Implementing REDDþ at the local level: Assessing the key enablers forcredible mitigation and sustainable livelihood outcomes
Joanes O. Atela a, b, *, Peter A. Minang b, Claire H. Quinn a, Lalisa A. Duguma b
a Sustainability Research Institute, School of Earth and Environment, University of Leeds, LS2 9JT, Leeds, UKb ASB- Partnerships for the Tropical Forest Margins, World Agroforestry Centre, PO Box 30677-00100, Nairobi, Kenya
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:Received 23 April 2014Received in revised form3 April 2015Accepted 9 April 2015Available online
Achieving cost-effective mitigation and sustainable livelihoods through reducing emissions fromdeforestation and forest degradation (REDDþ) depends heavily on the local context within whichREDDþ projects are implemented. Studies have focused on how REDDþ can benefit or harm local people,with little attention paid to how people, their assets and institutions can promote or impede REDDþ. Thispaper examines the key local assets necessary for REDDþ to protect forests and support local livelihoodsbased on evidence from a globally-linked REDDþ project in Kenya. Household interviews (n ¼ 100), focusgroup discussions (n ¼ 6) and in-depth interviews with government (n ¼ 8) and project stakeholders(n ¼ 14) were undertaken to rank and explain how local assets interact with the project's efforts toprotect forests, and the role of State institutions in shaping projecteasset interactions. Locally, pro-poorassets such as land tenure and water access had most influence on the project's ability to protect forests.Inclusion of communal forests as part of the REDDþ project entitled local poor peasant farmers toparticipate in and benefit from the project and so dissuaded them from using protected forests forcharcoal production. Water access determined agricultural productivity and intensity of forest use forlivelihoods and coping. Even though carbon revenues were distributed equally between social groupsand support directed to pro-poor livelihood initiatives, efforts were impeded by State decisions on landthat interfered with communal approaches to forest conservation, by strict carbon standards that limitedtrade-offs between livelihoods and forest protection and by fluctuating carbon prices and buyers thatlimited funds needed for project operations and local livelihoods. Equitable and pro-poor benefit sharingare necessary but not sufficient for effective REDDþ implementation unless national institutions arereformed and global carbon pricing harmonized with local livelihood needs.
Reducing emissions from avoided deforestation and forestdegradation (REDDþ) has gained both institutional legitimacy andcritique on its ability to link carbon management to humandevelopment in practice (Brown et al., 2011; UN-REDD, 2010). Ne-gotiations at the United Nations Framework Convention on ClimateChange (UNFCCC; decision 2/COP 13; decision 4/COP 15; decision 1/COP16), have formalized REDDþ as a cost-effective mechanism forprotecting forests in developing countries that could achieve amitigation potential of 20e30% of all carbon-dioxide (CO2)
emissions annually, as well as supporting livelihoods (UN-REDD,2010). The global REDDþ design rules recognize emissions re-ductions and livelihoods as key outcomes expected from imple-menting REDDþ (appendix 1/CP. 16).
Studies on implementing REDDþ (Corbera et al., 2009; Luttrellet al., 2012; Maraseni et al., 2014; Pokorny et al., 2013) acknowl-edge that global REDDþ design rules, when put to practice, arelikely to face new challenges that test their feasibility in the localcontext. These settings may contribute to fostering support and/orcreating barriers to the implementation of REDDþ (Lin et al., 2014;Mattsson et al., 2012; Mustalahti et al., 2012; Sills et al., 2009).Understanding of the local livelihood assets required to achieveREDDþ implementation outcomes is necessary to inform bothnational REDDþ policies and the literature on REDDþimplementation.
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Local livelihood assets are diverse. The sustainable livelihoodsframework (Scoones, 1998) defines them as tangible and intan-gible goods and services owned and used by households orcommunities for living. They are sorted into five broad categories:natural, financial, human, social and physical (Scoones, 1998).Emissions reductions under REDDþ build directly on natural as-sets, such as land and forests. Forests are vital for REDDþ projectsto meet their emission reduction targets (Lin et al., 2014). Areas orcountries endowed with forest resources retain more carbon(Gibbs et al., 2007) and so support REDDþ implementation (Atelaet al., 2014; Lin et al., 2014). These forest resources, especially intropical areas, also face high deforestation rates thatREDDþ projects can help to tackle and cost-effectively reduceemissions (Stern, 2006).
Financial assets, including income, savings and fixed assets(Vincent, 2007), are equally useful for REDDþ. These assets allowhouseholds or communities to pursue various livelihood strategiesincluding farming and business, and in so doing, influenceREDDþ implementation by shaping the drivers of deforestation(Boyd et al., 2007). Human assets include capabilities, skills, edu-cation and employment (Vincent, 2007). These aid the successfulpursuit of different livelihood strategies and even help local peopleto understand the content and objectives of REDDþ projects(Romijn et al., 2012). Social assets include household/communitynetworks, social claims, land tenure systems, affiliations and as-sociations (Vincent, 2007)that help households or communities tocoordinate their livelihood strategies (Scoones, 1998; Vincent,2007) and in their engagement in REDDþ projects (Maraseniet al., 2014).
