Vol. XXVI No. 10 October 2007

INDIA’S AMBITIOUS MISSILE PROGRAMME AND SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY

SAEED AHMAD RID

INSTITUTE OF REGIONAL STUDIES, ISLAMABAD

SPOTLIGHT ON REGIONAL AFFAIRS

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CONTENTS

Introduction 1

Indian missile programme: An overview 3

Missile programme — a derivative of the space programme 3

Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP) 4

Indian missiles with conventional warhead 4

BrahMos - PJ 10 cruise missile 6

Nuclear-capable ballistic missiles 7

Prithvi ballistic missile 8

Sagarika 9

Agni — India’s strategic ballistic missile 10

Surya 12

Doctrine of minimum N-deterrence & the missile programme 12

The concept of minimum deterrence 13

Traditional/classical concept of survivability 13

Modern concept of survivability 14

Indian nuclear doctrine 14

Triad of Indian nuclear forces 16

India’s strategic threats and missile requirements 17

Minimal deterrence against Pakistan & missile needs 20

Minimal deterrence against China & missile needs 23

Missile programme & desire for a great-power status 26

Conclusion 29

Notes and References 31

INDIA’S AMBITIOUS MISSILE PROGRAMME AND SECOND-STRIKE CAPABILITY

Introduction Among three members of “Asian Triangulation”, the term coined by Michael

Krepon for active nuclear and missile programmes of China, India and Pakistan, India

holds the key as far as the arms race in South Asia is concerned.(1) All the three states

pronounce that their nuclear programmes are intended for minimum nuclear deterrence

and they pledge not to get involved in an arms race with any other state. However, at

the same time they acknowledge deterrence is not a static concept and a lot would

depend on what other states in the region decide to do. In the current state, China is

quite satisfied with its prevailing superiority in nuclear and missile programmes in the

region. Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programme is purely India-specific and Pakistan

government believes in the current position it possesses enough resources to maintain

the minimum credible nuclear deterrence against India. That leaves India as the only

country in the Asian Triangulation which is dissatisfied with the status quo because it

believes China is in a favourable position vis-à-vis India on the nuclear and missile

front.

It needs no emphasising that nuclear deterrence is hard to imagine without its

integral component — a delivery system, adequate, reliable and accurate delivery

system. And missiles are an indispensable part, in fact the most indispensable part of

the delivery “triad.” This research paper basically deals with the question, whether Saeed Ahmad Rid is Research Analyst at the Institute of Regional Studies

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India’s missile programme is ambitious (far beyond its requirements) or not keeping in

mind the aforesaid Indian dissatisfaction? And can we justify it in the light of India’s

minimum deterrence requirements against that actual/potential strategic threats it faces?

Missiles are considered the most reliable delivery system to carry nuclear explosives

and to maintain the survivability for the second-strike which is vital for the success of

minimum credible nuclear deterrence. Therefore, one obvious justification for seeking

missile proliferation could be the desire to maintain minimum nuclear deterrence

against one’s strategic threats. We can determine whether Indian missile programme is

ambitious or not if we know whether this programme is restricted simply to achieving

the minimum deterrence against strategic threats or its mandate goes beyond that? A

key to answer the above questions would be to understand the relationship of Indian

nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence with India’s missile programme. Not denying

the fact that missiles are very important in conventional warfare as well, we shall focus

for the purpose of this study on missiles as a delivery system for weapons of mass

destruction (nuclear) only. Missile defence is also excluded from the discussion here

because it has little deterrence value as even its strongest proponents do not claim that it

could be hundred per cent effective against modern missiles.

The paper is divided into four parts. The first part gives an overview of the

Indian missile programme, while in the second we try to relate the Indian nuclear

doctrine of minimum deterrence to India’s missile programme. The third part deals

with India’s missile needs for a minimum deterrence vis-à-vis the strategic threats it

faces, and the fourth searches the rationale of the Indian missile programme behind its

desire for a great-power status.

After the end of the Cold War, being the only two nuclear states with active

bilateral conflict, immense interest is observed in the Indian and Pakistani nuclear and

missile programmes among the academic circles all over the world. The literature on

Indian nuclear and missile programmes can be divided into three categories. The first

category deals with research on the Indian Nuclear programme. A great treasure of

scholarly research is available in this category. Some of the recent major works in this

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category are Karnad (2002),(2) Tellis (2001),(3) Kapur (2001),(4) Perkovich (2000),(5)

Matoo (1999)(6) and Jasjit Singh (1998).(7) The second category comprises research

work on Indian’s missile programme. Here one cannot find the same level of research,

though a valuable contribution is made by Dr. Baskaran (2003),(8) Upendra Chaudhry

(2002),(9) Biringer,(10) Feickert and Kronstadt (2003)(11) and Mohammad Iqbal (1995).(12)

The third category covers the Indian nuclear and missile programmes studied in

the light of deterrence theory. This phenomenon has recently caught attention of the

researchers therefore not much work is available in this category. However, most

recently Sridharan (2007),(13) Ganguly and Hagerty (2005),(14) Rajain (2005)(15) and

Rajagopalan (2005)(16) have produced some really good scholarly works by applying

deterrence theory on the Indian nuclear programme. But strangely, so far, no separate

scholarly research is done on application of deterrence theory on the Indian missile

programme. This research basically aims to fill that gap in the third category.

Indian missile programme: An overview

Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO), the main research

and development organ of the Indian Ministry of Defence (MOD), was established in

1958 to build modern missile systems for Indian armed forces. DRDO established a

strong network of research laboratories which included the Defence Research and

Development Laboratory (DRDL) in Hyderabad that was responsible for designing and

developing the Indian missile systems. The DRDO could not show any success in

building missile systems for more than two decades despite making several good

attempts. Its ambitious attempts at building a first-generation anti-tank missile (ATGM),

an attempt to "reverse-engineer" the Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) in a

project named ‘Devil’ and an attempt to develop a 1,500 km-range ballistic missile

under project ‘Valiant’, failed to achieve the desired results.(17)

Missile programme — a derivative of the space programme

Many analysts agree that India’s missile programme was derived from its space

programme and that Indian success in space technology during the 1970s and early 80s

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provided a base for its missile programme. India launched its first space satellite in

1975 on a Soviet rocket and then succeeded in launching its first rocket from the Indian

soil on 18 July 1980 in a second attempt (the first unsuccessful attempt was made on 10

August 1979). On the aforementioned date, Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO)

launched the four-stage 17-tonne Space Launch Vehicle (SLV-3), which was actually an

adaptation of the US-designed Scout missile.(18) In 1982, the Vikram Sarabhai Space

Centre (VSSC) successfully launched a Centaur rocket under the joint cooperation of

India, West Germany, and Austria.(19) Centaur is a rocket stage designed for use as the

upper stage of space launch vehicles (SLV).(20) Some of the Western developed

countries were alarmed at Indian success in developing satellite launchers which was

considered a big step towards the development of missile armoury.

Integrated Guided Missile Development Programme (IGMDP)

This fear was very much real because just the next year in 1983 learning from

the past failures, the Indian government launched the Integrated Guided Missile

Development Programme (IGMDP) to develop five strategic and tactical guided

missiles. Dr. A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, who was the mastermind behind SLV’s success and

later on was recognised as the father of Indian nuclear and missile programmes, was

shifted from ISRO to the DRDO to guide the new venture. The five missiles which

were planned in the original plan included two ballistic missiles systems, Prithvi (short

range) and Agni (medium range); two surface-to-air missiles Trishul (short range) and

Akash (medium range) and the third-generation anti-tank Nag.

Indian missiles with conventional warhead

Among the five originally planned missiles, only two, Prithvi and Agni, are

nuclear-capable whereas Trishul, Akash and Nag are meant to carry only conventional

warhead. Therefore, DRDO attached far less importance to Trishul, Akash and Nag as

compared to nuclear-capable Prithvi and Agni. This is also evident from the fact that

despite being a part of the original IGMDP, all the three are still far from being

operational despite several flight tests being conducted (e.g. Trishul has been tested 80

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times and Nag 49 times) for them.(21) The other missile systems which were later

included in the IGMDP with conventional warhead are BrahMos PJ-10 and Astra. See

the following table (1.1) for details.

Table 1.1

Indian missiles with conventional warhead

Name Type Propulsion Payload

Range Comments

Trishul Surface-to-air/ short range

Uses solid dual thrust rocket motor for propulsion

5.5 kg 9 km Tested over 80 times, kept dormant for sometime, however revived again; a multi-role missile for the army, navy and air force; to be used against low-level (sea skimming) targets at short range.

