendment under the circumstances. I do not believe it is contrary to the joint resolution, but it is an enlargement. I am informed that the House is now voting on this resolution. The House joint resolution is about to be pre­sented to us. I cannot accept the amendment and go to conference with it, and thus take responsibility for delaying matters.

"I do not object to it as a statement of policy. I believe it is an accurate reflection of what I believe is the President's policy, judging from his own statements. That does not mean that as a practical matter I can accept the amendment. It would delay mat­ters to do so. It would cause confusion and require a conference, and present us with all the other difficulties that are involved in this kind of legislative action. I regret that I cannot do it, even though I do not at all disagree with the amendment as a general statement of policy" .26

Senator Nelson's amendment related the degree and kind of U.S. response in Viet-Nam to "provocation" on the other side; the re­sponse should be "limited and fitting." The greater the provocation, the stronger are the measures that may be characterized as "limited and fitting." Bombing of North Vietnamese naval bases was a "limited and fitting" response to the attacks on U.S. de­stroyers in August 1964, and the subsequent actions taken by the United States and South Viet-Nam have been an appropriate response to the increased war of aggression carried on by North Viet-Nam since that date. Moreover, Senator Nelson's proposed amendment did not purport to be a restriction on authority available to the President but merely a state­ment concerning what should be the con­tinuing policy of the United States.

Congressional realization of the scope of authority being conferred by the joint reso­lution is shown by the legislative history of the measure as a whole. The following ex­change between Senators Cooper and Ful­bright is illuminating:

"Mr. CooPER (John Sherman Cooper). The Senator will remember that the SEATO Treaty, in article IV, provides that in the event an armed attack is made upon a party to the Southea.st Asia Collective Defense Treaty, or upon one of the protocol states such as South Vietnam, the parties to the treaty, one of whom is the United States,

25 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 110, pt. 14, p.18459.

lieJbid.

would then take such action as might be ap­propriate, after resorting to their constitu­tional processes. I assume that would mean, in the case of the United States, that Con­gress would be asked to grant the authority to act.

"Does the Senator consider that in enact­ing this resolution we are satisfying that re­quirement of article IV of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty? In other words, are we now giving the President ad­vance authority to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting South Viet­nam and its defense, or with respect to the defense of any other country included in the treaty?

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think that is correct. "Mr. CooPER. Then, looking ahead, if the

President decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead into war, we will give that authority by this resolution?

"Mr. FULBRIGHT. That is the way I would interpret it. If a situation later developed in which we thought the approval should be withdrawn it could be withdrawn by concur­rent resolution." 27

The August 1964 joint resolution continues in force today. Section 2 of the resolution provides that it shall expire "when the Presi­dent shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress." The President has made no such determination, nor has Congress terminated the joint resolution.28

Instead, Congress in May 1965 approved an appropriation of $700 million to meet the expense of mounting military requirements in Viet-Nam. (Public Law 89-18, 79 Stat. 109.) The President's message asking for this appropriation stated that this was "not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this request is also

zr 110 Cong. Rec. 18409 (Aug. 6, 1964). Sen­ator [Wayne] Morse, who opposed the joint resolution, expressed the following view on August 6, 1964, concerning the scope of the proposed resolution:

"Another Senator thought, in the early part of the debate, that this course would not broaden the power of the President to en­gage in a land war if he decided that he wanted to apply the resolution in that way.

"That Senator was taking great consola­tion in the then held belief that, if he voted for the resolution, it would give no authority to the President to send many troops into Asia. I am sure he was quite disappointed to finally learn, because it took a little time to get the matter cleared, that the resolution places no restriction on the President in that respect. If he is still in doubt, let him read the language on page 2, lines 3 to 6, and page 2, lines 11 to 17. The first reads:

" 'The Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Com­mander in Chief, to take all necessary meas­ures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.'

"It does not say he is limited in regard t J

the sending of ground forces. It does not lim­it that authority. That is why I have called it a predated declaration of war, in clear vio­lation of article I, section 8, of the Con­stitution, which vests the power to declare war in the Congress, and not in the Presi­dent.

"What is proposed is to authorize the President of the United States, without a declaration of war, to commit acts of war." (CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 110, pt. 14, pp. 18426-27.)

28 On March 1, 1966, the Senate voted, 92-5, to table an amendment that would have re­pealed the joint resolution. [Footnote in original.]

voting to persist in our efforts to halt Com­munist aggression in South Vietnam. 29 The appropriation act constitutes a clear con­gressional endorsement and approval of the actions taken by the President.

On March 1, 1966, the Congress continued to express its support of the President's policy by approving a $4.8 billion supplemental military authorization by votes of 392-14 and 93-2. An amendment that would have lim­ited the President's authority to commit forces to Viet-Nam was rejected in the Senate by a vote of 94--2. D. No declaration of war by the Congress is

required to authorize United States par­ticipation in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam No declaration of war is needed to author­

ize American actions in Viet-Nam. As shown in the preceding sections, the President has ample authority to order the participation of United States armed forces in the defense of South Viet-Nam.

Over a very long periOd in our history, practice and precedent have confirmed the constitutional authority to engage United States forces in hostilities without a declara­tion of war. This history extends from the undeclared war with France and the war against the Barbary pirates at the end of the 18th century to the Korean war of 1950-53.

James Madison, one of the leading framers of the Constitution, and Presidents John Adams and Jefferson all construed the Con­stitution, in their official actions during the early years of the Republic, as authorizing the United States to employ its armed forces abroad in hostilities in the absence of any congressional declaration of war. Their views and actions constitute highly persuasive evidence as to the meaning and effect of the Constitution. History has accepted the inter­pretation that was placed on the Constitution by the early Presidents and Congresses in regard to the lawfulness of hostilities with­out a declaration of war. The instances of such action in our history are numerous.

In the Korean conflict, where large-scale hostilities were conducted with an American troop participation of a quarter of a million men, no declaration of war was made by the Congress. The President acted on the basis of his constitutional responsibilities. While the Security Council, under a treaty of this country-the United Nations Charter-rec­ommended assistance to the Republic of Ko­rea against the Communist armed attack, the United States had no treaty commitment at that time obligating us to join in the de­fense of South Korea. In the case of South Viet-Nam we have the obligation of the SEATO treaty and clear expressions of con­gressional support. If the President could act in Korea without a declaration of war a fortiori he is empowered to do so now 1~ Viet-Nam.

It may be suggested that a declaration of war is the only available constitutional proc­ess by which congressional support can be made effective for the use of United States armed forces in combat abroad. But the Con­stitution does not insist on any rigid for­malism. It gives Congress a choice of ways in which to exercise its powers. In the case of Viet-Nam the Congress has supported the determination of the President by the Sen­ate's approval of the SEATO treaty, the adop­tion of the joint resolution of August 10, 1964, and the enactment of the necessary authorizations and appropriations.

V. CONCLUSION South Viet-Nam is being subjected to

armed attack by Communist North Viet­Nam., through the infiltration of armed per­sonnel, military equipment, and regular com­ba,t units. International law recognizes the

29 For text, see BULLETIN of May 24, 1965, p. 822.

7926 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 right of individual and collective self-defense against armed attack. South Viet-Nam, and the United States upon the request of South Viet-Nam, are engaged in such collective de­fense of the South. Their actions are in con­formity with international law and With the Charter of the United Nations. The fact that South Viet-Nam has been precluded by So­viet veto from becoming a member of the United Nations and the fact that South Viet­Nam is a zone of a temporarily divided state in no way diminish the right of collective defense of South Viet-Nam.

The United States has commitments to assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself against Communist aggression from the North. The United States gave undertakings to this effec·t at the conclusion of the Geneva conference in 1954. Later that year the United States undertook an international obligation in the SEATO treaty to defend South Viet­Nam against Communist armed aggression. And during the past decade the United States has given additional assurances to the South Vietnamese Government.

The Gen.eva accords of 1954 provided for a cease-fire and regroupment of contending forces, a division of Viet-Nam into ~wo zones, and a prohibition on the use of either zone for the resumption of hostilities or to "fur­ther an aggressive policy." From the begin­ning, North Viet-Nam violated the Gene~a accords through a systematic effort to gain control of South Viet-Nam by force. In the light of these progressive North Vietnamese violations, the introduction into South Vi~t­Nam beginning in late 1961 of substantial United States military equipment and per­sonnel, to assist in the defense of the South, was fully justified; substantial breach of an international agreement by one side permits the other side to suspend performance of cor­responding obligations under the agreement. South Viet-Nam was justified in refusing to implement the provisions of the Genev-a accords calling for reunification through free elections throughout Viet-Nam since the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam cre­ated conditions in the North that made free elections entirely impossible.

The President of the United States has full authority to commit United States forces in the collective defense of South Viet-Nam. This authonty stems from the constitutional powers of the President. However, it is not necessary to rely on the Constitution alone as the source of the President's authority, since the SEATO treaty-advised and con­sented t.o by the Senate and forming part of the law of the land-5ets forth a United States commitment to defend South Viet­Nam against armed attack, and since the Congress--in the joint resolution of August 10. 1964, and in authorization and appropri­ations acts for support of the U.S. military effort in Viet-Nam-has given its approval and support to the President's actions. United States actions in Viet-Nam, taken by the President and approved by the Congress, do not require any declaration of war, as shown by a. long line of precedents for the use of United States armed forces abroad in the absence of any congressional declaration of war.

[From the American Bar Association Journal. May 1966J

THE LEGALITY OF THE UNITED STATES POSITION IN VIETNAM

(Reviewing the history of developments in and concerning the Southeast Asia area since 1954, Mr. Deutsch demonstrates the soundness o! the position ta.ken by the House of Delegates of th.eAinerican Bar Asso­ciation last February-that the position of the United States in Vietnam is legal under international law and in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the South­east Asia Treaty. The Cammi ttee of which Mr. Deutsch is chairman was one of the

sponsors of the resolution the House · adopted.)

(By Eberhard P. Deutsch) By the Geneva accords of 1954, the com­

manders in chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina, on the one hand, and of the People's Army of Vietnam, on the other, established the 17th parallel as the military demarcation line between North. and South Vietnam, With a demilitarized zone on each side of the line. They stipulated that the armed forces of each party were to respect the demilitarized zone and the territory of the other zone, and that neither zone was to be used "for the resumption of hostilities or to further an aggressive policy" .1 The accords additionally provided for the creation of an International Commission, composed of India (chairman), Poland and Canada, to supervise the agreements.2

In 1962 the International Commission re­ported, with approval. findings of its Legal Committee to the effect that "there is evi­den.ce to show that arms, armed and unarmed personnel, munitions and other supplies have been sent from the Zone in the North to the Zone in th.e South With the objective of sup­porting, organizing and carrying out hostile activities, including armed attacks, directed against the Armed Forces and Administra­tion of the Zone in the South", and that the People's Army of Vietnam "has allowed the Zone in the North. to be used for inciting, en­couraging and supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the South, aimed at the over­throw of the Administration in the South".8

The evidence further demonstrates that the aggression by North Vietnam against South Vietnam (the Republic of Vietnam) had been going on unabashedly since the signing of the Geneva Accords and that North Vietnam had consistently violated these accords from their inception. An official State Department report recites:

While negotiating an end to the Indochina War at Geneva in 1954, the Communists were making plans to take over all former French territory in Southeast Asia. When Viet-Nam was partitioned, thousands of carefully se­lected party members were ordered to remain in place in the South and keep their secret apparatus intact to help promote Hanoi's cause. Arms and ammunition were stored away for future use.4

It is important to bear in mind that nei­ther the Republic of (South) Vietnam nor the United States is a party to the Geneva Accords, and that while the United States participated in the discussions leading up to the accords, it did not sign. the final dec­laration. However, during the last plenary session of the Geneva Conference on July 21, 1954, Under Secretary of State Walter Bedell Smith, head of the United States delegation, said in an official statement that his Gov­ernment "would view any renewal ot the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agree­ments with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and secu­rity".6

On September 8, 1954, just a few weeks after the Geneva Accords were executed, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense (SEATO)

1 Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet Nam, IC/42/Rev. 2, July 20, 1954. (the

· Geneva Accords. The others, not immediately relevant, dealt with Laos and Cambodia re­spectively), Art. 19.

2 Jd., Chap. VI, Arts. 29, 34 et seq. a Special Report of the International. Com­

mission for Supervision and Control in Viet Nam, Saigon, June 2, 1962, para. 9; reprinted in Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Rela­tions Committee on S. 2793, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 736 (1966)', hereinafter cited as Hear­ings. The Polish delegation dissented.

4 Aggression from th.e North, 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 404, 424 ( 1965) .

6 31 DEP'T STATE BULL. 162-163 (1954).

Treaty was signed. Parties to it were the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Pakistan and the Philip­pines. The United States Senate ratified the treaty on February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1.8 It took effect on February 19, 1955.7

Paragraph 1 of Article IV of the SEATO Treaty provides that each party thereto "rec­ognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area 8 against any of the Parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate, would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes" .9 By a protocol to the treaty exe­cuted on the same rlay, the parties "unani­mously designate[d] for the purposes of Ar­ticle IV . . . the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam".10

The SEATO Treaty was made by the parties in a reiteration of "their faith in the pur­poses and principles set forth in the Char­ter of the United Nations",11 nothing in which, according to Article 52 thereof, "pre­cludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing With such matters re­lating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriat.e for re­gional action ... ". Article 53 of the charter provides that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorizati<>:n of the Security Council ... ". These two arti­cles are at the head of Chapter VIII.

The preceding chapter (VII) deals with "Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggres­sion". The first twelve articles (39 to 50, in­clusive) of that chapter prescribe the meas­ures to be ta.ken by the Security Council to meet "any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression". By the last arti­cle (51) of that chapter, it is stipulated ex­pressly that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Na­tions, until the Security Council has taken measures necessa:ry to maintain international peace and security".

It was clearly with these provisions of Arti­cles 51 and 52 of the Charter of the United Nations in mind that; in Article IV of the SEATO Treaty, each party thereto agreed that it would "act to meet the common danger" in the event of "aggression by means of armed attack [anywhereJ in the treaty area" (Southeast Asia. and the Southwest Pacific).. "Enforcement action" is clearly ac­tion to enforce decisions of the Security Council under Articles 39 to 50 of Chapter VU of the charter. Equally clearly, "enforce­ment action" does not include measures of "individual or collective self-defense". So that when Article 53 of the charter provides that "no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements ... without the authorization of the Security Council", it does not refer to such measures of "self-

e. 101 CONG. REC. I060 (1955). 7 6 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 81, T.I.A.S. No. 3170. The

treaty is reproduced in 101 CONG. REC. 1049 (1955) and in STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 89th CONG., 2D SF.SS., BACKGROUND INFORMATION RELATING TO SOUTHEAST ASIA AND VIETNAM 70-74 (Comm.. Print 1966).

s Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific, Article VIII.

10 The protocol ts annexed to the treaty. u Execution of the treaty by the United

States was "with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with refer­ence thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, ap­ply only to communist aggression ...... Supra note 7, signatory clause.

11 Prefatory clause.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7927 defense" as are contemplated under the SEATO Treaty, particularly in light of the explicit recital of Article 51 of the charter that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense". DECLARATION STATES PURPOSE OF AGREEMENT

The "Final Declaration of the Geneva Con­ference", issued on July 21, 1954, the same day on which the Geneva Accords were signed, states:

"The Conference recognizes that the essen­tial purpose of the agreement relating to Viet Nam is to settle military questions with a view to ending hostilities and that the military demarcation line is provisional and should not in any way be interpreted as con­stituting a political or territorial bound­ary." 12

It was by no means contemplated, how­ever, that there was to be no ultimate parti­tion of Vietnam. On the contrary, the very next article (7) of the final declaration pro­vided expressly that the political problems of "independence, unity and territorial in­tegrity" were to be determined by free elec­tions, internationally supervised. That article reads "that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the settlement of political problems, effected on the basis of respect for the principles of independence, unity and territorial integri­ty, shall permit the Vietnamese people to en­joy the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by democratic institutions established as a re­sult of free general elections by secret ballot •.. under the supervision of an international commission." 1a

It will be recalled that by the protocol to the SEATO Treaty, South Vietnam ("the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Viet Nam") was promised protection as such under the treaty. Reference has st.nee been made to South Vietnam as a "protocol state''.1'

In addition to the reference in the con­temporaneous protocol to the SEATO Treaty to "the State of Viet Nam", the Republic of (South) Vietnam "has been recognized as a separate international entity by approxi­mately sixty governments around the world. It has been admitted as a member of several of the specialized agencies of the United Na­tions. In 1957, the General Assembly voted to recommend South Viet Nam for member­ship in the United Nations, and its admis­sion was frustrated only by the veto of the Soviet Union in the Security Council." 15

The right of self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations is ex­pressed to be unlmpaired "if an armed at­tack occurs against a Member of the United Nations", and it has been asserted by oppo­nents of United States' policy in Vietnam that this amounts to explicit denial of such a right in the event of attacks against non­members of the United Nations. A thesis that members of the United Nations are not

12 IC/43/Rev. 2, July 21, 1954; reprinted in BACKGROUND INFORMATION, supra note 7, page 66.

13 Because of the North Vietnamese aggres­sion against South Vietnam, the contem­plated elections were never held: "A nation­wide election in these circumstances would have been a. travesty." Memorandum. The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet Nam, Department of State, Office of the Legal Adviser, March 4, 1966, page 33.

14 See, for example, Hearings 463-465 and JQint Southeast Asia Resolution, 78 Stat. 384, approved August 10, 1964.

15 Memorandum, supra note 13, page 12. See also Vietnamese-United States Relations, a joint statement issued at Washington by the President of the United States and the Pres­ident of Viet Nam, May 11, 1957, White House Press Release. 36 DEP'T STATE BULL. 851-852 (1957).

permitted to participate in collective self­defense to repel aggression, on the ground that the aggrieved nation is not a member of the United Nations, can hardly be sup­ported on its face, in reason, logic or law.16

Would proponents of this doctrine suggest that members of the United Nations would have no right to assist Switzerland in self­defense against a foreign invader?

But the right of self-defense has always existed independently of the charter,11 and that right is recognized expressly in Article 51. It is quite obvious that the charter merely confirms, as to members of the United Nations, the innate right of self-de­fense appertaining to both members and nonmembers. Article 51 expressly retains, unlmpaired, the ''inherent" right of both in­dividual and collective self-defense, thus implicitly recognizing the independent ex­istence of the right of members to come to the aid of nonmembers in collective self-de­fense against aggression, or attack "to maintain international peace and secu­rity"-the very first purpose of the United Nations itself, as stated in the charter.18

On August 7, 1964, the Congress adopted, by a vote of 88 to 2 in the Senate and 416 to O in the House,19 the Joint Southeast Asia Resolution, in which the preambular clauses recite that "naval units of the Com­munist reglme in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have de­liberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in in­ternational waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace": "these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression" against the South Vietnamese "and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom".

The resolution then states "that the Con­gress approves and supports the determina­tion of the President, as Commander in Qhief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression"; that "the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia"; and that "consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Col­lective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President deter­mines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Col­lective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom." 20

In an address delivered at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on April 4, 1959, President Eisenhower declared that his administration had reached "the inescapable conclusion that our own national interests demand some help from us in sustaining Viet Nam the mo­rale ... and the military strength necessary to its continued existence in freedom".21 In a letter of December 14, 1961, to the Presi­dent of the Republic of Vietnam, President

1e The principle that members of the United Nations are legally entitled to participate in collective self-defense of nonmembers is sus­tained by leading authorities on interna­tional law. BOWETl', SELF-DEFENSE IN INTER­NATIONAL LAW 193-195 (1958); KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS 793 (1950).

17 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 297 et seq. (8th (Lauterpacht) ed. 1955); JESSUP, A. MODERN LAW OF NATIONS 163 et seq. (1948).

is See footnote 16, supra. 19 CONGRESSIONAL EECORD, vol. 110, pt. 14,

pp. 18470-18471, 18555. 2o 78 Stat. 384, approved August IO, 1964. :n 40 DEP'T STATE BULL. 579-581 ( 1959) •

Kennedy, recalling that the Communist re­gime of North Vietnam had "violated the pro­visions of the Geneva Accords . . . to which they bound themselves in 1954" and that "at that time, the United States, although not a party to the Accords, declared that it 'would view any renewal of the aggression in viola­tion of the agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security'", assured him that "in accordance with that declaration, and in re­sponse to your request, we are prepared to help the Republic of Viet-Nam ... to pre­serve its independence".22

In President Johnson's message of August 5, 1964, to Congress, reporting the Commu­nist attacks on United States' naval vessels in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin, he said:

"The North Vietnamese regime has con­stantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has vio­lated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of sub­version, which includes the direction, train­ing, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Viet­namese territory ... Our military and eco­nomic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helplng these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence. The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear." 23

The Lawyers Committee on American Pol­icy Towards Vietnam questions whether Pres­ident Johnson's deployment of United States forces to Vietnam can "be squared with our Constitution ... for, contrary to widely held assumptions, the power to make and conduct foreign policy is not vested exclusively in the President, but is divided between him and Congress ... ".2' In his message of August 5, 1964, to the Congress, President Johnson went on to say unequivocally that "as Presi­dent of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress on its part, to join in affirming the national deter­mination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom." And the President forthrightly requested that Congress adopt "a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary ac­tion to protect our armed forces ... and to defend freedom and preserve peace in South­east Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States µnder the Southeast Asia Treaty."

Two days later, on August 7, in response to this message from the President, Congress adopted the resolution quoted above, and on August 10 the Pres'1dent signed it as Public Law 88-408.26

Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, which provides that "nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual and collective self-de­fense", requires that "measures taken by Members in the exercis·e of this right of self­defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council ... ". That the Southeast Asi·a Collective Defense Treaty was made under and in acc•ordance with the Charter of the United Nations, particularly Article 61, is evidenced by the provision of para­graph 1 of Article IV of the treaty (by which each party agreed to participate in defending acts of aggression in the treaty area), that "measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations."

On August 5, 1964, Adlai E . Stevenson, United States Representative to the United

22 46 DEP'T STATE B'tJLL.13-14 (1962). 23 DEP'T STATE BULL. 261-263 (1964).

.u Hearings, Appendix 704-705. 211 Supra note 20.

7928 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE . March 27, 1968 Nations and the Security Council, advised the council formally of two "deliberate armed attacks" by North Vietnamese torpedo boats against a naval unit of the United States on the high seas. He declared that "these wanton acts of violence and destruc­tion" were simply pa,rt of "the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva agreements-­and the deliberate, systematic and flagrant violations of those agreements by two re­gimes which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law · and civilized practice are bound by their provisions", all of which, he said, "fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in Southeast Asia for the -past decade and a half."

Ambassador Stevenson assured the Se­curity Council that "we are in Southeast Asia to help our f.rlends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror [and] alien assassination, managed by the North Viet-Nam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peiping." He affirmed solemnly "that the deployments of additional U.S. forces to Southeast Asia are designed solely to deter further aggression." 2e

On February 7, 1965, Ambassador Steven­son, by a letter to the President of the Se­curity Council, informed that body of "at­tacks by the Viet Cong, which operates under the military orders of North Vietnamese au­thorities in Hanoi". He said the attacks were part of an over-all plan "to make war against the legitimate government of South Viet­Na.tn" in "violation of international law and the Geneva Accords of 1954". He stated also that, as required by paragraph 2 of Article IV of the Southeast Asia Treaty, the United States and Vietnamese Governments had consulted immediately and had agreed that it had become "necessary to take prompt de­fensive action" to resist "this continuing ag­gression". He reported further that the "counter measures ... are a justified meas­ure of self-defense" and that he was "report­ing the measures which we have taken in accordance with our public commitment to assist the Republic of Viet-Nam against ag­gression from .the North".:n

Of particular interest at this point is the reiterated assertion by the Lawyers Commit­tee on American Policy Towards Vietnam, phrased variously throughout its submission, that "only the Security Council ... is au­thorized to determine the existence of any . . . act of aggression and . . . the meas­ures to be taken to maintain or restore inter­national peace" .28 To the statements quoted above, which were made by Ambassador Stevenson in his letter of February 7, 1965, he added significantly: "We deeply regret that the Hanoi regime, in its statement of August 8, 1964, which was circulated in Security Council Document S-5888, explicitly denied the right of the Security Council to exa.tnine this problem." 20

Less than three weeks later, in another letter to the President of the Security Coun­cil, Ambassador Stevenson transmitted to

20 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 272-274 passim (1964).

27 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 240-241 passim (1965).

28 Hearings, Appendix 695. 20 In a letter of July 30, 1965, from Arthur

J. Goldberg, who succeeded Ambassador Ste­venson as our Representative to the United Nations and the Security Council, to the President of the Security Council, he re­peated, in substance, this statement. Am­bassador Goldberg said: "It is especially un­fortunate that the regime in Hanoi ... has denied the competence of the United Nations to concern itself with this dispute in any manner, . and has even refused to participate in the discussions in the Council." United States Mission to the United Nations, Press Release 4610, July 30, 1965.

that body an extensive State Department report entitled Aggression from the North: The Record of North Viet-Nam's Campaign To Conquer South Viet-Nam, the facts re­ci_ted in which, Ambassador Stevenson sub­mitted, "make it unmistakably clear that the character of that conflict is an aggressive war of conquest waged against a neighbor­and make nonsense of the cynical allegation that this is simply an indigenous insurrec­tion" .oo

Innumerable other reports, both formal and informal, were made to the Security Council by the representatives of the United States at the United Nations; and there was even one by President Johnson on July 28, 1965, bespeaking the continued efforts of Secretary General U Thant to find a solution of the Vietnamese problem through the United Nations. In the last of these reports available as this article is written-two let­ters of January 31, 1966, from Ambassador Goldberg to the President of the Security Council-it is requested "that an urgent meeting of the Council be called promptly to consider the situation in Viet Nam". A draft resolution, calling "for immediate discussions without preconditions ... among the ap­propriate interested governments ... look­ing toward the application of the Geneva accords ... and the establishment of a du­rable peace in Southeast Asia", was trans­mitted with the second of these letters for consideration by the council.ai

"We are firmly convinced", said Ambassa­dor Goldberg, "that in light of its obligations under the Charter to maintain international peace and security ... the Council should ad· dress itself urgently and positively to this situation and exert its most vigorous en­deavors and its immense prestige to finding a prompt solution to it." 32 Despite all prior, and this formal, urgent submission of the Vietnamese problem to the Security Council, it has never taken any action of any kind looking toward the restoration of interna­tional peace and security to Southeast Asia. Neither has the council expressed the slight­est criticism of any action taken by the United States in the SEATO area.as

so 52 DEP'T STATE BULL. 403, 419 (1965). It is interesting to compare this statement by Ambassador Stevenson with the assertion of the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam that "Ho Chi Minh can compare his position in demanding union of Vietnam with that of Lincoln, when Britain and France were threatening to intervene to assure the independence of the Confed­eracy", Hearings, Appendix 692.

31 United States Mission to the United Na­tions Press Releases 4798 and 4799, January 31, 1966.

a2 Id., No. 4798. aa Memorandum, supra note 13, page 20. On

February 2, 1966, the Security Council did put the Vietnam question on its agenda at the request of the United States. The vote was nine in favor (Argentina, China, Japan, Jordan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, United Kingdom, United States and Uru­guay); two against (Bulgaria and the Soviet Union); four abstentions (France, Mall, Ni­geria and Uganda).

Ambassadors Federenko of the Soviet Union and Tarabanov of Bulgaria stated that their governments "supported the position of" North Vietnam "that the question be settled within the Geneva Accords", and the former added that the United States "was trying to throttle the struggle of the people of South Viet-Nam for freedom in independ­ence". Ambassador Seydoux of France in­sisted that the United Nations "was not the proper framework for achieving a peaceful solution".

No further action has been taken by the Security Council, but by a letter of Febru­ary 26, 1966, the president of the council ad­vised its members that the differences of

In its memorandum in opposition to the policy of the United States, the Lawyers Com­mittee on American Policy Towards Vietnam asserts that "the conduct of the United States Government in Viet Nam appears plainly to violate the terms of the Geneva Accords." 34

While the United States is not a party to the accords, it did by contemporaneous unilateral declaration agree, in effect, to respect them. But, as demonstrated above, the Geneva Ac­cords since their inception have been violated continuously by the Hanoi regime. It is an accepted principle of international law that a material breach of a treaty by one of the parties thereto dissolves the obligations of the other parties, at least to the extent of withholding compliance until the defaulting party purges its breach.35

It has been suggested that because the power to declare war is vested by the Con­stitution in the Congress alone, the deploy­ment of United States forces to Vietnam by the President, without a formal Congres­sional declaration of war, violates the con­stitutional fiat. When the phrasing of this clause of the Constitution was being con­sidered at the convention in 1787, its original form, vesting in Congress the power to "make" war, was changed to give it the power to "declare" war, "leaving to the Executive the power to repel sudden attacks"-"he should be able to repel and not to commence war" and "to 'conduct' it which was an Ex­ecutive function''.&!

The President is, under Section 2 of Arti­cle II of the Constitution, the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States". Throughout the history of the United States, he has been deemed to have authority to deploy the country's military forces to trouble spots around the world, frequently in combat. The Department of State has a record of some 125 such in­stances.37

In the last analysis, however, the exercise of the President's power as Commander in Chief in deploying forces of the United States to Southeast Asia for the defense of the Republic of Vietnam has had the repeated sanction of the Senate, as well as of the Congress as a whole, so that, although the situation now seems unquestionably to con­stitute war in its technical sense, a formal Congressional verbal declaration of war as such could not conceivably be essential to clothe the President's conduct with constitu­tional validity. This Congressional sanction has been evidenced by overwhelming ma­jorities in the Senate's approval of the SEATO Treaty, in the adoption of the Joint Con­gressional Southeast Asia resolution of Au­gust 10, 1964, and in the passage of the ap­propriations necessary to carry on the defen­sive actions undertaken by the Executive.

First, as to the treaty. In it (paragraph 1, Article IV) each of the parties "recognizes

opinion among them as to the problem of Vietnam had "given rise to a general feeling that it would be inopportune for the Council to hold further debate at this time", but "that the Council, having decided on Febru­ary 2 to place on its agenda the item con­tained in the letter of January 31 from the Permanent Representative of the United States, remained seized of the problem of Viet-Nam." UN Monthly Chronicle, March, 1966, pages 3-10 passim.

3' Hearings, Appendix 702. 35 2 OPPENHEIM, op. cit. supra note 17, at

136, 137. See draft Article 42 of the LAW OF TREATIES by the International Law Commis­sion in the report of its fifteenth session, May 6 to July 12, 1963. U.N. GEN. Ass. OFF. REC. 18th Sess., Supp. No. 9, (A/5509).

36 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON­VENTION 318-319.

37 See State Depatrtment Position Paper pre­pared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, November 19, 1965, BACKGROUND INFoRMATION, supra note 7, at 254.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL .RECORD- HOUSE 7929 , that aggression by means of armed attack in the treaty area against" any of them or against the "free territory under the juris­diction of the State of Viet-nam" (protocol) "would endanger its own peace and safety".

The "treaty area," under Article VIII, in­cludes "the general area of the Southwest Pacific not ... north of 21 degrees 30 min­utes north latitude". The United States has historically owned tremendously important and valuable strategic territorial interests in that area. Aside from its trusteeship over the Mariana ( except Guam) , Marshall and Caroline Islands, the United States owns Guam, Wake and the Samoan group. And yet the Lawyers Committee on American Policy Towards Vietnam has asserted that "SEATO is not a regional agency within the letter or spirit of the UN Charter", because "Articles 51 and 53 . , . envisaged regional systems which historically and geographical­ly developed into a regional community-not contemplating a regional system which fused ... Southeast Asia with a country of the North America Continent"-"separated by oceans and thousands of miles from Sou th East Asia." 38

In the cited paragraph of the treaty, the United States agreed that in the event of aggression in the treaty area it would "act to meet the common danger". In recommending ratification of the treaty to the Senate, its Foreign Relations Committee reported that "the oommittee is not impervious to the risks which this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that the acceptance of these obligations com­mits the United States to a course of action over a vast expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consistent with our own highest in­terests." 39 The Senate ratified the treaty on February 1, 1955, by a vote of 82 to 1.4.0

In light of all of the foregoing, it seems difficult to find anything in the nature of an adequate foundation for the ipse dixit o: the Lawyers Committee on American Policy To­wards Viet Nam that "the 'Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty'--connecting the United States with Southeast Asia, architec­tured by Secretary of State Dulles, ls a legalistic artificial formulation to circumvent the foundamental limitations placed by the United :f'Tations Charter on unilateral actions by individual members" .41

Undoubtedly the clearest and most un­equivocal Congressional sanction of the Pres­ident's deployment of United States forces for the defense of South Vietnam is con­tained in the Joint Southeast Asia resolution of August 10, 1964, reciting expressly "that the Congress approves and supports the de­termination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression", and that the United States is "prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom".42

The Lawyers' Committee on American Pol­icy Towards Viet Nam quotes a passage from an article in the Washington Daily News of June 4, 1965, by Richard Starnes, read into

38 Hearings, Appendix 693. 30 S. REP., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1955),

Senator Wayne Morse of Oregon, as a member of the committee, concurred in this report.

,o Supra note 6. The negative vote was that of Senator William Langer of North Dakota. Senator Morse voted for ratification of the treaty on the floor of the Senate where he stated, after ratification of the treaty, that "there is no doubt in my mind that the treaty is in conformity with the United Nations Charter". CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 101, pt. 1, p. 1060.

u Hearings, Appendix 693. '2 Supra note 20.

the Congressional Record by Senator Ernest Gruening of Alaska, which states that the joint resolution was "passed in the fever o:f indignation that followed" the Gulf of Ton­kin attacks, and then, again as their own ipse dixit, assert that "there is no evidence that Congress thought or understood that It was declaring war".4'll

This statement is simply incorrect. When the President sent his message to Congress on August 5, 1964, recommending passage of "a resolution expressing the support of Con­gress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty", he stated explicitly that he "should now ask the Congress on Its part, to join in affirming the national deter­mination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom"."

In the course of a colloquy on the floor of the Senate on August 6, 1964, between Sen­ator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky and Senator J. William Fulbright of Arkansas, Chairman of the Foreign Relations Commit­tee which recommended passage of the reso­lution,t5 the following discussion (excerpts) took place:

"Senator CooPER. Are we now [by this reso­lution] giving the President advance author­ity to take whatever action he may deem necessary respecting South Viet-nam and its defense, or with respect to the defense of any other country included in the treaty?

"Senator FULBRIGHT. I think that is cor­rect.

"Senator CooPER_. Then, looking ahead, if the President decided that it was necessary to use such force as could lead us into war, we would give that authority by this reso­lution?

"Senator FULBRIGHT. That ls the way I would interpret it."'°

Senator Morse himself called the resolu­tion "a predated declaration of war",47 which would, somewhat enigmatically, give "to the President what I honestly and sincerely be­lieve ls an unconstitutional power ... to make war without a declaration of war"." The enigma in this puzzling concept seems to arise from the rather simple and logical hypothesis that the function of a legislative "declaration of war" is to authorize the ex­ecutive "to make war". Since, by Senator Morse's own statement, the resolution au­thorizes the President "to make war", it surely has the same legal effect as a Congres­sional "declaration of war" in haec verba would have had.40

Actually. while two or three members of the Senate expressed doubt as to whether the resolution was intended to go as far as it did, there was no real question about It. Senator Morse himself made extended speeches against it, repeatedly warning his colleagues as to its dire import, in such words as that it "does go beyond the in­herent authority of the President to act in the self-defense of our country and does vest in him authority to proceed to carry out a campaign that amounts in fact to the wag­ing of war". 60

In the course of a recent debate on the floor of the Senate on a bill for an appropria­tion in support of the military forces in Viet-

43 Hearings, Appendix 710. 44 51 DEP'T STATE BULL. 261-263 (1964), 45 s. REP., 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964). 46 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 110, pt. 15,

p. 18409. ,1 Id. at 18427. 4B Id. at 18443. ,o "When I use a word", Humpty Dumpty

said in a rather scornful tone, "it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less." CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS.

50 CONGRES&IONAL RECORD, vol. 110, pt. 14, p . 18443.

nam, Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia, Chairman of the Armed Forces Committee, said:

"I knew that the joint resolution conferred a. vast grant of power upon the President. It is written In terms that are not capable of misinterpretation, and about which it is difficult to become confused .... The lan­guage could not have been drawn more clearly. Personally, I would be ashamed to say that I did not realize what I was voting for when I voted for that joint resolution. It is only one page in length. It is clear. It is explicit. It contains a very great grant of power".51

During the hearings on that appropriation bill before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 18, 1966, Senator Morse asked Secretary of State Rusk whether he thought that the vote on the Southeast Asia Resolution "would have been the same if my colleagues in the Senate had contem­plated that it might lead to 200,000 or 400,000 or 600,000 American troops in South Viet Nam?" The Secretary replied: "I d.oubt very much that the vote would be substantially different."

In response to that, Senator Morse com­mented that there would be "a chance next week to find out .... I intend to offer [a rescission resolution] as an amendment to the pending business in the Senate." 52 On March 1 Senator Morse offered his amend­ment to the military appropriation bill, to provide that the "'Joint resolution to pro­mote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia' ... is hereby repealed." 53

To avoid any question as to the effect and meaning of a vote on his amendment, Sen­ator Morse himself declared that it "would be a vote to make clear to the President that those who vote for the amendment disap­prove of the continuation of the exercise of the power he has been exercising under the Tonkin Bay resolution." M Senator Russell said "that the defeat of the proposal of the Senator from Oregon by the Members of the Senate ... will leave the original joint resolu­tion . . . unimpaired, in :(ull strength and vigor, and with Congress, except for two Members of the Senate who voted against the 1964 resolution, solemnly and solidly behind the President in the steps that he has taken in southeast Asia." 55

After full debate, Senator Mansfield of Montana, the majority leader, moved to table Senator Morse's amendment, and the motion was carried, 92 to 5.56 After some further dis­cussion, Senator Russell moved for passage of the appropriation bill, and his motion car­ried by a vote of 93 to 2.51

One of the best means available to the Congress for the control of executive action ls through the power of the purse-the ulti­mate necessity of Congressional action for ap­propriations to provide funds to carry out executive functions. As stated by Senator Morse during the hearings on the military appropriation bill, "a vote on this pending piece of business in the Senate really is a vote as to whether or not we are going to continue to support this program, because the only check, one of the b€st checks we have, is to say we are not going to finance

51 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 112, pt. 4, p. 4370.

52 Hearings 591. 63 CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 112, pt. 4,

p. 4370. 54 Id. at 4395. 55 Id. at 4370. 56 Id. at 4404. 51 Id. at 4411. Only Senators Morse and

Gruening voted against the appropriation. It was announced that five senators, necessarily absent, would each have voted "yea"; so that a full vote would have been 98 to 2. Id. at 4411. .

7930 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 it." GS As stated, the bill was passed in the Senate by a vote of 93 to 2. The vote in the House was 393 to 4.69

The legal authority of the President of the United States to conduct the present war, for "the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia", which, as the Congress declared in its 1964 resolu­tion, "the United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace". is surely sustained amply by the composite im­pact of that resolution, the terms of the SEATO Treaty ratified by the Senate and the appropriations made by the Congress to support the military actions in the treaty area.

That the memorandum of the Lawyers Committee on American policy Towards Viet­nam is grounded on an emotional attitude opposed to United States policy, rather than on law, is not only demonstrated by a look at the facts, but is emphasized by the memo­randum's concluding paragraph:

"Should we not, twenty years after Presi­dent Roosevelt's hopeful dream-twenty years after the advent of the nuclear age with the awesome potentiality of incinera­tion of our planet and the annihilation of our civilization and the culture of milleniar­Should we not 'spell the end of the system of unilateral action ... that has been tried for centuries-and has always failed''?" eo

Contrasted with the tone and substance of that memorandum is the temperate state­ment of thirty-one professors of internation- · al law from leading law schools throughout the United States, which recites simply that they "wish to affirm that the presence of US forces in South Vietnam at the request of the Government of that country is lawful under general principles of international law and the United Nations Charter. The engage­ment of US forces in hostilities at the re­quest of the Government of South Vietnam is a legitimate use of force in defense of South Vietnam against aggression." 61

Contrasted also with the tone and tem­per of the memorandum of the Lawyers Com­mittee on American Policy Towards Vietnam is the simple resolution adopted unanimous­ly on February 21, 1966, by the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association on the joint recommendation of its Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations and its Section of Interna­tional and Comparative Law. 62 The resolu­tion is supported by a brief report, which concludes "that the position of the United States in Vietnam is legal under interna­tional law, and is in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the South-East Asia Treaty". ea

&~ Hearings 593. On May 4, 1965, President Johnson had requested "the Congress to ap­propriate, at the earliest possible moment, an additional $700 million to meet mounting military requirements in Vietnam". He ex­plained, in his message to the Congress, that "this is not a routine appropriation. For each Member of Congress who supports this re­quest is also voting to persist in our effort to halt Communist aggression in South Viet­nam. Each is saying that the Congress and the President stand united before the world in joint determination that the independence of South Vietnam shall be preserved and Communist attack will not succeed." H.R. Doc. No. 157, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. ( 1965) . The appropriation blll (79 Stat. 109) was passed in the Senate, 88 to 3, and in the House, 408 to 7. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 111, pt. 7, pp. 9541, 9772.

69 CoNGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 112, pt. 4, p. 4474.

oo Hearings, Appendix 713. 61 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, vol. 112, pt. 1,

p. 1408. 62 52 A. B. A. J .392 (1966). 63 CoNGRESS!ONAL RECORD, vol. 112, pt. 4,

p. 5062.

These conclusions as to the legality of the presence of the United States forces in Viet­nam under the Constitution of the United States, as a question of domestic law, are those of the author. They were not included in the opinion of the thirty-one professors of international law or in the resolution of the American Bar Association.

[From the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Mar. 7, 1966]

THE U.S. LEGAL RIGHT To BE IN VIETNAM­THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION'S HOUSE OF DELEGATES SPEAKS Mr. BOGGS. Mr. Speaker there has been de­

bate in our country about the U.S. legal right to be in Vietnam.

The American Bar Association's House of Delegates spoke loud and clear on this issue at its midwinter meeting in Chicago February 21, 1966.

That body unanimously adopted a resolu­tion and report supporting the position of the United States. The resolution should put to rest any doubts about our position.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to add that the resolution was the work of one of my con­stituents, Eberhard P. Deutsch, chairman of the Standing Committee on Peace and Law through United Nations.

Mr. Deutsch is a world renowned attorney who has given of himself for the past 41 years in perfecting the American system of justice, both in the practice of civil and military law.

All Americans owe a debt of gratitude to Mr. Deutsch. May we all continue to deserve his efforts.

Following is the resolution and report adopted by the American Bar Association in addition to a brief biographical sketch of Mr. Deutsch: "AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION SPECIAL JOINT RE­

PORT OF THE STANDING COMMITTEE ON PEACE AND LAW THROUGH UNITED NATIONS AND THE SECTION OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW

"Recommendation "Whereas in recent hearings before the For­

eign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate, it has been stated that international lawyers are agreed that the U.S. position in Vietnam is illegal and in violation of the charter of the United Nations; and

"Whereas articles 51 and 52 of the charter sanction steps for self-defense and collective and regional security arrangements such as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization to which the United States is a party; and

"Whereas in the course of these hearings, it has been suggested that an expression on this subject by the American Bar Association would be appropriate: Now, therefore, be it

"Resolved by the American Bar Association, That the position of the United States in Vietnam is legal under international law, and is in accordance with the charter of the United Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty; and be it further

"Resolved, That the secretary of this asso­ciation be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to transmit a copy of this resolution immediately to the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate."

"Report "The attention of the committee and the

council has been called to the recent widely publicized hearings on appropriations for support of the U.S. forces in Vietnam before the Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate.

"At these hearings, it has been suggested that international lawyers are agreed that the U.S. position in Vietnam is illegal and in violation of the United Nations Charter.

"Articles 51 and 52 of the charter expressly provide that nothing contained therein 'shall impair the inherent right of individ­ual or collective self-defense,' nor preclude 'the existence of regional arrangements or

agencies for dealing with such matters re­lating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action.' The Southeast Asia Treaty Organizatfon is such an arrangement or agency.

"Professors of international law of some 31 law schoo,ls have expressed their opinion, and it is the opinion of the members of this as­sociation's Standing Committee on Peace and Law Through United Nations and of the members of the Council of the Section of International and Comparative Law, that the position of the United States in Vietnam is legal, and is not in violation of the Charter of the United Nations.

"During the course of the Senate commit­tee hearings, it was suggested that it would be desirable to have an expression on this subject by the American Bar Association.

"The matter was taken up at a joint ses­sion of the committee and the council of the section which now jointly recommend adoption by the house of delegates of the resolution herein above set forth to the effect that it is the position of the American Bar Association that the presence of U.S. forces in Vietnam is legal under international law, and in accord with the charter of the United Nations and the Southeast Asia Treaty.

"EBERHARD P. DEUTSCH, "Chairman, Standing Committee on

Peace and Law Through United Nations.

"EDWARD D. RE, "Chairman, Section of International

and Comparative Law. "Recommendation adopted unanimously

on February 21, 1966, by the house of dele­gates of the American Bar Association at its midwinter meeting in Chicago, Ill."

"BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF MR. EBERHARD DEUTSCH

"Eberhard P. Deutsch was born on October 31, 1897, in Cincinnati, Ohio, where he com­pleted his early studies. His parents were Dr. and Mrs. Gotthard (Hermine Bacher) Deutsch of that city.

"In April 1917, he enlisted in the 1st Illi­nois Cavalry-later the 122d U.S. Field Ar­tillery-in which, with the 33d Division, U.S. Army, he served throughout the First Worid War, rising to rank of lieutenant.

"In 1925, he completed his studies as a. special student at the College of Law of Tulane University, and has been engaged in the genera.I practice of civil law ever since at New Orleans, where he is senior member of the law firm of Deutsch, Kerrigan & Stiles."

[U.S. District Court, District of Massachusetts]

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, PLAINTIFF, V.

WILLIAM SLOANE COFFIN, JR., MICHAEL FER­BER, MITCHELL GOODMAN, MARCUS RASKIN, AND BENJAMIN SPOCK, DEFENDAN'I\3-CRIM­INAL No. 68-1-F-OPPOSITION OF THE GOV­ERNMENT TO THE MOTION OF DEFENDANT SPOCK FOR LEAVE TO TAKE DEPOSITIONS ABROAD

I

The Motion is Fatally Defective under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

A. The "Motion" Should be Stricken as Failing to Comply with the Rule 47 Require­ments for a Motion.

The Government moves to strike the mo­tion of the defendant Benjamin Spock for leave to take depositions abroad on the ground that it fails to meet the requirements of Rule 47 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

The Rule reads as follows: "Rule 47. Motions

An application to the court for an order shall be by motion. A motion other than one

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7931 made during a trial or hearing shall be in writing unless the court permits it to be made orally. It shall state the grounds upon which it is made and shall set forth the relief or order sought. It may be supported by affi­davit." (Emphasis added.)

The subject motion fails to state the grounds upon which it is made, other than to state that it is made "upon the annexed affidavit and pursuant to the provisions of Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure." The annexed affidavit adds nothing other than the bare conclusions that the affiant, Mr. Boudin, attorney for defend­ant Spock, "[is] advised and believe[s] that . . . [the proposed deposition] testimony is material to the issues in this case, and that [such] testimony is necessary in order to prevent a failure of justice."

The requirement of Rule 47 that a motion "shall state the grounds upon which it is made" cannot be satisfied by such bare con­clusions. Rather, to meet the requirements of the Rule, defendant Spock must outline the chain of logic by which the evidence which he seeks to obtain will be material and relevant to the issues of the case. Cohen v. United States, 378 F. 2d 751 (9th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 389 U.S. 897 (1967); and see United States v. Vomero, 6 F.R.D. 275 (E.D.N.Y. 1946). Without such an indication from the defendant, the Court is unable to make a judgment concerning the materiality vel non of the testimony sought by the defend­ant.

It would appear from the nature of the testimony sought to be obtained by deposi­tion that defendant Spock seeks to attack the "legality" of the war in Vietnam and the political and diplomatic causes and conse­quences of that conflict. But all that the mo­tion tells us is that Mr. Boudin "believes" that such questions are material to the is­sues in this case. The motion should be stricken.

B. The Motion Should Be Denied Because It Fails To Make An Adequate Showing of the Inability of the Prospective Witnesses to Appear at the Trial, and Because the Testi­mony Which It Seeks to Obtain By Deposi­tion is Immaterial to These Proceedings.

Depositions are permitted in criminal cases "only in exceptional situations." United States v. Grado, 154 F. Supp. 878 at 879 (W.D. l,\1:o. 1957); United States v. Glessing, 11 F.R.D. 501 at 502 (D. Minn. 1951); Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules of Criminal Procedure, Note to Subdivision (a), Rule 15, para. 2. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure specifically limits the taking of depositions to instances where "it appears that a prospective witness may be unable to attend or prevented from attend­ing a trial or hearing, that his testimony is material and that it is necessary to take his deposition in order to prevent a failure of justice." If these conditions are not estab­lished, a court has no authority to permit the taking of a deposition. In re United States, 348 F. 2d 642 (1st Cir. 1965); Wong Yim v. United States, 118 F. 2d 667 (9th Cir. 1941), cert. den., 313 U.S. 589 (1941).

Under the Rule, a defendant has the bur­den of establishing the prospective witness' inability to attend the trial itself. In re United States, supra; United States v. Grado, supra; United States v. Rickenbacker, 27 F.R.D. 485 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The inability must be an actual one; the mere unwilling­ness of a prospective witness, friendly to the defense but not susceptible to service of subpoena, to present himself unconditionally to testify at trial is not sufficient to estab­lish a basis for the taking of his deposition. See United States v. Soblen, 203 F. Supp. 5~2. 568-569 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), aff'd., 301 F. 2d 236 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. den., 370 U.S. 944 (1962).

The reason for this rule is self-evident. As noted in Soblen, "[i]n our jurisdiction, the theological sanctity of a witness' oath or the ethical obligation of his affirmation is rein-

forced by the legal sanction of the law of per­jury," 203 F. Supp. at 568; compare United States v. Bentvena, 319 F. 2d 916, 941 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. den., sub nom. Ormento v. United States, 375 U.S. 940 (1963). Where a witness is permitted to testify by deposition and remain outside the jurisdiction of this country, the perjury sanction loses its effi­cacy. This consideration has peculiar appli­cability here where, unlike United States v. Egorov, 3~ F.R.D. 130 (E.D.N.Y. 1963), defend­ant does not seek testimony relating directly to the question of whether or not he com­mitted the acts with which he is charged, but rather in support of a defense of pur­ported justification. Under such circum­stances, the importance of the perjury sanc­tion shm .. ,ld yield only to the most compel­ling showing of an irremediable impediment to the prospective witness' personal appear­ance at the trial.

More important, a defendant has the bur­den of establishing that the prospective wit­ness' testimony will be material. See United States v. Hagedorn, 253 F. Supp. 969 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); United States v. Glessing, 11 F.R.D. 501 (D. Minn. 1951); and United States v. Ausmeier, 5 F.R.D. 395 (E.D.N.Y. 1946).

The testimony of all of the prospective witnesses (deponents) would deal with mat­ters which, for reasons set forth in Argu­ments II and III below, cannot be considered by this Court in this case.1 Since all such testimony would therefore be inadmissible at trial, whether sought to be introduced as live testimony, by deposition, or in any other form, the testimony is immaterial to these proceedings and the taking of these deposi­tions is clearly .not "necessary . . . in order to prevent a failure of justice." The motion does not meet the standards of Rule 15(a), and therefore should be denied.

II

This Court Has No Jurisdiction to Exam­ine Questions Concerning the "Legality" of the Vietnam Conflict, Because the Exercise of Executive and Legislative Powers, In the Context of the Instant Case, Is Not Subject to Judicial Examination.

The contentions which defendant Spock would raise and would seek to support with the testimony he now seeks to obtain by deposition are political issues involving the executive's discretionary guidance of this na­tion's foreign policy, aided by the Congress in its appropriate Constitutional spheres. As such, these contentions are not subject to examination by this Court.

The' Courts have consistently recognized the division between their functions and

1 It is worth noting that, even if the "legal­ity" of the Vietnam conflict were to be con­sidered, several of the witnesses sought to be deposed do not appear, based on Mr. Boudin's ·affidavit, to have anything relevant to say to this Court on that subject. Included in this category are prospective witnesses (de­ponents) Nordmann, Cameron, Ivens, Four­niau, Riffaud, Fass, Sawada, and Thich Nhat Hanh. Mr. Boudin's affidavit supplies insuffi­cient information for a judgment to be made regarding the testimony of the witnesses Basso, Todd, Kahn, Harvey, Pie, Salmon, Chaumont and Cornn.

Furthermore, it would appear that some of the prospective witnesses intend not to tes­tify to facts from which legal conclusions flow, but rather to argue legal theories. In this category are prospective witnesses Fischer, Rolin, Pritt, de Qulrielle, and pos­sibly Basso, Salmon, Chaumont, and Cornil. These men can, of course, be associated with defense counsel for the purpose of present­ing legal argument, or can prepare argu­ments and make them available to defense counsel. Their legal opinions may be stated in the course of argument, if material, but should not be the subject of testimony from the witness stand.

those of the Executive and Legislative Branches of the Government. As early as 1803, the Supreme Court stated in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 87, 1 Cr. 137 (1803):

"By the Constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain impor­tant political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is ac­countable only to his country in his political character, and to his own conscience." (5 U.S. at 104, 1 Cr. at 165-166)

And Marbury states the role of the judici­ary to be: "to decide on the rights of indi­viduals, not to inquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion." (5 U.S. at 107, 1 Cr . atl70)

The defendant seeks to challenge, by way of defense, the wisdom of this country's engagement in foreign affairs, the propriety of its international decisions, and the consti­tutionality of its actions in this field. But such matters fall completely within the ambit of the traditional legal doctrine of the "po­litical question," over which the judiciary has no jurisdiction.

In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), the Supreme Court enunciated the "political question" doctrine (at page 217):

"Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional com­mitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discover­able and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion; or the im­possibility of a court's undertaking inde­pendent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for un­questioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embar­rassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question."

The matters which defendant Spock seeks to raise flt squarely within this formulation of the non-justiciable "political question." The presence of American troops in Vietnam is a matter of foreign policy, the setting of which policy the Constitution has committed to the Executive Branch and Congress ac­cording to their respective Constitutional responsibilities. Whether, and to what extent, our forces should be deployed in that troubled area is a question which cannot be answered by judicially discoverable stand­ards; rather, it is impossible of resolution "without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion." With all due deference, for the Court to at­tempt an independent resolution of the issue would express a "lack of the respect due co­ordinate branches of government." .

Concerning judicial intervention in the delicate and discretionary area of foreign policy, the Supreme Court said in Chicago & Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948) (at page 111):

"The President, both as Commander-in­Chief and as the Nation's organ for foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and ought not to be published to the world. It would be intoler­able that courts, without the relevant in­formation, should review and perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on informa­tion properly held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into execu­tive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of proph­ecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the peo­ple whose welfare they advance or imperil.

7932 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.JI

In affirming the dismissal of a suit which ha.d been brought by an Army private to en­join the Secretary of Defense a.nd the Secre­tary of the Army from sending him to Vietnam, on the grounds of the alleged un­constitutionality a.nd illegality of the conflict there, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Circuit said recently:

"It is difficult to think of an area less suited for Judicial action than that into Which Appellant would have us intrude. The fundamental division of authority and power established by the Oonstitution precludes judges from overseeing the conduct of foreign policy or the use a.nd disposition of military power; these matters are plainly the exclu­sive province of Congress and the Executive." [Citing cases] (Luftig v. McNamara, 373 F. 2d 664 a.t 665-666 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert. den., sub nom. Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).)

In summary, this Court has neither the jurisdiction nor the machinery to adjudicate questions involving the guidance of the na­-tion's foreign policy. Irrespective of the phraseology employed by the defendant, his a.tta.cks a.re levied against this country's in­volvement in the Vietnam conflict. The ques­tions thus raised a.re ones involving the exer­cise of executive and legislative responsibility for foreign policy and, as such, are not sub­ject to examination by this Court.

