INDONESIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS

INDONESIAN FOREIGN FIGHTERS

The Trajectory: Before, During, and After the Conflict

by

Sigit Aris Prasetyo

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of

Philosophy in Politics and International Relations, the University of Auckland.

Date of submission: 4 March 2022

i

ABSTRACT

This study examines the causes, motives and history of three waves of Indonesian foreign fighters,

those who participated in the conflicts in Afghanistan, Mindanao, and in Syria. It explains and analyses

their trajectory before, during, and after the conflicts. It seeks to explain their underlying motivations,

recruitment and radicalization process, roles, and interaction with insurgent groups during the conflicts.

This study also explains why Indonesian jihadists left the battlefront and examines their post-conflict

behaviours and the reasons many returnees engaged in terrorism at home.

Overall, this study reveals several thought-provoking findings. First, their motives for joining distant

conflicts are heterogeneous, ranging from ideologies, to political, and even personal interests.

Moreover, they mostly entered wars based on their leader's strategic decisions. They were instructed

to receive military skills, war experience and develop the transnational jihadi network. They were not

allowed by their leaders to fight and die in the battlefront because their ultimate goal was to wage jihad

at home to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia.

This study reveals that Indonesian jihadists fought under various rebel and local insurgent groups who

sought to topple their governments or establish an Islamic State. During the conflicts, they trained,

fought, and engaged in various military duties, including as fighters, military trainers, propagandists,

and even as suicide bombers. Under the protection of local insurgent groups, Indonesian jihadists

developed good interaction, which is more mutually beneficial than a pure ideology-driven motivation.

Based on their post-conflict behaviour, the Indonesian jihadists returned home for a variety of reasons

and with various motives. While many returned home to continue their armed jihad, with the aim to

strengthen their internal groups, many also abandoned the battle because they were traumatized and

disillusioned. Moreover, the majority were not truly demobilized, and they had not left their jihad, they

still wished to continue or extend their armed jihad at home. As they were active radical group

members, they are still seeking momentum to continue their armed jihad and materialize their political

goals.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

My three-year six-month journey of my Ph.D. gave me a great lesson “to never give up to

realize and fulfill the dream, to reach the star in the sky, even if it looks impossible to do

so. Thank God, I finally could finish this journey that I would not be able to accomplish

this without His grace and blessings. Concluding my doctoral studies has taught me about

the importance of prayers, dedication, endurance, discipline, and having supportive people

around me.

First, my sincere thanks to Dr. Chris Wilson, as my main supervisor, Dr. Wilson has been

a great help in this process. His expertise, supervision, patience, and analytical thinking has

helped me in terms of structuring and sharpening this thesis. My appreciation also goes to

Dr. Thomas Gregory, my co-supervisor, for his guidance, supervision, and critical

comments. I have had the privilege and fortune to have their solid supervisory assistance

which has made it possible for me to finish this thesis on time. I also would like to thank

my friends at the department for their peer support and friendship, Dr. Davood B.

Moghadam, Wisdom O. Iyekekpolo, Andrew Lim, Duane Oldfield, Latief, Arisarawan

(Ming), and Hasith K.

Many prominent experts have assisted me during my fieldwork and throughout the process

of writing this thesis. Accordingly, I must express my thankfulness to Dr. Noor Huda

Ismail, Adhe Bhakti, Sidney Jones, Al Chaidar, As’ad Said Ali, Solahudin, Kharis Hadirin,

Thayyep Malik, and many more who have given their insights and contribution to this

research project. I also thank my respondents, former foreign fighters, such as, Nasir Abas,

Ali Imron, Abu Tholut, Farihin, Yusuf, and many more, who I could not mention here.

Their willingness to share their memories, life stories, and views enriched and made this

study interesting and unique.

I acknowledge that this study would not have been possible without the support from my

institution, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia. I would also like

to express my sincere gratitude to the New Zealand Aid Scholarship (NZAS Aid) and The

Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, New Zealand, which helped to fund this study and

allowed me to study at the University of Auckland. Special thanks also to Sue and Arthur

iv

from the International Office, UoA, for their technical and friendly assistance.

The final words belong to my family members. My beloved wife, Martha, from the

beginning, you have given your support and motivation to begin this journey and you have

always shown your unwavering care and you have made many sacrifices. Thank you very

much for this. My thanks to my incredible son, Nedzar, and my daughters, Rachel, and

Hanna, who always make my day joyful when I come home from work. I love you all. Big

thanks and blessings to everyone.

v

TABLE OF CONTENT

ABSTRACT ................................................................................................................................ i

ACKNOWLEDGMENT........................................................................................................... iii

TABLE OF CONTENT ............................................................................................................. v

GLOSSARY ........................................................................................................................... viii

CHAPTER I ............................................................................................................................... 1

1.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 1

1.2. Aims of the Study and Research Questions .................................................................... 3

1.3. Methodology ................................................................................................................... 4

1.4. Overview of the Thesis ................................................................................................... 6

CHAPTER II .............................................................................................................................. 8

Conceptual Framework .............................................................................................................. 8

2.1. Introduction ..................................................................................................................... 8

2.2. Terminology .................................................................................................................... 8

2.3. Pre-Departure ................................................................................................................ 10

2.4. During the Conflicts ...................................................................................................... 17

2.5. Post-Conflict Phase ....................................................................................................... 20

2.6. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 27

CHAPTER III .......................................................................................................................... 28

The Mujahidin War .................................................................................................................. 28

3.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 28

3.2. The Afghanistan War: An Overview ............................................................................ 29

3.3. Darul Islam (DI) ............................................................................................................ 30

3.4. Jihad and Transnational Networks ................................................................................ 32

3.4.1. Jihad and Grievance Narratives .............................................................................. 35

3.4.2. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittehad-al-Islami ................................................................. 37

3.4.3. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) ............................................................................................. 42

3.4.4. Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda................................................................................. 44

3.4.5. Salafi Jihadi ............................................................................................................ 45

3.5. After Training and Fighting .......................................................................................... 49

3.6. Violent Activities .......................................................................................................... 52

3.6.1. Ambon Conflict ...................................................................................................... 53

3.6.2. The Poso Conflict ................................................................................................... 56

vi

3.6.3. New jihad call by Al-Qaeda ................................................................................... 59

3.6.4. Arms Cache ............................................................................................................ 63

3.7. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 64

CHAPTER IV .......................................................................................................................... 66

The Mindanao War .................................................................................................................. 66

4.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 66

4.2. Mindanao Conflict: Overview ....................................................................................... 66

4.3. The MILF ...................................................................................................................... 68

4.4. Darul Islam .................................................................................................................... 71

4.5. The Hudaibiyah Military Academy............................................................................... 74

4.5.1. Jemaah Islamiyah ................................................................................................... 81

4.5.2. Jihad and Grievance Narratives .............................................................................. 83

4.6. After the Training and Fighting .................................................................................... 85

4.7. Acts of violence ............................................................................................................. 87

4.7.1. Salamat Hashim’s Jihad Call .................................................................................. 87

4.7.2. Ambon and Poso Conflicts ..................................................................................... 90

4.7.3. Al-Qaeda’s jihad call .............................................................................................. 95

4.8. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 96

CHAPTER V ........................................................................................................................... 98

The Syrian War ........................................................................................................................ 98

5.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................... 98

5.2. Syrian Conflict: An Overview....................................................................................... 99

5.3. Jihad and Transnational Networks .............................................................................. 100

5.4. Jihad and Grievance Narratives ................................................................................... 103

5.4.1. Islamic State on Iraq and Syria (ISIS) .................................................................. 109

5.4.2. Takfiri Ideology .................................................................................................... 112

5.4.3. Jabhat al Nusra...................................................................................................... 115

5.5. After the Training and Fighting .................................................................................. 119

5.6. The Attack: Syawaludin Pakpahan ............................................................................. 123

5.7. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 126

CHAPTER VI ........................................................................................................................ 129

The Trajectory of Foreign Fighters ........................................................................................ 129

6.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 129

vii

6.2. Before the conflict ....................................................................................................... 130

6.2.1. Motivations ........................................................................................................... 130

6.2.2. Grievances and Framing ....................................................................................... 135

6.2.3. The Recruitment and mobilization ....................................................................... 136

6. 3. During the conflict ..................................................................................................... 139

6.3.1. Roles and Functions.............................................................................................. 140

6.3.2. Interaction with Rebel and Insurgents Groups ..................................................... 142

6.4. After the conflict ......................................................................................................... 145

6.5. Why Returnees attack? ................................................................................................ 149

6.5.1. Individual-Level Analysis .................................................................................... 150

6.5.2. Jihadi Group-level analysis ................................................................................. 159

6.6. External Triggering Factors ........................................................................................ 173

6.7. Unpredicted Potential Risks ........................................................................................ 178

6.8. Conclusion ................................................................................................................... 181

CHAPTER VII ....................................................................................................................... 185

Conclusion and Policy Implications ...................................................................................... 185

7.1. Introduction ................................................................................................................. 185

7.2. Elements of the analysis .............................................................................................. 186

7.3. Theoretical Claims and Empirical Findings ................................................................ 187

7.3.1. Individual Assessment .......................................................................................... 188

7.3.2. Group-level Assessment ....................................................................................... 190

7.3.3. External Factors .................................................................................................... 192

7.4. Political Prescription ................................................................................................... 193

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 197

APPENDIX ............................................................................................................................ 218

viii

GLOSSARY

Al Wala'Wal Bara : (Arabic) means loyalty and disavowal

Asma' wal-Sifat : (Arabic) means Oneness of Allah's Names and Attributes

ASG : (Abbreviation) Abu Sayyaf Group

Bai'at : (Arabic) means the oath of allegiance

BAP : (Abbreviation) Berita Acara Pemeriksaan (Police

Investigation Report)

BNPT : (Abbreviation) Badan Nasional Penanggulangan

Terorisme (The National Counter Terrorism Agency)

Da'wah : (Arabic) means religious outreach

Dauroh Askariyah : (Arabic) military training

Daulah : (Arabic) means state

Densus 88 : (Abbreviation) Detasemen Khusus 88 (Counterterrorism

Special Detachment 88)

DDII : (Abbreviation) Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (the

Indonesian Islamic Dakwah Council)

DI/NII : (Abbreviation) Darul Islam/ Negara Islam Indonesia

(Indonesian Islamic State).

Fard ain : (Arabic) means individual obligation

Fard khiffaya : (Arabic) means collective duty

Fatwa : (Arabic) means religious edicts

Fai : (Arabic) means robbery

FSA : (Abbreviation) the Free Syrian Army

Ghonimah : (Arabic) means wealth seized from the enemy after a war

GPII : (Abbreviation) Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (the

Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement

Hijrah : (Arabic) means migration

Hakimiyah : (Arabic) mean God’s Sovereignty HASMI : (Abbreviation) Harakah Sunny untuk Masyarakat

Indonesia (Harakah Sunni for Indonesian Society)

Infisol : (Arabic) means split

ISIS : (Abbreviation) Islamic State in Iraq and Syria

Idad : (Arabic) means preparation

Iman : (Arabic) means faith

Irhabiyah : (Arabic) means terror

Ijma : (Arabic) means juristic consensus

JI : (Abbreviation) Jemaah Islamiyah

JAD : (Abbreviation) Jamaah Anshorud Daulah

JAS : (Abbreviation) Jamaah Ansharut Syariah

JAT : (Abbreviation) Jamaah Anshorut Tauhid

JAK : (Abbreviation) Jemaah Ansor Khilafah

ix

Jamaah : (Arabic) means group

Jahiliyyah : (Arabic) means age of ignorance

Jihad : (Arabic) means striving or struggling

Jihad Musallah : (Arabic) means armed jihad

Jihad Qubro : (Arabic) means great jihad

Kafir : (Arabic) means infidels

KOMPAK : (Abbreviation) Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat

Krisis (the Crisis Management Committee)

Kufr : (Arabic) means non-believers

KKM (Abbreviation) Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia

(Malaysian Mujahideen Movement)

Laskar Jihad : Jihad Army

Madrasah : (Arabic) means religious school

Mantiqi : (Arabic) means regional division

MMI : (Abbreviation) Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian

Holy warriors Council)

MILF : (Abbreviation) Moro Islamic Liberation Front

MNLF : (Abbreviation) The Moro National Liberation Front

MIB : (Abbreviation) Mujahidin Indonesian Barat (The

West Indonesia Mujahideen)

MIT : (Abbreviation) Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (The

East Indonesia Mujahideen)

MIM : (Abbreviation) Muslim Independence Movement

NGO : (Abbreviation) non-governmental organizations

NU : (Abbreviation) Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of the Ulama)

Pancasila : The Five Principles, the Indonesian state philosophy.

PUPJI : (Abbreviation) Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jamaah

Al-Islamiyah) – The General Guide for the Struggle of

Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyah

Pesantren : Islamic Traditional Boarding School

PPI : (Abbreviation) Pelajar Islam Indonesia (the Indonesian

Islamic Students).

Qisas : (Arabic) means retaliation in kind

Qiyas : (Arabic) means analogical reasoning

Ribath : (Arabic) means patrol

Rububiyah : (Arabic) means Oneness of Allah's Lordship

SDF : (Abbreviation) the Syrian Democratic Forces

Syahid : (Arabic) means martyrdom

Sharia : (Arabic) means Islamic law

Shuhada : (Arabic) means martyrs

Tauhid : (Arabic) means unity of the God

Takfiri : (Arabic) means ex-communication

Thagut : (Arabic) means secular tyrants

https://www.britannica.com/place/Indonesia

https://www.britannica.com/topic/philosophy

x

TNI : (Abbreviation) Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The

Indonesian National Armed Forces)

Tanzim Sirri : (Arabic) means a secret organization

Uluhiyah : (Arabic) means Oneness of Worship

Ustad : (Arabic) means male teacher

Wakalah : (Arabic) means battalion

1

CHAPTER I

1.1. Introduction

Thousands of Indonesian civilians have fought in several bloody overseas conflicts as foreign

fighters. Many of them have died in the battle and they were buried in foreign lands without a

gravestone. For example, in the 1980s, hundreds of men left Indonesia to join the Afghanistan

War and they fought alongside the Afghan Mujahidin against the Soviet Red Army and the

communist Afghan government. A second wave occurred in the 1990s as Indonesian civilians

joined Mindanao insurgencies, the Southern part of the Philippines.1 Those men travelled to

Mindanao and received protection from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) that has

fought against the Philippines government. Like the Indonesian jihadists who fought in

Afghanistan and Mindanao, an unprecedented number of Indonesian foreign fighters have

travelled and fought overseas with the Islamic State's emergence in Syria and Iraq in June

2014.2

It is puzzling why those Indonesian citizens who seemingly had no immediate interest in these

distant conflicts would leave their country's comfort to fight in foreign lands. This conundrum

raises some pertinent questions worthy of investigation. Who were these Indonesians who

fought in these foreign insurgencies, and what motivated them? How were they recruited and

mobilized for these battles? Their participation in overseas conflict could risk their lives, as

well as the lives of their families back home.

It is also important to understand the role and activities of Indonesian foreign fighters during

the conflict. What foreign militant organizations did they join? What were their roles in these

groups? For example, during the Afghanistan war, mostly Indonesian jihadists flocked to

Abdul Rassul Sayyaf, one of seven Mujahidin groups, inspired by Salafi jihadi and

Wahhabism. This group was supported and funded by Abdullah Azam and Osama bin Laden

and they built a strong relationship with donor countries in the Middle East, such as, Saudi

1 According to Nasir Abas, Darul Islam had already sent their five cadres to go to Mindanao in 1991. Thus,

Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) established the Hudaybiyah camp in 1994 to train JI cadres and Moro fighters. 2 Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaimed the establishment of ISIL or Islamic State and declared himself as the “caliph”

or the leader on 29 June 2014.

2

Arabia.3 During the Mindanao war, Indonesian jihadists mostly fought for the MILF, where

nobody joined the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), which also fought and sought the

implementation of an Islamic state in the most Southern part of the Philippines. In the Syrian

War, Indonesian jihadists mostly flocked either to Jabhat al-Nusra or Al-Nusra and ISIS, while

many insurgent groups fought against the Syrian government. Why did they join certain groups

but not others, and how did they end up fighting alongside these particular groups?