Akash Surface-to-air/ Medium range

Ramjet rocket propulsion system with solid propellant booster

720 kg 30 km First test flight in 1990; army, navy and air force versions under development.

Nag Third-generation “Fire and Forget” anti-tank missile

Solid fuel 8 kg 4-7 km Developmental phase completed in 2005; entered production phase; separate versions for the army and the air force are being developed.

BrahMos PJ-10

Supersonic cruise missile/primarily anti-ship cruise missile

Two stage- solid+ liquid

200-300

280-300 ship/sub surface/land/ air based platforms

Naval variant completed and in service of Indian navy; army version successfully tested and inducted into service on 21 June 2007; air force version under development; currently only for conventional warhead but reportedly there are plans for nuclear warhead on medium and long range.

Astra air-to-air/ beyond visual range (BVR) missile

Solid fuel 15 kg 80 km in head-on chase and 15 km in tail chase

First test 9 May, 2000; recently tested on 25 march 2007; would be used in Mirage 2000, MiG-29, Sea Harrier, Su-30, and the light combat aircraft (LCA); has an active radar seeker to find targets and electronic counter measure capabilities to ensure it is not tracked or shot down.

Sources:

1. Indian Missile Overview” at < http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Missile/index.html>. 2. India’s “Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP)” at

<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Integrated_Guided_Missile_Development_Program>. 3. Mohammad Iqbal, ‘India’s Missile Muscles’, Regional Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 3, Summer 1995, p 3-34.

Like DRDO, the focus of this research would be the nuclear-capable Indian

missiles. As pointed out above, the inventory of such missiles is currently limited to

Prithvi and Agni ballistic missiles. Therefore, different variants of Prithvi and Agni

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would actually remain our focus here. However, a widespread agreement among

analysts exists that there are plans for making BrahMos cruise missile a nuclear-capable

missile. The globalsecurity.org claims that BrahMos could be easily modified to

accommodate a small nuclear warhead.(22)

According to Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary “a ballistic missile is a

missile guided in the ascent of a high-arch trajectory and freely falling in the descent”

whereas the same dictionary defines cruise missile as, “guided missile that has a

terrain-following radar system and that flies at moderate speed and low altitude.”(23)

The basic difference between the two is this that ballistic missile is only guided in the

initial stage of its flight whereas cruise missile has a thoroughly guided flight which

gives it an edge in accuracy and precision over ballistic missiles.

BrahMos - PJ 10 cruise missile

The BrahMos anti-ship cruise missiles were not included in the original IGMDP

plan; its idea came much later. In February 1998, through an inter-governmental

agreement between the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) of

India and the Federal State Unitary Enterprise Mashinostroyenia (NPOM) of Russia in

a joint venture established BrahMos Aerospace Private Limited (BAPL) to develop

BrahMos cruise missiles and the BAPL conducted first flight test for BrahMos on 12

June 2001.(24) The missile is named after two rivers, the Brahmaputra (India) and the

Moskva (Russia).

BrahMos is a state-of-the-art missile which travels at supersonic speed(25) and

has been built with stealth technology which, according to experts, could make it almost

impossible to intercept.(26) India is developing naval, army and air force versions of

BrahMos with Russian cooperation. So far the naval variant is already in service of the

Indian navy for quite some time and the army version was inducted into service on 21

June 2007.(27) Both India and Russia have expressed their desire to export BrahMos to

the third world countries. At the ceremony of delivering BrahMos to the Indian army,

the country’s president and the father of its missile and nuclear programme, Dr. Abdul

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Kalam, urged the Indian scientists to work on the Mark-II version of the BrahMos so

that India could emerge as the market leader in hypersonic (even faster than the

supersonic cruise missiles) missiles.(28)

Nuclear-capable ballistic missiles

The ballistic missiles Prithvi and Agni and their different variants comprise

India’s strategic weaponry(29) because of their longer range and nuclear capability.

Rahul Roy Chaudhury, of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS),

London, describes better speed, bigger range and greater mobility as main reason for

use of ballistic missiles as most favoured nuclear weapon delivery system.(30) Tara

Kartha, a research fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA),

New Delhi, describes larger “combat radius” as one of the important advantage for

using ballistic missiles as a strategic weapon.(31) See table 1.2 for type, propulsion,

payload, range and status of India’s ballistic missiles.

Table 1.2

Nuclear-capable ballistic missiles

Name Type Propulsion Payload kg

Range km

Status

Prithvi-I Surface-to- surface/SRBM

Single stage liquid fuel

1000 150 Army version; Production and induction into army-controlled 222 and 333 missile groups.

Prithvi-II Surface-to- surface/SRBM

Single stage liquid fuel

500 250 Air force version.; In production; undergoing user trials for Air Force

Prithvi-III Or Dhanush

Surface ship- launched/ SLBM

Single stage liquid fuel ∗

1000 350 Naval version; In development; undergoing flight tests.

(Continues)

∗There is wide disagreement among different circles over Prithvi III or Dhanush missile’s propulsion. A. Baskaran, Rodony W. Jones (Pakistan’s Nuclear Posture: Quest for Assured Nuclear Deterrence- A Conjecture, Regional Studies, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Spring 2000, p.12), Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) website, Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website and CDI website all agree that Prithvi III is a single-stage liquid-fuel missile. On the other hand, Dr. Upendra Chaudhury points out the single-stage solid propellant and Arun Vishwakarma of Bharat Rakshak website along with Wikipedia website agree Prithvi III is a two-stage solid + liquid fuel missile. Single-stage liquid propellant seems to be more reliable because Prithvi missiles as a whole come in that category and Agni was actually required for addressing that deficiency in the Prithvi series.

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Name Type Propulsion Payload kg

Range km

Status

Agni (Technology Demonstrator)

Surface-to- surface/MRBM

Two stage- solid+ liquid

1000 1200-1500 road/rail/ mobile

Completed flight tests; limited production; a "technology demonstrator project" to establish re-entry vehicle technologies

Agni -I Surface-to- surface/SRBM

Single stage- solid motor

1000 700 road/rail/ mobile

Undergoing flight tests; limited production; to be included in the army-controlled 334 Missile Group.

Agni -II Surface-to- surface/MRBM

Two stage- solid+ solid

1000 2000-2500 road/rail/ mobile

Completed flight tests; limited production; to be inducted into the army-controlled 335 Missile Group.

Agni -III Surface-to- surface/IRBM

Two stage- solid+ solid

1000 3,000-4,000 Successfully tested on 12 April 2007 on second attempt; can target most of Chinese cities including Beijing and Shanghai.

Sagarika Submarine- launched missile — class of missile (ballistic/ cruise?) contested

undisclosed undisclosed undisclosed Expected to become operational by 2010.

Surya ICBM Two stage solid + solid

1000 8000 Still in the pipeline.

Key to ballistic missile range terminology

SRBM- short-range ballistic missile- up to 1000 km MRBM- medium-range ballistic missile- 1000-3000 km IRBM- intermediate-range ballistic missile- 3000-5,500 km ICBM- intercontinental ballistic missile- beyond 5,500 km Sources:

1. Gaurav Kampani, “Indian Missile Overview” for Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), <http://www.nti.org/e_research/profiles/India/Missile/index.html>

2. “Indian Nuclear Arsenal” at <http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=2964> 3. Dr. Upendra Choudhury, “Dealing with the Danger of Ballistic Missiles in South Asia,” paper presented at

the Graduate Conference on Amity and Enmity : Patterns of Peace, War and Insecurity in the 21st Century, organised by the Department of Politics and International Relations (Cartmel College), Lancaster University, Lancaster , England, on 18 April 2002.

4. A. Baskaran, “An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia,” paper presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, Bristol, 26-28 June 2003.

5. Rahul Roy Chaudhury, “Missile Flight Tests: Challenges and Opportunities for CBMs,” in Prospects of Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia, collection of papers presented at an international seminar organised by the Institute 0f Regional Studies, Islamabad, 2005 on June 7-9, 2004, p.146-165.

Prithvi ballistic missile

Prithvi (Sanskrit meaning ‘Earth’), is a surface-to-surface short-range ballistic

missile (SRBM). Its three variants have ranges from 150-350 kilometres. Because of

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the short range of Prithvi, all defence experts on South Asia agree that Prithvi is a

Pakistan-specific missile system. All Prithvi variants use a single-stage, liquid-fuel

propulsion method which is considered less effective as compared to the solid fuel

because the liquid propellant mixture is highly volatile and corrosive and must be

loaded just prior to the launch. This is a major technical hurdle in the way of making

Prithvi a full-fledged strategic weapon for India. Development of the Prithvi began in

1983, and the first missile was tested on 25 February 1988.