Ill

Defendants in the Present Case Have No Standing to Raise the "Legality" of the Viet­nam Conflict.

Defendants are charged with conspiring to counsel, aid and abet violations of the Uni­versal Military Training and Service Act (50 U.S.C. App. 451-471), and of the rules, regulations and directions duly made -pur­suant to that Act, and with conspiring to hinder and interfere with the administration of that Act. Defendants clearly have standing in the present criminal proceeding to chal­lenge the constitutionality of that Act and of its administration. But the ,affidavit of Mr. Boudin makes clear that the testimony of every one of the twenty-five witnesses whose depositions he seeks to obtain would in no way relate to the constitutionality of the Act or of its administration, but would relate solely to questions concerning the "legality" of the present conflict in Vietnam, and the politica.1 and diplomatic causes and conse­quences of that oonflict.

Defendants do not have the requisite stand­ing to raise such questions. If an American soldier fighting in Vietnam were given an 11legal order, he would be directly affected thereby, and would perhaps have the requi­site standing to raise the illegality of the order in defense to a prosecution for refusing to obey it. See United States v. Bolton, 192 F. 2d 805 (2d Cir. 1951). But the defendants

2 Citing Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936); Detjen v. Central Leath­er Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918). See also Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 357, 13 Pet 415 (1839}; Eminente v. Johnson, 361 F. 2d 73 (D.C. Cir. 1966), cert. den., 385 U.S. 929 (1966); Pauling v. McNamara, 331 F. 2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 963 (1964); Pauling v. McElroy, 278 F. 2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960), cert. den., 364 U.S. 835 (1960); Worthy v. Herter, 270 F. 2d 905 (DC. Cir. 1959), cert. den., 361 U.S. 918 (1959).

The analogy from the international forum of the United Nations is instructive. Ques­tions concerning the legality of mllitary ac­tions are. considered by the Security Coun­cil, not a Judicial but a highly political body.

in the present case are far removed from such a position. See Richter v. United States, 181 F. 2d 591 (9th Cir. 1950), cert. den., 340 U.S. 892 (1950).

A. The Existence of an Armed Conflict, and the "Legality" of that Conflict, Do Not Bear U'J)On the Criminality of Interference with the Universal Military Training and Service Act and with Its Administration.

Matters concerning the Vietnam conflict, which defendant Spock seeks to inject into these proceedings, do not bear upon the question of his guilt or innocence of the crime with which he is charged. The Uni­versal Military Training and Service Act and its predecessors have been in existence since 1940 and have been amended several times since then. They have been administered, and violations of their provisions have been pros­ecuted, in peacetime as well as during periods of armed conflict.

In United States v. Mitchell, 369 F. 2d 323 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. den., 386 U.S. 972 (1967), the Second Circuit affirmed the conviction of a. young man for wilful failure to report for induction into the armed forces. The defend­ant had attempted at trial to introduce evi­dence to show the Vietnam conflict to be in violation of law. All such evidence had been excluded by the trial judge as immaterial. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held (at page 324) ~

"Appellant's allegations are not a defense to a prosecution for failure to report for in­duction into the Armed Forces and his evi­dence was properly excluded. Regardless of the proof that appellant might present to demonstrate the correlation between the Se­lective Service and our nation's efforts in Vietnam, as a matter of law the congressional power "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a navy" is a matter quite distinct from the use which the Execu­tive makes of those who have been found qualified and who have been inducted into the Armed Forces. Whatever action the Pres­ident may order, or the Congress sanction, cannot impair this oonstitutional power of the Congress."

In a similar case, the Second Circuit af­firmed a conviction for wilful failure to re­port for civilian work (alternative service). United States v. Hogans, 369 F. 2d 359 (2d Cir. 1966). The court there held (at page 360):

"The Congressional power to provide for the draft does not depend upon the existence of a war or national emergency, but stems also from the Constitutional power to raise and support armies and to provide and main­tain a navy." United States v. Henderson, 180 F. 2d 711 (7th Ctr. 1950). Accord, Etchev­erry v. United States, 320 F. 2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert. dented, 375 U.S. 930 ... (1963); United States v. Bolton, 192 F. 2d 805 (2d Cir. 195•1) (per curiam).

"The courts will not examine the purposes for which the executive employs the armed forces in foreign military operations." United States v. Bolton, supra.

B. Defendants Cannot Obtain Standing to Raise the "Legality" of the Vietnam Conflict by Attempting To Show that They Hold Sin­cere Philosophical, Ethical, or Other Beliefs, Concerning that Conflict, Based on "Higher Law."

An argument suggested by the various mo­tion papers recently fl.led by the defendants is that they have standing to introduce testi­mony regarding the "legality" of the Viet­nam conflict for the purpose of showing a lack of criminal intent on the part of the defendants in comm.iting the crimes with which they are charged, in that they had a sincere belief in the illegality of the war and of the conscription of young men to serve in it.

But the law is clear that a defendant's subjective notions of "higher law," no mat­ter how motivated, cannot be the yardstick of criminal intent ln the enforcement of

Selective Service law.8 United States v. Madole, 145 F. 2d 466 (2d Cir. 1944); United, States v. Henderson, 180 F. 2d 711 (7th Cir. 1950), cert. den., 339 U.S. 936 (1950); United States v. Kime, 188 F. 2d 677 (7th Cir. 1951); United States v. Spiro, 384 F. 2d 159 (3rd Cir. 1967) (printed in Appendix to advance sheets for 387 F. 2d, No. 2, March 4, 1968), cert. den., March 4, 1968. -

In affirming convictions for refusal to register for the draft, the Seventh Circuit said in Henderson:

"The final argument of the defendants is that none of the defendants had the criminal intent, which was necessary to a conviction. This argument scarcely deserves our con­sideration. Each of these defendants was a mature, young man, educated and intelligent. Each understood the law and what it re­quired of him. Each deliberately decided not to meet its requirements, knowing that penalties were provided for non-compliance, and that such penalties might be meted out to him. As this Court said in United States v. Mroz, [136 F. 2d 211 (1943)] at page 226: "Appellant's clear and unqualified duty was to comply with his draft board's order. He can not 'take the law into his own hands' and render himself invulnerable to conse­quences. The draft machinery has been legally set up, and it is not for the individual to constitute himself judge of his own case." Each defendant here intended to, and did, deliberately violate the Act. That is sufficient to support his conviction." United States v. Henderson, 180 .F. 2d 711 at 716.'

C. The Doctrines Enunciated By the .Nuremberg War Crimes Trials Cannot Confer Upon the Defendants the Standing to Raise the "Legality" of the Vietnam Conflict, Be­cause Those Doctrines Do Not Bear In Any Way on the Criminal Conduct With Which Defendants are Charged in This Case.

Another argument suggested by the various motion papers filed by the defendants is that they have standing to introduce testimony regarding the "legality" of the Vietnam con­flict in support of a defense based upon the principles established at the Nuremberg war crimes trials at the conclusion of World War II.

Such a defense is not available to the de­fendan,ts in the present case. Nothing ema­nating from the events at Nuremberg bears in any way on the crime with which defend­ants are charged: conspiring to counsel, aid and abet young Americans to resist the or­derly administration of the Universal Mill­tary Training and Service Act.

Article 6 of The Charter of the Interna­tional Military Tribunal, 59 Stat. 1546 ( 1945), enunciated three categories of crimes, none of which is relevant to the present proceed­ings:

Crimes Against Peace: this category, deal­ing with wars of aggression or in violation of treaties, applies only to those at policy­making levels, and could not possibly apply either to defendants or to the young men re­sisting the Act.5 In any event, United States

sThe intent required by 18 U.S.C. 462(a) is the "usual criminal intent." United States v. Hoffman, 137 F. 2d 416 at 419 (2d Cir.1943); Graves v. United States, 252 F. 2d 878 (9th Cir. 1958).

"'See the discussion of Keegan v. United States, 325 U.S. 478 (1945) and Okamoto v. United States, 152 F. 2d 905 (10th Cir. 1945) in the Government's Opposition to Defend­ant Spock's Motion to Dismiss the Indict­ment.

O The International Law Commission con­firmed this interpretation in its formulation of the Nuremberg principles. Report of the International Law Commission, GA Supp. No. 12 (A/1316), Part III, Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, para. 117, p. 13. See also United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb (the High Command Case.) reported in Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Mili-

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7933 presence in Vietnam is clearly in accordance with law and could not possibly be deemed a crime against peace. (See Argument IV, infra.)

War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity: the first of these categories deals with the violation of the traditional rules and customs of war; the second with certain massive out­rages against peoples transcending violation of the rules of war. These categories serve to illustrate the principle that a soldier's duty to obey the lawful order of his superior does not compel him to commit a war crime or a crime against humanity. Should he commit such crimes, the illegal order of his superior would not be a defense. However, criminality for such acts does not attach merely because the individual may have been a member of the force by which such crimes were com­mitted. There must be a personal derelic­tion.0

United States policy in Vietnam is con­sistent with the international law of war.7

It is opposed to the commission of War Crimes and of Crimes Against Humanity. The United States has continually taken mea­sures to ensure that the laws of war are re­spected by United States forces. (See the fol­lowing Directives of the United States Mili­tary Assistance Command, Vietnam: No. 27-6, November 2, 1967, "Legal Services: War Crimes and Other Prohibited Acts," and No. 20-4, March 26, 1966, "Inspections and In­vestigations: War Crimes;" see also Depart­ment of States Publication No. 8276, August 1967, "Prisoners of War.") Any transgres­sion is subject to prosecution.

The short answer to the attempt to raise a "Nuremberg defense" in the present pro­ceedings is that a registrant could not be held criminally liable merely for cooperating with the administration of the Universal Military Training and Service Act during the pendency of a war and that he has no legal Justification for refusing to do so. One who conspires to counsel, aid and abet such re­fusal is in no better position.

The defendants also seem to argue that the Government nonetheless cannot compel a citizen to fight in an illegal war.8 The re­sponse to such an argument is that it as­sumes the desired conclusion: that the Viet­nam conflict is "illegal." Most of this brief constitutes a response to the circularity of that argument. As has been fully set forth above, the "legality" of the conflict is amen­able to no Justiciable standards. Under our Constitutional system of separation of pow­ers, such totally political matters are com­mitted to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government. Such an issue can­not be examined in this case, both because the Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate it and because the defendants lack standing to raise it.

rv The United States Presence in Vietnam is

in Accordance With Law. There is no basis for the charge that

United States presence in Vietnam is illegal.

tary Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. 11, pp. 462, 488-489, published by GPO (1960).

a See United States v. Wilhelm von Leeb, supra, pp. 643, 644. See also Article 8 of the Charter of the International Military Tri­bunal; 59 Stat. 1546 ( 1945) ; and Report of the International Law Commission, GA Supp. No. 12 (A/1316), Part III, Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, Principle IV, p. 12 (which states the doctrine to be that superior orders constitute no defense "provided a moral choice was in fact possible" for the one committing the crime.)

7 U.S. Department of the Army Field Man­ual 27-10, Section 509.

8 It is worth noting that the doctrines of Nuremberg provide no authority whatever for such an argument.

United States forces are fighting in Vietnam at the request of the government of the Re­public of Vietnam. They are participating in the defense of South Vietnam against armed attack from Communist North Viet­nam. South Vietnam has the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense, and United States participation in that defense is consistent with the Constitution of the United States, the Charter of the United Nations and international law.

United States presence in Vietnam is supported by the full Constitutional author­ity of the President and the Congress, and no declaration of war is necessary to au­thorize that presence.9 Over a long period of history extending from the undeclared war with France at the end of the 18th century through the Korean War of 1950-53, practice and precedent have confirmed the constitutional authority to engage American forces in hostilities without declaration of war. The broad powers of the President un­der Article II of the Constitution extend to United States presence in Vietnam. To those powers are joined the authority expressed by Congress: in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, signed at Manila on Septem­ber 8, 1954, and approved by the Senate on February 1, 1955 (6 U.S.T. 81, T.I.A.S. 3170, 209 U.N.T.S. 28); the Joint Resolution of August 10, 1964 (78 Stat. 384) which au­thorized the President "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty re­questing assistance in defense of its free­dom"; special appropriations for our mili­tary effort (e.g., P.L. 89-18, 79 Stat. 109; P.L. 89-375, 80 Stat. 82; PL 89-687, 80 Stat. 997; P.L. 90-5, 81 Stat. 6); and other actions.

The Charter of the United Nations in Article 51 expressly recognizes that there is an in­herent right of individual or collective self­defense against armed attack which is not limited by any other provision of the Char­ter. Members of the United Nations are re­quired to attempt to resolve disputes by peaceful means, but measures of self-defense against armed attack may be taken im­mediately. In the event of armed attack, Article 51 requires only that the measures of individual or collective self-defense "shall be immediately reported to the Security Coun­cil." The United States has continually sought to achieve a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Vietnam. It has reported to the Security Council as required by Article 51, and it has attempted many times to engage the United Nations in this matter. On two occasions, in August 1964 and 1n January 1966, the United States has formally brought the matter before the Security Council. These efforts have not had results, primarily because North Vietnam and cer­tain other Communist powers flatly reject the competence of the United Nations in this situation.

Thus, there can be no doubt that United States presence in Vietnam is in compliance with domestic law, the United Nations char­ter, and international law.10

v

CONCLUSION

On the merits, defendant Spock could not possibly demonstrate any "illegality" per­taining to this nation's presence in Viet-

9 Prize Oases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1862): The Eliza, 4 U.S. 32, 4 Dall. 37 (1800); United States v. Bolton, 192 F. 2d 805 (2d Cir. 1951); United, States v. Herling, 120 F. 2d 236 (2d Cir. 1941).

10 See "The Legality of U.S. Participation in the Defense of Vietnam," Department of State Publication 8062, printed in the De­partment of State Bulletin, March 28, 1966; and see generally Hull and Novograd, Law and Vietnam (Oceana, 1968).

nam. Nonetheless, such matters are totally immaterial to a full and fair hearing of the criminal charges under which he and his co­def endants stand indicted. The motion should be denied.

PAN AMERICAN AIRWAYS ASSISTS IN REST AND RECUPERATION FOR OUR MEN IN VIETNAM Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan­

imous oonsent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Washington?

There was no objection. Mr. ADAMS. Mr. Speaker, long hours

have been consumed debating the issue concerning our involvement in Vietnam. My own position is well known and has been stated on other occasions before this body.

As long as we are in -this war, how­ever, it seems to me to be of vital interest to look after the needs of our fighting men to the best of our capabilities. I have been heartened, therefore, to learn of the job being done by Pan American Airways with the R. & R. program that has been so successful in relieving, tem­porarily at least, the dreadful burdens imposed by war on our men who .fight in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I would like to call to the attention of this body a fine article on this subject which appeared recently in the Washington Evening Star: VIETNAM SOLDIER CAN TRAVEL FROM WAR TO

WORLD OF LUXURY

(By William W. Prochnau) HONG KoNG.-Alexander the Great's war­

riors took their rest and recuperation where they could find it along the battle trail to Persia.

Caesar's legions lived it up in conquered European villages, spreading Roman culture and progeny throughout most of the civilized world.

The luckiest of the weary American G.I.'s in the Second World War could hop a jeep and bump down to the Riviera for a day or two away from hell.

Rest and recuperation, a soldier's respite from the dirt and death of battle, is as old as war itself.

But none of those earlier soldiers could have imagined R. & R. as it is today. The American soldier in Vietnam is given the best money can buy. His R. & R. not only is no exception but probably ls the best example.

NINE R. & R. LOCATIONS

Somewhere near the midpoint of his one­year tour in Vietnam, every American fight­ing man is offered a five-day vacation. But no longer does that mean frolicking in a con­quered village or hitch-hiking a jeep ride away from the lines.

Today's G.I. is given a choice of a holiday in any of nine of the most romantic and exotic cities in the world. He can fly 6,000 miles to Honolulu for an idyllic rendezvous with his wife. He can travel to Sydney where he can forget the war briefly in a sea of Australian miniskirts and the world's warm­est hospitality.

Or he can choose Tokyo, Hong Kong, Taipei, Penang, Singapore, Bangkok or Kuala Lum­pur-each an Oriental pearl.

Everything about R. & R. is luxurious and designed to put miles-mentally and physi­cally-between the fighting man and his war.

The luxury begins the moment a G.I. steps aboard the airplane. The prettiest and most

7934 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968

charming stewardess of the Pan American line will serve him steak and ice cream. He might get an in-flight movie and surely will get all the first-class accoutrements expected by any sophisticated traveler.

The air travel is provided by the govern­ment through a no-profit contract with Pan Am. The rest of the R. & R. expenses are paid by the soldiers themselves.

But they find discounts at most of the best hotels in most R. & R. cities. Restaurants, bars, tour guides and even taxicab drivers knock down their prices for vacation G.I.'s.

The result is a once-in-a-lifetime experi­ence, a holiday that would be the envy of any well-to-do and well-traveled civilian.

"I don't know who dreamed all this up," an enlisted man said here, "but he oughta get a medal."

FEW PROBLEMS

During the past 12 months 400,000 war­weary servicemen have :flown into another world. That great exodus of young Americans could have been fraught with problem.s­and many officials, both American and for­eign, expected trouble. But few problems have materialized since the R. & R. program began 21 months ago.

The Vietnam-era soldier is one of a new breed-better educated and more sophisti­cated than his predecessors. Like any soldier coming out of war, he is likely to look for a girl, a bar and all the high living he can cram into five days.

But today's G.I. is busting up far fewer hotel rooms and bars than his father did in the Second World War. He is doing much less street brawling. And he is far more likely to visit a palace in Thailand, a sheep ranch in Australia or a Shinto temple in Japan.

The R. & R. program has been so success­ful that American officials now are beginning to add up some unexpected bonuses-most notably the chance to show one of America's best faces, its youth, in a part of the world in which the United States would like to woo and keep friends.

Commanders say their troops work better, think better and fight better after R. & R. The G.I.'s themselves just count the days to eligibility.

For the fighting man who takes his R. & R. in Honolulu, it is like being ejected from hell into paradise-and getting a second honey­moon thrown in.

Waikiki Beach is good-time, wealthy, peace­ful America at play. The war in Vietnam simply doesn't exist here.

HONOLULU MOST POPULAR

Every month 7,000 American :fighting men go to Honolulu for R. & R. It is the war's biggest and most popular R. & R. center. It is the only American city that a vacationing G.I. can visit. It is balmy, tropical and serene. The way of life is devoted to pleasure-a hedonistic antithesis of the life the soldiers temporarily are leaving behind.

But hedonism is not the main Hawaiian attraction for American G.I.'s. Hawaii ,is just close enough to the mainland for a rendez­vous with the girl he left behind. Almost 80 percent of the G.I.'s who select Honolulu are meeting their wives there.

The emotion-Jarring experience of meet­ing and then leaving your spouse once again causes some war-separated families to decide against Honolulu for a second honeymoon.

Down Under, in Australia, R. & R. has dif­ferent attractions.

Twenty-five years ago the Yanks charged into Australia for their first taste of its unique brand of hospitality.

Rambunctious and eager, they came away from the bloody beach land1ngs and the bit­ter jungle fighting of the Pacific war for a few days of rest and recuperation in a land few of them ever had seen before.

They got little rest and they did little recuperating. In fact, those high-living Yanks of the Second World War just about tore old

Sydney Town apart. And the Australians, rambunctious themselves, loved every min­ute of it.

Now the Yanks are coming again from a different, dirty ll ttle Jungle war in Asia. When the word got out last fall that Ameri­can :fighting men would come here from Vietnam for rest and recuperation, memories of times past prepared Australians for an onslaught.

THE "QUIET AMERICANS"

The Aussies, hoping for the worst, were a little disappointed.

The new Yanks doffed their uniforms, donned civilian clothes and quietly melted into Sydney's teeming crowds.

"I see about one of 'em a week," said a taxi driver with a dismayed look that re­flected a lost experience, not a lost fare.

The Australians have named their guests the "Quiet Americans.'' But if the new Amer­ican soldier is more subdued than his dad, he still hasn't lost any of that old camaraderie with the Australians.

Of all the nine cities a Vietnam :fighting man can visit on R. & R., Sydney is the one that swamps him with the most hospitality.

Taxi drivers have t~rned off their meters and taken G.I.'s on all-day tours. Australian families are on waiting lists to invite soldiers to dinner. And ranchers in Australia's "out­back" have been known to pay a serviceman's air fare to their homes in the interior.

When a G .I. arrives there he is greeted by a group of Australian matrons at the R. & R. center in a downtown hotel. The women ask each visiting soldier what he wants to do in Australia. Most of the requests, from petting a kangaroo to visiting an Australian home, are filled almost immediately.

While the married men head for Hono­lulu and some of the servicemen are flying to Australia, R. & R. for most of the Vietnam fighting men means five days in one of seven Oriental cities.

ASIAN ATTRACTIONS

Each Asian center has its own special at­tractions. Few G.I.'s are disgruntled if they show up in Kuala Lumpur instead of Tokyo or in Taipei instead of Bangkok. Still, as often as possible, the G.I.'s are allowed to select the site.

So a G.I. might head for Tokyo because his big brother extolled Japan's mama-san reputation after the Korean War.

Another might choose Hong Kong because, as the sailors say, it's the biggest PX in the world. They come back carting tape recorders, cameras, tailor-made suits and, usually, hangovers.

Few of them had ever heard of Penang before Vietnam, but now that Malaysian city is a favorite among the Marines.

Bangkok, all the returnees say, has the friendliest and prettiest girls.

Taipei is picking up a word-of-mouth rep­utation as the most underrated of all the R. & R. cities. The word is out that the smart set heads for the Nationalist China capital.

History buffs like Singapore, but they u sually find more than history there.

It is obvious that there are many more chances for trouble in the rest-and-recupera­tion program in the Asian cities. Almost all the cities are risking political problems and antiwar demonstrations by allowing visits by Vietnam fighting men.

In Hong Kong, for instance, where the British and the Communist Chinese have been involved in an eyeball-to-eyeball con­frontation, one of the sore-points is the R. & R . program.

AVOID DEMONSTRATIONS

But most of the G.I.'s are smart enough to steer a wide course around political dem­onstrations.

The G.I. who is cut loose !or five days 1n

Bangkok or Taipei or any of the Asian cen­ters finds plenty of opportunities for thera­peutic hell-raising-maybe too many oppor­tunities to suit worried Mom back home. But almost anyone in Vietnam who is interested in the welfare of the G.I.'s thinks that R. & R. hell-raising, after all, is the best medicine in the world for a war-weary Amer­ican fighting man.

There is no one in Vietnam any more con­cerned about the welfare of his "boys" than the Army's 4th Division chaplain, a rough­edged and crusty Catholic priest :from Brook­lyn, Father Joseph Francis Sheehan.

Father Sheehan gets a little sore when someone attaches what he calls the "stigma that my boys are all off sinning" when they are onR. & R.

"You can't stop a man from going to hell if he wants to get there," the priest says. "And it doesn't make any difference whether he's in a little town in Georgia, in the city of New York or in Hong Kong."

Father Sheehan says that R. & R. is not Just important but also essential for the morale of the troops.

UNIQUE AIRLINE

Here in Hong Kong Pan American operates a unique airline within an airline that whisks the G.I.'s out of the war into the world.

The most discouraging thing that could happen to an eager G.I. heading !or R. & R. would be to have his flight scrubbed or de­layed seriously. The R. & R. airline has had an on-time rating of between 90 and 92 per­cent, far higher than the record of most commercial airlines.

Much of the credit for the almost flawless record of the R. & R. airline belongs to a soft-spoken former Pan Am pilot named Thomas J. Flanagan. Recently named Pan Am's vice president for Far East operations, Flanagan had the R. & R. airline in operation only three weeks after the government de­cided to start the program.

And the stewardesses have developed a rapport with their passengers that you see on few commercial flights.

"Getting on a plane with 162 soldiers is a bit unnerving the first time," said Peggy Deuringer of South Bend, Ind. "You expect them to tear everything apart. But it's just the opposite. They aren't rowdy. They're the most polite people you'll ever meet.''

U.N. ACTION CENSURING ISRAEL IS SETBACK TO MIDDLE EAST PEACE

Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection. Mr. SCHWEIKER. Mr. Speaker, the

United Nations Security Council's one­sided censure of Israel for attacking Jor­dan is both an unfair slap at Israel and a setback for peace generally in the Mid­dle East.

The censure resolution "condemns" what Israel did, mentioning Israel by name. In much vaguer language, the res­olution "deplores all violent incidents in violation of the cease fire." But nowhere in the resolution does the Security Coun­cil mention Jordan by name, or mention by name the Al Fatah terrorist organiza­tion that provoked Israel from bases on Jordanian soil.

There are strong indications that the resolution will lead to more strife along the border. not less. The stiff condemna-

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7935 tion of Israel, measured against the rel­atively mild criticism of the terrorist ac­tivity, will tell the terrorists · that the blame is not really on their side. It will give them the moral support to continue to destroy life and property inside Israel, to shell Israel settlements, and to plant mines such as the one that blew up an Israel schoolbus earlier this month.

The United Nations Security Council, Mr. Speaker, could have taken steps to cool down the tense border crisis by dis­patching a peacekeeping force to the scene. Instead it has made the situation hotter by ill-timed and ill-considered words.

A final thing we must realize, Mr. Speaker, is that the Soviet Union has scored yet another diplomatic victory in the Middle East arena. By pressing for the condemnation of Israel in the Secu­rity Council, the Soviet Union has once again acted as the patron of the Arab bloc. The rise of Soviet power in the Mid­dle East calls for a U.S. policy that is unmistakably committed to holding back Soviet influence there. Too often in the past the United States has fallen back to a stance of "neutrality" in the Middle East, a nonposition that has helped the Soviet Union make the inroads it has. Now is the time for realism, before it is too late.

MORESQUANDERMANIA Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan­

imous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAK.ER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Iowa?

There was no objection. Mr. GROSS. Mr. Speaker, I am

pleased to note that the General Ac­counting Office in its usual thorough manner, has once again exposed a need­less waste of the taxpayers' money for some useless "think factory" research re­ports.

In this case, the GAO discovered that some of the officials in the Office of Civil Defense have squandered nearly $2 mil­lion on an outfit in New York State called the Hudson Institute.

And here is some of what they got for this nice little piece of change:

First. A study, entitled "On the Rat­ing of Blast Shelters," that even the civil defense people themselves ad­mitted was worthless because it added nothing whatsoever to what was already known about rating blast shelters.

Second. A study, on "A New Look at the Design of Low-Budget Civil Defense Systems," was also worthless because it was simply, to quote the civil defense people, "a rehash of old, if not tired, ideas."

Third. A report, on "Management Requirements for Crisis Civil Defense Programs," was so inept and superficial that the civil defense official responsible said he approved it only because it had already been paid for.

Fourth. Still another report was so bad that its distribution was strictly limited because the civil defense official who ap­

CXIV---500--Part 6

proved it said he saw no reason for "load­ing bookshelves with a report for which he saw no value."

Mr. Speaker, this ridiculous outfit up on the banks of the Hudson River has been handed over $5 million by the Fed­eral Government's giveaway artists since it was formed in 1961.

The Hudson Institute is the brainchild of one Herman Kahn, who apparently learned how soft a touch "Uncle Sucker" is when he was working for another think factory-the Rand Corp.

Kahn has also created a new gimmick by which he explains away the amazing ability of his so-called researchers to come up with just plain junk time after time.

Here is what he told the GAO: This kind of speculative research (that

Hudson performs) must be evaluated on the kind of "batting average" basis, and 1! the batting average gets too high, we believe that one should be suspicious that the work ls not being imaginative and adventurous enough.

Now is that not nice? Mr. Speaker, spending money for this

sort of nonsense is part of the reason this Nation is in the most serious finan­cial trouble it has been in for a century.

Perhaps that has not filtered down into the bomb shelter over there in the Pentagon. Certainly Herman Kahn is not going to tell them about the administra­tion's will-o-the-wisp "austerity" pro­gram because Kahn is living off the squandermania that grips the adminis­tration so tightly.

But I would recommend that every Member of the Hm:.se, and certainly every member of the press, read this GAO report carefully.

This Hudson Institute is just one ex­ample of the mushrooming growth of these so-called nonprofit think factories that are bleeding us for $16 billions in research money each year.

This sort of foolishness has got to stop and I cannot think of a better way to start than by cutting off this outfit right now.

THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF OKLAHO­MA'S LEGISLATURE STANCHLY SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT'S POL­ICY IN VIETNAM Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan­

imous oonsent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma.

There was no objection. Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, many of

our colleagues may have noticed a re­cent article in the newspapers wherein the Nation was informed that by a unanimous vote of the State Senate of Oklahoma, including the nine Republi­can members, that body loyally took its stand in support of President Johnson's policies in pursuing the struggle in Viet­nam to an honorable conclusion. The action taken by the State senate had also, on March 19, the day before, been taken by the house of representatives.

The resolutions of both of these bodies of Oklahoma's Legislature reflect the pa­triotism and loyalty of the people of Oklahoma. I am proud of Oklahoma, my native State. In this case, the action of the legislature reflects great credit upon the people of Oklahoma who have elected a legislature dedicated to the welfare of Oklahoma and the entire Nation. Under the unanimous-consent agreement, I pre­sent a copy of the resolution of both houses of our State legislature for in­clusion in the RECORD:

ENROLLED SENATE RESOLUTION 79 Resolution expressing confidence in and sup­

port for President Johnson and the United States mllitary and civllian forces in Viet­nam; recommending the continuation of mllitary operations through to an honor­able conclusion; and directing distribution Whereas, this Nation, as the leader of the

"free world," is presently being called on to commit military supplies and fighting men in Vietnam for the protection and preservation of freedom and for the prevention of world Communist domination; and

Whereas, Communist aggression in this small country or in any country cannot and should not be tolerated; and

Whereas, the policy presently being pur­sued in Vietnam by the Commander in Chief and the mllitary and civilian forces appears to be the only plausible approach for the protection of our national interest and the interest of all the free world; and

Whereas, the policy of mllita.ry operations should be followed through to an honorable conclusion; and

Whereas, President Johnson and the United States Mllitary and Civllian Forces in Viet­nam deserve and should have the undivided support of all.

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the Sen­ate of the second session of the thirty-first Oklahoma Legislature:

Section 1. The Senate of the Second Ses­sion of the Thirty-first Oklahoma Legisla­ture does hereby express confidence in and support for President Johnson and the United States Milltary and Civllian Forces in their valorous effort in the preservation of freedom, a.nd does hereby recommend that this policy be pursued through to an honor­able conclusion.

Section 2. That duly authenticated copies of this Resolution, after consideration and enrollment, shall be prepared for and sent to President Johnson, the Secretary of De­fense, to each member of the Oklahoma Con­gressional Delegation, and to each member of the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Com­mittee.

Adopted by the Senate the 20th day of March, 1968.

CLEM MCSPADDEN, President Pro Tempore of the Senate.

Attest: BASIL R. WILSON,

Secretary of the Senate.

ENROLLED HOUSE RESOLUTION 623 Resolution expressing confidence in and sup­

port for President Johnson and the United States military a.nd civlllan forces in Viet Nam; recommending the continuation of military operations through to an hon­orable conclusion; and directing distribu­tion Whereas, this Nation, as the leader of the

"free world", ls presently being called on to commit mUitary supplies and fighting men in Viet Nam. for the protection and preserva­tion of freedom and for the prevention of world Communist domination; and

Whereas, Oommunist aggression in this small country or in any country cannot and should not be tolerated; and

7936 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968 Whereas, the policy presently being pur­

sued in Viet Nam by the Commander in Chief and the military and civilian forces ap­pears to be the only plausible approach for the protection of our national interest and the interest of all the free world; and

Whereas, the policy of military operations should be followed through to an honorable conclusion; and

Whereas, President Johnson, and the United States Military and Civilian forces in Viet Nam deserve and should have the undivided support of all.

Now, therefore, be it resolved by the House of Representatives of the second session of the thil'ty-first Oklahoma Legislature:

Section 1. The House of Representatives of the Second Session of the Thirty-first Okla­homa Legislature does hereby express con­fidence in and support for President Johnson and the United States Military and Civilian forces in their valorous effort in the preser­vation of freedom, and does hereby recom­mend that this policy be pursued through to an honorable conclusion.

Section 2. That duly authenticated copies of this Resolution, after consideration and enrollment, shall be prepared for and sent to President Johnson, the Secretary of De­fense, and to each member of the Oklahoma Congressional Delegation.

Adopted by the House of Representatives the 19th day of March, 1968.

REX PRIVETT, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Sl)ejaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. ALBERT. I yield to my colleague from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. I thank the dis­tinguished majority leader for yielding. I certainly agree with him in his state­ment of pride in the action of our legis­lature. The .action of the Oklahoma Legislature represents not only the pa­triotism and loyalty of our people in Oklahoma, as mentioned by the leader, but also their commonsense and good judgment. I had intended to place the same resolutions in the RECORD and am very glad of the majority leader's action on them.

The gentleman said that some people may have noticed an article in the news­papers pertaining to these resolutions. If you did notice it in the big city news­papers, you had t.o be reading your newspapers very carefully, because it had .about an inch of space in the great newspaper that is supposed t.o print "all the news that is flt to print." I just won­der how much space it would have had if this legislative action had been a unanimous action condemning the Presi­dent and our policies in Vietnam. My opinion is it would have had .a lot more space because somehow or other we seem to find it very difficult to get appropriate attention in some of the press for actions in support of the President.

Mr. STEED. Mr. Speaker, will the gen­tleman yield?

Mr. ALBERT. I yield to the gentleman from Oklahoma [Mr. STEED].

Mr. STEED. Mr. Speaker, I wish to associate myself with the remarks of my distinguished majority le.ader in praising the Oklahoma Legislature for this action, and to say that we are all very proud to be able to say that the people of Oklahoma have not forgotten who the real enemies of this Nation are.

GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND Mr. ALBERT. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent that all other mem­bers of the Oklahoma delegation and any other Members desiring to do so, may extend their remarks at this point on this subject.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Oklahoma?

There was no objection.

DANIELS INTRODUCES BILL TO AID IRISH IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES Mr. DANIELS. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection. Mr. DANIELS. Mr. Speaker, one of the

unfortuna.te results of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 has been a sharp decrease in the number of immi­grants from the Republic of Ireland.

The number of visas actually issued for Irish nationals has dropped from 4,619 in 1964 to 1,809 in 1967.

One reason for this is section 212 (a) (14) of the Immigration and Na­tionality Act of 1965 which makes it mandatory for a potential immigrant to obtain a labor certificate stating that his entry will not displace an American worker.

When you add to this provision, sec­tion 204 (a), which makes it mandatory for sixth preference immigrants, skilled and unskilled workers, to be admitted only after their employer in this country requests a visa, it is easy to see why Irish immigration to the United States has dwindled.

Mr. Speaker, Irish immigration has enriched this Nation from our earliest days, and I for one would not want to close the door to Irish immigrants. Be­cause Ireland is an English-speaking na­tion and its customs and institutions are so close to our own, the Irish immigrant tends to become assimilated very rapidly. Because Ireland is a poor country and so many of its most energetic sons and daughters do emigrate, I would like to

see these young people come to our shores. Surely, this is good for Ireland, but it is good for America as well.

Mr. Speaker, I have introduced a bill today which I think wm help correct this situation which surely has arisen by accident rather than design. My bill would remove the definite job require­ment contained in section 204 (a) and would, in addition, amend that section of the bill, 212(a) (14), requiring aliens in some categories to obtair. a work cer­tificate to conform with the pre-1965 law.

I urge all Members to join with me in support of this worthy bill.

THE PENNSYLVANIA CANNED MUSH­ROOM INDUSTRY DUE TO IN­CREASED IMPORTS IS IN A DES­PERATE PLIGHT Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute, to revise and extend my re­marks, and to include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Pennsylvania?

There was no objection. Mr. MORGAN. Mr. Speaker, I would

like to bring to the attention of the House the desperate plight of the Penn­sylvania canned mushroom industry caused by ever increasing imports of canned mushrooms, particularly from Taiwan.

This problem has been brewing for some time but has reached crisis pro­portions in the last few months. Imports of Taiwanese canned mushrooms have risen from practically nothing a few years ago to 710,000 oases last year when they supplied nearly one-third of the domestic market. Chinese exporters recently announced thait they plan t.o sell 1 m1llion oases in the United States dur­ing 1968, an increase of 41 percent. They plan to take such action although they must know that this increase will severely injure the domestic industry.

The situation of the domestic industry is vividly described in the following tables based on U.S. Department of Agriculture data as well as in material prepared by the Pennsylvania Depart­ment of Agriculture which I would like to insert at this point for the RECORD:

MUSHROOMS, CANNED-IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES

Calendar year Taiwan France

1950 _______ __ -- -- ____ -- ________ -- -- -- __ • _ -- __ • 1951 _________ -- ________ ---- ____ -- -- -- -- -- ____ • 1952 ____ • __ -- ----- ___ -- ------ -- -- ---- -- -- -- __ • 1953 ____ •• _ -- ------ - - - • -- -- ---- -- ---- -- -- -- - - • 1954 ____ -- ___ ------- _ -- ---- -- _. -- ---- _. -- -----1955 ______ • ---- ____ -- ---- -- ------ __ -- ---- ____ • 1956 _________ -- -- ---- -- -- __ ---- __ • _ -- __ -- __ __ • 1959 ______ -- - -- - - -- -- -- -- - - -- -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - -1958 ____ --- -- __ • _. _ ---- -- • _ -- -- -- -- -- ____ • _ -- • 1959 ____ -- _ -- -- • -- • ---- __ ---- -- -- __ -- -- ____ -- • 1960 _____ ---- -- ---- -- -- _ --- -- -- •••• -- ______ -- _ 1961________________________________ 680 1962 ___________ ------------------ --- 6, 379

mt:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 1A: ~~~ 1965________________________________ 11, 569 1966________________________________ 12, 772 1967 ________________________________ 16, 609

262 364 788

1, 580 2, 459 1, 936 1, 892 1,894 2, 190 1, 805 1, 307 1, 940 1,356 1, 069 l, 163 1,064

690 604

Japan Switzer-land

Italy West Other Germany

Thousand pounds

58 43

116 91 43 53 58 97

232 434 901

2, 000 2,275 1, 468

782 352 325 563

2 3

22 18 13 15 17 23 11 24 24 28 29 31 11 36 12 25

10 ----------9 5 8 12 4 20 3 28 1 21

16 19 2 17 7 21

20 18 16 20 16 13 18 27 5 14

18 8 30 14 11 34 39 41

5 9 9 5

26 16 40 38 40 22 24 34

101 29

190 143 161 169

Total

337 433 955

1, 718 2, 572 2,042 2,042 2,071 2, 501 2,323 2,292 4, 711

10, 185 13, 868 10, 870 13, 208 14, 005 18! 050

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD- HOUSE 7937 MUSHROOMS, CANNED-IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES-continued

Calendar year Taiwan

1950 __________ _______ -- -- -- -- -- -- -------------1951 _______ -- ---- -- -- -------------------- -- -- _ 1952_ --- ___________ -- __ -- -- ---- -- -- -- ________ _ 1953 _____ ________________ -- __ -- -- ____________ • 1954 ______ -- ___ -- -- -- -- ____ -- __ -- __________ ---1955_ -- __ • ---------- -- -- ---- ---- -- --- ----- -- _ 1956 ____ ------ -- --- ---- -- -- ------ -- __ -- -- -- ---1957 ----- ------------ _ ----- ---- -- ------ --- -- __ 1958 __________ -- ___ • ---- -- __ -- __ -- -- ___ -- ____ _ 1959 _________ -- ____ -- -- -- -- ______ ____________ _ 1960 ___________ -- -- ____ -- -- -- -- ____ -- -- ______ _ 1961_ __________________________ ----- 362

!!it~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ !: D1 1966_______________________ __ _______ 6, 713 1967________________________________ 9, 175

France

145 204 430 842

1,290 1, 019 1, 105 1, 242 1, 332 1,g~ 1, 309

969 766 830 846 604 510

[From the Pennsylvania Department of .Agriculture J

TASK FORCE MUSHROOM BRIEF

From Table I, Canner's Price Index, data indicates market prices little changed over the past five years, with a. total increase of only 3 % in finished product prices.

From Table II, Grower Price Index's, data indicates growers are receiving prices over the pa.st five years showing little changes, with only 1967 showing a slight increase, with presently prices identical to 1964 prices.

From Table III, Mushroom Industry Labor Index's, data indicates hourly wages have sharply increased from $1.00 per hour in 1964 to $1.60 per hour in 1968, an increase of60%.

From Table IV, Mushroom Grower's Pro­file, indicates Contract and Harvesting labor constitutes 48% of the growers cost expense, added to this ls a fair amount of supervisory labor expense, then surely it would be fair and true to assume labor represents better than half of an American growers total ex­pense dollar, or a. comparison with Taiwan, where as methods of growing, both in Amer­ica and in Taiwan are the same as to labor intensiveness, prices of labor are drama­tically disparate. Prices of factory labor in Taiwan are 5c per hour, in America $1.60 per hour are now minimum wages.

From Table IV, Mushroom Growers Profile, indicates that compost ls 34% of the Amer­ican growers expense cost. Here the dis­parity ls just as great, in Taiwan mushroom growing is primarily conducted as an ad­junct to rice farming, hence the straw that ls used for composting ls avallable free as a by-product, prior to entrance into the mush­room business, most Taiwanese farmers used it for fuel in their homes and for thatch for their roofs. So in the majority of cases it is free or relatively low-cost or a bartered item with other farmers in area.

In America, growers use straw as well. American mushroom growing ls conducted in semi-urban areas as a sole single horti­cultural enterprise, with 90% of American Mushroom growers engaged in no other farming enterprise or crops. Hence they must purchase all of their straw and corn cobs from the nearby farming sector, with Berks and Chester counties the major mushroom producing areas situated in major dairy farming areas, straw ls usually scarce and high.

In America, growers use migrant labor, usually paid minimum wages of $1.40 per hour at growing level and $1.60 per hour at processing levels. In Taiwan, growers usual­ly use the free family labor force, or at worse during peak harvesting times local peasant and child labor for which they pay

Japan

36 34 96 79 36 53 53 87

160 291 540

1, 166 1, 205

760 428 247 206 349

Switzer­land

Italy

Thousand dollars

West Other Germany

1 14 ---------- 4 2 10 3 4

18 10 9 7 13 7 13 5 10 6 20 16 8 3 15 8

14 13 14 21 21 2 16 39 11 6 21 37 23 19 10 19 25 10 21 17 27 15 11 19 30 17 26 55 37 5 16 21 17 18 10 104 57 26 18 77 18 13 45 106 36 43 49 103

Total

200 257 570 959

M~ 1: 220

~·:~ 1: 415 1, 519 2, 909 5, 319 7, 187 5,659 7, 116 7, 705

10, 265

3 to 4 cents per hour, with Taiwan Canners in the processing sector paying only 5 cents per hour for Factory labor.

So it can readily be seen that in the areas of compost and labor where the greatest disparity appears, there ls about a gap of 60c of the total cost factor or dollar.

Where a Taiwan canner/grower makes a net of over 47%, American canner/growers have in the past five years had to be satis­fied with less than 10%.

Where an American has tremendous amounts of capital investments in modern mushroom growing houses, the Taiwanese has little invested in his primitive straw thatched huts and houses.

With Labor 48%, Compost 34% as shown in the cost expense profile constituting 82 % of an American growers cost expense, a Taiwanese with straw from the family farm in most cases free, and labor at 5c per hour on average, this constitutes less than 10% of a Taiwanese growers cost expense, as per data in the 1967 Far East study and com­pendium, which was presented at the Lan­caster seminar by the Penna. Dept. of Agri­culture.

CANNED MUSHROOMS

U.S. SUPPLY, STOCKS, AND SHIPMENTS

Pounds

1966--67

Inventory, Oct 1 stocks... 7, 365, 456 Pack, Oct 1-Feb. 11 ______ 17, 845, 812 Supply to Feb. L _________ 25, 211, 268 Stocks, Feb. !____________ 9, 219, 780 Shipments during

January 2______________ 4, 491, 864 Shipments, Oct. 1-Feb. L. 15, 991, 488

1967--68

9, 750, 804 19,334,676 29, 085, 480 12, 596, 892

3, 911, 676 16, 488, 588

Per­cent

change

+33 +8

+15 +37

-13 +3

I Pack includes domestic production for canning plus ;mports. ~Shipments and demand or sales are synonymous.

U.S. TOTAL, 1967--68-PACK AND IMPORTS DURING JANUARY

CAN SIZE

24/2 oz. ______ 24/4 oz _______ 24/8 oz ____ ___ 12/16 oz ______ 6/10 oz _______

GLASS

24/Z~oz. ____ 12/4.14 oz.- ---

U.S. totaL ••

Per-1967 units cent 1968 units

of total

168, 374 28.6 156, 081 238, 931 40.6 305, 103 62, 801 10. 7 48, 334 32, 265 5.4 22,536 28,801 4.9 29,015

41, 634 7.1 46, 162 15, 978 2. 7 20, 315

588, 784 100. 0 627, 546

Per- Percent cent change of total

24.9 -1· 48.6 +28

7. 7 -23 3.6 -30 4.6 +1

7.4 +11 3.2 +27

100. 0 +1

U.S. TOTAL, 1967--68-SHIPMENTS DURING JANUARY

CAN SIZE

24/2 oz _______ 209, 802 31. 5 149, 307 25. 7 -29 24/4 oz _______ .261, 583 39. 3 265, 380 45. 7 +1 24/8 oz _______ 76, 164 11. 4 51, 398 8. 9 -33 12/16 oz ______ 26, 368 4.0 25, 913 4.5 -2 6/10 oz ___ ___ _ 29, 917 4. 5 25, 146 4.3 -16

GLASS

24/2~ oz _____ 40, 463 6.1 42,872 7.4 +6 12/4~ oz __ ___ 21, 224 3.2 20, 546 3.5 -3

U.S. totaL. 665, 521 100. 0 580, 562 100. 0 -13

U.S. TOTAL, 1967--68-STOCKS (SOLD AND UNSOLD) IN CANNERS' HANDS FEB. 1

CAN SIZE

24/2 oz ____ __ _ 511, 139 35.4 452, 314 24. 7 -12 24/4 oz _______ 520, 976 36.1 702,661 38. 4 +35 24/8 oz. ______ 115, 267 8.0 140, 895 7. 7 +22 12/16 oz ______ 105, 292 7.3 91, 099 5.0 -13 6/10 oz. ______ 48, 590 3. 3 113, 817 6. 2 +134

GLASS

24/2Y2 oz _____ 116, 218 8.1 236,862 12. 9 +104 12/4~ oz. ____ 25, 842 1.8 93, 049 5.1 +260

U.S. totaL _ 1, 443, 324 100.0 1, 830,697 100.0 +27

Mr. Speaker, this factual and revealing information speaks for itself and shows the need for immediate action to restrict uncontrolled import competition.

The Pennsylvania congressional dele­gation has met with representatives of the Department of State, Agriculture, and AID. We have urged these depart­ments to convince the Chinese Govern­ment that it would be in the mutual in­terest of the United States and Chinese industries if restr,aints were imposed on mushroom exports. The U.S. industry does not seek to cut back foreign trade, and even though mushroom imports al­ready supply nearly one-third of U.S. consumption, domestic producers would be prepared to see imports grow in proportion to the growth of domestic consumption. I have long been and re­main an advocate of preserving the jobs of the American workingman. However, I believe-and I am sure my colleagues agree with me-that mushroom imports cannot be permitted to wipe out the do­mestic mushroom industry.

Mr. Speaker, I am happy to be able to report that the administration shares the concern of the Pennsylvania congres­sional delegation and that discussions between the United States and Chinese Governments have been held at extreme­ly high levels for the past month. Unfor­tunately, despite these efforts, the Chinese Government has remained ob­durate and refused to take any action to alleviate the present desperate situation.

Time is running out. We are reaching the peak of the do­

mestic crop and a major price break will soon occur unless action is taken.

While I continue to prefer to have this situation handled in a reasonable and flexible manner by Chinese export re­straints, if no action is taken by April 1, I will introduce legislation to impose quantitative limitations on imports of canned mushrooms. I would like to re­peat that I continue to hope such action will not be necessary. However, if it is,

7938 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

I hope that my colleagues will support legislation necessary to prevent this be­leaguered industry from being destroyed.

REINSTATEMENT OF JOHNSON­O'MALLEY PROGRAM IN CALIFOR­NIA The SPEAKER. Under previous order

of the House, the gentleman from Cali­fornia [Mr. TuNNEY] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, California Indian education is a no man's land, lying between the State and Federal Gov­ernments, with neither side accepting re­sponsibility for the particular educa­tional needs of Indian children. As a consequence, those needs have been unmet. This was not always so. Until the 1950's the Federal Government pro­vided Johnson-O'Malley grants-in-aid of $318,500 annually to Oalifornia to help improve Indian educational opportunity. Progress was being made. Then these funds were phased out, on the assump­tion that the State would assume the responsibility for providing comparable assistance. It has not. Although Indian children attend public schools through­out the State, they are submerged in the general student body and their severe and unique educational problems are glossed over. As a result, Indian educa­tion in California-and with it, the living conditions and advancement of the In­dian people generally-has stagnated. Thus the February 1966 report of the California State Advisory OOmmission on Indian Affairs declares:

High schools with high percentages of en­rolled Indian students reported a dropout rate which is three times higher for Indians (21 percent) than for non-Indians (7 per­cent), with some schools reporting rates which range from 30 to 75 percent. Needless to say, few Indian students finish high school, few attend college, and many who have grad­uated from high school receive an inferior education because of lack of teacher concern or the failure of the school system to devise compensatory teaching techniques to cope with students of differing cultural back­grounds.

I have met with the Indian people and their children in California and have be­come increasingly disturbed by their frustration, their defeated hopes. I ques­tion the wisdom of the Federal Govern­ment continuing this neglect, when it provides Johnson-O'Malley assistance to Indians in so many other States, as rightly it should.

If we are to honor our obligation to these people, we must reconsider this discrimination and reinstate a Johnson­O'Malley program in California.

New educational opportunities will help the Indians of California to make a better life for themselves and their chil­dren. Of equal importance, improved edu­cation will help them to be more produc­tive citizens, to the benefit of their com­munities, the State, and the Nation.

The Federal Government, particularly the Bureau of Indian Aff'airs, has on a national basis increasingly recognized Indian needs and spent more and more to meet them over the past few decades, with current Federal Indian expendi­tures totaling approximately one-third of

a billion dollars annually. By contrast, although California is the fourth or fifth most populous State in terms of native Indian population-and first or second if relocated Indians are included-the Federal Government began withdrawing its services and programs for California Indians in the late 1940's and most were ended by the m~d-1950's, except for trus­teeship of the land.

This has produced some ironic re­sults. The Sherman Institute in River­side, Calif., for example, is open to Indi­ans from other States but closed to the Indians of California-even though sev­eral million dollars were deducted from the claim award of the California Indians to pay for past maintenance and opera­tion of Sherman. Similarly, three of the BIA's seven national relocation or em­ployment assistance offices are located in California, yet few California Indians receive help from these offices. The same is true of the Madera Training Center for Indians, a project in California cost­ing approximately $2 million per year.

But the most egregious instance of un­equal treatment of the California Indians is the cut.off of Johnson-O'Malley Act funds in the 1950's. Until 1953, California received $318,500 of these Federal grant­in-aid funds annually for California Indian educational assistance. Com­mencing in that year, Johnson-O'Malley funds were withdrawn at the rate of $50,000 per year until, in 1958, they were completely eliminated. For the past 10 years, then, California Indians have lost severial million dollars in such assistance. Who can say how many more Indian youths would have remained in school over this decade, how many more would not be skilled laborers or engineers or doctors, if the Johnson-O'Malley funds had remained available t.o give them the extra boost they so badly needed? The dollar loss to these individuals, their families and communities, resulting from their lost chances and undeveloped talents, probably exceeds by severalfold the amount of Johnson-O'Malley funds that would have been expended.

The fundamental injustice of this sit­uation is highlighted when we consider that 19 other States will receive $13,352,000 in Johnson-O'Malley assist­ance for fiscal year 1969. Most of these States have far smaller Indian popula­tions than California. If California were given the same percentage-12 percent­of Johnson-O'Malley funds which it re­ceived when the phaseout began in 1953, it would receive $1,602,240 of the $13,352,000.

The Federal policy of discrimination against California Indians was based largely on two assumptions: First, that the California Indians would be speedily terminated; and, second, that the State would step in to provide the necessary services. Both premises have proven false.

Relatively few Indians and acres of trust land have been terminated; and termination seems even less likely to occur in the future because most Indians do not believe that it benefits them. In­deed, many Government officials now question whether precipitous termina­tion is desirable.

As for the second assumption, the State has not provided any educational programs geared to the special needs of the Indians. They continue to drop out, or be "pushed out," as one member of the State commission on public education has phrased it, at an alarming rate.

No one would deny the great educa­tional needs of Indians in other States, but there is something quite awry when Federal policy discriminates against an important segment of American Indfans and for reasons which, if they ever had any force, have become meaningless: The Indians of California ask not for preference, only equality.

A consensus has developed in Cali­fornia concerning the need for reinstrute­ment of a Johnson-O'Malley program. The first education recommendation of the State advisory commission on Indian affairs is reinstatement of such a pro­gram. Also, a study entitled "A Johnson­O'Malley Educational Program for Cali­fornia Indians," by the commission's staff analyst, Ailfthony D. Brown, documented withdrawal of the program and recom­mended its reinstatement, suggesting a number of specific uses to which John­son-O'Malley funds could be put. Three State senators and three assemblymen recently coauthored a resolution, intro­duced in the legi:slaJture on January 22, 1967, as Senate JoiDlt Resolution 3, which would memorialize Congress to rest.ore Federal services for California Indians. The first Federal program mentioned is Johnson-O'Malley. This resolution has cleared the senate rules committee with a do pass recommendation. It is expected to reach the senate :floor very soon and appears to have no opposition.

In addition, California law, Welfare and Institutions Code, section 8200, au­thorizes the State to receive Federal funds to assist in the education of Cali­fornia Indians.

Most heartening of all, a grassroots all-Indian organization, known as the Ad Hoc Committee on Indian Education, has been established in California. The committee obtained a small foundation grant; sponsored an All-Indian State­wide Conference on Indian Education, participated in by approximately 150 In­dians from all parts of the state; and published an 80-page report of the pro­ceedings of the conference. This report makes numerous specific recommenda­tions to parents, teachers, counselors, school board members, and administra­tors, and State and Federal officials, for the improvement of Indian education in California. The conference and report mark the beginning of a new era of Cali­fornia Indian iruterest in education for their children. The first recommendation of the conference was reinstatement of a Johnson-O'Malley program.

Through an auspicious confluence of circumstances there now exists a new chance for the California Indians, an opportunity to participate more fully in American life and yet preserve that which is unique in their own special heritage. No new act of Congress is needed. The BIA has ended the Johnson­O'Malley program by administrative ac­tion and can reinstate it in the same manner.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7939 It is, however, of the utmost impor­

tance that a new Johnson-O'Malley pro­gram fulfill certain minimum conditions if it is to be effective:

First. The program should be operated at the State level to insure efficient ad­ministration and maximum coordination.

Second. The program should provide special educational assistance only for Indians, not subsidize local taxpayers. Such subsidization is necessary in areas where there are large blocs of untaxed Federal Indian lands, but in those cases impacted area funds can be used and Johnson-O'Malley funds ought not to be diverted from the purpose embodied in the act, the improvement of Indian education.

Third. The program should be avail­able to nontrust as well as trust Indians, as is the case in other States. This is especially necessary in California, where, because the U.S. Senate failed to ratify the United States-California Indian treaties of 1851-52-after the Indians had surrendered their lands in reliance on the treaties-the great majority of the Indians are homeless. It would be the ultimate injustice to deny California In­dians a program available to Indians elsewhere because the Federal Govern­ment dishonored its promise to them.

Fourth. The California Indians should participate in the development of the programs, policies, and goals and Indian representatives should share in the re­sponsibility for supervising the on-going programs.

The foregoing conditions are based for the most part on recommendations con­tained in the ad hoc committee report and the study for the State advisory com­mission on Indian affairs. I also com­mend the other recommendations in those papers to the attention of the Bu­reau of Indian Affairs.

The need is clear, the opportunity pres­ent. I call upon the Bureau of Indian Affairs to meet its responsibility to the Indians of California and reinstate a Johnson-O'Malley program there.