Indonesian jihadists mostly returned to their home country during or after the conflict ended.

The phenomenon of returning jihadists, especially those from the Syrian Civil War, has raised

concerns among many scholars, security officials, and policymakers that they will reorganize

and carry out acts of terror in their home country. Many foreign fighters have acquired military

skills and the capability to carry out violent acts. During the 2000s, Indonesia experienced

several major terrorist attacks carried out by returning foreign fighters, especially those who

previously fought in Afghanistan and Mindanao, in particular, the deadly terrorist acts on 12

October 2002 in Bali, in which the bombing of two tourist nightspots killed 202 people and

injured more than 300.4 This was the largest and most devastating terror attack to occur in the

country and probably in South East Asia's history.5 Other Afghanistan and Mindanao veterans

also engaged in sectarian conflicts in Maluku and Poso in eastern Indonesia in the 2000s.

Observers have also claimed that these veterans were behind a series of terror attacks targeting

churches, government officials, and foreign citizens during the 2000s.

Therefore, it seems clear that some former combatants have engaged in terrorism in Indonesia,

strengthening domestic radical groups and establishing jihadist networks worldwide. Between

2002 and 2016, Indonesia has experienced approximately 260 terror attacks and 1,050 people

who have been convicted as terrorists have also been arrested.6 Former fighters have been

convicted as the perpetrators of some of these attacks, such as, on the Philippines Consulate in

2000 and in the Bali bombing in 2002. A number of Indonesian jihadists returned home from

3 Peter Tomsen, The wars of Afghanistan (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 310. Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New

York: The Penguin Press, 2004), 119. See also Olivier Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan. New York:

Cambridge University Press, 1990. 4 Brad West, “Collective memory and crisis the 2002 Bali bombing, national heroic archetypes and the counter-

narrative of cosmopolitan nationalism,” Journal of Sociology, The Australian Sociological Association, 44 no

4(2008): 337–353. Arif Wachjunadi, Misi Walet Hitam: Menguak Misteri Teroris Dr. Azhari, 78. 5 Imam Samudra, Amrozi, Ali Imron, and Mukhlas are the perpetrators of the Bali bombing on 12 October 2002. 6 “Sejak 2002 – 2016, Ada 260 Serangan dan 1.050 Orang Ditangkap dalam Kasus Terorisme.” (Between 2002-

2016, there were 260 terror attacks and 1.050 terrorists were arrested), 14 December 2016.

3

the Syrian conflict in the 2000s. As the media reported, a returnee named Syawaludin Pakpahan

returned home and engaged in terrorism in 2016. Together with his followers, he launched an

attack against the North Sumatra police headquarters. A policeman on guard was brutally

murdered and burnt in this attack. While still imprisoned in police detention, Syawaludin

Pakpahan participated again in terrorism in 2018. This clearly indicates that some of the

returnees pose a security threat.

1.2. Aims of the Study and Research Questions

In general, this thesis aims to explain and analyse the multi-faceted nature of the Indonesian

jihadist phenomenon, those who trained and fought in overseas conflicts as foreign fighters.

With the three internationalized armed jihad theatres participated in by Indonesian jihadists,

this thesis analyses and theorises how Indonesian jihadists are recruited and mobilized before

they travel overseas, the pattern of jihadists' activities during the conflict, and their post-conflict

behaviours once they return home.

Therefore, this study addresses three main research questions to explain Indonesian jihadists'

flow in a distant conflict. The first question is related to the jihadists' decision to travel and how

this was put in action: Who were these Indonesians who fought in these foreign insurgencies,

and what motivated them? How were they recruited and mobilized?

The second research question mainly focuses on Indonesian jihadists' activities during the wars

in which they participated. Several questions are raised, such as: What rebel and militant

organizations did they join? What were their roles in these groups? And how does the

interaction between the Indonesian jihadists and the insurgent groups proceed during and after

the war?

This study also examines the fighters' decisions to return home and their activities after doing

so. Why did these foreign fighters return, and why did a number of them engage in terrorism

at home? In the end, this study also seeks to provide policy implications and recommendations

for the government, primarily to deal with and mitigate the security risks posed by returning

jihadists in their home country.

4

This study applies micro, meso, and macro levels of analysis to explain the Indonesian foreign

fighter phenomenon. With micro-level analysis, this study analyses individuals' level of foreign

fighters by revealing their motivation to join and leave the conflict, the role of grievance, and

ideologies. With meso level analysis, this study analyses the groups of jihadists in Indonesia

and the insurgent groups they joined during the conflicts. Based on this perspective, this study

aims to explain the Indonesian jihadist groups' structure, ideologies, leadership, objectives, and

strategies. Lastly, in terms of the macro-level analysis, this study looks for a broader

perspective to analyse the external environment, which might influence Indonesian jihadists'

decision to join the conflict and to explain why several returnees engage in terrorism.

1.3. Methodology

This study utilises a qualitative research approach to examine and analyse the phenomenon of

Indonesian transnational jihadists who fought in Afghanistan, Mindanao, and Syrian conflicts.

A qualitative approach is ideal in this study because it helps the researcher understand the

individuals' and groups' underlying values as respondents, including the returning foreign

fighters. This method further enables the researcher to analyse several factors, such as, their

ideology, motivations, social identity, and the social network affiliations that might influence

the risks posed by returning jihadists in the homeland.

This research uses primary as well as secondary data in the data collecting process. Firstly, the

secondary data was collected from previous scholarly studies that have studied terrorism,

radicalism, and groups or organizations that recruited and sent their cadres to engage in

transnational insurgencies. This research draws upon reports and transcripts of interviews, 25

depositions, and Indonesian returning fighters' court documents.

In addition to interviewing a number of returning fighters, I have analysed a number of the

Police Investigation Reports and some convicted returning foreign fighters' court indictments.

This approach has helped me to be able to know and understand several important profiles and

life-narratives of returning foreign fighters, who might be difficult or impossible to be

interviewed directly, especially those who had just returned from the Syrian conflict. Based

on reviewing those police investigation reports and court documents, this study investigates a

number of Indonesian returning jihadists who have engaged in terrorism by analysing their

5

historical background and considering their motivations, social networks, ideology, and other

important information in this research.

Several autobiographies or books by former jihadists, such as, by Ali Imron, Nasir Abas, Imam

Samudra, Febri Ramdani, and Ali Gufron, either published or unpublished, also serve as

essential sources in this research. Through these manuscripts, I analyse the micro-level or the

individual level of the jihadists who engaged in terrorism. A wide range of information, such

as, their personal historical background, such as, their ideology, motivations, social networks,

life-narratives before, during, and after the conflict, and other aspects are analysed in this

research. Besides using reports from the government, think tanks, and NGOs, this research also

gathers data from other literature including books, reports, journal articles, media, online

databases, investigation reports, and other relevant sources.

To further advance the data collection process, this research also utilises primary data, which

is collected through oral interviews. This field research was carried out in Indonesia in seven

consecutive months from February to August 2019 to obtain insights, data, and information

from the primary sources, which is valuable in the study. Moreover, respondents in this field

research consist of representatives from different groups: government officials and security

officers, NGOs, academics, and think-tank researchers as well as returning foreign fighters.

Several representatives from government and security officers are selected as main

respondents. They are mostly several high or prominent positions in the ministry or

departments who work on terrorism, including the returning foreign fighters, such as, the

BNPT, the National Police, the Coordinating Minister for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs

(Menkopolhukam), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. I also interviewed several prominent

experts from universities, think tanks, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) who have

expertise in terrorism and Indonesian returning foreign fighters. These respondents are

essential to this research due to their experience and expertise in reintegrating returning foreign

fighters into mainstream society. They could also give their perspectives and insights on

jihadists' behaviour and the risks posed by returnees in their home country.

The most challenging aspect in terms of collecting the primary data in this research is to

conduct semi-structured interviews with several returning foreign fighters. To recruit potential

respondents, I initially used random sampling and the snowball method. I identified prospective

6

interviewees with local contacts' assistants, selected several returning foreign fighters, and

invited them to participate in this research. With their assistance, I have interviewed several

returning foreign fighters from Afghanistan, Mindanao, and Syria. Moreover, due to security

concerns, this research had only recruited 'inactive' and successfully integrated returnees into

'normal' society.7 Some veterans have successfully lived in the community and worked in

certain professions, such as, teachers, religious leaders, NGO activists, and entrepreneurs.

A crucial step during the interview process was creating trust with the returning jihadists.

Before starting the interviews, I convinced the former jihadists that this research is for scholarly

purposes, avoiding potential harm to the interviewees and I offered them full anonymity if they

requested it. To have a smooth or good atmosphere during the interviews with former jihadists,

I developed a good relationship with them. By using this approach, the interview with one

former jihadist could be carried out multiple times.

1.4. Overview of the Thesis

This thesis consists of seven chapters. Chapter 1 sets forth the rationale for the study, identifies

the study's purpose, the research questions, and the methodology used in this study. Chapter 2

discusses the existing literature studies on foreign fighters in the global armed jihad. This

chapter also presents the existing theoretical frameworks to explain the complexity of foreign

fighters’ trajectory before, during, and after the conflicts, such as, grievance, political

opportunity, framing, identity, and triggering events, to explain the phenomenon's multifaceted

foreign fighters.

Chapters 3, 4, and 5 describe the comprehensive historical contexts of thousands of Indonesian

foreign fighters who trained and fought in the three global armed jihad theatres. Chapter 3, for

example, narrates the flow of Indonesian men who joined the Afghanistan war in the 1980s. It

intends to describe their trajectory before entering the conflict zone, what happened in the

battle, and their reasons for leaving the conflict zone. Similar to the previous model, Chapter 4

mainly recounts the participation of hundreds of Indonesian civilians who travelled, trained,

and fought in the thick jungle of Mindanao, the Southern part of the Philippines, in the 1990s.

7 Several Afghanistan and Mindanao veterans have been successful in living in normal society and working in

certain professions, such as, teachers, religious leaders, NGO activists, and businessmen.

7

It describes the trajectory of Indonesian foreign fighters in this conflict to understand why they

joined, what they did in the battle, and what happened after they returned to the home country.

Like the two previous chapters, Chapter 5 seeks to explain Indonesian civilians' participation

in Syria's sectarian conflict in the 2010s. It tries to answer the puzzles on why thousands of

Indonesian men, including women and children, wanted to travel to Syria to fight or become

the citizens of ISIS. Further, it explains what happens in the conflict, why they abandoned the

battle zone, and why returnees posed security risks once they returned home.

Overall, the three chapters on the historical context of Indonesian foreign fighters' participation

in Afghanistan, Mindanao, and Syria become the groundwork for further analysis and

comparison in Chapter 6. In this analysis chapter, it explains why Indonesian jihadists

participated in each of those overseas conflicts. This section also describes the roles, activities,

and interactions with rebel or insurgent groups during the battle. This study also investigates

why a number of Indonesian returning jihadists engaged in terrorism at home. Chapter 7 is

mainly about the conclusion and policy recommendation based on these research findings,

especially to mitigate the potential risks posed by former jihadists and how to help them to be

reintegrated into society.

8

CHAPTER II

Conceptual Framework

2.1. Introduction

This chapter elucidates the existing theories to explain the foreign fighters' phenomenon and

their trajectory. It describes how and why individuals who lived far away from the conflict

epicentre got triggered to fight as foreign fighters. What are their motives and how did they

gain access to the battlefield? Are these religious, political, or individual motives? Besides

answering these questions, this chapter also examines foreign fighters' activities in the battle

zone and their interaction with local insurgents or the rebel groups they joined.

Foreign fighters leave the conflict, return to their country of origin, and sometimes join another

global armed jihad theatre. As many scholars claim, returnees are dangerous for many reasons.

They are radicalized and hardened during the conflict, inevitably skilled with military and

combat experience, and build transnational jihadi networks, which could help them plan to

launch terror attacks at home. This chapter presents the prevailing theories to explain why

foreign fighters abandon the battle and return home. It also describes why a number of returnees

engage in violent acts at home.

2.2. Terminology

The definition of foreign fighters is complex with multiple interpretations.8 Academics,

scholars, journalists, and policymakers all have their preferences. Cerwyn Moore and Paul

Tumelty apply the words non-indigenous or non-territorialized combatants to describe the

presence of foreign volunteers who fought in the Chechnya War.9 Kristin Bakke employs the

term transnational insurgents to define foreign fighters as non-state actors who joined the

Chechnya War.10 Further, Pape and Fieldman utilize the term "transnational fighters" to

8 David Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context,” Terrorism and Political

Violence 27 no 3 (2015): 455; Barak Mendelsohn, “Foreign Fighters-Recent Trends,” Orbis 55, no.2 (2011): 192;

Anthony Vinci, “The “Problems of Mobilization” and the Analysis of Armed Groups.” Parameter, Spring 26 no

1 (2006): 49. 9 Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,” Studies

in Conflict and Terrorism 31, no. 5 (2008): 412–433. 10 Kristin M Bakke, “Copying and Learning from Outsiders? Assessing Diffusion from Transnational Insurgents

in the Chechen Wars,” (2010). APSA 2010 Annual Meeting Paper.

9

describe foreign combatants who fought in the Spanish War (1930s), the Israeli Independent

War (1948), and the Ethiopian War in 2006.11

Despite numerous scholarly studies investigating the foreign fighters phenomenon, two leading

scholars of transnational fighters, David Malet and Thomas Hegghammer, claim the

phenomenon is understudied.12 As Malet points out, political scientists before the 2000s have

failed to establish a standard definition of foreign fighters.13 Similarly, Hegghammer also notes

that the existing literature cannot explain the rise in the phenomenon comprehensively. The

involvement of foreign fighters in insurgencies is mostly identified from a single case, but not

as cross-case analyses to create a broader understanding. As a consequence, the study of foreign

fighters has become merely a subdivision of terrorism studies.14

Malet defines foreign fighters as "non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during

civil conflicts."15 He explicitly excludes regular military forces, foreign legions, mercenaries,

and private contractors to avoid ambiguity. In this exclusion, he argues that they differ from

foreign fighters because they still connect with a government, a specific legal status, and

receive a salary that contradicts the nature of foreign fighters who are not primarily motivated

by financial gain.16

Hegghammer further develops his definition of the foreign fighter by using Malet's standpoint.

In his more restrictive concept, he highlights that "foreign fighters" are non-citizen combatants

who have joined an insurgency, both training and fighting, and lack citizenship of the conflict

state. Thus, they lack affiliation with any official military organization and receive no salary or

11 Robert A. Pape and James K. Feldman. Cutting the Fuse: The Explosion of Global Suicide Terrorism and How

to Stop It (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 2012): 59. 12 David Malet. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts. New York: Oxford University Press,

2013. Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.”

International Security, 2010-2011, 35 no 3 (2010): 53-54. 13 David Malet. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts. New York: Oxford University Press,

2013. 14 Thomas Hegghammer. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of

Jihad.” Quarterly Journal: International Security, 35. no. 3. (2010): 53-94. 15 David Malet. Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts. (New York: OUP USA, 2013), 9. See

also David Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization and Persistence in a Global Context,” Terrorism and Political

Violence 27 no 3 (2015): 456. 16 David Malet, “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts, (2013), 9-10. Thomas Hegghammer,

“The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters.” International Security 35, no. 3 (2010): 63-64.

10

payment from government.17 Hegghammer also highlights that foreign fighters are different

from mercenaries or soldiers who obtain a salary or other compensation. Further, foreign

fighters are not returning diaspora members or exiled rebels who previously left their home

country.18

I define Indonesian foreign fighters by adopting Malet and Hegghammer's insights. Thus,

Indonesian foreign fighters in this study are described as civilians, either men or women, adults

or children, who have engaged in military activities whether to train, fight and support any

activities relating to military activities on foreign soil. They have no affiliation with any

military organization in Indonesia, lack citizenship in the conflict state, and they are not a

member of a diaspora with any warring factions. Furthermore, they are not mercenaries/private

contractors who typically join the conflict because of personal or financial gain. Even though

Indonesian jihadists received incentives either from the group that recruited and despatched

them into an overseas conflict or the group they joined, their primary motivation is not salary

or income. Based upon these characteristics, anyone who intended to join the war overseas but

failed to cross the border and be deported to the home country were not yet returnees and they

are called 'deportees.'