The Prithvi missile project embraced developing three variants for use by the

Indian army, air force and navy. Prithvi I, the army version, is in the service of the

Indian army since 1994 and is capable of striking roughly a quarter of Pakistani

territory, including Islamabad.(32) Prithvi II, the air force version, was first test-fired on

27 January 1996 and the development stages were completed in 2004. It is in the

process of induction into the Indian air force.(33) Prithvi III, the naval variant code-

named as Dhanush (in Sanskrit means bow), is a single-stage, liquid-fuel, road-mobile

weapon. Dhanush is a surface- and ship-launched ballistic missile aimed at providing

the Indian navy the third leg of the triad (land, air and sea) of delivery system for the

nuclear weapons. It has two variants of 250 and 350 ranges. Prithvi-III was first

successfully tested on 21 September 2001 and the most recent test for the Dhanush was

conducted on 30 March 2007.

Sagarika

There exists a great confusion around this missile programme. Bharat Rakshak

website claims “Sagarika and Prithvi-III are two different acronyms for the same

missile” According to the Wikipedia Encyclopaedia the code-name Dhanush for Prithvi

III would be replaced by Sagarika once the Sagarika becomes operational. On the other

hand, Indian government denies even the existence of the Sagarika missile programme.

However, in April 1998, The New York Times, citing US intelligence sources, claimed

that India was launching a sea-launched ballistic missile code-named Sagarika with

Russian help.(34) In March 1999, the Centre for Policy Studies in Russia (PIR) in its

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monthly arms control letter also confirmed the existence of Sagarika missile

programme.(35)

Confusion also persists whether Sagarika is a cruise missile or a ballistic missile.

However, citing the Indian intelligence sources, The Indian Express claimed that

Sagarika would come in both versions — cruise and ballistic.(36) The paper further

reported that Sagarika was designed exclusively to work as a submarine-launched

ballistic missile (SLBM) and submarine-launched cruise missile (SLCM). According to

some reports, Sagarika would be a medium-range nuclear-capable missile with two-

stage solid fuel to address the technical flaws of Dhanush or Prithvi III missile.

Agni — India’s strategic ballistic missile

The Agni (Sanskrit meaning “fire”) series contains a short-range to medium-

range surface-to-surface ballistic missiles with ranges from 700 km to about 4000 km.

Like Prithvi, the Agni was part of the original IGMDP plan since its inception in 1983.

However, unlike the Prithvi all variants of the Agni use solid fuel for their propulsion

which gives it an edge over Prithvi for its use as a delivery system for nuclear warhead.

Most of the Agni series except Agni I (single-stage solid-fuel) are powered by two-stage

solid + liquid propellant.

The Agni is considered India’s genuine strategic ballistic missile because

according to the assessment of Indian defence experts due to Prithvi’s shorter range and

use of liquid fuel Prithvi would be used only as a tactical weapon once Agni comes

under service of the Indian armed forces. Another important argument given for

restricting Prithvi to tactical use is, using Prithvi for both tactical and strategic goals

would create confusion and its advanced deployment in war conditions might cause a

misperception for the adversary about the nuclear threshold. Furthermore, the use of

solid fuel provides Agni the flexibility of rapid launch and quick reaction, and mobility

by road and rail provides it facility of easy dispersal which goes a long way in ensuring

its survivability for the second-strike. This is why Arun Vishwakarma of the Bharat

Rakshak website terms Agni “the mainstay of the Indian missile-based strategic nuclear

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deterrence.”(37)

So far four variants of Agni have come to the surface. Agni Technology

Demonstrator (TD) was the first one, followed by the medium-range Agni-II, and then

a short-range version Agni-I. Lastly, the intermediate-range Agni III with a range of

about 3000-40000 km was developed which can reach deep inside China.

The first test of Agni (TD) took place at the Interim Test Range in Chandipur in

1989. It was for the first time that directly a component of Indian civilian space

research programme, was used for a pure military programme. According to Gary

Milhollin of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam spent four

months at 1963-64 at NASA's Langley Research Centre in Virginia, where the US

Scout rocket was conceived, and then returned home and built SLV-3 on Scout’s design

in the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO).(38) The solid-booster motor of SLV-

3 was later used in the development of Agni. This shows how easily the Indian

government can use a purely civilian programme for strengthening a military

programme. Initially, India described the Agni (TD) not as a weapon system but just a

“technology demonstrator project” to demonstrate the successful incorporation of re-

entry vehicle technologies. The solid-booster motor of SLV-3 was later on used in all

Agni variants.

The Agni-I is a single-stage, solid fuel, short-range ballistic missile (SRBM) with

a range of 700km. while Agni-II is a two-stage, solid-fuel, medium-range ballistic

missile (MRBM) with a range of 2000-2500 km. The Agni-II was successfully test-fired

on 11 April 1999 and marked a major breakthrough for its strategic use because it can

be launched in just 15 minutes. For launching Agni II a highly mobile platform is used

which can be transported secretly by rail or road anywhere in the country.

The Agni-III is a two-stage, solid fuel, intermediate-range ballistic missile

(IRBM) which can be deployed using submarine, road and rail mobile launch vehicles.

It was tested for the first time on 9 July 2006 but during the second stage the rocket had

failed to separate and the missile had fallen well short of its target. However, it was

successfully tested on 12 April 2007 from the Wheeler Island off the Orissa coast.(39)

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With Agni III, India got most of the Chinese cities including Beijing and Shanghai

within its reach. According to several Western and Indian reports, India has definite

plans for the development of full-range intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) in the

Agni series named Agni IV and might soon test that missile.

Surya

According to similar reports, Surya (meaning “Sun” in Sanskrit and many other

Indian languages) would be the first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) of

India.(40) Federation of American Scientists (FAS) website claims that Surya is a

surface-based, solid- and liquid-propellant ballistic missile with range between 8,000

and 12,000 km.(41) On the other hand, Dr. Richard Speier in his policy research paper

for the Washington-based Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre (NPEC) claims that

the Surya programme would result in several variants like Prithvi and Agni with ranges

from 5,000 to 20,000 km.(42) Dr. Speier shows United States as a possible target for

Surya-II with range of 8,000-12,000 km and global for Surya III with range of 20,000.

Reports also suggest that most of the components to be used for ICBM Surya would be

taken from India’s civilian space programme and that Surya shall be based on Polar

Space Launch Vehicle (PSLV), Geo-Synchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV) and

the Agni IRBM.

Doctrine of minimum N-deterrence & the missile programme

Indian views on nuclear deterrence have dramatically changed after Pokhran II

(May 1998). Previously, India had been the worst critic of nuclear deterrence over the

years. In its memorandum to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 1995, the Indian

government vehemently opposed nuclear deterrence and said it “implies that a state if

required to defend its own existence will act with pitiless disregard for the

consequences of its own and its adversary's people."(43) However, later fascinated by

the theory of nuclear deterrence or pushed by the necessity to justify its nuclear

detonation, Indian government overturned its previous so-called principled stance and

prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee proclaimed in the Lower House (Lok Sabha) on

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15 March 1999 that the nuclear weapon was “the kind of weapon that helps in

preserving peace. If in the days of the Cold War there was no use of force, it was

because of the balance of terror."(44) Before looking closely at the Indian nuclear

doctrine of minimum deterrence, it would be pertinent to understand the concept of

minimum deterrence in the context of missile proliferation.

The concept of minimum deterrence

The first and most important element of minimum deterrence is that the country

following this doctrine must seek to limit its nuclear forces as much as possible. This is

in contrast to the Cold War situation, when the two superpowers followed the strategy

of “mutual assured destruction (MAD)”, which required massive nuclear forces capable

of completely destroying the strategic adversary. Whereas, India, Pakistan and China

opting for minimum deterrence need to limit their nuclear forces to a point where they

can survive the first pre-emptive strike of the strategic adversary and retaliate with a

nuclear response capable of inflicting “unacceptable damage”. This makes the

survivability for a second-strike a critical point in the minimum deterrence concept.