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speak­er, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the gentleman from California.

Mr. BROWN of California. Mr. Speak­er, I wish to compliment the distin­guished gentleman from California [Mr. TUNNEY] upon bringing this problem to the attention of the Members of the House of Representatives.

As I am well aware, the gentleman has a 1arge Indian population which resides in the congressional district which it is his honor to represent. As the gentleman from California knows, I represent an urban district, but a district wherein I wish to indicate the fact that we have a large number of Indians, Indians located in the Los Angeles area. Many of them are located in the congressional district which I represent. They have called this problem to my attention also.

Mr. Speaker, I certainly wish to add my voice to the plea which has been made by the distinguished gentleman from California [Mr. TuNNEY] for the restoration of the Johnson-O'Malley funds. In my opinion this represents a most critical situation and further repre-

sents a failure on the part of the Federal Government to recognize the means of meeting the particular, the peculiar, cul­tural background of these first inhabit­ants of our country.

It is a definite need, and I believe we would be greatly remiss if we did not seek to meet this need in some fashion or other.

So I want to compliment the gentle­man from California on his fine presen­tation, and I want to join with him and do everything I can.

Mr. TUNNEY. I thank the gentleman from California.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the gentle­man from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to express appreciation also to the gentleman from California for pointing so effectively and so drastically to a prob­lem that does need attention in his State, and to commend the gentleman also for the great work and diligence the gen­tleman has brought to Indian problems all over the country through his service on the Committee on Interior and In­sular Affairs.

I know tha,t the gentleman consistently has voted for and supported measures to assist the Indians in their various, needs all over the country. I certainly have deep sympathy for the gentleman in connec­tion with the problem he has in Cali­fornia.

I believe that one of the problems that we have had in Indian legislation over a long period of time has been the tend­ency on the part of some people to re­late Indian programs entirely to In­dian lands, and to forget that it is the Indian himself, and the Indian child in particular, that should be our special concern, and not so much the Indian­held lands. I believe that this has been the position of the gentleman from Cali­fornia in all of the actions that I have observed him to take in the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. I, too, certainly hope it will be possible to im­prove our programs with regard to the Indians in California.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, I could not agree more with the gentleman from Oklahoma. Certainly he has provided tremendous leadership in this regard on the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, and I want to thank him for his comments.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the g-entle­man from California.

Mr. JOHNSON of California. Mr. Speaker, I want to join the gentleman in the well in the statement that he has made concerning legislation for the In­dians in C;alifornia, and the Indians throughout the Nation. I believe we have one of the largest Indian populations of our country in California, and we are growing day by day. And when I was in the senate of the State legislature we thought that we could handle the prob­lems of the Indi,ans in California. I want to say that I hope we can take advantage of the Johnson-O'Malley funds, and that we can get into this program and thus

assist in the progress and the welf.are of the Indians of California.

Mr. Speaker, I represent an area that has a great many Indians on the ranch­erias and elsewhere. As I said, I know that within the State of California we have a very large population of Indians.

The gentleman in the well serves us on the Committee on Interior and In­sular Affairs, and I commend him on bringing this matter to our attention tod;ay, and I again want to compliment him for this because I believe that this is a correct move in behalf of the Indians of California, and the Indians through­out our Nation.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, I cer­tainly want to thank the gentleman from California for his observations.

Mr. KORNEGAY. Mr. Spe.aker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the gentleman from North Carolina.

Mr. KORNEGAY. Mr. Speaker, I thank the gentleman for yielding to me. I would like to commend the gentleman very highly for bringing this very significant and important matter to our attention today. I also wish to say that I am very ple.ased to see somebody stand up on the floor of this House and talk out in strong, clear, and concise language about the flrst Americans, and about the for­gotten Americans, and about the Ameri­can Indi,an, who certainly has been passed by in many, many of the pro­grams that we here in the Congress have passed.

I want to commend the gentleman from California for his insight, for his fortitude, and for his knowledge in sup­port of and in speaking out for a group of certainly well-deserving Americans who, because of their small number, have too long gone unlooked after and un­regarded in this country.

Not only are there, of course, Indians in California, that great State, 'but scat­tered throughout a great part of the United States. This is a national prob­lem, and it is really a national shame for the way the Indian has been treated by the rest of the people in this country.

Again I want to thank the gentleman for yielding to me, and to commend him for a fine presentation.

Mr. TUNNEY. I thank the gentleman. Mr. ROYBAL. Mr. Speaker, will the

gentleman yield? Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the gentleman

from California. Mr. ROYBAL. I thank the gentleman

for yielding. Mr. Speaker, I would like to associate

myself with the excellent statements made by the gentleman from California. I believe he had de.finitely portrayed the picture that emphatically exists.

I want to compliment the gentleman for bringing this matter to the attention of the House.

Mr. Speaker, I represent a urban com­munity-and many of us who represent large city areas do not believe that the Indians within our particular districts have a problem. The truth of the matter is the city of Los Angeles alone has ap­proximately 20,000 Indians. And as we look at the statistics with regard to edu­cation and with regard to poverty, we

7940 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

find that this is one area where these Indians actually play a major role. They are a part of the poverty of the cities and they are part of the poverty of the communities, that at the present time we are trying desperately to do something about their particular problem.

So I commend the gentleman from California for bringing this matter to the attention of the House, and I sin­cerely hope that more of us can actually join with the gentleman in seeing to it that the Johnson-O'Malley funds are made available not only for the State of California, but for the rest of the Nation.

Mr. TUNNEY. I thank the gentleman very much, and I appreciate the gentle­man's remarks.

Mr. Speaker, there is just one point I would like to emphasize, and that deals with what would happen if the Johnson­O'Malley funds are restored to the State of California.

In my opinion, the funds should be ad­ministered at the State level and not at the Washington level. I think the only way that you can get proper administra­tion would be at the grassroots level which in this case would be in Sacra­mento.

Second, I feel it is important that the funds be used for the special educational needs of the Indians and not to subsidize local taxpayers.

This differs slightly from impacted area funds. The funds would not go to school districts as a whole to be put in their general revenue funds, but would operate to take care of the special needs of Indians.

You can have special teachers aids and perhaps have a State administrator who would be responsible for coordinating In­dian programs.

Another point is that the funds should be made available to nontrust as well as trust Indians in California. Because the California Indian treaties were not rati­fied by the U.S. Senate in the period 1850 through 1852, we have many homeless and landless Indians. These Indians should not be denied the benefits of John­son-O'Malley funds.

Last, it seems to me Indians should participate in the development of the programs as well as sharing responsi­bility for administering the programs, because after all, the Indians know what their peculiar needs are and they should have the opportunity to voice these needs as well as to share, as I have indicated, in the responsibility to see that these needs are met.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. TUNNEY. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. EDMONDSON. I do hope that the

gentleman will pursue this matter in depth. We have an able Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Robert L. Bennett-an Indian himself, and I think he is the first Indian ever to hold the position of Commissioner of Indian Affairs. I believe that Mr. Bennett feels just as the gen­tleman from California does that the problem of the Indian is not a problem of land and it is not a problem of land holdings. It is a problem of people, and the programs that are directed at these problems must deal with people and his children particularly if we are going to get effective long-term answers.

I certainly feel that the gentleman will find a sympathetic listener in the person of the present occupant of the chair of Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Mr. TUNNEY. I cannot agree with the gentleman more. I think Mr. Bennett, the Commissioner of Indian Bureau of Indian Affairs has proved most respon­sive to the needs of the Indians and has been most imaginative in every way in trying to bring about a change of policy. After all for the past 100 years we have had a Bureau of Indian Affairs and with the millions and millions of dollars that have been spent it is quite clear that the funds have not been allocated properly and there has not been a sensitivity to those needs of the Indians. Because if there had been we would have had a much different condition existing on the reservations, as well as with the Indians who live off of the reservation, than we have now.

Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from California [Mr. SISK] may extend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection. Mr. SISK. Mr. Speaker, I join in the

remarks of my good friend and colleague from California [Mr. TUNNEY] in sup­porting the reinstatement of the John­son-O'Malley grants-in-aid to California to help improve Indian educational opportunities.

The State of California has not as­sumed the responsibility for providing comparable assistance to the Indians of California as that provided under the, Johnson-O'Malley program. For the past 10 years, California Indians have lost several million dollars which would have been theirs from such assistance. The situation is critical, as the school dropout rate for Indians is three times higher than for non-Indians, and I am informed that some schools are reporting rates which range from 30 to 75 percent. Johnson-O'Malley funds would help to remedy this situation.

I know many of my colleagues recog­nize the severe and unique educational problems of the Indians and as such, I am sure you will support the reinstate­ment of this worthy program in California.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous oonsent that the gentleman from California [Mr. CORMAN] may ex­tend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection. Mr. CORMAN. Mr. Speaker, I am

glad to have this opportunity to join my colleague, the gentleman from Cali­fornia [Mr. TUNNEY], in urging that consideration be given to the reinstate­ment of the Johnson-O'Malley grants­in-aid program to California.

These grants were instituted many years ago and provided $318,500 annually to California to help improve educa­tional opportunities for Indian children. The history of this program clearly shows that good progress was being made in projects geared to the special

needs of these children. The grants began to be phased out in 1953 when it was felt that the California Indians would be terminated and that in the interim the State would provide the necessary comparable services to the schools. But neither was done; and the California Indians have been left with­out the valuable assistance that the grants had previously provided.

Since the time the program began to be phased out, there is every indication that Indian children in the State have received the kind of inferior education that results from lack of funds with which to treat their special needs. As a result, the California Indian high school students have the highest percentage of dropouts among ethnic groups in the State.

The reinstatement of the Johnson­O'Malley grants will give new hope to the Indian families; it will offer young people an opportunity to become pro­ductive citizens and benefit themselves and their communities.

The State of California has indicated a strong desire to have the Johnson­O'Malley program reinstated. It has be­come the focus of the State advisory commission on Indian affairs. the sub­ject of a special study on the Johnson­O'Malley educational program, and one of the main concerns of a newly formed all-Indian ad hoc committee on Indian education in the State. The interest and activities of all these groups reflect the hope that a new beginning can be ini­tiated for Indian children in the State of California.

No new legislative action is needed to reinstate the grants. The Bureau of In­dian Affairs needs merely to take ad­ministrative action.

Mr. Speaker, educational opportuni­ties for California Indians have been given very little attention by the Fed­eral Government in the past 10 years. We must now reassume our responsibil­ity to the Indian youngsters. I would hope that the Bureau of Indian Affairs would give this matter the urgent con­sideration it deserves.

Mr. TUNNEY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from California [Mr. EDWARDS] may ex­tend his remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from California?

There was no objection. Mr. EDWARDS of California. Mr.

Speaker, I wholeheartedly concur with the facts and sentiments expressed to­day by my esteemed colleague from Cali­fornia. I share Mr. TuNNEY's grave con­cern about the disastrous stagnation of Indian education in California. Our State is justifiably proud of its great educational progress, but we must rec­ognize that the educational opportuni­ties have not adequately reached the California Indians. With the gradual withdrawal of Federal assistance be­ginning in 1953, came a halt in the de­velopment of educational programs for these Americans. Responsibility for de­veloping programs to meet the educa­tional needs of the American Indian in California has unfortunately become

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7941 lost in a vacuum of neglect by both the Federal and State governments.

Our Nation cannot afford to accept such neglect in the place of creative leadership. And in this case, the ne­glect has been compounded by a form of discrimination: while other States have continued to receive Johnson-O'Malley grants-in-aid for Indian education, Cali­tf ornia's funds have been terminated. This despite the fact that California has one of the largest Indian populations in the country.

The gentleman from California [Mr. TuNNEY] has explained how the Fed­eral policy concerning California In­di·ans has been based on two false as­sumptions, and how the California Indian has suffered from this serious miscalculation. It is time now to correct the unfortunate decision to phase out Federal assistance for the education of Oalifomia. Indians. I join with Con­gressman TuNNEY, the State Advisory Commission on Indian Affairs, and many California legislators and citizens, to urge thaJt the Johnson-O'Malley pro­gram be reinstated in our State.

VIETNAM POLICIF.s DESERVE OUR SUPPORT

The SPEAKER. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN] is recognized for 60 minutes.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani­mous con.sent to revise and extend my remarks and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Oairolina?

There was no objection. GENERAL LEAVE TO EXTEND

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani­mous consent that all other Members of the House may have 5 legislative days in which to e:Xitend their remarks on the subject of my special order.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from South Carolina?

There was no objection. Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I rise today

to support the President's policy in Viet­nam and to support the policy as enunciated by General Westmoreland, secretary Rusk, and the 500,000 or more gallant Americans who are serving in that area of the world.

In connection with my support of these great men and our policy, I should like to point out that I noticed in this morning's Washington Post an article by former President Eisenhower. In that article he made a very significant state­ment to the effect that much of the criticism of our South Vietnam policy today is not honest dissent but borders on treason. That was the statement of former President of the United States Dwight Eisenhower, who served for 8 years as President of the United States, who was my commander in chief in Europe during World War II, and who following World War II, for a number of years, was NATO commander in chief in Western Europe.

It might be well for those who are pulling the rug out from under our men in South Vietnam to read and ponder

what the former President of the United States and the general in chief of our Armies in Europe had to say about some of those who are criticizing and causing demonstrations to create a division in this Nation. General Eisenhower-and I think he is an expert in this field-said this conduct is encouraging Hanoi and Peking in their diabolical aggression.

I have before me clippings from news­papers published last week quoting former President Harry Truman while in Key West, Fla. He was President of the United States for almost 8 years and Vice President of this country during the later stages of World War II. I think he qualifies as an expert on this sub­ject. He ordered support of Greece and Turkey when they were threatened. Later on, when South Korea was in­vaded, he gave his support to South Korea.

It is well for us to ponder today just where we are going with their policy of division, of carping criticism of every­thing that is being done, without a posi­tive alternative to the program being carried out by the Government and by our men in South Vietnam.

The President is for · peace. I know General Westmoreland is for peace, as well as Secretary Rusk. I know of no thinking person in our country today who is for war. I feel-our fighting men feel-most of our great military men feel that by standing firm in South Vietnam today against aggression we are taking a step to prevent world war III.

I want to tell my colleagues here to­day, Mr. Speaker, that all of the young people of America do not agree with those we read about who are chanting, screaming, and yelling against our men in South Vietnam and what they stand for and the leadership of this country.

I just recently returned from an American campus and I saw fine young men and women, who are supporting our policy in Southeast Asia to contain Com­munist aggression. I find the veterans of our country, the overwhelming majority of them, supporting our policy.

Before some go too far against our Vietnam policy in this country, I think they will become aware of a great reac­tion from among those who served-26 million veterans in this Nation. When we hear from them, the overwhelming ma­jority of them are against aggression and are dedicated to fighting aggres­sion in Europe and in the Pacific and all over the world.

Mr. Speaker, I might say that today, because our men did fight overseas in World War I and in World War II, in Europe and the Pacific, in the air and under the sea and on the sea, because they did serve over there, no bomb has ever fallen on the women and children of this country and on the academic communities of this country-not the single first bomb, because they kept the tide of war a way from the shores of this country.

This is exactly what our men in South Vietnam are doing today. We are the only major nation in this world where bombs have not fallen from the air, from the sky, onto our cities, and onto the fnnocent women and children of our

Nation. Bombs fell on England, on France, on Italy, on Germany, on Rus­sia, on China, on Japan, and even on Spain in the Spanish civil w.ar, but not the first bomb has ever fallen on the cities of this Nation, because these 26 million men and women of our country served, many of them overseas, and kept the tide of war away from the great in­dustrial cities and the heart of this Nation.

This is exactly what our men are doing in South Vietnam today. They are fight­ing, yes, for America, for the security of this country, and they are fighting for the security and freedom of a little na­tion to whom we have given our word of honor. They know, if they turn the Me­kong Deleta and the rice and oil and untapped resources over to a billion peo­ple sworn to conquer the world, that this Nation will be under the gun in the life­time of those who are chanting on some of the campuses of this Nation today and in academic communities.

I told these young people last week that these men in South Vietnam are fighting so the young people will not have to go. The men are fighting for peace. They are fighting for these people who are screaming and yelling on the cam­puses of this country. If we show some unity and some support, they will not have to go, these young people, those on the campuses and in the academic com­munity, and in the high schools of this Nation, just as this young man sitting here. But if we pull out and quit, they will have to participate in world war Ill whether they want to or not. Just as the imperial militarists of Japan went into Manchuria in 1931, on September 18, without warning, with airpower some day this Nation may be attacked.

Genghis Khan, Mr. Speaker, more than 740 years ago drew a map, it is reported, in the sand and said that the nation or conqueror who controlled Asia would control Europe, Africa, and Asia. It is difficult for some of us to realize, but it is all one' continent-Afro-Eurasia, and Western Europe is only one small penin­sula of the great Afro-Eurasian land mass. Genghis Khan saw that in the year 1220, and he conquered all of Asia and he rolled into Europe, and the only thing that saved Western Europe at that time and Christian civilization was that Genghis Kharl died.

Commodore Perry in 1853 opened up Japan and made a call on that nation, which . had spawned the policy of iso­lation. Three years later, Commodore Perry, speaking in New York City, 112 years ago in 1856, said:

Someday the forces of freedom Will be locked in a death struggle in Southeast Asia With the forces of totalitarianism for con­trol of that area of the world.

And on the outcome of that struggle would depend the freedom of all the free peoples of the world.

I believe, Mr. Speaker, that time is upon us in Southeast Asia. We either have to stand against aggression or en­courage and sanction aggression by pull­ing out.

Southeast Asia has 250 million people, with the rice bowl of the Mekong Delta. Indonesia has 100 million, and is the

7942 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

world's fifth largest nation, with rubber, oil, tin, and uranium.

If we walk off, we leave this in the hands of those who are reported as hav­ing said-I wish General de Gaulle would listen to this-reported as having said that the road to Paris is the road through Peiping.

They have Peiping. They have had it about 18 years. They have had time to consolidate and to liquidate in China. They are now beginning to move over the ground and through the jungles, in a stealthy, diabolical type of aggression, into Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, Burma, and, yes, South Vietnam.

If we turn this area over to the Com­munist world, they are going to take India. They attacked India a few years ago, at the northern frontier.

Then it will be Saudi Arabia, with its oil, and Pakistan. I am told by American oil men that 67 percent of the world's untapped oil is found in Saudi Arabia. How could we hope to make a stand in our lifetime, 10 years from now, with 2 billion people behind the Iron Curtain, with 75 percent of the world's oil, and tin and rubber and uranium?

I say, Mr. Speaker, the time to make that stand is today, and to punish the ag­gressor as the veterans of our Nation did a few years ago.

Let us go back to Manchuria, 1931, September 18. Mr. Speaker, do you know what was said by Henry Stimson, a mem­ber of the party on this side of the aisle, a great Secretary of the Army? He warned President Herbert Hoover that we had to do something about cold ag­gression in Manchuria by the Japanese high command. Their own government did not even know the military in Japan was planning this aggression until it ac­tually happened. Henry Stimson said, "We ought to take action now." But our leaders put their heads in the sand and tried ·to ·sweep the problem under the rug in the United States and in the free world.

Then came Mr. Mussolini. He waited 4 years. Nothing happened to Japan, so on October 2 and 4, 1935, he went across the border into Ethiopia, with tanks and planes, and he took that nation in a mat­ter of a few months.

Hitler was standing by. Nothing hap­pened to Mussolini. They talked about sanctions and argued about it in the higher councils, at summit meetings, but nothing was done, so Hitler goose­stepped into the Rhineland in 1936, just a year later, after Mussolini went to Ethiopia.

Then he went into Austria in 1938, March 11. Nothing happened.

Then he went over to Munich. I am not going to deal at any length with what happened at Munich. The Members know what happened at Munich. But I will say this: Chamberlain caused World War ll by going over to Munich and meeting these bloody axis dictators-yes, Lord Halifax, Chamberlain, Daladier, and Bonnet of France went over there.

They tell me that Chamberlain had never flown in a plane before in his life; he was so afraid to fly. But he got in a plane and went there, because Hitler told him, "You had better come, or we will take Europe, but if you -just give me

Czechoslovakia, that is the last foot of territory that I want." Well, they went over there and they gave it to him. My friends, you would not want that kind of blood on your hands-25 million people killed in the world, 100 million injured, $300 billion in property damage. That is just because Chamberlain did not have the courage at Munich to say no to Hitler a.t that time.

Oh, yes. A lot of people over here said that it was not our problem. Then Pearl Harbor came along on a Sunday morn­ing. We might as well realize today that there are some people in the world who murder. Ever since Cain and Abel, ever since Cain killed his brother Abel right after the Garden of Eden we have had this. Why, I do not know, but we have always had evil in the world. We have people who want something that you have. We have had more bank robberies in my area of the country, and in many of the States in the Union last year than they have ever had in history. What are we going to do about it? Just give the robber half of the money and sit down and negotiate and pat him on the back and say "Go ahead"? That is what some of my good friends in this country appear to want to do.

You have had the Roman legions going into Jerusalem and razing the city down to the ground and putting the people in slavery. You have had Genghis Khan and Kubla Khan and people like that all through history. What would the peace­niks and the beatniks do about it if they came into power in this country? We are entitled to know where they would make a stand and whether they would make a. stand for their own homes and for our women and children and for the prin­ciples and ideals that made this Nation great such as private enterprise and free­dom of worship, freedom of speech, and peaceful assembly.

Those in the academic community, if they really want to demonstrate and if they have to demonstrate, then why do they not demonstrate like my good friend from Illinois said the other day. Why do they not demonstrate on the side of academic freedom as manifested by the students in Warsaw and Czechoslovakia where 4,000 of them in Warsaw demon­strated against censorship of the news and demonstrated for freedom of speech? If the students in our country have just got to demonstrate, and some of our national leaders in high places are going out stirring them up, then why do they not lead them in a demonstration in fa var of freed om across the sea and be­hind the Iron Curtain? Why do they not demonstrate for freedom of speech and freedom of the press and those basic rights that are guaranteed to every American in our Bill of Rights? This is what we need in this Nation today. Why don't they demonstrate for their op­pressed fellow students in Warsaw?

Mr. Speaker, you know, I deplore those who go out all over this country and encourage Hanoi and encourage Peiping to look for victory because of disunity and dissension in the United States. I wish you would read some of their broad­casts from Hanoi and Peiping and see what they say about the President of the United States and about General West­moreland and about Secretary Rusk and

about President Eisenhower, all those who have stood up for the cause of freedom.

Yes, my friends, no bomb has fallen on the cities of our Nation because some­body cared, because somebody stood up. I do not pretend that the millennium is here. We have crime and we have robbery and, yes, we have aggression. You just disband your Army, as some would have you do, you disband your police force in any city in this Nation and tell your National Guard to go home, and the FBI, and tell them that we are going to have an appeal to morality. Everybody will do right because it is right. It would not be safe in your home or leaving your house today. You have to have guys with white hats. You have to have men who will stand up against the evil in society, and when international gangsters walk across the borders of a free nation. It makes no real difference whether they infiltrate, or come across as the North Koreans did on June 25, 1950, with bands playing and tanks and guns behind a great artil­lery barrage into a free land of innocent, unsuspecting people-it is stark aggres­sion just the same. It makes no dif­ference whether they come that way or whether they sneak in through the jungle and underground and commit acts of terror and aggression-it is ruthless ag­gression to destroy a free nation.

I want to say this. I am proud of America. I am proud of our restraint. We have killed less civilians. It may cost us a lot, but this is a part of the principle upon which this country was founded. We have saved more civilians in North Vietnam than the North Vietnamese have killed through terror tactics within a 2-week period of time, for instance, during this war in South Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, we are a compassionate people; we are a tolerant nation. But we do not like to see an aggressor-and we have had many unfortunate experiences with aggressors. Many of us remember Rotterdam, Liege. Denmark, Norway in the early morning hours, ..tbout 4 or 5 o'clock being attacked by dive bombers, and followed by tanks. Then some sabo­teur representative of the aggressor would get on the radio and tell the chil­dren and the men and women to get out in the streets and flee for their lives. Then they mowed them down.

Mr. Speaker, what are we going to do about those aggressor tactics? We are not fighting individual Vietcong or

· North Vietnamese in South Vietnam. We are fighting an ideology which would enslave the world.

What are we going to do about it? What are we going to do with people whose basic dogma teaches their people that lying, murder, aggression, and stealing is moral and ethical if such conduct will help the Communist to conquer and enslave the world. Yes, Mr. Speaker, would they-these peacenik ieaders in America-would · any of them-fight in the villages of our own country-these people about whom I read who are demonstrating at this very moment? Would they fight in Alaska, would they fight in Oregon or, Mr. Speaker, would they even fight in Ar­kansas if they were invaded in the night

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7943 by the bombers and by goosestepping legions of the aggressor?

Mr. Speaker, it is my opinion that the American people are entitled to know the answer to this question. I do know this-that those who do fight, fight to prevent those very things from happen­ing in our own country and in other friendly nations throughout the world.

Mr. Speaker, if we should pull out of South Vietnam, we would have world war III. We would have hur..dreds of millions of people killed within the span of seconds or of a minute. I heard the Secretary of State when he stated that if we had world war III, there would not be enough people left in the world to write a decent history of what hap­pened. Yet, Mr. Speaker, we have the screaming and yelling on the campuses of the so-called academic institutions located throughout this country. I know of nothing more inimicable and objec­tionable to academic freedom than the Nazi or the Fascist or the Communist who would walk in and stack our books and burn them and then march our children off to a state-sponsored movie as they are continuing to do today be­hind the Iron Curtain and who rewrite the history of these great and distin­guished people.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I am glad to yield to the distinguished gentleman from Illinois.

Mr. FINDLEY. Mr. Speaker, I wish to congratulate the distinguished and able gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DoRNJ for making this Chamber a place of discussion of what, in my opinion, is the great issue of today.

Mr. Speaker, I do not wish to impose upon the time of the gentleman, but if the gentleman feels that this is a suit­able time and place to have a little dia­log with reference to this problem, I would really and sincerely welcome the opportunity to engage in_ such dialog.

Mr. Speaker, as the gentleman from South Carolina knows upon several dif­ferent occasions I have asked for time upon the floor of this House of Repre­sentatives in the hope of having an ex­change of ideas not only among those who just cannot agree but among those who agree as well.

I believe the gentleman has brought up a good topic. And may I ask, if I could be permitted to do so, to make some comments for a few minutes or so?

Mr. DORN. Go right ahead. I yield to my good friend from Illinois, and I com­mend him.

Mr. FINDLEY. I appreciate it very much.

I am sure that the gentleman will agree with me that, beginning with the end of World War II, we faced a new era in world politics, the disappearance of empires directed from Europe which, for all that might be said critical about them, at least provided stability and or­der, and kept the sealanes open.

The disappearance of these empires created a tremendous power vacuum. We tried through the Organization of the United Nations to meet that need for a world policing authority, and I am sure the gentleman will agree with me that the United Nations has not measured up

to its original assignment~ and it shows no real promise of filling that need to­day or tomorrow, and therefore there is a vacuum of authority. And the question is what power is going to move into that vacuum. Will it be one that meets our own ideals? I hope it will.

Well, there is no almighty multi-na­tional group that I can see on the hori­zon to fill that vacuum right now. So as President Johnson has said, we find our­selves defending the gates of freedom by ourselves. We are undertaking, so to speak, the job of world policemen.

Now, if we are undertaking that mas­sive assignment of trying to provide or­der on a worldwide scale, and that is the way it looks to me, then it seems to me we have to be big enough to recog­nize when we have made a mistake. We have to 'be big enough to roll with the punches, and if we get into a quagmire that has no promise, if we get into a situation that seems to be going nowhere, I believe we owe it to ourselves as a na­tion, to consider our wider interests as a world policeman, to have courage to face up and to extricate ourselves and to take our stand on a more favorable ground.

I would appreciate comments from the gentleman on that.

Mr. DORN. I appreciate the comments of my good friend from Illinois. I want to say this, however: that when we went into South Vietnam in force, we had ad­visors there-and I do not know the dif­ference in having an advisor in some unit who was going to get shot when President Eisenhower was President, or when President Kennedy was President, or having them in more force today­the question of the moral principle is the same.

We were committed. We had given our word of honor that if aggression de­veloped in Southeast Asia, we would go to the aid of the nation who was the victim of the aggression.

Mr. FINDLEY. May I comment on that?

Mr. DORN. If the gentleman will per­mit me to continue for just one moment.

And by so doing I believe we saved South Vietnam. Governments came and went. For months we would not know from one day to another what the gov­ernment would be, but we have made great progress. We are in there, and as a result of our going into South Vietnam I believe we have saved Indonesia.

Let us consider for a moment what we have don&--what we have accom­plished-rather -~ban what we have not done.

Yes, we have saved Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world, with vast un-

. tapped resources, stretching across the great trade route between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean. Does the gentleman believe for one moment that if Indonesia fell to the Communists that the Philippines would not fall eventually, and then India, and then Africa, and as they predicted, De Gaulle and Western Europe would fall without :firing a shot?

So I say we have saved Indonesia. We have given South Korea. time to develop her armed forces. On the island of Tai­wan we· have given. them time to develop a great army, we have given them more time to get better.

I remember in 1962, in October, the Chinese launched a major J.ttack on India. But they pulled back because they found out that America would stand firm. There is no telling today what would have happened to Thailand and Burma had we not moved, I think, in the nick of time.

Now, just because we cannot win and get it over with in a matter of weeks does not mean that we have not accomplished much. We have saved the whole of South­east Asia, in my opinion, from the ham­mer and sickle, the Iron Curtain, and the Bamboo Curtain of this diabolical, sin­ister philosophy.

Mr. FINDLEY. Does not the gentleman feel that the present policies-to use a colloquialism-does the gentleman feel that the present policies will actually do the job that is to be done in Southeast Asia?

Mr. DORN. If we send more equipment and if we send more modern weapons, as the Chinese and Russians have done, to their North Vietnamese allies-and if we continue to encourage our allies to send more manpower, still the nation in the world that has the greatest percentage of its total manpower in South Vietnam is South Korea.

Would not the Philippines give up tf we pulled out?

Would not Australia ai:d New Zealand make a deal with the Communists?

Think of Thailand and India. The sit­uation would be hopeless.

We must stand firm in this, the most important and key area of the world­Southeast Asia-as Teddy Roosevelt said back 60 years ago-a great member of your party.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for a correction?

Mr. DORN. I yield to the gentleman. Mr. EDMONDSON. The gentleman

said that the nation with the greatest percentage of its manpower fighting in South Vietnam was South Korea. I be­lieve it is South Vietnam itself-the Re­public of Vietnam with 700,000 men in the field has a larger percentage in the field than anybody else.

Mr. DORN. The gentleman is abso­lutely correct. I was trying to make the point-referring to countries outside of Vietnam.

Mr. McCORMACK. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I yield to the distinguished Speaker of the House.

Mr. McCORMACK. I think it might be well in connection with the dialog that our friend, the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] has referred to-and it is a very healthy dialog-to find out how far apart the gentleman from Illinois is from the gentleman from South Caro­lina, and myself.

As I understand my friend, the gen­tleman from Illinois, he does not favor withdrawal of our troops from South Vietnam; is that correct?

Mr. FINDLEY. I would not favor a precipitous withdrawal. It is difficult to answer a question like that with a yes or no answer.

Mr. McCORMACK. The gentleman says he would not favor a precipitous withdrawal. The gentleman has shifted apparently in his decision. The gentle­man will remember the other day we had

7944 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968

a little colloquy and he did not qualify his statement at that time but he simply said that he did not favor unconditional withdrawal of our troops from South Vietnam.

Mr. FINDLEY. I certainly do not favor unconditional withdrawal of our troops from South Vietnam.

Mr. McCORMACK. As I understand my friend he also said he did not approve of the cessa.tion of bombing in the north of strategic and military targets, except some places on some road on the Chinese border; is that correct?

Mr. FINDLEY. So long as our men are in the field under battle conditions I think our Nation owes it to them to back them up with every resource. And I might go even further, if the Speaker will permit me, and say that if our be­leaguered men at Khe Sanh should get into such a desperate position that the only way to save their lives would be to use tactical nuclear weapons I for one would feel that it would be our duty to use those weapons.

Mr. McCORMACK. I cannot disagree with the gentleman on that-that is-in the case of necessity.

Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, and only if it is necessary.

Mr. McCORMACK. I want to see how far apart we are. So the gentleman does favor the withdrawal of our American forces in South Vietnam.

Mr. FINDLEY. Not unconditionally. Mr. McCORMACK. All right-in other

words, the gentleman does not favor un­conditional withdrawal. And the gentle­man does not favor the unconditional cessation of bombing of military and strategic targets in the north except with one slight exception on some road; is that correct?

Mr. FINDLEY. We are agreed on those points.

Mr. McCORMACK. So as I understand the gentleman then it would seem that the gentleman has unintentionally cre­ated an impression throughout the coun­try concerning his position which the remarks and the thoughts of the gentle­man do not justify. Because if I analyze correctly what the gentleman has said in response to my questions the other day and what he has said now we are in practically complete agreement.

Mr. FINDLEY. I hope we are. I think it would be unfortunate otherwise.

Mr. McCORMACK. I do not like refer­ences to "doves" or "hawks."

Mr. FINDLEY. I do not either. Mr. McCORMACK. I do not think it is

a fair reference to make, because when you talk with men who are characterized by the press and television as doves, we know there is no one who wants us to withdraw. Very few, if any, want us to withdraw from South Vietnam without an honorable peace based upon justice and honor. That is correct?

Mr.FINDLEY. Yes. Mr. McCORMACK. Some men want

to bomb certain places, others do not. The gentleman and I are pretty much in agreement on the conclusion that the bombing should continue. There might be some who would like to close the harbor of Haiphong. There might be some who would want to have our forces go behind the demilitarized zone. There

is a lot to those suggestions. I am not closing my eyes to them. Those who have such views are called hawks. There are some with different views, but those who believe that we should not withdraw from South Vietnam are in basic agree­ment. The gentleman from Illinois goes further and agrees with the bombing of military targets in the north, and that is done to protect our own American boys in the main. Is that correct?

Mr. FINDLEY. But does the Speaker contend that we have only the choice of unconditional withdrawal of our own forces, on the one hand, and present poli­cies? I think there are other possibili­ties, and I believe that we in this body have the responsibility to consider al­ternative possibilities.

Mr. McCORMACK. I do not think any­one argues against that. We have our duty, but my friend realizes, of course, that one man must make the decision.

Mr. FINDLEY. That is his job as Commander in Chief, but I do not think it relieves the Congress of its responsi­bility.

Mr. McCORMACK. I agree with that. I think the dialog is very good, but I wanted to find out for the record, for the gentleman's own benefit and my benefit, how far apart the gentleman from Illi­nois and I are and, frankly, outside of some road close to the border of China that he has in mind. I do not see where the gentleman has any disagreement at all with the position taken by the gentle­man from South Carolina, myself, and many others.

Mr. FINDLEY. May I say to the Speaker, having agreed with you on the points that you have raised, I neverthe­less must honestly state to the distin­guished Speaker my dissatisfaction with present policies and with the assignment of additional troops. I think there is a better way for us to proceed to fulfill our responsibilities as a world power in Southeast Asia. I do feel that the Presi­dent--

Mr. McCORMACK. Have you stated what your personal views are in that re­spect?

Mr. FINDLEY. Yes, and I welcome this opportunity, if I may, to list a couple of them.

Mr. McCORMACK. You are not going to start talking about cessation of bomb­ing. You are not going to start talking about the withdrawal of troops. With the gentleman's admission to that effect, I would be interested to hear what his proposals are.

Mr. FINDLEY. I might mention three. May I impose upon the gentleman from South Carolina to do so?

Mr. DORN. If my good friend from Illi­nois would proceed briefly, I would be happy to yield to him. Quite a number of other Members are present who wish to speak.

Mr. FINDLEY. I shall merely list them, and hope there will be an opportunity later to discuss them.

One, which is not original with me but was presented by my colleague, the gen­tleman from California [Mr. DoN CLAU­SEN] is called the phase-in, phase-out proposal. That is it in topic form.

The second proposal is a new strategy in the south.

Mr. McCORMACK. Just a minute. You say "phase-in, phase-out." Let us get down to specifics.

Mr. FINDLEY. I am under a limitation here. I hope the gentleman will permit me to expand a bit on the topics.

Mr. McCORMACK. The gentleman speaks of a "phase-in, phase-out" pro­posal. Do you mean phase-out?

Mr. FINDLEY. No, I would not charac­terize it in that way; I am sure the au­thor of the proposal would. not either. He instead would have a program in which, hopefully, South Vietnam would cooperate, which would amount to a de­Americanizing of the struggle; as addi­tional ARVN troops are trained, the combat forces in U.S. uniform would be reduced.

Mr. McCORMACK. That is in the fu­ture.

Mr. FINDLEY. I hate to impose upon the gentleman's time. I do not defend this as the best proposal, but as the one which I think is deserving of considera­tion.

Mr. McCORMACK. I do not think there is anything original in that.

I do not think there would be much disagreement on that, as the South Viet­namese forces increase, but that would be some time in the future:

Mr. FINDLEY. Hopefully it could begin very soon.

May I mention the second idea which is called conf ederal.

Mr. McCORMACK. There is nothing new to that.

Mr. FINDLEY. I think there is some­thing new. Certainly it is not the policy our administration is following. Indeed, our administration wants more combat troops.

Now, just to mention the other two by topics, there is the conf ederal policy in the south, by which our Government would bypass South Vietnam if necessary to negotiate on a village-by-village basis, if necessary, to take these areas out of the :fighting.

The third proposal, which I hope could be given some consideration, would be to refer the legal issues which would be in­volved in this dispute-and there are many of them-to the International Court of Justice for adjudication. We could not do this on our own, but we could express the willingness to have this settled by application of international law.

Mr. McCORMACK. The gentleman is getting into another field on that. On that field, I would have no argument. I believe in strengthening the Interna­tional Court of Justice, but I cannot do it. It depends on each individual nation. We know their jurisdiction is very limited.

Mr. FINDLEY. But we have never ex­pressed our willingness in this war to do that.

Mr. McCORMACK. The gentleman is getting into another field, which would be interesting to discuss, and if the gent:i.e­man will discuss giving the International Court of Justice original jurisdiction, that would mean nations must designate certain parts of their external attributes of sovereignty in order to give the Inter­national Court of Justice original juris­diction, the power to take jurisdiction.

Mr. FINDLEY. Which is precisely what our Government did.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 79~5 Mr. McCORMACK. That could be a

very interesting field, and a very interest­ing discussion, but I do not think it 1s particularly relevant to the situation ex­isting today in Vietnam. It is a great hope, and I have thought of it too, and I have thought of it for many years.

I think the Court did a remarkable job in Pakistan and India, but that is a case where both countries agreed to accept the decision of the Court.

Mr. FINDLEY. But why do we not ex-press our willingness to accept that?

Mr. McCORMACK. We have. Mr. FINDLEY. No, we have not. Mr. McCORMACK. Yes, we have. Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, may I say to

my good friend from Illinois that we tried this negotiating route.

Mr. FINDLEY. I do not speak of negotiation.

Mr. DORN. We tried this coalition government in China, and I think this is the cause of much of our trouble today, because we tried to force the Chinese into a coalition. I do not think this would work at all in Vietnam.

I want to say to my good friend this: My friend may know I was named after a man from Illinois, William Jennings Bryan, and I will tell why I was named after Bryan. It was because Bryan broke with Woodrow Wilson. Bryan was a pacifist and broke with Wilson over measures which Bryan said would lead to American participation in World War I. The Congressman from my district on the floor of this House voted against World War I, on October 6, 1917, but when that war started and our men were committed, the Congressman from my district and my people went all out and supported the boys, won the war and brought them back home; and we did the same thing again in World War II.

I think. the trouble today is that we have men, some in high places, running all over the country, pulling the rug out from under the men at the front who are :fighting.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I yield to my good friend, the gentleman from Illinois, who made a brilliant speech the other day concern­ing this matter.

Mr. PUCINSKI. Mr. Speaker, my good friend from Illinois [Mr. FINDLEY] has enumerated all sorts of possibilities of resolving this conflict. Yet the President has made a very simple suggestion. The President has said, in his San Antonio formula, that we can bring this thing to a conclusion and start exploring peaceful ways of resolving this conflict, and he is willing to stop the bombing tomorrow, or right now, this second, if Hanoi will indicate that they will not take advantage of the bombing pause and not move 10 or 12 divisions into South Vietnam and massacre 10,000 or 15,000 American soldiers.

I hear people talk about ending the bombing unconditionally, ending the bombing now. I want one of those people who is advocating unconditional ending of the bombing to stand up and say, "I will· take the responsibility for every sin­gle American soldfer who is killed by Communis.t troops who are in:tlltrated into South Vietnam. during the bombing pause."

So nobody wants to address himself to Mr. Johnson's magnificent offer.

I said yesterday on the floor that in my judgment Lyndon Johnson 1s Amer­ica's No. 1 peace candidate. No man in this country has worked harder to re­store peace to this world than Lyndon Johnson.

In his most recent off er he said, "Look; we are not expecting you to stop your hostilities. We want you to just let us presume that you will not take advan­tage of the bombing pause and move a huge army into South Vietnam and de­stroy our men."

If there is anyone who is intransigent in this dispute it has been Ho Chi Minh. I will tell why he has been intransigent. It is because he sees what is going on in this country. He sees these people going around undermining American foreign policy, undermining the men who are battling for their lives in South Viet­nam. Those boys are scared, and their lives are at stake.

How easy it is for these people back at home to be debcting what our men ought to be doing in Vietnam.

Our President has made it clear. As he said himself, he has gone about as far as any human being possibly could go to try to bring these Communists to the negotiating table. But he has a half million American lives to worry about.

So I say to these men who have been going around offering all sorts of solu­tions, "Why do you not get behind the President and support him in his de­mand for the San Antonio formula?" Why do not the leaders of the world­Brezhnev, Kosygin, De Gaulle, Willy Brandt, Wilson, and all the leaders say­ing, ''Stop the bombing and we will have negotiations for peace," apply pressure to Hanoi and say, "Let us give that American President assurance you are not going to move thousands of troops into South Vietnam and destroy Amer­ican soldiers."

We can have this war over in 12 hours if these men who go around with a lot of hollow promises will get behind Lyn­don Johnson and unite this country and let Hanoi know where we stand, that we stand together at the altar of freedom.

I congratulate my friend for one of the finest speeches made in this Cham­ber.

Mr. DORN. I am deeply grateful to my friend from Illinois, and I thank him for his splendid statement and for his outstanding address on this floor a few days ago.

r would love to say to these people­some of them in high places in this Gov­ernment--who go all over this Nation and indeed all over the world lambasting the President of the United States while we are engaged in a death struggle, with a half million men involving the most precious lives of the young men of this Nation, "You fellows are having your own statements quoted in Hanoi and in Peking." They say, "We do not have to say it. Here is what the people in Amer­ica are sayir.g in high places." And they get pictures of demonstrations and show them to their men and on their tele­vision.

Heaven forbid that any person in my district or in my family would ever say

one word that would encourage the dia­bolical Communist conspiracy in its stated aim to conquer the world.

Mr. JOELSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I yield to my good friend from New Jersey.

Mr. JOELSON. I heard with interest the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Frnn­LEY] talk about our referring this con­flict to the International Court of Jus­tice.

We have done better than that. Our State Department and our President have said to Hanoi, "Let us have an elec­tion. Let us have an election supervised by an international tribunal such as the U.N. or any other."

They have said this on 10 different occasions. Let the people decide. If the people would freely vote to choose com­munism we would get out of there.

My opinion is that if the Hanoi gov­ernment really thought the people of South Vietnam would choose communism they would have an election. They do not want bloodshed for the sake of bloodshed alone.

So we have done more than agree to take this to the International Court of Justice; we have offered to take it to the best tribunal of all, to the people them­selves, with an election subject to inter­national inspection.

Mr. DORN. And Hanoi wants no part of it.

Mr. JOELSON. That is right. Mr. DORN. I thank my distinguished

friend-yes, we would welcome an elec­tion tomorrow but Hanoi and Peiping tremble at the thought of an honest fair election. Their method is terror, liquida­tion, and stark aggression.

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gen­tleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I yield to my good friend from Connecticut.

Mr. IRWIN. I thank the gentleman from South Carolina for his very, very thoughtful and unique contribution today. He is trying to warn his colleagues and the people around America that we face difficult crises.

I should like to say, the same things the gentleman has referred to I have noted. On March 14 of this month in the New York Times was a story about 3,500 stu­dents staying out of their classes at Co­lumbia, and 100 members of the faculty.

The story goes back to p-oint out that the Columbia Spectator, the daily news­paper at Columbia, indicated that the last time students and faculty at the university held a protest was on April 12, 1935. At that time 5,000 participated in a demonstration against U.S. involvement in the Second World War, although there was no war then. However, Nazism was on the rise in Germany and it was appar­ent all through Europe. Six years before we finally got involved students were demonstrating against our involvement.

We all remember that this House, I think, decided to extend the draft law in 1941 by 1 vote. This was after England and France had already been invaded.

Now, another item that I again noted in a newspaper, this time in the Times, was that Kingman Brewster m, the son of the president at Yale University, won a conscientious objector classification from his · draft board in New Haven.

·'7946 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

When foterviewed by a Times corre­spondent he made it clear that he con­vinced the draft board that he would never fight in another war. Now, these things went on in the thirties.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I want to thank my good friend from Connecticut for having made a wonderful contribu­tion. You are absolutely right. I remem­ber hearing Secretary Rusk talk about the time when he was at Oxford and a certain professor there was leading the peacenik groups at Oxford then against anyone standing up against Hitler. Later the same professor came back, in 5 years, w~1.en Hitler goosestepped into Poland and said, "Boys, I was wrong, and I want to apologize to you."

There are people in the world like Hit­ler, Ho Chi Minh, and Mao Tse-tung, who would take over and liquidate all the things that we hold dear. Students and all of our people should realize that these sinister ideologies are opposed to everything that we stand for.

Mr. mWIN. To continue on, this young man, Kingman Brewster III, when asked about whether he would fight Hit­ler again answered-and this is frighten­ing-

Hitler died before I was born. So where is the relevance of that question? I cannot project myself backward and forward in time. All I know . is I did what I had to do a.t this moment.

Now, the lesson that this young man seeks to teach is that every generation needs its own Hitler to know what he meant. I might say that this young man's father in 1940 was the editor of the Yale Daily News, and chairman of the Amer­ica First chapter in Yale at that time. He wrote an article for the Atlantic Monthly, a very eloquent article, in co­operation with Spencer Glow, editor of the Harvard Crimson. This was an elo­quent argument against American in­volvement in World War II. He described that possibility as a trans-Atlantic act of aggression on our part which would lead us into an endless war with no end in sight and which would do away with democracy in Europe and eventually in the United States.

The lessons of history are dimly seen in the newspapers if one tries hard to see them, but many seem not to hear it.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I am glad to yield to my good friend from Oklahoma.

Mr. EDMONDSON. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend the gentleman for an outstanding speech and one that is reminiscent in some ways of speeches delivered in · the House of Commons in England in the thirties by a great man named Winston Churchill.

Mr. Speaker, I just finished reading the other night for the second time Churchill's volwne, "The Gathering Storm," in which he told the story of the events of the thirties and the failure of the British people to wake up to the men­ace that was threatening them on the continent of Europe aud to prepare to meet it.

Mr. Speaker, there are in our midst today many who need to read "The Gathering Storm" and to learn the les­sons of history, the lesson of history as

it was written by Sir Winston Churchill in the pages of that great book.

Mr. Speaker, the distinguished gentle­man from South Carolina [Mr. DoRN] has made a constructive contribution by recalling to our memory this· afternoon the events of the thirties, the events all the way from Asia where the Japanese began the use of aggression, over into Africa and to Europe itself, as the plague spread and the ability of free men to deal with it was upon only a limited basis. And then came the necessity to go to total war in order to blunt and to stop that type of aggression.

Mr. Speaker, it is my opinion that we are today fighting to prevent world war III in Asia. I further feel that the men who stand today at Khesanh are stand­ing for peace and are standing for the peace of future generations, because only if you take a stand against aggression, and only if you demonstrate to those na­tions which seek to aggrandize their own position through the process of aggres­sion that that nation will not prosper and is subject to the reaction of the freedom-loving people of this world.

Mr. Speaker, I cannot help but recall that only a few years ago practically every leader on both sides of the aisle of this House of Representatives, that practically every leader throughout this Nation and throughout this world stated that the free nations of the world ought to fight for the cause of freedom in Viet­nam.

Mr. Speaker, it has not been so very long ago that a great Governor of New York was using these words:

President Johnson merits the support of free men everywhere for his strong stand in Vietnam and his manifest determination to defend and save human freedom from Com­munist aggression and so ultimately to win a more certain peace.

Mr. Speaker, those were the words of Governor Rockefeller who speaks with a rather uncertain tongue upon this sub­ject today. But he is not today as clear and explicit as he was in August 1965 about this particular problem.

Mr. Speaker, if one wants to go back a few more years, there was a Senator from that same State who did not hold a seat in that body at that time, but held a seat in the Cabinet of the United States of America, who said in February 1962:

We are going to win the war in Vietnam. We will remain there until we do win. I think the American people understand and fully support the struggle.

Mr. Speaker, that was back in Febru­ary 1962. Today that same Senator does not speak with quite so certain tongue. But it seems to me that I recall quite clearly that in February 1962, another man sat in the White House and began the buildup of our forces to stop aggres­sion in that area.

Mr. Speaker, I wish to congratulate the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN] for the great speech which the gentleman has made.

Mr. Speaker, we are confronted each day with grim news from Vietnam. There was the treacherous, truce-breaking Tet offensive. Our marines are under siege at Khesanh. We hear reports of widespread oorruption in the Vietnamese Govern-

ment. There is the tragic plight of many of the refugees. And there are daily re­ports of the loss of lives-American and Vietnamese, military and civilian.

To the most patriotic and conscientious citizen all of this frequently adds up to the question: Cannot we somehow stop all of this and turn our resources to the pressing needs we face here at home?

I do not intend, Mr. Speaker, to dis­cuss the problems we face in this country. All of us are acutely aware of them and we must deal with them on a scale we have never attempted before. But I am disturbed by the implication that what we have done and are doing in Vietnam is futile, that our sacrifices in that coun­try are not worthwhile.

What brings this to mind, Mr. Speaker, is an article in the March 11 issue of U.S. News & World Report entitled "Amaz­ing Success Story in Asia." Better than any article I have seen recently, this one describes what has taken place in east Asia in the past 15 years and in doing so helps to put the events in Vietnam today in perspective.

I would like to cite the conclusions of the writer of this article, a respected journalist who has spent many years in Asia. After an absence of 15 years from that part of the world he recently re­turned and came up with these convic­tions:

First, he found that communism no longer is the wave of the future.

Second, in most countries supported by the United States, prosperity is mounting under free enterprise.

Third, he found that national devel­opment plans in many countries are, to use his words, "fashionable, daring, am­bitious-and working."

Fourth, the writer found that regional cooperation, new to Asia, is developing.

Fifth-and I would like to emphasize this, Mr. Speaker-the U.S. News re­porter found that anticommunism is strong, and that most non-Communist nations around the rim of Communist China are lined up behind the United States in Vietnam.

I believe these conclusions are so en­couraging that I would like to quote briefly from this article to enable us to have a better understanding o-f what is forgotten or overlooked as we read the news each day from Saigon. The writer says:

You look back down the years. This is where America has fought two major wars since 1950 -and three since 1941. This is where America has poured in billions of dollars in aid. This is where millions of Americans, soldiers and civilians, have fought and worked to make -a go of American policy.

Have they succeeded? You see growing prosperity. Political sta­

bility is the rule, not the exception. You see new cities on what used to be swampland. You see Asians who are bigger and better­dressed. Most of all you talk with Asians, discouraged 15 years ago, who are now filled with confidence and hope.

Fifteen years years a.go, America was striv­ing to help create an Asia that was non­communist, economically healthy and politi­cally stable.

What America wanted then, America seems to be getting now, in many countries. But the struggles are far from over. ·

The war goes on in Viet-Nam. Communists threaten Laos and Thailand, harass Hong Kong, Oambodi-a, South Korea. Despite in-

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7947 terna.l tensions, Communist China remains a potentially powerful enemy. Russia keeps stirring up troubles.

For now, however, the trend is against the communists, not with them as it used to be.

Mr. Speaker, I am convinced that what this reporter has seen and written is true. The evidence of this amazing success story is there. But how many of us are aware of these achievements? How many of us instead are influenced more by the daily reminders of the difficulties we face in Vietnam?

It is a tragedy, of course, that these accomplishments have cost us much in lives and treasure. No one regrets this more than I do. I submit, however, that the total interests of the United States have been served by our role in making this success story possible. If we remain steadfast in Vietnam we will win the vic­tory for freedom that is our major ob­jective, and thereby greatly enhance the chances for a just and lasting peace.

Mr. Speaker, the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN] has made a constructive contribution here today. I am sure his voice and his words will hearten our servicemen in Vietnam, and their pa.rents and loved ones here at home.

We hear and see so much that is nega­tive and critical and so little that is posi­tive and constructive, that it is easy to lose perspective entirely in our under­standing of the Vietnam conflict.

There was a time when virtually every leader in political life in America clear­ly recognized our vital interest in pre- . venting a Communist takeover in South Vietnam. It is a curious fact of history that virtually every challenger of our role in Vietnam on the national political scene today was a strong supporter of that role only a year or two ago.

Today, when the conflict nears a show­down stage and American losses are at a high level, many of those leaders who once supported the effort for freedom are now listed as bitter critics of that effort.

I am proud to observe that the Con­gressman from South Carolina is not listed among the sunshine patriots on the issue of Vietnam. I am proud that he is aware of the big picture and has not developed any water on the knee or weakness of the backbone on the issue.

I am also proud of the fact that most of our fighting men in Vietnam--espe­cially ·those who have been there for at least 6 months-are strongly in support of our continued determined effort there.

I agree wholeheartedly with my col­league that all Americans would like to see peace in Vietnam, and want our President to continue his efforts to nego­tiate an honorable peace.

At the same time, I agree that our people do not want to see withdrawal or abandonment of our allies in Vietnam, for that would be a disaster for freedom and a victory for tyranny and commu­nism.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I thank my beloved friend, the distinguished gentleman from Okla­homa [Mr. EDMONDSON] for his contri­bution to this discussion.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I yield to the distinguished gentleman from Texas.

Mr. YOUNG. Mr. Speaker, I wish to commend the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN] upon the very fine statement which he has made. Briefly, I wish to say that in my opinion there is no question that the greatest propaganda coup the world has ever seen is the false propaganda coup which has been perpetrated upon this Nation to the effect that this Nation and that our President is the aggressor in this Vietnam situation.

Mr. Speaker, this is the greatest prop­aganda coup the world has ever seen, the greatest national disgrace, since this propaganda is emanating from people within our own country, people who would use these great problems of our Nation for political ends.

But, Mr. Speaker, the people of this Government and the people of this coun­try will take care of these politicians who try to use this sort of trouble for their own political ends.

Mr. Speaker, I am concerned about the conscientious citizens of this country who, because of this propaganda, have some problems raised in their minds with reference to our position and to our pos­ture in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, I thank the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN] for the fine remarks which he has made and I wish to associate myself with those remarks.

Mr.· Speaker, I would like to as­sociate myself with those Members who have spoken today in support of the position of the United States in Viet­nam.

My own remarks will be addressed to answering some of the criticism that has been launched against our efforts in Vietnam.

Mr. Speaker, like the war we fought successfully in Korea, the Vietnam war is a limited conflict being fought in a limited way for limited objectives. It is a war in support of a sovereign Asian na­tion with its own views and objectives, all of which do not always coincide with our own. And the tortured roots of the conflict stretch back to the murky days of Japanese occupied French Indo­china.

It is in short, a war beclouded by com­plexities, in which the courses of action are sharply limited. Fighting such a war calls for a good deal of patience, and upsets people who like to see issues in terms of simple black and white. It holds little appeal for those who like neat and quick solutions.

Many sincere people ask why we can­not go in and · win the way we did when we were fighting the Germans and Jap­anese in World War II. Twenty-two years have passed since Hiroshima, yet the terrible dangers to the survival of all of us posed by all-out nuclear war have evidently not yet penetrated in all quar­ters. Letting them have "everything we've got" as some swashbucklers advocate, presumably meaning the use of nuclear weapons, could invite an immediate reac­tion from China and the Soviet Union. Even far less drastic steps must be ap­proached with extreme caution, for each could risk a tragic escalation in the scale of warfare.