2.3. Pre-Departure

Many scholarly investigations have been conducted to examine the recruitment process to

explain how foreign fighters join insurgencies. For example, Malet claims that the foreign

fighters' recruitment model has not changed throughout modern international history.19

Regardless of the types of conflicts, local insurgents generally try to attract their targets by

framing the conflict as existential threats, not only for the local insurgents but also for the

transnational community. 20

However, Hegghammer argues that in terms of the modern civil conflicts' recruitment process,

it is not always initiated and carried out by the local insurgents. The recruitment and

mobilization could be carried out by individuals or groups who want to participate, even though

17 Thomas Hegghammer “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters,” (2010): 57-58. Thomas Hegghammer, “Should

I Stay or Should I Go? Explaining Variation in Western Jihadists’ Choice between Domestic and Foreign

Fighting,” American Political Science Review 107, no 1 (2013): 1. 18 Ibid. 19 David Malet. “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspective and Solutions.” Orbis, 54, no 1 (2010): 97-114. 20 Ibid.

11

they live far away from the conflict epicentre. Also, Hegghammer contends that insurgents

sometimes prefer to gain moral, political, and financial support rather than the foreign fighters.

In this regard, Hegghammer points out that foreign fighters are not initially invited to join the

conflict by local insurgents, but those foreign volunteers may join conflicts as uninvited

combatants.21

Similar to terrorist network operations, foreign volunteers' recruitment to join insurgencies

could be a long or multi-step process. Weimann defines the process as five stages that occur

gradually, such as, radicalization, instruction, preparation, training, and its operation on the

ground.22 In the first stage, recruiters generally persuade any individuals by utilising specific

propaganda to join the ranks. After the targeted individuals are properly or fully indoctrinated,

the next phases could be preparation, training, and operation. In the overall recruitment process,

the local insurgents or terrorist groups generally expect to gain resources, expand the conflict,

and increase the probability of winning the war.

A research study by Byman and Shapiro has shown the schematic model of foreign fighters'

recruitment. Both scholars divide the stages into five transformation processes from foreign

fighters to jihadists: Decide, Travel, Train & Fight, Return, and Plot. First is a stage when an

individual is influenced by radical ideology and motivated to fight. The second stage is when

an individual decides to travel to a foreign country to engage in jihad. The third stage is to have

training, skills, experience, and to use those skills in the battle. The fourth is to return to their

home country. The fifth stage is to plot a terror attack in their home countries or to recruit

others as new jihadists. Overall, the process is circular, where the current recruit may become

the recruiter after that.23

So, why do individuals decide to train and fight in an overseas conflict? Malet argues that

shared values mostly become an essential theme in the recruitment process of foreign fighters.

These shared values could be ethnicity, religion, ideology, or other values. In their message,

the local recruiters propagate that their shared value is threatened or under attack, requiring the

21 Thomas Hegghammer. “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.”

International Security, 35 no 3 (2010): 64-65. 22 Weimann, Gabriel. “The Emerging Role of Social Media in the Recruitment of Foreign Fighters.” In Foreign

Fighters under International Law and Beyond. 23 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro. “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western

Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” Policy Paper no 34, (2014).

12

transnational community to take action or perform defensive actions. In other words, such

action is needed as a rationale for foreign fighters to participate in the conflict.24 Further, Malet

also highlights that these shared transnational identities could be more substantial than national

citizenship ties.25

Moreover, Malet also notes that recruitment occurs if the local insurgents are the weaker

factions in civil conflicts. By recruiting from the transnational community, they expect to gain

additional sources in terms of human resources and maximize the probability of winning the

conflict. However, this argument is not necessarily relevant to all types of conflicts. Inevitably

in conflicts, both parties might recruit from the transnational community to win the battle. For

example, in the Syrian War, both ISIS and the Syrian government (Assad regime) have also

attempted to double their forces by recruiting foreign fighters.

By analysing several historical world conflicts, Malet concluded that local insurgencies

generally recruited outside foreign fighters by framing distant civil wars as threatening a

transnational identity group, such as, their ethnicity or religious ties. Through his historical

case studies, Malet explains that the recruitment takes place through global communities' social

networks. What he implies here is that the recruiters tend to use specific means to target their

audiences.

Many scholars have tried to explain individuals' underlying motivations to participate in the

war as foreign fighters. Venhauss, in his study, found that there are four different clusters of

foreign fighters' motivations during the Afghanistan war. While many join the fight because

they wanted to seek revenge on Western society, many also wish to seek recognition and self-

esteem. For example, some jihadists joined Al-Qaeda to get something meaningful in their

lives, and other small numbers are motivated to join insurgency for the sake of adventure, the

experience, excitement, and glory. 26

Weiss and Hassan's study also shows the various motives of individuals joining the conflict as

foreign fighters. By investigating hundreds of ISIS's foreign fighters during the Syria war, both

24 David Malet, “Why Foreign Fighters? Historical Perspectives and Solutions,” Orbis 54, no. 1 (2010): 15. 25 Ibid., 112. 26John M. Venhaus. “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda.” The United States Institute of Peace, Special Report 236, (2010):

8-11.

13

scholars found that many jihadists joined the conflict because they were indoctrinated by

radical ideology and driven by sectarian agendas. Moreover, many others also joined the war

because of personal motives or ambitions.27

From Weiss and Hassan's point of view, it is argued that ideology derived from sacred religious

texts plays a critical role and should not be overlooked in the foreign fighters' phenomenon.

The same as many other scholars investigating the role of religious doctrine in the international

armed jihad, Moore and Tumelty found that ideology becomes the main driver of the

mobilization of thousands of Muslim foreign fighters to travel and fight in the Chechen conflict

besides kinships.28 Similarly, in his study, Nilson found that religious ideology becomes one

of the driving motivations for many jihadists from Middle East countries who fought in Bosnia

in the mid-1990s.29

Similarly, Neumann, who investigated European foreign fighters in the Syrian War, asserts that

many jihadists have different socio-economic backgrounds. They are heterogeneous, educated

and uneducated, wealthy and poor. Neumann explains that many foreign fighters were

motivated by ideology, and a desire to defend and protect their fellow Sunni groups who were

persecuted by President Bashar Hafez al-Assad (Shia). Other jihadists joined the war because

of personal identity where they experienced grievances having been excluded and

marginalized, having no social status, and some are unemployed. Moreover, many travelled

and fought in the battle because their leaders, peers, or social networks simply ask them. 30

Existing studies of conflict and terrorism have also highlighted the role of grievance in

triggering individuals or groups to participate in rebellions or disputes. For example, Stewart

and Walton argue that grievance may motivate individuals or groups to engage in conflict or

armed struggle.31 Similarly, Bjorne, who investigates the multiple root causes of terrorism,

27 Michael Weiss and Hassan Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. (Regan Arts, New York: 2015), 160-167. 28 Moore and Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,” Studies in

Conflict & Terrorism 31 no.5 (2008): 412-433. 29 Marco Nilsson. “Foreign Fighters and the Radicalization of Local Jihad: Interview Evidence from

Swedish Jihadists,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 38 no. 5 (2015). 30 Peter R. Neumann. Radicalized New Jihadist and the Threat to the West (New York: I.B. Tauris, 2016): 95-

96. 31

Stewart, F. (2008). Horizontal inequalities and conflict: Understanding group violence in multi-ethnic societies.

Palgrave Macmillan. Walton, O. (2010). Youth, armed violence and job creation programmes: A rapid mapping

study. Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre (NOREF). Retrieved from

http://www.gsdrc.org/docs/open/EIRS11.pdf

14

asserts that individuals' actual grievances at a personal level become motivational causes to

engage in violent acts.32 Furthermore, he explains that elites or leaders translate the grievance

and persuade individuals to take action by using ideology and rhetoric.33

Similar to Stewart, Borun and Fein also argue that resentment plays a crucial role besides greed

and identity as these a necessary "push factors" for individuals to fight in the distant conflict.34

By examining transnational jihadists who fought in the Syrian War, both scholars found that

many Muslims who fought in this conflict experienced grievances at the first stage. Before

entering the battle, they were aggrieved by the narrative that Islam or Muslims are being

attacked. Borun and Fein also assert that many Muslims were motivated to join radical groups

to be part of a collective group with similar grievances and collective meaning.35

While grievance is crucial in any protest or collective action, the elites and group leaders play

an essential role in recruiting and mobilizing individuals or groups to join a conflict overseas

as foreign fighters. The elites channel individual grievances into collective actions.36 Using

ideology and propaganda, leaders motivate or persuade aggrieved individuals and groups to

engage in particular activities.37 As Regan and Norton assert, the leader exploited individual

grievance into collective action, then used it to channel discontent, garner support, and

coordinate collective action.38

A number of scholars apply the framing approach to explain the foreign fighters' phenomenon

where thousands of individuals travel and fight in the distant conflict. For example, Malet

argues that framing is essential in recruiting and mobilizing individuals who fight in

transnational conflicts. Based on his historical analysis of the foreign fighters' phenomenon, he

found that local insurgent groups' recruiters purposely use framing to attract recruits to join

conflict overseas. In Muslim foreign fighters' case, the recruiters mostly frame the distant

conflict as a threat to the transnational community group. Moreover, the recruiters advocate

that the duty of Muslims is to fight to defend religion and other Muslims.39

32 Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, (New York: Routledge, 2005), 3-4. 33 Ibid. 34 Borum and Fein, “The Psychology of Foreign Fighters,” (2017): 250. 35 Ibid. 36 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 291. 37

Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, 3-4. 38 Ibid. 39 Malet, Foreign Fighters, 208.

15

Hafez asserts that framing is a critical factor in mobilizing jihadists to fight on foreign soil. He

highlights the three most dominant framing narratives where foreign fighters are triggered to

take arms to defend their Muslim brothers persecuted by external powers. The first narrative is

about Muslim humiliation, where all Muslims are obliged to help and fight the West as the

oppressors. The second narrative is a scathing commentary of the Muslim regime that helps

the West. The third frame is the hope as God promises that Muslims would obtain victory in

their struggle.40

Political opportunity theory could give an alternative explanation to answer a puzzle about why

individuals or groups of people leave their home country to fight in a distant conflict. One of

the main arguments is that civilians' participation in fighting in a foreign battle is not primarily

driven by irrational, unstructured, and spontaneous decisions. Instead, it could be a 'rational or

strategic decision,' as many scholars argue that any collective actions [serve] as rational

responses of an individual and group interest.41

Tarrow asserts that people join in a social movement when they see a political opportunity.42

Thus, there are such incentives for individuals to gain when they join or undertake any

collective action.43 In this context, it can be argued that foreign fighters' motives to join

conflicts are not always driven by grievances or ideologies. Moreover, individuals or radical

groups joined the combat because of their strategic reasons, where they expected to receive

material benefits from their participation.

History has shown that many global conflicts offered an opportunity for foreign fighters'

activism. During the Afghanistan war, many countries even allowed their citizens to participate

in this war to help Afghan people fight against the Soviet occupation. On the other side, several

local Afghan insurgent groups also invited and offered foreign fighters from Muslim countries

with economic incentives to join the warfare.44 Similarly, many rebel and insurgent groups

40 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in

Videos and Biographies,” Terrorism and Political Violence 19, no. 1 (2007): 96. 41 Buechler, Steven M. Understanding Social Movements: Theories from the Classical Era to the Present, 112.

See also, J. Craig Jenkins, “Resource Mobilization Theory and the Study of Social Movements” Annual Review

of Sociology 9 (1983): 527-553. 42 Sidney Tarrow. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics, 23. 43 Ibid, 85. 44 Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 205. Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, 144.

16

during the Syrian War in the 2010s also provided foreign fighters economic benefits to fight

under their banner. The leaders of ISIS, for example, offered not only cash but also other

attractive incentives, such as, jobs, housing, and healthcare.45

Overall, the opportunity approach could give a perspective in the research of the foreign

fighters' phenomenon. It could offer an explanation of what particular domestic environment

and international conditions may have an influence on or present a political opportunity in the

mobilization of foreign fighters to go and fight on foreign soil.

Apart from multiple explanations of the cause of foreign fighters' mobilization and the motives

of returning jihadists to engage in violent acts at home, I argue that it is important to highlight

the role of "triggering events," which many scholars have overlooked. Triggering events are

such incidents that create personal or political grievances for individuals or groups, which

become a catalyst for them to engage in collective actions. On the micro-level, a triggering

event causes an individual to change from being passive into someone who is aggrieved, which

may incite him to take revenge or take actions, including acts of terrorism.46

From the historical perspective, a triggering event can be a military invasion by external forces,

sectarian wars, or a policy action that incites or provokes individuals to leave their country of

origin and fight. Thus, history has shown that several transnational conflicts have become

'triggering events,’ which caused the massive participation of hundreds or even thousands of

individuals to leave their home country to become foreign fighters. A number of conflicts in

the Islamic countries, such as, in Afghanistan (1980s), Bosnia (1990s), and Syria (2010s), for

example, have generated hundreds or perhaps thousands of Muslims worldwide to leave their

country of origin, many of whom claim their participation as a religious duty and Muslim

solidarity to fight and kill in the name of God.

45 Interviews with Indonesian jihadists, 2019. Anita Perešin, “Fatal Attraction: Western Muslimas and ISIS,”

Perspectives on Terrorism 9 no. 3 (2015): 21-38. Mohamad Ali Harissi, “ISIS is trying to lure recruits from the

West with promises of love and jobs,” https://www.businessinsider.com/afp-promises-of-love-jobs-for-foreign-recruits-

in-is-utopia-2015. 46 David Wright-Neville & Debra Smith, “Political rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion,” Global Change,

Peace & Security 21 no. 1 (2009): 85-98.

17

2.4. During the Conflicts

Joining a jihadi group in battle is another stage of identity transformation for foreign fighters.

It is a crucial phase where a recruit blends his individual identity into a collective identity.

Buhrmester and Swann define this process as "identity fusion," a sense of oneness or ‘we-ness’

with the group joined. In this transformation, the personal self-characteristic joins or merges

with the social self-characteristics, which creates pro-group behaviours.47

Identity fusion is critical in jihadi groups and networks. To create identity fusion, they request

all members to declare a sense of loyalty and solidarity to the leader and the group. This ritual

is called bai'at (oath), where all members should swear their fealty to the organization and the

leaders. This ritual strengthens their identity among the leader and the members and between

the members and the group. With the bai'at, the members give their loyalty and submission,

even their life to the group, and they share oneness with other members.

With this new collective identity, jihadists share brotherhood, mutual trust, and respect, which

creates oneness and pro-group behaviours. This identity also makes them united, and they are

willing to sacrifice everything they have, including their lives, in the name of solidarity and

group. Scott Atran describes those individuals as 'devoted actors' who join radical groups to

commit sacred values. Their identities have fused into a collective identity.48

With this collective identity, jihadists also share a collective goal to establish an ideal

community, as Anderson described as an 'imagined community.'49 Similarly, Scott Atran

argues that jihadi groups developed the narrative of 'imagined kin' to boost the feeling of

solidarity, brotherhood, and oneness. It is a kind of moral imperative that drives all members

to share the ultimate goal and it even encourages them to sacrifice everything they have in the

name of those values.50

Besides constructing a collective identity, jihadists also build a transnational identity in the

broader context. It is a shared belonging across groups, ethnicities, and even national borders.

47 Buhrmester and Swann. “Identity Fusion.” Current Directions in Psychological Science 24 no. 1 (2015): 52–

57. 48 Scott Atran, “The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures,”

Current Anthropology 57 no. s13 (2016): 192-203. 49 Anderson, Imagined Communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism, 6–7. 50 Scott Atran, “The Devoted Actor: Unconditional Commitment and Intractable Conflict across Cultures,”

Current Anthropology 57 no.s13 (2016):192-203.

https://archive.org/details/imaginedcommunit0000ande_f5f1/page/6

18

Oliver Roy captures the trend of the Islamization of individuals within a global context. He

coins the "de-territorialization of Islam," where Muslims propagate Islam's notion as borderless

in terms of ethnicity and state.51

In his study, Malet also highlights foreign fighters' emergence who have developed their

broader identities - transnational identities across national boundaries.52 Malet points out that

this identity beyond a shared ethnic and cultural history triggers foreign fighters to travel to a

distant conflict far away from their origin country.53

Inspired by Hassan al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb's doctrines, jihadists mostly believe that Islam

is a worldwide faith where all Muslims live in "ummah" or worldwide community of Islam.