The flow of livelihood assets between households and com-munities and into REDDþ activities is mediated by institutions.Institutions, such as State legislated tenure regimes, structure landaccess and utility thereby creating opportunities and barriers forlocal REDDþ activities (Chhatre et al., 2012). As such, the State playsa key role in REDDþ implementation and has been mandated bythe UNFCCC to coordinate and support REDDþ within nationaljurisdictions (decision 2/CP 17).
Based on the influence local livelihood assets and the State mayhave, projects are expected to adapt the global REDDþ design toboth national and local settings (appendix 1/CP, 16; Corbera et al.,2009). This may involve new community engagement and benefitsharing mechanisms that go beyond global standards to suit thelocal context (appendix 1/COP16). In doing so, projects mayreshuffle assets in a manner that either benefits or harms localcommunities (Peskett and Brockhaus, 2008; Skutsch and McCall,2010). Projects might support local people with alternative liveli-hood activities to compensate for the loss of forest-based liveli-hoods when forests are protected for emission targets (Boyd et al.,2007; Asquith et al., 2002). But projects may also harm localpeople by excluding them from project activities and benefitsresulting in a net loss for local livelihoods (Pokorny et al., 2013;Dzingirai, 2015).
This paper aims to identify and discuss the set of local liveli-hood assets necessary for effective implementation of REDDþ atthe local level drawing on evidence from the ongoing imple-mentation of the Kasigau REDDþ project in Kenya. The specificobjectives of the study are: (1) to evaluate how a globally linkedREDDþ project engages the local community in its activities; (2) toidentify the livelihood assets that significantly influence theproject's ability to protect forests; (3) to analyse project impactson livelihood assets and forest conservation; (4) to analyse therole of the State in the project's implementation. The next sectionunpacks policy implementation as this study's conceptualframework. Research methods, results and discussion then followsubsequently.
2. Unpacking policy implementation
This paper applies the concept of policy implementation(Leventon and Antypas, 2012) to analyse REDDþ implementation.Policy implementation refers to translating documented policydecisions into practice through on-the-ground activities (Leventonand Antypas, 2012). In the context of REDDþ this would meantranslating the negotiated decisions on forest protection intopractice and coordinating activities to deliver on sustainabledevelopment outcomes such as sustainable forest managementand livelihood benefits (appendix 1/COP 16). Policy implementa-tion however remains a key challenge in environmental gover-nance with most policy decisions characterised by implementationdeficits (Leventon and Antypas, 2012). Implementation deficitsoccur when the original goals of a policy are not met either becausethe policy itself is not translated into action or the policy is trans-lated into action but fails to sufficiently achieve the desiredimplementation outcomes (Jordan, 1999). In the context of REDDþ,this would mean failure by a globally designed REDDþ initiative tosustainably conserve forests/reduce emissions and alleviatepoverty/support livelihoods in practice (appendix 1/COP 16). Thispaper analyses REDDþ implementation focussing on how locallivelihood assets and the State influence the achievement of theexpected implementation outcomes.
3. Research design and methods
3.1. Research design
Kenya, alongside 16 African countries, is currently preparingnational REDDþ policies through the World Bank's Forest CarbonPartnership Facility (FCPF) and thus requires policy lessons to begenerated from ongoing REDDþ demonstrations. An initial map-ping of REDDþ projects in Kenya (Atela et al., 2014) guided the caseproject selection process. The Kasigau Corridor REDDþ project inthe Kenya's Coastal region was selected as a case study (Fig. 1). Theproject is the world's first globally-linked REDDþ project to sellverified carbon credits in the voluntary carbon market (Peters-Stanley and Gonzalez, 2014). Lessons from this project are there-fore of interest to project developers implementing or intending toimplement REDDþ projects in other contexts (Caplow et al., 2011).
To validate data on projectelivelihood interactions and partic-ularly the project's impacts on livelihood assets, data collected fromproject sites (intervention) were compared with the opinions ofhouseholds in non-project sites (control) (Jagger et al., 2010).Specific study sites were selected through a rapid rural appraisalprocess bringing together project extension staff and communityinformants (Chambers, 1981). Marungu and Mbololo villages wereselected as representative of intervention and control sitesrespectively (Table 1).