But simplistic reaction to the war takes on other guises that are no less dangerous in the long run. One form of reaction-a type particularly prevalent among young people-is the kind of neo-isolationism that finds expression in statements like: "Why can't we just let the people out there settle their own problems?" or "What happens in Southeast Asia really isn't our concern. Those countries would be better off without our interference." The motivation behind this philosophy is not necessarily narrow or self-seeking. Its exponent is not an old fashioned America-firster. He is kindly disposed to the people of Southeast Asia but he really thinks they would be better off if the United States left tbem to their own de­vices.

Such a view, superficially appealing as it is, unhappily does not tally with the hard lessons reality has taught us in this century, or with the facts as they are. It rests on an idealistic base to be true, but an idealistic base that is ostrich-like, one believing that if one does not worry about something or get mixed up with it, it will turn out all right.

These are, of course, those who object to our support of South Vietnam on far narrower grounds. They recognize our security interests in Asia and back our presence and objectives there. But for one reason or another they believe Viet­nam is the wrong place to make the stand.

Their objectives may be strategic: Vietnam presents difficult terrain or messy conditions. They may be historical: they may have questions about the Ge­neva accords and their enforcement or doubts about the validity of some past commitment. Objections may center on the South Vietnamese, their honesty, ef­ficiency, leadership, or Government. Or they may argue that a victory for Ho Chi Minh would not really matter so much because Vietnam would evolve in an independent, Tito-like direction and act as a buffer against Red China.

My answer to most of these objections is that they no longer have relevance. Three Presidents-Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson-and several Congresses made promises and gave assurances to South Vietnam. A whole series of deci­sions was made, and other decisions were made on the basis of previous ones. Other policies may have been viable, or even preferable. Not every decision taken may have been correct. It may be that some things should have been done that were not done or that some things should have been said rather than some other things.

But the decisions and commitments were made and the policies were formu­lated and developing events have turned them into the core of our entire stance in Asia. Even if it is conceded that not every one of them was correct, it is too late to unravel them. To back down on our specific commitment to Vietnam now that it is so cemented to our general global posture would represent a major disaster for overall American policy.

As to the argument that a Vietnam un­der Ho or his successors would take on an independent, nationalist coloration and act as a buffer, it seems wise to be skeptical. I would only remind Members of what happened when the Communist

7948 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968

Party, the Lao Dong, consolidated its hold on North Vietnam.

In the days following Japan's sur­render in 1945 when Ho began his battle against the French he announced the dissolution of the Communist Party and the formation of a "popular front." By 1951, the party was reestablished and a campaign instituted to communize the country. The victims of that campaign included non-Communist nationalists who fought with the Vietminh against the French and even some longtime members of the Communist Party. The theory was "It is better to kill 10 inno­cent people than let one enemy escape." It is an episode that should sober anyone too sanguine about the direction any Communist dominated Vietnam would take.

There is one other form of dissent on the Vietnam war that I want to mention. It is the hardest to deal with because it is the most subjective and devolves finally on personal values, feelings, and choices. I speak of moral dissent and the view that the killing and bloodshed is not worth the cost.

Those who do not think so, and I do not question their feeling or their sin­cerity, must however, ponder the fate that would befall non-Communist Viet­namese-or non-Communist Asians-if we withdrew precipitously.

The use of military means to settle a dispute is always tragic. It is tragic in Vietnam. The United States hopes and believes it is worth the cost to do what we promised to do; help the South Viet­namese determine their own destiny. So far they themselves are still fighting hard, and the.v have not ask:ed us to stop helping them.

We have, I believe, used our great power with restraint and discrimination. We have sought in every way possible, even at some risk to our own men, to avoid harming civilians. Civilians have been injured, but when that has hap­pened it has been in error. The record of the Vietcong is not equally admirable.

Finally, this war is worth the cost if one assumes, as I do, that the lives of people who want to defend their free­dom and independence are worth fight­ing for. It is worth the cost if one would rather live in a world where people can freely choose their own governments and be free to live in the way they want to live.

Because we are not talking about some temporary change in government that is fleetingly unpleasant but that can be shaken off after a few months or years. We are talking about a militant, totali­tarian, and ruthless government that im­poses its will and dominance perma­nently.

That, Mr. Speaker, in a nutshell, is my view of this war that we are fighting, and the question of whether it is worth it.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I might say to my distinguished friend, the gentle­man from Texas [Mr. YouNG] that I am deeply grateful for his splendid remarks and that Colonel Bonham and Colonel Travis left my district in the great State of South Carolina to fight in faraway Texas for the same principles and the same ideas that are being fought for in South Vietnam today. At that time the distance between the Carolinas and

Texas was much farther away than is South Vietnam today. I am glad that they stood upon the territory of the great Lone Star State and fought in defense of its freedom and liberty.

I thank the distinguished gentleman from Texas for his remarks.

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I yield to my distinguished and able friend from North Carolina.

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Speaker, I com­mend my dear friend from South Caro­lina for his very eloquent presentation of the cause of America here today. I have been interested in these contentions so many make about the necessity for de­bate and the necessity for the exchange of ideas. Perhaps it is oversimplifying it, but as far as I am concerned, when our Nation is engaged in a military conflict, there are only two sides, our side and the enemy's side, and I would like to be found on our side.

I know the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina who fought for this country in World War II, as did many others of us here in this body, finds little difficulty in standing up for Amer­ica in a time of crisis. I do not want to be unkind to anyone, but I observe that many who are apprehensive that they may be called upon to wear the uniform of the United States, and many who never wore the uniform of our country, are the ones who do the wailing and the whining in favor of communism in these dark days.

So I commend the gentleman. Mr. Speaker, I hear so much discus­

sion about the International Court of Justice, and I would ask what armies and what navies does the International Court of Justice have to enforce its de­crees if either litigant is unwilling to abide by the judgment of that court?

We in America should today stand up for this country of ours, and whether we like the man who occupies the White House or not, it is immaterial. We should love the young men who are carrying on the cause, and fighting the battle for freedom which many of us were privi­leged to do in other years.

I salute my friend from South Caro­lina, and I associate myself with him in his magnificent statement.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gen­tleman from South Carolina has expired.

Under a previous order of the House, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. THOMPSON] is recognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I yield 15 minutes of my time to the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. DORN].

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I am deeply grateful to my warm friend from Georgia for making available to us some addi­tional time. You are a gentleman and I appreciate your thoughtfulness and kind­ness.

I want to thank my good friend from North Carolina for his very kind com­ments. I will say this: that some of these people who would play politics with the security of this Nation, and the cause of freedom throughout the world, might wake up to find that between now and November the 26 million veterans in this Nation, and most of the students

with whom I have talked in the high schools and in the colleges-and I had the great pleasure of speaking to at least 15,000 students during the period we were home during the Lincoln-Washington Birthday recess. They are alarmed about these things that are being said on the television by some who do not speak for the people of America. These so-called politicians are going to find this out by November.

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DORN. I yield to my friend from North Carolina.

Mr. WHITENER. Mr. Speaker, I be­lieve that the gentleman in the well at­tended, as did I, a briefing recently given by our distinguished Ambassador to Indonesia, the Honorable Marshall Green.

Mr. DORN. The gentleman is correct. Mr. WHITENER. At which time we

were told by Ambassador Green that there was no doubt in his mind that the stand for freedom which our country has been making in Vietnam was responsible for the forces of freedom taking over the Government of Indonesia, the fifth largest nation in the world.

Mr. DORN. The gentleman is cor­rect in his statement.

I might say to my good friend that since that time, since they put Sukarno out of the way, some of these good mili­tary leaders who were trained at Fort Benning in the United States, and who love freedom, have taken over. Since then they have reentered the United Nations and reentered the good circle of freedom­loving nations in the world, and have re­jected communism.

Mr. WHITENER. There have been ref­erences here today of activities of stu­dents behind the Iron Curtain demon­strating for freedom of speech and freedom of expression. I am sure the gentleman would agree with me it is en­tirely likely that the fact that our coun­try has stood up for freedom in Vietnam has given courage to those who are op­pressed behind the Iron Curtain, and they believe that the cause of freedom is being held high by the world's greatest Nation, the United States of America.

Mr. DORN. Precisely, precisely. And they now have hope because of our firm stand.

It is with particular pleasure now, Mr. Speaker, that I yield to my good friend, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. THOMPSON] and I thank him and am grateful to him.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I would like to state that his­tory does not deal kindly with appeasers. If you look through the annals of his­tory, you will find that when there have been appeasers-for peace at any price­later events have proven them wrong.

I would be less than honest if I were to say that I agree with all of the positions that our President has taken in Vietnam. I am convinced that he is sincere in what he is doing in Vietnam. Vietnam is a millstone around his neck, and more so than around the neck of any other politi­cian in this country.

I have every confidence that could he get this war over with, he would have it over with today if it were possible. How-

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7949 ever, I do feel that the policies we are following in Vietnam are not the best policies to bring this war through to a conclusion.

It is my personal conclusion that had we fought Germany and Japan on the same basis that we are fighting this war in Vietnam, we would still be fighting there today.

We are told that we are seeking vic­tory in Vietnam, and yet we are not try­ing to defeat the North Vietnamese. It is difficult for me to reconcile these two statements. I do not think that we can put a shield up to protect South Vietnam from aggression and allow the enemy to choose the time and the place and the intensity of each battle. This is what we have been doing.

We have our troops stationed in Khe­sanh waiting for the enemy to attack. The President is under tremendous pres­sure to bring about peace. Ho Chi Minh is not under this pressure to bring about peace.

During World War II we bombed the civilians in the cities. War is not a moral act. But I think we may have to recog­nlze this fact, however, that the North Vietnamese are only going to quit and give up when this war is made so costly for them that they will want to quit and give up.

Ho Chi Minh does not have the public clamoring at his back to negotiate and bring this war through to a conclusion because the war has not been made that costly to the civilians of North Vietnam.

Now, it has not been made that costly for the simple reason that we want to be humanitarian. We do not want to cause the death of a single civilian unnecessar­ily. But it may well be necessary that in order to save American lives in Vietnam and to bring this war to a conclusion as fast as possible-and I think that is the most moral act---we are going to have to use some of the tactics that had been used throughout the ages in warfare; namely, to make it so costly to the enemy that he wants to quit.

This may very well mean that we are going to have to bomb supply centers located in populated areas, which to this point have not been bombed.

I do not know what the President has in his mind, but I do know this-that bombing supply lines and trying to hit individual truck convoys is like stirring up an anthill and then, as the ants leave the hill, trying to hit and kill each indi­vidual ant.

Supply centers are in populated areas, and I suspect that this is the only rea­son that they have not been bombed. I think we are going to have to recognize that we are going to be in a difficult posi­tion, and we are going to have to make a hard decision, and we are going to have to make a decision to the effect that, in order to force Ho Chi Minh, not just to sit at the negotiating table, because just the simple fact that he comes to the ne­gotiating table, and we may have peace for a year or two is no solution but we have to make him come to the negotiat­ing table on such terms and on such a basis that we will not see a resumption of this fighting, and it is going to require a greater effort here, and a more united front here in America.

The dissenters and people who are cry-

ing "peace at any price" are not doing assault on Malay, but would also give the anything to benefit our fighting men, or impression that the wave of the future in their children, or their children's chi!- Southeast Asia was China and Communists. dren. They are simply benefiting the So, I believe it. Communist cause. I congratulate the He then went on to say this-and this gentleman from South Carolina. While is especially pertinent at this time, and I do not concur with the positions in all this is why your speech is so meritorious respects taken by the President, I rec- today-ognize the fact that he is doing what he . What I am concerned about is that Ameri­considers is best, which, in my judgment, cans will get impatient and say because they with more limited information than he don't like the government in Saigon that we has, is not enough. I thank the gentle- should withdraw. That only makes it easy for man for allowing me this time. . the Communists. I think we should stay. We

Mr. DORN. I thank my warm friend should use our influence in as effective a way from Georgia for an excellent contribu- as we can, but we should not withdraw. tion to this discussion. I would be the Those are the words of President John first to admit that a very good case could F. Kennedy 2% months before his be made for using to a greater extent death-very forceful, very clear. our science and technology in this war Another quotation I would like to draw in Southeast Asia. to the attention of my colleagues is a col-

Mr. KORNEGAY. Mr. Speaker, will umn by James Reston on October 16, the gentleman yield? 1965. His own title is "Washington: The

Mr. DORN. I yield to my good friend Stupidity of Intelligence." He stated: from North Carolina.

Mr. KORNEGAY. I thank the gentle­man for yielding.

Mr. Speaker, I rise to congratulate my friend from South Carolina for his most stirring and enlightening speech. I think perhaps it is one of the finest I have ever heard come from any Member here on the floor of the House.

I think, sir, that your call for unity in this country is of the tone, of the nature, and with the explanation that you gave for it. It is regrettable that it could not· go out from this Chamber into every community in this country, because you so well pointed out what to me is one of the chief failings-our chief failing today-and one of the reasons this con­flict and struggle in Southeast Asia con­tinues as it does is because of the lack of unity and because of the publicity given to some of the activities of the great dissenters in the country. These people-and I do not care whether they are in the academic community or what community they might be in-through and with vitriolic criticism, unfounded and untrue statements, are rendering great disservice to our Nation and are betraying those great Americans who are presently fighting in Southeast Asia. I want to congratulate you, sir, and say that you have rendered your country, in my opinion, a great service here today. Thank you.

Mr. DORN. I want to thank my very dear friend from North Carolina. I regret that you have decided not to come back with us next year, but I do hope that you will return in a few years to the other body or to the governorship of your great State.

Mr. KORNEGAY. You are very kind, sir. Thank you.

Mr. DORN. I yield again to my friend from Connecticut [Mr. IRWIN].

Mr. IRWIN. Mr. Speaker, I thought it might be good for us to review something that our late President John F. Kennedy said about 2 % months before his tragic death, on the Huntley-Brinkley program in response to a question by Brinkley on the "domino theory." His response was as follows:

I believe it. I think that the struggle is close enough. China is so large, looms so high just beyond the frontiers, that if South Viet­nam went, it would not only give them an improved geographic position for a guerrilla

It ls not easy, but let us assume that all the student demonstrators against the war in Vietnam are everything they say they are: sincerely for an honorable peace; troubled by the bombing of the civil population of both North and South Vietnam; genuinely afraid that we may be trapped into a hope­less war with China; and worried about the power of the President and the Pentagon and the pugnacious bawling patriotism of many influential men in the Congress.

A case can be made for it. In a world of accidents and nuclear weapons and damn fools, even a dreaming pacifist, has to be answered. And men who want peace, defy the Government, and demonstrate for the sup­port of the Congress, are not only within their rights but must be heard.

THE PARADOX

The trouble is that they are inadvertently working against all the things they want, and creating all the things they fear the most. They are not promoting peace but post­poning it. They are not persuading the Pres­ident or the Congress to end the war, but deceiving Ho Chi-Minh and General Giap into prolonging it. They are not proving the superior wisdom of the university community but unfortunately bringing it into serious question.

That is by James Reston. I do not think Mr. Reston flies as steadily today as he did then, but quite a few people do not. However, I think what he said then had validity, and sometimes if we put the quotation in his mouth, it stands up better than from my own.

Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I thank my good friend from Connecticut for this good article by Mr. Reston. I thank him also for calling to the attention of this House a statement by the late John F. Kennedy.

I came to this House with the late President in January of 1947. We were among the four youngest Members of this body. I was close to him and I know that John F. Kennedy, perhaps as well as any man, realized the importance of the Pacific. He almost gave his life for this Nation in the South Pacific.

I talked with him during the Korean war, in Japan, when he was over there, and we talked at length about the Far East, with its great untapped resources as being the key area of the world, where the future destiny of freedom was entwined.

So I am glad my friend brought up the quotation by John F. Kennedy. I do not think any man recognized as he did, far

7950 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

beyond his years, the challenge of com­munism in the Far East, and what it might do if permitted to run rampant through Asia and Africa and Western Europe.

Mr. mWIN. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield for one last word?

Mr. DORN. I yield to my friend from Connecticut.

Mr. ffiWIN. Mr. Speaker, President Kennedy at the age of 20, in about 1940, wrote a little book called "While Eng­land Slept." It is a primer even today.

Mr. DORN. It is a classic. Mr. Speaker, the following appeared in

the Washington Post this morning and reflects what General Eisenhower said about those who promote disunity: [From the Washington Post, Mar. 27, 1967]

EISENHOWER DEPLORES "ARMCHAIR STRATEGISTS''

Former President l!:isenhower said yester­day that "armchair strategists" are giving "aid and comfort to the enemy" in Vietnam and dissenters are probably "making hon­orable negotiations impossible."

In a strongly worded denunciation of critics of America's war policy, Mr. Eisen­hower said the actions of "militant peace­at-any-price groups" are "not honorable dis­sent. It is rebellion, and it verges on trea­son."

"In a long life of service to my country, I have never encountered a situation more depressing than the present spectacle of an America deeply divided over a war,", Mr. Eisenhower wrote in an article in Reader's Digest.

"What has become of our courage? What has become of our loyalty to others? What has become of a noble concept called patriot­ism, which in former times of crisis l::as car­ried us through to victory and peace" the former President asked.

He said if dissent were as strong "in the desperate days of World War II" when he was the Allied Commander in Europe, "I doubt that we and our allies could have won."

Mr. Eisenhower was scornful of the "en­clave theory" advanced by his former col­league, retired Lt. Gen. James Gavin, who has proposed that American forces pull into. defensive perimeters around the cities and the populated coast of Vietnam instead of fighting in the Jungle.

Without naming Gavin, the former Presi­dent said those who advance the theory "want our troops to sit down in 'defensive enclaves' and drop all offensive action-pre­sumably until a tough enemy gets tired of looking at our military might and goes quietly home."

"Instead of giving faith and backing to the men who are responsible for the conduct of the war, these armchair strategists snipe at every aspect of the conflict," Mr. Eisenhower said. "Of course their words give aid and comfort to the enemy and thus prolong the war ... "

"In the midst of this disgraceful public uproar, the dissenters continue to demand that we negotiate," he said. "Listening to all the antiwar sound and fury on our home front, Hanoi obviously prefers to wait it out in the hope that public opinion in the United States will eventually compel our with­drawal. It is probable that the behavior of the dissenters themselves is making honor­able negotiation impossible."

In an election year, he said, it "is right and proper to advocate a change of leader­ship and to discuss the conduct of the war," but he vowed: "I will not personally sup­port any peace-at-any-price candidate who advocates capitulation and the abandonment of South Vietnam.."

Mr. Truman is quoted in the Washing­ton Star of March 20 as saying:

Truman refused comment on the war in Vietnam other than to say he supported the administration's policy in Southeast Asia. He later said he saw "something similar" be­tween the Korean situation he faced as president and the present Vietnam conflict.

Mr. Speaker, the following out­standing address on South Vietnam of Ambassador George J. Feldman was made before the Businessmen's As­sociation of Luxembourg on March 21, 1968:

It has sometimes been said that we Americans are a people particularly sensitive to criticism and resentful of it. I do not believe that this is the case. We have always been willing to give the other fellow a hearing and to let him speak his mind, and to give him credit for the valid points he has to make. But it is equally incumbent upon us to explain ourselves to our critics in order to elimi­nate misunderstandings and misconcep­tions, and to make certain others under­stand what it is that our country is trying to do, even if they do not agree with it.

As we perform this function, our great­est ally is our own political tradition and view of the world, which remain as valid today as they have always been.

THE POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY

The American nation evolved from three distinct developments: the formation of the Union under the Oonstitution, a democra­tization of life within the United ·states, and the formulation of a body of political theory. Implicit in each of these developments was the overriding principle that the nation was "conceived in liberty and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal."

The American political philosophy and the system of government which reflected it were the fruition of ideas propounded by John Locke, Montesquieu and other English and French political theorists of the 17th and 18th centuries. These ideas were founded upon a series of basic assumptions about the nature of government, and it was these as­sumptions which profoundly influenced the Founding Fathers of our country during the formative stages of our government.

These assumptions are clearly reflected in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States. Regard­less of flaws of act or logic in the reasoning which led to these ideas, their central theme and purpose is a noble one. Men may not in fact be created equal. They may derive from nature no rights that are in fact inalienable. There may be no self-evident truths. But to say that we propose to regard all men as equal, that we recognize no basis of govern­ment except in the general consent of the governed, and that we concede no proper purpose to government except to serve its citizens-to say this is to set forth goals that do indeed have a timeless and universal validity.

When the Founding Fathers addressed themselves to the problem of creating a central government, one of their solutions was to apply to government the concept of separation of powers. The Constitution pro­vided that the executive, legislative and judicial functions be separated and exer­cised by different groups of men, and created a system of checks and balances so that no one of these groups could obtain exces­sive power, thus protecting the people against tyranny. In addition, the Constitution clearly separated the powers of the Federal Gov­ernment from those of the local governments, again, with the aim of protecting the su­premacy of the popular will. Nowhere outside the people themselves did the Americans

envision the existence of any general and all­embracing authority. They stressed the need · to restrict power by protecting the social and economic from arbitrary political action.

BY WAY OF CONTRAST

The Communist revolutions of the 2oth century took place in societies in which the economic and social order was highly un­equal, and burdened with arbitrary privi­leges--societies in which the economic and social lot of the majority of the people was hopeless. The Communist revolutionaries in these situations sought to take over the state in order to use its power to destroy the existing economic and social order and build a new one. To do this, it was thought necessary to strengthen and centralize rather 1i_haP.. to limit and diffuse the authority of the state; to unite rather than to separate the power to legislate and the power to act; to disregard rather than to foster the sacred­ness of individual life, liberty and property insofar as they were imbedded in the old order. What emerged from the Communist revolutions was the totalitarian state, exer­cising unrestrained the whole power of the community, and crushing rather than pro­testing the resources by which men could individually assert their dignity.

The mob111zation of the unrestricted authority of the state in disregard of indi­vidual rights, euphemistically called "dicta­torship of the proletariat," was Justified by its perpetrators as springing from revolu­tionary necessity. Men were promised that once the injustices of the old order had been eradicated, a free political society could be allowed to grow on the basis of the new social and economic order. But what has experience shown? It has proved to be impossible to foster a free social and economic life within a totalitarian government. Freedoms of eco­nomic choice, of speech and assembly, are turned immediately against the totalitarian government, which must restrict or curtail them to protect its own survival. Not one of the totalitarian governments has in fact, yet permitted the growth of free social and economic institutions or has itself been transformed toward free and limited govern­ment.

An interesting development, however, has been the growing insistence of the people in Communist countries for a greater degree of freedom of expression. Totalitarian govern­ments have at times felt it necessary to re­spond to pressures in this direction. In China, there was the famous and short-lived 100 Flowers movement. In the Soviet Union, the Government has from time to time hesi­tantly granted and then withdrawn the right of greater freedom of expression. Most re­cently, a series of writers' trials in the Soviet Union has again illustrated the dangers to a totalitarian system of giving people a taste of freedom. The Founding Fathers of America did not originate the ideas that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by nature with rights beyond the authority of any government to reach, that governments exist only to protect and foster those rights of individual men, and that they can only be properly based on the consent of the governed. But what was important was their achievement in being the first to make those ideas incarnate in a free government and a living society.

A VEXING PROBLEM

The force of those fundamental ideas has grown from generation to generation. No one today can afford to deny their validity. They constitute the core of the world's unsilence­able political conscience. But merely to enunciate principles, however self-evident they may be, without taking action on those principles, when the need arises, would make of them a hollow mockery. As a concrete ex­ample of the workings of our political con­science in giving meaning to tliese funda­mental principles, let us for a moment turn

March 27, 19"68 CONGRESSIONAL .RECORD- HOUSE 7951 our attention to- a vexing problem that I know is in the minds of all of us-the problem of Vietnam. In 1965, President John­son answered the question. Why We Are in Vietnam. Much has happened since then. But the President's statement of our goals then remains valid today. The President spoke as follows:

"'It is said by a few: 'But Vietnam is dif­ferent. Our stake there hardly justifies one boy's life.'

"Vietnam is different. The aggressor has chosen a different terrain, a. different people, and a different kind of war to satisfy his appetite. But his goal is the same: someone else's freedom. '

"To defend that freedom-to permit its roots to deepen and grow without fear of external suppression-is our purpose in South Vietnam. Unchecked aggression against free and helpless people would be a grave threat to our own freedom-and an offense to our own conscience."

The American philosophy of human rights and the dignity and equality of man have led us to Vietnam. We do not say that our own practice of these principles as specified by our Founding Fathers has been perfect. We do say that we have a system which permits us to judge our own shortcomings and meas­ure up to the standards which we have set for ourselves. We strongly affirm that all peo­ples, and particularly those of South Viet­nam, should have the right to choose their own destiny and enjoy the privilege of living in a free society in an area of the world where freedom should not perish.

THE FIGHT FOR FREEDOM

President Johnson's concern for the rights of the Vietnamese to choose their own des­tiny, and his equating of the fight for free­dom there with the cause of freedom every­where, are equally shared by our Asian al­lies who are fighting with us today in South Vietnam. At the conference with our allies in Manila in October 1966, the Seven Nations said of their common aims:

"The nations represented at this confer­ence are united in their determination that the freedom of South Vietnam be secured, in their resolve for peace, and in their deep con.:. cern for the future of Asia and the Pacific ..•. We are united in our determination that the South Vietnamese people shall not be con­quered by aggressive force and shall enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government."

Some of our friends in Europe have lost sight of these broader interests, which of course include their own interests, at stake in Vietnam. Many, but by no means all. Here is what was recently said by the English news­paper columnist, Bernard Levin, in the Lon­don Daily Mail:

"If ( the war in Vietnam) is lost, if the Americans finally get tired of doing the world's work for nothing but the world's abuse, if South Vietnam is left to its fate, then what will follow, as surely as Austria followed the Rhineland, and Czechoslovakia followed Austria, and Poland followed Czech­oslovakia and six years of war followed Po­land, is a nuclear confrontation on a global scale between the forces at present engaged in one tiny corner of the globe."

Similarly, here in Luxembourg voices are being raised in recognition of the meaning of our struggle in Vietnam.

We cannot be indifferent to the fate of small, weak nations who fall prey to the ap­petites of aggressive neighbors. And we, as Americans, with our unique heritage of belief in the dignity and rights of man, cannot fail to act on these principles. We did so here in Europe 20 years ago; we did so in Korea, and we will continue to do so in Vietnam.

It is precisely our belief that these princi­ples remain alive and valid that has led us to espouse hard causes that cost us much in blood and money. When we cease to do this,

CXIV--501-Part 6

we will no longer be "the· same country that twice tn this century liberated Europe from oppression, and that will indeed be a bad day for the entire world.

VIETNAM AND THE NEW ASIA

Mr. Speaker, some people have ques­tioned the fact that we have devoted our time and attention and effort to the problem of Vietnam when there are other issues that demand our participation.

The fact is that Vietnam has become the focal point for ·a new form of aggres­sion that if left unchecked will greatly weaken the newly independent and eco­nomically developing nations of the new Asia in their quest for growth and stabil­ity. They have had their revolution. They are free. They now need time to build and time to strive. This the Communists seek to deny them.

The North Vietnamese Communist at­tack upon South Vietnam and the related North Vietnamese pressures upon Laos and Thailand strike at the heart of the Southeast Asian mainland. The chal­lenge has been hurled against the free nations by a ne:w imperialism, a new colonialism, a new tyranny waving the banner of the Lao Dong Party of North Vietnam and following the doctrine of Mao Tse Tung. How is it possible to avoid the challenge? If you happen to live in the new Asia, it cannot be avoided. This is why those who live there have taken a role and a stand. This is why Thailand has sent combat forces to fight alongside the South Vietnamese Government units in South Vietnam. The Philippines, Aus­tralia, New Zealand, and the Republic of Korea have also backed tl:eir concern and their commitment with troops. Korea has sent more troops in propor­tion to her population than any other nation assisting the Republic of Vietnam.

Other nations in the new Asia have supported the policies and the actions of the Vietnam commitment. . Reference statements of Asian and Pacific leaders follow:

OPINIONS OF ASIAN AND PACIFIC LEADERS

"There ls dangerous thinking in the West . . . progressives of the West believe that Communism will win and the best that they can do is surrender peaceably to it ... they are free to expound their ideas from remote positions. But there are millions of people in Southeast Asia and 450 million people of India who, in spite of the basic defects in the structure of their society, will not permit themselves to be traded in the drawing rooms and cabinets of the Western world ....

"If America compromises on this vital is­sue of freedom in Asia, she will have to pay the price dearly .... It is alarming that [re­sponsible commentators] of the West should talk so lightheartedly about leaving India's eastern flank open to the dangers of Chi­nese invasion.

" [The] counsel of retreat to the West is certainly not what Asians want. We want and need the presence of the West on Asia's land and sea. The West can provide the power to balance Communist China until such a time as democratic nations like India and Japan can provide it."-Rajmohan Gandhi, Editor of Himmat Magazine, Febru­ary 1965.

In any evaluation of the issues in Viet­Nam, the attitudes of the· countries of the Asia/Pacific area must clearly be an impor­tant consideration. These countries are best informed about conditions in the area, are-

most keenly aware of the stakes, and their leaders have stated their views.

Obviously, opinions differ among Asian leaders on various points of policy. There are both optimistic and pessimistic interpre­tations of almost every development in the Vietnamese war. But, on the central issue­the fundamental commitment of the United States to the defense of South Viet-Nam­there is overwhelming support from the leaders of the region for the American policy. This support comes not only from countries allied with South Viet-Nam and the United States, but also from most of the uncom­mitted countries. Nor is that support limi­ted to government leaders. The statement quoted above of Rajmohan Gandhi, editor of Himmat Magazine, while not offered as re­presentative of official Indian views, is an example of a large body of unofficial opinion among Asians.

This pamphlet presents some representa­tive samples of Asian views on the following principal aspects of the problem:

1. The basic U.S. commitment. 2. The nature of the war--civil war, or

aggression? 3. North Vietnamese involvement. 4. Chinese involvement. 5. The threat to neighboring countries. 6. U.S. bombing policy. 7. Peace efforts. 8. Regional goals beyond the war.

BASIC U.S. COMMITMENT

Among non-Communist Asians in positions of responsibility, the commitment of the United States to help free Asians resist Com­munist expansion is widely approved. Even Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, whose views on Viet-Nam are well known, has increasingly expressed his concern about developments in Viet-Nam which could pre­sent a Communist threat to his own country. Support of the U.S. commitment is expressed not only by those leaders whose nations are military allies of the United States and South Viet-Nam, but by leaders of most neutral countries in the area as well. For example:

Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, in an interview published in U.S. News and World Report, November 6, 1967:

Q. "Some critics of the war say the United States should pull out of South Vietnam. As the Premier of Laos, which has borders with both South and North Vietnam, what do you think would be the effect of such a withdrawal?''

A. "There would be a danger for the coun­tries of East Asia-a very great danger .

"Right now, South Vietnam alone cannot face the danger of the North. Thus, if the Americans and the allies leave tomorrow, South Vietnam would be Communist.

"Should South Vietnam become Commu­nist--that is to say, should all of Viet-Nam become Communist--it would be difficult for Laos to exist. The same goes for Cambodia, the same for other countries.

"I have always said that if all of Vietnam becomes Communist, we could do nothing but pack our bags and leave."

Eisaku Sato, Premier of Japan, November 14, 1967: '

"I wish to express my deep respect to you, Mr. President [Johnson], for the great efforts being made by the United States under your able leadership to bring peace and stability to the world, particularly in Asia at this moment." · Lee Kuan Yew, Prime Minister of Singa­pore, addressing a meeting of the University of Singapore Democratic Socialist Club, June 15, 1966. (From transcript distributed by Singapore Government, June 22, 1966):

"Do you believe that the Indians are stooges and lackeys of the Americans? ... There are the Burmese-they are the best neutralists in Asia. How is it that none of them have really said that 'this is a crime against humanity committed by the Ameri­cans'? Of course!. Hundreds of Vietnamese

7952 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 are dying every day-for what? For Viet­Nam? No! To decide that Viet-Nam shall not be repeated. That is why they haven't raised their voice in protest with the same indigna­tion and rage. But whilst we buy time, if we just sit down and believe people are going to buy time forever after for us, then we deserve to perish."

CIVIL WAR OR AGGRESSION

Another point on which there is wide agreement in Asia is the nature of the war in Viet-Nam:

Philippine President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Manila, 1966:

"It is established beyond dispute that the war in Viet-Nam is not a civil war. It is a war on an international scale involving mas­sive aggression from Communist North Viet­Nam with the active encouragement of Com­munist China." ,

Thailand Premier Thanom Kittikachorn, Manila, 1966:

"Even though the war in Viet-Nam is being fought mainly between peoples of the same race, it is in no way a civil war ... North Viet-Nam is waging an imperialistic war of Communist expansion not only in South Viet-Nam but also in other parts of South­east Asia as well. . . ."

Korean President Pak Chung Hui, Korea, 1966: .

"The forces which support and control the Viet Cong in Free Viet-Nam today are the same forces which 16 years ago supported and controlled the southward aggression of the Communist troops in Korea ... the sit­uation in Viet-Nam is more than a simple domestic problem of that country. It repres­ents rather a confrontation of the free world with Communist tyranny."

NORTH VIETNAMESE INVOLVEMENT

North Vietnamese involvement in the war in South Viet-Nam is regarded among Asian and Pacific leaders as a long-established fact, as the statements cited above illustrate. As long ago as 1962 the International Control Commission reported that "there is sufficient evidence to show beyond reasonable doubt" that the North Vietnamese Army was con­ducting hostile operations against South Viet-Nam in clear violation of the Geneva accords. Since that time, Asian leaders have charged that North Vietnamese forces have also conducted offensive operations against neutral Laos and are training and equipping guerrillas in Thailand. Prince Norodom Si­hanouk of Cambodia also has commented on North Vietnamese operations in Cambodia.

Prime Minister of Laos, Prince Souvanna Phouma, November 2, 1967:

"We were fully satisfied with the [1962] Geneva accords. We thought that the night­mare of internal subversion and foreign aggression was over. But, alas, our people were grievously deceived. The accords were immediately and shamelessly violated ... the Pathet Lao ... , valet of the Hanoi Gov­ernment, continued its sabotage. War, instead of stopping, grew more intense. Today, five years after the signature of the Geneva ac­cords, we can count about 40,000 North Vietnamese soldiers in our territory. They are fighting beside 15,000 Pathet Lao, armed, paid, trained and encadred by North Viet­Nam. Development of our country is par­alyzed. Thousands of refugees stream into Governmental zones. Hundreds of villages are abandoned. Only half of the soil is culti­vated. The Ho Chi Minh trail has become an active transit route for North Vietnamese forces. . . . But, the most distressing aspect is to think that this useless, bloody, tragedy could not have occurred if some ideological, greedy nations had not come and interfered directly or indirectly in our internal affairs. By what right, what moral, do they assume the right to 'liberate' us?"

Foreign Minister of Thailand, Thanat Kho­man, April 20, 1967, the "Today" show.

Q. "The wa.r that's going on now in the

northeast provinces of your country, where is the direction for this insurrection coming from, Peking or Hanoi, or, perhaps, Moscow?"

Foreign Minister Thanat: "Oh, I think, from both. You see, in general when it is the question of-of instigating troubles, and disorders, and insurrection in non-Commu­nist countries, Communist powers generally join hands.

"But, I would say without hesitation that, at the present time, direction, and support, and training, and equipment are coming pri­marily from North Viet-Nam, and also from Communist China."

Prince Norodom Sihanouk of Cambodia, May 9, 1967:

"They launched these attacks because they want to create ·civil war ....

"If we fail in our operations against them and if the Khmer [Cambodian] Viet Minh emerge victorious, they can transform the nation into a Communist country. If not they must continue to accept independence and neutrality ....

"The master of the Khmer Viet Minh are the Viet Minh and the Viet Cong."

Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs and Acting Foreign Minister Tun Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Jahore Bahru, 1966:

"I do not intend to make an anti-Commu­nist speech. But I feel it is useful to stress that it is not South Viet-Nam which !:leeks to annex North Viet-Nam, but vice versa. This has been officially admitted by Hanoi, and Peking is giving Hanoi every encourage­ment. Peking's and Hanoi's involvement in the Communist offensive in Laos is also well known. And since early last year, Peking has repeatedly threatened Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore with !so-called People's Wars to be launched by local Communist move­ments against these three countries. . . ."

Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United Nations, Mr. Liu Chieh, October 12, 1966:

"What is happening in Viet-Nam is not a local rebellion caused by internal discontent. It is a war of aggression conducted from across the northern border of the Republic of Viet-Nam. The Viet Cong guerrillas are the creatures of Hanoi. They are trained, armed, supplied and directed by the Communist North with the support of Peiping. Their mission is to destroy the Republic of Viet­Nam's will to resist, to erode its faith in the future, to paralyze its social, economic and political progress."

In an interview with Associated Press, 1966, Lao Premier Prince Souvanna Phouma said:

"North Viet-Nam has never respected the 1962 Geneva agreements. Even during the conference, the Pathet Lao denied the pres­ence in Laos of troops from North Viet-Nam. But we were there also and we know posi­tively that there were Vietnamese units with the Pathet Lao. After the signing of the Geneva agreements, they were still there in flagrant violation of the terms of the agree­ments."

INVOLVEMENT OF COMMUNIST CHINA

The war in South Viet-Nam is regarded by most Asian and Pacific leaders as part of the larger struggle against domination by Com­munist China of all Southeast Asia. They realize the outcome of the conflict in Viet­Nam is likely to have an important effect on the intentions of Communist China and North Viet-Nam toward other countries in the area. For example:

Tun Dr. Ismail bin Dato Abdul Rahman, Minister of Home Affairs and Acting Foreign Minister of Malaysia, Jahore Bahru, June 23; 1966:

"The power vacuum left over from the re­treat of western colonial rule still poses a grave threat to the independence of South­east Asian states .... ·

"This vacuum has not been filled by the growth and consolidation of indigenous pow­er. On the contrary, taking advantage of the situation, a giant outside power, the Peo-

pie's Republic of China, seems bent on a. long-range program of expanding its power and influence through its proxies in South­east Asia ....

"We do not oppose the Communist system in Mainland China, so long as it confines itself within its own borders. But we call upon the People's Republic of China to keep its hands off our region and to adopt a policy of peaceful co-existence towards its fellow Asians in Southeast Asia."

Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew-"Meet the Press," October 22, 1967:

Q. "Speaking as a Chinese who under­stands China, can you make an estimate or a guess as to the future of China? Do you think in the near future it will become again a unified country, a strongly unified country that might re.Present some kind of a danger to Southeast Asia?"

Mr. Lee: " ... I don't believe ... the simple theory that they are just going to send their armies across and eat up Southeast Asia. It is too simple, and it is too simple for you, for the Americans, and for us, because then it is naked aggression; the whole of Southeast Asia will jell together and meet an incoming invader. But you have this 'make it your­self' kind of revolution. Wars of national liberation, you know. Here is the text. 'We have an instructor. He will teach you how to organize and will slip you a. few guns and more if necessary and, if it gets more difficult, well, surface-to-air missiles and so on.'"

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Republic of the Philippines, September 15, 1966:

" ... for the present and the years ahead, Communist China's neighbors cannot expect, singly or together, to 'balance' China's crucial margin of nuclear power without the assis­tance of non-Asian countries like America. There is in consequence a new disposition to regard America's deterrent power in Asia as a necessity for the duration of time required by the Asian nations to develop their own system of regional security supported by what they hope would have become a greatly strength­ened United Nations."

Joint Communique issued by Prime Min­ister Eisaku Sato of Japan and President Johnson, November 15, 1967:

"The President and the Prime Minister ex­changed frank views on the recent interna­tional situation, with particular emphasis on developments in the Far East. They noted the fact that Communist China is developing its nuclear arsenal and agreed on the im­portance of creating conditions wherein Asian nations would not be susceptible to threats from Communist China. The Presi­dent and the Prime Minister also agreed that, while it is difficult to ·predict at present what external posture Communist China may eventually assume, it is essential for the free world countries to continue to cooperate among themselves to promote political stabil­ity and economic prosperity in the area. Look­ing toward an enduring peace in Asia, they further expressed the hope that Communist China would ultimately cast aside its present intransigent attitude and seek to live in peace and prosper alongside other nations in the international community."

THREAT TO NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Asian and Pacific leaders recognize that it is easier to wage the new forms of massive politico-military warfare if the aggressor can stage his operations out of territory adjacent to the target country. Obviously, it would be easier for Communists to develop a "war of national liberation" against Thailand and Malaysia, for example, if they first control the Indochinese peninsula. As each country falls, it becomes the staging area for politico­military aggression against the next:

Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew, May 6, 1965:

"If the Communists are able to advance their frontiers to envelop South Viet-Nam it will be only a matter of time before the

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7953 same process of emasculation by military and political techniques Will overtake the neighboring countries." · ·

Thai Government announcement, January 3, 1967: '

"Thailand is situated near Viet-Nam and it will be the next target of the Commu­nists, ·as they have already proclaimed. This is why Thailand realizes the necessity to send military units to help oppose Communist c.ggression [in Viet-Na:"'l] when it is stm at s, distance from our country." ·

Prime Minister Keith Holyoake of New Zea­land, July 23, 1966:

"The present war in Viet-Nam is a wretched example of the waste of human life and much needed resources which is likely to be repeated if we cannot persuade the Asian Communist powers that aggression will not be allowed to succeed. That is why the struggle in Viet-Nam is of such critical importance. If the North Vietnamese were to succeed in their attempt to subJuga,te South Viet-Nam, the stage would be set for a series of further Communist encroachments."

President Pak Chung Hui of Korea, June 25, 1966:

"Unless the superior combined forces of the free world succeed in defeating the ag­gressive scheme of the Communists there [in Viet-Nam), the chances for the system­atic Communist aggression of our neighbor­ing Asian states are sure to become greater. The ceaseless aggressive maneuver of the Communists of the last twenty years, a,nd their recent pronouncements of a provoca­tive nature, are eloquent proofs of their con­tinued aggressive intention."

The late Prime Minister Harold Holt of Australia, January 12, 1967:

"But for massive and effective military and civil assistance from friendly countries out­side the region, the countries of Southeast Asia would either have to carry a crippling defense burden, frustrating to their plans of development and social improvement, or live under constant threat of external danger or internal subversion and terrorism. The free countries of this region want the western world to know that we regard the contribu­tion made in particular by the United States to the security and progress of this area as fundamental to our prospects of security and national growth."

Narciso Ramos, Philippine Secretary of For­eign Affairs, before the U.N. General Assem­bly, September 25, 1967:

"Of the gravest concern to us is the situa­tion in Viet-Nam. We are concerned not merely because of the geographic proximity of the Philippines to that country but be­cause that land has become the testing­ground for the free world's determination to resist acts of subversion and aggression masquerading as wars· of national liberation. The triumph of Hanoi and the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam would mean that move­ments of the same nature could with im­punity be started anywhere in the world and pursued to success. It would give a new and more dangerous dimension to subversion and aggression, and no country anywhere would be immune. In the interest of our own na­tional survival we do not wish to see this happen."

Cambodian Chief of Sta.te Prince Norodom Sihanouk, May 9, 1967:

" Concerning the Communists, dear com­p anio,ns, we say that we trust the Chinese and Vietnamese. But when the moment comes what will happen between us and the Vie·tnamese?

" I must tell you that the Vietnamese Com­m unists and the Viet Cong negotiated with us three or four times but that absolutely nothing comes out of the negotiations. They did not sign a pledge of respect for our present frontiers. That is the first problem. Th e second problem is the fact that the pro­Viet Minh Khmer [Cambodians) have had the habit of permitting the Viet Minh to

come into our country. Formerly, after I had expelled the French and after the French troops left Cambodia, the Viet Minh remained in our country in order to conquer it. How can we· have confidence in the Viet Minh? Will we be able to escape falling into their hands once we turn Communist?"

" .. . If we side with the Viet Minh, we will lose our independence ... "

U.S. BOMBING POLICY

While there is overwhelming support among Asian and Pacific leaders for the basic U.S. commitment, some of our East Asian and Pacific friends have urged the President to try once again a suspension of the bomb­ing; on the other hand, a few have urged wider bombing.

U.S. policy has been to bomb only to the extent believed necessary to impede the flow of men and materiel from the North to the South. The President, at San Antonio on September 29, 1967, said: "The United States is willing to stop all aerial and naval bom­bardment of North Viet-Nam when this will lead promptly to productive discussions. We, of course, assume that while discussions pro­ceed, North Viet-Nam would not take ad­vantage of the bombing cessation or limita­tion." The absence of any indication of will­ingness by Hanoi to restrict its own military effort if bombing were halted leaves the United States facing a difficult choice, as regional opinions illustrate:

Japanese Foreign Minister Takeo Miki, 1967:

"I do not subscribe to the thought that if the United States would only stop bombing, something may come of it. It is not that simple ....

"There are some who say try it anyway. Even if you might be fooled. These advocate that if, after waiting three or four weeks, North Viet-Nam does not reduce its scale of fighting, or shows no willingness to come to the conference table, then resume the bomb­ing of the North. . ..

"There are some Americans who hold this view .... -

"But, I believe that to do so is a dangerous gamble. I feel this way because this line of reasoning contains the risk of further esca­lating the war."

New Zealand Prime Minister, Keith Hol­yoake, November 27, 1967:

". . . while the Government accepts the military necessity for the bombing of mm­tary targets in North Viet-Nam, we have al­ways been anxious to work toward a mutual scaling down of military activities in Viet­Nam. We have always recognized that an­other suspension of the bombing could be an important step in this process. It is well known that the United States Government is ready to stop the bombing the moment North Viet-Nam gives a reliable sign that it is prepared to undertake some reciprocal step to reduce its military activity in the South or to make some meaningful advance toward a political settlement. This, however, the North Vietnamese Government has consist­ently refused to do."

PEACE EFFORT S

The great range and variety of peace ef­forts is described in detail in Viet-Nam In­formation Note. No. 2. All these efforts, whether initiated by the United States or interested third parties, have collapsed due to Commnuist intransigence. The core of the problem is examined in these Asian state­men ts:

Indian President R.adhakrishnan, Septem­ber 28, 1966:

"But the U.S. has in recent days repeatedly made offers to halt the bombing provided North Viet-Nam will agree on its side to re­duce the temperature of the war .... The question of whether the U.S. should not first stop its bombing operations in the North may no longer be the most important. Cessation of bombing, if it is to be followed

by its certain resumption in the future, can hardly promote the cause of peace in Viet­Nam. Nor -does it seem that the inclusion of Viet Oong at the talks is a question that need present insuperable difficulties. The ultimate obstacle is traceable. today to Hanoi's con­sistently stubborn insistence on full compli­ance with its· 4-point and the Viet Cong's 5-point proposals, an important element in both of which is the demand for a unilatera l withdrawal of the U.S. from Vi.etnam ....

"With Hanoi standing pat on its obdurate position, there remains only one hopeful and effective quarter to which peace appeals m ay be directed: This is the Soviet Union. The U.S. has recently made strenuous and public efforts to call upon Moscow to face up to its great power responsibilities and exercise its undoubtedly growing influence o-n North Viet-Nam with a view to helping the latter adopt a more positive response to peace pro­posals. . . . So far the Soviet Union's role has been to stand on the sidelines and help stiffen Hanoi's will to resist. A more positive interest on its part to see that peace prevails in the region is the objective towards which all with influence in Moscow must now work."

J.apan's Foreign Minister Takeo Miki: "Before urging the United States to halt its

bombing, I would like to verify the possibility of some meaningful reaction to this move on the part of North Viet-Nam . ...

"I have sought to obtain some signs of this possibility in Moscow, Warsaw and the United Nations. But there was no one willing to act as 'guarantor' ....

"I believe that it is not unreasonable from the standpoint of the responsible leaders of the United States, that they s,hould Eeek

· some form of guarantee that if the bombing is stopped, North Viet-Nam would respond by coming to the conference table for pro­ductive talks."

Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck of Australia, April 18, 1967:

" ... there have been many efforts for peace and many disappointments in the lack of response from Hanoi. In some quarters there seems to be a disposition to believe that one­sided action by the United States Govern­ment could bring peace in Viet-Nam. Some people appear to believe that if it surrendered unconditionally, if it abandoned those who have depended on it and who are supporting its effort to resist aggression, and if it was false to the sacrifice of those who for many long years h ave painfully tried to m aintain freedom in Viet-Nam and have given the~r lives in that cause, it would bring peace. I t might bring a sort of peace. But it would not be a Just peace. It would not be a peace with which an honorable man could live. It would not be a peace that would last but would be only a prelude to further aggression. Freedom is truly gone when one is not even free to defend it."

GOALS BEYOND THE WAR

In a broad sense, the U.S. and Asian goals are identical: to speed development of inde­pendent Asian nations in a pluralistic world where the people in each country and each region are free to solve their problems in the light of their own needs and their own cf:pa­bilities. A variety of views of the. future has been advanced by Asian leaders:

Singapore Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, April 22, 1966:

"There are people who believe that de­colonization and the end of the European era means that we all go back to what we were. Ancient titles are resurrected in the hope that ancient glory-which is believed to have existed-will similarly be resur­rected! ...

"I would choose to believe that the past was never thus, and that the future will never be like the past; and that we have it now, in our hands, to help to determine the shape of the future. Because it is not al-

7954 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

together in our hands. There are bigger forces ....

"Assuming t!la,t the process of bleeding and attrition goes on in South Viet-Nam; that, despite all the viciousness and the brutality of conflict, the Americans are not de­feated . . . and that therefore the battle­ground cannot be shifted from South Viet­Nam across Cambodia on to Thailand; and that we in Southeast Asia have time to sort our little differences: What should we do? How can we secure the future for our­selves? ...

"We thought-at least, I thought-that we would have secured it by a wider base-a broader federation, a multi-racial society­to rationalise what has happened over a hundred and fifty years of empire and the migration of peoples from China, India, In­donesia into Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories."

Thai Minister of Foreign Affairs Thanat Khoman at the opening session of the First Ministerial Conference for Asian and Pacific Cooperation (ASP AC), Seoul, Korea, June 14, 1966:

"We do not claim to have succeeded in building paradises on this earth, therefore our people are free to leave their land any time they want. Only where terrestrial Edens are claimed to exist, high walls have to be built and armed patrols accompanied by police dogs have to be used to prevent the people within from escaping from their un­wanted paradises. Our desire, therefore, is to see those barriers and obstacles which divide and separate people of this world crumble down to make way for free exchange and contact between them ·for the sake of better understanding and good will. . . .

"Ours will be a society where freedom shall prevail, a freedom that will be enjoyed not by one, not by a few, but by all, freedom for the individual, freedom within the family as well as within the national community. It will be a freedom from the dictatorial and tyrannical domination by a class composed of a privileged few who usurp the populace. It will also be a society characterized by progressive evolution not by a stagnant im­mutability or by revolutionary jolts in which the lower passions of men are let loose."

Malaysia's Foreign Minister S. Rajaratman, March 1966:

"Now the centre of political gravity has shifted to the Pacific and it is interesting to note that President Theodore Roosevelt at the beginning of the century, foresaw such a development.

"'The Mediterranean era,' he said, 'died with the discovery of America. The Atlantic era is now at the height of its development and must soon exhaust the resources at its command. The Pacific era, destined to be the greatest of all, is just at its dawn.'

"It may well be the greatest of human eras if the world realises and understands the implications of this shift in the centre of world politics. In the Pacific region there is, for the first time in human history, a spectacular meeting of the world. . . . In the Pacific, the nations of the world could learn how to build truly a world civilization through cooperation and peaceful competi­tion. As Mr. Roosevelt said this may be the greatest of all human eras-the Pacific era."

More than 31 nations are sending economic and social assistance to the South Vietnamese people who are in their 11th year of struggle in their efforts to resist Communist subversion and attack.

Still, there are those who prescribe for the United States a sideline role. This is not the time, they say. This is not the place, they say. We should deal with other problems first, they say. Now this is not new advice. In Asia in 1931, the military leaders of Imperial Japan in­vaded Manchuria. The world beyond Asia

was full of other concerns. The United States was in the throes of a severe eco­nomic crisis. Europe was attempting to resolve problems left over from the great conflict of 1914-18. So there were good reasons why people not living in Asia could feel that the events there were not nearly as important as those events they were devoting their time and attention to in the Western World. But Asia was and is a part of our world, an impartant and patentially explosive part of our world and Asia will not just go away. A distinguished American statesman, Sec­retary of War Henry Stimson, warned the Nation and the world that the Jap­anese aggression in Manchuria must not go unheeded and unchecked. He warned that the price for Western in­action and complacency and failure in the Manchuria incident would be reck­oned in countless lives and world misery in the years to follow. Mr. Stimson's words were lost in the clamor of debate that swirled around national issues in the United States and Europe.

But the thrust into Manchuria had its audience. A military dictator in Italy, Benito Mussolini, was paying close at­tention and when he struck Ethiopia savagely and without cause the world registered its attention. But once again the pattern of Manchuria reasserted its influence. If the effort had not been made in Manchuria, why then should it be made in Ethiopia? Both regions were distant and remote from the West. The impassioned plea of Haile Selassie be­fore the League of Nations went un­answered.

The pattern was more deeply in­grained into the psychology and policy of the times. Adolf Hitler had been paying attention. He was master of a Nazi Party movement in Germany that had come to power on a wave of desire to wipe away the humiliation of the de­feat suffered during World War One. He saw treaties and commitments as barriers to be breached. He followed the pattern established by the Manchurian­Ethiopian crises. He marched into the Rhineland in defiance of the written pledge, reclaiming it for Germany. The reaction of the free nations in the West and the reaction of the United States had also been established by the Man­churian and Ethiopian experiences. If not for the previous causes, why for this latest violation of sovereignty and law? During this period Walter Lipp­mann wrote that Herr Hitler did not rep­resent a.n aggressive threat. He only wanted what was rightfully his. And so the avalanche came. But its progression was unnoticed by many. For the failure to heed the warning of Secretary Stim­son in 1931 seemed to allow time for the United States and the free nations of the world to work on their own problems. And our attention was centered on these local national' concerns. "America first," some said. But how costly the price for that time. For after the warfare in Spain, in 1936, and the Austrian agony of 1938 and the death of free Czechoslo­vakia, Herr Hitler had brought the crisis to the frontyard of the world.

A Munich conference had brought not compromise but appeasement. He

made his new demands upan Poland. Britain and France resisted. Still the United States was an onlooker. And then after 2 years of neutrality during which Europe was consumed by the hor­ror of holocaust, the United States it­self was attacked. And where did the

· attack come? It came on a peaceful Sun­day from Asia. It struck without warn­ing. It reigned death and destruction upon the outposts of a nation that had done its very best to concentrate on other things. And the cost was high, terribly high. Millions died around the world in the conflict that brought new or nearly forgotten names and places and faces to the awareness of Ameri­ca: Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Guam, Wake, Saipan, the Philippines, Indo­china, Thailand, Burma, China, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, the Alaskan chain of Aleutian Islands of Kiska, Atka, Attu, and finally Japan itself. Asia had thrust its way into our lives with irresistible force. Never again would the United States forget that Asia was a part of this world and an important and volatile part of the politics of man.

But memories fade and experiences not lived become cold to those who en­counter them only in the print of history texts. And so the young men in the warm summer of 1950 in the United States had been living through and living with crisis since the close of World War II. But the main arena was Europe and the re­sponse to the threats had also been made in Europe. This new generation had met the challenges hurled by aggression and subversion in Greece, Iran, Berlin. But once again, it became a painful neces­sity to embrace the reality that the world still included Asia and that nearly two-thirds of mankind lived there. Moreover, warfare that defeated the Japanese had also overturned the old or­der. There were newly independent na­tions in Asia for the first time in modern history. They had grievances and goals, needs and dreams. In one of these, the Republic of South Korea, the efforts to build a new nation was abruptly threat­ened by an attack from the north's Com­munist dictatorship. The United States, under the leadership of President Tru­man and working in concert with the United Nations, was determined to meet this challenge; the lessons of the 1930's were too fresh in the records of policy. Aggression unanswered breeds aggression insatiable. The road was hard, the cost in blood and treasure was great. But the aggression was repelled. The horizon was for an Asia that allowed new nations an opportunity to develop as a part of a world of law. And then less than 4 years after the Korean war came to a close, Communist subversion and Poli­tical attack was unleashed against the Republic of South Vietnam. Once again our commitment and our respansibility as a leader of the free world was under test. Britain and France had become weak. They had been phasing out of Asian involvements as a result of World War II and its aftermath. Their em­pires were gone. They recognized the new day that had dawned. They realized a new Asia was awakening. We not only realized it, we were committed to the

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7955 support of its growth. For we were not a colonial empire. We were a free society that was determined to foster the efforts of these new nations to remain · free. Just as we had early turned from the path of controlling other Asian nations with our pledge to grant nationhood to the Philip­pines our policy was in the new Asia of the 1960's a commitment to encourage self-determination and free choice.