They perceive themselves as part of a global Muslim (pan-Islamic identity) regardless of their

skin colour, ethnicity, or country of origin. With this belief, they actualize their existence as a

part of the ummah and reject or eliminate nationalism, race, and other secular identifications

branded as Jahiliyyah (age of ignorance) because they are man-made and create or cause

division between the true believers.

With the Islamic Ummah's transnational ideas, jihadists perceive themselves as part of the

struggle to bring Islamic faith on this earth. They even build the narrative that they are the right

defenders of Islam and fight on behalf of all Muslim communities. With this belief, waging

jihad to defend other Muslims is borderless and must be an individual obligation.

Foreign fighters may have different types of duties or roles if they join conflicts. Some fighters

may be deployed to fight on the frontlines as martyrs or suicide bombers, while others function

as operational or logistical support and those who just obtain military training rather than

fighting at the battlefront.54 Borum and Fein classify the roles into four categories: direct action,

operational, movement, and logistical support.55 Among these categories, foreign fighters

51 See, Olivier Roy, Globalised Islam: The Search for a New Ummah, Columbia University Press, Columbia,

New York, 2004. 52 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identities in Civil Conflicts, 23. 53 Ibid. 54 Mohammed M. Hafez, “Jihad after Iraq: Lessons from the Arab Afghans,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism,

32 no 2 (2009):75. Hafev divides the motivations of jihadists to join conflict into five categories: religious,

employment, adventure, safe haven, and military training. 55 Randy Borum and Robert Fein, “The Psychology of Foreign Fighters,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 40 no.

3 (2017): 250. The category of direct action refers to foreign fighters who participate in combat on the front line.

Operational support involves several activities, such as, planning and on-site support to attack, and preparing

19

involved in "direct actions" are those who fight on the frontline, while others are mostly in non-

combat operations or supporting roles.

History has shown that most foreign fighters received military training and fought under a

group or organization they joined in the battle. They blended with other fighters from many

countries and created a "collective identity." Through these new social networks, they could

share their beliefs, ideas, and ideologies. Furthermore, through this engagement, foreign

fighters may construct their new jihad ideology, which is more radical, rigid, and apocalyptic.

This transformation would likely shape their way of life after they abandon the conflict zone

and return to their country of origin.

During the Afghan-Soviet War, many foreign fighters were inspired by Abdullah Azzam's

jihad call to fight against the Soviet Union. The main reason was to defend their Muslim

brothers, whose country was invaded by an external non-Muslim aggressor. Hegghammer calls

it "classical jihad" or "defensive jihad" as terminology to explain jihad's rationale to defend a

Muslim country's territory occupied by an outside invader.56 Moreover, jihad constructed by

Al-Qaeda is different and broader. Through "global jihad," this group emphasises a fight

against a "far enemy" (the United States and its Western allies) rather than a "near enemy" or

a corrupt regime in the Muslim world.57

Moreover, the emergence of the Islamic State proclaimed by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi in 2014

has also overturned a new version of jihad. ISIS, which aims to establish an Islamic State, has

waged a sectarian war between Shia and Sunni Muslims. Unlike Al-Qaeda, ISIS divides world

society today into Islam and Kafir (infidel) and has targeted non-Muslims and other minorities

rather than the West in their jihad operations.58

weapons and ammunition. Movement support involves non-combat activities, such as, recruitment, media

propaganda and fund-raising, while logistic support involves more on logistical matters such as transportation,

communication, and food. 56 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad.” 57 Daniel L. Byman and Jennifer R. Williams, “ISIS vs. Al Qaeda: Jihadism’s global civil war,” Brookings,

February 24, 2015, https://www.brookings.edu/articles/isis-vs-al-qaeda-jihadisms-global-civil-war/. 58 Cameron Glenn, “Al Qaeda v ISIS: Ideology & Strategy,” 28 September 2015. Retrieved from

https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/al-qaeda-v-isis-ideology-strategy.

20

2.5. Post-Conflict Phase

There have been numerous studies from different perspectives investigating the phenomenon

of returning foreign fighters, especially after the emergence of the Islamic State and the

conflicts in Syria and Iraq in the 2010s. The unprecedented number of foreign jihadists from

different countries who fought in this conflict has raised many security experts' concerns

worldwide that they commit terrorism after they return home. Peter R. Neumann asserts that

the Syrian wars were an extraordinary phenomenon that attracted the highest number of foreign

fighters from Europe in the last two decades. This conflict has mobilised more foreigners than

any of the conflicts anywhere in the world in the past 20 years.59

As many scholars argue, returning foreign fighters pose real risks for their country of origin,

having gained combat capability to use weapons and explosives. They can also spread radical

ideology in society and develop domestic extremist networks.60 The returnees, who may suffer

mental illness or post-traumatic stress disorder, can also commit such crimes or terrorist acts

due to unstable emotions, a sense of betrayal, or if they have been motivated by radicalized

ideology. Furthermore, the returnees could also enhance sectarian violence in their home

countries where there have already been tensions between Sunni and Shi'a Muslim followers

or Muslims and non-Muslims.

Byman and Shapiro argue against the claim that all returnees pose security threats to their home

countries. According to both scholars, the risk is overstated.61 They claim that not all returnees

will become terrorists and carry out attacks in their home country. Moreover, many returnees,

mostly young, are psychologically disillusioned or traumatized after experiencing horrific

violence.62 Neumann, who has investigated hundreds of returning European jihadists from the

Syrian conflict, asserts that some returnees have no desire to carry out terror acts in their home

59 Ella Flaye. “At least 500 Europeans fighting with Syria rebels, study finds, stoking radicalization fears,” CBS

News, 30 April 2013. 60 Andrew Zammit. “Australian foreign fighters: Risks and response.” Lowy Institute for International Policy,

April 2015, accessed 18 June 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/sites/default/files/australian-foreign-fighters-

risks-and-responses.pdf; Timothy Holman. “Blind: Five Factors Influencing the Foreign Fighters Impact;”

Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid,” (2014): 16 61 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western

Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” Policy Paper, no 34 (2014):1. 62 Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized New Jihadists and the Threat to the West, 106. Daniel Byman, “The Jihadist

returnee threat just how dangerous?” Political Science Quarterly.131 no 1 (2016): 69. Further, approximately

20,000 of them died in October 2015 according to Pentagon. This mortality number could be higher since the

massive military operation by U.S.

21

countries. Further, some of them may end up returning to normal society, living as ordinary

civilians. 63

Therefore, it may be misleading to stigmatize all returnees as a single entity or label them as

terrorists. Neumann notes that the returnees have varied characteristics upon their arrival in

their home countries. Based on his investigations of Western jihadists who previously joined

the Syrian conflict, he further divides those returnees into four criteria: traumatized,

disillusioned, dangerous, and undecided. The traumatized returnees are those who are

psychologically traumatized after experiencing violence, brutal war, and killing. Although not

exposed to radical ideology, they might decide to launch a terror attack in their home countries

if they remain untreated.64 Disillusioned returnees are those former fighters who feel

disappointed by what they have experienced during the War. They found that the reality of

jihad on the ground is different from what they have thought before. The dangerous category

is those returnees who are still radicalized and still loyal to the Islamic State. Furthermore, the

undecided category is the returnees, whose actions are still unpredictable. They retain a low

profile in society but keep contact with their ex-jihadist's networks.65

Similarly, a previous study by Byman and Shapiro has shown that many returning foreign

fighters who fought in the Syrian conflict were traumatized and disillusioned. This is since they

have not only experienced brutal conflicts during insurgencies, the foreign fighters are also

often mistreated because they cannot speak the language, they have no understanding of the

local culture, and they have no family to protect or defend them. Because many returnees

experienced post-traumatic stress disorder, both scholars assert that the returnees may require

psychological assistance.66

Hegghammer asserts that only a few former foreign fighters would become hostile in their

home countries after joining the conflicts. He further estimates that no more than one in nine

Western foreign fighters in the Syrian conflict committed acts of terror in their home

countries.67 Klausen's study also shows that approximately one in four (of 900 ex-foreign

63 Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized New Jihadists and the Threat to the West, 105. 64 Ibid.,106. 65 Ibid., 106-108. 66 Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western

Foreign Fighters in Syria and Iraq,” (2014): 27. 67 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?” (2013): 10. Thomas Hegghammer, “Will ISIS

‘weaponize’ foreign fighters?” CNN Wire, (2014).

22

fighters in the Syrian conflict) would carry out terrorist actions after returning home.68 A 2015

study by The Brookings Institution reached findings that are similar to the findings of

Hegghammer and Klausen. This report further points out that only one in 200-300 foreign

fighters posed a security threat to their home countries.69 However, although the percentage is

small, Hegghammer points out that a "veteran effect" is a more dangerous and lethal operative

than home-grown terrorists.70

Despite motivating individuals to travel and fight overseas, a grievance can also fuel

radicalization or even violent acts. It can be a source if the aggrieved individuals decide to

engage in violence to redress their grievances. Gurr asserts that grievance can be a source of

individuals to engage in violence or collective violence. 71 The argument is that aggrieved or

frustrated individuals are likely to be more receptive to the idea of violence because the emotion

causes someone to lose calculation or rationality.72

Several case studies on terrorism show that feelings of fear, hatred, and humiliation intertwined

with religious doctrines can become a decisive pull factor in motivating individuals to engage

in violent acts. For example, Crenshaw found that the existence of specific grievances caused

by discrimination is essential in explaining terrorism.73 She argues that discrimination and

repression by an ethnic majority against the minority produce such a fertile environment for

terrorist groups to flourish.74 Similarly, in their study, Ghatak and Prins found that the state's

political exclusion and economic discrimination create grievances, which then trigger groups

to political violence.75 Overall, as Regan and Norton stated, grievance leads to collective

behaviour where the leaders or elites use it to channel discontent, garner support, and

coordinate collective actions.76

68 Peter R. Neumann, Radicalized New Jihadists and the Threat to the West, 106. 69 Charles Lister, “Returning Foreign Fighters: Criminalization or reintegration?” Brooking, Policy Briefing

(2015): 2. 70 Thomas Hegghammer, “Should I Stay or Should I Go?” (2013): 11. 71 Gurr, Why Men Rebel, 210-221. 72 Ibid. 73 Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism.” Comparative Politics 13 no. 4 (1981):379–399. 74 Ibid. 75 Sambuddha Ghatak and Brandon C. Prins, “The Homegrown Threat: State Strength, Grievance, and Domestic

Terrorism,” International Interactions 43 no. 2 (2017): 217-247. 76 Patrick M. Regan and Daniel Norton, “Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars,” The Journal of

Conflict Resolution 49, no. 3 (2005): 319-336.

23

A number of studies on conflict and terrorism have shown that ideology, although not the

primary driver, has been an essential factor that causes individuals or groups to carry out violent

attacks. Richardson, Bjorgo, and Crenshaw are among the scholars who highlight the role of

religious ideology, which could lead normal individuals into radical, exclusive, intolerant, and

to finally engage in terrorism. Overall, religious doctrines serve as an "intermediate cause,"

which connects structural and motivational causes.77 Richardson explicitly points out that a

belief-system derived from religion incites and mobilises individuals to engage in violent acts

and legitimate their actions as just.78

Historical context has shown that ideology as a 'cultural resource' is often constructed or even

manipulated by a particular group or organization to influence individuals to engage in violent

acts. Political leaders and elites have used ideology to trigger grievances and motivate

individuals to engage in collective action and justify violent acts, even cruelty against the

enemy or even civic society. Esposito argues that religion provides a 'powerful source of

authority, meaning, and legitimacy.' Furthermore, he claims that religious texts' ideology can

serve as an absolute authority, which can be used by the leaders of radical groups by providing

religious symbols, justification, belief, and heavenly rewards for their followers to wage jihad

and die martyrs.79

Overall, religious ideology, such as, jihad fi Sabilillah or fighting in the path of Allah, Muslim

solidarity, wala al bara (loyalty and disavowal), and martyrdom are among the frequent

doctrines used by Muslim radicals, including returning foreign fighters to engage in a terror

attack. Thus, the religious ideology is also used to frame outside the group as the main target

of attack and justify their actions.

It is a fact that many radical groups utilized religious sources, such as, the Holy book, hadiths

and quoted several twentieth-century ideologues, such as, Sayyid Qutb, Hassan al Banna, Ibn

Tamiya, and Abdul al-Wahhab. Furthermore, those radical groups also adopt contemporary

radical thought, such as, Abdullah Azzam, Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and Abu

Bakar Baghdadi to legalize or justify their actions.

77 Richardson, What terrorists want, 68. See also, Bjorgo, Root Causes of terrorism: Myth, Reality and Ways

Forward, New York: Routledge, 2005. 78 Richardson, What terrorists want, 68. 79 John L. Esposito, “Terrorism and the Rise of Political Islam,” in Louise Richardson, The Roots of terrorism,

New York: Routledge, 2006.

24

Furthermore, it is important to note that while ideology has never been static on individuals or

groups it can change before, during, and after the conflict. This leads to the consequence that

such change needs to be addressed and analysed. Hegghammer, for example, suggests that

ideological changes within transnational Islamists networks play a significant role in

explaining the rise and risks posed by the returning foreign fighters.80

The ideology of jihad constructed by Al-Qaeda and ISIS remain dangerous. The ideological

leaning of the terror group (defensive jihad or offensive jihad) that the returning foreign fighters

belong to is likely to influence their home country's risk level. Those returning foreign fighters

who are inspired by offensive jihad and those who see the main jihad to be waged at home will

more likely pose security threats after they return. As such, the returnees inspired by IS from

the Syrian and Iraq conflicts may pose a threat to the government and the grassroots. Moreover,

the returnees inspired by Al-Qaeda may likely pose a threat to Western interests in Indonesia.

Overall, religious ideology is crucial where jihadi leaders could use it to recruit and mobilise

individuals to fight in a conflict overseas. Moreover, this factor should not be overlooked as it

remains an influential aspect to motivate and provide justification for returning jihadists to

engage in violent acts after they return home. In other words, while ideology is essential in the

emergence of the Islamic terrorist movement, the framing approach could be a useful tool to

explain why individuals engaged in terrorism.81

There are several arguments that discuss why social identity could be useful to explain that

returning jihadists pose potential threats after they return home. First, jihadists who are inspired

by Salafism simply divide the world rigidly into black and white. They tend to perceive the

world with a narrow lens by defining their groups and members as "us," while they refer to

other individuals or groups outside of their groups as "them." While describing the in-group

members as true believers, they perceive other groups as "them" so they are described as

immoral, corrupt, infidels, sinners, and heretics. With this concept, it provides justification to

prosecute or annihilate out-group members.

80 Hegghammer, “The Ideological Hybridization of Jihadi Groups,” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology,

https://www.hudson.org/research/9866-the-ideological-hybridization-of-jihadi-groups. See also Bakke, 2014. 81 David A. Snow and Scott C. Byrd. “Ideology, Framing Processes, and Islamic Terrorist Movements.”

Mobilization: An International Quarterly Review 12 no.1 (2007): 119–136.

25

Second, jihadists construct a pernicious narrative based on Islam's ideology to embrace a sense

of loyalty, pride, and unity shared by all group members more than any other community and

the state. They emphasized an obligation for all members to show loyalty to their leaders,

seniors, and group members. The doctrines "sami'na wa athoina" means "we hear, and we

obey" and "wala al bara" (loyalty and disavowal) are intentionally used to strengthen this

narrative that all members should listen to and undertake whatever their leader stated or

instructed. On the other hand, they must leave or disconnect with individuals or organizations

outside of their group.

Among the jihadists, the term Wala is interpreted as a moral obligation to help, love, unity, and

an obligation to protect, including not surrendering members to their enemies. Based on

"Bara," they believe that they must stay away and disconnect from unbelievers or any people

outside of their group. With this concept, they create a strong bond internally, especially to

seniors or leaders, more than anything else, including their parents, and other religious figures

out of their group, and even the state.