3.2. Data collection
3.2.1. Document analysisContent analysis of project documents and consultation with
project staff were first undertaken to evaluate the project's activ-ities in the context of key REDDþ implementation outcomes, e.g.forest protection for carbon, community participation and benefitsharing/poverty alleviation (appendix 1/CP 16). Participation in thiscase refers to community contribution to project decisions andactivities (Angelsen et al., 2009). Benefit sharing focused on sharingof carbon revenues between the project and community, andassociated livelihood impacts (Mwakalobo et al., 2011). The docu-ments were analysed through a combination of exploratory anal-ysis to identify project activities and actors (Thai et al., 2008) and
Fig. 1. Kasigau Corridor project location within Kenya and the specific data collection sites (2-column fitting image).
Table 1Characteristics of the study sites.
Attribute Maungu (intervention) Mbololo (control)
Geographical location 3� 330 S/38� 450 E 3� 160 S/38� 280 EDistance from the project 0.5 km 26 kmEthnic composition Taitas, Kambas, Durumas Taitas and DurumasAgro ecological condition Semi-arid Semi-aridMain livelihood activities Farming FarmingExisting forest resources Ranches, communal forest Ranches, trust and communal forestForest management Private, communal and trust Private, communal and trustVulnerability indexa 0.917 1.014Land ownership Private and communal Private and communal
a Atela et al. (2014).
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in-depth iterative content analysis to establish the linkages be-tween actors and activities (Marsh and White, 2006; Kohlbacher,2006).
3.2.2. Household questionnairesQuestionnaires were used to collect data from a total of 100
households on how local livelihood assets influence project ac-tivities (asset-impact) and the corresponding project response/impact on these local assets (project-impact). Stratified randomsampling was used to select households equally from theintervention and control sites. The sampling frame at the inter-vention site was a Community Based Organization (CBO) ‘The
Marungu Hills Conservancy’. The CBO provides the link throughwhich the REDDþ project engages community members anddisseminates benefits. The CBO includes all community groups inMarungu administrative location and as a result of their directengagement with project activities respondents were able to givea realistic account of projecteasset interactions. Control house-holds were randomly sampled from Mraru and Tausa ranchgroups, which work closely with conservation projects in theirareas.
The intervention and control samples represented 20.1% (50 of280 registered households) and 19.4% (50 of 285 registeredhouseholds) of the sampling frame respectively. This sample size
Table 2Asset indicators used in assessing the projectelivelihood interactions.
Asset Category Asset indicator
Social Forest access rulesHousehold associationsLand ownership
Natural Land sizeLand productivityForest use(s)
Financial Economic activitiesIncome level
Human Education levelEmployment status
Physical Water accessMarket access
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enabled time to be spent to explain questions and retrieve qualityinformation from households, considering the low level of under-standing of carbon issues among individual households (Wildlife-Works, 2011). Village elders who had lived in each location formany years and had a good knowledge of their community assistedin categorizing all households in the target groups (CBO and ranchgroups) into low, middle and high wealth status. Village eldersmediate resource allocation and conflicts among households andthus possess a deeper knowledge of important assets (Bolin andTassa, 2012). Household land holdings, crop yields, livestocknumbers and educational capabilities were used to define thewealth categories. Of the 100 households, 48 low-wealth, 32middle-wealth and 20 high-wealth households were interviewed.
The questionnaires comprised both open and closed questions.Questions for the intervention and control households werematched. The first three parts of the questionnaire detailed re-spondents' livelihood assets. The assets were categorized into thefive asset capitals of the sustainable livelihood framework(Scoones, 1998) and each category represented by specific in-dicators developed from a scoping study (Atela, 2013; Atela et al.,2014) (Table 2). Respondents stated and explained the positiveand/or negative impact of each asset indicator on forest protection(asset-impact).1 In a similar way, the respondents detailed theimpacts of forest protection procedures on the asset indicators(project-impact). While considerable overlap between the asset-impact and project-impact was noted, structuring enquiries inthis way improved objectivity and clarity in describing project-easset interactions.
In assessing the asset-impact and project-impact for each of theasset indicators, an impact measure of þ1 was assigned to anypositive impact and �1 to any adverse impact. If positive andnegative impacts on a particular asset indicator were of equal valueto a respondent, an impact factor of 0 (no overall effect) wasassigned. The asset-impact scores show the impacts of householdassets on the project but do not reveal the relative strengths of theassets in influencing the project's activities. As such, respondentswere additionally asked to rank and explain the three top assetswith most influence on forest protection. The highest ranked assetwas assigned 3 points, the middle ranked asset 2 point, and thelowest ranked asset 1 point. Focus group discussions and in-depthinterviews were used to triangulate household interviews.