THE COMMUNIST CHALLENGE

Other forces from a Chinese mainland controlled by Mao Tse-Tung and a Mos­cow that had supported the aggression of North Korea, were proposing different answers for the solution to development problems in the new Asia. Communist China has set its pattern early.

"Power grows from the mouth of a gun" was the famous dictum of Mao Tse­Tung. In 1962, Peiping launched a sav­age attack upon India. The India of Prime Minister Nehru had been standing at the center of efforts to create a third force or a neutral world bloc to provide a local balance and an equilibrium in a crisis-torn Asia. No one had done more to counsel moderation, to practice greater restraint in attempting to deal with the problem of building a new framework of law and order and prog­ress. Yet it was India, herself, that was in dire need of support and assistance in 1962 as the Communist Chinese troops fanned out from the mountain border of the Northeast and began drives upon the Assam plain. This marked the failure of an attempt to wish away policies held by aggressors. It was_ for many Asians the death of the illusion that the ag­gressor can be appeased. It was clear that it _would · take strength to back the efforts of the new nations of Asia to build their societies. India herself needed that . strength and protection and she received it from the United States and other na-tions in her hour of need. ,

Mr. Speaker, the present struggle in Vietnam today is only the latest test of the will and the determination of the new Asia to maintain a right of free choice against the bullets and the terror and the devastation of Communist at­tack. It is equally a test of our determina- · tion and our will and our understanding. The lesson of the past in Asia as well as Europe is clear. This is one world. We who inhabit this planet must learn to live together or we shall certainly perish together. And the kind of society that will avoid the ultimate catastrophe is a· society of law and a society of justice.

It is to this end and for this goal that we pay the price today in Vietnam so that the new Asia may have its to­morrows and so that we may have the achievements of today without the ter­rible price of a challenge ignored which a decade or so later brings millions to grief and the world to cataclysm. Is it not wiser to face the fundamental chal­lenge now and at the place where the nation and the people of South Vietnam are fighting to remain free to choose their own path, just as the nation and the people of Laos and the nation and the people of Thailand are resisting the subversion and attack that Hanoi and Peiping have organized in their border regions? And the challenge in postwar

Asia is not a new one. It. took the Brit­ish 12 years .to put down the Commu­nists' guerrilla war in Malaya and at any moment iri · those long years following the great devastation that World War II had brought to England it would have been easy for the British people to say: "This cannot be done, there are too many other things we have to do here in London." Yet they persevered and today there is a free, independent people in Malaysia, who retain links of common interest with Britain but who are in their own developm~nt becoming a growing power and influence for con­structive achievement in Southeast Asia.

There were Communist guerrilla at­tacks upon the Philippine people fol­lowing World War II. The Filipinos, who had fought so long against the Japanese occupation forces in guerrilla fashion, joined as a nation and spent their resources and their lives to def eat the Communist effort and at the same time to off er a better life for the free citizen of the Philippine nation. - The United States supported the ef­forts of the Indonesian people at the close of World War II to gain their independence from the Dutch. The In­donesian nation was born in bloodshed and struggle as the Indonesian people asserted their right to freedom.

Ten years later in 1965 it seemed that Indonesia would lose its freedom and in­dependence. The nation seemed headed down the Communist path; the nation­alism of that nation's leader had become more extreme and hostile. This had led Indonesia into a dangerous confronta­tion with Malaysia. Then in October 1965, the Communists sought to destroy resistance to their program with a coup. Communist China's influence had grown to gigantic proportions, the Indonesian Communist Party was its willing tool and the forces that were controlling Indo­nesia political structure were seeking to eliminate the top non-Communist lead­ers who stood in the path of a total Com­munist takeover. But the coup was ill timed and poorly executed. It backfired and brought into being the current strongly nationalist and non-Communist government to Indonesia. These events constituted another lesson in the new Asia arena. In the words of Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs William Bundy:

What happened in In6:onesia was above all the work of heroic and dedicated non-Com­munist nationalists. I am quite sure that had we not stood firm in Vietnam in 1965-and had Vietnam thus been rapidly. on the way to a takeover by force from Hanoi, as would surely have been the case-Aidit (the Indonesian Communist Party leader) and company would not have needed to force their luck and the morale of the non-Com­munists would not have been equal to the very tight struggle for power that ensued for the next six months. Hence it is the widely accepted judgment in the area-which I share-that the dramatic change in Indo­nesia would have been far less likely, if not impossible, without the stand that we and others took in Vietnam.

Since that time Indonesia has resumed its relationship with the U.N., has ended its confrontation with Malaysia, has undertaken a new economic effort, and

has provided new encouragement for private investments.

· And so, as Secretary Bundy's words reiterate, it is not just Vietnam that we are concerned with. It is our relation­ship to that new Asia. It is our interest in developments that make the new Asia one of the most exciting growth and change areas in the world today. We now have a 49th State only a few miles from the shores of the coast of the Soviet Union in north Asia. We have a 50th State 2,400 miles from California in mid­Pacific. We have a role and a respon­sibility because it has become clear to us that the waves of the Pacific Ocean that wash the shores of Southeast Asia also carry the hope, the trouble, the torment, and the promise of this new Asia to the very shores of the United States with little lapse in time or geography.

The age of the jet plane and the inter­continental missile have brought this world relationship to a new focus that we dare not overlook. The lessons of the thirties and the lessons of the fifties can­not be forgotten today without imperiling the very survival of freedom on this planet. For the weapons are more ter­rible, the holocaust more final. There will be little opportunity for post-mor­tems. The time to work and build to prevent such a disastrous conclusion to the efforts of free man in this world is today. The new Asia is building. It needs help. It needs support. The way of the aggressor must not succeed.

CASE STUDY IN ACCOMPLISHMENT: SOUTH KOREA

As we face this challenge let us con­sider an example of how much has been accomplished. Let us look closely at Korea, that war-torn land where aggres­sion was repelled at great cost in the early 1950's. What has that effort and sacrifice produced?

An article from the U.S. ·News & World Report follows:

AsIA'S "CINDERELLA"-SOUTH KOREA

While Japan, third-greatest industrial pow­er in the world, is the obvious succe::-·· story of Asia, it is in South Korea that you find the "Cinderella story."

It is Korea that inspires other Asians­particularly the South Vietnamese. Feeling is that if the Koreans could come back from al­most total devastation after their war with the Communists, others can too.

And the Koreans have developed to a de­gree nobody would have dared to predict 15 years ago.

Then, South Korea was prostrate. The war still raged. There was no industry to speak of, not even much to rebuild. Seoul was a city of shattered buildings, broken streets. People were hungry. Most lived in mud huts with thatch roofs. Merchants squatted in the dirt before their wares.

The South Korean Army was better than it had been when the war started-but not much.

Men without experience ran the Govern­ment. The Japanese, who ruled Korea until 1945, never had let a Korean hold a position of responsibility. An American says, "A Korean could be a postman, but never a postmaster."

As a result of these things, when the truce was signed in 1953, Korea had to start from scratch.

A correspondent returning for the first time since then finds it difficult to believe how far Korea has advanced. Seoul now is a modern city of 4.3 million. Factories spread for miles in every direction. There are new skyscraper

7956 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 hotels--and more are under construction. The hllls that surround the city, once barren, are filled with apartments and one-family houses, of new design and bright colors.

People are well-dJ:essed, many in Western style. Schoolboys- in town and country favor black leather jackets.

To stop erosion and build a timber indus­try, 3.5 billion trees have been planted on hillsides during the last few years.

But the biggest change of all ls in the new pride and confidence of the people.

A good deal of this is due to the record of the South Korean Army in Vietnam. An American official says, "Every Korean seems to stand a foot taller because of that Army."

But the Army ls only one factor. Koreans, given the chance, developed efficient man­agers and bureaucrats for industry and gov­ernment. An American official gives this ex­ample:

"I can drop a letter in a postbox in Seoul today and have full confidence it will be delivered to the addressee 400 miles away in Pusan tomorrow-more sure than if I mailed a letter in New York City to an address in New York City."

American industry finds that Korean work­ers learn technical jobs faster and better than many other Asians. Head of a U.S. oil company with new refineries and fertilizer plants in Korea says the. newly trained tech­nical staff already is as good as the long­experienced crews the company employs. in similar plants in Denmark.

A major u·.s. TV-set producer has a 7-miI­llon-dollar plant. making parts for sets sold in America--and is se pleased with the re­sults. that It plans to build another plant.

By the beginning of 1967, American manu­facturers had invested almost 50 million dol­lars in plants in Korea, and more money was coming in. This fiCI>w helped bring a dramatic change in the nature of Korean ex­ports. In 1960, only 12 per cent were manu­factured goods-. By 1966, processed products made up 62 per cent of total exports.

More U.S. investments have gone into oil refineries, fertilizer plants, TV and other electronics. The first major U.S. investment didn't come until 1963, when an oil qompany built a 5-mlllion-dollar refinery. It was an­other two year.13 before the next big single investment-a 10-mlllion-dollar fertilizer plant, built by the same oil company.

Willingness to gambre and try new things, general in Asia, ii; very pronounced in Korea.

As an example, the Government 1-s order­ing drastic change in farming methods for the whole country. First, in 1962, the mili­tary junta banned the age-old system of moving water uphill, from low-lying rice fields to higher ones, by treadmill or bucket~ All farmers were ordered to buy motorized pumps, made in Korea.

Now an even more drama.tic change has been ordered. Traditionally, Korean farmers owned small, scattered plots of ground. The Chung Hee Park Government. has ordered re­arrangement of ownership, so that each farmer will have all his land in one piece. Surveys are under way to assure fair trades. At the same time, new irrigation systems are being built, with the water on high ground so it no longer will have to be pumped up­hill.

All this ls part of the second five-year de­velopment plan of President Park. His ob­jective, U.S. officials say, is to give Korea its first "golden age."

New cities are being created. More power is being generated. More private homes are getting piped water. Old, uneconomic build­ings are to be demolished. New ones must meet rigid specifications.

Diplomatically, too, Korea is moving. It was President Park who first proposed the Manila summit meeting of heads of state that had troops in Vietnam, held in October, 1966. And he was furious when President Ferdinand E. Marcos of the Phillipines made the initial announcement.

Amerfcan diplomats in Seoul are certain that when the time comes to talk peace in Vietnam, the Koreans will insist on being heard. And they can be expected to be tough. They don't want to settle for Just a non­Communist South Vietnam. They want an anti-Communist regime in Saigon.

South Korea still is having trouble with the North Korean Communists, who have trained special military teams to step up infiltration, sabotage.

The Communist North has several objec­tives: Disrupt South Korea's economic boom-which comes at a time of increasing economic trouble in the North. Attract at­tention of the Communist world, in an ef­fort to force Russia to restore economic aid which was cut because of heavy Soviet com­mitments elsewhere. Create enough disturb­ance to prevent South Korea from send­ing more troops to Vietnam.

It was for these reasons that North Korea heightened tension this year by sending 31 infiltrators into Seoul in a vain effort to as­sassinate President Park, and by seizing the U.S. surveillance ship Pueblo,

South Korean troops, along with 50,000 Americans, seem strong enough to hold along the Demilitarized Zone, against the armed infiltrators. Farther south, 230 police field­farce teams have pro"Ved effective, so far, against Communist infiltration-sabotage groups that land from small boats.

The infiltration and harassment are more than distraction. As an example, the town of Munsan-ni, with 31,000 people, is too close to the Demilitarized Zone to be a. safe place to establish industry, which ls de­sired there.

The example of Korea shows what can be accomplished by a nation in the new environment of freedom in Asia erasing the ravages of war.

Japan is another outstanding exam­ple of what rehabilitation and recon­struction can mean in the context of a New Asia.

An article from the U.S. News & World Report follows:

JAPAN: MAKER AND BUYER

The stamp of Japanese power ls seen everywhere in Asia.--and other Asians want the same success for themselves.

Theaters feature Japanese movies. Plush hotels in Manila, Hong Kong, Taipei and elsewhere have Japanese restaurants-and lobbies filled with Japanese 1:>usinessmen.

You ride Japanese-made taxicabs in Seoul, Manila, Taipei. Saigon streets are clogged with Japanese motorbikes. Billboards every­where advertise Japanese automobiles, mo­torbikes, TV and radio sets, watches, cam­eras--even Tokyo depaTtment stores.

Not even in the days when their armies occupied much of Asia have Japanese had it so good-and they know it.

For one thing, they no longer must sacri­fice at home to support armies abroad. In­stead, profits from this new way of spreading Japanese power and influence bring the good thin6s of life to the average Japanese-­even on the farm.

In farm villages, a TV antenna seems to be a part of every rooftop. You see more ceramic-tile roofs now, fewer thatch roofs. Remote farm villages have running water in the houses, washing machines and refrig­erators for the housewife, electric shavers for the farmers.

Large numbers of J apanese families own automobiles-and a most significant change is that the once-retirtng Japanese woman often drives the family car.

This explosion in Japanese demand for consumer goods is. a boon to that country's Asian neighbors, in opening up new mar.kets for them.

Taiwan,, for example, boosted food exports from I6.5 million dollars in 1960 to 128 mil­lion 1-n 1966, largely because of new sales to Japan.

In those six years, Taiwan's exports of ba­nanas went from 6.8 million dollars to 57.4 million, of asparagus from zero to 14.9 mil­lion, and of canned mushrooms from 150,000 to 29 million.

Sales rose despite almost prohibitive Jap­anese tariffs-70 per cent on bananas last year, for example.

These high tariffs are illustrative of the fact that the Japanese are not easy to do business with. Americans are :finding that out.

In automobiles, for example, the J'apanese now are the second-biggest producer in the world, having passed West Germany 1-n vol­ume during the last year.

Japanese auto makers are pushing sales in the United States. But high Japanese tariffs are all but pricing American-built cars out Of the Japanese market.

American manufacturers sent a delegation to Tokyo last year to try to get a more even break. They didn't get it.

An American official says: "Their manufactw."ed goods compete with

ours-so they want to keep our processed and manufactured goods out of Japan, use us as a source of raw materials."

Two oi the raw materials Japan most wants f:rom U.S. now are natural gas, from Ala5ka, and timber, from the Pacific North­west. Purchases of each &Fe growing. Special ships are being built to carry liquefied natural gas from Alaska. Need for this gas went UJ>' when Japan found that the Arab­Israeli war last June threatened its supply of Mideast. oil, main fuel for Japanese power­generating plants.

Japanese, outbidding Amerioons for tim­ber in the U.S. Northwest, have created a shortage of logs. U.S. mill owners and unions­charge that, as a result, lumber mills are f·orced. to close, worker.s left jobless.

To American diplomats, these problems a.re annoying, but not explosive. These diplomats are satisfied that Japan-because of its new affluence and power-is obliged to s-tand with the United States and the free world in order to protect its own interests.

U.S. and Japan, it is pointed out, have similar problems. Each must give foreign aid. Each must defend its interests against the more extreme demands of the undeveloped countries, as pushed through the UN. Con­ference on Trade and Development.

In addition, Japan's annual two-way trade of about 20 billion dollars depends on busi­ness with the richer nations of the free world.

As Japan's worldwide economic interests grow, the Japanese Government is being forced into a. more active posture on inter­national diplomatic issues.

Until a year or so ago, the Japanese were able to keep out of most international squabbles, rarely took strong positions on diplomatic issues. Main efforts were devoted to developing economic strength at home.

But now Tokyo is obliged to speak up more. As an example, late in 1967 Premier Eisaku Sato toured Asian capitals-and made a stop in Saigon that was politically pointed. He was standing up and being counted on the side of the U.S. in Vietnam.

At almost the same time, Defense Minister Chiang Chingkuo of the Nationalist Chinese Government, son of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, was received officially in Tokyo. The younger Chiang asked for and got as­surances that. Japan would not materially expand its oommerce with Communist China.

Two-way Japanese trade with the Chinese mainland was 621 ml-llion dollars- in 1966-about 200 million more than Japan's trade with Taiwan.

Trade with other Asian Communist coun­tries, however, was modest-27 million dol-

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7957 lars with North Korea, 15 million with North Vietnam, according to Japanese figures.

The Tokyo Government is sensitive to Asian reactions to its trade with the Com­munists. As an example, under pressure from South Korean officials in Seoul, Japan can­celed negotiations to sell a synthetic-textile factory to North Korea.

The horizon for new Asia is full of promise but the immediate problems fac­ing many of the new nations are crucial. The road ahead for them and for those who support their efforts will not be easy.

A brief survey of the situations pre­vailing in seven of the nations of new Asia reveals the extent of the challenge posed by aggression, subversion, and terror.

SUBVERSION AND TERROR

In Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh still strives to conquer the South Vietnamese peo­ple. In Laos, the North Vietnamese Com­munist forces have violated Lao sover­eignty and invaded Lao territory to op­erate the infiltration trails leading to Vietnam as well as to attack Lao Gov­ernment positions in the countryside. The North Vietnamese have sent approx­imately 40,000 troops into Laos in viola­tion of two Geneva agreements, 1954 and 1962. They have assaulted the Royal Lao Government as it seeks to maintain a position of neutrality in political affairs. Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma has denounced the North Vietnamese for their attacks and declared his intention to resist the aggression.

Mr. MURPHY of New York. Mr. Speak­er, recently a senior representative of the weekly U.S. News & World Report-­Howard Randleman-returned to the Far East after an absence of 15 years. In his report, published in an issue earlier this month of that distinguished journal, he revealed his amazement at what he saw, which he labeled a success story. I would go further, I would call it a success story largely ignored, or a virtually un­known success story.

Wherever he traveled in the area he saw great progress. He saw great con­fidence. And everywhere he found that confidence related directly, by the man in the street as well as by political leaders and ·other key people, to the stand the United States has taken in Vietnam. Our recognition that we are members of the community of the Pacific as they are, our fidelity to our commitments, our eagerness to trade as equal partners and to cooperate in aid programs where nec­essary, these he found essential ingredi­ents in the success story of these our neighbors on the further shores of the Pacific.

Among Asians he discovered wide ap­proval for the help we are giving the South Vietnamese, thereby fulfilling our treaty obligations. This is not to say there is no dissent from our policy. There is dissent there, as there is here. This is particularly so in Japan, where an ex­treme sentiment of pacifism has been the reaction in some circles to the country's defeat after its imperialist adventures of the thirties and the forties. But the dis­sent is far outweighed by understanding and support, here implicit, there explicit, for our determination in Vietnam.

I would not . accuse our press and our television of completely ignoring this story. Even the New York Times, which is unfortunately and wrongly in head­strong opposition to our policy did a survey of Asian countries some time ago which came up with similar results. But I think it is worth calling attention to Asian support, Mr. Speaker, because all too often those who in our own country dissent from our policy allege, whether out of ignorance or out of malice I do not know, that the United States finds little or no support for its position in the countries of the Far East.

In judging the issues in Vietnam, Mr. Speaker, we must pay close attention to attitudes in the Far East. After all, that is the area which is in danger should we withdraw or fail. These countries know conditions in the area best. They are most aware, of the stakes, that they will be the next victims of subversion, aggres­sion and terror in the guise of so-called wars of national liberation, should Ha­noi be allowed to carry out its purposes against South Vietnam and Laos.

Perhaps the Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs and Acting Minister of Foreign Affairs put it best when he said:

It is not South Vietnam which seeks to annex North Viet-Nam, but vice-versa. This has been officially admitted by Hanoi, and Peking is giving Hanoi every encouragement. Peking's and Hanoi's involvement in the Communist offensive in Laos is also well

. known . . . Peking has repeatedly threat­ened Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore with so-called People's Wars to be launched by local Communist movements against these three countries.

And the Prime Minister of Singapore has said:

If the Communists are able to advance their frontiers to envelop South Viet-Nam, it will only be a matter of time before the same process of emasculation by mlli tary and po­litical techniques will overtake the neigh­boring countries.

In view of this threat to their own ex­istence, it is hardly surprising that lead­ers on the other side of the Pacific ap­prove of our engagement in Vietnam. They see the issue broadly, as for ex­ample the President of the Philippines, who stated not long ago:

For the present and the years ahead, Com­munist China's neighbors cannot expect, singly or together, to "balance" China's cru­cial margin of nuclear power without the as­sistance of non-Asian countries like America.

The lamented late Prime Minister of Australia, Harold Holt, said only last year:

The free countries of this region want the Western world to know that we regard the contribution made in particular by the United States to the security and progress of this area as fundamental to our prospects of security and national growth.

Now naturally, Mr. Speaker, opinions vary among our neighbors in the Pacific area on some specific points of policy. They interpret differently developments in the conflict. But here again, American critics who claim universal support in that region for cessation of the bombing of North Vietnam, for example, are clearly wrong. Here I would · quote the

Foreign Minister of Japan, who declared last year:

I do not subscribe to the thought that if the United States would only stop bombing, something may come of it. It is not that simple. . . . There are some Americans who hold this view .... But, I believe that to do so is a dangerous gamble. I feel this way be­cause this line of reasoning contains the risk of further escalating the war.

I fear that from the way the debate on Vietnam has gone in this country in re­cent weeks, our Pacific area friends may doubt our constancy and our resolve. Some have shrewdly suggested that this debate was the real objective of the enemy in his treacherous offensive dur­ing the Tet truce he had proclaimed.

As we consider the issues we face to­day, Mr. Speaker, I believe that it is ad­vis:ible to keep the thoughts of our friends in the Far East very much in mind. It is fashionable today to dismiss outright the domino theory. Asians do not. They know well what lies ahead for them should we abandon our commit­ment in Vietnam.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Mr. Speaker, I would like to compliment the gentleman from South Carolina, Congressman DORN, for this special order on Vietnam and for his dedication to his country and his unabashed patriotism. Very few peo­ple represent the great spirit of our coun­try as well as he does .

Our policy aims in Vietnam are limit­ed, they are limited to securing peace for that country and for that part of the world. We are engaged in a hard, long struggle in Vietnam. That struggle is one which we entered only in response to overt aggressive acts by a country whose policy aims were to undermine, destroy, and take over the Republic of Vietnam. At that time, the record shows that our first reaction was to seek a peaceful solu­tion to the aggression of North Vietnam. Our efforts in this regard failed not be­cause they were not genuine, for they were, but because the Government of North Vietnam would not change its aggressive policies. This attitude of the North Vietnamese has not changed in the many years that we have sought to end this war by other means than mili­tary. We have sought peace through over 1,000 peace feelers only to have every one turned down by the North.

As leader and stabilizer of the politics of the free world we must see that the law of nations is not abrogated by the actions of countries in whose interest it is to establish p-uerrilla organizations in every country within their sphere. Vietnam is the place where this is happening, and Vietnam is the place where this form of aggression will be stopped. We are there not because we want young men to die, but because we want them to live and be free.

We may differ on the proper policy to be applied in the Far East, we may separate on questions of strategy. We may divide on personalities. But we will be united in our devotion to liberty and justice, be singleminded in our will to preserve our institutions. We hope that they may be preserved in peace, but pre­serve them we shall.

7958 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968

The issues which might divide our people are far transcended by the things which unite them. Our President is wasting no effort and losing no time in doing for America what every American wants-to live peacefully.

There are many people and many groups that have sprung up lately, claim­ing to be more for peace than anyone else. I believe there is no one in this country who has worked harder or who has made more attempts to secure real peace than President Johnson. Yet, our President cannot merely stand up and make a speech about how he wants peace, he has to prove it. I believe President Johnson has proved his dedication to peace many times. He must bear the awesome burden of responsibility that goes with being President, and he cannot be satisfied with mere words, he does not have the right to call for peace and have that be enough. He must seek out peace. No one has done more for this cause than President Johnson. Perhaps it is time for some of the slogans and signs to be directed at Ho Chi Minh. Perhaps too it is time to soberly and maturely realize that no amount of abuse heaped on President Johnson can make him want peace more than he does right now and because if the other side is not interested what can really be done. This is the crux of the problem. What can we do now? No voice has been heard from the wilderness of discontent which directs itself to this, the central ques­tion of the conflict we all want to see ended.

Mr. WRIGHT. Mr. Speaker, I want to commend my distinguished colleague from South Carolina upon his timely remarks.

It. seems to me to be essential in ap­proaching the problem of Vietnam that we try to understand the dilemma and the tragedy of the forgotten man in Viet­nam: The non-Communist South Viet­namese Nationalist, who wants only that his country be permitted its territorial integrity in which its own people may work their will by orderly and peaceful internal processes.

He is more numerous and. more legit­imate, and in many ways more coura­geous and more sacrificing than his widely heralded, disciplined, trained, dedicated adversary, the Vietcong. But he has suffered greatly in the last sev­eral decades of Vietnamese history through his own pettiness and deficien­cies. The non-Communist South Viet­namese, an overwhelming majority of the population of South Vietnam, have a recent 28-year history of internal bick­ering, divisive and strength-sapping dis­putes, failure until recently to generate a constitutional system and a unifying elected spokesman and leader, corrup­tion through the attractions of material­ism in high places, and 'being misunder­stood and mistreated by allies and by world opinion.

Nevertheless, the typical South Viet­namese has continued steadfast in his anticommunism and in his defense of his institutions against armed usurpa­tion. Experts estimate that 1 million North Vietnamese refugees and South Vietnamese have been killed, wounded or kidnaped in their fight against the

Vietnamese Communists since 1945. Very, very few indeed have willingly or voluntarily gone over to the Communist side in all these years.

In the months following the Geneva Accords of 1954, just short of 1 million North Vietnamese refugees left their homes and the bones of their ancestors in North Vietnam and fled to the south.

The fear that motivated this exodus was that of the expected Communist 'purge and repression so necessary to the consolidation of any Communist police state. These fears were well justified, it seems, because even after the exodus of one-sixteenth of its population, the reign of terror among those who remained was so fearsome that even Communist voices were heard to cry for a halt to the slaughter which had put several hun­dred thousand North Vietnamese to death by the end of 1956.

Now these 1954 refugees from the north and their descendants, and the en­tire military and civilian governmental structure of South Vietnam, as well as the entire nongovernmental anti-Com­munist nationalist community of reli­gious leaders, scholars, intellectuals, businessmen, and plain people really de­serve our consideration.

If the events of the Communist Tet offensive in early February proved any­thing, they proved that the vast majority of South Vietnamese people still refuse to accept the political, social, and eco­nomic solution that Hanoi and its agents in the south are trying to impose by force. While there is still a certain amount of division, confusion, and dis­agreement among the various elements that make up non-Communist South Vietnamese nationalists, there is clearly agreement on this one point.

That the Communist elements have a certain measure of popular support in the South cannot be doubted, but that this support is a distinct minority is also beyond doubt. It is very easy for us to become frustrated when, in the midst of the life and death conflict, in Vietnam we :find Buddhists alined against Cath­olics; Central Vietnamese and northern refugees disputing with southerners; rural folk being misunderstood and ignored by urban folk; Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Montagnard, Cham, and ethnic Cambodian minorities being ignored and, therefore. struggling against the govern­ment for recognition; and rich Viet­namese exploiting 'poOr Vietnamese. But this must not be allowed to obscure the basic nature of the struggle.

That basic nature is of the essence of the United Nations Charter. It is collec­tive resistance to armed aggression. It is the essence of our treaties and agree­ments with more than 40 other countries of this world. It is of the essence of our democratic system and our concept of the rights of man; namely, whether one Political entity has the right to imPose a military solution on another against the latter's will. So much of what is heard and so much that bothers us could be disposed of if we could keep the answer to that question always in mind.

Mr. BENNETT. Mr. Speaker, we are aJ.1 indebted to the gentleman from South Carolina in bringing about this discussion. He has shown himself to be

a level-headed patriot, a distinguished legislator and always a dedicated friend of whatever is best for our country, re­gardless of whether it may be helpful or pleasant for himself.

Mr. Speaker, the war in South Viet­nam is not the complicated thing that some would make it. We have a treaty under which we agreed to assist in put­ting down aggression in South Vietnam if the Government there asked it of us. The aggression occurred and we were asked by the South Vietnamese Govern­ment to help put down the aggression; and this we are doing. What other moral course is open to us? I think none.

It is significant that not one of the aspirants for the presidency in this country has suggested simply withdrawal by the United States from South Viet­nam. In fact what they seem to be say­ing is that war is unpleasant, horrible, expensive, and tragic. General Sher­man said it more pithily when he said "war is hell."

In my opinion we need to reconcile ourselves to the fact that what we have to do is to bring this war to as prompt an end as possible by way of military victory. As we do so perhaps we can shorten the time and the sacrifice on both sides by a diplomatic conclusion consistent with the principles upon which we entered the fight, to let this little country choose its own government free from external aggression. I hope this can be done; but without the mili­tary victory or strong progress toward it, there seems to be little hope. Military might should never be used unless vic­tory is the goal sought. Otherwise we do an injustice to those who fight for us. We should stop apologizing for doing what is right and get on with the job.

TOWARD GREATER ECONOMY IN OPERATION OF FEDERAL AVIA­TION ADMINISTRATION The SPEAKER. Under a previous order

of the House, the gentleman from Georgia [Mr. THOMPSON] is recognized for the remaining 15 minutes of his special order.

Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent- to re­vise and extend my remarks and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Georgia?

There was no objection. Mr. THOMPSON of Georgia. Mr.

Speaker, the international gold crisis and the shaky condition of the dollar has finally made the administration recog­nize what many of us have been say­ing for more than a year-that the Fed­eral Government must reduce deficit, nondefense spending substantially as part of the effort to cut down inflation-ary pressures in the American economy. My purpose in speaking out today is to point out to my colleagues an area where meaningful reductions can be made through more efficient utilization of the taxpayers' dollars. Specifically, I direct your attention to the operations of the Federal Aviation Administration.

Let me say in the beginning as a pilot

March 27, 1968 _CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7959 and as one who has intense personal interest in aviation safety, that all of us recognize the value and the need of the FAA. The safety of millions of com­mercial airline passengers, and crews, and millions of pilots and passengers in general aviation, depends upon the ef­ficiency with which the FAA fulfills its purpose. This Congress, I am confident, would be the last to endanger the safety of a single human creature in the name of economy. But economy in operating the FAA does not mean reducing the ef­fectiveness of this vital agency. I have in my possession information and statistical data prepared at my request by the Gen­eral Accounting Office which, in my judgment, presents a clear-cut case of inefficient, wasteful use of millions of dollars in tax funds by the FAA which if corrected will in no way diminish the safety policing function of the FAA.

Mr. Speaker, I regret to report that in the name of air safety, on the pretense of necessity to protect the flying public, the FAA has amassed a fleet of aircraft comparable in numbers to that of the largest commercial airlines in operation today. The General Accounting Office verified, on table l, which I am asking be entered into the RECORD, that as of June 20, 1967, the FAA owned a total of 101 planes, about the same size as the fleet of Delta Airlines. Some of these, indeed, are necessary, for they are instru­mented aircraft designed to calibrate and check the navigational aids installed near airports throughout the Nation. But I question the necessity, in fact, I chal­lenge it-and I think you will also--of the FAA owning an air fleet with an inven­tory value of $46,000,000.

An interesting fact in this fleet of air­craft owned, maintained and operated by the FAA, as shown on table II which I am also entering into the RECORD, is that there are a number of expensive, luxury, executive-type aircraft. The table shows Grumman Gulfstreams, a Lockheed Jet Star, Beechcraft Queen Aires and tur­bine-driven Aero Commanders-some of these planes having cost the taxpayers more than $1,360,000 apiece on initial purchase.

The major use of many of these air­craft, as shown on table VI which I am also entering into the RECORD, is "job performance." Indeed, it is my judgment that an excessive amount of these air­craft is involved in "job performance" wherein executive personnel of the FAA, who hold pilot ratings but whose job is not particularly one of flying, use these aircraft as a means of continuing their pilot skills although this is not a require­ment of their jobs. Here again, this utilization seems to me to be a wasteful use of the tax funds given this agency to promote and enforce air safety. Why, I ask, should the taxpayers have to provide expensive executive, luxury-type aircraft for these government personnel to keep up their pilot proficiency when their jobs do not require it?

A careful analysis of the inventory of aircraft compiled by the GAO also raises some other very serious questions about the necessity of the FAA owning and maintaining such a tremendous fleet of aircraft. This analysis will show that the

inventory includes a large .fleet of the biggest jets in commercial airline opera­tion-planes that cost as much as $4,000,-000 each. The list includes big jets like the Boeing 720, Convair 880, Boeing 727 ·and C-135. What's more, I am told, the FAA plans to purchase another expensive big jet during fiscal 1968-a Douglas DC-9, again at the taxpayers' expense.

Tremendous sums of money have been invested by the FAA on equipment ap­parently on the questionable theory that in order for FAA safety agents to prop­erly check airline pilots, the FAA should have available for training purposes at least one of each type of big jet aircraft commercially operated by the airlines. Indeed, the flight time logged on some of these plans, as reflected in table VI, does reflect much utilization for training purposes.

But, here again, there are some items which raise grave doubts about the ne­cessity of such large capital investments for training purposes. The FAA, for ex­ample, has a Convair 880 Model M which is probably the only one of its type in the world today. A safety agent trained only in this aircraft would not be competent to check out pilots flying any other Con­vair 880 because their instrumentation is di:ff erent. Thus, training in this air­craft could not fulfill the purpose of the FAA.

In addition, an incident has been brought to my attention-and verified by the General Accounting Office's in­vestigation-which indicates that some of the log entries of training flights may not be training flights at all. Acting on information supplied by me, the GAO found that a Boeing 727 owned by the FAA-purchased with your tax money at a cost of $4,299,000-:flew a grGup of 26 women from Washington to Atlanta and Marietta, Ga., and returned last October 26.

The women were members of the FAA Women's Advisory Committee on Avia­tion and their purpose in making the flight-which was authorized by the FAA Administrator-was to observe a new type of air traffic control system at the Atlanta Municipal Airport.

The General Accounting Office, usually a "tiger" about such :flippant use of tax money, reported that the agency's pol­icy for the use of its aircraft provides that passengers may be carried on agency aircraft when the carrying of such passengers will not result in addi­tional cost of the Government and when advance authorization has been granted by the agency official having dispatch authority for the flight involved. After reviewing FAA's regulations, GAO stated:

It appears that the use of the Boeing 727 aircraft . . . was within the agency's guide­lines for the use of its aircraft.

But this statement raises more ques­tions than it answers. Just what kind of regulations does the FAA have that will allow a $4 million aircraft with a ca­pacity of 83 passengers to be used legiti­mately at the people's expense to ferry 26 women and three crewmen on a 1,200-mile flight? Is this the FAA's definition of training as the flight log reflects? Just how many other training flights

shown in the FAA aircraft logs were ·actually made for such purposes?

The total per-flight-hour cost on some ·of these aircraft was almost a million dollars during 1967. The FAA operated 51 DC-3 aircraft for 48,000 hours at a ·cost of $9,400,000. These aircraft are the workhorses of the FAA fleet, constantly checking and rechecking navigation and landing aids.

Then, there are the big jets, one of which cost almost a million dollars per year just to operate. Are these aircraft necessary? The bxpayers should be told. Congress should be told. Simple explana­tions of "job performance" or "training" should not be allowed to suffice when so much in tax money is involved, as shown by table VI, which is also entered in the Record.

As astronomical as the purchase price and operational costs of these aircraft are, they are by no means as costly to the people in the long run as maintenance and upkeep for such sophisticated jet equipment. Table IV, which I am also inserting in the RECORD, demonstrates how costly maintenance can be. During a 2-year period, GAO reported the FAA has spent more than $31,700,000 on main­tenance of these aircraft alone-and this total was developed with incomplete and insufficient cost uata. I think it is sig­nificant to the taxpayers that GAO states it was "unable to obtain complete inf or­mation on all aircraft because the agency does not have a uniform cost reporting system for its aircraft operations." This fact is incomprehensible and inexcusable when $46,000,000 worth of aircraft and an annual maintaintence cost of about $15,000,000 is involved. These figures do not include costs which often can, in the long run, exceed the purchase price of the aircraft, such as spare parts, crew salaries and ground facilities needed to support such an extensive air fleet.

And, as if to add insult to injury, Mr. Speaker, the FAA in addition to the amount of tax money burned up in main­taining and operating this air fleet, also spent over a quarter of a million dollars last year on leased aircraft. Table 3, which I am entering into the RECORD, shows $380,000 was spent in 1967 for this purpose and $119,000 in 1966. On top of that, as shown by table VII, better than $3,000,000 has been spent over the last 3 years by the FAA on open market rental aircraft.

Mr. Speaker, I have presented the ma­terial gathered at my request by the GAO in detail so that my colleagues and the people will know the reason for my con­cern and share my conviction that money can be saved through more efficient op­eration of the FAA. I am making a copy of the complete GAO report available to the Government Operations Committee and am requesting the committee to ini­tiate a staff study to check into the ac­tual need by the FAA for this large num­ber of aircraft.

I am confident many of my colleagues will share my conviction that it is unnec­essary for the FAA to maintain this large fleet of aircraft to maintain the pro­ficiency of its safety agents, when it is possible for these personnel to better maintain their proficiency for millions

7960 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968

of dollars less in costs by means of a contract agreement with the various air­lines and remove the necessity for owning a fleet of expensive airplanes which re­quire such expensive ground support facilities.

Recognizing the propensities of bu-

reaucracy, I am certain that any attempt by the Congress to "clip the wings" of the FAA by suggesting that its mission can be better served in .a more economi­cal manner through a contract with the airlines instead of owning this costly aircraft fleet, will be met with cries of

indignation. But, Mr. Speaker, I say that this is a situation that demands our at­tention. If we are here to protect the tax­payers, if it is our purpose to reduce ex­penditures to protect the economy, then here is an opportunity. I urge the Con­gress to accept it.

TABLE 1.-INVENTORY OF ACTIVE AIRCRAFT OWNED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AS OF JUNE 30, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1965, 1966, AND 1967

Aircraft type June 30,

1962

Number of aircraft included in inventory of-

June 30, June 30, June 30, June 30, 1963 1964 1965 1966

June 30, 1967

Aero Commander AC-680___ 1 2 1 1 1 1 Beechcraft T-34 B(D-45)____ _________ _ 1 1 1 1 1 Beech craft C-45_ ________ ___ 10 ___ ------ ____ ------ ______________________________ _ Beechcraft 95 BE-55________________________ ______ _____ __ _ 4 4 4 Beechcraft BE-65______________ _______ 2 2 2 2 2 Beechcraft BE-80---------------------------- ----- --- ----- 4 4 4 Boeing KC-135A___________ 2 2 2 2 2 2 Boeing B-720______________ 1 1 1 1 1 1 Boeing B-727 --------------- ---- ____ ---- ---------- -------- -- __ ---- - _ -- - - - - --- 1 Convair CV-340-31________ ___ ________ 2 2 1 1 1 Convair JC-13L____________ 2 2 2 1 -- ------ -- -- ------ --Convair CV-580_________ ___ 5 5 5 5 Beechcraft C-18S___________ 1 ----------------- ------ __ -------- ------ ______ ____ _ Bell H-13H ___ ------------- 1 ----- -------------- -------- ------ ---- --- --- -------Convair CV-880 22M__ ______ 1 1 1 1 1 1 Convair T-29________________________ 10 10 10 10 10 Douglas DC-3____________ __ 63 61 62 52 52 51

Note: The agency plans to purchase a Douglas DC-9 aircraft during fiscal year 1968.

Number of aircraft included in inventory of-Aircraft type

June 30, 1962

June 30, June 30, 1963 1964

Douglas DC-6B _____________ ______ _____________ _ Douglas DC-7_ ___ __ ___ ___ __ 1 1 Douglas C-54__ ____________ 2 7 Fairchild C-123B_____ _____ _ 1 1 Grumman G-159___ __ ____ ___ 1 1

2 1 4 1 3

June 30, 1966

2 1 4 1 3

June 30, 1967

2 1 4 1 3

Grumman SA-16A_____ __ ___ 1 Grumman HU-lGA _______________ __ __ _ 1 - - - --

1 1 --------------------------=---Grumman F9L_______ ___ ___ 3 Lockheed L-188C____ _______ 1 1 1 1 Lockheed L-749____________ 2 4 4 3 Lockheed L-1329 ____ -------- ________ _ 1 1 1 Lockheed TV-2_____________ 5 5 5 4 Martin RB-57_________ _____ 1 Piper PA- 22.-------- -- ---- 1 1 1 ------========================

Total aircraft_________ 106 113 116 105 103 101

TABLE 2.-INSTALLED PASSENGER CAPACITY AND COST OF AIRCRAFT OWNED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AS OF JUNE 30, 1967, AND JUNE 30, 1965

Aircraft type FAA

registration No.

Lockheed Jetstar 1329 _________ N-1 Grumman G-159 _______________ N-3

Do·-------------·-------- N-3 Douglas DC-3C ________________ N-5 Douglas DC-3A ______________ __ N-6 Douglas DC-3C _____ ____ __ ____ _ N-7

Dout:~-~~~~~:-~~-~~~~====== ttr Douglas DC-3A, type IL _______ N-12 Douglas DC-3C, type If ____ ---- N-14 Do _______________________ N-15 Douglas DC-3A, type If ________ N-16 Douglas DC-3C, type If ________ N-18

Do·---- ---------- -------- N-20 Do ______ ___ ______________ N-21 Do _______________________ N-22

Douglas DC-3, type IL ________ N-23 Douglas DC-3C, type If ________ N-25

Do----------------------- N-26 Do _______________________ N-27 Do _______________________ N-29

Do_·-------······-------· N-30 Do--·-·-··-·-···-·-----·- N-31 Do------·--··-----------· N-32 Do •• ·---------··--------- N-33 Do ••• ---·-···--·-----·-·- N-34 Do ••• ----·----------·---· N-35 Do ··--·····-·----------- N-36 Do ••••••••••••••••••••••• N-37 Do ••••••••••••••••••••••• N-38 Do ••••••••••••••••.••.••• N-39 Do •••• ------------------- N-40 Do ••••••••••••••••.• • •••• N-41 Do·-·-· ------------------ N-42 Do _______________________ N-45

Do .••• ----·------------- N-46 Do ••••••••••••••••••••••• N-47 Do •••••••••••••••••.••••. N-48 Do •••• ------------------- N-49 Do •••. ------------------- N-51

Douglas DC-3, type IL ........ N-52 Douglas DC-3C, type"-------- N-53

Do_·--------------------- N-54 Do •••• ------------------- N-55 Do _______________________ N-56

Do·-·-------------------- N-57 Do _______________________ N-58

Do----------------------- N-60 Do _______________________ N-62 Do _______________________ N-63 Do _______________________ N4i4

Lockheed L-749 _______________ N-65 Douglas DC-3C, type 11 •••••... N-66 Do _______________________ N-67

Do _____ ___ _______________ N-70 Douglas C-54G ________________ N-81

I Not available.

In­stalled

pas· senger

ca­pacity

10 20 20 11 19 12 7 7 6 7 7 7 4 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 9 7 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7

40 7 9 7

10

Cost Included in inventory

of-

June 30, 1967 June 30, 1965

$1, 360, 123 X X 1, 356, 845 X ------------

850, 000 ------------- X 90,000 X X 90,000 X X 90, 000 X 90, 000 X - - x· . --90,000 X 90, 000 X 90, 000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90, 000 X 90,000 C 90, 000 X 90, 000 X 90, 000 -------------90, 000 X 90, 000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90, 000 X 90, 000 X 90,000 X 90, 000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90 000 X 90:000 X 90, 000 X 90, 000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90, 000 -------------90, 000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90, 000 X 90 000 X 90:000 X 90, 000 X 90,000 X 90,000 X 90, 000 X

160, 000 -------------90, 000 X 90,000 X 90, 000 X

383, 000 X

x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

Aircraft type FAA

registration No.

In­stalled

pas­senger

ca­pacity

Cost Included in inventory

of-

June 30, 1967 June 30, 1965

Douglas C-54D ________________ N-82 16 $382, 780 X Do·----------------·-- --- N-84 10 382, 780 X Do _______________________ N-85 12 382, 780 X

Boeing KC-135A __________ ___ _ N-96 6 2,673,410 X Do·-- ---- ---------------- N-98 55 2,673,410 X

Douglas DC-3C C-47 _____ __ ____ N-100 10 90, 000 X Convair CV-580 _______________ N-101 6 735, 000 X

Do _______________________ N-102 6 735, 000 X Do _______________________ N- 103 6 735, 000 X Do·------ --------- ------- N-104 6 735, 000 X Do _______________________ N-105 6 735, 000 X

Lockheed L-188C ______________ N-111 68 2, 504, 649 X Convair 880 22M ______________ N- 112 72 3, 821, 079 X Boeing 720--027_ _________ __ ___ N-113 42 4, 299, 127 X Douglas DC-6B ________________ N-114 66 290, 000 X

Do _______________________ N-115 66 290, 000 X Convair 340-31__ ______________ N-118 44 404, 560 X

Lockg~~~-~~~~~========== === == tm :~ ~: ~:~: ~tl ============= Douglas L-749A-79 ____________ N-121 40 175,235 X Fairchild C-123B ______________ N-123 12 556, 342 X Boeing 727/61__ ____ ___ ___ __ ___ N-127 83 4, 553, 649 X Beechcraft 65 _________________ N-140 4 111, 820 X

Do _______________________ N- 141 4 139, 870 X Beechcraft Queen Air so _______ N-143 4 171, 889 X Beechcraft 95-855 _____________ N- 144 2 62, 746 X

Do _______________________ N- 145 4 62, 746 X Do _______________________ N-146 2 62, 746 X Do _______________________ N-38034 2 62, 746 X

x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x

--- x· - ------ x· --

x x x x x x

(N-147) Beechcraft Queen Air 80 _______ N-148 4 171,889 X X

Do _______________________ N-149 4 171,889 X X Do·---- ----------- ------- N-150 4 171, 889 X X

Lockheed TV-2 ________________ N-151 1 175, 106 ------------- X Lockheed TV-2/T-33 ___________ N-152 1 175, 106 X X

DO----------------------- N-155 1 175, 106 X X Do _______________________ N-156 1 175, 106 X X Douglas DC-3C ________________ N-182 6 90,000 X X Beechcraft T-34B(D-45) ____ ___ _ N-190 2 33, 716 X X Convair AT-29C _______________ N-244 10 682,000 X X

Do _______________________ N-245 13 682, 000 X X Do _______________________ N-246 11 682, 000 X X Do _______________________ N-247 11 682, 000 X X Do _______________________ N-248 10 682,450 X X Do _______________________ N-249 5 682, 000 X X Do __________________ __ ___ N-250 13 715,342 X X Do _______________________ N-251 10 682, 000 X X DO---------------- ------- N-252 10 682,000 X X

Convair T-29 _________________ N-254 10 682, 000 X X Grumman G-159 _______________ N-376 5 1, 177,648 X X

Do _______ ________________ N-377 5 1, 177,648 X X Douglas DC-7 _________________ N-464 49 229, 194 X X Convair JC-131. ___ _____ _______ N-466 (1) -------- --- -------------- X Aero Commander AC-680E. ____ N-477 5 126, 500 X X

Total active aircraft_________ _____ _______ _________________ 101 105 Total cost. _______________ __ ______________ -------- ______ $46, 068, 815 $45, 430, 080

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL ·RECORD- HOUSE 7961 TABLE3:-AIRCRAFT LEASED BY THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION AS OF JUN.E30,

1967, AND JUNE 30, 1965

Aircraft type FAA

registration No.

Aero Commander AC--o80T 1 ____ _ N- 146E Aero Commander AC-1121 2 __ ___ N-612JC Cessna C-210 3 _ _______________ N- 383 Lear Jet 23/24 2 ____ ______ ______ N- 1967L Aero Commander AC-560F 2 _ _ ___ N-78380 Cessna C- 310 •----- ---------- - - N-8026M Mooney Super 21 2 ____ __________ N- 7140U Mooney Super 21 2 __________ ____ N-5751Q

Installed passenger capacity

Rental paid in-

1967 1965

5 $59, 208 --- -- -- -- --- --i ___ ___ 149, 940_ - - -- ----------.

6 166, 666 --- - -- ------ --5 ---- ----- --- -- $72, 900 5 - ------------ - 41, 513 4 - --- ------ --- - 5, 174 4 5, 160 --- -- --· - -- ---

! ~~~r;~~t~naang3 ~{;~;h~~i~le~~:i:~~~~!s~~~ i~ t~~n!te~~:.y the agency. 3 Aircraft is leased for $1.00 a year for a research project. The lessor has been paid$19,543 for

costs related to the project. • Fuel and oil-and all maintenance furnished by the lessor.

TABLE 4.-AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE COSTS BY AIRCRAFT TYPE, FISCAL YEARS 1967 AND 1966

Maintenance cost Total Aircraft type ---------- maintenance

Scheduled Unscheduled cost

Aero Commander AC-680E: 1967 (l) _____________ --- -- ____ _ --- -- _____ $33, 808 $11, 957 $45, 765 1966 (l) ______ ----------- - - - - - -- -- __ -- - - • 26, 134 9,020 35, 154

Beechcraft T-348 (D-45): 1967 (}) _______________ _____ - - ------ __ -- _ 4,454 3,328 7, 782 1966 (l) ________ ---- - - -- -- ___ ------ - __ --- 20, 221 6,692 26,913

Beechcraft 95 BE-55: 1967 ( 4) ____ ------ - - - - ---- -- -- ______ -- ---1966 (4) ____ -- -- -- ------ -· -- -·-- -- -- ---·-

Beechcraft BE-65:

122, 585 101, 726

37, 526 51, 178

160, 111 152, 904

1967 (2) _____ -- __ _ ---- ---- -- -- -- _ - - - - -- _. 61, 542 34, 901 96, 443 1966 (2) ____ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- _ -- --- -· -- --- - · 67, 802 29,931 97, 733

Beechcraft BE-80: 1967 (4) ___ _ --- - -- -- -- __ -- -- - - -- -- __ ----- 178, 941 70, 500 249, 441 1966 (4) ___ _ -- -- ---· -- ___ ___ -- -- -- _ - -- -- • 209,474 93, 123 302, 597

Boeing KC- 135A: 694, 704 m~ m:::::: :: :: : ===== :: :: :: : : ====: ====

693, 047 1, 387, 751 1, 047, 377 109, 201 1, 156, 578

Boeing 8-720: 416, 871 314, 630 731, 501 1967 (!) _______________________ ·---·-----

1966 (1) ___ _ -- -----·---- ---· -- _ --- --·· --· 510, 233 329, 975 840, 208 Boeing 8-727: 1967 O>----------------------- 339, 414 224, 820 564, 234 Convair JC- 131: 1966 (1) (Disposed of in August

1965) ____ -- -- _ ----- -- -- -_ ----·- ------ -- -- • 13, 511 240 13, 751 Convair CV- 340- 31:

1967 (1) _______ ----- -- __ ------ -·-··· ___ -· 1966 (l) ____ - --- __ ---- ---- _ · - --- -·-- - - ---

Convair CV-580:

200, 427 161, 276

65, 073 82,233

265, 500 243, 509

1967 (5) ___ -- _ -- _ -- -- __ -- ______ -- ---- -- -- 779, 544 461, 984 1, 241, 538 1966 (5) __ _ -- -- -- __ -- ---- -- -- __ -- --- - -- -- 1, 021, 814 611, 972 1, 633, 786

Convair CV-880 22M:

m~ Ht::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 191, 731 571, 595

Convair T-29:

142, 492 290, 178

334, 223 861, 773

1967 (10) _____ -- __ -- ------ -- ---- -- ____ - - -1966 (10) ____ --- __ --- -- _ -- -- - - -- _ -- _ -- ---

965, 771 683, 760

239, 593 216, 406

1, 205, 364 900, 166

Douglas DC- 3: m~ gg--- -------------------- -- -- -- --- 3, 539, 421 5, 123, 150

1, 777, 848 2, 377, 130

5, 317, 269 7, 500, 280

Douglas DC-68: 147, 453 117, 005 264, 458 1967 (2) __ ___ -- -- ____ --- - - _ - ---- -·--·- -- -

1966 (2) ________ __ _____ ----- - -- - - -------- 321, 024 183, 643 504, 667 Douglas DC-7:

347, 633 1967 (l) ___ -- -- -- _ -- -- ____ - - -- __ - - __ - - -- _ 33, 776 381, 409 Doug~~:t~4: - - -- - - -- -------- -- -- -- --- - -- --· 47, 472 35, 882 83, 354

1967 ( 4) _____ ____ - - ____ -- ___ _ -- ____ __ - - -- 602, 659 199, 431 802, 090 1966 (4) __ __ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- --- 551, 183 200, 385 751, 568

Fairchild C- 1238:

rn~~ at:=================== =========== Grumman G-159:

206, 984 63, 708

44, 791 23, 378

251, 775 87, 086

m~ 8t=============================== 240, 967 231, 591

Lockheed L- 188C:

53, 054 71, 903

294, 021 303, 494

m~ HL:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: 132, 858 104, 503 237, 361 191, 870 163, 144 355, 014

Lockheed L- 749: 1967 (1) ____ ---- ---- __ - - - --- - - ----- - - --- · 143, 547 116, 845 260, 392 1966 (3) ______ ------ -------- -- -- ---- _ - -- - 292, 291 463, 112 755, 403

Lockheed L- 1329: 1967 (l) ___ --- -- -- -- -- ·--- -- -- -- -- _______ 202, 721 40, 252 242, 973 1966 (l) ___ _ -- -- - - -- -- -- - - - - -- -- --·- -- -- • 241, 837 63,.685 305, 522

Lockheed TV- 2: 1967 (3) ______ -- -- -- - - ---- __ ----··-- -- ---1966 (3) ____ - _ - - - - -- -- ------ ----------·--

Total:

138, 785 193, 743

75, 183 109, 172

213, 968 302, 915

1967 ___ -- -- -- ---- -- __ - • -- ·-·--- -·- 9,692, 830 4, 862, 539 14, 555, 369 1966 _____ ·--- -- ------·· --· -------- 11,962, 792 5, 521, 583 17, 214, 375

Note: Included in the above amounts for scheduled maintenance are the costs incurred at the Aeronautical CenterhOklahoma City, Okla., for engine overhaul, major overhaul, and modification of agency aircraft. T e cost applicable to these items of work amounted to $4,146,752 in fiscal year 1967 and $4,444,902 in fiscal year 1966.

Number shown in parentheses represents the number of aircraft as of the end of the year.