Henri Tajfel defines social identity as "an individual's self-concept which derives from his

knowledge of his membership in a social group together with the value or emotion significance

attached to that membership."82 From this standpoint, Tajfel also argues that individuals'

identity attached to a particular group impacts or influences how it defines others or out-groups.

Furthermore, this social identity shapes intergroup behaviour and could create an intergroup

conflict and group cohesion.83

A number of scholars have applied social identity theory in different fields of study, including

terrorism, to explain this multifaceted phenomenon and individuals' motives to engage in

violent acts. For example, Schwartz, Dunkel, and Waterman argue that personal, social, and

cultural identity plays a crucial role in terrorism.84 Overall, they argue that the sharp

distinctions between the group and the out-group in society could trigger violent acts. It occurs

82 H. Tajfel. “Social categorization, social identity and social comparisons.” In H. Tajfel (Ed.), Differentiation

between social groups. London, UK: Academic Press, 61–76. 83 H. Tajfel “Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations,” Ann Rev. Psychol 33 (1982):1-39. Turner, J. C., &

Tajfel, H. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behaviour. Psychology of intergroup relations, 7-24. 84

Seth J. Schwartz, Curtis S. Dunkel & Alan S. Waterman. “Terrorism: An Identity Theory Perspective, Studies

in Conflict & Terrorism 32 no. 6, (2009): 537-559. DOI: 10.1080/10576100902888453.

26

if the in-group perceives the out-group members as the threat's potential or source, threatening

their shared values and identity.85

The collective identity approach would be useful to explain the process of life transformation

from civilians into foreign fighters. One of the arguments is that being part of jihadi groups

provides a strong identity for its members before, during, and post-conflict. Not only oneness,

brotherhood, and group homogenous, but collective identity also creates a sense of solidarity

and loyalty between the members and the group's leaders.

Triggering events could also cause grievances on individuals or group members, which then

creates sympathy for terrorist causes. In other words, terrifying events may also influence or

determine individuals to engage in violent acts. Many scholars, such as, Bjorgo, Crenshaw,

Wright, and Smith argue that triggering events or causes remain an essential factor if an

individual decided to engage in terrorism.86 Bjorgo, for example, highlights specific triggering

causes that might become the direct precipitators of terrorist acts. He refers to starting factors

that can be momentous or provocative events that could trigger radical individuals or groups

to call revenge or any attack as retaliation.87

While triggering events could trigger foreign fighters' mobilization, it could also become a

catalyst for returning jihadists to activate their armed jihad at home. Many returning jihadists

reacted and decided to take action in response to specific events. Thus, they interpreted and

gave meaning to such events and then constructed thoughts, such as, Islam or their existing

values or community, were under attack. It is relevant to Horgan's theory that highlights

terrorists in many cases reacted based on a specific event where they begin to 'develop a sense

of communal identification with the victimized.' 88

Moreover, triggering events may be sharp, which motivates individuals, including returning

jihadists, to attack soon after they were aggrieved. It provokes individuals to right away engage

85 Ibid. 86 Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, 4. M Crenshaw (1981). The causes

of terrorism. Comparative Politics 13 no. 4 (1981): 379-399. David Wright-Neville & Debra Smith. “Political

rage: terrorism and the politics of emotion.” Global Change, Peace & Security 21 no. 1 (2009): 85-98. See also,

Post, J. M., Ruby, K. G., and Shaw, E. D. “The radical group in context:1 An integrated framework for the

analysis of group risk for terrorism.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism. 25 no. 2 (2002): 73-100. 87 Tore Bjørgo, Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, reality and ways forward, 4. 88 Horgan, The Psychology of Terrorism, 87.

27

in violent acts without calculation. Moreover, triggering events could also be a gradual process

where individuals or returning jihadists engage in terrorism after they get prepared and

opportunity is available.

2.6. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed how the relevant theories explain the complexity of the foreign

fighters' phenomenon. It shows that no single approach can explain the multifaceted issues of

foreign fighters. As many scholars state, the grievance and ideology approach is not enough or

even fails to explain the puzzle of foreign fighters' rise. It is not sufficient to describe why many

people are aggrieved and participate in the conflict far away from their country of origin, while

others do not join, although all of them might experience similar anger or frustration.

Therefore, I argue that the existing theories explained in previous discussion, such as,

grievances, ideology, framing, and opportunity approaches are important, which could explain

many aspects of foreign fighters: recruitment, mobilization, and indoctrination. In other words,

these theories could describe the pathway of individuals who join the global jihad theatre as

many have claimed that their participation was triggered by pure religious ideology.

Moreover, the existing theories, such as, grievances, framing, identity, and triggering events

may also explain or provide valuable arguments for understanding why returning jihadists

engaged in violent acts after they arrived home. Such theories could help scholars, security,

and intelligence officers and policymakers understand the phenomenon of foreign fighters and

enable them to design the most effective measures or policy recommendations aimed at

minimising these risks and preventing terrorism after they return home.

28

CHAPTER III

The Mujahidin War

3.1. Introduction

The invasion of the Soviet Red Army in Afghanistan in 1979 resulted in a war that triggered

thousands of Muslim foreign fighters to fight in the name of jihad. Hundreds of Indonesian

citizens who also joined the caravan flocked to the borders of Pakistan and Afghanistan to join

the insurgency.89 They mostly joined several Mujahidin factions, receiving military training to

fight against the Soviet army and the communist Afghan government. After the Soviet army

withdrew in 1989 and the collapse of the Afghan communist government, the Indonesian

foreign fighters returned home. Initially these jihadists were recruited by radical groups, Darul

Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah. After their return, several of these jihadists called themselves

Mujahidin and engaged in terrorism.

This chapter narrates the historical background of approximately 300-400 young Indonesian

men who left their home country in the 1980s to train and fight in Afghanistan as foreign

fighters. This chapter discusses how they gained access to the battlefield, the motivations of

these ordinary Indonesian citizens, and how they got involved in the battle. This chapter also

describes their roles, function, military activities, and their interaction with the local insurgent

groups they joined.

History has shown that thousands of foreign fighters who fought in Afghanistan left the conflict

zone after the war ended. Indonesian foreign fighters also abandoned the battlezone in the

1990s. The question arises here why those Indonesian jihadists abandoned the Afghanistan War

and returned home. What was their motive for leaving the battlefield? Apart from answering

these questions, this chapter also seeks to explain their post-conflict behaviour and what

happened to hundreds of Afghanistan veterans after they returned home. Historically, many of

these veterans engaged in violent acts, including several terror attacks by targeting Christians

and Western interests in Indonesia in the 2000s.

89 Indonesia's Afghan-Trained Mujahideen A story of Indonesia's own mujahideen, TEMPO Magazine, No.

04/II/October 2-8, 2001. See also Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah. Solahudin, NII Sampai JI:

Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia. Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 2018.

29

3.2. The Afghanistan War: An Overview

The establishment of the leftist government in Afghanistan and further the Soviet invasion in

1979 had triggered fierce and massive resistance by local Afghans and many Islamic

countries.90 In response, 34 Muslim countries condemned Afghanistan's Soviet intervention

and occupation in December 1979 and demanded their immediate and unconditional

withdrawal.91 For the Afghan Muslim people, the Soviet Communists' intervention as a crusade

sought to destroy the Afghans' religion and traditional culture. The resistance fighters called

"Mujahidin" proclaimed "Jihad" or Holy War and invited all Muslims worldwide to support

their struggles.

The invasion of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan triggered massive waves of foreign fighters

from around the world. Between 1980-1992, approximately 20,000 non-Afghan jihadists

joined the war.92 According to Mohammad Yousaf, a senior Pakistani Intelligence Service (ISI)

who engaged in the jihadist recruitments, around 35,000 foreign fighters from 35 countries

flocked to Afghanistan, and about 17,000 came from Saudi Arabia.93 Overall, these foreign

combatants came from different countries, mostly Arab countries, with varied motivations

ranging from economic reasons, to escape from their own countries, as adventurers, and for

other reasons.

There is no precise number of Indonesian transnational jihadists who travelled, trained, and

fought in Afghanistan. According to a CIA report, 30-40 percent of Indonesian students in

Middle Eastern universities in Egypt, Syria, Iran, and other Middle East countries are suspected

of having joined the war.94 Approximately 200-300 Indonesian men received military training

90 The Soviet army launched a military operation in Kabul, Afghanistan on 24 December 1979. Under the treaty

of the Soviet-Afghan Friendship Treaty of 1978, the supreme leader of the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev had embarked

a massive military operation to take control Afghanistan and assisted the pro-Soviet faction, the Marxist People’s

Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) to take the power. After capturing the capital city of Kabul, the Soviet

army had established a puppet government under communist ideology and assisted them to fight other anti-

communist Afghan rebels. 91 “Moslem Condemn Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette dated 29 January 1980, retrieved

from https://news.google.com/newspapers? 92 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of the Muslim Foreign Fighters,” International Security 35 no. 3 (2010): 61.

See also Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam, I.B Tauris & Co Ltd, New York, 2004. 93 Ahmed Rashid. Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, 129. Zachary Abuza,

Militants Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publisher, 2003), 10. See also

Mark Adkin and Muhammed Yousaf, Afghanistan-The Bear Trap: Defeat of a Superpower (London: Casemate

Publisher, 2001). 94 Bilveer Singh, The Talibanization of Southeast Asia: Losing the War on Terror to Islamist Extremists, (USA:

Praeger Security International, 2007), 113. Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 12.

30

in Afghanistan between 1985 until 1991.95 Similarly, Ayip Syafruddin, spokesperson of the

Laskar Jihad (Jihad Army), claimed that more than 400 Indonesian fighters entered the

Afghanistan War in the 1980s.96

The War in Afghanistan also attracted the attention of many Islamic groups and activists in

Indonesia. The heroic resistance of the Afghan Mujahidin against the Red Army was covered

by most national media outlets and became a common topic of discussion among Islamic

activists. The Afghans' struggle against the Soviet invasion created sympathy for and solidarity

with the Afghans among the Indonesians and fueled their hostility towards the Soviets. The

Indonesians viewed the Soviet invasion as an unlawful act of aggression towards a Muslim

country. Pamphlets and books about the Afghan Mujahidin war were available in many public

places. For example, in Solo, Central Java, the translation of Abdullah Azzam's book The Signs

of The Merciful in the Jihad of the Afghan was available and became a common topic of Islamic

discussion groups on many campuses.97

3.3. Darul Islam (DI)

The Islamist organization Darul Islam (hereafter DI) recruited and dispatched hundreds of men

to Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s.98 This radical group saw the conflict as an opportunity

to strengthen its military capacity to engage in jihad at home. 99 Dispatching their members to

the conflict was more of a chance to prepare (idad) and reinforce their group by obtaining

military skills and combat experience and building international Islamist networks. In other

words, the ultimate goal was to fight against the secular Suharto government in Indonesia.

During the 1970s, several DI members, including Aceng Kurnia and Djaja Sudjadi, sought to

revive its goal to establish an Islamic state as declared by Kartosuwiryo.100 They revisited DI’s

ideology and transformed into an inactive rather than an active armed guerilla movement.

95 Interview with Solahudin, 22 August 2019. See, Solahudin, NII Sampai JI: Salafy Jihadisme di Indonesia (NII

to JI: Salafi Jihadism in Indonesia) (Jakarta: Komunitas Bambu, 2011), 197. Deradicalization and Indonesian

Prison, ICG, Asia Report N°142 – 19 November 2007. See also Arif Wachjunadi, Misi Walet Hitam, 5. 96 “Indonesia’s Afghan-Trained Mujahideen, Tempo, 5 October 2001. 97 Interview with Noor Huda Ismail and Iqbal Muhammad. Both were used to be religious students (santri) in

Ngruki and Al Irsyad, Solo. Interview with Yusuf, Mindanao veteran. 98 DI was established by Maridjan Kartosuwiryo, who proclaimed an Islamic State in Indonesia and himself as

the Imam (leader) on 7 August 1949. 99 Sidney Jones. “The changing nature of Jemaah Islamiyah.” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 59 no.2

(2010): 169-178. 100 Kartosuwiryo was arrested and executed by government in 1962, thirteen years after he proclaimed the

Islamic State.

31

Nevertheless, under the Komando Jihad (Holy War Command), several DI members in 1976

began to engage in terror activities in Sumatra and in Java. They targeted churches, hospitals,

cinemas, and bars in North and West Sumatra and they attacked mosques.101 These attacks

were carried out to provoke religious conflict between Muslims and Christians.102

Political repression by the state failed to stop Darul Islam from continuing their struggle and

regaining strength. Their goal to establish an Islamic State has never vanished. Many fanatic

members still tried to revive the movement through underground networks to avoid

surveillance. Furthermore, they kept recruiting new members and strengthening their social

networks through kinship, marriages, and familial bonds. They also actively recruited younger

and more educated Muslims who were marginalised politically by the government to advance

new recruits. Moreover, they successfully infiltrated some Islamic organisations to revive the

idea of an Islamic State and Sharia implementation in the country.103

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir were among the individuals recruited by DI. Both

clerics built an Islamic boarding school (Pesantren) Al Mukmin, which is known as Pondok

Ngruki, located in Solo to advance their religious outreach. They also found a radio station, the

Islamic Dakwah Radio (Radio Dakwah Islamiah) as a medium to promote outreach and recruit

new joiners. Through this radio station, they delivered messages by campaigning to establish

the Islamic community (Jama’ah) as a precondition of the implementation of Sharia Law and

the establishment of the Islamic State in the country.

The government under Suharto began to be suspicious of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar

Bashir’s Islamic radical movement. The military officers arrested them and put them in jail for

six weeks after they carried out subversive activities by urging their followers to boycott the

general election. Both clerics were dragged to the prison again for four years (1978-1982) on

101 Quinton Temby, “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to Jemaah Islamiyah,”

Indonesia, no. 89 (2010): 1-36. Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 99-101. 102 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 99-101. 103 Hwang, The Disengagement of Indonesian Jihadist, 25. Darul Islam attracted many sympathisers from other

Islamic groups like the Indonesian Islamic Students (Pelajar Islam Indonesia - PPI), the Indonesian Islamic

Dakwah Council (Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia-DDII), and the Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement

(Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia - GPII) and others.

32

charges of their opposition to Pancasila as the sole ideology.104 Thus, the government also

charged them because they were promoting the idea of an Islamic state in Indonesia.105

3.4. Jihad and Transnational Networks

DI leaders, such as, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who lived in exile in Malaysia,

viewed the 1980s war in Afghanistan as an opportunity to revive their jihad and strengthen

their internal resources. Both clerics took the conflict as an opportunity where they were able

to recruit, mobilise, and dispatch members to undertake military training. In the long run, they

believed that obtaining military training and war experience would help them rebuild their

group capabilities to wage jihad in the home country on their return.

Strengthening military capability has always remained an essential element related to DI’s

strategy. There have been three stages of establishing the Daulah Islam or Islamic State, as

stated in the guideline books “Pedoman Dharma Bhakti” (Dharma Bhakti Guide) and “Qanun

Asasi,’ specifically, hijra (immigrate), idad (preparation), and jihad (Holy War). Hijra is

interpreted as an act of leaving Jahiliya into correct Islamic practice. Thus, Afghanistan's

military training was part of idad or training, to develop internal military strength in terms of

combat skills, strategy, and to gain access to weapons. This step is carried out as preparation

to take power and establish an Islamic State in Indonesia through armed jihad.