Traditional/classical concept of survivability

The survivability for a second-strike has been a controversial point in academic

circles. There are basically two views on survivability. One is the traditional/classical

view which holds that deterrence depends on certainty of the retaliation by the

defender; in other words, ‘Assured Second-Strike Capability.’(45) Herman Kahn and

Albert Wohlstetter were the main proponents of classical deterrence. To ensure

survivability, the proponents of this view demand massive development and deployment

of nuclear forces to ensure hundred per cent certainty of the second-strike.

In classical view, qualitative and quantitative balances and the cognitive factor of

‘credibility’ of the defender are considered key determinants to ensure the survivability

for the second-strike. As far as ballistic missiles are concerned, they consider strategic

reach, triad, mobility by rail and road to ensure proper dispersal as essential

requirements to maintain survivability for the second-strike. In classical view,

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survivability cannot be quantified because it is considered a dynamic concept which

changes with every new move of the strategic adversary. Gregory S. Jones, a defence

expert in RAND, points out that there is no end-point of this search for assured

survivability.(46) Thus, when a country takes classical view of “survivability” then in

theory it might be called minimum deterrence but in reality there is nothing minimum

about it.

Modern concept of survivability

In the modern view, “deterrence is achieved if the challenger senses that there is

the mere possibility of the defender being left with a residual force after a first

strike.”(47) Rajesh Basrur, Director for Global Studies, Mumbai, says for minimal

deterrence even a handful of weapons would suffice because according to him, as

opposed to the traditional argument that certainty of retaliation deters, “the (real) basis

of deterrence lies not in one’s own certainty of inflicting damage on an adversary, but

on the adversary’s uncertainty about the possibility of such damage being inflicted upon

it.”(48) To prove his point, he gives the example of the Cuban Missile Crisis when

despite possessing overwhelming ‘advantage’ over Soviet nuclear forces in Cuba,

America’s president Kennedy did not risk the pre-emptive strike because “there was no

guarantee that it would be hundred per cent effective.”

In the modern view, numerical and qualitative differences are meaningless.

Basrur doubts even if 1: 50 ratio could have any impact on deterrence because he

argues when deterrence is based on uncertainty, “even a force of only four weapons has

a 20 per cent chance of penetrating a large and effective missile defence.”(49) He gives

the example of British, French and Chinese deterrent postures which successfully

deterred vastly superior superpower forces.

Indian nuclear doctrine

India's draft nuclear doctrine was announced on 17 August 1999 by the then

secretary of the National Security Advisory Board, Brajesh Mishra, which was later

adopted with minor modifications along with the announcement of Nuclear Command

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Authority (NCA) on 4 January 2003 by the Cabinet Committee on Security.(50) The only

significant modification in the later document was further dilution of the No First Use

principle to include nuclear retaliation to attacks by biological and chemical weapons.

Indian nuclear doctrine declares that India would follow the principle of

minimum nuclear deterrence based on No First Use and Second-Strike Capability.

However, an Indian external affairs ministry official was quoted by the US Defense

News in 2002, that a No First Use policy did not mean India would not have a first

strike capability. The official further explained that India was "working towards having

a first strike capability," but that it was a political decision how to exercise this option

within the No First Use policy.(51) This shows that in real sense No First Use is nothing

more than a political gimmick. Indian defence expert Rajesh Basrur also confirms that

No First Use policy “means much symbolically but not much strategically.”(52)

Just a cursory look at the Indian nuclear doctrine would reveal that Indian

policymakers have taken classical view of survivability while formulating their policy.

The language used in the doctrine tells everything. The draft of the Indian nuclear

doctrine calls for organisation of nuclear forces capable of achieving “very high

survivability” against surprise attacks and “to endure repetitive attrition attempts”

(emphasis added) and declares that nuclear forces would be designed for “adequate

retaliatory capabilities for a punishing strike” (emphasis added). N. Ram, Editor-in-

Chief of the leading Indian newspaper, The Hindu, said by emphasising second-strike

(or even third-strike) capability and "survivability", India wanted to maximise its

nuclear stakes to provide justification for its “open-ended, adventurist and unlimited

programme of nuclear weaponisation.”(53)

The draft of Indian nuclear doctrine calls for a “rapid punitive response” in Para

4.3.i. Lawrence Prabhakar describes quick retaliation as maximalist nuclear agenda

because he says minimum deterrence depends on “the certain means of retaliation more

than the speed with which retaliation would be made.”(54)

The draft describes credible minimum deterrence as “a dynamic concept” and

connects it to the “strategic environment” in the region. By calling minimum deterrence

18

a “dynamic concept” and attaching it to the “strategic environment”, the Indian

government wants to keep its options open for steady increase in its nuclear assets in

the garb of minimum deterrence.

Triad of Indian nuclear forces

In classical view, the triad of nuclear forces, especially its third leg, that of

submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), is considered the most important

element to achieve the “assured second-strike capability”. Indian policymakers

believing in classical deterrence declared in the draft doctrine that Indian nuclear forces

would be based on “a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based missiles and sea-based

assets”.

Currently fighter-bomber aircraft are considered the core of India’s delivery

system for nuclear warheads. Most defence analysts agree that MiG–27 and Jaguar

would be used for India’s nuclear strike capability. However, the Stockholm

International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Year Book 2006 reported that the Indian

Air Force (IAF) had certified the Mirage 2000 combat aircraft for delivery of nuclear

warhead.(55) The report even claimed that the IAF had deployed two squadrons of

Mirage 2000 at the Gwalior air force station in north-central India for this purpose.

Some other analysts point out that MiG-29 and Su-30 could also be easily modified to

deliver air-dropped nuclear weapons. Delivery aircraft are considered vulnerable before

a highly capable air defence; therefore they are usually not relied upon as the only

delivery means for achieving credible minimum deterrence. Yet, they are important

because they constitute the first leg of the triad.

Tara Kartha describes missile capability a key component in nuclear deterrence

because he says there is no effective defence against a missile yet.(56) In the category of

land-based missiles so far, India’s only confirmed operational ballistic missile which

can carry the nuclear warhead is the 150-km range Prithvi I.(57) However, SIPRI Year

Book 2006 claims that in 2004 Agni I (700 km range) and Agni II (2000-2500 km

range) were inducted into Indian army’s 334 and 335 missile groups respectively.(58)

19

According to some confirmed reports, India deployed Prithvi I near the Pakistani

border during a year-long eyeball-to-eye-ball military confrontation in 2002. We

observed in the earlier pages that the Indian missile inventory is very large and they

have definite plans to develop IRBM and ICBM range ballistic missiles in future.

So far the only missing link in their missile inventory is “sea-based assets”.

Defence experts consider the undersea weapons platform (submarine-launched missile

system) as the most invulnerable nuclear weapons delivery system because they are

most difficult to detect and destroy but at the same time all experts agree that it is too

expensive to be advised for a developing country. Former Indian foreign minister

Jaswant Singh told Indian journalists in an interview that “Just as parity is not essential

for deterrence, neither is a triad a prerequisite for credibility.”(59) However, according

to reliable sources, plans are underway to develop Dhanush and Sagarika, two

reportedly SLBM systems. Some other reports suggest that a nuclear-powered

submarine project code-named Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV), based on a

Charlie-I class Soviet submarine, has been underway since 1976.(60) Indian government

has not declared Dhanush or Sagarika as nuclear-capable missiles but all neutral reports

from US and other Western sources confirm that the two systems are surely meant for

carrying nuclear warheads to complete the third leg of the triad of Indian nuclear

forces.

India’s strategic threats and missile requirements

The missile requirements for a “credible minimum deterrence” vary when the

point of reference is changed. For instance, for India the missile requirements for

achieving second-strike capability cannot be the same for two vastly different threats

like Pakistan and USA. Therefore, it is a matter of prime importance to determine

actually what the reference points for the Indian nuclear and missile policy are.

Unlike Pakistan which clearly points out India as its only strategic threat, the

draft Indian nuclear doctrine fails to pin down any particular strategic threat. It just says

the purpose of India’s nuclear posture is “to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear

20

weapons by any State or entity against India and its forces”. This statement could be

read as India's nuclear weapons are directed against all possessors of nuclear weapons.

Confusion about the strategic threat gets compounded when we look at the clause

relating to non-use of India's nuclear weapons against "non-nuclear weapon states".