TABLE.5.-COST PER FLIGHT HOUR BY AIRCRAFT TYPE, FISCAL YEARS 1967 AND 1966

Aircraft type

Aero Commander AC-680E: 1967 p>--- -- ---- ------------- ----------·

Beecl~~~ft V- 348 (D-45):--- - ----- - -- -- ----- . 1967 (l) ___ -- -- __ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- _____ -- _ 1966 (l) ____ - - ---- - - - - ---- - - - - --- - - - ---- _

Beechcraft 95BE- 55: 1967 (4) ___ -- - - -- -- -- -- -- -- - - -- -- __ -- -- --1966 (4) ___ - - -- -- -- -- - -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- •

Beechcraft BE-65: 1967 (l) ___ -- -- -- -- ___ ---· -- -- -- -- -- -- -- _

Beecl~~~frnE-80:-- -- -- -- ----- -- - - - - -- -- -- -- -1967 (4) ____ -- -- -- -- __ -- ------ -- -- -- -- ___

Boei~~6~l~?35A: - - --- -- -- -- ---- -- -- -- ---- -- -1967 (2) ________ -- -- -- -- -- -- ---- -- -- -- _ --

Boei~~6it~do: -------- -- ---------------------1967 (1)-- -- -- -- __ -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- ------ _

Boei~~6itW1: ---------- ---·-----·-----------1967 (}) ____ __ -- -- -- -- __ ---- -- -- -- -- -- ___

Convair CV- 340-31: 1967 (l) _____ -- -- -- --- -- -- -- -- -- __ -- -- --· 1966 (l) ______ ____ ---- -- -------- -- --- - --·

Convair CV- 580: 1967 (5) __ _ -- -- __ -- -- _ -- -- -- -- -- __ -- -----1966 (5) __ __ -- -- -- ---- -- __ -- __ -- -- -- __ --·

Convair CV-88022M: 1967 (l) ___ __ - - --- - --- -- -------- - - -------1966 (l) ________ - - -- - - -- ----- - -- ---------

Convair T-29: 1967 ( 4) _______ ---------··---------------1966 (5) ______ ___________________________

Douglas DC-3: m~ gg-·-·----------------------------Douglas DC-68:

1967 (2)_ - - ------ --------···-------·-· · --1966 (2) __ _______________________________ Douglas DC- 7: 1967 (l) _________________________________

Doug~~~7l~4: - ------------ ----- - --- - -- --- -- -

1967 (3). ------------···-·--··-·-·-···-·-1966 (3)_ ------------------------------·-

Fairchild C-1238: 1967 (1). - - ------------------- -----------1966 (l)_ - - ------·- · - - -----·-·-· ------- --

Grumman G-159: 1967 (3). --- . -- • ---· .. ---·---------------1966 (3) .•. ----. ·-.. -- -----·--------- ----

Lockheed L-188C:

m~ HL:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Lockheed L-749:

rn~~ HL:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: Lockheed L- 1329:

1967 (1)_ ---- ---------------- ------ - - ----1966 (1). ----------·---------------------

Lockheed TV-2: 1967 (3) ________________________ . ----- ---1966 (3) . ........ ----. ---·-·-----. -·. - - --

Total tlight­hours

304 381

71 187

2,228 2, 117

487 440

2,454 2,270

2, 145 2, 190

1,284 1,421

1, 466

693 810

5, 441 5,845

565 1,228

2,505 2, 732

48,498 51,376

720 1, 263

128 261

2,648 3, 019

574 641

1, 442 1, 298

732 865

895 2,602

487 541

1,429 1, 712

NOTES

Total cost Average cost per flight-hour

$53, 686 $177 45, 083 118

7, 590 107 26, 141 140

180, 765 81 174, 139 82

68, 550 141 67, 708 154

275, 834 112 260, 112 115

1, 865, 982 870 1, 393, 908 636

757, 044 589 994, 118 700

662, 313 452

151, 588 219 246, 589 304

1, 114, 796 205 1, 356, 035 232

328, 908 582 771,274 629

812, 536 324 746, 619 273

9, 473, 256 195 10, 761, 258 209

312, 576 434 547, 446 433

75,400 589 175, 352 672

986,428 373 1, 019, 235 338

198, 375 346 197, 067 307

382, 845 265 398, 812 307

249, 398 341 377, 522 436

492, 987 551 1, 545, 055 594

195, 206 401 218, 407 404

275, 770 193 382, 773 223

(1) The number shown in parentheses represents the number of aircraft as of the end of the year, except as noted below.

(2) Tota I cost figures, except as noted below supposedly include direct and indirect mainte­nance cost, crew and related support costs, and the cost of fuel and oil. We did not verify the com­pleteness of the cost data recorded by the agency.

(3) Average cost per flight-hour for the following aircraft assigned to the European region was not computed because only maintenance cost was available.

1966: 1 BE-65, 5 T-29's. 1967: 1 BE-65, 6 T-29's.

In addition, no costs were available for the C-54 assigned to the European region during 1966 and 1967.

(4) Average cost per flight-hour for the following aircraft assigned to the Aeronautical Center is understated because the computation is based only on the cost of maintenance and fuel and oil costs.

1966: 1 T-34, 1 C-135.( 1 B-720, 1 CV-340, 4 CV- 580's, 1 CV-880, 5 DC-3's, 1 DC-6, 1 L-188, 1 L-749, 3 TV-.:'s.

1967: 1 T- 34, 1 C-135, 1 B-720, 1 B- 727, 1 CV- 340, 4 CV-580's, 3 OC- 3's, 1 DC-6, 1 L-188, 3 TV- 2's.

(5) Total cost figures do not include the costs of engine overhaul, major overhaul, and modifi· cation, performed at the Aeronautical Center.

TABLE 6.-AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION BY AIRCRAFT TYPE AND MAJOR CATEGORIES FISCAL YEARS 1967, 1966, AND 1965

Aircraft type

FAA-owned aircraft: Aero Commander AC-680E:

Flight inspection

and logistics

Hours flown

Job perform·

a nee

Training

tm m====== ============ == == == == == == == ======== ===========

Research and

deve.op­ment

304 381 326

Total hours flown

304 381 326

7962 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 TABLE 6.-AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION BY AIRCRAFT TYPE AND MAJOR CATEGORIES, FISCAL

YEARS 1967, 1966, AND 1965-Continued

Hours flown

Aircraft type Flight Research inspection Job Training and

and perform- develop-logistics ance ment

FM-owned aircraft-Continued Beechcraft T-34B (0-45):

mi m____ ____ ___ ______________ ____ __ ~~ ========== l~~ Beec1~~~~1~5-BE-55: ---- ---- - ------- · · ------ -- ----. --- ·. · - -- -- - 276

BeJ~!iJtj5=:========================== ~: m === ============ ==== = rnii m _____________________ -------32- m ====================

Beec1~~~f~E-80: -------------------- ----- 793 ----------------- -- -

1967 (4) 2, 454 -- ----------- ---- ---

.,.;1m1~{iiit= ;;;=;;;;;==;;====;\;t} a:i::;: ;;; ; ; : '.\ ;; ;:;;;

eo,;i~-{l: :: :::::: :: ::::::::--_ '· I:-::::::::::---ii~-;;;;;:;;;; 1965 (l) _____ -- --------- ---- -- -- ___ - --- - -- ---- --· 1, 387 ·---- -- --·

Boeing B-727: 1967 (1)-------- ------- -- ---------- -- - · 1,466 ---------· Convair JC-131:

1966 (Disposed of in August 1965) _______________________ ___________________________ _

1965 (l) ___ ---- -- -- ------- - - -- -- -- -- ---- - - ----- - -- ---- - -- -· Convair CV-340-31:

6 560

1967 (l)__ ____ ___________________________________ 693 --------1966 (l) ___ -- ------ - - ----- -- -- -- -- - - -- -- ---- -- --- 810 -- ----- - . -1965 (l) ___ __________________________ - ---------- 1,254 ---------·

Convair CV-580: 1967 (5>-- ------~----------- - 5, 250 -------------- --- --- 191

m~ ~~L====== ============ ~:m === ====== === ========-------~~-Convair CV-880 22M:

mrnL================= ·==========--- -----9

- d~i --- -- --~~-1965 (l) ___ -- -- ---- -- -- _ -- -- --------- _ -- . _ -- -- -- _ 913 - - - -- -- --· Convair T-29:

1967 (10)____________ ________ 66,. ~~~ -__ -:::::::::::::::::: 763 1966 (10)____________________ 1, gig 1965 (10)____________________ 5, 879 - -------- · 38

Douglas OC-3: 1967 (51).___________________ 46, 170 1, 040 1,288 --------- · 1966 (52)____________________ 49, 169 518 1,668 21 1965 (52)________ ____ ________ 51, 543 1, 333 2, 735 140

Dougi~P~~:------------------ ----- -- -------- -- -- - 515

1:~ ~R=================================== == === l: g~~ Douglas DC-7: 1967 (1) ______ -_ - - - - - - -- -- - - - - - - ---- - - -- -- - - - - -- - - -- - - - - - -• 1966 (1) ....• _ -- ______ ---- ____ - -- • __ -- -- · - -- • - ---- - -• - -- -- • 1965 (1) ______ ___ • - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - -- -- - - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -

Douglas C-54:

205 177 75

128 261 172

1967 (4)____________ ______ ___ 3, 329 1966 <4>-------------- _______ 34,. 91M ___ -·_ :::::::::::::: :::::: ______ _ 1965 (4) ____________________ _

Fairchild C-1238: 1967 (!) ____________________ _ 1966 (!) ____________________ _ 1965 (l) ____________________ _

Grumman G-159:

574 ------ -----------------------· 641 _ -- ------ -------- __ ---- -- -- -- • 555 --- -- -- -- --- - -- -- ---- ---- -- -- -

1967 (3) •••. -- ------ ---- -- -- --- - -- ----· 1966 (3). ------- ------ -- -- -- __ -- -- -- - - -

418 302 288

310 273 325

714 723 592 1965 (3) ____ ---------- -- ---- -- ----- - ---

Lockheed L-188C: 1967 (l) ___ _______________ -- ------ -- _ - ------ -- --- 732 -- -- ----- -

865 ------ --- · 1966 (l) __ __ ---- -- ---- -- __ ---- ------ ------ -------526 ------- ---1965 (l) ____ -- -- -- _. -- -- -- __ -- -- --- . -- __ -- -- -- ---

Lockheed L-749: 1967 (!) __ ____ ______________ _ 1966 (3) _____ _____ __ ___ __ ___ _ 1965 (3) ____________________ _

Lockheed L-1329:

895 --- ----- _____ -- -- - --------- -- · 2, 602 -----------------------------· 3, 112 -------- -------------------- --

1967 (l) __ __ -- -- ____ -- ---- -- - - -- ---- -- _ 297 190 --- -- ---- -305 236 -- ------- -1966 (l) __ __ --- --- -- ------ ------ ---- __ _

1965 (l) ____ ---- -- -- ---- - --- -- -- _ -- --- . 332 182 ---- -- --- -

Total hours flown

71 187 276

2, 228 2, 117

687

781 899 793

2,454 2, 412 4, 015

2, 145 2, 190 2, 106

1, 284 1, 421 1, 387 1,466

6 560

693 810

1,254

5, 441 5, 845 6,240

565 1,228

913

6,852 7, 507 6, 757

48, 498 51, 376 55, 751

720 1,263 1, 962

128 261 172

3, 329 3, 912 4, 105

574 641 555

1, 442 1, 298 1, 205

732 865 526

895 2,602 3, 112

487 541 514

TABLE 6.-AIRCRAFT UTILIZATION BY AIRCRAFT TYPE AND MAJOR CATEGORIES, FISCAL YEARS 1967, 1966, AND 1965-Continued

Hours flown Total

Aircraft type Flight Research hours inspection Job Training and flown

FM-owned aircraft-Continued Lockheed TV- 2:

and logistics

perform· develop· ance ment

1967 (3)____ ____ _____________ 637 645 147 - --------· 1966 (3)__ _____ ______________ 674 729 309 ---------·

Pipe!9tt)t-i965-(b°isposed-otiii-

754 702 357 30

January 1965) ___ __ __________________ ___ ___ --------····-- __ __ _ 39 Exclusive-use Rental Aircraft:

Aero Commander AC- 560F: 1966 (l) _____ -- -- ---- --- -- _ --- _ ----- -- -- ---- ----- 566 • ---- -- -- • 1965 (l)_______ ________ ___ __ ____________ _________ 594 --------··

Aero Commander AC~80T: 1967 (l) ___ • ___ -- -- -- -- --------- ---- -------------- ---- _ 358 ------- ---

Aero Commander AC- 1121: 1967 (1) .. -- ___ -- ____ -- ---- ---- ------ - -- __ -- ---- -- -- --- 476 --------··

Beechcraft BE-35: 1965 (Not leased at end of year>---- ---- -- --- - ---- ------------- 91 ·--------·

Beechcraft BE-50: 1965 (Not leased at end of year>-------- ------- --- ------ -- ----· 126 ·--------·

Cessna C-210: 1967 (1) ____ --- -- -- - - ---- -- ·· --- ---- -- -- ---- ---- ------ ----· 66 1966 (l)_____ ________ ______ ____ ______ __ 44 ------- --· 142

Cess~~6tWo:" -----·-·---· -- -- --- ---- -- --- 89 --------------- -----1966 (Not leased at end of year)___ ______ ___________ 54 ·-·------· 1965 (!)___________________ ________________ __ ____ 503 ····--····

Lear Jet 23/24: 1967 (1)------ ------------------------ - 493 ·-----·-·· Mooney Super 21:

1967 (Not leased at end of year)_____ _____ 350 --------·-------·-··

1,429 1, 712 1, 843

39

566 594

358

476

91

126

66 186 89

54 503 493

350 585 298 m~ HL:::::::::::::::::::::::::::: ~~~ ::::::::::::::::::::

1967 ________________ _____ ___ 65, 089 8, 237 8, 425 2, 510 1966________________ ______ __ 71,436 7,964 8,512 2,953 1965______________ ______ ____ 74,294 8,537 10,918 3,050

84, 261 90,865 96, 799

Note: Number shown in parentheses represents th 1 number of aircraft as of the end of the year.

TABLE 7.-UTILIZATION ANO COST OF OPEN MARKET RENTAL AIRCRAFT, FISCAL YEARS 1967, 1966, ANO 1965

Fiscal year and category Flight-hours Cost

Fiscal year 1967: Category L-------- --- -- -- ---- -------------------· 1, 528 $19, 285 Category 11 •• -------------------------------------- 17, 949 425, 519 Category Ill________________ ___ __ _______ ___________ 8, 304 576, 705 Category IV ___________________________ --------- -- -- 3, 035 168, 815

~~~~~~~~~~~

Total..__ ____ __ ___ _____ ___________ ____ ___________ 30, 816 1, 190, 324 ======================

Fiscal year 1966: Category L-------------------------------- ---- -- · 1, 357 19, 422 Category 11___________ ___ _____ ___ __ ______________ __ 16, 864 381, 450

g:i::~~ w---~================ ===== ======= ==== ===== ~:m m:~~~ ~~~~~~~~~~-

Tot a L _______ ____ ______________ ----------------- 29, 121 1, 103, 035 ======================

Fiscal year 1965: Category L ------------·---------·---------------- 1, 284 16, 488 Category II__ ___ ________ _________________ ______ ____ 20, 787 455, 404 Category 111.. _ --------------------------------- __ _ 7, 598 407, 284 Category IV _______ ---------- __ -------------- ______ • 1, 936 103, 655

~~~~~~~~~~-

Tot a L ___ ______________ _____ ____ ----------------· 31, 605 982, 831

NOTES

Category I: Single-engine, propeller-driven, 1· to 2-place fixed-wing aircraft. Category II: Single-engine, propeller-driven, 3· to 5-place fixed-wing aircraft. Category 111: Twin-engine, propeller-driven, fixed-wing aircraft certificated maximum gross

weight below 12,500 pounds. Category IV: Rotary-wing aircraft and other aircraft not covered above. Total flight-hours for fiscal year 1965 does not include 4L363 hours flown at the Aeronautical

Center. The cost applicable to these hours was not availaole. About 90 percent of the flight-hours were flown for job performance.

MILITARY INJUSTICE The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a

previous order of the House, the gentle­man from Texas [Mr. GONZALEZ] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. GONZALEZ. Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent I include at the end of my remarks an engrossing and pro­vocative article by Edward F. Sherman from the New Republic, aptly entitled "Military Injustice."

I have repeatedly urged that our traditional legal rights be extended to military personnel. Military justice is less often judicial than it is an arm of mili­tary discipline. Such basic legal liberties as the right to counsel, independent re­view of appeals, bail, and the require­ment that the accused be apprised of his rights are frequently not enjoyed by the American serviceman.

glaring deficiencies in military justice. First, my bill would provide military per­sonnel with the right to qualified coun­sel in all cases of special courts-martial, similar to the rights granted in general courts-martial. About two-thirds, or 40,-000 yearly, of all courts-martial are "special." And despite the fact that a special court-martial can try any of­fense including murder and hand down sentences including 6 months' imprison­ment, fines, demotion, and a bad e,-onduct

In the first session of this Congress, I introduced H.R. 6555, to remedy two

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7963

discharge, the right to counsel is not now provided.

Secondly, my bill would require that military personnel who are accused or suspected of an offense must be apprised of their right to legal counsel before be­ing interrogated or requested to make a statement.

Congress is aware of the need for changes in the military code. Senator SAM ERVIN'S subcommittee has been working on an omnibus Military Justice Act, S. 2009, which would include the right to counsel in special court-martial cases.

Also, Subcommittee No. 1 of the House Committee on Armed Services directed this month that a "clean bill" on mili­tary justice be introduced, as a result of its executive sessions. This bill, H.R. 15971, includes the right to counsel in those special courts-martial which might lead to a bad conduct discharge.

I understand that H.R. 15971 is being advocated as noncontroversial, in ad­vance of a comprehensive, detailed study of the military justice code being planned by the subcommittee. I look forward to such a study. The two reforms embodied in my legislation should only be consid­ered a beginning. Certainly Mr. Sher­man's article makes a strong case for major reforms in military justice. I com­mend it to my colleagues:

MILITARY INJUSTICE

(By Edward F. Sherman) The last major reform of military law took

place in 1950 when the Uniform Code of Military Justice was passed by Congress. An outcry a.ga.ins·t court-marital a.buses during World War II had led to the appointment of investigating committees (headed by General James Doolittle and Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt) which recommended an overhaul of military law and new emphasis on soldiers' rights. The Oode as finally approved was a compromise. Lt provided vast new procedural protections for servicemen, but commanders were left in control of courts­martia.l (General Eisenhower testified that loosening command control would weaken discipline); the lower courts-marital (sum­mary and special courts-martial) were not made into real courts but left as semi­disciplinary hearings without mandatory provisions for lawyers, and no attempt was made to improve the inferior position and prerogatives of the enlisted man. In short, the worst aspects of drumhead justice were removed, but military justice remained a dis­ciplinary, rather than a strictly judicial, af­fair. Professor Edmund Morgan of Harvard Law School, the chief drafter of the Code, commented somewhat ruefully: "The serv­ices have the opportunity of demonstrating to Congress that the concessions made in the Code to the demands of effective discipline do not impair the esssentials of a fair, im­partial trial and effective appellate review."

Now, some 18 years and two wars later, it is apparent that the concessions made in the Code to the demands of discipline have af­feoted the quality of military justice. The fl.rsrt report in 1953 of the committee required to make an annual assessment of the Code recommended 17 immediate changes. Reme­dial bills were proposed ·i;hroughout the 1950's and a sweeping American Legion bill in 1959 proposed taking away court-martial juris­diction to try servicemen for civilian-type criznes, further limiting commanders' con­trol of courts-martial, requiring lawyers in special courts-martial, and having civilians on courts-martial and Boards of Review. But the edge of reform had been blunted by the passage of the Code, and the reform bills were toned down by congressional com-

mittees, picked over by the Pentagon, and finally packaged into a rather benign omnibus bill.

Advocates of reform of military law have difficulty getting · very excited about this omnibus bill. It makes a few needed and valuable changes in court-martial procedures and administrative discharges, but it does not attack the core problem-the failure of the Code to make military justice a genuine judicial system. This weakness is observable in the every-day operations of military law: a domineering commander can influence the outcome of a trial; the absence of lawyers in lower courts-martial can result in an Allce­in-Wonderland trial where legal terms are ga rbled, procedures are misunderstood, and legal rights are ignored; built-in favoritism toward officers, both in and out of court, can prevent equal treatment under the law; and the attitudes of the members of the mili­tary who administer the court-martial can be so lacking in understanding of modern concepts of criminology, constitutional due process and individual rights that a fair and impartial trial is jeopardized.

Command influence is the most serious threat to justice in the military. Courts­martial are the responsibility of the com­mander, and so every trial is, in a sense, a test of his disciplinary policies. The com­mander is in complete control of the ma­chinery; he decides whether to bring charges, he appoints the court (similar to a civilian jury), the law officer (judge), the trial coun­sel (prosecutor), and the defense counsel from among his junior officers, and he re­views the sentence with the power to reduce or waive it. It is a little like having a district attorney act as grand jury, select the judge, both attorneys and the jury from his staff, and then review the sentence on appeal. The Code, in an attempt to preserve a fair trial, forbids commanders from influencing the ac­tion of a court-martial, but the possibility that a junior officer can banish the influence of his commander (who rates him and con­trols his assignments) is about as likely as a senator not being influenced by accepting large gifts.

Events of the past year confirm the opin­ion that weaknesses of the 1950 Code are seriously impairing the quality of military justice. It was one of the rockiest years for military law in the history of the Code with deficiencies splitting out at every seam. There were the charges last July against Major General Thomas Lipscomb, command­ing genera.I of Ft. Leonard Wood, for tamper­ing with court-martial trials, the worst case of command influence in years. (He was cleared by the investigating law officer of "improper" influence after some three months of testimony that he had threatened counsel, pressured court members, and ac­tively worked for harsher sentences.) The old specter of officer favoritism cropped up in two separate courts-martial last summer when Army and Marine enlisted men were convicted of murdering Vietnamese POW's, while their officers who were alleged to have given the orders were acquitted ( officers are tried by an all-officer court while enlisted men are only entitled to a court composed of one-third enlisted men). Then there was the stockade riot at Ft. Dix, New Jersey, last summer, the worst in years, when a hundred minor offenders, many of them teen-agers who are not usually a confinement problem, took over a compound and had to be put down by 140 MP's and police. And through­out the year there were the courts-martial of Vietnam dissenters, Captain Howard Levy, Privates Andrew Stapp, Richard Perrin and others (See "Dissenters and Deserters," NR, Jan. 6, 1968), a continual reminder of the absoluteness of the demand for conformity within the military and the limited nature of soldiers' individual rights.

The passage of time has tended to com­promise even the strong points of the Code. The Code provided a number of guarantees which, in 1950, surpassed those of most civil-

ian courts, but the Supreme Court's revolu­tion in criminal law over the last decade has brought civilian standards up to, and in many cases past, the guarantees in the Code. For example, the 1963 Gideon v Wainwright decision that indigents are entitled to a law­yer makes the Code provision that only a counsel (usually a nonlawyer junior officer) will be provided in special courts-martial, a second-rate right at best. And the 1966 Mi­randa decision that a full warning of rights must be made prior to police interrogation makes the Code's requirement of a warning (which does not include telling the accused that a lawyer will be provided on request) insufficient.

Supreme Court decisions do not directly affect the military because military law has been held to be an autonomous legal system not subject to the same constitutional stand­ards as civilian courts. (However, the Court of Military Appeals, a civilian court created in 1951 by the Code as a sort of "military Supreme Court," has applied a number of Supreme Court decisions to the military, the latest being the application of Miranda to the military in US v Tempia in 1967.) Most of the objectionable practices in military law are in those very areas where the military has not been required to comply with civilian constitutional standards on the grounds of "military necessity." For example, servicemen are not entitled to a lawyer in special oourts­martial (which account for two-thirds of the over 60,000 yearly courts-material and, al­though not as serious as the general court­martia.1, can still try any offense including murder and adjudge six months imprison­ment, fines, demotion and a bad conduct dis­charge). The case of Private James E. Stapley is an example of how serious a deprivation of the right to a lawyer can be. Stapley, 19 years old, was charged in a special court-mar­tial with check fraud, AWOL and three other military crimes. His request for a lawyer was refused, and a captain in the Veterinarian Corps, whose only legal training had been some classes in military law, was appointed his counsel. The captain confused the law, incorrectly told him he had no defense, and advised him to plead guilty. Stapley later suc­ceeded in overturning his conviction on habeas corpus to the federal district court in Utah on grounds of denial of his 6th Amendment right to counsel, but other de­cisions by the higher US circuit courts and the Court of Military Appeals have now held that a serviceman is not entitled to a lawyer in a special court-martial unless Congress changes the Code.

Since many of the military crimes in the Code are taken with little change from the 18th-century British military law, the Code abounds with crimes which are unconstitu­tionally vague under present-day standards. For example, Article 133 forbids "conduct un­becoming an officer and a gentleman"; Article 134, "disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline"; Article 117, "provoking or reproachful words or gestures towards any other persons subject to the Code"; and Article 88, "contemptuous words against the President, Vice President, Con­gress, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of a De­partment or a legislature of any State." These crimes are more often honored in the breach than in the observance (the mind conjures up a scene of MP's patrolling a bar filled with sailors to overhear any contemptuous words about the state legislature or arresting the commander and his staff at an officers' club drinking party for conduct unbecoming an officer), and they are often used only when the commander wants to get someone. Lieu­tenant Henry Howe Jr. was sentenced to two years under Articles 133 and 88 for carrying a sign referring to "Johnson fascist aggres­sion in Vietnam" in an off-post rally, and other Vietnam dissenters have been charged under these imprecise articles. These provi­sions may be necessary to maintain military discipline, and few would quarrel with the military's right to discipline men for obvious

7964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968 infractions. But there, is a vast difference be­t.ween a disciplinary punishment and a court­martial sentence of several years' imprison­ment for violations of articles wbich a.re so vague that military men cannot agree as ta ~hat conduct they forbid. The Code should be rewritten to remove these overly ambigu­ous crimes, and the line between discipline (a commander has the authority, under Article 15, to assess disciplinary punishments, without court-martial, of up to one month's confiinement, demotion and fines) and the more serious court-martial should be clearly demarcated.

Now that the Supreme Court has broad­ened the right to an effective appeal, the court-martial appeal procedures appear defi­cient. Special court-martial convictions are only reviewed by the convening authority and the staff Judge advocate (except when a bad conduct discharge is adjudged), and since the convening authority is the man's commander and the staff Judge advocate is the commander's lawyer, the review is hardly equivalent to a civilian appeal to an inde­l)endent. and impartial court. Since verbatim transcripts are rarely made of the trial pro­ceedings, it. is even more difficult for trial ~rrors to be reviewed. There is no right to 'bail in the military, and although men are not usually confined prior to trial or pending completion of their appeal. dissenters like Lieutenant Howe and Captain Levy were de­nied release while their appeals were pending~ despite their meeting the usual civilian standards for release on ball. The ACLU, rep­resenting Levy, has been unsuccessful in its suit in the federal courts to require the mi1i­tary to grant a right to bail.

The most revolutionary portions of the prepared omnibus bill relate to administra­tive discharges and special courts-martiaL A serviceman can now be given a bad conduct, discharge in an administrative proceeding without a. judiclal-tjpe he,aring or repre­sentation by a lawyer. Recent civil service regulations have established the right of a civil servant to a full hearing before dis­missal, with a right to cross-examine, present evidence .. and have a lawyer, but servicemen have no such rights. The omnibus bill pro­vides an opportunity to confront witnesses and evidence and ta obtain compulsory ap­pearance of favorable witnesses amd evidence in an administrative discharge. hearing, ( as well as in courts-martial and other military hearings). The special court-martial provi­sions in the bill SJ1e the most controversial since Senator Sam Ervin (D, N.C.), chairman of the Senate subcommittee on constitutional :eights, added the provision last year that lawyers must be provided in all special courts­martial. (Congressman Henry Gonzalez (D, Tex.) has introduced a. similar bill in the House in the last two sessions. ) But the military, with anguished cries that there are not enough military lawyers and that discipline would be endangered, will un­doubtedly bring substantial pressure to have this provision stricken from the bill.

The basic fact is that the present 1950 Code is totally out of date. It was drafted largely in terms of Von Clausewitz's concept of the military (in his treatise On War for the 19th-century Prussian Army) that a soldier must submit to "obedience, order. rule and method" and have no opinions con­trary to . the interests of the state. Dwight Eisenhower's genera tion could accept that concept. Eisen hower, the professional sol­dier, never questioned the right of the mili­tary to repress the right of the individual, as shown by his story in his autobiography~ At Ease, of being called before the chief of the infantry after .World War I for writing a p aper for a military Journal which was criti­cal of Army tactics: "I was told that my ideas were not only wrong but dangerous and that henceforth I would keep them to myself. P articularly. I was not to publish anything incompatible with solid infantry doctrine. If I did, I would be hauled before a court:­martial."

The situation ls vastly different today. The United States is in its 18th year of continuous drafting, and the military to­day, more than. at.. a.ny time except the height.. of the two world wars, is made up pre­dominantly of civilians.

The Doolittle Board reported in 1946: "There is a need for a new philosophy in the military order, a policy of treatment of men, especially in the ranks, in terms of advanced concepts in social thinking. The present system does not permit full recog­nition of the dignities of man." The Board's recommendations, largely ignored, are still valid-abolish rules and traditions which for­bid and discourage social association be­tween officers and enlisted men; eliminate the terms "officers" and "enlisted men" and substitute the term "soldier" for everyone; reduce special privileges for officers and dis­criminations against enlisted men; abolish the salute off-base and off-duty; create re­spect for the individual rights o! soldiers. This type of "democratization" of the Amer­ican military is long overdue. The Israeli Army, with its similar mixture of profes­sionals and short-term citizen soldiers, does not have many o! the class distinctions and vast differences in privileges between officers and enflsted men which exist in the Amer­ican military, and it serves as proof that­"democratizatron" does not affect an army's fighting capabillties. A movement fo-r a re­vamping of the role of the serviceman with­in the military was begun on December 23, 1967 when a group of servfcemen, acting un­der the auspices o! an antiwar group, the New York-based Committee tor Gr Rights, established the ''first servfcemen•s union," modeled after a similar organization in the Bundeswehr of West Germany. There ma:y be a place for the trade union movemen-t­in the· military, and demands for broader rights and higher pay for enlisted men will: undoubtedly hlcrease as graduate students are drafted in coming months.

Now, with the rapfd Vietnam war build­up and the substantfal numbers of unwill­ing draftees and reservists swelling the ranks of the military, an assessment of whether the rules and concepts which have gov­erned our military are still satisfa:ctory should be made-.

YEAR 1968 QUESTIONNAIRE, RE­SULTS-33D DISTRICT OP NEW YORK The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a

previous order of the House, the g-entle­man from New York [Mr. ROBISON], is Fecognized for 30 minutes.

Mr. ROBISON. Mr. Speaker, some of the best known words of advice left us. by the great British statesman, Edmund Burke--and advice- we should never for­get-were these:

Your r epresentative owes you, not his in­dustry only, but his Judgment; and he be­trays instead of serving you if he sacrifices it to your opinion.

Nevertheless, most of us have found that it is a valuable exercise in represent­ative government to, from time to time, determine constituent opinion on some of the more important issues of the day, and the opinions we thus receive can often help guide us in the appropriate exercise of our judgment.

In accordance with such an ambition, early in January of this year r dispatched a questionnaire to · the some 147,000 households in the 33d Congressional Dis­trict of New York which I am privileged to represent in this body. Although the returns are still coming in, as of this. date over 18,000 have been returned.__ which I believe to be an excellent per-

centage of participation-and the an­swers to my questions have been tabu­lated for me by an independent data processing :firm.

This year, in an effort to make our sampling of opinion even more meaning­ful than it has been in the past, we also asked those participating to give us their age and income level, by grouping, and also to state, if they wished, their normal political affiliation. Where we had such information-and most respondents fur­nished it-we have been able, through use of the computer, to establish some characteristic patterns for the answers received that, I believe, are revealing and, since a good deal of speculation has to be involved in attempting to analyze them, also intriguing.

At this point, Mr. Speaker, under unanimous consent to insert, at the con­clusion of these remarks, a complete sum­mary of the questions asked and of the returns received, as tabulated by per­centages, together with some generalized information as to the characteristics-­by age, income, and party affiliation-of those replying.

But what I should like t.o do, now, is to comment specifically concerning some of the answers received, leaving the oth­ers to speak for themselves, and I would like to begin by reviewing the several questions relating to the war in Viet­nam-which is so much on our minds these days-and giving my comments on the answers received to them.

My first questionr in this series, was this:

Do you belieYe involvement in. war in Viet­nam was essential to the security of the Unit­ed.States?-

To this question, 34.2 percent of those responding said "Yes,'" but 63.5 percent said "No," with the balance of 2.3 per­cent offering no opinion.

And rwould have to say, Mr. Speaker, that I would side with the majority in this respect for I continue to find it very difficult to believe that Vietnam-or South Vietnam, if we wish to be more specific-is of sufficient strategic military importance to us, or of sufficient strategic economic importance to us, to make our o.wn security dependent upon its se­curity; or, to turn it a1:ound and put it another way~ to make its security central to our own.

A few of those responding admitted in accompanying letters-and, as antici­pated, we received many such supple­mentary letters-that they were given some trouble by my use of the word "was» in my question. They explained that, originally. they were- more ox: less of the opinion that South Vietnam was "cen­tral" to our own security, but that they were no longer so sure of this fact and that if I had used the present tense­or the word "is" in my question-they would have had less difficulty in answer­ing "No."

Be that as it may, the answer to my second question showed an interesting switch. That question was:

Even if your answer (to question I) is ''No," do you believe U.S. involvement in war fn Vietnam was desi:rable to prevent the spread of Cemmunfsm in Asia?

And, here .. 57.9 percent-a majority­said "Yes," while :t5.6. percent said "No," and 6.5 percent had no opinion.

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7965 How do you explain this swit~h, Mr.

Speaker? The most logical explanation would

seem to be that my respondents were demonstrating their understanding of and-by a slim majority-their support for the American involvement in Vietnam as being part and parcel of the familiar "containment" policy which the United States has been following for some time; a policy that worked so well in the post­World War II years, particularly in Western Europe, where the Marshall plan, the Truman doctrine and NA TO all combined to provide the fruitful use of economic aid under a military shield against external aggression.

This result also probably indicates some similar understanding of, and sup­port for, the related "domino" theory, in­sofar as our thumb-in-the-dike opera­tion in South Vietnam is concerned, though the fact that the approving majority was not larger may also indi­cate some growing doubt about the prac­ticality of our trying to prop up so many "dominos" as we have, all at once, and so virtually alone.

In any event, it is admittedly easier to see that, if not our own security, then the security of a number of other Asian na­tions is threatened when that of South Vietnam is, the more obvious ones being Laos and Thailand, to a lesser extent Cambodia, and eventually perhaps that of such nations as Indonesia, Malaysia, Burma, and possibly even India and the Philippines.

So, here again, I would side with that majority of my constituents who see South Vietnam as being of some strategic geopolitical importance to us.

The question, however, Mr. Speaker, is, how much?

Well, let us leave that particularly dif­ficult problem unanswered for the mo­ment, and go on to my third question to my constituents, which was:

Regardless of your answers to ( 1) and ( 2) , do you generally approve of President John­son's conduct of that war to date?

As to this, Mr. Johnson did no better than might have been expected, since one could anticipate automatic "no" answers from the polar points of view toward the war in Vietnam-namely, from both "hawk" and "dove"-along with some evidence of the desire of those members of the public who fall in between such extremes to see this war ended as soon as possible, and who chafe under what seems to them to be a persistent stale­mate.

So, while 33.2 percent of those respond­ing said they generally approved of the President's conduct of the war to date, 63.3 percent said they did not, with 3.5 percent being undecided.

And here, for the first time, the com­puterized breakdown of our replies­especially by party affiliation-became significant in attempting to analyze the result.

For, as might have been expected if for no other reason than party loyalty, those who said they were Democrats ap­proved of the Johnson handling of the war to the tune of 42.1 percent, while only 31.9 percent of the Republicans and a meager 28.5 percent of the self­styled "independents" approved.

However, one might explain it, age

seemed to make a difference, too, for of those replying who were under 30 years of age only 29.3 percent approved, while the comparable figure for those between 30 and 40 years was 35.7 percent, with the percentage of those over 40 dropping back to 33.2 percent. This same phe­nomenon appears again, with respect to another question, as I will touch upon in a moment.

For now comes along my fourth ques­tion-by all odds the most important one insofar as the series concerning Viet­nam is concerned-for much of what we have been discovering thus far is of academic or, at best, of only political im­portance when ranged against the ques­tion of What should we do now in Viet­nam?

This fourth question was the hardest one for me to draft, for it involved the offering of alternative courses for my constituents to consider and choose from and I knew, at the outset, that there were probably other alternatives to list as well as better ways to word those I did offer. But I did the best I could and those who were critical of my efforts wrote-as I expected they would-valu­able supplementary letters to aocompany their returns of the questionnaire, so that I have received the benefit of their individualistic views in any event.

However, here are my suggested alter­natives-as posed in my fourth ques­tion-and the tabulated results:

"Again, regardless of your prior answers, which course would you now recommend in Vietnam: (a) Stepping up military pres­sures to achieve earliest possible victory?"­which 45.1% chose; "(b) Holding military activity at about present level?"-which 5% chose; "(c) Another pause in bombing North Vietnam to see if this would produce nego­tiations ?"-which 12.2% chose; "(d) Turn­ing war over to South Vietnamese via grad­ual withdrawal of U.S. forces?"-which 24.2% chose; "or (e) Immediate U.S. with­drawal?"-which only 6.6% chose.

We have had to show 6.9 percent of those replying as having no opinion, here, or as choosing none of m:y sug­gested alternatives. But as I have already indicated, this is not wholly accurate since numerous respondents seemingly falling into this category did write sup­plementary letters in which some of them offered their own alternatives, of which by far and away the most pop­ular one was the expression of their hope that the United Nations might, somehow, rise phoenixlike out of the ashes of our disappointment with it, and provide us with a satisfactory polit­ical conclusion to the conflict.

But how, Mr. Speaker, do we analyze the returns that I received to my ques­tion, as stated?

At first glance, it would seem as though my constituents were still hold­ing to a "hawkish" point of view. After all, the largest percentage of those reply­ing-45.1 percent-did opt for some sort of a military "victory," and I have pur­posely put that word in quotation marks since I, myself, doubt whether we can win anything further through military means in Vietnam except at a price which, under all the surrounding cir­cumstances, would seem to be an un­acceptable one.

It is not simply a question of our

ability to totally defeat the Vietcong on the battlefield. Given time enough, I as­sume we could do this-but such an ef­fort would undoubtedly require more than the 206,000 additional U.S. troops General Westmoreland is supposed to have asked for, and certainly more than the additional 35,000 or so the President, in another compromise with himself, is reported ready to send.

Such an effort would also seem to re­quire not only a continuation of the mas­sive bombing attacks to which we have been subjecting both South and North Vietnam, but also some escalation of that costly effort even though it is estimated that we have already dropped some 12 tons of bombs in this war for every square mile in South and North Vietnam.

Such an effort would not only bring into question, again, the point or limit which both Russia and Red China have set for themselves for refraining from direct participation in the war so long as they considered our purposes "lim­ited," which apparently is a question no one can answer, but also the question we must try to answer which is: Can we win anything further in this fashion in Vietnam without almost totally destroy­ing that which we supposedly went there to save?

There are, besides these questions, two events of recent weeks that bear upon the solution to this problem. One of those is an isolated event; the other represents the culmination of the unwise fiscal and monetary policies that, forced upon us by the war and the administration's un­willingness to face up to its reality here at home, we have for too long been fol­lowing.

The first of those events is, of course, the capture of the Pueblo-an event that so dramatically reminded us of the re­sponsibilities we bear, and the other chal­lenges we constantly face elsewhere in this divided and dangerous world. And the second is that equally dramatic flight from the dollar and stampede for gold that has not only shaken the foundations of the international monetary structure our strength undergirds, but aroused proper concern here at home and abroad about whether we can get our fiscal house back in order in time to avoid the risk of a recession or even depression, the effects of which would be worldwide in scope and, unless avoided, would con­stitute just about the biggest boon global communism could hope to get.

Though the dearest measure of the cost of this limited war to date has been in American lives, of which over 20,000 now have been lost-making this the fourth bloodiest war in our history, be­ing exceeded only by the Civil War and World Wars I and II-there are, as we are seeing, other costs that have to be reckoned in during any reappraisal of the acceptability of its price.

One can recognize the difficulties in­herent in debating the justification for a war-or arguing about the strategy to be pursued in winning it-while that war is going on.

But I do not believe we can afford to blink at the underlying question which confronts us, which is: Does victory in this war actually lie on the immediate battlefield in Vietnam or, rather. in find-

7966 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968 ing other and better means than its steady escalation for thwarting whatever may be the long-range Communist ob­jective in Southeast Asia?

This is not an. easy question for any proud or patriotic American to try to answer, and I take no pleasure in asking it. But it is a question that has to be asked, and an answer that has to be sought in the hard light of present real­ities, and we should permit neither pride nor blind patriotism to deter us from thinking about it.

In any event, perhaps this was the question that was running through my constituents' minds as they sought to choose from among the several alterna­tive courses for action now in Vietnam that I offered them.

For, if we leave out those who said they were undecided, we find that 48 percent of those responding either did not favor a further military escalation of the war or else picked one or another of the other alternatives I suggested for either reduc­ing or ending our involvement in it.

That would still :not add up-toa major­ity viewpoint and, at best,, only shows something of a standoff in my district between what might be called. warlike and alternative more peaceful attitudes toward the Vietnamese war. Still, it is also a noteworthy result considering the legitimacy the general public normally accords the decisions made by those in charge of the intricacies of foreign policy, for-as an associate professor in the department of sociology at. Cornell University wrote me about this result:

In a. random sample of' the population you can always expect the general sentiment to be closer to Johnson and Westmoreland than to Kennan and Shoup.

In the latter two instances, she was referring, of course, to former Ambas.­sador George F. Kennan and Maj. Gen. David M. Shoup, Medal of Honor winner and Commandant ot the Marine Corps from 1960 to 1963, both of whom have been outspoken critics of the policy we have been following in Vietnam.

What end result. that policy is actually aimed at remains, all too unfortunately, in considerable doubt. Perhaps the Pres­ident does not actually seek a · military victory-who can tell for sure? But he seems to keep talking more in that direc.­tion than in any other, as witness this urgent call issued in Minneapolis last week when he said:

The time has come when your President must ask you to join in a total national effort--to win the war, to win the peace, and to complete the job at home.

Such words may suffice as a political answer to the candidacies of Senators KENNEDY and McCARTHY, here at home, but they do little to help clarify for the American people, or for the enemy, for that matter, as well as the rest of the watching world, exactly what our inten­tions and goals are in Vietnam~

The American people, especially, need some straight talk from their President­they need to have him define what he means by "winning" the war, and they need to have him define what he would consider as an American "def eat.'' should one come about.

Until he does so~r perhaps I should say until circumstances force him to do

so-we will have to continue with the same kind of speculation and uncertainty that has: been the source of so much con­fusion and diYisions among us for far too long~

Let me give you an example of the kind of speculation I have in mind, by reading into the RECORD these two para­graphs from a recent Walter Lippmann column in Newsweek magazine. Here is what Lippmann wrote:

There is- no conceivable way in which the war can be brought to an end if terms, which are less than the dictates of an uncondi­tional surrender, are regarded as "defeat". If American forces cannot. leave Vietnam until it is certain tha.t there is permanently established in Saigon an anti-Chinese, anti­Hanoi, anti-Communist, pro-American gov­ernment able to pacify the whole of Vietnam·, then we shall never be able to leave. If we do not leave, then the war will never end.

Even if General Westmoreland is in fact winning the war, and even if General Giap is having a. "last gasp", there is still all Asia to be pacified before we have "won". Lyndon .Tohnson thinks he is :fighting a limited war because he does not escalate as fast as some of the generals would like him to. The fact is that his war aims are unlimited: They promise the paci:flcatron of all Asia. For such unlimited ends it is not possible to win a war with limited means. Because our aims are limitless, we are sure to be "defeated".

I do not always agree with Mr. Lipp­mann's conclusions or opinions on other matters, but here I believe he has put, and most concisely, the central point around which the current. congressional and public reappraisal of our policy in Southeast Asia is revolving. Where that reappraisal will take us remains very much to be seen-and much depends on the Presidential willingness to partici­pate in it in a meaningful manner-but I believe. that such a reappraisal is very badly needed, late though the hour may be.

Pending· that result, however, I would suppose that the President could find justification from the results of my poll­as he can from others on this compli­cated and confused subject-for what­ever policy he wants to pursue from now on in Vietnam. He can, that is, if he continues along on the usual thesis that a. President makes opinion, rather than following it. But, on the other hand, I think my poll shows that the President

. would be mistaken to believe anything other than the fact that the great ma­jority of the American people desire peace in Vietnam,. do not want war with China-or Russia-and are prepared to accept some sort of compromise truce in Vietnam and~ in fact, anticipate a negotiated peace rather than a victory which will see the defeat of the Vietcong.

I cannot prove this as an absolute fact, of course, from my poll-but most of us are, actually, both "doves" and "hawks" at one and the same time, and I cannot help wondering, for instance, what the result might have been if I had added one phrase to my first offered option in this question. so that it read:

(a) Stepping up military pressures to achieve earliest possible victory, even if this meant possible war with Russia or China?

I mention this, Mr. Speaker, only to point up the fact that none of us-in­cluding the President-shol.lld place an overreliance on pub-lie opinion polls, or

their results,. bur~ should concentrate in­stead on giving this Nation the wisest and best possible foreign policy for it to follow in times such as these that, we must believe, are as full of opportunities for truly organizing a just and lasting peace as they are of threats to that am­bition.

In any event, since this is an election year, it may be of interest to potential candidates to note that our breakdown into categories of those answering this mult:.ple-choice question shows that Re­publicans tend to be a bit more "hawk­ish"-49.4 percent-than Democrats-41.6 percent-with the "independents" being the least so of all-34.3 percent, this being the division among those se­lecting my option "(a)."

And, for some reason I cannot divine, those with incomes over $10,000 were slightly more "hawkish" on this choice-46.9 percent-that those with incomes under $10,000--at 43.2 :pe::-cent.

While again, from the standpoint of age on this choice, the least "hawkish"-42.6 percent-were those under 30 years oi.d; the most "hawkish," those between 30 and 40 years old-49 percent-with those "hawks" over 40 dropping back down to 44. 7 percent.

How do you explain this? Perhaps it could reflect, though this is only a guess, the fact that those between 30 and 40 years of age can afford to be that bit more "hawkish" since they are, now, too old to be required to :fight in Vietnam, themselves, but still too young, as par­ents,. to have sons who might be called up for such service.

Whatever the reason, the answer to my fifth question was something of a. surprise.

This was the question: Would you favor specific Congressional ap­

proval before· a President could again commit U.S. forces to a future "limited" war like that in Vietnam?

And, here, a. whopping 79.6 percent said "Yes.'' while only 18.4 percent said ''No," with only 2 percent-next to the smallest number on any question-being undecided.

I think this is especially significant for, though the recent verbal scuffle between Secretary Rusk and most of the mem­bers of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was, at best, a standoff and Mr. Rusk, if anything, came out ahead on points even though his performance at times seemed like a, television rerun of an old movie, does it not clearly show that the great majority of the American people badly want to see Congress regain its limited but important role in helping to shape foreign policy?

I am convinced it does-and that this is a most healthy sign which the Presi­dent, astute politician that he is, should immediately heed, and he could find no better place to begin than by consulting with Congress over the need and wisdom for more troops to Vietnam, and consult­ing in such a way as t.o permit, at long last, true congressional debate over the issues in this war that so plague and seem to divide us.

No one can predict what the result of such a debate might be but I, for one, cannot help but believe that such a de­bate would help restore the sagging pub-

March 27, ,1968. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7967-lie confidence in our democratic institu­tions and, by- so doing, even strengthen the President's own hand if we could thereby regain the kind .of consensus he used to so cherish.

Skipping, now, to my eighth ques­t ion-for the wording of which reference is made to the summary of my poll as set for th at the end of these remarks-this produced, again, a bit of surprising re­sult. For, as you will see, 55.9 percent o~ those responding indicated their support of increased East-West trade-that is, between us and Russia and the Soviet bloc countries-while 38.6 percent dis­approved, with 5.5 percent having no opinion. In view of the hardening of at­titudes between our Nation and Russia that has accompanied the escalation of the conflict in Vietnam, which could not long continue if Russia ceased to supply Hanoi with arms and other strategic ma­teriel, one could have expected a thumbs­down attitude on the President's an­nounced desire to build some trade bridges to the East.

But, even the Republicans who r~­sponded favored this proposal-on which, quite obviously, Congress is not prepared to act at this time-to the tune of 49.9 percent, with 44 percent being opposed and 6.1 percent undecided, while the Democrats were more willing-65.1 per­cent-to take a chance on our ability to use such a trade lever to further the moderation of overall Russian attitudes·, with the independents voting at a 69.1-percent level for such an attempt. Here, income level again seemed to be impor­tant, for it was those with incomes of over $10,000 a year-at 63.4 percent­who carried the proposition, while those with lower incomes registered-at 49.9 percent-a raror-ithin disapproval of such an idea.

Still more revealing of all, perhaps, was the age differential-for, as to this, those responding who were under 30 years of age were-at 68.4 percent-far more willing to take a chance on Russia ·as a trade partner than those between 30 and 40-at 54.9 percent-or those still older respondents who were reluctant-at 51.5 percent-to really believe Russia had or could change its cold war attitudes.

My next two questions were on the "bread and butter" issue of increased Federal taxes. For the wording of these questions, I suggest you look again at the subsequent summary, but the result shows the anticipated reluctance of any­one to pay any more in taxes, Federal or

otherwise, than they now do. My re­spondents turned down the President's 10-percent surtax proposal by 77.7 per­cent to: 19.8 percent, with 2·.5 percent un­decided, but then turned around-in an swer to my tenth question-to say they might support a surtax if Federal spend­ing was simultaneously cut by about the same amount as the tax would bring in, the vote here being 45.4 percent for, with 36.4 percent still stubbornly opposed, and with the undecideds at a high of 18.2 per­cent holding the balance of power.

The categorical breakdown showed, not surprisingly, that Republicans were more opposed to the surtax-83 per­ent-than the Democrats-at 67.4 per­cent-or the independents-at 72.3 per­cent. It also showed that those with incomes below $10,000 were more op­posed-at 80.8 percent-than their more effluent neighbors-at 75.3 percent.

But, when it came to the turnaround­on question 10-it was, as might have been expected, only the Republicans who were really interested in reduced Federal spending, for their support for the surtax jumped all the way from 15.2 to 49.6 percent, if it were to be accompanied by roughly the same amount in curtailed spending, while the Democratic figure changed only from 30.3 to 36 per­cent in such an event, and the independ­ents were only ·so impressed by the idea of such a package arrangement that their support for the surtax went from 25 to 39.2 percent, from all of which, Mr. Speaker, it would appear that if the Pres­ident really wants his surtax proposal· enacted he had better look for help over here on this side of the aisle where the idea of fiscal responsibility has always seemed to have broad appeal.

It is not particularly significant, but you might be interested in noting that those with incomes over $10,000 were slightly more willing to buy the surtax idea on its own merits-at 22.7 percent­than their less affluent neighbors-at 17 percent; but that, in the turnaround on the idea of combining tax increases with spending reductions, this brought more support from the lower-income people­at 45.9 percent-than it did from those in those higher brackets-at only 44. 7 per­cent. Could it be because those folks in the lower brackets have been feeling the pinch of inflation more, and may more accurately relate its source to unre­strained Federal expenditures? Perhaps so.

On my question relating to the poverty RETURNS TABULATED BY PERCENTAGES

No Yes No opinion

program-question 11-income levels seemed to make no difference at all, but politics did, for Democrats, perhaps rec­ognizing this as Mr. Johnson's own fa­vorite program, favored its continuation and gradual enlargement-at 64.1 per­cent-as did the independents-at 57.3 percent-while it was the disapproving Republicans-at a support level of only 37 percent-who brought the result slightly below the break-even point, though the undecided-at 4 percent­really could be the deciding factor.

Rent subsidies-a subject of perennial debate around here-took a beating, in question 12, from both Republicans-of whom only 29.1 percent registered sup­port-and independents-at a somewhat surprising 44.9 percent-while even the Democrats could only rally a slim 52.7 percent in favor of this key Great Society program, with income levels, once again, seeming to make no difference.

My final question-the 13th-related to that long-standing debate over a Fed­eral gun control law, about which all of us have probably had more mail, pro and con, than on any other issue in recent years, including that far more impor­tant issue of Vietnam.

If I had hoped my poll might help me make up my mind on this, it did not, really, for the result was still pretty close, with 52.6 percent favoring some such law-the specifics of which would be left up to us-while 45.6 percent were op­posed, and strongly so, one can assume from their letters, with 1.8 percent being undecided.

And, Mr. Speaker, I do not know how to explain it, but the Democrats were far more in favor-at 61.7 percent-of such a law, than the Republicans-at 48.2 percent-with the "independents" regis­tering their approval at 58.5 percent; and, once again, it was those "hawkish" 30- to 40-year-olds who-at 53.1 per­cent-were most opposed of . all age groups.

Well, that is the story, Mr. Speaker. It was a most interesting and, indeed,

a fascinating experience for me to have made this sampling of public opinion in my district, and it is my hope-in mak­ing this report-that the results I ob­tained, if not my own comments, will be of interest and perhaps of some value to those of my colleagues who-may notice these remarks.