Strengthening resources is a critical goal that DI prioritized during the 1970s-1980s. The

group's elite had learned this from their previous failed attempts at establishing an Islamic State

routed twice by the Indonesian armed forces. They knew they needed to have enough resources

in terms of military capabilities and personnel to defeat the state. In my interview, Ali Imron,

an Afghan veteran and one of the Bali bombers, mentions that there have been two incidents,

namely, “Tanjung Priok” and “Lampung,” which inspired radical groups, such as, DI to pursue

military skills as a priority. During clashes with security forces in those riots, several rioters

succeeded in seizing arms but they could not use them.106

104 See, Sidney Jones, “New Order Repression and the Birth of Jemaah Islamiyah,” in Soeharto's New Order

and Its Legacy. 105 Abu Bakar Bashir argued that Pancasila as sole ideology as a conspiracy of Christians to destroy all Islamic

institutions in Indonesia. See, Fauzan Al-Anshari, Saya Teroris? (Sebuah “Pledoi”) (Jakarta: Republika, 2002),

37. 106 Interview with Ali Imron, 2019. See also Arif Wachjunadi, Misi Walet Hitam, 8. Tanjung Priok or “Tanjung

Priok Massacre” occurred in 12 September 1984 when military opened fire of protestors who demanded the

release of their religious leaders. Previously, the military arrested and put into jail four religious leaders who

33

The lack of resources and military skills encouraged DI elites, such as, Ajengan Masduki,

Abdullah Sungkar, and Abu Bakar Bashir in the 1980s to look for any options to strengthen its

military capabilities. Repressive policies and surveillance by Suharto’s security forces and

intelligence left no choice except to seek external support. With this condition, Ajengan

Masduki once had tried unsuccessfully to request financial support and arms from the Libyan

Embassy in Malaysia.107

Ajengan Masduki, with Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, tried to revive DI by seeking

external support. They began to look at the Afghanistan War in the 1980s and viewed it as an

excellent opportunity to wage holy jihad.108 Hence, it was a strategic tactic for Sungkar, who

served as the Supreme Commander for Foreign Affairs, to establish direct links with the

Mujahideen in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and in other Middle East countries.109 He

also sought to establish contact with some Muslim-humanitarian organizations, such as, Gama

Islami and the Muslim World League (Rabitat al Alam al-Islami), which later provided funding

for the recruitments.110

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir succeeded in establishing contacts with Saudi

networks, which helped them build a connection with the Afghan Mujahidin in Pakistan. Both

clerics flew to Saudi Arabia and met several Salafi scholars, including Abdul Aziz bin Baz,

who served as the Head of the Saudi Council of Religious Scholars. Bin Baz was the most

famous Salafi scholar who became the Saudi Grand Mufti in 1993. With support from Bin Baz

and the Saudi Salafi networks, both clerics went to Peshawar in Pakistan, to meet Abdul Rasul

rejected the implementation of Pancasila as the sole ideology. It is estimated that 400 protestors were killed.

Similarly, “Lampung incident” or “Lampung Massacre” took place in Lampung province 7 February 1989 when

the military launched a attack in a village residence Talangsari, Lampung because they were charged with

subversion. Hundreds of civilians were killed, wounded, and even disappeared. 107 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 3. Quinton Temby. “Imagining an Islamic State in Indonesia; From Darul Islam to

Jemaah Islamiyah.” Indonesia, no. 89 (April 2010): 1-36. 108

The government under Suharto regime was alarmed to DI socio-religious activities and responded repressively.

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir were charged in trial and sent to jail. Both were accused of spreading

radical thoughts and being involved in terrorist activities such as Komando Jihad which was charged as

responsible for bombings of several targeted churches, cinemas, and nightclubs. Further, both clerics were

considered as radical Muslim preachers who could endanger the nation’s harmony, pluralism, security, and

ideology. Due to the strict repression and detention by the government, both clerics decided to leave the country

in 1985. 109 Abdullah Sungkar and Ajengan Masduki went to Afghanistan in 1987 and met Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, one of the

Afghan factions who fought against the Soviet Army to discuss the jihadist recruitments from Southeast Asia to

Afghanistan. Interview with Asad Ali, 2019. 110 Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, 15.

34

Sayyaf, one of the Mujahidin leaders who fought against the Soviet’s invasion in

Afghanistan.111 Sayyaf established Ittihad-I Islami-Barayi Azad-I Afghanistan (Islamic Union

for the Liberation of Afghanistan) in 1981, having being influenced by the Muslim

Brotherhood and Salafi Wahhabism.112

In a meeting with Sayyaf, Sungkar requested that Sayyaf help their jihad by providing military

training for their members. Sayyaf agreed to the request and allowed DI members to undertake

military training in his Military Academy (Harbiy Pohantun) in Pabbi, Peshawar, Pakistan.

Furthermore, he agreed to finance all the costs of travel and accommodation.113 Besides

Indonesian foreign fighters, Sayyaf also offered military training for hundreds of jihadists from

other countries to train and fight against the Soviet army.

Abdullah Sungkar, Abu Bakar Bashir, and Ajengan Masduki began to recruit and send their

members to the border of Pakistan-Afghanistan at the beginning of 1985.114 They selected their

internal members rather than from outside. According to Farihin, an Afghan veteran, the

enrolment was carried out in many ways. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who

established Pondok Ngruki in Solo Central Java, recruited their students and some from small

Islamic study groups (usroh). They selected the best male graduate students who were

committed to jihad. Meanwhile, Ajengan Masduki nominated his internal members from the

DI family and community who had been recruited from school, campus, and mosque

networks.115 Through the recruitment process, DI mostly carefully selected their unmarried

111 Interviews with several Afghan veterans – Nasir Abas, Farihin, and Ali Imron. Greg Barton, Indonesia’s

Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, 55. There were seven Afghan résistance or factions who fought

against the Soviet Army and its Communist Afghan government which are The Afghanistan National Liberation

Front (ANLF), The Islamic Party (HIH), The Islamic Party (HIK), The Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA),

Islamic Society (JIA), The Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan (IUA), and The National Islamic Front

of Afghanistan (NIFA). Further, DI members were mostly sent to military camp belonged to the Islamic Union

for the Liberation of Afghanistan under Abd Al-Rab Abdul-Rasul Sayyaf. Based on its ideology, this faction is

militant fundamentalist and against Shia. This group was also financed by the Saudi Arabia which had political

interest to spread the Wahhabism. See also Solahudin, The Roots of Terrorism in Indonesia: From Darul Islam to

Jemaah Islamiyah. 112 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 119. Peter Tomsen, the Wars of Afghanistan (New

York: Public Affairs, 2011), 310. Jason Burke, Al Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (New York: I.B. Tauris,

2003), 66. Ken Conboy, The Second Front (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), 41. 113 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 203. 114 Greg Fealy, “Militant Java-based Islamist movements,” in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in

Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited), 71. Greg Barton,

Indonesia’s Struggle: Jemaah Islamiyah and the Soul of Islam, (University of New SouthWales, 2005), 15. 115 Interview with Farihin, 13 May 2019. See also, Greg Fealy, “Militant Java-based Islamist movements,” 67.

35

male members, between 20 and 30 years of age. Moreover, DI, since 1989, also began to recruit

new joiners from Malaysia and Singapore. 116

3.4.1. Jihad and Grievance Narratives

At the personal level, jihad was a motive for many Indonesian citizens who went to Afghanistan

to fight as foreign fighters. As Ali Imron claimed, the word “jihad fisabilillah” or fighting in

the name of God was his reason to go to Afghanistan as a foreign fighter, “Why I finally arrived

in Afghanistan to learn military skills over there for several years, the main reason is jihad.”117

In his autobiography, Ali Imron recalls when he joined an Islamic study group (usroh) linked

to JI in his school in 1990, he was aggrieved after watching a video on the Afghanistan War

and Palestine. The narrative of injustice and political repression by non-Muslims against

Muslims in the video influenced his mind and changed his life. He wanted to carry out jihad as

he recalls:

From that moment, my soul was touched to change my bad habits into a good deed, and

I want to be serious in my study and worship. I also have a wish to take part in jihad to

defend Islam and Muslims from the evil of their enemies, such as, in Palestine and

Afghanistan.118

From the life narrative of Ali Imron, it can be stated that he experienced a grievance when he

knew about the war of Afghanistan, where the Soviet army invaded and persecuted Muslim

Afghan people. Moreover, his resentment did not automatically trigger him to wage jihad in

Afghanistan. His social network or his JI leader captured his grievance, channeled it, and

persuaded him to go to Afghanistan in the name of jihad.

However, there have been many different personal or individual motives to engage in

Afghanistan as foreign fighters. Through interviews with Afghan veterans conducted in 2019,

I found that many of them argued that their participation in the war was solely to wage jihad

and aid the Afghan Mujahidin fighting against the Soviet invasion. The idea of ousting the

infidel foreign occupier motivated them to engage in the overseas conflict as foreign fighters.119

116 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom (Ali Imron the Bomber) (Jakarta: Penerbit Republika, 2007), 10. Nasir

Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 63. 117 Ali Imron, “Hanya Butuh Waktu 2 Jam untuk Jadi Teroris” (Needed 2 hours to become a terrorist), 8 June

2017, Kompas TV, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=r-lfs32AkpE. See also, Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang

Pengebom, 4. 118 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 4. 119 Interviews with several Afghan veterans, 2019.

36

Although jihad remained a factor for those individuals who went to Afghanistan, DI elites had

a specific plan to recruit and send their members to engage in the conflict. For example, in my

interviews with Afghan veterans, many argue that Abdullah Sungkar requested they learn the

military's art as a priority.120 Farihin asserts that all Indonesian fighters had to join military

training for three years. Quoting a Hadist, he states, “al ilmu qabla al-qoul wa al amal” which

means “to learn the knowledge first, then implement it.” All Indonesian fighters were also

called khoriji or fighters from foreign countries.121

In his memoir, Nasir Abas recalls that Abdullah Sungkar instructed that all recruits learn as

much as possible about military skills as the top priority. This instruction triggered confusion

and even anger among several non-Indonesian members who expected to fight once they

arrived in the conflict zone. One of the participants from Malaysia named Mat Beduh felt

deceived when he knew that he was required to do three years of military training rather than

immediately engage in the war after arriving in Afghanistan. 122

Before heading to Afghanistan, the recruits went to Malaysia to meet Abdullah Sungkar and

Abu Bakar Bashir as the recruitment coordinators. All of the participants joined the informal

meeting (tausiyah). Abdullah Sungkar gave religious advice and technical instructions before

departure, such as, having an alias name in Arabic, communicating using a non-Indonesian

language, and concealing their national identity. Such actions were carried out to avoid

surveillance and a possible crackdown by Indonesian intelligence.123 With these instructions,

most of the participants claimed to be Filipinos.124

Ajengan Masduki arranged detailed preparations for their members before heading to

Afghanistan. During my interview with Nasir Abas, he recalled that Ajengan Masduki advised

all the members to follow local Afghan culture and religious practices. For example, all

recruits, without exception, had to convert from the Syafii School of Islamic jurisprudence,

120 Interviews with Afghan veterans, 2019. 121 Interview with Farihin, Jakarta, 2019. 122 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 46-47. While Nasir Abas joined military training, Mat Beduh

could not continue the training and was sent back to Malaysia. 123 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 205. 124 Ibid.

37

which is mostly practiced in Indonesia, to Hanafi, which is mainly practiced by Afghan

Muslims.125

At the end of the session, each candidate was required to pledge allegiance (bai’at) in front of

Abdullah Sungkar. By holding Amir’s hand, each recruit stated, “Ba’yatuka ‘alas sam’i wat

thoah fil ‘usri wal yusri” which means “I pledge my allegiance to listen and obey whether in

joy and difficult time.”126 With this devotion, each cadre legally belongs to the group, and

loyalty or obedience should be given to their leader and organization.

3.4.2. Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s Ittihad-al-Islami

A few cadres of Darul Islam began to travel to Peshawar in 1985 to join Abdul Rasul Sayyaf,

one of the seven Mujahidin factions leaders who established Ittihad-al-Islami (Islamic Union).

This group emerged in 1981 and declared jihad against the occupation of Soviet armies as well

as the communist Afghan government.

A relatively small number participated in the first batch (Daurah Awal) of Indonesian jihadists.

There were only five men who were DI internal members, such as, Syawal, Zulkarnain,

Mohamad Faiiq, Idris alias Solahudin, and Saad alias Ahmad Roichan. Before starting the

Military Academy in Camp Sadah, they were temporarily housed in the military high school

for Afghans known as Harbiy Sohanjay.127 While local Afghan fighters were called Dakbili

(insider), Indonesian jihadists were considered as Khariji or outsiders.

The second group (Daurah Duwom) had more of a greater number of participants, there were

fifty-nine. Among those fighters were Mukhlas, Hamzah (Abu Rusydan), and Mustapha (Abu

Tholut), who later on became the elites of JI and engaged directly in a series of bombing

operations in the 2000s. The following deployment continued to come until the tenth batch in

1992. 128 Overall, from 1985 to 1992, there were approximately 200 men who had participated

in the training.

125 Interview with Nasir Abas, 19 July 2019. There have been four schools of law or religious jurisprudence

(Fiqh) of traditional Islam Sunni which are Hanafi, Syafii, Hambali and Maliki. Mostly Indonesians practice

Syafii, while Afghan people follow Hanafi. 126 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 37. Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 205. 127 Interview with Nasir Abas, 7 October 2019. Harbiy Sohanjay is the military school for Afghans where

Indonesian foreign fighters used it for transit. 128 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 42-66. See also, Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 213-216.

38

The Mujahidin military academy operated for three years and had five different faculties

including infantry (Pohanzay Piyadah), engineering (Pohanzay Engineering), artillery

(Pohanzay Tupciy), logistic (Pohanzay Logistik), communication (Pohanzay Mukhobarat), and

cavalry (Pohanzay Zahridor). While Afghan students mostly attended one faculty in this

academy, Indonesian jihadists were not required to take a specific department but more

generally focused on infantry.129

During the military academy, Indonesian foreign fighters learned military tactics, such as, map

reading, weapon training, and field engineering.130 Besides obtaining these military arts, they

were required to join Islamic teaching classes to study Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh), leadership,

Hadiths, and Al-Quran carried out weekly on Friday afternoon after the Asr prayer.131

DI leaders, such as, Ajengan Masduki, Abdullah Sungkar, and Abu Bakar Bashir were involved

closely in recruitment and monitored their members in the Military Academy. They travelled

to Pakistan to meet Abdul Rasul Sayyaf and inspected their members on the training in 1987.

At a meeting with Sayyaf, both requested the continuation of military training. Ajengan

Masduki even asked to obtain weapons and to have them delivered to Indonesia. However, this

request was turned down because Abdul Rasul Sayyaf had difficulties in transporting the

weapons.132

Although the primary purpose was to learn the art of war, several DI/JI members experienced

actual combat during the training. Nasir Abas states that the Indonesian jihadists were only

allowed by Abdul Rasul Sayyaf to join the war, especially during the semester break.133 During

the holiday break, they were permitted to practice their military knowledge. Moreover, they

could not go to the frontline, rather they were to remain in the backline as infantry to defend

the territory or to counter the enemy’s attacks. 134

129 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 50. 130 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 213-216. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 46. Ali Imron, Ali Imron

Sang Pengebom, 10-15. Interview with Ali Imron, 6 March 2019. 131 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 81, 83. The Asr prayer or Afternoon prayer is one of the five

prayer. 132 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 231. 133 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 55. 134 Interview with Ali Imron, 6 March 2019.

39

During my interviews with Afghan veterans, they claimed to have engaged and participated in

military operations.135 Mubaroq, for example, recalled that he went to battle, witnessing one of

his comrades die after stepping onto a land mine in the middle of the fight.136 Nasir Abas also

asserts that Sayyaf allowed Indonesian fighters to practice their military skills in real combat.

Moreover, Sayyaf made a stringent regulation that they should not fight in the frontline. He

once stated that Indonesia Mujahidin were prepared to carry out jihad in Indonesia, not in the

Afghanistan war.137

There were language barriers during the first, second, and third batch of recruitments (1983-

1985) as DI combatants were trained by Afghan and Pakistan instructors who only spoke

English and Arabic. The graduates of these groups trained subsequent groups eliminating the

language barrier. Training by previous graduates improved communication and instruction

delivery.138 These graduates also trained different jihadists from other countries.139 Nasir Abas,

Nuaim, Mughirah, and Syawal were among the trainers who taught hundreds of fighters from

various countries, including Bangladesh and Kashmir. Nasir Abas recalls that forty men from

Bangladesh and one hundred men from Kashmir came to learn military skills including

weaponry, artillery, map reading, and field engineering.140 Indonesian trainee jihadists received

a monthly stipend of 150 Pakistani Rupees, while trainers were paid between 1,000-1,500

Rupees.141

Besides DI members, many Indonesian foreign fighters had already engaged in the conflict in

1984. They were mostly students who had studied in universities in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.

Inspired by jihad to help the Muslim Afghan people, they joined the Mujahidin faction led by

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, who established the Hezb-i Islami (Islamic Party) in 1979. Similar to

Abdul Sayyaf, Hekmatyar led his men to fight the Soviet army and received money and

weapons from Saudi, Pakistan, and from the United States.142 They flocked to one of

Hekmatyar’s military wings known as “Jamaat ad Da’wah” under the leadership of Jamil ar

Rahman based in Kunar Province, Afghanistan.