Para 2.5 declares, “India will not resort to the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons

against States which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear

weapon powers” (emphasis added). This would mean any non-nuclear state allying with

any nuclear-weapon state — if we look in the regional context, allying with China or

Pakistan — would not be able to benefit from the above mentioned clause. In other

words, it could be taken as a threat to neighbouring states to keep away from allying

with China or Pakistan. The former chief of the Indian navy, Admiral L. Ramdas,

criticised this clause for opening "a Pandora’s box to frighten the entire

neighbourhood."(61)

Apart from its nuclear doctrine, it is very clear from the statements emanating

from Indian government sources and intelligentsia that Pakistan and China are the

major strategic threats in the minds of Indian decision makers. After the nuclear tests

on 11 May 1998, the first Indian official statement declared that “the nuclear

environment in India’s neighbourhood” necessitated the nuclear tests — an indirect

reference to Pakistan and China.(62) A vast literature available on Indian nuclear and

missile programmes also confirms that Pakistan and China are the reference points for

Indian deterrence requirements.

However, after Pokhran II, India’s strategic finger is pointing more at China for

obvious reasons. According to leaked press reports, then Indian prime minister Atal

Behari Vajpayee in his 11 May letter to US president Clinton clearly pointed to Chinese

threat as a primary motivation for going nuclear.(63) Vajpayee wrote, “We have an overt

nuclear weapon state on our border… a state which committed armed aggression against

India in 1962 (an obvious reference to China).”(64) Many in the Indian strategic

community believe China is the real threat and it must be the actual reference point for

Indian deterrence requirements.

21

But Indian defence expert Kanti Bajpai and many others in Pakistan point out that

India’s day-to-day diplomatic and strategic moves and the concentration of Indian

military deployments along the Pakistani border prove the fact that Pakistan is “a co-

equal if not greater threat” in the minds of Indian policymakers.(65) Many analysts in

India, including E. Sridharan and Bharat Karnad, concede that so far Indian strategic

thinking has been transfixed on Pakistan.(66)

Bharat Karnad complains that by regarding Pakistan a primary threat, India

provided Pakistan “a status of parity” and “equality of opportunity” which has reduced

India in strategic-nuclear terms to Pakistan’s size. Sridharan agrees: India’s “strategic

mental horizon seems to be limited, from its actions or lack of them, to South Asia,

despite invoking the Chinese threat”. He gives the example of India’s decision to

deploy only the short-range Pakistan- specific Prithvi missile so far. Karnad further

says, “countries are known by the enemies they keep”. Therefore, in his most recent

article he has argued that India must focus on China because China is the main strategic

rival for India in Asia and that Pakistan-India confrontation is just a side show in the

long run.(67) This thinking is gaining more and more support in the Indian strategic

community and it appears that China is gradually becoming a main reference point for

India’s minimum deterrence planning.

On a non-serious note, some hawks in the Indian defence lobby even call for

making the United States a reference point and going all out for nuclear and missile

development. They cite the incident of the 1971 East Pakistan war, when US had

despatched a carrier fleet to the Bay of Bengal to convince India not to attempt

overrunning West Pakistan. Using a similar context, in 2004 General Padmana Bhan

came out with a fiction work titled The writing on the wall: India checkmates America

2017, which paints a sensational war scenario in 2017 where India takes on the US

while the US enters into the war to prevent a 1971 war like situation to save

Pakistan.(68)

The bad memories of the Sino-Indian war of 1962, the unresolved border dispute

over 90,000 square kilometres territory in Arunachal Pradesh, Chinese strategic

22

partnership with Pakistan and competition over the sphere of influence in Asia are

described as major Indian concerns against China. However, Indian writers agree that

after the signing of the interim agreements of Zones of Peace and Tranquillity with

China in 1988, relations between the two countries have improved considerably and

they also admit that unlike Taiwan there is very little chance of China going for a war

with India over its territorial claims.(69)

Nonetheless, there are two other obvious reasons for making China a reference

point after Pokhran II. One is India’s growing strategic partnership with the US and the

idea of India emerging as a possible counterweight to China. The second obvious

reason is that after Pokhran II the nuclear and missile programmes entered a stage

where India could no more justify such ambitious programmes merely on the basis of

‘Pakistan threat’. It needed a far bigger threat as justification on the basis of minimum

deterrence.

Minimal deterrence against Pakistan & missile needs

With India’s more varied and relatively far more extensive nuclear and missile

programmes as compared to Pakistan, minimum deterrence against it should not be a

problem for India. We must also keep in mind that Pakistan’s nuclear and missile

programmes do not precede the Indian nuclear or missile proliferation attempts; rather

it just follows or reacts to it. Furthermore, Pakistani leadership and strategic

community have categorically stated on several occasions that it is “neither necessary

nor desirable for Pakistan to match Indian nuclear strength warhead for warhead or

delivery vehicle for delivery vehicle.”(70) This means the offsetting nuclear and missile

balance is presumed to remain in favour of India vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Vijay K. Nair describes “assured threat to six to ten metropolitan centres” and

“neutralization of up to three sets of communication centres” in Pakistan as conceivable

targeting requirement for Indian deterrence against Pakistan.(71) He points out the

communication centres at Sukkur and Jacobabad, thermal power stations of Mangla and

Tarbela and railway centres at Hyderabad, Bahawalpur, Dera Ghazi Khan and Gujrat

23

along with attack on sea connections of Karachi and Gwadar as possible targets to

completely cripple its economy and make Pakistan dysfunctional as a state. However,

Nair proposes that a mix of 4-5 targets from the list would fulfil the “unacceptable

damage” objective of India.(72) He developed these targeting alternatives for India on

the basis of S. Rashid Naim’s analytical work on all possible employment policy

options and their effects on India and Pakistan.(73) In Dr. Upendra Choudhury’s

opinion, Islamabad, Lahore and Karachi constitute “unacceptable damage” for

Pakistan.(74)

As observed above, so far Indian strategic thinking was transfixed on Pakistan so

India has made every possible attempt to achieve the assured second-strike capability

against it. Naim in the same work, which first appeared in 1991, claimed that the whole

of Pakistan was within the range of India’s MiG-23, MiG-27 and MiG-29 planes.(75)

With the added inventory of Mirage 2000, Vajra with 1850-km range and Jaguar IS

Shamshir with 1400-km range, India surely possesses the capability to reach any part of

Pakistan through air.

In the category of land-based missiles, we have already reported that India has

deployed Prithvi I missile with 150-km range. The range of Prithvi I and even Prithvi II

(250km) would be insufficient to achieve survivability against Pakistan on the basis of

classical definition of survivability. Prithvi II can strike half of Pakistan, including

almost all important military targets and all major cities. However, then they need to

launch Prithvi missiles from the bordering areas of Pakistan which makes those missiles

vulnerable to the first strike from Pakistan air force.

IISS report 2006 reported that Agni I with 700 km range and Agni II with 2000-

2500 km range were inducted into the Indian army in 2004. With the induction of 700-

km Agni I, India reaches any target in Pakistan (see fig. 1.1). As far as minimum

deterrence against Pakistan is concerned, the road and rail mobile Agni I is sufficient

because Pakistan does not have the capability to interdict mobile missiles. Still, some

classical deterrence proponents in India argue that the problem of survivability remains

with Agni I, because India would need to launch its missiles from Amritsar or

24

Rajasthan close to Pakistani border to reach the far-off targets. This limitation is

removed by the Agni II which has 2000-2500 km range. With the induction of Agni II,

India will have the capability to launch its missiles deep inside Pakistan and still strike

any strategic target there.

We know Agni is a ready-to-launch solid propellant, rail and road mobile missile

systems. Therefore most defence experts on South Asia agree that Agni II provides

India a comprehensive strike capability (far more than what minimum deterrence

requires) against Pakistan even by the classical definition of survivability. This in other

words would mean, any Indian attempt of further increasing the range of Agni will

have no direct bearing on Pakistan and that then Indian threat perception against

Pakistan cannot justify such a proliferation attempt. This also explains why China is

becoming the point of reference for India lately.

Fig. 1.1 The strategic reach of Agni-I vis-à-vis Pakistan

Source: Bharat Rakshak website, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/MISSILES/Images/Agni26.jpg

[J&K disputed territory]

25

Minimal deterrence against China & missile needs

India’s former external affairs minister, Jaswant Singh once stated: “Our

Problem is China. We are not seeking parity with China. We don’t have the resources

and we don’t have the will. What we are seeking is a minimum deterrent.”(76) Let us

explore what the minimum-deterrence nuclear and missile needs of India against China

are in the eyes of Indian defence experts. Jasjit Singh suggests that two to three dozens

of nuclear weapons would be required for deterrence against China.(77) On the other

hand, Bharat Karnad gives the figure of 300 plus.(78) Vijay K. Nair points out that India

would need the capability to strike four to five metropolitan centres, same number of

major industrial centres and two ports used for strategic submarines by China.(79) Lt.