The recapitulation of questions and results follows:

No Yes No opinion

1. Do you believe involvement in war in Vietnam was essential to the 6. Rega rdless of your view toward the war in Vietnam, do you favor secu rity of the United States?_ _____ __ ____ _______ __ _____ ___ _ 2. 3 34. 2 63. 5 continuation of the Selective Service System to meet future

2. Even if your answer is "No", do you believe U.S. involvement in military-manpower needs? ____________ - - - ----- ____ ______ ___ 3.4 77. 4 19. 2

~~~i:m V/~t~:~? ~~~ -~~s}~~~~e_ !~ _ ~~~~~~~ !~~-~~~~~~ _ ~f- -~~~:- 6. 5 35. 6 7. Do you favor stricter Government prosecution of violations of the

2.6 74.5 22. 9 57.9 Selective Service Act? ____ ______ ______ ------- - ______ ___ ___ _ 3. Regardless of your answers to (1) and (2?, do you generally ap- 8. Do you favor steps to increase East-West trade-between the

prove of President Johnson 's conduct o that war to date? _____ 3. 5 33.2 63.3 United States on one hand and Russia and the so-called 4. Again, regardless of your prior answers, which course would you Soviet-bloc countries on the other?_ ______ ______ _________ __ 5. 5 55. 9 38. 6

now recommend in Vietnam (check one): (a) Stepping up 9. Do 6.ou support the President in his request to Congress for a military pressures to achieve earliest possible victory? ·4·5.1; 1 -percent increase ~surtax) in Federa l income taxes? _____ ___ _ 2. 5 19. 8 77. 7 (b) Holding military activities at about present level? 5.0; 10. If your answer is "No ', would you support tha t request if the (c) Another pause in bombing North Vietnam to see if this President would agree to cut Federal spending by roughly the

18. 2 45.4 36.4 -:iit

1~ Jl~~~~~ees~e~~ti:~~0Ji!1 !;;t1~r~~ar~rt~/ ~:~eimJ~

same amount the surtax would bring in? ____________________ _ 11. Do you favor continuation, and gradual enlargement, of the Fed-

(e~ Immediate U.S. withdrawal? 6.6. No opinion, 6.9. eral Government's war·on-poverty program? __ __________ __ ___ 4.0 45. 4 50. 6 5. Wou d J°u favor specific congressional approval before a President 12. Do you favor Federal rent subsidies to help lower income families

coul again commit U.S. forces to a future limited war like that meettheir housing needs? ___________ ____ ___ - - -------- ----- 4.1 36. 5 59.4 in Vietnam? ___ _____ _______________ -- -- -- -- -- - ----- - - ----- 2. 0 79.6 18. 4 13. Do you favor stricter Federal controls over sale and ownership of

firearms?_ •• __ _______ _______ __________ __ - - --- -- - -- - ------ 1.8 52.6 45.6

CXIV--502-Part 8

7968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March · 27, 1968 CHARACTERISTICS OF THOSE REPLYING

Percent Age: 16 9 t~i1i:~;; :: :: : : :: : : : : : : : : : :::::~~~~ ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ ~~ ~~~ ~:: :: : : : : : : ~::: ~ ~ ~ If i

Percent Polit~C::~ublican_ - - - - - - - - - - ---- -- - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - -- -- - - -- -- -- ---- -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - 53. 6

Democrat_ __________ -- ___ --- _ - -- -- ---- --- - - - - - -- -- -- - - ---- -- - - ---- - - -- - - -- - - - 15. 1 Independent __________________________ - --------- -- - ----------------- -- ----- - - H· ~ Unknown ___ ______ -- __ ---- -- ---- --- - -------- -- ---------- -- -- -- - ---- - -- - - -- - - - ·

Fami~n~~cro$li.~i~ ~~~?~-- ------ -------------- -- __ ---------------- ____ __ __ __ __ __ _ 47. 3 Over $10,000 ________________ -------------- ------ - --------- -- -- -- -- -- -- - - - -- -- 37. 0 Unknown _______ -- -------- -- ------------------ -- -------- ------ -- -- -- - - -- - - - - - 15. 7

U.N. CENSURE OF ISRAEL APPALLING

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gentle­man from New York [Mr. HALPERN] is recognized for 10 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, the ad­ministration's support of a United Na­tions Security Council resolution censur­ing Israel last SUnday made a mockery of all the pious truth about the necessity of displaying firmness and willpower to deter the terrorism and aggression in Vietnam.

The resolution ignored the real threat to peace in the Middle East, the unrelent­ing buildup of the El Fatah terrorists by the most radical Communists and Arab elements with the collaboration of King Hussein of Jordan. I am appalled that the Am~rican delegation to the United Nations approved of and voted for the resolution that emerged. This indicated to the radical Arabs and the Russians that they have found a soft spot along the Jordanian-Israel cease-fire lines, a sort of privileged sanctuary from behind which they can sally forth and spread havoc into Israel.

The administration has displayed a lack of will power and resolve by going along with the one-sided unilateral con­demnation of Israel. This appeasement tendency will be quickly noted in Cairo, Damascus, Amman, Moscow, and El Fatah command posts. It encourages more terrorism and undermines hopes for stability and negotiations. Israel has certainly as much right to defend her territory against guerrilla terrorists as we have to defend South Vietnam.

I regret that the administration has approved a resolution that undermines the peace by placing all the onus on the victim of aggression rather than the true instigators. I urge that this policy be re­versed at once.

BILLS TO CHANGE FEDERAL BAIL LAW

Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to address the House for 1 minute and to revise and extend my remarks.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Florida?

There was no objection. Mr. ROGERS of Florida. Mr. Speaker,

I have just introduced legislation which will strengthen existing laws to deal with the increasing number of crimes com­mitted by accused persons during the time they are free on bail.

These bills are designed to revise ex­isting bail practices in courts of the United States, and the District of Co­lumbia.

One bill would deny bail to a person

charged with an offense punishable by death or an offense involving the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon.

The other bill would amend the Bail Reform Act of 1966 to require a judicial officer to consider the defendant's po­tential danger to the community or to another person in determining whether or not to release the accused pending trial.

Right now, in the Federal court sys­tem, a judge can only take into account those factors which will insure the ap­pearance of the accused when deciding whether to admit him to bail pending trial.

Only when the accused, first, is charged with an offense punishable by death, or second, has been convicted and is await­ing sentence or has appealed, may the judge consider the defendant's potential danger to the community or another per­son as well as his likelihood of flight.

I' am of the opinion that such bail provisions should be strengthened by denying bail to an accused whose offense involved the use of a deadly or dan­gerous weapon, or is punishable by death.

In pressing for early consideration of this legislation, I also call for the as­surance of a speedy trial for any defend­ant denied bail. The judiciary of this Na­tion, State and Federal, must bear this responsibility.

Available statistics point to the need for tightening our bail practices.

Crime in the Nation is on the increase. The latest figures released by the FBI are shocking. Serious crime increased 16 percent in 1967 over 1966. Crimes of violence up 15 percent; robbery up 27 percent.

Serious assaults where a gun was used as the weapon rose 22 percent; one out of every five assaults was committed with a gun. The viscious street crime of armed robbery had a sharp upswing of 30 per­cent and a firearm was used in 58 percent of all robbery offenses.

In the Nation's Capital, between Janu­ary 1, 1963 and October 8, 1965, th~re were 2,776 persons being held for action of the grand jury on felony charges.

During this period, a total of 253 f el­onies were charged against 207 of these persons. Two hundred and twenty-two of these felonies occurred while the de­fendant was released on trial bond.

These figures were obtained by the President's Commission on Crime in the District of Columbia. Because of the difficulty in collecting data, the Com­mission study included only felony of­fenses brought to the attention of the District grand jury.

Of the 207 persons in the survey who allegedly committed the 253 felonies, only seven persons were not convicted of either the original or the subsequent charge.

I should like to add that the Presi­dent's Commission on Crime in the Dis­trict of Columbia, in the report made in 1966, supports a tightening of the bail procedure:

The Commission recommends amendment of the Bail Reform Act to allow the court to consider the defendant's potential danger to the community as well as the likelihood of flight in setting conditions of release. While it is possible that constitutional objections may be raised against any restrictions on a person's liberty based on a belief that he is a danger to society, we believe that reasonable restrictions would be no more unlawful than those presently imposed to ensure the accused presence at trial.

I strongly urge immediate action on this bill to assist the law enforcement officers of this Nation, and to better in­sure the safety of the citizens from in­creasing criminal acts against their per­son and property.

ANTI-SEMITISM IN THE SOVIET UNION

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a previous order of the House, the gen­tleman from New York [Mr. FARBSTEIN] is recognized for 20 minutes.

Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, the recurrent evidence of anti-Semitism in the Soviet Union has been a source of much alarm in the United States and the rest of the civilized world. I am pleased that our Government is alert to the danger and is not accepting it com­placently. Earlier this month, Ambas­sador Morris B. Abram delivered a compelling address at the United Na­tions expressing the concern of the United States. I would like to insert the substantive portion of that address into the RECORD, with the plea that my col­leagues give it their attention: STATEMENT BY MORRIS B. ABRAM, U.S. REP­

RESENTATIVE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS COM­

MISSION ON THE REPORTS OF THE SUBCOM­

MISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINA­TION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES

Four years ago, this month, when I was the U.S. member of the Subcommission, I called attention to Mr. Trofun Kichko's book, Judaism Without Embellishment. I said then and I say now that this book, is­sued by an official organ of Soviet society, is a damnable instance of religious hate mon­gering, a vicious piece of anti-Semitic liter­ature, reminiscent of Hitler, Goebbels, Strei­cher and other depraved Nazi authors. Here is a copy of the book in the original form. One does not have to read Ukrainian to get its cruel and hateful message. Just look at the illustrations. Anyway, after attention was called to the book, there was a world­wide clamor against this recrudescence of anti-Semitism in the Ukraine, where some of Hitler's worst anti-Jewish policies found fertile and long cultivated soil during the German occupation. I am glad to say that various Communist parties and leaders out­side the USSR reacted to the exposure of the

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7969 Kichko book with particular horror, and soon the Soviet Union, under the force of world opinion, retreated from its support of the book.

Fairness requires my saying that anti­semitism and its literature has not been unknown to American society. However, the U.S. Government has never published a.n anti-Semitic book. Certainly it would not take a crescendo of world-wide criticism to bring the U.S. to a prompt denouncement of the act of any official person who perpetrated any such disgrace a.s Klchko.

In the Soviet Union, Kichko's deed was surely a. crime under Article 74 of the 1961 Criminal Code of the R.S.F.S.R. based on Article 11 of the Fundamentals of Criminal Jurisprudence of the USSR adopted by the Supreme Soviet in December 1958. In the Ukraine these provisions appear in Article 66 of the Criminal Code. The sincerity of the Soviet Acts reportedly taken against Kichko may be tested by this question: Was Kichko ever accused of this violation of law? Appar­ently not.

Now we learn that Kichko is actually back at work. Here is the proof: In OCtober last, an article appeared in the Soviet News news­paper Komsamolskoye Znamya, the official publication of the Young Communist League of the Ukraine. This article feeds on ancient fears, alleging a mythical world Jewish con­spiracy to dominate world politics. This is a theme first advanced in the Czarist regime in the notorious forgery, the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, which became a bible of the Hitler regime and fed the fears which fed the fires and stoked the furnaces of Auschwitz.

Competent historians with psychiatric training are now telling us that Hitler was able to turn Europe into a Jewish charnel because of his skillful and calculated use of the fears invoked by the myth of a Jewish world conspiracy. The extermination of the Jews, of course, offended the norms of the 20th .century European civilization in which it occurred. Yet those who participated, as Eichmann, felt little or no sense of guilt, because of the peculiar and distorted way in which they regarded the victims. To produce this Inhuman feeling in normal humans, German, Russian, Ukrainian or American, a campaign of propaganda and indoctrination is first required, the purpose of which is to withdraw .from the proposed victim the pro­tection afforded by the view of him as an­other human being. The victims must be first perceived as things, or as animals, or as vermins, or as sub-humans, or as reincarna­tions of evil, or in any case, as a desperate threat.

The victim does not have to be Jewish­he may be a Christian victim of other sincere Christians who first perceive him or her as a witch. Thousands of "witches" lost their lives in the 17th century. The lesson is appli­cable to our own times: an individual Capi­talist who sees a Communist or an individual Communist who perceives a Capitalist as­a sub-class of homo sapiens and therefore a desperate threat, is in the rut which per­mits annihilation without a pang of con­science.

Now I pronounce the myth of the World Jewish conspiracy as promulgated in the Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion and as repeated thematically, at least in recent Soviet writings, as the most spectacularly successful of all the instruments precondi­tioning to mass murder.

At all costs, no matter what temporary political advantages the Soviets may gain from this line, it must be avoided.

It is particularly regrettable that at the time the Soviet Union is engaged in vicious cartooning and harpooning of Jews in various parts of the world-replaying the anti­semitic Czarist and Nazi themes of conspir­acy, Mr. Kichko should be honored. Yet on January 20, 1968 it was reported in Pravada

Ukrainy, the official organ of the Ukrainian Communist Party, that Klchko received the Diploma of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on behalf of the Society for Propagat­ing Atheism.

Thus, Kichko is rehabilitated to use a Soviet phrase, restored to official favor and rewarded.

The Soviet record regarding Jews is not by any means all black. In fact, the regime be­gan with a great promise to reverse the Czarist reactionary anti-Semitic policies which were vigorously denounced and re­versed by the founder of the Soviet State, V. I. Lenin. Such persecution of the Jews was also denounced by generations of Rus­sian intelligensia and most eloquently con­demned by the great Soviet writer, Maxim Gorky, whose centennial is being observed this year.

In the Soviet Union, many economic rights are enjoyed by Jews as others and the promise of the future before Stalin's time seemed very bright indeed.

Yet political policy considerations joined with an a.version to religion, has produced a crisis within Soviet society of which Kichko is the phenomenon and the symptom.

History tells us that if the Jewish rellgious group is not safe, none other is; that if one Christian may be burned as a witch, another may be declared to be one.

As Ben Franklin put it to a less crowded planet: "We must all hang together or as­suredly we shall all hang separately."

PROJECT OUTREACH The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under a

previous order of the House, the gentle­man from Ohio [Mr. FEIGHAN] is recog­nized for 10 minutes.

Mr. FEIGHAN. Mr. Speaker, it ls gratifying to me that my home city of Cleveland is part of a new and novel approach to the problems of our coun­try's urban areas.

We are aware that decay is occurring in the heart of so many of our cities. There has been an unfortunate out­movement of businesses and people from our central cities-an out-migration of the wealth and leadership it takes to make a community thrive. · Left in so many of our central cities are people without the resources to move and without jobs which would bring such resources. If a business enterprise remains, it is often owned by an absentee entrepreneur too far away to take the kind of interest the area deserves.

The Cleveland project represents an effort to reverse this unfortunate trend. It is designed to restore in the central cities the kind of business activity that counts-businesses that can offer jobs and that can offer ownership that is con­cerned about the community of which it is a part.

This effort is known as Project Out­reach, and its principal purpose is to promote economic development in our depressed urban areas. An important by.:. product, of course, is the domestic tran­quility our Constitution defines and which each of us seek.

Project Outreach is being adminis­tered by the National Committee for Equal Participation in Business--.an or­ganization created by the terms of a contract between the National Business League and two agencies of our Govern­ment, the Office of Economic Opportu­nity and the Economic Development Ad­ministration.

In working with mi:iority small busi­nessmen in our urban areas, Project Outreach is seeking to promote economic development-and the jobs and income that come with it-by offering business training and technical assistance, partic­ularly with respect to the development of equity capital.

In a broader sense, Project Outreach will bring massive resources to bear on the need for the economic development of our central cities-an economic de­velopment that will involve those resi­dents of the area as owners and man­agers of businesses which can hire and serve those who live there.

The National Business League, founded by Booker T. Washington in 1900, is the parent organization of most of the 18 national Negro trade associa­tions. Since its inception, the league has been devoted to promoting sound busi­ness enterprise among disadvantaged small businessmen.

The National Business League con­tinues to be the central agency through which numerous distinguished national Negro educational and business leaders have sought to apply their talents to the need for the economic development of minorities through participation in and control of business.

In a recent speech to the National Committee for Equal Participation in Business, Berkeley G. Burrell, president of the National Business League, stated:

It ls our deep hope that this meeting will produce the kind of interracial cooperation that will make our people better business opera.tors, more meaningful symbols of the kind of material success that the world's richest society offers the majority of its citi­zenry, and the firm and lasting confidence that business people have for each other that will vastly expand our economic pro­ductivity.

Mr. Burrell said: Business is the motor force of our society

and provides the fuel for its operation. The free and unfettered operation of the profit­making process is the sole source for eco­nomic, social, and political stature. What we say to you here is: If you join hands with us here and now we can reduce the tremendous liability of public welfarism and high police costs by making the elements contributing to these costs productive units within the society.

We will do this not with hat-trick speed but through sustained motivational effort, visible examples of material rewards for diligent performance, and positive images of responsible citizenship. And, we submit that the cost to you, your firms and our society will be substantially less than the cost of military suppression of ill-advised and irra­tional violence. Violence as we have seen it recently, is an emotional response to im­mediate stimuli, underwritten by deep­seated grievances ignored. To suppress violence is to expend resources; to support the indigent is to expend resources; to trans­form the non-productive to roles of produc­tivity is to create and add to the Nation's resources. As business people, it is our in­herent responsibility to make this trans­formation-here and now-at this point in our Nation's history.

Project outreach is not a broad pro­gram. At present, only 12 cities come under the· national program. It is the hope of the National Business League, however, that the idea will spread and

7970 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968 produce, through local effort, Outreach offices in hundreds of American cities.

Through these offices practical business training can be developed. Sources of equity capital can be identified, and hold­ers of such capital can be encouraged to take part in this important effort to stimulate domestic tranquility and promote economic growth.

I am glad Cleveland is a part of this important effort and I share the hope that it will be expanded.

IT IS ILL ADVISED FOR OUR GOV­ERNMENT TO SEND ARMS TO JORDAN Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objootion. Mr. FARBSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, I re­

gard it as exceedingly ill advised for our Government to proceed with negotiations to send arms to Jordan. The Jordanian Government has shown itself not only willing but anxious to c<mtribute to the instability of the Middle East. It has sanctioned the use of its territory for guerrilla bases. It has already taken an unwise United Nations resolution to mean that its murderous conduct is in­ternationally acceptable. Sending arms to Jordan now, apart from the threat they imply, suggests that the United States, too, agrees with Jordanian poli­cies. Israel may not find itself disad­vantaged by the hardware--though that is a major consideration-but it cannot fail to be hurt by this expression of American confidence in Arab terrorism. I urge the administration to change its mind about arms to Jordan.

HERE IS A MODEL CITY Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, I ask unan­

imous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Montana?

There was no objection. Mr. OLSEN. Mr. Speaker, Butte and

Helena, Mont., have been designated for model cities planning grants. I have watched these two applications progress from the drawing boards and I know the local initiative; the local enthusiasm and the local hopes wmch have contrib­uted to make this goal come true.

But this is really not the goal for which our two communities are working. It is a stepping stone, not a goal. Local officials and civic leaders know that many, many long hours of hard work remain ahead before Butte and Helena will be model cities as envisioned in this program. But that day will come. I have confidence that it will come because I have confi­dence in these communities.

Mr. Speaker, I have an editorial here which I clipped from the March 24 Butte-Anaconda Standard. It illustrates the local determination which has won

for Butte model city designation. It illus­trates the local determination which, I believe, will make Butte a "model" model city:

MODEL MODEL CITY

Butte could become a model city under the federal program of that title if it carefully and conscientiously lays the foundation for the program; if it gets the close cooperation of all local governmental bodies; if the peo­ple and their officials can work toward a common goal without friction.

These are not idle ifs. Much more could have been accomplished in this city and county if there had been less abrasive in­dependence and narrow attitudes.

There is the prospect that this federal project will end with just the federal plan­ning grant, unless the closest coordination of interest, effort and energy is somehow established and maintained.

In initiating this coordination of commu­nity-wide participation, Butte will have a group of 11 citizens aptly called the Model Cities Demonstration Committee. It will ad­vise the city on policy, projects and admin­istrative matters.

The responsibility of getting federal ap­proval of a practical, feasible program of improvements for the community will rest with this committee. This is quite a task because of the many facets of the Model Cities program and the many areas in which improvement can be made.

The cities program is not confined to eco­nomic development as better housing. It em­braces improvement in education, health services, welfare programs and recreation, for example.

The emphasis, of course, will be placed on economic development and more Job oppor­tunities.

Butte has a one-year planning period. This should be sufficient since some planning al­ready ha.s been done. In the next step the city's plans will have to be approved by the federal agencies involved. Then the federal assistance in a coordinated effort to make of Butte a model city will be forthcoming.

A look at the t arget area for development will point up the necessity of cooperation be­tween the county government and those of Butte and Walkerville. This area runs from Walkerville south to Front Street with the Butte business district as the prime sector. Upgrading the oldest part of the community is the objective.

The Model Cities program, as you can ob­serve, has the prospect of becoming a huge face-lifting project for this community. So no time should be lost in getting the or­ganizational work and planning started.

The federal agencies assure us that there will be no delay on their part. This is refresh­ing information. Red tape will be drastically curtailed, they say. Once Butte has set up guidelines and projects for solving its prob­lems, it can ask the various agencies for help and expect to get it without undue delay.

As Helena, this community is among the first selected for Model Cities planning funds. As a result, much attention will be focused on the Montana development to see if this federal program can be effective. There's a challenge here. Butte and Helena could be­come models for the Model Cities program.

PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS SHOWN STATESMANSHIP; THE CONGRESS MUST DO THE SAME Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include e:Ktraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there

objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection. Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, at one

time or another, e,·ery President has been accused of taking the easy way out, of bowing to expediency instead of fac­ing up to his responsibility.

When President Johnson requested a tax surcharge last year, he was going against so-called political wisdom. He was asking for action which no citizen, no Congressman, no Senator likes to hear. And yet he did ask for a tax in­crease because the national interest de­manded it.

The national interest still demands a t ax increase. If you do not think so, leaf through the newspapers and magazines and read the stories about gold, and the stock market, and price rises, and our international balance of payments. Now that the President has done the coura­geous although unpopular thing by ask­ing for a tax increase, the issue is placed squarely before the Congress.

Will we ignore it? Will we wait for someone else to take

the first step? Or will we respond in a statesmanshiplike manner, meeting our duty, honoring our obligations, and doing what needs to be done?

I, for one, intend to do what the na­tional interest clearly requires, and that is to support the tax surcharge.

CHAIRMAN PATMAN PRAISES CREDIT UNIONS IN CONNECTI­CUT SPEECH Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD .and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there obj,ection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objection. Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, last

Saturday, the distinguished chairman of the House Banking and Currency Com­mittee, the Honorable WRIGHT PATMAN, addressed the annual meeting of the Connecticut Credit Union League in Hartford. Chairman PATMAN praised the more than 25,000 credit unions in the Nation for the outstanding job they have done in protecting the Nation's economy. Chairman PATMAN pointed to favorable comments made about credit unions con­tained in the December issue of the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review. The magazine reports that not only had credit unions with­stood the tight money situation better than any other financial institution but are prepared to withstand additional periods of tight money.

While commending the credit unions, Chairman PATMAN also made it clear that the American Bankers Association, rather than attempting to help the econ­omy, is attempting to gain millions of dollars in bonus payments for banks throughout the Nation. The bonus pay­ments would come about as a result of loans made by the banks under the Higher Education Act. The story of the American Bankers Association's attempt

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7971

to extort money from the Federal Gov­ernment makes highly interesting read­ing in its own right. Because every Mem­ber of this House has credit unions in his district, I am including a copy of Chairman PATMAN's speech in my re­marks so that all Members can be kept up to date on the activities of our Na­tion's credit unions: ADDRESS BY HON. WRIGHT PATMAN, U.S. REP­

RESENTATIVE FROM THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS, AND CHAIRMAN OF THE HOUSE BANK­ING AND CURRENCY COMMITl'EE, BEFORE THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CONNECTICUT CREDIT UNION LEAGUE, HARTFORD, CONN.,

MARCH 23, 1968 Last winter, I visited Hartford to take part

in the Greater Hartford Forum and bumped into my old friend, Bill Smith. I was, indeed, pleased when Bill asked me to address your annual meeting.

I have known Bill for a long time so I was extremely grateful for the opportunity to come to Connecticut today to meet with some of my old friends and to make new ones. I have heard wonderful reports about the Connecticut Credit Union League and how it is emerging as one of the outstand­ing leagues in the country. When Bill was with the Alabama League, he did an out­standing job and I can see that he is doing an equally effective job here in the Nutmeg State.

You know the State credit union league is one of the most important aspects of the overall credit union picture and so it is highly important that State leagues be as strong as possible and that every credit union within the State take an active part in the affairs of the league. For this reason, I am glad that Bill is here helping to build Connecticut into one of the strongest leagues.

I would like to take a few minutes this morning to discuss the state of the art of credit unions with particular emphasis on credit union progress and also to look to the future of credit unions.

The United States is slowly coming out of one of the worst tight money periods in his­tory. There was a time wlien stories concern­ing monetary matters were printed only on the financial pages of our daily newspapers. But lately, the American public has become far more interested in what happens to its dollars, and the current tight money period has whetted the public's appetite for more detailed financial news. Read almost any newspaper in the country for one week and at least once during that seven-day period, there will be a story on the front page con­cerning monetary matters. And, of course, the world gold situation has rated banner headlines in most of this nation's news­papers. Unfortunately, most of the news stories that have appeared in the past year tell of tight money, high interest rates, and a critical shortage of mortgage funds.

FED RAISES DISCOUNT RATE

We read of banks and other lending insti­tutions increasing their interest rates to bor­rowers and severely limiting the amount of funds available for borrowing. And, only last week, the Federal Reserve Board raised the discount rate to 5 percent, which means very simply that the cost of money ls going to increase.

During 1966 and 1967, mortgage credit was at its lowest point in decades. Residential mortgage loans dropped about $18 billion in 1966 over 'the previous year and housing starts, which already were running at a rate below the needs of our nation, fell off 20 per­cent from 1965. Fortunately, there was an upward trend in housing starts during 1967 and in the first part of 1968, but the increase in housing activity is stm far below the na­tion's needs.

During this critical financial period, many financial institutions have clamored for as­sistance from public bodies such as the Con­gress of the United States or State legisla-tures. ·

A number of State legislatures were asked to raise the state usury rates so that lenders could extract more interest from borrowers. Governors were requested to call emergency sessions of their State legislatures in order to raise usury rate limitations. And, last month, the Commonwealth of Virginia, which for years had limited interest rates to 6 per­cent, increased the rate to 8 percent. That 2 percent increase may not seem like a great deal, but it means that the average Virginia homeowner will have to work two extra years solely to pay the added interest on his home.

But, while almost every financial institu­tion in this country was asking for outside assistance in solving many problems, there was one financial institution, which I am happy and proud to say, did not ask for as­sistance and has weathered the financial storm in the finest of styles. I have, of course, referred to the credit unions in this nation, which once again are demonstrating that they play a major role in the stabilization of our economy.

FITl'ING CREDIT UNION SALUTE

Perhaps one of the most fitting salutes given to credit unions is contained in the December 1967 Business Review of the Fed­eral Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. It must be remembered that the Federal Reserve Banks are run by the big bankers, so when the Federal Reserve System extends a com­pliment to the credit unions, It is a fact that cannot be taken lightly. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Business Review re­ports, "that there is no question that credit unions moved into the 1966 tight money period with a full head of steam. For ex­ample, during the 1961-66 period, assets of the nation's credit unions increased over 81 percent, compared to growth rates of 45 per­cent for commercial banks, 63 percent for savings and loan associatio)lS, and 42 percent for mutual savings banks." The article cites credit union's advantages over other finan­cial institutions as one of the principal rea­sons that credit unions are not greatly af­fected by tight money situations. The article reports, "the advantages include convenient location near the place of work or in the neighborhood, a good safety record, attrac­tive yield on savings, and a rate of interest charged on loans which is comparable to or lower than members would have to pay other financial institutions." In short, the article admits that credit union members get a "good deal",

And, what about the effects on credit un­ions over a prolonged tight money period if additional monetary crises come in the fu­ture? Once again, the article pats credit un­ions on the back with its closing paragraph:

"The growth patterns and potentials of credit unions coupled with their unique characteristics probably would again result in a rather favorable experience for credit unions in future periods of tight money."

I think the article is a fitting tribute not only to credit union officials, but to the more than 19 million credit union members in this country.

Let no one question the strength, the im­portance, or the safeness of credit unions, for in the most critical financial period of our nation, credit unions alone have shown that they can not only withstand such ex­perience, but actually grow during these adverse times. The Bureau of Federal Credit Unions reports an increase of more than 400 credit unions during the year ending Feb­ruary 1967 and during the sam.e period, more than a million new credit union members were added. These are impressive totals and

clearly show the faith that the American people place in credit unions.

Not only are credit unions growing on a. numerical basis, but the movement continues its outstanding record of safeguarding mem­bers' shares. The minimal losses that have been sustained throughout the history of credit unions in this country ls a sign that credit unions are not sacrificing safety solely for the sake of expansion.

Every year the question of Federal share insurance for credit unions ls raised and, unfortunately, the subject of such insurance is given more consideration than it merits. A look at the loss record of Federal credit unions for the past quarter of a century confirms the belief that Federal credit union insurance is not needed by credit unions. From 1936 through 1964, only $1.2 m1llion has been lost in Federal credit unions. From 1956 to 1965, commercial bank losses on in­sured accounts amounted to more than $12 million, while losses in insured savings and loan accounts were slightly more than $11 million. Of course, these figures do not ac­curately depict the losses to the banking and savings and loan industries because they do not include the losses on accounts that were in excess of the insurance ceiling, nor is consideration given to the losses suffered by stockholders of falling institutions. Since credit union members are, in a sense, both stockholders and depositors, it is quite re­markable that the loss figure is so low. If the stockholder losses were added to the figures for other financial institutions, many more m1llions of dollars would have to be added to their totals.

BIG PAYMENT-LITTLE LOSS

What would a program of Federal share insurance have cost Federal credit unions if it had been in effect in the past ten yea.rs? By using a premium of one-twelth of one percent of shares annually, Federal credit unions would have paid, during the last decade, nearly $25112 million for share insurance. The premium figure approximates the rates imposed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on commercial banks and the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Oorporation on savings and loan associations.

Thus, credit unions would have paid $251h million to cover a $1.2 m1llion loss, And, the insurance might not have covered all of the losses since shares in excess of the insur­ance maximum would not have been covered. I cannot help but wonder what might have happened to the credit union movement if $25 m1llion were pulled out over a ten-year period.

In addition, Federal share insurance would bring red tape to the credit union operation. Credit unions have long prided themselves on their non-bureaucratic methods of opera­tion. But, Federal share insurance would require a mountain of paperwork, a con­stant audit of every share account and need­less expense. The simplicity of the credit union cannot be overlooked as a prime reason more than 19 million Americans have become credit union members.

Credit unions have built a reputation for safety because of their neighbor-lending-to­neighbor philosophy. If one credit union member gets behind on a loan repayment, all mem·bers of the credit union have an interest in that delinquent loan and they can get after the poor payer with a sharp stick. But in an insured institution, there is no interest on the pa.rt of the depositors as to whether or not a borrower repays a loan. In addition, I am certain that credit union borrowers feel a far deeper sense of responsibility for repaying loans than do borrowers from insured financial institu­tions. In short, the best insurance that credit unions have is their la.ck of Federal share insurance.

Except in one area, credit unions are fully

7972 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 covered by insurance. The excellent bonding program adopted by credit unions insures against losses from burglary, robbery, em­bezzlement and virtually every other type of occurrence which would cause a credit union to lose funds. The only way that a credit union can lose money and not have it cov­ered by insurance is due to bad loans. How­ever, the possibility of a credit union making bad loans is greatly minimized because of the use of a credit eommlttee to review or approve major lending activities. The minimal loss record that credit unions have established is a fitting tribute to the out­standing job that these credit eomm.ittees and loan officers have done, and clearly shows that credit unions a.re extremely carefUl with their members' funds.

Recently, Congress reaffirmed its faith in the safety of credit unions by passing legisla­tion that I introduced that woUld allow tlie credit committee to delegate any of its functions to a loan officer. Clearly, Congress would not have gone along with such legis­lation 1! it had not been impressed with the safety record of credit unions.

LARGEST FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

There can be no doubt that credit unions are making progress in every sector of our economy. Credit unions are playing an im­portant role in the war on poverty, our for­eign aid program, and in our every day lives. There are more credit unions than all other :financial institutions combined and more Federally chartered credit unions than the combined total of other :financial institu­tions licensed by the Federal government.

But for some reason, and I have not been able to find anyone who knows the exact an­swer, the regulation of Federal credit unions lies buried in an agency of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and to compound the problem, the Director of the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions does not re­port directly to the Secretary CY! HEW, but must work through the Social Security Ad­ministration. When the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions needs legal advice, it must de­pend on part-time lawyers borrowed from the Childrens Bureau of the Social Security Ad­ministration. I do not mean to imply that the Bureau of Federal Credit Unions does not do an excellent job, but what I am saying is that the Bureau is not allowed to operate with the authority that it should command as the regulator of more than 12,000 Federal credit unions.

To this end, I have introduced leglslation, H.R. 14030, to create an independent Federal credit union administration that would up­grade the existing Bureau and take it out of the "stepchild" status. I was happy to note that the Connecticut League was one of the first leagues to endorse the bill. But !or some reason, there are a few states that do not favor my bill. Some say enactment of the bill might increase the examination fees pa.id by Federal credit unions. While this may be true that a slight increase might be neces­sary, any monetary increase would be more than offset by the advantages gained from a new Federal credit union administration.

If we are to have continued meaningful progress within the credit union movement, we will have to have a Federal credit union agency with as much status and standing as the other Federal :financial regulatory agen­cies because as the credit union movement continues to expand, the bankers of this country begin to take a longer look at your operations. Unless there is an agency to fight for credit unions on an equal level with other Federal financial regulatory agencies, much of the work that you have done in the past could be spoiled.

Some people choose to measure progress in the terms of favorable leglslation. Under this yardstick, perhaps 1967 and 1968 will be years of some of the greatest credit union prog­ress, for three pieces of major credit union

legislation have been passed by Congress and two are now law.

One of the new pieces of legislation pro­vides for increased borrowing authority by certain officers of credit unions and the sec­ond new law provides for quarterly dividends, full dividend credit on payments received by the 10th of the month, and a delegation of authority from the credit committee to loan officers. A third proposal, H.R. 6157, provid­ing for payroll deductions for purchases of shares in credit unions for government em­ployees has passed the House unanimously and is now before the Senate. Unfortunately, the bill is temporarily bogged down because a number of other :financial institutions want to be included in the bill. My personal feeling is that if these other :financial insti­tutions want to get into the allotment pro­gram, they should get their own bill, for the credit unions have worked too long and too hard to have their legislation held up be­cause of the desires of non-credit union financial institutions.

There are several other pieces of legislation which I have introduced that are of impor­tance to credit unions. H.R. 14907 would in­crease the maximum maturity on Federal credit union loans from 5 to 10 years, would enable credit unions to invest directly in sta­bilization funds and central credit unions and to purchase notes from liquidating credit unions. The legislation would also re­Vise the existing reserve procedures for Fed­eral credit unions. There is also legislation, H.R. 15437, pending in the House of Repre­sentatives and the Senate that would in­crease the unsecured loan limit from $750 to $2,500. Although this may seem like a large increase, it must be remembered that when the Federal Credit Union Act was passed, it had an unsecured loan limit of only $60. Credit unions have shown, through their stability and safeness, that they can easily handle an unsecured loan limit of $2,500. Eventually, I foresee a time when the un­secured loan limit will be removed entirely.

CHECKING ACCOUNTS IN FUTURE

Before leaving the subject of credit union legislation, I would briefly like to touch on a bill which I introduced during the 89th Congress and again during the 90th Con­gress. The legislation would allow Federal credit unions and Federal savings and loan associations to hold checking accounts for members, provided that a 100 percent reserve is maintained behind each account. The leg­islation may make it sound as if credit unions are branching into entirely foreign fields, but I think that modern-day credit unions clearly have the expertise to handle checking services.

And, it would provide a degree of competi­tion in a field that has been completely dominated by commercial banks. Not only do commercial banks have an exclusive right on checking accounts, but when the Federal Deposit Insurance Act was written in 1933, the banks successfully had a section of the Act worded so that banks are not required to pay any interest on demand deposits. Not only do they not pay you for using your money, but they charge you for the privilege of allowing them to spend your money.

Only recently, the courts have ruled in two states that mutual savings banks could issue checks for accounts of their members. The court reasoned that it was unrealistic for a mutual savings bank to be required to use the service of a commercial bank to facilitate its transactions with its members. The same is true for the credit unions. If one of your members obtains a large loan or makes a withdrawal that he does not want in cash, the credit union must honor this request by drawing a check on its account at a commercial bank. There is no reason why the credit union cannot act as its own banker and draw checks on itself and even allow

its members to write checks on their own accounts. And, since the Federal Reserve System clears checks for member banks without charge, check clearing could be handled through the Federal Reserve System at a minimal charge to the credit unions.

Now I know that this may sound like so much "blue-skying" to some of you, but I honestly believe that at some point in the future, credit unions will be able to afford checking accounts to their members. And, perhaps as your International Credit Union Service Corporation grows, this may be the vehicle for providing this new service.

BANKER'S BONANZA BILL

There is one piece of legislation before the Congress that I was happy to see did not receive the public endorsement of the credit unions. Although the bill, The Higher Edu­cation Act of 1968, is an extremely impor­tant and worthwhile piece of legislation, there is a section of the bill that is nothing more than a "bankers' bonanza" disguised as helping potential college students.

This provision would provide for an up to $35 payment to banks for each guaranteed student college loan that they make. This fee would be in addition to the 6 percent interest rate allowed the lender. It is bad enough to think that the government will have to bribe banks to make loans but the legislation goes further than that. It requires that every loan made by the banks from June 1, 1967, to the date of enactment of the Act will be eligible for a $35 bonus payment. That means that the banks will receive more than $13 million in payments for loans made from June 1967 to the beginning of 1968, the date of the most current :figures for the lending program. Of course, the $35 payment will also be made for loans made from the beginning of 1968 to the date that the bill is passed.

The American ·Bankers Association is chief­ly responsible for the back payment to banks. Dr. Charles Walker, the hired Ebenezer Scrooge of the American Bankers Association, told his members last year to go a.head and make the loans _because the legislation would be passed with a retroactive feature. Of course, he had no right to make such a. state­ment and he apparently now is pushing hard for the back payments so that he can save face with his members.

Dr. Walker has been the chief architect of the $35 bonus payment for the banks. He contended that the banks were losing money on the loans that they made and presented a group of :figures to prove his point. However, the General Accounting Office studied the situation and found that rather than losing money on these loans, as contended by the American Bankers Association, banks were actually making a tidy profit on the loans.

The big areas of difference between the two sets of :figures is based on the bank's cost of obtaining the lending funds. The banks argue that it costs them roughly 5 percent to ob­tain funds, while the General Accounting Office points out that the figure is far lower than 5 percent. The American Bankers Asso­ciation refuses to include in its calculation the millions of dollars in free funds that they hold in the form of demand deposits and every time that they are reminded of this, they simply switch the subject. In short, 1! a bank must pay 5 percent for savings funds, while at the same time obtaining an equal amount of money at no cost, it cannot be ac­curately said that the cost of money to that bank is 5 percent. In truth, the cost of the funds is only 2Y:z percent, since one-half of the funds are obtained without cost. Dr. Walker's position was further contradicted by the respected banking publication, Bank Stock Quarterly, which reported that the breakeven cost on loans for a selected num­ber of banks across the country was 3.89 percent. This figure includes not only the costs of the money but administrative costs

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7973 in processing a loan. So when the American Bankers Association says that its banks can­not make money at 6 percent, I am not too sympathetic.

RUSSIAN AUTOMOBILE RACE

The figure juggling by the American Bank­ers Association reminds me of the story of the great automobile race between Russia and the United States. Each country claimed that it had the fastest racing car in the world. Finally, in order to settle the dispute, a race was held between the Russian and American car. When the dust had cleared, the American car had defeated the Russians by a wide margin and the next day the head­lines in the Soviet newspaper read: Russians finish second in great automobile race-­Americans next to last.

For a long time, I have said that next to the church the credit unions accomplish more good in this country than any other institution. I believe that with my whole heart. I wish the philosophy of the credit union movement would rub off onto some other sectors of our financial community, for not all members of that community are dedicated to efforts that would be the most beneficial to the American people. Perhaps the greatest example of breaking faith with t.he people of our country is the Federal Re­serve Board and its Chairman, William Mc­Chesney Martin. Outside of the Vietcong, I do not know of any institution that has done more damage to the American economy in the past few years than the Federal Reserve System.

I have never been too happy with the over­all operation of the Federal Reserve Board but no Federal Reserve Board has failed the American people as thoroughly as the Wil­liam McChesney Martin Board. Mr. Martin has allowed runaway profiteering and rux~­away interest rates throughout the Viet­namese crisis. He has not held the right in the area of economy under which his agency has the responsibility-interest rates and monetary policy.

Today, we have the highest interest rates of this century-in fact, some are higher than they have been in 100 years. The Fed­eral government is in the disgraceful posi­tion of paying about 6 percent on securities that are fully backed by the credit of this nation. Municipalities, school districts, and county governments have been choked off from funds and are paying record interest rates because . of the profiteering policies of the Federal Reserve. Corporate bonds are out of sight and the consumer, the farmer, and the small businessman are being gouged un­mercifully by these record interest rates. The taxpayer will be forced to pay $15.5 billion in interest charge on the national debt this year, about $8 billion more than would have been the case if Mr. Martin had kept interest rates at the levels existing when he took office in 1951.

We have had other wars and during the same period had responsible members of the Federal Reserve Board. Throughout World War II-at a time of tremendous expendi­tures-the Federal Reserve Board, under Marlnner Eccles, kept interest rates on long term government bonds below 2¥:z percent. In fact, short term rates were as low as % of one percent during this period. This action saved the American people billions of dollars. And, I do not think anyone, not even the bankers, suffered from this fact.

During a war-time period, we expect all agencies of government to put out the maxi­mum effort to support our national policies. We expect the agencies of the Federal govern­ment to conserve resources, to hold down prices and to make every effort to keep the economy going, despite heavy war-time ex­penditures. Today, this is generally true throughout the government, but it is not the case at the Federal Reserve. If any other

executive of this government had failed as thoroughly as Mr. Martin to hold down prices, they would have long since been retired from government service.

Recently, I charged Mr. Martin with mal­feasance and nonfeasance in carrying out duties of his office. I repeat those charges here today and add that the American people cannot afford to allow Mr. Martin to pursue a course of action that is directly opposite the needs of the nation. Mr. Martin con­tinues, as if driven by some antiquated eco­nomic theory, to pursue higher interest rates. Perhaps his answer for inflation is to bank­rupt the country and then, quite simply, if we have no money, there can be no inflation. Perhaps Mr. Martin ls too caught up with economic theories to see what is happening. Perhaps he is depending on a textbook case study to cure our monetary ills. It is quite clear that Mr. Martin does not serve all Americans but, instead, serves only a small group of big banks, and time and time again we have seen evidence to support that state­ment.

Perhaps Mr. Martin needs to get out with the little people of this nation and to find out what is really happening in this country. He could learn a great deal from credit union people. And, if he practiced what he learned from the credit union movement, it would go a long way towards putting our country back on a sound financial course.

Thank you very much for inviting me here this morning.

H.R. 10477: A DISSERVICE TO VETERANS

Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the record and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Illinois?

There was no objeotion. Mr. ANNUNZIO. Mr. Speaker, yester­

day this body overwhelmingly passed H.R. 10477, a bill that supposedly would provide more housing for veterans, and thus alleviate the critical housing short­age for returning servicemen.

While the thrust of the legislation is, indeed, a commendable one, in practice, the bill is in effect, a slap in the face at our veterans, particularly those who have served so nobly in Vietnam.

At present, the interest rate on VA loans cannot exceed 6 percent. However, H.R. 10477 removes that ceiling and it allows the Administrator of the Veterans' Administration to establish interest rates compatible with current market levels. Once again, this sounds like an excellent idea but in practice, it will only mean that the veteran will have to pay thou­sands of dollars more to purchase a home.

It is contended that the free market should set interest rates and that by giv­ing the VA Administrator power to raise or lower the VA rate, that more money will be available for veteran's housing. However, the so-called free market, in setting interest rates, is a one-way street

· and serves only to keep interest rates at a high level, thus benefiting the lender while never moving in a cycle to lower interest rates and thus benefiting bor­rowers. This fact has been brought home on a number of occasions by leading economists. Chairman PATMAN, of the

House Banking Committee, in a recent hearing of the Joint Economic Commit­tee, quoted Mr. Allen Sproul, former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, about the fallacy of the mar­ketplace setting interest rates. Said Mr. Sproul:

So far as free markets are concerned, I think we are all attracted by the phrase. It suits our habit of mind. But we haven't had a free market in money and credit, at least since the Federal Reserve System was es­tablished.

Thus, while leading financial experts have disclaimed the free market con­cept, it has been used not to help our returning boys in uniform, but to put more money in the hands of the lenders.

At the present time, the Housing Sub­committee of the Banking and Currency Committee is conducting hearings on a housing bill. One of the problems being considered is that of stimulating the mortgage money market for veteran home loans. I think this body would have been much wiser to have withheld action on the interest rate section of H.R. 10477 until the Housing Subcommittee of the Banking and Currency Committee had filed its report on the housing legisla­tion. Unfortunately, that was not the case and very shortly, I suspect, this leg­islation will become law. And, when our returning Vietnam veterans attempt to purchase homes and find that they will be paying interest rates of 7, 8, or 9 per­cent, they will be contacting Members of Congress wanting to know why they have had to pay these rates when veterans of other wars were able to obtain Govern­ment loans as low as 4 percent. It is an honest question, and I hope that Mem­bers will have an answer that will satisfy our Vietnam veterans.

FOOD SUPPLEMENTS: THE DOCTORS CHOICE

Mr. HORTON. MT. Speaker, I ask unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection. Mr. HORTON. Mr. Speaker, for some

time now I have been concerned about the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act relating to food supplements. As an outgrowth of my interest in reestablish­ing consumer needs and wan ts in an area which is presently being jeopardized by unwarranted FDA controls and regula­tions, I am introducing today a bill which would limit the authority of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare over the marketing of food sup­plements. It limits the Secretary's au­thority only to those situations in which these supplements constitute an estab­lished hazard to the public health. This will be done by providing a definition for these food supplements.

As you know, the 1966 regulations pro­posed by the FDA attempted to discour­age widespread use of vitamins and drug supplements by requiring manufaoturers to label these products, as follows:

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968 Vitamins and minerals are supplied in

abundant amounts by the foods we eat. The Food and Nutrition Board of the National Research Council recommends that dietary needs be satisfied by foods, except for per­sons with special dietary needs, there is no scientific basis for recommending routine use of dietary supplements.

In addition, these regulations extended over the potency limitations of foo~ s1:1p­plements, thereby making a prescri~tion necessary for the consumer who wished vitamins over a certain strength.

I find the consequences of these regu­lations grave and alarming. They spell out higher prices and inconvenience. The elderly and those with fixed incomes would be hardest hit. Thousands upon thousands of men, women, and children would not obtain food supplements, as they used to, simply because they. w~re not easily accessible, or the prescription carried too high a price tag. Health food stores would be severely hurt. Manufac­turers would lose their valuable incen­tive to improve their product because FDA imposed "monopoly" controls wo~ld eliminate competition which is the mam-

, stay of research in the field of nutrition. If these facts are not alarming enough,

·consider that this proposed edict com­pletely ignores the fact that the average American does not eat a balanced daily diet. Just as important is the considera­tion that these regulations would take away from the consumer's right of free choice, and the personal decision as to whether or not these supplements are beneficial.

Mr. Speaker, it is time that aotion be taken to remedy a situation which seems unfounded, unwise, and a possible threat to the health of millions of American cit­izens. It is clear to me that the FDA has acted hastily. It has acted without proper investigation and outside of its purview in issuing these proposed food supple­ment regulations nearly 2 years ago.

We simply cannot compromise the total health and well-being of Ameri­cans. It is the family physician, not the Food and Drug Administration, who must ultimately be the source of reliable health information. For the past 25 years vitamins and minerals have been en­dorsed as products which are beneficial and useful in supplementing the mini­mum daily requirements of each and every person by doctors across the Na­tion and throughout the world. They are nutritional products which are neither harmful nor dangerous. I hope that the Congress will act promptly to endorse this legislation.

NORTH CASCADES NATIONAL RECREATION AREA PLAN

Mrs. MAY. Mr. Speaker, I ask unani­mous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include ex­traneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentle­woman from Washington?

There was no objection. Mrs. MAY. Mr. Speaker, today I am in­

troducing a b111 to establish the North Cascades National Recreation Area in

the State of Washington. This legislation is being introduced for the purpose of placing before the House Committee on

.Interior and Insular Affairs the official proposal Jf the State of Washington for the future best use of the great North Cascades region, one of nature's great natural wonderlands. This proposal is submitted as an alternative to S. 1321 and other bills to establish a North Cas­cades National Park and Ross Lake Na­tional Recreation Area in the State of Washington.

In 1963, Mr. Speaker, President Ken­nedy directed the Secretaries of Interior and Agriculture to conduct a survey of the Federal lands embraced in the North Cascades and to make a report to the Congress as to their future use. A part of the charge given the study team by the Secretaries was that recommendations were to be sought and considered, which were expressive of the interest of the people of the area, the State of Washing­ton, the region and the United States, in that order, and to invite from the Gov­ernor of the State of Washington an of­ficial recommendation from the people of the State of Washington.

Gov. Daniel J. Evans undertook this responsibility conscientiously. To assist him he formed an advisory com­mittee on the North Cascades. This com­mittee consisted of a representative group of citizens of the State having an expressed interest in the future of the North Cascades and included directors of State departments having official respon­sibilities for the natural resources in­volved. The committee consisted of 16 persons. It was purposely developed to represent the diverse interests involved and to bring them to the conference table for reasoned discussions.

The committee held a number of meet­ings and, on each occasion, the Governor met with them so that he could benefit from their reasoning. It was early evident that while the group included strong proponents and strong opponents of a national park in the North Cascades, a clear majority favored no national park. Thus if only a majority view had been sought, it could have easily and quickly been achieved and it would have been one of opposition to a third national park in my State.

That this was not done is a credit to the farsightedness and reasoning of the committee members. From these delib­erations came a growing conviction that a position in opposition to, or in favor of, a North Cascades National Park, left almost totally unanswered the real ques­tion: How could this great natural won­derland be preserved and retained intact and in perpetuity, and how could it best be made available, not just for groups of people, but truly for the outdoor recrea­tional interests of all of the people of America?

There began to develop in the minds of the committee a new and different concept of preservation and use, one which had not previously been offered or considered-a plan which eventually cap­tured the interest and support of all of the diverse groups represented on the committee but with one dissenting vote.

This concept is presented in the legis-· 1ation I am introducing today. While the entire area of approximately 1,891,-000 acres is termed a national recrea­tion area, perhaps the terminology is confusing. The committee selected the term not as it is defined by national standards but rather to describe an entire area that should be set aside for primary recreational use and within its outside boundaries be further zoned into high­intensity recreational use areas, wilder­ness areas, and a national park.

I might say, Mr. Speaker, that the Governor's committee was called back into session just prior to the Senate hear­ings on the Federal proposal, S. 1321, to review that bill. As a result of that meet­ing the Governor's committee reiterated its endorsement of its original proposal as being more comprehensive than the Federal proposal.

The House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs recently announced that the Subcommittee on National Parks and Recreation will conduct field hearings on North Cascades National Park legis­lation in the main ballroom of the Ben­jamin Franklin Hotel at Seattle, Wash., on April 19 and 20, 1968. The introduc­tion of a bill at this time which embraces the official recommendations of the State of Washington will place before the subcommittee this alternative proposal which I believe is more nearly reflective of the needs of all persons and groups interested in the North Cascades.

The following are the provisions of this legislation to establish the North Cascades National Recreation Area in the State of Washington, and for other purposes:

H.R. 16252 A bill to establish the North Cascades Na­

tional Recreation Area in the State of Washington, and for other purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and House of

Representatives of the United States of · America in Congress assembled, That in order to preserve for the benefit, use, and inspiration of present and future genera­tions majestic mountain scenery, snowfields glaciers, alpine meadows, and other unique natural features in the North Cascade Moun­tains of the State of Washington; in order to provide for the public outdoor recreation use and enjoyment of portions of the rivers, lakes and scenic areas and for the conserva­tion of the scenic, scientific, historic and other values contributing to the public en­joyment Of such lands and waters; and in order to further the purposes of the Wild­erness Act, there is hereby established, sub­ject to valid existing rights, the North Cas, cades Recreation Area consisting of the unit of National Park, Wilderness, and Recreation Areas hereinafter referred to and designated on the map entitled "North Cascades National Recreation Area," numbered -- and dated ---, 1968. The map shall be on file and available for public inspection in the Office of the Director, National Park Service, De­partment of the Interior, and in the Office of the Chief; Forest Service, Department ot Agriculture. · SEC. 2. (a) In furtherance of the purposes of this Act and subject to valid existing rights there is hereby established the North Cascades National Park comprising approxi­mately three hundred and twelve thou­sand acres as designated on the map referred to in section 1. The land within such National Park is hereby eliminated

March 27, 1968 -CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7975 from the Mount Baker Nati.anal Forest. The natl.anal park shall be admi.nistered by the Secretary of the Interior as a substantially undeveloped and wilderness type national park in accordance with the Act of August 25, 1916 (39 Stat. 535; 16 U.S.C. 1-4), as amended and supplemented.

(b) Within the boundaries of the park the Secretary of the Interior may acquire lands, waters, and interest therein by donation, purchase with donated or appropriated funds, or exchange. In exercising his authority to acquire property by exchange the Secretary may accept title to any non-Federal property within the boundaries of the park, and in ex­change therefor he may convey to the grantor of such property any federally owned prop­erty under his juri.sdiction in the State of Washington which he classifies as suitable for exchange or other disposal. The values of the properties so exchanged either shall be ap­proximately equal, or lf they are not ap­proximately equal the values shall be equal­ized by the payment of cash to the grantor or to the Secretary as the circumstances require.

SEC. 3. (a) In furtherance of the purposes of thi.s Act and subject to valid existing rights there are hereby established the Mt. Baker Recreation Area, the Ross Lake Recrea­tion Area, the Lake Chelan Recreation Area, the Cascade River Recreation Area, and the North Cascade Highway Recreation Area, each as designated on the map referred to in sec­tion 1 of this Act, comprising in the aggre­gate approximately 399,000 acres.

(b) The Recreation Areas shall be ad­ministered by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the laws, rules, and regula­tions applicable to the national forests in such manner as in his judgment will best provide for: (1) public outdoor recreation benefits; (2) conservation of scenic, scien­tific, historic, and other values contributing to the public enjoyment; and (3) such man­agement, utilization, and disposal of renew­able natural resources and the continuation of such existing uses and developments as are compatible with, or do not signUicantly impair, public recreation and conservation of the scenic, scientific, historic, or other values contributing to public enjoyment.

(c) The lands within the recreation areas, subject to valid existing rights, are hereby withdrawn from location, entry, and patent under the United States mining laws. The Secretary of the Interior, under such regu­lations as he deems appropriate, may permit the removal of the nonleasable minerals from the lands within the recreation area in the manner prescribed by section 10 of the Act of August 4, 1939, as amended (53 Stat. 1196; 43 U.S.C. 387), and he may permit the re­moval of leasable minerals from lands within the recreation area in accordance with the Mineral Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.), or the Ac­quired Lands Mineral Leasing Act of August 7, 1947 (30 U.S.C. 351 et seq.). Any such per­mit or lease may be issued by the Secretary o! the Interior only with the approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and upon a deter­mination by him that such disposition would not have significant adverse effects on the administration of the recreation area or rec­reation areas i.nvolved, and each permit or lease shall be subject to such conditions as the Secretary of Agriculture may prescribe to insure the adequate utilization of the lands for the primary purposes for which the recreation areas are being administered.