3.2.3. Focus group discussions (FGDs)The household questionnaire data was triangulated with six
FGDs, three each in the intervention and control sites. The FGDparticipants were purposefully selected (Bedford and Burgess,2001) and included village elders (n ¼ 12), land owners (n ¼ 11)and representatives from women, men and youth groups in thecommunity (n¼ 15). Draft cumulative asset rankings gathered fromhousehold interviews were presented to representatives of com-munity groups who then verified, discussed and voted on the assetrankings. Village elders and community resource persons con-structed community livelihood calendars overlaid with key liveli-hood assets as well as project activities. Information fromhousehold questionnaires indicated that land tenure was a majorfactor for the REDDþ project and so land owners drawn from ranchshareholders, individual owners and community land trusteesdiscussed the project's work in the context of diverse landownership. The discussions and debates about asset ranking wereparticularly useful in explaining why certain assets are more crucialfor the project than others (Sithole, 2002). These discussions were
1 For example ‘How does water availability for your family affect how you use theforest?
complemented with non-participant observations in several com-munity meetings and group activities on engagement in andbenefit sharing from the project.
3.2.4. In-depth interviewsSemi-structured interviews were undertaken with stakeholders
drawn from the Kenya Forest Service (n ¼ 5), which hosts theREDDþ National Coordination Office,and the NationalREDDþ taskforce (n ¼ 3) tasked with formulating nationalREDDþ strategies. These State level stakeholders discussed nationallevel implementation and the role of the State in the KasigauREDDþ project (see Atela and Quinn, 2014). Project stakeholders(staff and CBO leaders) (n ¼ 14) were also interviewed about theproject's interactions with local assets, links to the State level, na-tional policy, practical challenges and project experiences. The in-terviewees were identified using a snowball technique (Reed et al.,2009).
3.3. Data analysis
The impact factor scores were averaged for each asset indicatorand for each wealth category, with qualitative responses used tounderstand and explain the scores. Household data from the con-trol site were only used in the project-impact analysis where sitecomparisons were quantitatively possible, but were excluded fromthe asset-impact analysis because the control respondents had noexperience with the project and could not give an account of theinfluence of their assets on a REDDþ project. In comparing project-impact between intervention and control sites, the quantitativeproject-impact score for the control group was pre-assigned on anull basis or ‘no-effect’ scale (0) to remove the confounding effect oflivelihood changes driven by the State or other projects. Chi-squared and spearman rank correlation coefficient were appliedto test for significant differences in the impact scores betweenwealth categories and between sites (Green and Salkind, 2010).Qualitative data drawn from FGDs and in-depth interviews werecoded to draw out themes and illustrative quotes (Hopkins, 2007).
4. Results
4.1. Project design and community participation
Project activities, institutions involved and community partici-pation are illustrated in Fig. 2. The project has been designed underglobal standards: the Voluntary Carbon Standard (VCS) and theClimate Community and Biodiversity Standard (CCBS) (Wildlife-Works, 2011). The VCS emphasizes emissions reductions and pro-vides procedures upon which carbon credits are verified for pay-ment. By contrast, the CCBS emphasizes participation and robustbenefits to the local community in line with REDDþ safeguards
Fig. 2. Flow of activities between the project, State and local communities (1.5-column fitting image).
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(appendix 1/CP16) but does not ideally influence payments. Guidedby these standards, the project protects a dryland forest consti-tuting private ranches (50e2500 members per ranch) and com-munity land altogether covering 500,000 acres. This is expected toreduce emissions by 49, 300,000 tons of carbon over a 30 yearproject period (2006e2036).
Group ranches registered as private companies are the primarysource of carbon sequestration, generating 75% of all carbon credits.However, most shareholders of the ranching companies/groupsreside outside the local community with only about 5% of theshares held by locals. Most local community members nonethelessparticipate in the project via CBOs through which the communitycommits communal land to the project, participates in capacitybuilding and forest protection activities, and bargains for benefits.Within the CBOs, community members have elected LocationalCarbon Committees (LCCs) that directly represent community in-terests in the project. By committing their lands to the project andgranting conservation rights to the project, the local communityand ranch shareholders transferred carbon rights to the projectproponents in accordance with free prior and informed consentprocedures outlined in the project standards and global safeguards.A key feature of the easement agreement is the flexibility involved,i.e. the community and ranch shareholders can change their com-mitments to the project at any time. While this could threaten theproject's sustainability, the threat is minimal because both ranchesand communal lands have regulations that require collective landuse decisions rather than individualized ones.
Other than transfer of carbon rights, committing land to theproject also means that the local community is restricted fromaccessing and using forests for livelihoods e.g. livestock grazing,
charcoal burning or firewood collection. These forest uses werecommon before the project but their restriction allows for replen-ishment of payable carbon. In collaboration with project extensionservices, the CBOs and their respective LCCs coordinate trainingneeded for the community to implement forest protection activitiesinitiated by the project,e.g. eco-charcoal factories, tree nurseriesand recruitment of community forest wardens. These activitiesemploy members of the local community thereby providing analternative income to charcoal burning in the protected forestlands.