General B.M. Kapur suggests India must go for triad capability to strike Beijing and

develop Agni V, with range of 5000 km.(80)

In complete contrast to all this, Bernard Brodie in his masterpiece, Strategy in

the Missile Age, published in 1995, argued that “with only a single thermonuclear

bomb”, directed at a premier city “would be a retaliatory capability sufficient to give

the (aggressor) government a pause.”(81) Similarly, going even further, Rajesh M.

Basrur, promoting modern concept of survivability declares, India does not need

capability to strike Beijing and that large arsenals are unnecessary for minimum

deterrence.(82) But no one in the Indian strategic community is expected to buy his

argument as most governments in nuclear-capable countries believe in traditional

balances. Let us probe Indian missile programme and see how far it stands for

minimum deterrence against China.

Analysing Indian air-based delivery systems, Kanti Bajpai claims that “Indian

Air Force could hit most of the urban China, right up to the east coast cities of Fuzhou,

Nanchang, Hangzhou, Shanghai, Nanjing, Tianjin, and Beijing.(83) However, he gives

some ifs and buts and says to attack high targets in China, Indian aircraft would have to

contemplate suicidal air strikes because to reach those targets the outer limits of their

ranges need to be achieved. This means, somehow, India possesses the air leg of its

triad against China.

26

In the category of land-based missiles most defence experts agree that SRBM

Prithvi I or even II are useless against China. Agni is considered a China-specific

missile, while recent reports suggest that it is going to emerge as India’s only strategic

weapon against both China and Pakistan. Kanti Bajpai’s study reveals that Agni with

1500 km perimeter range and deployed as far as Assam would be able to target four

Chinese cities of more than half a million population and two cities of more than one

million population. He argues, however, in Assam Indian missiles would be

unprotected against the first strike from Tibet or other adjoining areas of China.

Therefore he suggests Agni would be better placed in West Bengal or Bihar from

where, with 1500 km range, it can strike Kunming and Lanzhou of more than half a

million populations and Chengdu of more than one million population. Agni II, with its

2500 km range, if deployed in Assam can strike six over one million population centres

and six over half a million population centres (12 major cities in total) of China. While

if deployed further back in West Bengal or Bihar, eight major cities of China come

within 2500 km perimeter, which includes Xian, Chengdu, Changsha, Guiyang,

Lanzhou, Chongqing, Kunming and Nanning.(84)

Tellis contends that the road and rail mobile Agni II is adequate for the purpose

of Indian minimum deterrence against China and Pakistan both because it cannot be

“successfully interdicted” by either.(85) Bharat Karnad criticises this Tellis argument but

agrees that so far both China and Pakistan do not have capability to interdict mobile

missile systems. However, he raises a question about the possible threat from the

United States which surely possesses the capability to destroy even mobile missiles.(86)

Keeping that in mind one can argue that India should have resisted further enhancing

the range of Agni until China achieved the capability to interdict mobile missile

systems, if only achieving minimum deterrence against China was the target.

To the contrary, India went ahead with the testing of intermediate-range

ballistic missile (IRBM) Agni III in July 2006 (partially successful) and again in April

2007 which has reportedly a range of 3000 to 4000 km and can strike even Shanghai

and Beijing. In fact, the road and rail mobile Agni III with its 3000-4000 km range is

27

capable of striking any target in mainland China (see fig. 1.2). Immediately after the

second test, Indian Defence Ministry’s official statement claimed that the test “validated

all mission objectives” of the test and that it "confirmed India’s strategic capability for

minimum credible deterrence."(87) Does it mean India no more needs further

enhancement of the Agni range? Or has India abandoned its alleged plans for

developing the submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) to complete the triad?

Fig.1.2 Agni III reach vis-à-vis China

Source: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Agni-III_Ranges.png>

28

As reported in earlier pages quoting different independent sources, India has

definite plans for going for ICBM Surya and SLBM Sagarika. Within the Indian

strategic community, some scholars might justify the development of SLBM for

minimum deterrence by overstretching the need for the third leg (sea-based) for India.

But it is very hard to find any justification for ICBM Surya if only minimum deterrence

against China is the objective.

Missile programme & desire for a great-power status

As discussed above, Indian plans of developing SLBM Sagarika and ICBM Surya

do not fit into their nuclear doctrine of minimum deterrence against China and Pakistan.

To justify these two systems, India would need to change either of the two variables,

the type of the deterrence India seeks or the reference point (strategic threat). India’s

draft nuclear doctrine clearly mentions the word “credible minimum deterrence,”

though there is ambiguity about the strategic threat (reference point) in the document.

Or there could be some other logic or justification behind these missile proliferation

attempts.

After the test-firing of Agni III, Indian security analyst C. Uday Bhaskar said it

would be "misleading to see the Agni test in a unifocal manner as anti-China." He

added, “In the post-Cold War period, Weapons of Mass Destruction capability is not

predicated on a single-point threat. The Agni test should be seen in the context of India

trying to enhance its country's overall strategic profile."(88) The nuclear and missile

programmes of India started during the heydays of “Hindi Chini Bhai Bhai,” which

also proves that China was not the original motivation behind Indian nuclear and

missiles programmes. The China factor entered into the framework only later. At that

point motivation came from Prime Minister Nehru’s understanding of realpolitik and

India’s so-called love for Non-alignment. Jawaharlal Nehru linked atomic energy with

“the building of a free and self-reliant India.”(89) This gives a hint, as if power politics

was the original motive behind India’s nuclear and missile programmes.

The policy of missile proliferation adopted by a particular state is directly

29

proportional to its strategic ambitions because the resources spent on developing

missiles of higher range could not be explained otherwise. See table 3.1 where India

possessing IRBM (Agni III) is bracketed with North Korea and Iran, the two countries

that are allegedly developing IRBM missiles. One must keep in mind that Iran and

North Korea going for IRBM makes some sense because both of them consider a far-off

target USA as a strategic threat whereas India’s tacitly declared strategic threats are its

neighbours, China and Pakistan. With reports of ICBM (Surya) and SLBM (Sagarika)

under development, India is aiming to join the elite club of five nuclear-weapon states

and North Korea (no testing so far, again allegedly developing an ICBM) on the top of

the list. This gives an idea about India’s strategic ambitions.

Table 1.3

Missiles by categories of range

Range Country

Intercontinental

and/or

submarine-launched

ballistic missiles

(>5,500 km)

China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, United States,

North Korea∗

Intermediate-range

ballistic missiles

(3,000 - 5,500 km)

India, Iran , possibly North Korea

Medium-range

ballistic missiles

(1,000-3,000 km)

Israel ,North Korea, Saudi Arabia, China, India ,Pakistan, and Iran

Short-range

ballistic missiles

(70–1,000 km)

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, China, Czech

Republic, Egypt, Greece, India, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Kazakhstan, Libya,

Netherlands, North Korea, Pakistan, Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, South

Korea, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates,

Vietnam, and Yemen.

Source: Congressional Research Service (CRS) USA, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries, updated 5 March 2004, CRS-p.6, <http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31999.pdf>

∗Based on US Intelligence reports, North Korea is developing Taepo Dong III ICBM. If North Korea is included in this section based on US intelligence reports then why India is missed out despite there being similar intelligence reports about its ICBM Surya?

30

Nuclear weapons are widely considered as weapons of prestige and power. In our

anarchic world, they bring its possessors strong diplomatic leverage and political clout

in foreign affairs. Who else could have better understood this than the realpolitik-adept

statesman in Nehru? Bharat Karnad writes about him:

“Non-violence, according to Nehru, it would seem, was to be resorted to only

when the use of armed force was infeasible or unavailable, which made the issue

moot any way; but once these objective conditions changed and India secured the

necessary wherewithal, there would be no hesitation in resorting to the traditional

means of power politics.”(90)

India’s nuclear and missile policy very much testifies to of this Nehruvian

pragmatism. India started with ‘the moral high ground’ of denouncing the military use

nuclear technology and condemning deterrence for its complete disregard to human

lives. But after Pokhran II in 1998, without wasting a moment, India came up with its

own version of minimum deterrence and who knows what position they will take when

the situation is ripe for their SLBM Sagarika and IRBM Surya.