(d) Any license for water power develop­ments or other power purposes within any part of the recreation areas shall b~ i.ssued by the Federal Power Commission only with the consent of the Secretary of Agriculture and shall contain such conditions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of Agriculture to insure the adequate utilization of the lands for the primary purposes for which the recreation areas are administered.

(e> The Secretary of Agriculture shall permi.t hunting and fishing on lands or waters under hi.s jurisdiction within the rec­reation areas i.n accordance with applicable laws of the United States and the State of Washington, except that the Secretary may designate zones where, and establi.sh periods when no hunting or fishing shall be per­mitted for reasons of public safety, admin­istration, or public use and enjoyment. Ex­cept in emergencies, any regulations of the Secretary pursuant to this subsection shall be put into effect only after consultation with the Department of Game of the State of Washi.ngton.

SEC. 4. (a) In furtherance of the purposes of this Act and subject to valid existing rights there are hereby established the El­dorado Wilderness, and the Okanogan Wil­derness, and the Glacier Peak Wilderness is hereby enlarged, all as designa ted on the map referred to in section 1 of this Act. Within the Mount Baker Recreation Area, the Secretary of Agriculture is hereby authori.zed and directed to designate a wilderness core i.ncluding Mount Baker itself. The Eldorado Wilderness, the Okanogan Wilderness, the Glacier Peak Wilderness as enlarged, and the wilderness core in the Mount Baker Recrea­tion Area contain in the aggregate approxi­mately 1,180,000 acres. Such areas shall be administered by the Secretary of Agriculture in accordance with the provisions of the Wilderness Act.

( b) For the purposes of this Act, the boundary of the North Cascades National Recreation Area and the boundaries of its compon ent national park, wilderness areas, recreation areas, and North Cascade high­way shall be shown on the map referred to in section 1 of thi.s Act. The Secretary of Agriculture and the Secretary of the Interior are instructed to develop preci.se boundaries which as nearly as possible are those shown on the map referred to in section 1. When such precise and actual boundaries have been described, maps and legal descriptions of such boundaries shall be filed with the Interior and Insular Affairs Committees of the United States Senate and House of Rep­resentatives, and such descriptions shall have the same force and effect as if included in this Act: Provided, however, That correction of clerical or typographical errors in such legal descriptions and maps may be made.

(c) Upon the filing of the legal descrip­tions and maps as provided for in subsection (b) of this section the Eldorado wilderness, the Okanogan wilderness, the wilderness core of the Mount Baker Recreation Area, and the additions to the Glacier Peak wilderness shall be subject to the provisions of the Wilderness Act governing areas designated by that Act as wilderness areas, except that any reference in such provisions to the effec­tive date of the Wilderness Act shall be deemed to be a reference to the effective date of this Act.

SEC. 5. There is hereby established the North Cascades Advisory Board to consist of the Governor of the State of Washington or his representative, the Secretary of Agricul­ture or his representative, and the Secretary of the Interior or his representative. The North Cascades Advisory Board shall revi.ew from time to time and submit to the Federal agencies charged with admi.nistration of units of the North Cascades National Recrea­tion Area its recommendations on plans for the development of and administration of such units.

SEC. 6. Nothing in this Act shall be con­strued to affect adversely or to authorize any Federal agency to take any action that would affect adversely any rights or privilege of the State of Washington in property within the recreation areas establi.shed by this Act which is being utilized for the North Cross State Highway.

SEC. 7. There are hereby authori.zed to be appropriated such sums &a may be necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act.

JOBS IN HOUSING Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New York?

There was no objection. Mr. BINGHAM. Mr. Speaker, impos­

sible schemes will no more close the pov­erty gap in this country than will half­hearted measures inadequately funded. It is noble to dream great dreams, and bold slogans may serve as a call to action. But the situation in this country today calls for more than slogans and dreams.

Recognizing that we have not done nearly enough to eliminate the jobless­ness which is a chief cause of slum con­ditions, and the substandard housing which is one of the principal effects, I am introducing today the Jobs-in-Hous­ing Act of 1968. Eight of my colleagues have joined me in sponsoring this pro­posal.

I would like to emphasize that our bill, which calls for the construction of 3,160,-000 public and publicly assisted housing units over the 4 years, is in a real sense one of the least radical housing proposals to come before Congress this year. It does not contemplate any new programs, simply because we already have legisla­tion on the books providing for almost every type of federally financed low- and moderate-income housing, including public housing, privately sponsored me­dium-rent housing and rent subsidies.

America is already committed, on the books, to doing away with our slums and, in the process, providing much-needed employment. In the Housing Act of 1937, which has now been law for more than three decades, Congress declared that it is the policy of the United States, through public funds and credit, to assist local governments in eliminating unsafe and unsanitary housing, remedying the acute shortage of decent low-income housing and alleviating "present and recurring unemployment."

This is the promise. The only missing ingredient has been the money to carry out our commitment. Over the years, we have built new housing for the poor at a rate which will not suffice to do away with existing inadequate housing, much less keep pace with our enormous population growth. The administration's proposed Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, which is now before the Congress, goes a long way in the right direction. I have cosponsored it, and I support its promise and its provisions whole­heartedly.

But, at the same time, I do not feel it goes far enough in terms of the number of new housing units it would build in the next few years. As a spokesman for the ·influential and responsible National Housing Conference said the other day, testifying before the House Subcommit-

7976 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968

tee on Housing in support of the ad­ministration bill:

The long-range requirements for meeting the nation's needs (for low and ·moderate in­come housing), taking into account the mas­sive population growth which is in process, are greatly in excess of the proposals con­tained in the Housing and Urban Develop­ment Act of 1968.

A representative of the AFL-CIO also offered general support for the bill but added:

We feel the immediate ne,ed is for far more housing than is envisioned by this bill­considerable as it is.

Thus the jobs-in-housing bill which I am introducing authorizes the funds to construct 2 million public housing units over the next 4 years, including 500 000 units in fiscal year 1969, which begin~ on July l, 1968. It also authorizes over a 4-year period funds for 400,000 housing units under the rent supplements pro­gram; 160,000 units under the 202 pro­gram for the elderly and handicapped; and 600,000 units under the 221 (d) (3) below market interest rate program. In fiscal year 1969, 100,000 units would be constructed under rent supplements, 40,000 under section 202, and 100,000 un­der 221 (d) (3).

Increased funds are also sought for such directly related programs as model cities, urban renewal, urban planning as­sistance, urban mass transportation, water and sewers, and neighborhood fa­cilities.

As I mentioned earlier, a primary goal of this proposal is the creation of jobs in ghetto areas.

For many years, most white Americans have shared in an economic boom sus­tained in part by massive Federal spend­ing. But the residents of our urban and rural slums have seen little of the money spent on defense, highways, space, agri­cultural subsidies, and other programs. The benefits of Federal largesse and gen­eral prosperity have trickled down to them, if at all, almost entirely in the form of welfare subsistence allowances with all of their debilitating and degrad­ing implications.

So-called make-work programs for the poor are really no better than welfare if they consist of projects comparable to as­signing one team to dig holes in the ground and another to go around filling them up. If there were no socially valu­able work that needed to be done in this country, such a scheme might be justi­fiable. But obviously there is at least one public works program that will meet a desperate national need while avoiding the stigma of make-work charity.

This program is public and public as­sisted housing, a fertile field for the ex­penditure of Federal funds that will reach the residents of poverty neighbor­hoods. Housing construction will provide good-paying jobs right where they are needed-in the ghetto. What is more it takes into account the fact that m~st slum residents have a low level of educa­tion and skills.

Equally important, it is wholly realistic i? . view ?f prevailing attitudes, the po­ht1cal climate in this country and our form of Government.

According to most housing surveys ~here are approximately 10 million dilap~ 1dated or deteriorating housing units in the United States at the present time. The President proposes to replace 6 mil­lion of these over the next 10 years, at an average rate of 600,000 new and re­habilitated low- and moderate-income units a year.

Through the jobs-in-housing bill, my colleagues and I propose to build just o~er 3 million units in the next 4 years. Like the President, we project over a longer period the construction of an average of 600,000 units a year. In about 15 years, the total need of 10 million units will be almost completely satisfied.

But the administration would start with on_ly 300,000 units in the first year. I want mstead to start big-with 740 000 units in the coming fiscal year-~nd then taper off very gradually after 4 or 5 years to reach the projected average. The principal advantage of this approach is that it will produce a great stimulus to the labor market by creating a sudden demand for 500,000 or more new con­struction jobs. The result of this demand inevitably will be the hiring of tens of thousands of presently unemployed Negroes and other ghetto dwellers.

The existence of widespread public support for this type of public works program was clearly demonstrated in a Harris poll published last August, near the end of a summer of racial tension and violence in the cities. Sixty-six per­cent of the white respondents and 91 percent of the Negroes said they would favor setting up large-scale Government programs to make jobs available to all unemployed Americans. Sixty-three percent of the whites polled and 84 per­cent of the Negroes supported a Federal program to tear down urban ghettos.

Mr. Speaker, the jobs-in-housing bill is a solid, realistic program-firmly based in our federal system of government and calling upon the full resources of our free enterprise economy. It is a program behind which the support of the white community can easily be mobilized. Even more important, perhaps, it is a positive program behind which Negro Americans can coalesce, channeling their natural frustrations and their desire for less words and more action into the demo­cratic mainstream.

When we consider the alternative, how can we turn our backs?

For the benefit of my colleagues and other readers of the RECORD I am insert­ing the full text of my bill herewith:

H.R. 16266 A bill to increase funds authorized for exist­

ing programs to build low- and moderate­income housing and for other purposes Be it enacted by the Senate and House

of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That this Act may be cited as the "Jobs-in-Housing Act of 1968".

DECLARATION OF POLICY

The Congress of the United States recog­nizes the grave racial crisis that faces this Nation; the chronic problem of unemploy­ment in America's slums; the great value that would be derived by creating tens of thousands of new well-paying construction jobs; and the absolute necessity of wiping

out this Nation's crime-breeding, rat-infested and life-destroying slums; and desires to in­crease greatly the authorization for existing Federal housing programs in order to mount a major attack on these problems that threaten to destroy the fabric of American society.

TITLE I-EXPANDED Low AND MODERATE INCOME HOUSING PROGRAMS

PUBLIC HOUSING

SEC. 101. Section lO{e) of the United States Housing Act of 1937 is amended by striking out in the first sentence "$366,250,000 per annum, which limit shall be increased by $47,000,000 on the date of enactment of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, and by further amounts of $47,000,000 on July 1 in each of the years 1966, 1967, and 1968, respectively," and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "$507 ,250,000 per an­num, which limit shall be increased by $505,000,000 on July 1 in each of the years 1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971, respectively,".

RENT SUPPLEMENTS

SEC. 102. Section 101 (a) of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 is amended by striking out everything after the word "exceed" the second time the word ap­pears in the third sentence and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "105,000,000, per annum prior to July 1, 1968, which maxi­mum dollar amount shall be increased by $90,000,000 on July 1 in each of the years 1968, 1969, 1970, 1971". HOUSING FOR THE ELDERLY AND HANDICAPPED

SEC. 103. Section 202(a) (4) of the Housing Act of 1959 is amended by striking out "$500,000,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$2,580,000,000". 221 (d) (3) Federal National Mortgage Associ­

ation Special Assistance Funds SEC. 104. Section 305(c) of the National

Housing Act is amended by striking out "and by $525,000,000 on July 1, 1968" and insert­ing in lieu thereof the following: "by $1,350,-000,000 on July 1 in each of the years 1968 and 1969, and by $2,700,000,000 on July 1 in each of the years 1970 and 1971 ".

TITLE II-MODEL CITIES

SEC. 201. (a) Section lll{b) of the Dem­onstration Cities and Metropolitan Develop­ment Act of 1966 is amended by-

( 1) striking out the word "and" the third time it appears;

(2) striking out "$500,000,000" and insert­ing in lieu thereof "$1,000,000,000"; and

(3) inserting before the period at the end thereof", and "$2,000,000,000 for each of the fiscal years ending on June 30, 1970 and June 30, 1971".

(b) Section lll{c) of such Act is amended to read as follows:

"(c} Any amounts appropriated under this section shall remain available until expend­ed, and any amounts authorized for any fiscal year under this section but not appro­priated may be appropriated for any suc­ceeding fiscal year commencing prior to July 1, 1971".

TITLE III-URBAN RENEWAL

SEC. 301. (a) Section 103{b) of the Hous­ing Act of 1949 is amended by striking out "and by $750,000,000 on July 1 in each of the years 1967 and 1968" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "by $750,000,000 on July 1, 1967, by $1,500,000 on July l, 1968, and by $2,800,000,000 on July 1, 1969".

(b) Section 103 (b) of such Act is further amended by striking out "$250,000,000" in the second sentence and inserting in lieu thereof "$950,000,000". TITLE IV-URBAN PLANNING AND FACILITIES

COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING

SEC. 401. (a) Section 70l{a) of the Hous­ing Act of 1954 1s amended by striking out

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE 7977 the word "and" at the end of paragraph (8), by substituting for the period at the end of paragraph (9) the phrase "; and", and by adding a new paragraph (10) to read as follows:

"(10) State planning agencies for as5:ist­ance to district planning, or planning for areas within districts, carried on by or for district planning agencies."

(b) Section 70l(b) of such Act is amended by striking out "$230,000,000, to carry out the purposes of this section, and any amounts so appropriated shall remain available until expended" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "$335,000,000 prior to July 1, 1969, to carry out the purposes of this section, which amount shall be increased by such additional sums in fiscal year 19'70 and sub­sequent fiscal years as are necessary. Of the amount available prior to July 1, 1969, $60,-000,000 may be used only for district plan­ning grants under subsection (a) (10), which amount shall be increased by $30,000,000 on July 1 in each subsequent fiscal year. Any amounts appropriated under this section shall remain available until expended". WATER AND SEWER FACILITIES AND NEIGHBOR-

HOOD FACILITIES

SEC. 402. (a) Section 708 (a) of the Hous­ing and Urban Development Act of 1965 is amended to read as follows:

"(a.) There are authorized to be appro­priated for each fl.seal year commencing after June 30, 1965, and ending prior to July 1, 1969, not to exceed ( 1) $200,000,000 for grants under section ·702, which limit shall be increased by $200,000,000 on July 1, 1968, (2) $50,000,000 for grants under section 703, w.hich limit shall be increased by $50,000,-000 on July 1, 1968, and (3) $25,000,000 for grants under section 704".

(b) Section 708(b) of such Act is a.mended by striking out "July 1, 1969" and inserting in lieu thereof "July 1, 1970".

TITLE V-URBAN MASS TRANSPORTATION

SEC. 501. (a) Section 4(b) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 is amended by striking out "and $150,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 1967, 1968, and 1969" and inserting in lieu thereof the following: "$150,-000,000 for ea.ch of the fiscal years 1967 and 1968; $300,000,000 for fiscal year 1969; and $380,000,000 for fiscal year 1970".

(b) Section 6 ( c) of such Act is amended by ( 1) striking out "$50,000,000" and insert­ing in lieu thereof "$112,000,000", and (2) inserting at the end thereof the following: "On or after July 1, 1969, the Secretary may make available to finance projects under this section such additional sums out of the grant authorization provided in section 4(b) as he deems appropriate."

MARXISM'S NEW ·ECONOMICS Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include extraneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection. Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, Bar­

ron's, the well-known national business and financial weekly, featured an exten­sive article on Yugoslavia's economic status in its issue of March 25, The cri­tique of so-called economic reform in Yugoslavia, a major beneficiary of U.S. foreign aid, was written by Hal Lehr­man and Brutus Coste. Mr. Lehrman is a foreign correspondent and specialist on East European affairs. Mr. Coste, former secretary general of the Assembly of Captive European Nations, is now pro-

f essor of international relations at Fair­leigh Dickinson University.

This well researched and highly en­lightening article should be brought to public attention, and it is for this reason that I insert it in the RECORD at this point: MARXISM'S NEW ECONOMICS-LIBERAL "RE­FORM" IN YUGOSLAVIA HAS FAILED REPEATEDLY

In the best of Communist worlds-Yugo­slavia--Josip Broz Tito last December warned of an imminent "elimination of all negative manifestations." Decoded, this spelled "merciless purge," a forecast that was promptly followed in January by disclosure that 400 apparatchiks had been "cleansed" ( expelled) from the Party for obstructing the regime's "liberal" economic reforinS.

Three times now-in 1950, 1960 and 1965-­Yugoslavia has launched a "drastic reform" of her economy, each time in the same do­or-die mood and for practically the same stated purposes. Each time, the subsequent program has been stop-go-stop; economic stalemate and fear of reduced Party power have brought counter actions which washed out the liberalism. Each time, too, official Washington and most American observers have applauded the announced reforms, embraced the feasibility of the declared goals, and blil::ked away the recurring prof­it that Belgrade, when the chips were down, perennially opted for red. Moreover, the U.S. has given massive assistance-a total to date of more than 2.5 billion, including mmtary aid worth $750 million-despite the uncon­cealed hostility of Tito's "non-alignment" foreign policy.

The effect has bten to increase his re­gime's external ability to aid and comfort our enemies, and its internal ability to stay in power without being forced, by the cumu­lative bogdown of a Marxist-directed econ­omy, to move effectively toward a genuine free market. Such a market would erode the political controls which hold Yugoslavia in Communist fiefdom, a result which Wash­ington presumably desires but which its policy has managed to thwart.

Post-war Partisan Yugoslavia was the m:ost police-ridden state, her economy the most Party-dictated, in Soviet Europe. Her expul­sion from the satellite family in 1948 may be explained in many ways, but not by the propaganda that Yugoslavia was inade­quately modeled after Stalinism; she had everything but Stalin himself. Belgrade's first Five Year Plan (adopted April 1947) con­tained precise production programs for each four-month period and each of the six Fed­eral republics. Orders from 217 central and provincial ministries went down to regional bureaucracies, which passed them on to in­dividual factory managers. Each enterprise received monthly, weekly and daily sched­ules. The paper for the yearly Plan weighed around 3,000 pounds. Presumably it had to, because the five-year program fixed impos­sibl!" ambitious goals. Belgrade solemnly planned to increase industrial production by 394 % in a half-decade and raise GNP to 80%-an impossibly tall order.

Upon the 1948 Soviet rift-Moscow there­after called Yuogslav planning "megalo­maniac and utopian"-the orie-sided Yugo­slav-American romance blossomed. The 1950 reform proposed to liberate enterprises from central domination; expose production, pric­ing, distribution and other factors to market influences; and introduce a Yugoslav­invented concept of direction by Workers' Councils (a system officially designated as "self-management") . The reform won gen­erous support in the West, notably in the U.S., which furnished a variety of loans, credits and other aid for the triple-barreled purpose of tiding Yugoslavia over a boycott by the Soviet bloc, fortifying her security as an "independent" Communist State, and

ma.king workable her "daring experiment" in Western-style econoinics. A scholarly study sponsored by the Twentieth Century Fund, "Yugoslavia. and the New Communism," in 1962 professed to discern great strides made under self-management up to 1960, and con­gratulated Tito on having mapped his "own road to socialism" for Eastern Europe.

Meanwhile, however, Yugoslav critiques (notably "Introduction to the Economic System of Yugoslavia," by Professor Nijo Mirkovic, Zagreb, 1959) were berating "ran­dom investment, management without ac­count, spending without order," low wages, abysmal productivity and agricultural stag­nation. Other ranking Yugoslav econoinists wrote morosely of a "vicious circle" of in­dustrial-agricultural-trade imbalance; the "surgery" needed to boost wages, consump­tion and productivity; and the "folly" of the country's politically motivated, lopsided eco­noinic growth.

Yugoslav academicians proved more accu­rate than their American counterparts. The second Great Reform, unfolded in 1961, tackled the piled-up probleinS as if the 1950 reforms had never existed. Once again sweep­ing measures were decreed for "self-manage­ment," free trading at home and abroad and genera.I abstention from interference with the workings of the market place. Once again the State Department and other free world agencies obliged: the Export-Import Bank advanced $50 million; the Development Loan Fund and the Mutual Security Program, $25 Inillion each; the International Monetary Fund, some $75 million in assorted curren­cies; West European g-overnments and pri­vate West German banks extended credits of $100 Inillion more-.

The lack of results led Tito in 1962 publicly to assail "worker apathy" and the general "economic pigsty," in which he located the failure of the new reform. Nothing daunted, Secretary of State Dean Rusk in 1963 found it possible to justify U.S. aid to Yugoslavia. as imaginative and courageous." Toting up the perf-0rman-0e at year-end 1964, however, the Belgrade official Party organ, Borba, esti­mated that "every third Yugoslav enterprise finished the year with a net loss," and that one-fifth of the naitional labor force- was wastefully employed. Tito in May of 1965 deemed it imperative to declare that "now, at this moment, the essential task is to put our economy in order."

But Senator J. William Fulbright two months later was able to assure his Foreign Relations Committee concerning the Tito regime that "we are bound to concede it has been a s11ccessful government." The Yugo­slav economy, he added, "has made iinpres­sive strides," and "rapid growth continued in 1964." A "new threwt to the Yugoslav balance of payments," said Fulbright (the balance in 1963 was in the red by some $270 million) had arisen out of the "unfortunate" Oon­gressional decision in October 1964, to "deny Yugoslavia the right to purchase surplus American food products for local currency under the food-for-peace program."

Four months later Tito contradicted the Senator, as follows: "We have built factories regardless of whether they could survive ... wasting funds on projects whose purpose was political ambition, propping them up with enormous subsidies ... Today we are pay­ing dearly for our own mistakes. . . ." Such authoritative confessions were taken lightly over here. The Great Reform of 1965 prompt­ly received long-term U.S. credits of $86 mil­lion for Yugoslav purchases of 1,350,000 tons of wheat; a $40-million credit for transporta­tion and farm equipment; a one-year stand­by I.M.F. credit of $80 m1llion and release o! $60 million held back from an earlier I .M.F. loan; and postponement o! a $17-mil­lion payment on interest and amortization due the Export-Import Bank. Other Western

7·978 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, -1968 governments made similar conc.essions, while Italy granted a new $40 million loan.

The third reform went the way of both the others. By November of 1967 the League'.s Federal Central Committee was candidly ad­mitting grave failures, and Chairman Vladi­mir Bakaric of the Croatian Central Commit­tee was mediating publicly on the perilous clash in the self-management system between workers and bureaucrats to the detriment of reform.

That month the Director of Belgrade's In­stitute for Economic Research, Dr. Branko Horvat, published a blanket assault on top leadership's "ignorance" of economic cycles and "neglect" of such mysteries in drafting the reforms: "We have here a classic example of theory lagging behind practice and of practice lagging behind requirements." As recently as January 7 of this year, Politka, the official government daily, was ruminating on "the ineffectiveness and indecisiveness, in fa<:t the anarchy" at the top echelon of eco­nomic command.

There is plenty of tangible evidence that the 1965 reform is now in big trouble. For example, industrial goods produced by state­owned enterprises, with an estimated book value of 8,000 billion dinars ($6.4 billion), are glutting warehouses, depreciating and unsalable. They are "worth" more than the total 1965 Yugoslav national income. Despite Tito's mea culpa about "political" factories, extra steel mills are rising in Skoplje (fi­nanced by a $100 million loan from a British consortium) and Smederevo (Soviet-aided). Located in backward eastern Yugoslavia, both will rely on "enormous subsidies" (banned in the 1965 reform) from advanced western Yugoslavia. Both continue the political pro­gram-economically wasteful--of industrial­izing the poor republics at the expense of the rich ones in order to gloss over the historic conflict of rival nationalities which continues to divide even communist Yugoslavia. Both will Join a rash of mills notorious for ineffi­ciency.

One such, modernized last year thanks to a $10.5-million World Bank loan, is a gal­vanizing plant with a trivial annual capac­ity of 73,000 tons. Jesenice, the Yugoslav So­cialist Federal Republic's oldest mill and largest unit for specialty steel, was expanded in 1963 by an Export-Import loan and some $4 million of equipment from Westinghouse International as part of a national program to double production in five years. It is now going out of business.

One remedy for non-marketable output and non-productive plant is to bum them down. An epidemic of fires that smell · of arson has swept the country (Belgrade, Zag­reb, Split, Pirot, Kresevac and Caoak, among other places) and cleared phenomenal quan­tities of oonsumer-goods inventory. At the Kras fa-0tory in Karlovac, one billion dinars' worth of shoes were recently smoked out. The review Ekanomska Politika comments wryly on "good-business fires," wherein "insurance pays the damages and enterprises get rid of products which cust:omers refuse to buy."

The regime's new emphasis on "profita­bility" has failed to loosen the Marxist bu­reaucracy's grip on unnecessary pseudo-man­agerial Jobs. At one end of the totem pole, the Yugoslav National Airline boasts 24 air craft and 17 general directors. At the other end, the People's-owned Belgrade Taxi serv­ice has four jobholders in the office for every cabdriver on the street. Notwithstanding solid Job security for the Party faithful, un­employment for ordinary folk continues to mount as the reform drive forces at least some unprofitable enterprises to shut down. There are 224,000 jobless, according to latest official count, not reckoning a current 90,000 graduates fresh out of school, nor the esti­mated 400,000 Yugoslav emigrant workers allowed to flee to frankly capitalist West Ger­many, France, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Sweden and Switzerland.

The gap is as wide in wage levels as in Job opportunity, depending on one's political af­filiation and trade connection. Average Yugo­slav monthly pay has been officially calcu­lated at $63.77 monthly (approximately the price of one locally made suit). Employes earn more in privileged and monopolistic sectors like banks, insurance companies, housing enterprises, State sports organiza­tions and public utilities. · Moreover, with certain socialized enter­

prises shorn of subsidy and turning to wage­trimming as the simplest way to reduce costs, strikes ( called "work-stoppages" in Yugoslavia) h ave begun to exceed the an­nual average of the period from i958 to 1966, for which a total of 1,365 was recorded. The bus drivers of RiJeka, after taking a cut to $32 per month and learning that top admin­istrative personnel had just voted them­selves a 140% raise, quit work and started marching with placards which recommended, not unreasonably, "Down With Manage­ment." In Nis, workers reacting to a drop in pay tossed their managing director bodily over a wall.

Some advocates of unflagging U.S. "sym­pathetic treatment" for Yugoslavia may concede that Belgrade's "liberalization ex­periment" has been getting nowhere fast. But they argue that more aid makes sense just the same, because Yugoslavia, after all, is moving away from the Kremlin, or is at least "non-aligned" in a neutralist "Third World" camp. Evidence to this effect is hard to come by.

On the contrary, a new Bible of Yugo­slav communism, entitled "Draft Theses Concerning the Reorganization of the League of Communists," published last April, con­firms Tito's solidarity with the Kremlin. The "Theses" pledged maximum contribu­tion to "the rea lization of the international workers' . . . struggle for world peace and socialism." Again the Yugoslav press intones an unremitting litany of hate against that trio of imperialist monsters, "Johnson-Rusk­CIA." The Marshal himself has assailed the U.S. in Vietnam for "trying out its most up­to-date weapons against unarmed people." He has even likened our "aggression" there to the "hellish plans of Hitler and Mussolini to enslave the world." The International Day of Solidarity With the Struggle of the Viet­namese People last October 21 was feted at least as fervently in Yugoslavia as anywhere else behind the Iron Curtain.

Yugoslavia's arsenal bristles with Soviet weaponry, and she herself makes Jets, rocket launchers, destroyers, tanks, cannon and an assortment of infantry weapons (rifles, machine guns, mortars, ammunition, ex­plosives). There has been no decline in the Yugoslav penchant for finding arms outlets among causes hostile to U.S. interests. Al­geria's National Liberation Army sported made-in-Yugoslavia weapons. The anti­American Sukarno, late of Indonesia, and the anti-American Nkrumah, late of Ghana, were customers. During the Arab-Israeli con­flict last June, Soviet planes flying arms to Egypt refueled at Yugoslav airfields; Soviet atomic submarines were seen in Yugoslav coastal waters; Soviet warships anchored in Cattaro Bay; and a 10% levy was imposed on Yugoslav civil-service salaries "to aid the suffering Arabs."

There is also evidence that substantial chunks of U.S. assistance continue to be diverted to political operations which vari­ously threaten us, compete with us, or flagrantly assist our adversaries. By her own official (and therefore incomplete) figures, the proportion of Yugoslavia's budget ex­pended overtly under the open title of De­fense, some 48% in 1961, had risen by 1965 to 56 % . By 1967 it was reportedly higher; local economists were complaining publicly <>If excessive military expenditures. While Tito was being rescued from one Marxist morass after another by U.S. grants, loans

and food, he also has been playing rich anti­colonialist uncle to the emerging Afro­Asian world. In a speech at Pristine. la.st March, he congratulated himself on having extended $650 million in Yugoslav credits at minimal interest to those countries. As for his neighbors in East Europe-where the U.S. Congress in 1967 showed reluctance for building U.S. "bridges" despite White House entreaty-Tito has been using our aid willy­nilly and without our known consent to build some bridges of his own.

Post-war Yugoslav trade with the rest of communist Europe was insignificant. When grace was restored by the Kremlin in 1954, trade resumed and climbed steadily. Imports rose $250 million by 1964, with ex­ports slightly behind. Late that year Yugo­slavia signed on as an "affiliate" member of COMECON, the intra-bloc economic union­and Tito instantaneously emerged as the Prodigal Comrade.

By May of 1965, for the first time since 1948, Yugoslav exports to Russia's Europe were not only higher than to the West, but also were overtaking and passing imports from the bloc. Since then the gap has wid­ened. On a clearing basis, the bloc at last re­port owed Yugoslavia. $140 million for buy­ing more from her than it sold.

Officially, Belgrade deplores this "fa­vorable" balance of trade, and would cer­tainly prefer to sell more to the West (for hard money) . But the design, quality and price of Yugoslav products cannot compete in Western markets. So the goods go East-­where buyers and consumers can do less picking and choosing. Indeed, the uncriti­cal sateliite market is a bonanza for old­llne Yugoslav Party factory "managers" in­capable of learning the new tricks which might make their sub-standard product competitive. Whatever the cause, the result is that the USSR and its friends are en­joying an expanding and practically inter­est-free loan from Yugoslavia.--all indi­rectly but plainly financed by the West.

U THANT: THE ONE-SIDED NEUTRAL Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, I ask

unanimous consent to extend my remarks at this point in the RECORD and include e~traneous matter.

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from Ohio?

There was no objection. Mr. ASHBROOK. Mr. Speaker, a news

article of several weeks ago informed us that U.N. Secretary-General U Thant would have the United States inch a few miles farther back and "assume" that a cessation of bombing and all other acts of war against North Vietnam would bring about negotiations.

We have been listening to the same proposals from U Thant for several years and during this period they have ex­hibited the same naivete and one-sided approach.

There is no denying that the Secretary General is unrelenting in his attempts to move the parties of the Vietnam war to­gether. But this attempt consists of al­lowing the Communists to maintain their position-and U Thant's-and then, through concessions, bringing the United States around to it.

I realize that the vacillations of the Johnson administration have done a great deal to lead U Thant to the belief that he has a free hand in the shaping of U.S. policy, but it is about time we :flatly state that we have gone as far as we will

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7979 go. The Communists can begin coming to us.

For years the Secretary General has lived and acted in the fantasyland where the differences between the Communists and the free world are mere petty prej­udices. To him there is no reason be­hind the war in Vietnam nor for the cold war. Worst of all, from this position he is forcing upon us his particular policies.

His total failure to grasp the reasons for conflict are evident in his statement of late February. In it he stated that he believed the United States should "as­sume" that a halt in the bombing of North Vietnam, in the DMZ and around the frontiers, would lead to talks. This of course, is based on the "good faith" of the Communists.

To make such a statement, U Thant must ignore the history of the Com­munists, their conquests, and their state­ments past and present. I can think of few things more dangerous than as­suming the "good faith" of any Com­munist regime.

This "good faith" is revealed by the hundreds of broken . agreements and violated treaties which have been left in their diplomatic and revolutionary wake. A subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee has reported that of nearly 1,000 "treaties and agreements, bilateral and multilateral, which the Soviets have entered into not only with the United States, but with countries all over the world," they have broken nearly every one.

Included in the list are: nonaggression pacts, signed promises at Teheran and Yalta, lend-lease agreements, promises to refrain from revolutionary activities, and the first treaty signed with the United States, which was violated, literally, while the ink was drying.

Note that this study was of the Soviet Union, not North Vietnam. It should be sufficient to say that treaties, agree­ments, and the like, are merely tools to the Communist, wherever and whoever that Communist may be.

Note also that these agreements were signed promises; the Secretary General would have us believe the "good faith" of the Communists on a blank ''assump­tion." This becomes ludicrous when one realizes that U Thant must be aware of several other violations of promises by the Communist-those of the United Nations Charter.

U Thant either ignores, or chooses to dismiss Communist history.

It is more than evident that the Secre­tary General's attempts to get the United States to "assume" and yield are part of his personal goal-not freedom and self-determination for South Viet­nam and Southeast Asia-but only an end to the combat. Freedom is not his concern and he does not once mention it in his statement.

From this position it makes no differ­ence to him that Hanoi will not yield in order to achieve peace talks. U Thant merely continues to probe the softest area. He works for more concessions from the United States.

Although his unenlightened view of the free world-Communist conflict would

seem to be sufficient reason for his state­ments, it is also revealing to look at his personal view of the war in Vietnam.

In his statement, as printed in the New York Times, he says:

The indispensable first step of ending all bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should be taken.

This is the action he would take to bring about negotiations.

On February 7 he was told by the North Vietnamese Consul General that Hanoi "would hold talks with Washing­ton on all relevant matters at an ap­propriate time after the unconditional cessation of bombing and of all other acts of war against the Democratic Re­public of Vietnam."

For some reason, the Secretary Gen­eral then posed questions which were sent to Hanoi. Five days later, Hanoi commented. This "further clarification," as U Thant put it, amounted to this: Hanoi would talk with Washington "at the appropriate time; that is, as soon as the unconditional cessation of bomb­ing and of all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam be­came effective."

I would say that the statements are equally clear. They are also nearly identi­cal with the position of U Thant.

To read the statement is to realize the futility of hoping the Secretary General will achieve any solution in line with U.S. policy.

His statement that the United States is of "unyielding will" certainly belies the truth. Our continual modifications of position are anything but unyielding. Hanoi's position is. But to the implacable Secretary General, these facts appear to be of little consequence. With vision im­paired by the sole desire to end combat, he loses sight of primary considerations such as allowing self-determination for South Vietnam and halting Communist terror and aggression in Southeast Asia. He gives no consideration to the ultimate fate of this area of the world and his "genuine desire to bring this conflict to an end" is evidently supposed to resolve, through sheer omission, the total aggres­sive scope of the Communist position.

While the genuine desire of the Secre­tary General is doubtless true, the gen­uine desires of the Communists are indi­cated in two recent statements coming out of Korea. At this point, it is my de­sire that these statements be acknowl­edged as the true Communist position. This is what faces South Vietnam, should there be any solution short of victory over her enemy.

North Korean Vice Premier Pak Sung Chul said of attempts by North Korean infiltrators to kill the President of South Korea:

This is the patriotic revolutionary strug­gle of the South Korean people themselves who rose up against the United States im­perialist aggressors and a handful of traitors of South Korea, their stooges.

Or take the statement of the North Korean Premier, Kim n Sung:

Without driving the U.S. Imperialist ag­gressor forces from South Korea and over­throwing their colonial rule, the South Ko-

rean people cannot free themselves .... It is necessary to form the broadest possible anti­U.S. united front to isolate U.S. imperialism thoroughly and to administer blows to it by united strength everywhere.

These are indications of both the "good faith" of the Communists and of their aims.

The simple fact is that U Thant wants the United States to quit fighting. Why else would he .ask that we not only stop the bombing in the North but also, "par­ticularly in the demilitarized zone."

And after all this on our part and no concessions by the Communists "it can reasonably be assumed that these will be dealt with in good faith."

The good faith of the North Vietnam­ese will be the good faith the Commu­nists exhibited during the Tet cease-fire and that they exhibited during the later stages of the Korean war when negotia­tions were forced only through the use of military power. Thant is perfectly willing to use American and South Viet­namese blood to test the unfaithfulness of the Communists, but not the blood­or even the material-of the North Vietnamese.

U Thant assures the United States that there would not be "too great a military risk" in a bombing halt-cease-fire, but he fails to mention that there would be even less risk if the Communists would stop infiltration and terror. Does he have these concessions from the Communists? Certainly not. He has not even come close to getting them. Why should the North Vietnamese give in when they know that Thant will turn .around and approach the United States asking for further modifications of our position. We con­tinually move toward them while they refuse to move at all. If U Thant has not seen this by now, he is either stupid, conniving, or immensely more intent on achieving negotiations than_ gaining a fair chance for freedom in Southeast Asi.a.

The "good faith" of the Communists has cost us much. A recent price was the U.S.S. Pueblo and a crew of 83 men. We should not concede this, let alone more.

Near the end of his statement the Sec­retary General makes one more point with which I must take exception. He remarks:

Inasmuch as the United Nations remains humanity's main hope for peace it is my duty, regardless of all criticisms, to try to reflect the consensus of international public opinion and the deep concern which has ex­pressed itself through the forum of the Gen­eral Assembly. . . .

There can be no victory, no defeat .... The very survival of Vietnam is at stake. It is time to call a halt.

I would first suggest that if the United Nations is humanity's main hope for peace, then the United States is human­ity's only hope for peace with freedom.

Second, I refuse to accept that the foreign policy of the United States be conducted by international public opin­ion, or the General Assembly of the United Nations. We are still a sovereign nation, regardless of what the Secretary General would like.

Third, I point out that many Ameri­cans refuse to accept the statement that

7980 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE March 27, 1968 there can be no victory over commu~ nism; after all, whether U Thant sees it or not this is our enemy. I am also sure that the people of Cuba, East Berlin, the captive nations of Eastern Europe, or South Korea or North or South Vietnam would also deny that there can be no def eat of freedom.

There are precedents for the recent statements of Mr. Thant, precedents which are revealed when we remember that it was Thant who urged economic pressures against Katanga and who fought against any solution in the Congo short of total reunification. We can also remember that it was this "neutralist" compromise selection who took pains to avoid a confrontation in the U.N. over enforcement of article 19 of the charter. When placed into context it becomes absurd that we should credit his evalua­tions, let alone his exhortations on "a just solution to the problem."

The text of the statement follows: TEXT OF THANT'S STATEMENT ON TALKS ABOUT

VIETNAM UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., February 24.-The

following is the text of a statement on Viet­nam made by Secretary General Thant to­day:

Various questions have been raised, and different interpretations have been given, following my recent talks in certain capitals. Indeed, it is for me a great advantage in the discharge of my responsibilities as Secretary General of the United Nations to be able to meet at intervals with leaders of govern­ments and to exchange views with them.

Obviously, in the present circumstances, the war in Vietnam has taken precedence over all other subjects in the discussions, simply as a result of the increasing concern that this war causes the world over.

Although it is for the parties directly in­volved, ultimately-and, I hope, soon-to take the steps and establish the contacts necessary for negotiations, which they know must take place if this war is ever to be brought to an end, the Vietnam conflict has repercussions which extend far beyond the parties themselves. That is why I feel it would be useful to present this account of what happened during these recent meetings.

TRAVEL DETAILS GIVEN Some of the details of my travel have al­

ready been made public on a day-to-day basis by the United Nations headquarters. Never­theless, as I feel it relevant to what I wish to state today, I will record them again in the order in which they took place.

As is known, I took the opportunity during a brief visit to New Delhi in connection with the second session of the United Nations Con­ference on Trade and Development to meet the Consul General of the Democratic Re­public of Vietnam [North Vietnam), Mr. Nguyen Hoa, on Feb. 8, and to discuss with him the question of Vietnam.

The counsel general affirmed that his gov­ernment "would hold talks with Washington on all relevant matters at an appropriate time after the unconditional cessation of bombing and of all other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam."

He drew my attention to· the statement that had been made on this subject the day before [Feb. 7] by the Foreign Minister of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in an interview with a press agency, which said, in particular, that talks will begin as soon as the United States has proved that it has really unconditionally stopped the bombing. I then put to him some questions which he promised to transmit to his Government, as­suring me that it would reply to these ques­tions as soon as possible.

FLEW ON TO MOSCOW

While in New Delhi, I called on the Presi­dent of India, Dr. Zakir Husain, and had sev­eral meetings with the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi.

From there I flew to Moscow where I was received by the secretary general of the Com­munist party, Mr. Leonid Brezhnev; the chairman of the council of ministers, Premier Aleksei Kosygin, President Nikolai V. Pod­gorny and Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko.

In London, I was received by Prime Min­ister Harold Wilson and had discussions with him, Foreign Secretary George Brown, Com­monwealth Secretary George Thomson; the Minister of State, Lord Chalfont, and the leader of the Opposition, Mr. Edward Heath.

While in London, on Feb. 13, I was in­formed that the delegate general of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in France, Mr. Mai Van Bo, had just received a mes­sage from his Government for transini ttal to me. This was the reply to the questions I had subinitted in New Delhi. I left for Paris on the 14th and saw Mr. Mai Van Bo, who conveyed to me the reply from his Govern­ment, dated Feb. 13, to my questions.

In this message, there was a further clar­ification of Hanoi's position concerning dis­cussions with Washington. I was told that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam would hold talks with the United States at the ap­propriate time, that is, as soon as the un­conditional cessation of bombing and of all other acts of war against the Democratic Re­public of Vietnam became effective.

ANY TOPIC ADMISSmLE I was further informed that, at the talks,

the United States could bring up any mat­ters for discussion in the same way as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam could bring up any other. In reply to my query, Mr. Mai Van Bo stated that the question of the re­duction in the fighting in South Vietnam, the question of the reconvening of the Geneva Conference and any other question could be brought up at the talks.

On the same day, I was received by Presi­dent Charles de Gaulle and Foreign Minister Maurice Couve de Murville. Upon my return to New York Feb. 15, I informed Ambassa­dor Arthur Goldberg of the substance of my discussions on Vietnam during my visit to various countries. On Feb. 16, I conferred with the permanent observer of the Repub­lic of Vietnam [South Vietnam], Mr. Nguyen Huu Chi.

On Feb. 21, I was received by President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of State Dean Rusk in Washington. The President re­affirmed his continued desire to achieve a peaceful settlement and the continued validity of the San Antonio formula. Both the President and the Secretary of State stressed the no-military-advantage provision of that formula.

CONVICTION REINFORCED My talks in various capitals h ave rein­

forced my conviction, which I have repeated­ly expressed in my public statements on the issue of Vietnam for the past three years, namely, that the question is essentially a political problem which cannot be solved through the application of military force.

In the light of my talks, I reaffirm ali that I have said in the past concerning my assess­ment of the Vietnam problem and my ap­proach to it. If the Vietnam question is seen as a contest of unyielding will, there can be no solution.

In the broader context it appears, indeed, that both the United States and the Soviet Union are firmly determined to prevent the defeat of the side which each supports. If such a trend continues, the conclusion is in­ellcapable that there will be continued in­tensification and escalation of the conflict,

resulting in unforeseeable developments· with ?ire consequences.

EARLY TALKS EXPECTED

On the other hand, my recent contacts have confirmed my view that, if essential steps are taken, they will lead to a chain of events which, in the end, can bring about a just solution to the problem, and which will save both South Vietnam and North Viet­nam from devastation and virtual destruc­tion and will offer a chance for the people of Vietnam to regain a sense of national identity and to reconstruct their war-torn country.

Everywhere I found a genuine desire to bring this tragic conflict to en end. The in­creased intensity of the hostilities during the past few weeks should not lead to the con­clusion that the door is closed for negotia­tions.

In my view, the indispensable first step of ending all bombing and other acts of war against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam should be taken and could be taken without too great a Inilitary risk. If such a step were to be taken. I am more than ever convinced that meaningful talks will take place much earlier than is generally supposed, even per­haps within a matter of a few days.

As for the questions concerning the con­duct of the fighting after the unconditional cessation of the bombing, particularly in the demmtarized zone and across the frontiers, it can reasonably be assumed that these will be dealt with in good faith. The parties themselves should solve this problem in order to allow for the larger negotiations to take place, with the participation of all parties concerned, including the Government of the Republic of Vietnam and the National Liberation Front of South Vietnam.

ATMOSPHERE POISONED The Vietnam ·war has already poisoned

the atmosphere and strained International relations. This strain is keenly felt in the United Nations, whose effective functioning has been impaired as a result. We are wit­nessing more and more the unfortunate and undesirable repercussions of this war in other parts of the world.

Inasmuch as the United Nations remains humanity's main hope for peace it is my duty, regardless of all criticisms, to try to reflect the consensus of international public opinion and the deep concern which has ex­pressed itself through the forum of the General Assembly.

Indeed, the world is anguished and slek­ened by the continued intensity and savagery of the war. It is heart-rending to witness the agony of the innocent civilians who cannot possibly know what it is all about. Also the military casualties steadily mount. The ugli­ness of the war is matched only by its futil­ity. There can be no victory, no defeat, only more suffering, more death and more de­struction. The very survival of Vietnam is at stake. It is time to call a halt.

LEA VE OF ABSENCE By unanimous consent, leave of ab­

sence was granted to: Mr. HELSTOSKI (at the request of Mr.

ALBERT), on March 26 to March 28, on account of official business.

Mr. KEE, on March 28, 1968, on ac­count of official business.

Mr. KYROS, on March 27 and March 28, on account of official business.

SPECIAL ORDERS GRANTED By unanimous consent, permission to

address the House, following the legi~-

March 27, 1968 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- HOUSE 7981 lative program and any special orders heretofore entered, was granted to:

Mr. GONZALEZ, for 10 minutes, today; and to revise and extend his remarks and include extraneous matter.

(The following Members· <at the re­quest of Mr. DELLENBACK) and to revise and extend their remarks and include ex­traneous matter: )

Mr. ROBISON, for 30 minutes, today. Mr. HALPERN, for 10 minutes, today. (The following Members <at the re-

quest of Mr. DORN) and to revise and extend their remarks and include ex­traneous matter: )

Mr. FARBSTEIN, for 20 minutes, today. Mr. FEIGHAN, for 10 minutes, today.

EXTENSIONS OF REMARKS By unanimous consent, permission to

extend remarks was granted to: Mr. HOLIFIELD in five instances and to

include extraneous material. (The following Members (at the re­

quest of Mr. DELLENBACK) and to include extraneous matter:)

Mr. RHODES of Arizona. Mr. FINDLEY in four instances. Mr. WYATT in two instances. Mr. GOODELL in five instances. Mr. REINECKE. Mr. SCHERLE. Mr. DERWINSKI in three instances. Mr. CONTE. Mr. SHRIVER in two instances. Mr. GOODLING. Mr. ROUDEBUSH. Mr. STEIGER of Wisconsin. Mrs. MAY. Mr. COLLIER in five instances.

. Mr. FINO. Mrs. DWYER in three instances. Mr. MATHIAS of Maryland in two in-

stances. Mr.ZWACH. Mr. HALPERN in two instances. Mrs. BOLTON. Mr. ASHBROOK in two instances. Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia in two in-

stances. Mr. WYMAN in three instances. Mr. KEITH in two instances. Mr. BELL. (The following Members (at the re­

quest of Mr. DORN) and to include ex­traneous matter:)

Mr. DADDARIO in three instances. Mr. EviNs of Tennessee in two in­

stances. Mr. LONG of Maryland. Mr. BROWN of California in two in-

stances. Mr. MINISH. Mr. PIKE in two instances. Mr. RESNICK. Mr. CELLER. Mr. LEGGETT in two instances. Mr. JOELSON. Mr. HAMILTON in four instances. Mr. GONZALEZ in three instances. Mr. FULTON of Tennessee in three in­

stances. Mr. O'NEILL of Massachusetts in five

instances. Mr. RARICK in six instances. Mr. DOWNING in two instances. Mr. DINGELL. Mr. BINGHAM in two instances.

Mr. HANNA. Mr. VANIK. Mr. NIX. Mr. ROYBAL in six instances. Mr. FRIEDEL in two instances. Mr. WILLIAM D. FORD. Mr. THOMPSON of New Jersey. Mr. MARSH in two instances. Mr. RYAN in two instances. Mr. CoHELAN in three instances. Mr. MOORHEAD in two instances. Mr. TAYLOR in two instances. Mr. O'HARA of Michigan. Mr. PucINSKI in three instances. Mr. ROGERS of Florida in five instances.

SENATE BILL REFERRED

A bill of the Senate of the fallowing title was taken from the Speaker's table and, under the rule, referred as follows:

S. 3033. An act to increase the authoriza­tion for appropriation for continuing work in the Missouri River Basin by the Secretary of the Interior; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

ENROLLED BILL SIGNED Mr. BURLESON, from the Committee

on House Administration, reported that that committee had examined and found truly enrolled a bill of the House of the following title, which was thereupon signed by the Speaker:

H.R. 1308. An act to establish the Saugus Iron Works National Historic Site in the State of Massachusetts, and for other pur­poses.

ADJOURNMENT Mr. DORN. Mr. Speaker, I move that

the House do now adjourn. The motion was agreed to; accord­

ingly (at 5 o'clock and 14 minutes p.m.), the House adjourned until tomorrow, Thursday, March 28, 1968, at 12 o'clock noon.

EXECUTIVE COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

Under clause 2 of rule XXIV, executive communications were taken from the Speaker's table and referred as follows:

1693. A letter from the board of trustees, Federal hospital insurance trust fund, trans­mitting the 1968 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance Trust Fund (H. Doc. No. 290); to the Com­Illittee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed.

1694. A letter from the board of trustees, Federal supplementary insurance trust fund, transmitting the 1968 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Federal Supple­mentary Insurance Trust Fund (H. Doc. No. 291); to the Committee on Ways and Means and ordered to be printed.

1695. A letter from the Secretary of the Interior, transmitting volume II of the report on the national requirements and costs of water pollution control; to the Committee on Public Works.

1696. A letter from the Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, transmitting a supplement to the Commission's annual re­port for 1967, entitled "Fundamental Nuclear Energy Research, 1967"; to the Joint Com­Illi ttee on Atomic Energy.

REPORTS OF COMMITTEES ON PUB­LIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS Under clause 2 of rule XIII, reports of

committees were delivered to the Clerk for printing and reference to the proper calendar, as follows:

Mr. CELLER: Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 15216. A bill to authorize the Bureau of Prisons to assist State and local govern­ments in the improvement of their correc­tional systems; with amendment (Rept. No. 1212). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. FEIGHAN: Committee on the Judi­ciary. H.R. 15972. A bill to permit black and white or color reproductions of U.S. and for­eign postage stamps under certain circum­stances, and for other purposes (Rept. No. 1213). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

Mr. DAWSON: Committee on Government Operations. H. Res. 1101. Resolution to dis­approve Reorganization Plan No. 1 (Rept. No. 1214). Referred to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union.

PUBLIC BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS Under clause 4 of rule XXII, public

bills and resolutions were introduced and severally ref erred as follows:

By Mr. MILLS (for himself and Mr. BYRNES of Wisconsin):

H.R. 16241. A bill to extend the tax on the transportation of persons by air and to re­duce the personal exemption from duty in the case of returning residents; to the Com­mittee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. CARTER: H.R. 16242. A bill to amend the Internal

Revenue Code of 1954 to allow a credit against income tax to employers for the ex­penses of providing job training programs; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. DANIELS: H.R. 16243. A bill to amend the Immigra­

tion and Nationality Act with respect to the application of the labor certification require­ment of section 212(a) (14), and for other purposes; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DENT: H.R. 16244. A bill to provide that Flag Day

shall be a legal public holiday; to the Com­mittee on the Judiciary.

By Mr.DOW: H.R. 16245. A bill to amend section 101 (a)

(27) (D) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. EILBERG: H.R. 16246. A bill to amend title 18 of the

United States Code to make it unlawful to injure, intimidate, or interfere with any fire­man performing his duties during the course of any riot; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 16247. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to provide an addi­tional income tax exemption for a taxpayer supporting a dependent who is mentally re­tarded or has a neuromuscular disease or· disorder; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. GILBERT: H.R. 16248. A bill to amend the tariff

schedules of the United States with respect to the prohibition on the importation of cer­tain fur skins; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. HANLEY: H.R. 16249. A bill to amend the Federal

Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act with respect to the labeling of packages of cigar­ettes, and for other purposes; to the Com­mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. HARRISON: H.R. 16250. A bill to provide for orderly

trade in iron and steel mill products; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

7982 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - HOUSE March 27, 1968-

By Mr. HORTON: H.R.16251. A bill to amend the Federal

Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to include a definition of food supplements, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mrs. MAY: H.R. 16252. A bill to establish the North

Cascades National Recreation Area in the State of. Washington, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. PATMAN: H.R. 16253. A bill to set forth a congres­

sional statement on a national educational policy and to direct the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to initiate a compre­hensive study on the formulation of a plan to implement such policy; to the Committee on Education and Labor.

By Mr. RIVERS: H.R. 16254. A bill to amend title 10, United

states Code, relating to the authorized strengths and grades for certain medical, dental, veterinary, medical service, and bio­medical sciences officers of the Armed Forces; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. WHALLEY: H.R. 16255. A bill to amend title 23, United

States Code, in regard to the obligation of Federal-aid highway funds apportioned to the States; to the Committee on Public Works.

By Mr. BLACKBURN: H.R. 16256. A bill to establish a nationwide

system of trails, and for other purposes; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

H.R. 16257. A bill to amend the Federal Water Pollution Control Act in order to authorize comprehensive pilot programs in lake pollution prevention and control; to the Committee on Public Works.

H.R.16258. A bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to allow an incentive tax credit for a part of the cost of construct­ing or otherwise providing facilities for the control of water or air pollution, and to per­mit the amortization of such cost within a period of from 1 to 5 years; to the Commit­tee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. BURTON of Oalifornia: H.R. 16259. A bill to amend title VI of the

Public Health Service Act to improve the existing program for assistance for construc­tion and modernization Of hospitals and other medical facilities and to provide for the ma.king of loans for such modernization; to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce.

By Mr. GONZALEZ: H.R. 16260. A bill to amend title IV of the

Social Security Act to improve the program of aid to families with dependent children, . and for other purposes; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

H.R. 16261. A bill to amend the Social Security Act so as to revise certain provisions thereof relating to public assistance which were enacted or amended by the Social Security Amendments of 1967; to the Com­mittee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. PRYOR: H.R. 16262. A bill to include an amendment

to title III of the Housing and Urban De­velopment Act of 1967; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. RESNICK: H.R. 16263. A bill to increase funds au­

thorized for existing programs to build low­and moderate-income housing and for other purposes; to the Oom.mittee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. STEIGER of Arizona: H.R. 16264. A bill to amend the act of

Augus,t; 9, 1955, to authorize longer term leases of Indian lands at the Yava.pai­Prescott Community Reservation in Arizona; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

By Mr. BIESTER (for himself, Mr. RoB­ISON, Mr. CONABLE, Mr. BUSH, Mr. BROYHILL of North Carolina, and Mr. DELLENBACK) :

H.R.16265. A bill to amend the National Security Act of 1947 to add two Members of Congress to the National Security Coun­cil; to the Committee on Armed Services.

By Mr. BINGHAM (for himself, Mr. BRASCO, Mr. GILBERT, Mr. HALPERN, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. NIX, Mr. ROSEN­THAL, Mr. RYAN, and Mr. SCHEUER):

H.R. 16266. A bill to increase the funds authorized for existing programs to build low- and moderate-income housing and for other purposes; to the Committee on Bank­ing and Currency.

By Mr. CONYERS: H.R. 16267. A bill to impose, under cer­

tain conditions, import limitations on metal ores or metals during labor disputes affecting domestic production of such articles; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

By Mr. McMILLAN: H.R. 16268. A bill to amenct the District of

Columbia Alcoholic Beverage Control Act to permit certain clubs to hold licenses under that act; to the Committee on the District of Columbia.

By Mr. ROYBAL: H.R. 16269. A bill to increase funds au­

thorized for existing programs to build low­and moderate-income housing and for other purposes; to the Committee on Banking and Currency.

By Mr. BIESTER: H.J. Res. 1202. Joint resolution authoriz­

ing the President to proclaim August 11, 1968, as Family Reunion Day; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. WHALLEY: H.J. Res. 1203. Joint resolution proposing

an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relating to employment of sub­versives in defense facilities; to the Com-· mittee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. YATES: H. Con. Res. 740. ConcurTent resolution for

consideration by appropriate committees of House and Senate of question whether con­gressional action should be taken on. policies in Southeast Asia; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. FARBSTEIN: H. Con. Res. 741. Concurrent resolution rec­

ognizing the 25th anniversary of the Warsaw ghetto uprising; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mrs. KELLY: H. Con. Res. 742. Concurrent resolution to

express the sense of congress against the persecution of Jews in Poland; to the Com­mittee on Foreign Affairs.

By Mr. SOHWEIKER: H. Con. Res. 743. Concurrent resolution ex­

pressing the sense of the Congress that U.S. diplomatic relations with the United Arab Republic should not be restored until certain conditions are met; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs. ·

By Mr. BR.OWN of California: H. Res. 1116. Resolution to establish a Se- ·

lect Committee on Technology and the Human Environment; to the Committee on Rules.

By Mr. PODELL: H. Res. 117. Resolution that it is the sense

of the House of Representatives that the United States should not use nuclear weapons against any nation not possessing such weapons; to the Committee on Foreign Affairs.

MEMORIALS

Under clause 4 of rule XXII, memorials were presented and referred as follows:

324. By Mr. ALBERT: Memorial of the 31st · Oklahoma Legislature, memorializing the

Congress. of the United States to invoke its: rightful power to deterinine a question of public policy and to nullify the recent rulin_gs of the Treasury Department imposing a non­exempt status of financing for industrial de­velopment under section 103 of the Internal Revenue Code; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

325. By the SPEAKER: Memorial of the Legislature of the State of Ohio, relative to establishing a quota system on the import of foreign steel; to the Committee on Ways and Means.

PRIVATE BILLS AND RESOLUTIONS

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, private bills and resolutions were introduced and severally ref erred as follows:

By Mr. BRADE·MAS: H.R. 16270. A blll for the relief of Stavros

Vasilias; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. BROYHILL of Virginia:

H .R. 16271. A bill for the relief of John A. Tarin; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. DANIELS: H .R. 16272. A bill for the relief of Arc.angelo

Borrelli; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. FEIGHAN:

H.R. 16273. A bill for the relief of Aleksan­dar Zambeli; to the Committee on the Ju­diciary.

By Mr. GILBERT: H.R. 16274. A b111 for the relief of Perla

Cassuto (nee Eskanazi); to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. HANLEY: H.R. 16275. A bill for the relief of Gee

Ping Tank; to the Committee on the Ju-diciary. .

By Mrs. HECKLER of Massachusetts: H.R. 16276. A bill for the relief of Feri­

nando Neola; to the Committee on the Ju­diciary.

H .R. 16277. A bill for the relief of Sorbello Salvatora; to the Committee on the Judi-cl~ .

By Mr. MORSE: H.R. 16278. A bill for the relief of Eugenia ..

Anna, Rosa, and Gionanni Colletta; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. PODELL: H .R. 16279. A b111 for the relief of Pietro

Candela; to the Committee on the Judiciary. H.R. 16280. A bill for the relief of Gaetano

Favuzza and his wife, Tommasa Favuzza; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H .R. 16281. A bill for the relief of Pietro Di Lorenzo; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. ROGERS of Florida (by re­quest):

H.R. 16282. A bill for the relief of Jaya­rama Reddi Perumareddi; . to the Committee on the Judiciary.

H.R. 16283. A bill for the relief of Harvey E. Ward; to the Committee on the Judiciary.

By Mr. STRATI'ON: H .R. 16284. A bill for the relief of Giuseppe

Vitale; to the Committee on the Judiciary. By Mr. WIGGINS:

H.R. 16285. A bill for the relief of Andrea Najar Perez; to the Committee on the Judi­ciary.

PETITIONS, ETC.

Under clause 1 of rule XXII, petitions and papers were laid on the Clerk's desk and ref erred as follows:

273. By the SPEAKER: Petition of Civic rn1provement Club, Sinajana, Guam, relative to the reintegration of the Marianas Islands; to the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs.

274. Also, petition of Ohio Bell, Chicago, Ill., relative to his constitutional rights; to the Committee on the Judiciary.