In return, the local community is entitled to all the carbonrevenue resulting from communal forests and additionally, ben-efits from a one third share of carbon revenue from the ranches.The one third community share is part of a benefit sharingmechanism in which the other two thirds are equally dividedbetween ranching companies and project operations. The com-munity share of carbon revenue is invested in a host of livelihoodprojects through an established trust fund ‘Wildlife WorksREDDþ Project Trust Fund’ (WWRPTF). While the communitymakes decisions on which livelihood projects are to be supportedthrough the WWRPTF, their decisions have to be supported byvarious institutions including the LCC and its sub-committees onwater or bursaries, approved by the project proponents andassessed by relevant State agencies e.g. the water board (Fig. 2).Local institutional structures coordinate community participationin the project but also exclude the opinions of some communitymembers, especially those who are not part of any group or CBO.Even though non-group members may be excluded, the project'sability to conserve forests depends on all community memberswhose livelihood assets are linked to forests.
Fig. 3. Impact factor of assets on the project differentiated by household wealth status (1.5-column fitting image).
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4.2. Impacts of household assets on forest protection (asset-impact)
Household assets influenced project activities in different waysand depending on wealth categories (Fig. 3). Low-wealth house-holds generally perceived that most of their asset levels negatively
Table 3Qualitative impacts of high ranked assets on the project [Negative impact (�) No impact
Asset (impact score) Main impacts of asset indicators on the p
Low-wealth
Water access (�0.5*) (�)Unreliable rainfall/waterscarcity; reduced landproductivity and increasedpressure on forest/treeresources
Land ownership (�0.28*) (þ) Communal land benefits all(�) No title deed; fear of projectand rich people acquiringcommunal land
Land productivity (�0.3) (�) Decline in productivity;pressure on forest/treeresources to fill the productiongap
Economic opportunities (0.04) (þ) Declining economicactivities increase thehousehold willingness to bepart of the project(�) Charcoal/firewoodgathering as economic activitiesincrease deforestation
*significance between wealth categories at p ¼ 0.05.
impacted on forest protection. This low-wealth group identifiedwater access as a key asset supporting project objectives yet theirown poor access to water raised pressure on protected forests,especially during drought-driven crop failures (Table 3). On thecontrary, asset levels for most middle and high-wealth
(0) Positive impact (þ1)].
roject
Middle-wealth High-wealth
(�) More time spent searchingfor water instead of treeplanting
(�)Unreliable rainfall/watersources; carbon related treesdrying up(þ) Water scarcity enables saleof water at higher prices asalternative income source toforest uses.
(�) Competitive land marketwith sales of the land to ahigher bidder
(þ) Have land title deeds thuscommitment to plant trees forcarbon credits(�) Availability of title deed canlead to conversion of land tonon-carbon land uses
(�) Decline in productivity;more time in non-farmactivities instead of farm/landcarbon related activities
(�) Decline in productivity;reduced residue volume forlivestock resulting in forestbased grazing
(þ) Farming as an economicactivity enhances on-farmconservation activities forcarbon
(þ) Households with stable/diversified economic activitiesreduces charcoal productionwithin the protected forest
Fig. 4. Ranking of household assets in terms of their influence on the project's activities (1.5-column fitting image).
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respondents, e.g. land sizes and economic activities, had positiveimpacts on forest protection. Middle-wealth households felt thatpursuing farming as an economic activity within their relativelylarge land holdings enabled them to undertake agroforestry prac-tices that reduced pressure on protected forests (Table 3). Mosthigh-wealth households received carbon revenues from theirshares in the ranches and were motivated to commit part of theirlarger landholdings to on-farm forests for carbon. Despite the factthat asset levels of relatively richer households positively sup-ported forest protection, spearman rank correlation coefficientshowed that the low-wealth household assets had the most weightin influencing forest protection at 0.85 (p < 0.01) compared to themiddle- and high-wealth households with coefficients of 0.69(p < 0.01) and 0.44 (p < 0.05) respectively.
The importance of low-wealth household assets for forest pro-tection also manifests in the ranking of relative influence of assetson forest protection. Assets that were identified by the poor (low-wealth households) to negatively impact forest protection,e.g.water access, land ownership, economic activities and land pro-ductivity, received higher overall ranking (Fig. 4). These asset
Table 4Wilcoxon matched pairs signed test for differences between project impacts (interventio
Household asset Low-wealth
Water access 0.42**Land ownership 0.08Economic opportunities 0.21*Land productivity 0.17*Income level �0.08Land size �0.04Education 0.42**Local associations 0.38*Forest use �0.04*Forest access rules �0.13Employment status 0.54**Market access 0.17Overall significance in relation to control 0.756**
*0.05, **0.01 Significance in relation to the control (paired t-test).
indicators are interlinked, form part of the community livelihoodcalendar and influence dependence on forests.