Lately, India has been termed as a “global power”, “rising power”, “great

power” and even a “superpower in the making” by several Western and Indian

writers.(91) Many in the Indian strategic community believe India’s robust nuclear and

missile programme would figure as a key component along with sustained economic

development for India’s surge as a global player. In Indian policy makers’ view the two

are very much intertwined. Para (1.4) in the preamble of the draft of Indian nuclear

doctrine reads: “India continuously aims at promoting an ever-expanding area of peace

and stability around it so that developmental priorities can be pursued without

disruption”.

Bharat Karnad reminds the Indian policy makers that a time-tested principle for

nuclear force structuring for a potentially great power requires “the deterrent being of

sufficiently large size and for it to be capable of high levels of destruction at

intercontinental distances.”(92) This explains why SLBM Sagarika and ICBM Surya are

in the pipeline. However, India is expected to keep these two projects on low profile in

31

years to come because it would not like to scare its new strategic partners immediately

after signing the nuclear deals with them.

Conclusion

Even after all the above discussion it is still not very easy to answer the two

basic questions raised in the introduction section. This is because the concepts of

‘minimum’, ‘survivable’ and ‘credible’ are interpreted in different ways by different

sources. The other problem is the so-called dynamic nature of deterrence. Defence

experts say requirements of deterrence also change with changes in technology and

advancement on the side of reference point. This creates a confusion which is used by

the nuclear powers to fulfil their ambitions in the garb of deterrence.

If we take the modern view of survivability, then the Indian missile programme

looks quite ambitious because the modern concept of survivability works on the

‘uncertainty’ principle and calls for restricting the nuclear and missile arsenals to lowest

possible levels without considering the balances. By that definition even Agni with its

1500-km range was good enough for minimum deterrence against both China and

Pakistan because it provided India nuclear strike capability at all targets in Pakistan and

also a few important cities (Kunming, Lanzhou and Chengdu) in the Chinese heartland

came in the strike range of 1500-km radius.

By classical view, the developments that have taken place in India on the

missile front so far (the induction of Agni I and Agni II), can be justified when we take

China as a reference point. However, India should have stopped at Agni-II as suggested

by Tellis. Agni-III was not required for minimum deterrence, but that can be justified

as a cover-up for ‘assured second-strike capability’. Beyond that there is no valid

justification in the light of minimum deterrence against China as a reference point.

This also tells us that Indian dissatisfaction with the status quo in the nuclear

and missile fields in the region is not because India is scared of Chinese strategic threat;

rather, it is because India wants to match China as an emerging great power in the

global politics and that India believes that nuclear and missile development would be

32

one of the most important component in this competition.

Ambiguity about the strategic threat in India’s draft nuclear doctrine leaves the

option of including new threats open. This ambiguity must be intentional. Indian policy

makers might have wanted to keep open the option of redefining or providing new

explanations for going beyond Chinese reference point in future.

To conclude, at the outset the Indian missile programme does not look very

ambitious but an in-depth study reveals that it is very comprehensive and ambitious

specially when we include the projects of ICBM Surya and SLBM Sagarika in our

analysis. The doctrine of minimum deterrence against China and Pakistan fails to

provide proper justification for such an ambitious missile programme. However, the

argument regarding “great-power status’ makes a strong case. It provides far better

explanation and justification for India’s missile programme than does the doctrine of

‘minimum deterrence.’

33

Notes and References

1. The term “Asian Triangulation” is borrowed from Michael Krepon’s article “Missile Defence and the Asian Cascade,” in Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne, (ed), The Impact of US Ballistic Missile Defences on Southern Asia, Report 46, (Washington DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, July 2002), <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ SABMDKrepon.pdf,>, accessed on 15/05/07.

2. Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security: The Realist Foundations of Strategy, (New Delhi: Macmillan India, 2002).

3. Ashley J. Tellis, India’s Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).

4. Ashok Kapur, Pokhran and Beyond: India’s Nuclear Behavior, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001).

5. George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000).

6. Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999).

7. Jasjit Singh (ed.), Nuclear India, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998). 8. A. Baskaran, “An Assessment of Nuclear and Missile Developments in South Asia,” A

paper presented at Seventh Annual Conference on Economics and Security, Burwalls Hall, Bristol University, Bristol, 26-28 June 2003.

9. Dr. Upendra Choudhury, “Dealing with the Danger of Ballistic Missiles in South Asia,” paper presented at the Graduate Conference on Amity and Enmity: Patterns of Peace, War and Insecurity in the 21st Century, organised by the Department of Politics and International Relations (Cartmel College), Lancaster University, Lancaster , England on 18 April 2002.

10. Kent L. Biringer, “Missile Threat Reduction and Monitoring in South Asia,” In Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne (Eds.) The Stability-Instability Paradox: Nuclear Weapons and Brinkmanship in South Asia, Henry Stimson Report, No.38, June 2001, Washington DC, <www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/NRRMBiringer.pdf>, accessed on 10/06/07.

11. Andrew Feickert and K. Alan Kronstadt, “Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia,” Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, 17 October 2003.

12. Mohammad Iqbal, ‘India’s Missile Muscles’, Regional Studies, Vol. XIII, No. 3, Summer 1995, p 3-34.

13. E. Sridharan (ed.), The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, (New Delhi: Routledge Taylor and Fracis Group, 2007).

14. Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the shadow of Nuclear Weapons, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005).

15. Arpit Rajain, Nuclear Deterrence in Southern Asia: China, India and Pakistan, (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005).

16. Rajesh Rajagopalan, Second-Strike: Arguments about Nuclear War in South Asia, (New Delhi: Penguin, Viking, 2005).

17. Gaurav Kampani, “Indian Missile Overview,” <http://www.nti.org/e_research/ profiles/India/Missile/index.html>, accessed on 12/06/07.

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18. Iqbal, ref. 12, p. 6. 19. The Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, “India Missile Milestones: 1947-

2005,” The Risk Report, Volume 11 Number 6 (November-December 2005), <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/MissileMiles2005.html>, accessed on 15/06/07.

20. Centaur was the world's first high-energy upper stage, burning liquid hydrogen (LH2) and liquid oxygen (LOX). Centaur has had a long and successful history in planetary exploration. (Wikipedia).

21. Rajat Pandit, “Trishul, Akash Missiles far from being operational,” The Times of India Mumbai, 24 July 2006.

22. <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/india/brahmos.htm>, accessed on 16/06/07.

23. The US Defence Threat Reduction Agency’s Weapons of Mass Destruction Terms Reference Handbook defines a ballistic missile as “a missile that is guided during powered flight and unguided during free flight when the trajectory that it follows is subject only to the external influences of gravity and atmospheric drag” and a cruise missile as “a long-range, low-flying guided missile that can be launched from air, sea, and land.”

24. See the official website of Brahmos missile system, <http://www.brahmos.com/aboutus.html >, accessed on 16/06/07.

25. Former Soviet Union and now Russia is the only country which has succeeded in launching supersonic cruise missiles. Remember, Brahmos is also a joint venture of India and Russia and it is about three times faster than the current US Tomahawk cruise missile.

26. Eas Bokhari, ‘And now the Brahmos’, 4 December 2003, http://www.globalsecurity.org/ org/news/2003/031204-brahmos-missile.htm, accessed on 23/06/07.

27. T.S. Subramanian, “Army acquires Brahmos missile,” The Hindu, New Delhi, 22 June 2007.

28. Ibid. 29. In general terms, a strategic weapon is one designed for mass destruction like a nuclear

missile. A tactical weapon, on the other hand, typically carries a conventional high-explosive warhead. A strategic weapon would typically be targeted at a military base or city according to a premeditated war plan. A tactical weapon, however, would usually be used against battlefield targets that may change rapidly as battle conditions change.

30. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, “Missile Flight Tests: Challenges and Opportunities for CBMs,” in Prospects of Peace, Stability and Prosperity in South Asia, (2005), collection of papers presented at an international seminar organised by the Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, on June 7-9, 2004, p.147.

31. Tara Kartha, “Ballistic Missiles and International Security,” in Jasjit Singh (ed.) Nuclear India, (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1998), p. 119.

32. “Prithvi-India Missile Special Weapons Delivery Systems,” Federation of American Scientists website, <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/prithvi.htm> accessed on 05/07/07.

33. The Federation of American Scientists website confirms the induction of Prithvi II by the Indian air force but no other source validates this. Wikipedia website says it is in the process of induction which appears more reliable.

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34. Steven Lee Myers, "Russia Is Helping India Extend Range of Missile, U.S. Aides Say," The New York Times, 27 April 1998, p. 1, abstract available on New York Times archive <http://select.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=FB0917FE355B0C748EDDAD0894D0494D81>, accessed on 06/07/07.