135 Interviews with several Afghan veterans, 2019. 136 Interview with Mubaroq, 7 August 2019. 137 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 58. 138 Ibid., 52. 139 Interview with Farihin, Jakarta, 2019. 140 Ibid., 61-62. 141 Interview with Afghan veteran, 2 March 2019. 142 Steve Coll, Ghost Wars, 67, 118. Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 71.

40

Unlike DI foreign fighters who joined Sayyaf’s military camp, those who joined “Jamaat ad

Da’wah” were more radical and conservative. Inspired by Salafi and Wahhabism, they aimed

to fight any religious innovation (bid’ah) practiced by many local Afghans besides engaging

in the war against the Soviets and the communist Afghan government.143 They considered that

smoking, music, and singing were bid'ah and, as such, practices of corruption. Overall, they

remained conservative and exclusive and did not interact with other Mujahidin, including DI

members. Among those individuals who joined this group were Jafar Umar Thalib, Abu Nida,

Zaitun Rasmin, and others.144

Furthermore, DI not only dispatched its members to train in the Military Academy, through a

representative office in Peshawar, Pakistan, they also facilitated others to undertake a short

military drill for two or three months. During the training, the participants received military

skills and fought under Arab groups or local Afghans.145 There is no fixed number, but Dul

Matin, Agung Riyadi, Suhaimi, Faiz Bafana, and Holisudin were among those who took the

short military training.146

Moreover, the fall of the Afghan communist government under President Muhammad

Najibullah in 1992 created various implications for DI members, who were still undertaking

military training. The Pakistan government, which had previously supported and hosted many

military camps, ordered all transnational combatants to leave their soil.147 In his memoir, Ali

Imron states that the Pakistani government had changed its policy in dealing with foreign

fighters in their land. Under the new administration of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, Pakistan

requested that all foreign fighters were to leave the country. Pakistani police officers often

carried out random checks at several military camps at the border to find foreign combatants.

143 Interview with Sydney Jones, 22 February 2019. Interview with several Afghan veterans, 2019. See also

Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 204. 144 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 204. Interview with Nasir Abas, 2 March 2019. 145 Interview with Asad Ali, 2019. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 59. 146 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 59. Interview with a former terrorist, 29 October 2019. Dul

Matin became one of the most wanted terrorists in the Southeast Asia because of his involvement in terrorist

attacks in Indonesia, such as, at the Phillipines’ consulate bombing, churches bombing and the Bali bombing

2002. He was killed by Indonesia’s special counter-terrorism unit or Detachment 88 in 2010. 147 Roy Gutman, How We Missed the Story; Osama bin Laden, the Taliban, and the Hijacking of Afghanistan

(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2008). David Malet, “Foreign Fighter Mobilization and

Persistence in a Global Context,” 465. The U.S. formally ended its support to the Afghan Mujahidin on 11

September 1991. This policy was followed by the Pakistan government that previously also gave full support for

the Afghan Mujahidin and for other foreign fighters from another country.

41

These continuing inspections disturbed the training process in the military academy. Ali Imron

further explains that he and some of his colleagues tried to hide in the bush and valley to avoid

being arrested or deported by the Pakistani government.148

In 1993, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf began to relocate his military base from Sadda, Pakistan, to

Kabul, Afghanistan. Sayyaf’s decision to move his military base out of Pakistan territory to

Kabul gave Indonesia jihadists two options, whether they would move along or stay in Sadda.

However, Abdullah Sungkar decided not to join and rather asked Sayyaf to utilise his

abandoned military camp in Towrkham or “Khyber Pass.” This camp was located on the border

between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Sayyaf approved this request as an Afghan veteran

explained as follows:

We got permission from Sheikh Sayyaf to turn the land into a military training centre.

We were freer here, not just because we could supervise ourselves but we could

undertake any kind of training. Torkham was far from anywhere, so any kind of

experiment was possible. You could blow up a mountain and it wouldn’t bother

anybody. We had to sleep in tents, and it was even hotter.149

Indonesian jihadists autonomously operated their new military training in Towrkham though it

was still under Sayyaf’s authority.150 Ali Imron, who said in Towrkham, explains that the new

camp enjoyed autonomy and abundant ammunition or weaponry. He likewise recalls that they

had more opportunities to practice their military skills, including shooting training, than

previous groups trained in the previous Sadda military camp.151 In this new camp, Ali Imron

also states that Abdullah Sungkar visited to inspect their training after returning from Saudi.

While continuing the military academy in the Towrkham training ground, Indonesian jihadists

provided brief military training for internal members and other jihadists from other countries.

All of the instructors were senior members who had graduated from the military academy.152

In this training ground, they operated two military camps, The North camp for a short training

and the South camp, which was used for the military academy.153

148 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 20. 149 Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous, 26 August 2003, ICG Asia Report No.63 150 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 67. Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 20. 151 Interview with an anonymous Afghan veteran, 2019. 152 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 17. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 67. Several JI

seniors served as military trainers in Towrkham such as Nasir Abas, Abu Tholut, Faturrahman Al Ghozi,

Mubaroq, Abu Dujanah and others. 153 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 20.

42

3.4.3. Jemaah Islamiyah (JI)

Darul Islam experienced a split in 1993 because of an internal clash among its leaders. Abdullah

Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, who at the time lived in exile in Malaysia, entered into political

friction (infishol) with Ajengan Masduki, the Imam of DI.154 The intensification of the rift

ended their alliance.

The discord between the DI leaders affected the members in training with Sayyaf in

Afghanistan. They were each required to decide on their status, whether it was under JI or DI-

NII. Those who chose JI were able to settle and continue military training, while the others had

to return to their home country or join another military camp.155 The majority decided to join

JI and retook an oath (bai’at) with Abdullah Sungkar as the new leader. While only a few

remained loyal to DI and Ajengan Masduki as the leader, both Imam Samudra and Mughirah

left the camp because they aligned with DI and resisted joining JI.156 However, Imam Samudra

changed his mind and joined JI in Malaysia after having been convinced by Hambali.157

Jamaah Islamiyah began to control the recruitment process and the operation of its military

training after the split. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir started to strictly select their

members, mostly from the alumnae of the religious boarding school, Pondok Ngruki, and

Usroh circles. This school was established in the 1970s and introduced Salafi teaching, which

interprets Islam as more conservative and puritanical.158

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir played a significant role in formulating JI’s political

and ideological guidance. Both clerics who were influenced by Salafism introduced a more

conservative interpretation of Islam. They adopted many of the Salafi thoughts and beliefs of

Ibn Tamiya, Ibn Hambal, Abu Ala Mawdudi, and Sayyid Qutb. For example, on Tawhid

154 Ajengan Masduki was announced as an Imam or new leader of DI on 4 November 1987 based on the

consultative council called Majelis Syura in Lampung. 155 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 86. Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 29. 156 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 236. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 67. 157 Interview with Farihin, 13 May 2019. Interview with Nasir Abas, 22 October 2019. According to Nasir Abas,

Imam Samudra did not finish his military academy after he left the camp. Farihin and Nasir Abas state that Imam

Samudra was advised by Hambali to join JI when he was in Malaysia. He agreed and pledged himself as the

member of JI. 158 Greg Fealy, “Militant Java-based Islamist movements,” 72. JI ideology was inspired by some Islamic scholars

and jihadist thinking like Muslim Brotherhood, Gama’a Islamiyah, Abdullah Azzam, Sa’id Salim al-Qathani,

Sa’id Hawwa and others.

43

(sovereignty of God), they believed that sovereignty belongs solely to God and rejected human

sovereignty. With this frame, both clerics rejected all rulers or governments who do not rule

under God’s law, and they referred to the rulers as Thagut.

Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir provided the intellectual leadership for JI. Both

clerics introduced a guidance book known as the General Guidelines for the Jemaah Islamiyah

Struggle (Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Jamaah Islamiyyah-PUPJI) in 1996. In general, this

guidance book outlines the group's structure, religious principles, plan, and insights into the

organization’s vision and mission, membership, and recruitment. This manifesto also defines

the ultimate goals, establishing Daulah Islamiyah, the stages, and the strategy to achieve it.159

As stipulated on the PUPJI, the long-term aim of JI’s goal was to create “Daulah Islamiyah” as

the first step to restore the global Islamic Caliphate. Therefore, this Islamic state's establishment

should be carried out gradually or persistently involving many parties, individuals, families,

and ummah (society). Once the Islamic community was ready, the jihad mussallah (armed

struggle) would occur, leading to the ultimate goal of achieving an Islamic State.160

Under the guideline of PUPJI, Abdullah Sungkar had prioritised the development of its

resources, the indoctrination and the recruitment of new personnel. The armed struggle is not

yet the priority but rather the empowerment of the members and organization. This manifesto

also formulates the gradual steps to be taken as a process to establish Daulah Islamiyah. First,

the need to strengthen the community’s faith (Quwwatul Aqidah). Second, the strengthening

of solidarity among the member and the JI community (Quwwatul Ukhuwwah). Once the

community’s faith and brotherhood are established, then the military capability will be

strengthened.161

JI adopted a new operational strategy known as Tandzim Sirri (secret organization).162 With

this blueprint, this organisation operated its programs and agenda clandestinely. Secrecy and

159 See Pedoman Umum Perjuangan Al-Jama’ah Al-Islamiyah (PUPJI). Majlis Qiyadah Markaziyah Al-Jama’ah

Al-Islamiyah, 30 May 1996. 160 See The PUPJI, Chapter II, 37. 161 Elena Pavlova, “Jemaah Islamiyah according to PUPJI,” in in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in

Southeast Asia, 5. 162 The PUPJI, Chapter II, 6.

44

discipline are essential elements that this group firmly imbued in all members, especially those

who obtained their military training overseas.163

In terms of territory, JI had a broader view of their goal compared to DI. To struggle to establish

an Islamic state in the country, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir also had a long-term

vision to create an Islamic Caliphate in the region encompassing Indonesia, Malaysia,

Singapore, Philippines, and Thailand. Within this idea, they divided three different territories

(Mantiqi), which included specific areas. Mantiqi I (Ula) covered Peninsular Malaysia and

Singapore; Mantiqi II (Tsani), which included Indonesia, and Mantiqi III (Tsalis) covered

Sabah (Malaysia), East Kalimantan, North Sulawesi, and Southern Mindanao.164

3.4.4. Osama bin Laden’s Al-Qaeda

While training and fighting with Abdul Rasul Sayyaf's group, a number of Indonesian fighters

had nurtured personal contact with Osama bin Laden and other jihadists from Arab countries.

For example, in 1998, Zulkarnaen, head of JI military operation, established relations with Abu

Hafs al Masri or Mohammed Atef, who served as an Al-Qaeda military leader and Osama bin

Laden’s deputy. Through this contact, Mohammed Atef offered Zulkarnaen the chance to use

Al-Qaeda’s military camps. 165 Zulkarnaen welcomed this offer and began to dispatch his

members to upgrade their military skills and leadership in the Al Faruq military camp in

Kandahar, Afghanistan. According to Ali Imron, Mukhlas was among the Indonesian jihadists

who went to Al Faruq camp and met Osama bin Laden. Through this meeting, it is said that

Mukhlas received US$ 30.000 to operate jihad in the Southeast Asia region.166

Abu Dujana asserts that he met Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan.167 He joined the military

academy in 1989. At that time, he was an ordinary soldier and he trained in Sayyaf’s camp,

while Osama was a field commander. Through several meetings, Abu Dujana observed that

163 Interviews with several Afghan veterans, 2019. 164 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 124-129. Interview with the author in 19 July 2019. Nasir Abas

corrects other scholars who mention that there has been Mantiqi IV covering Australia and Papua. Moreover, this

region is still considered as “Ukroh” since it has not yet fulfilled requirements in level of Mantiqi. 165

Justin Magouirk and Scott Atran, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s radical madrassah networks,” Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict 1, no. 1 (2008): 25–41. 166 Arif Wachjunadi, Misi Walet Hitam 09.11.05-15.45 Menguak Misteri Teroris Dr. Azhari (Black Swallow

Mission 09.11.05-15.45 Revealing the Mistery of Terorist Dr. Azhari) (Jakarta: PT Kompas Media Nusantara,

2017), 15. Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 245. 167 Dan Rivers, Accused Asian terror leader: Expect more blood, CNN, 26 June 2007,

https://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/06/25/abu.dujana/index.html. Accessed in 30 May 2020.

45

Osama was a respected figure committed to jihad to defend the Afghan people and the Muslims

worldwide. He began to receive a new interpretation of jihad from Osama that killing people

is permissible in the name of jihad.168

Several Indonesian jihadists also had experience fighting with Osama bin Laden in

Afghanistan. Hambali, Ahmad Roihan, Hamzah, and Muhklas were among the JI foreign

fighters involved in the “Joji” battle at the time the Soviet army attacked Osama bin Laden’s

camp in April 1987.169 Mukhlas claimed to meet Osama and recalled his participation in Joji

battle as a sweet memory as he states:170

In 1987 I met Sheikh Osama bin Laden in Joji, Afghanistan, when it was being attacked

by Russia; the snow was two meters high. When the mujahidin went on attack, I went

with them, and it was Osama bin Laden who […] led the mujahidin.

The connection between JI and Al-Qaeda among their personnel continued after the

Afghanistan war. Many Indonesian jihadists maintained contact with several key Al-Qaeda

figures even after they had returned home. Many claim that Hambali served as a liaison officer

between the two organizations. Several Al-Qaeda’s high ranks, such as, Faiz Bafana, the Al-

Qaeda treasurer, even developed contacts with JI fighters who had already returned home.171

In the interview with Afghan veteran, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, one of Al-Qaeda’s elites and

an initiator of the 9/11 attack, had developed relationships with several JI members; he visited

Indonesia to wage jihad against the West.172

3.4.5. Salafi Jihadi

The Afghanistan war in the 1980s became a breeding ground for transnational jihadists.173 The

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered Muslim condemnation and generated a massive influx

168 Ibid. 169 Interview with anonymous Afghan veteran, Jakarta, 2019. 170 ICG Asia Report N0 63. Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous, 26 August

2003. Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 208. 171 Zachary Abuza, “Tentacles of Terror: Al Qaeda's Southeast Asian Network,” Contemporary Southeast Asia,

24, no. 3 (2002): 427-465. Rolf Mowatt-Larssen, “Al-Qaeda Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat: Hype or

Reality? Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, January 2010.

file:///C:/Users/spra657/Desktop/al-qaeda-wmd-threat.pdf. 172 Interview with anonymous Afghan veteran, Jakarta, 2019. 173 See Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam. Translated by Anthony F. Robert. The Belknap Press

of Harvard University Press, United States of America, 1994. Oliver Roy, Islam and Resistance in Afghanistan

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

46

of international jihadists from different Muslim countries to wage jihad based on their political

goals. In his report, Ahmed Rashid, a Pakistani journalist, states that there were 35,000 radical

Islamists from 43 countries to fight on the side of Afghan Mujahidin between 1982-1992.174

Many militant groups also engaged in the conflict, such as, Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ),

Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Jamaah Islamiyah (JI).

Darul Islam maintained the Afghanistan war as a fertile ground to build and connect their

members with the transnational Islamist network. During the military training in Sadda,

Pakistan, they were able to interact with many international jihadists. This interaction

transformed them from local militants into global jihadists. They also began to adopt an

outward-looking rather than an inward-looking approach towards jihad.