When the asset ranks were discussed during in-depth in-terviews and FGDs, water access and land ownership emerged asprinciple asset indicators that influence the other high-rankedasset indicators. Most poor households practice rain-fed agricul-ture both for food and income. However, their poor water accessaffects land productivity and the harvest available to cover theirfood and income needs and this leads to illegal charcoal productionand firewood collectionwithin protected forests. Communal forestsprovide crucial complementary livelihood goods and services, e.g.charcoal/firewood, to the poor whose small land sizes have limitedcapacity to provide these goods.
4.3. Project impacts on household assets (project-impact)
The project-impact scores for asset indicators in the interven-tion site compared to the control site are presented in Table 4 andexplained in Table 5. Low-wealth respondents perceived that thecarbon revenue allocated to communal livelihood projects, e.g.
13 staff at the local CBO,200 casual employeesand 100 permanentemployees withinproject activities
(þ) Project to offer jobs (þ) Project to offer jobs (þ) Project to offer self-employmentopportunities such asbusinesses
Householdassociations
(þ) Marungu Hills Conservancy and associated groups supported with administrative and activity funds (þ) Increased activity for local groups
Forest cover (þ)25,000 seedlingssupplied to households
(þ)25,000 seedlingssupplied to households
(þ)25,000 seedlingssupplied to households
2500 acres of communalhills and over 400,000acres of dry-land forestconserved
(þ) increased forestprotected area
(þ) Increased on-farmforest cover
(þ) Increased on-farmforest cover
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water projects and pro-poor education bursaries, positivelyimproved their asset indicators compared to middle- and high-wealth respondents (Table 5). Low-wealth respondents furtherperceived that incorporating communal land into the projectimproved their bargaining power for benefits, which they wouldotherwise forego because of their smaller land sizes (Table 5). Thiscontradicts the perception of some high-wealth respondents, whofelt that the project's emphasis on and recognition of collective/communal ownership hinders the sub-division of land into indi-vidual parcels or ranch shares. Even though all wealth groupsexperienced increased economic opportunities as a result of theproject, most of low-wealth households have not utilised theseopportunities to increase their incomes compared to the middleand high-wealth households who were able to increase theirbusiness clientele and claim direct carbon payments.
Overall, the project impact on livelihoods was significant in theintervention site (p < 0.05). Control households mainly hoped thata REDDþ project would support a range of livelihood initiativesincluding water and education, as witnessed in the project area(Table 4). Most importantly, the control community hoped that aREDDþ project in their area would facilitate the handover of Stateforests and associated benefits to the community.
They claimed that the forested hills currently benefit only a fewState officers and business people involved in corruption and illegallogging. The control households, especially the middle-wealthones, however expressed fears that a REDDþ project mightrestrict livestock grazing areas, thereby affecting their livelihoodopportunities.
Despite the significant project impact on livelihoods, discus-sions revealed that the livelihood benefits have not adequatelymatched community expectations or the opportunity costs ofrestricting forest use. The local community still expects the projectto support more alternative livelihood initiatives such as irrigatedhorticulture and poultry projects, among others. According toproject staff, expectations of dramatic livelihood improvementremain a challenge for the project. This is exacerbated by fluctu-ating carbon prices and buyers. The project mainly sells credits ininternational carbon markets to buyers including private com-panies such as Puma (EU and USA) and Alliance Panapa Bank.Buyers offer varied prices, from as low as US$ 4 to a high of US$ 10per ton of CO2. By the time of this study, the project had sold creditsgenerated up to 2011 but was still sourcing buyers to purchasecredits generated from 2012 onwards. Pressurized by livelihoodexpectations, the project sometimes allowed community membersto draw firewood from and graze animals in protected forests,especially during dry seasons. This is recognized by project staff as amajor source of loss of carbon credits.
4.4. The role of the state in the project
The engagement of the State in the Kasigau project is minimalbecause national REDDþ policies are still under preparation by theforestry sector. Even though the State, through the National Envi-ronment Management Authority (NEMA), initially assessed theproject's potential environmental and social impacts, this could notbe adequately performed because there is little capacity in thegovernment to understand the global standards upon which theproject operates. Further, Kenya's NEMA is not fully conversantwith issues of REDDþ given their poor representation in the na-tional REDDþ taskforce.2 The taskforce is responsible for imple-menting REDDþ strategies for Kenya but is main streamed within
2 Atela and Quinn (2014). Also see Kenya REDD Readiness Proposal (Governmentof Kenya, 2010).
the forestry sector with little representation from key sectors suchas lands, environment, agriculture or energy even though thesesectors are closely linked to deforestation in Kenya and are legalcustodians of some REDDþ enablers, e.g. land tenure.