35. PIR-Center for Policy Studies in Russia, Arms Control Letter titled “Indian Nuclear Submarine Fleet Development Program: Russian Participation,” 15 March 1999, downloaded from the Global Beat website <http://www.bu.edu/globalbeat/southasia/PIR031599.html>, accessed on 07/07/07.

36. D.N. Moorthy, “In a workshop at Hazira, desi underwater missile launcher gets ready for trial,” The Indian Express, New Delhi, 28 May, 2001.

37. Arun Vishwakarma, “Agni — Strategic Ballistic Missile,” <http://www.bharatrakshak.com/MISSILES/Agni.html>, accessed on 08/07/07.

38. See a comprehensive report on how India’s strategic missile Agni derived from a civilian space programme in Gary Milhollin, "India's missiles with a little help from our friends," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November 1989, <http://www.wisconsinproject.org/countries/india/misshelp.html>, accessed on 08/07/07.

39. The Hindu, New Delhi, 13 April 2006. 40. Vivek Raghuvanshi, “Indian Scientists Poised to Test-Launch Country’s First ICBM,”

Defence News, 30 April 2001, p. 26. 41. <http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/missile/surya.htm>, accessed on 09/07/07. 42. Dr. Richard Speier, “India’s ICBM — On a glide path to trouble?,” The

Nonproliferation Policy Education Centre, Washington, DC, 7 February 2006, < http://www.npecweb.org/Essays/060207SpeierICBM.pdf>,

43. T. Jayaraman, “Deterrence and other Myths,” Frontline, Volume 16, Issue 10, 8-21 May 1999.

44. Ibid. 45. For a detailed study of the classical view and its requirements see Albert Wohlstetter

"The Delicate Balance of Terror," Foreign Affairs, New York, Vol. 37, No. 2, January 1959.

46. Gregory S. Jones, “From Testing to Deploying Nuclear Forces: The Hard Choices Facing India and Pakistan,” RAND Issue Paper, 2000, <http://www.rand.org/pubs/issue_papers/IP192/index2.html>, accessed on 11/07/07.

47. Kanti Bajpai, “The Fallacy of an Indian Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999), p. 160.

48. Rajesh M. Basrur, “International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence,” in E. Sridharan (ed.), The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, (New Delhi: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2007), p.141.

49. Ibid., p. 142, For a detailed study of the numbers game in deterrence see James H. Lebovic, “The Law of Small Numbers: Deterrence and National Missile Defence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2002, pp.455-483.

50. See the text of India’s draft nuclear doctrine on Indian embassy website, <http://www.indianembassy.org/policy/CTBT/nuclear_doctrine_aug_17_1999.html>, accessed on 15/07/07.

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51. This quote is carried in “Table of Indian Nuclear Forces, 2002” on Natural Resources Defence Council (NRDC) website, <http://www.nrdc.org/nuclear/nudb/datab20.asp>, last revised on 25 November, 2002, accessed on 15/07/07.

52. Basrur, ref. 48, p. 144. 53. N. Ram, “Dreaming India’s Nuclear Future,” Frontline (The Hindu, New Delhi),

Volume 16 - Issue 18, 28 Aug–10 Sept. 1999. 54. W. Lawrence Prabhakar, “The Challenge of Minimal Nuclear Deterrence,” in Michael

Krepon (ed.) Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia, (New York : Henry L. Stimson Center, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.47, <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ SABMDPrabhakar.pdf >, accessed on 18/07/07.

55. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), SIPRI Year Book 2006: “Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,” Oxford University Press, p.661.

56. Tara Kartha, ref. 31, p.115. 57. See “Table of Indian Nuclear Forces, 2002”, ref. 51. 58. See Table “Indian Nuclear Forces January 2006” in SIPRI Year Book 2006, ref.55,

p.662. 59. See Jaswant Singh’s interview in The Hindu, 29 November 1999. 60. Dr. Upendra Choudhury, ‘Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures in South Asia: Problems

and Prospects’, Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS) Policy Studies 35, (New Delhi: Manohar, 2006) p. 9; also see “Table of Indian Nuclear Forces, 2002, ref. 58.

61. N. Ram, ref. 53. 62. The Hindu, New Delhi, 12 May 1998. 63. The letter was immediately leaked to New York Times, “India’s letter to Clinton on

nuclear testing,” 13 May, 1998. 64. Quoted in Perkovich 2000, ref. 5, p.417. 65. Kanti Bajpai, ref. 47, p.151. 66. See E. Sridharan ref. 33, p. 28-29; and Bharat Karnad ref. 2, p.556-574. 67. Bharat Karnad, “South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence Theory,”

in E. Sridharan (ed.), The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, (New Delhi: Routledge Taylor and Fracis Group, 2007), p. 83-129.

68. See a report on the novel in The Times of India, Mumbai, 1 February 2004. 69. W. Lawrence Prabhakar, “The Challenge of Minimal Nuclear Deterrence,” in Michael

Krepon (ed.) Nuclear Risk Reduction in South Asia,(New York : Henry L. Stimson Center, Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p.47, <http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pdf/ SABMDPrabhakar.pdf>, accessed on 25/08/07.

70. Rasul Bux Rais, “Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence: Pakistan’s Posture,” in E. Sridharan (ed.), The India-Pakistan Nuclear Relationship: Theories of Deterrence and International Relations, (New Delhi: Routledge Taylor and Fracis Group, 2007), p. 58.

71. Vijay K. Nair, “The Structure of an Indian Nuclear Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999), p.85-87.

72. Ibid, p. 99. 73. S. Rashid Naim, “Adhi Raat ke Baad -After Midnight,” in Stephen Cohen (ed.),

Nuclear Proliferation in South Asia: The prospects for Arms Control, (Boulder, CO:

37

Westview Press, 1991), reissued June 1998 by Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security (ACDIS) at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

74. Dr. Upendra Choudhury (2002), ref. 7, p.11. 75. Ibid. p. 6. 76. Taken from Bharat Karnad (2002), ref. 2, p. 615, originally cited in John W Garner,

“Nuclear Weapons and the India-China Relationship,” paper presented at the conference on “South Asia’s Nuclear Dilemma,” Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 18-19 February 1999, and p.34.

77. IPCS Special Report 13, “India’s Credible Minimum Deterrence a Report,” (Report of the IPCS Panel Discussion held on 7 February 2006, with Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, Lt Gen BM Kapur and Prof Rajaraman as panellists), February 2003, < http://www.ipcs.org/IPCS-Special-Report-13.pdf> accessed on 08/08/07.

78. Bharat Karnad , “A Thermonuclear Deterrent,” in Amitabh Mattoo (ed.), India’s Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, (New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1999).

79. Vijay K. Nair (1999), ref. 47, p. 88-99. 80. IPCS Special Report 13, ref. 79. 81. Cited in Bharat Karnad (1999), ref.79, p.125. 82. Rajesh M. Basrur (2007), ref. 49, p.144. 83. Kanti Bajpai, ref. 48, p.164. 84. Ibid, pp. 164-167. 85. Tellis (2001), ref. 3, p.577-582, cited in Karnad (2002), ref. 2, p.585-586. 86. Bharat Karnad (2002), ref. 2, p.585-586. 87. The Tribune, Chandigarh, 13 April 2007, Internet edition

<http://www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070413/main3.htm>, accessed on 12/08/07. 88. Ibid. 89. Jawaharlal Nehru, Years of Struggle: Selected Readings, Compiled by Arjun Dev, New

Delhi, National Book Trust, 1989, p.169-170; cited in Bharat Karnard (2002), ref.2, p.182.

90. Bharat Karnad (2002), ref.2, p. 166-167. Karnard based his assessment on several speeches of Nehru, like one at the 1929 Nagpur Session of the Congress Party, Nehru said: “We have not the material or the training for organised violence… The great majority of us, I take it, judge the issue not on moral but on practical grounds, and if we reject the way of violence it is because it promises no substantial results. But if the Congress, or the nation at any future time comes to the conclusion that methods of violence will rid us of slavery, then I have no doubt it will adopt them.”

91. See Jafery R. Ambrose, “India: A Super Power in the making,” <http://www.realtruth.org/articles/434-iasitm.html>, accessed on 15/08/07 and Ashley J. Tellis, “India as a New Global Power”, (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment, 2005).

92. Bharat Karnad (2002), ref.2, p.618.