The exclusion of key sectors in national REDDþ reduces thelegitimacy of REDDþwithin the excluded sectors. Certain decisionsmade in these excluded sectors, e.g. lands, do not support keyREDDþ enablers. For instance, the Kasigau project partly draws itssuccess from collective tenure systems (communal and groupranches) which have enabled inclusive participation and benefitsharing as well as simplified negotiations with the local communityto commit their lands to the project. However, the lands authorityplans to issue individual title deeds to ranch shareholders meaninga single ranch could be subdivided into 50e2500 individuallyowned parcels of land. This means that the REDDþ project mayhave to convince over 2500 individuals to commit their parcels ofland to the project, a situation that would be complex and costlyand perhaps a recipe for emission reversals in the context of diverseindividual interests in land use.
Ideally, State institutions are expected to support and enforceenablers of REDDþ. However, project staff and communitymembers have blamed bureaucracy within State institutions e.g.the water board and lands registrar, for delays in assessing andapproving livelihood projects funded by carbon revenues. Therewas, however, a perception among State stakeholders that theKasigau project is a private entity operating with its own fundsand the State wouldn't want to interfere. Discussions revealed lackof support for local enablers of REDDþ projects within State in-stitutions, caused by ahistoric process of centralisation of re-sources. Benefits from andmanagement decisions about the area'swildlife resources have historically been channelled to the centralgovernment with no share for the local community. Thiscentralization of benefits was apparent in the control community(Mbololo) who thought that a REDDþ project could help to re-distribute benefits from the State owned Mbololo forest in theirfavour. The opinion of the area's forestry staff, however, contra-dicted this expectation. The staff asserted that REDDþ fundslinked to the hills would be channelled to central governmentthrough the Kenya Forest Service (KFS) as outlined in the Kenya'sREDDþ readiness proposal.
5. Discussion
5.1. Enabling local assets
This study aimed to identify and discuss the enabling assets forREDDþ to achievemitigation and build local livelihoods in practice.The study context comprised a diversity of wealth-structuredlivelihoods that revolve around water access, land ownership,land productivity and economic opportunities,but from which theproject protects a dryland forest for carbon credits and livelihoods.From this diversity of assets, water access and land ownership wereidentified as the most strategic assets for the project due to theirrole in agricultural livelihoods and economic opportunities for thepoor, who pose a greater threat to protected forests.
The above finding corroborates other studies that indicate thatwater scarcity linked to drought is the greatest form of vulnerabilityfor forest ecosystems, especially those in arid and semi-arid areas,as poor community members invade forests to cope with agricul-tural failures (FAO, 2010; Nkem et al., 2012). Various lands,including private/group ranches and communal lands, host theforests targeted for carbon. At the same time, these lands providecrucial livelihood resources for different groups within the projectarea. Recognizing the diverse claims to lands enhanced inclusion ofvarious groups into the project's activities and widened the pool of
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beneficiaries. This promoted collective commitment to REDDþ andreduced pressure on forests hosted by these lands. The Kasigauproject experiencewith diverse and collective land tenure contrastswith other studies that have viewed the enabling tenure system forREDDþ mainly in terms of titled private/individualized ownership(Chhatre et al., 2012).
Supporting water access and diverse land tenure inREDDþ promotes pro-poor and equitable participation and benefitsharing in REDDþ. Equity and pro-poor approaches have beenemphasized as crucial for effective REDDþ implementation (Boydet al., 2007; Smith and Scherr, 2003). Achieving these mayrequire that the global design procedures be reshuffled in particularways to fit the local setting. For instance, global design standards,e.g. the VCS, mainly emphasise carbon delivery yet the Kasigauexperience reveals that local livelihood needs are critical fordelivering carbon. As such, benefit sharing with regards to liveli-hoods represents a key area where global REDDþ design interplayswith local assets to influence implementation. Even though mostcarbon results from ranches owned by relatively smaller number ofricher land owners, redistributing carbon revenue equally with thepoor is a crucial part of the project's implementation success. Thisbenefit redistribution is not explicit in REDDþ global designs butthe Kasigau experience reveals that this kind of benefit redistri-bution significantly reduces pressure on dryland forests and mini-mizes leakage by providing more support for poorer livelihoods sothat they need to rely less on protected forests.
From a broader perspective, benefit redistribution is crucialconsidering that the State and other private groups control mosttropical forests (Lyster, 2011). Local communities own only 18e25%of tropical forests (Bluffstone et al., 2013). As a result, paymentsbased on ownership alone will generate relatively few benefits forthe poor. Payments based on property rights could also createspaces for powerful actors to acquire communal land and furthermarginalize the poor (Lemaitre, 2011). For instance, some richhouseholds in the Kasigau area view the project as an impedimentto the subdivision of communal ranch land into purchasable indi-vidual pieces which they could use their wealth to acquire. Pro-poor approaches and equitable benefit redistribution are, howev-er, conditioned by other national and global factors.
5.2. Global and national factors controlling the local projectenablers
Results presented here revealed that State institutions andglobal carbon conditions are key to REDDþ implementation locally.The case of Kasigau specifically reveals that gaps within thesebroader policy settings remain important impediments to effectiveimplementation. The State is the legitimate representative of acountry in the global REDDþ process and is expected to supportREDDþ activities in line with their climate commitments. However,this study reveals that bureaucracy and sectoral fragmentationwithin State agencies and poor links to the private sector currentlythreaten the project's work. The shortcomings of the State areattributable to national institutional gaps, especially path de-pendencies where REDDþ decisions have beenmonopolized by theforestry sector to the exclusion of other relevant sectors (Atela andQuinn, 2014). This limits the legitimacy of the REDDþ agendaacross sectors. As such, thewater sector, which is not represented inthe national REDDþ taskforce, may not appreciate the need forwater in a REDDþ project. Similarly, the lands sector, where au-thorities do not understand what REDDþ is about, may not thinkthey are harming a REDDþ project by making decisions on landsubdivision and privatization.
Sectoral fragmentation is an impediment to successful forestprotection in many developing countries (Brockhaus et al., 2014,
Minang et al., 2014). However for any meaningful emissions re-ductions to be achieved under REDDþ, restructuring of nationalinstitutions to embrace sectoral integration is required. This iscrucial because findings here indicate that certain enablers ofREDDþ, such as tenure regimes and livelihood projects, depend onState institutions and are beyond the institutional scope of sub-national private projects. While these private projects dominatethe current and future REDDþ portfolio and have the resources tosupport local implementation, their potential to do so requirespolitical goodwill and support from the State.
Global institutions mainly constrain project implementation viastrict carbon standards and conditions. Equitable and pro-poorstrategies in the Kasigau project implementation are constrainedby strict carbon requirements that limit trade-offs between forestlivelihoods and forest protection. Tension between carbon andlivelihoods has been a concern in many studies, e.g. Leach andScoones (2013) and Pokorny et al. (2013), but in this study thistensionmanifests as the key source of negative impacts communitymembers associate with the project. Such perceived negative im-pacts include the restriction of forest-based livelihoods as a meansto secure carbon. While the project has attempted to providealternative pro-poor livelihood support funded by a share of thecarbon funds, this ‘equitable’ share had not met community ex-pectations because of the opportunity costs imposed by restrictedforest access and use. This is further exacerbated by fluctuatingcarbon prices and a diminishing pool of carbon buyers in the globalcarbon market. As such, while a plethora of literature (Jindal, 2010;Corbera et al., 2007; Asquith et al., 2002; Luttrell et al., 2012) andREDDþ safeguards support equitable benefit sharing and pro-poorapproaches as key REDDþ enablers, this study shows that evenwhen projects do these things, broader factors such as nationalinstitutional gaps and global carbon-based conditions, e.g. pricesand buyers, can still create implementation deficits.
In the context of policy implementation, the constraintsemanating from national and global REDDþ processes supportthe assertion by Leventon and Antypas (2012) that multilevelpolicy implementation deficits often result from higher levels ofgovernance. This justifies why emerging debates onREDDþ implementation should seek to unpack the multileveldesign and implementation of REDDþ to holistically identifysources of implementation deficits.
6. Conclusion
This study aimed to identify and discuss the enabling assets forREDDþ implementation at the local level. The study shows thatwhile enabling assets align with the livelihood interests of variouswealth groups, especially the poor, these assets are conditioned byprocesses outside the local context. Locally, water access and in-tegrated land tenure are key assets for REDDþ implementation dueto their close links with livelihoods and their knock-on effects onother assets that are equally crucial for a REDDþ project. Thewater-land ownership nexus constitutes an important part of the land-scape for REDDþ projects, driving pro-poor livelihoods and eco-nomic opportunities and thereby influencing the direction ofdeforestation.Communal approaches to engagement and theredistribution of carbon revenue to favour poor livelihoods are keystrategies that apparently improve local participation as well ascollective commitment to and acceptance of REDDþ projects.Achieving these enabling conditions however depends on the Stateinstitutions that legitimize actions and global carbon conditionsthat influence the funds available to support pro-poor livelihoodactivities and project operations. Therefore, equitable benefitredistribution and pro-poor livelihood support are necessary con-ditions for local REDDþ implementation but are not sufficient
J.O. Atela et al. / Journal of Environmental Management 157 (2015) 238e249248
unless national institutions are reformed and global carbon con-ditions and pricing harmonized with local forest-based livelihoods.
Acknowledgement
This research was funded by a University of Leeds InternationalResearch Scholarship and the ASB-Partnership (3109 6332 NORD-886.01 GBL008) for the Tropical Forest Margin of the World Agro-forestry Centre. The scoping study for this work was fundedthrough fieldwork bursaries from the University of Leeds' Sus-tainability Research Institute.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2015.04.015.
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