Besides learning combat skills, DI members received further religious indoctrination. Most DI

combatants were required to listen to Islamic teaching, which relied on the text of Ibn Tamiya

and Hambali jurisprudence, where the scripture (Qur’an and Hadits) is interpreted more

literally or more strictly rather than by using juristic consensus (Ijma) and analogical reasoning

(Qiyas).175 As such, with this indoctrination, DI fighters had experienced ideology

transformation and adopted a new form of jihad known “Salafi jihadi” with the interpretation

of jihad as armed struggle.

Similar to many other transnational jihadists in Afghanistan, DI members also developed

networks or physical interactions with many world jihad ideologues. One of them, Abdullah

Azzam, was known as the founding father of global jihad. During their time in camp, they

attended religious teaching by Abdullah Azzam, the founder of the Maktab al-Khidamat

(Services Centre) in 1984.176

Abu Tholut recalls the time he interacted closely with Abdullah Azzam during his military

training in the 1980s. He claimed to develop a personal relationship with Azzam and respect

him as a spiritual jihad leader for many Mujahidin. With such intensive and continuous

meetings, Abu Tholut learned the interpretation of Islam, including jihad. Abu Tholut even

174 Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York:

Pantheon, 2004), 137. 175 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 45. Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 216. 176 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 216.

47

claimed to understand Abdullah Azzam’s jihad call better compared to his other comrades. He

says, “I spent eight years with him. So, I know more about him than Ustad Abdullah Sungkar

(the founder of JI).” 177

Before arriving in Afghanistan, most DI members had already known and idolized Abdullah

Azzam. His books on jihad had motivated them to wage jihad in Afghanistan. Among Azzam’s

writings, Ayatur Rahman Fi Jihadil Afghanistan (Signs of Ar-Rahman in the jihad of Afghan)

and “Tarbiyah Jihadi,” which had been translated into the Indonesian language by local

publishers.178 In his autobiography, Nasir Abas recalls that he witnessed many of the

Indonesian jihadists who had lived in exile in Malaysia in the 1980s, before heading to

Afghanistan, brought and studied many religious books, including Abdullah Azzam’s doctrine

on jihad.179

Through interviews with several Afghan veterans, I found that Azzam’s thoughts on jihad

became their main inspiration. They believed that jihad was an obligation to defend their

Afghan Muslim brothers who were persecuted by infidels.180 Some interviewees also believed

that miracles occurred during the war. One of my interviewees claimed to have seen a

supernatural phenomenon that happened to his comrade, who died as a martyr in the

battlefield.181

Abdullah Azzam became a central figure of jihad ideologue for many Indonesian jihadists.

Imam Samudra claimed in his autobiography that Abdullah Azzam’s book “Ayatur Rahman Fi

Jihadil Afghanistan,” on jihad, had significantly changed his life. When he was still sixteen-

years-old, he read Azzam’s book and was influenced to wage jihad in Afghanistan. He explains

that:

177 Noor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization,” (PhD

diss., Monash University, 2018),195. 178 The book “Ayatur Rahman Fi Jihadil Afghanistan” is translated into Indonesian language with the title of

“Perang Afghanistan, while “Tarbiyah Jihadi” was a collection of Abdullah Azzam’s Islamic preachings. See,

Abdullah Azzam, Perang Afghanistan (Jakarta: Gema Insani Press, 1991). 179 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 28. 180 Noor Huda Ismail, Temanku teroris? 174. Interview with the author. Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris!

(I fight terrorist!) (Solo: Jazera, 2004), 41. 181 Interview with Mubaroq, 7 August 2019.

48

When I know that ‘miracle book,’ I never stop praying to God to gather me with those

Afghan Mujahidin and choose me as a martyr. To sharpen and strengthen my prayer, I

stopped watching TV and listening to any music from that moment.182

Abdullah Azzam is not the only reference on jihad ideology for Indonesian combatants. They

also read the writings of jihad ideologues, such as, Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al Banna, Abdul Qadir

Abdul Aziz, and Abdus Salam Faraj. These jihad ideologues had shaped their understanding

of jihad into a more radical and revolutionary way of living. For example, through the book

“Al-Faridhah al-Ghaibah” (The Neglected Duty) by Abdus Salam Faraj, many of them believed

that jihad becomes equal to the important pillars of Islam.183 With this reference, many also

believed that jihad is more important than other pillars of Islam, such as, the hajj, zakat

(almsgiving), fasting, and prayers.

The interaction with many radical jihadi groups during their military training in Pakistan and

Afghanistan also influenced DI/JI’s interpretation of certain texts and events. The construction

of jihad endorsed by Abdullah Azzam influenced how they framed the conflict, including

defining the enemy of Islam and the necessity of jihad fisabilillah.

Abdullah Azzam endorsed “defensive jihad” rather than “offensive jihad.” Military activity

was conducted to defend the Islamic community against intruders in Afghanistan, Kashmir,

Palestine, and in other Muslim countries. The narrative of jihad is broader, transnational, and

engages all Muslims without exception. The jihad is an obligation (fard ain) for all Muslims,

significantly to free Muslim land occupied by Christians. As Azzam states:

Jihad must not be abandoned until Allah alone is worshiped. Jihad continues until

Allah’s Word is raised high. Jihad until all the oppressed peoples are freed. Jihad to

protect our dignity and restore our occupied lands. Jihad is the way of everlasting

glory.184

There have been at least two stages of ideological transformations experienced by Indonesian

jihadists who went to Afghanistan. The first conversion occurred at the time that most DI

182 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Terorist!, 42. 183 The five pillars of Islam involve the profession of faith (shahada), prayer (sholat), social taxation (zakat),

fasting (saum), and pilgrimage (hajj). 184 Andrew McGregor. “Jihad and the Rifle Alone: Abdullah Azzam and the Islamist Revolution.” Journal of

Conflict Studies 23 no.2 (2003):92-113.

49

members had to leave their ideology and convert to JI membership after the split in 1993. With

this fragmentation, they began revising DI doctrines, such as, Rubiyah, Mulkiyah, and Uluhiyah

(RMU).185 They also began to purify their Islamic practices and beliefs derived from traditional

Islamic and mysticism (Tharekat). They then converted into Salafi teaching, which interprets

Islam as more conservative and puritan. They also began to change their notion from

“Indonesia-centric” jihad to transnational or global jihad.

The second ideological shift occurred after they began to adopt a new jihad definition known

as Salafi jihadi. Solahudin argues that the Afghanistan war had radicalised the ideology of

Indonesian foreign fighters. Specifically, they began to correct their previous understanding of

jihad. There is no other definition of jihad except war (Qital). They also believed that jihad was

an obligation (fard ain) for all Muslims, and it became a defensive jihad while unbelievers

occupied the lands of Islamic countries.186

3.5. After Training and Fighting

The conflict among Mujahidin factions after the fall of the Afghan communist government in

1992 and the Taliban's emergence in 1994 led JI members to discontinue their military training

in Towrkham. According to Ali Imron, the Taliban began attacking Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s

military camp and any other Mujahidin groups who refused to join. As a result, Abdullah

Sungkar finally decided to close and disband its training camp in Towrkham and returned it to

Abdullah Rasul Sayyaf.187

The last contingent of JI jihadists left Afghanistan in 1995. Ali Imron states that he was among

the last group who left Towrkham camp and handed it over to Ittihad Islami Tandzim.

Furthermore, he went to Peshawar, Pakistan, and joined Jamaah Islamiyah’s office

representative in Pabbi, Pakistan, where he reunited with other members, such as, Abu Dujana,

Sa’ad al Ghazali, and Shohib.188

185 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 197. Tawhid Mulkiyah refers to God is the highest, who creates the universe,

including human beings. While Tawhid Mulkiyah is a belief that Islam as the only life guidance, as stated in

Qur’an and Hadith. With this Tawhid, people who did not implement this tawhid is considered as Jahiliya as

referred to any rules or law created by human beings. Moreover, tawhid Uluhiyah is a belief that God is the only

or the most to be worshiped. 186 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 216. See also, Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 35, 51. 187 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 23-24. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 68. 188 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 24.

50

There was no fixed number of returning Indonesian jihadists who previously joined the

Afghanistan War. Ayip Syafruddin, a spokesman of the Laskar Jihad Ahlusunnah Wal Jamaah

(Jihad Army), claimed that around 400 Afghan foreign fighters had returned home.189

Similarly, Solahudin put the figure between 200-300 veterans who returned home after the

conflict.190

Most of the DI/JI returnees left Afghanistan or Pakistan and headed back to the home country.

Therefore, some returnees went to Malaysia to join Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir,

who operated the JI headquarters in Negeri Sembilan (1993-1999). Mustaqim was teaching

Islam in Lukmanul Hakim Islamic boarding school located in Johor Baru while Zulkarnain

lived in Pahang as the head of JI’s military division. In addition, Hambali, the mastermind of

terror attacks in the 2000s, lived in Selangor, Malaysia, and started a small business at the

Klang market while recruiting new members.191

Abdullah Sungkar managed to take control of the deployment of his Afghan veterans in

different assignments. While some members, such as, Abu Tholut, Nasir Abas, Qatadah,

Ukasyah, Tamim, and Ma’mar were assigned as trainers in Pakistan, others were assigned to

Mindanao, the Philippines, as JI successfully established the military camp, known as the

“Hudaibiyah camp” in 1994.192

Overall, most JI fighters returned to Indonesia once they finished their military training; they

were now tasked with different assignments. Some returnees with religious knowledge were

assigned to teach in several Islamic religious boarding schools (Pesantren) affiliated with JI,

such as, Pondok Al-Mu’min, Ngruki Solo and Al Islam, Lamongan, East Java. For instance,

Ali Imron, an Afghan veteran who returned in 1996, was tasked with teaching Islam in the Al-

Islam boarding school in Lamongan, where he came from originally.193

Upon their arrival in the home country, there were unwritten rules that applied to all of the

returnees. In the interview, Mubaroq stated that they could reintegrate into society without

189 Edy Budiyarso, “Indonesia's Afghan-Trained Mujahideen.” Tempo, 05 Oct 2001, Retrieved from

https://www.library.ohio.edu/indopubs/2001/10/05/0040.html. 190 Interview with Solahudin, 22 August 2019. 191 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 53. 192 Interview with Nasir Abas. Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 21. 193 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 31.

51

revealing their identity as a member of JI and Afghan veterans. He further recalls the time that

Abdullah Sungkar prohibited all returnees from carrying home their military uniforms, guns,

and even the academy’s graduation certificates.194 While performing routine daily activities,

all returnees had to keep in contact to strengthen the JI networks. Farihin also recalls that each

returnee was requested to recruit ten new numbers.195

Besides recruiting new members and trained local fighters, several Afghan veterans with

specific military skills were selected as “Special Forces” (Laskar Khos). Established in 1998,

this squad was mainly tasked with carrying out special missions, such as, the protection of the

JI territory (Qoidah Aminah) while they launched an armed rebellion against the Indonesian

state. Thus, this group was also designed to carry out armed jihad preparations, such as,

collecting arms and explosives.196 Among those Afghan veterans who joined this special unit

were Farihin, Sawad, Ali Imron, Zuhroni, and others.197

Most Afghan veterans enjoyed the highest status or privileged positions in the internal social

networks after they returned. Their hierarchy is higher compared to local jihadi members who

had never engaged in jihad overseas. Not only posed a heroic image as “Mujahidin” with

combat experience, they also received moral and intellectual acknowledgments. With this

status, many of them remained respectable figures in the JI organizational structure or

hierarchy, such as, the heads of the Syura Council (Majelis Syura), the military affairs, the

brigade (Mantiqi), battalion (Wakalah), and companies (Khatibah). For instance, Hambali and

Mukhlas, both Afghan veterans, were appointed as the head of Mantiqi 1. While Nuaim and

Abu Fateh served as the head of Mantiqi 2, Abu Tholut was assigned as the head of Mantiqi

3.198 Furthermore, Abu Rusydan, an Afghan veteran, who was previously appointed as the

Syura Council head, was selected as the chief of JI. He replaced Abu Bakar Bashir, who was

arrested by the authorities after the Bali bombing in 2002.

194 Interview with Mubaroq, 7 August 2019. 195 Interview with Farihin, 13 May 2019. 196 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 246-247. Ali Imran, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 32. Interview with an Afghan

veteran, 2019. 197 Ibid. 198 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 20. Interview with the author, 19 July 2019. See also,

Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 56. Almost the central position or the Amir of JI

was held by Afghan veterans. After replacing Abu Bakar Bashir as JI’s leader in 2002, Abu Rusdan was arrested

by Indonesian authority in 2004 and replaced by Adung, an Afghan veteran who was also arrested by police in

2004. The predecessor of Adung was Zarkasih, an Afghan veteran who became JI’s caretaker in 2004. He was

arrested by the Indonesian security in 2007.

52

Moreover, many Afghan veterans who were not under DI or JI had also returned home after

the conflict. Jafar Umar Thalib, who previously joined Jamil ar Rahman group, also returned.

Upon his arrival, he established an Islamic boarding house (Pesantren) in 1993 named

“Ihya’As Sunnah,” located in Yogyakarta. He taught Salafi in his school and gave a stricter

and a more conservative interpretation to Islamic texts. Another veteran, Abu Nida, also

returned home in 1993. He began to build an Islamic foundation that was known as “At-Turots

Al-Islamy,” in Yogyakarta. Through this organization, he engaged in religious preaching

(da’wah) on Salafi and social affairs.

3.6. Violent Activities

It is thought-provoking that all of the Afghan veterans, whether they were associated with DI,

JI, or with other Salafi groups, did not immediately engage in violent attacks after they returned

in the 1990s. Initially, only a small minority of returnees began to launch terror attacks in late

2000, more than ten years after their return to Indonesia. Why did they not launch an attack?

Furthermore, what are the factors that made them postpone their armed jihad at home?

Given their training and militancy level, Afghan veterans' absence of atrocious acts in the home

country for almost a decade is puzzling. Moreover, it can be inferred that the military skills and

combat experience they obtained in the battleground had not yet triggered them to engage in

terror activities. In addition, their jihad doctrine “Salafi jihadi” had not automatically triggered

them to wage armed jihad against the Suharto secular government viewed as thogut (infidel).

The domestic political environment in the late 1990s had provided the opportunity for many

Afghan returnees to engage in violent activism. The first juncture occurred as Suharto's regime

lost power in 1999 after the country was hit by the economic recession, followed by political

unrest and waves of demonstrations demanding him to surrender his authority. This political

unrest became a critical moment for the JI leaders and Afghan veterans to reactivate their

struggle.

To respond to the political changes in the home country, Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar

Bashir decided to return home after living in exile for more than a decade. They relocated to

Jemaah Islamiyah’s headquarters from Johor Baru, Malaysia, and then to Solo in Indonesia.

53

With this political transition in Jakarta, Abdullah Sungkar believed that they would benefit

from carrying out the political agenda of the group, including recruiting new members.199

Many Afghan veterans viewed the political transition in their home country in 1999 as the right

opportunity to take action. For many of them, the end of an authoritarian regime gave a signal

that the path of jihad would come soon. Ali Imron believed that the armed jihad could be carried

out soon. Furthermore, he even predicted that political unrest would occur following the fall of

the Suharto regime.

When the regime of New Order collapsed in May 1998, I had predicted that there would be

much political unrest or even riots. On the other side, the end of New Order gave me a new

hope, which is the opening of jihad fisabilillah somewhere so that it would become a way

to reduce idolatry, immorality, and injustice.200

However, Suharto's fall did not still trigger the JI and its military groups to launch violent

activism through armed jihad. Interestingly, Abdullah Sungkar did not make an order (fatwa)

to take any action. He requested his Afghan veterans to be inactive and preferred to wait and

see and monitor further political development.

3.6.1. Ambon Conflict

The Ambon conflict, which erupted at the beginning of 1999, became a critical moment for

Afghan veterans to begin their armed jihad. This inter-religious clash was initially sparked in

Ambon City, the Province of Maluku, located in Indonesia's eastern part. It was caused by a

fight between a local Bugis Muslim migrant and the Christian Ambon.201 This conflict

escalated into a mass riot and began to spread in several areas in the middle of 1999, which

became the bloodiest and longest sectarian conflict that has ever happened in Indonesia.

The Ambon conflict triggered emotions and grievances over the perceived persecution of

Muslims. Some perceived the conflict as a new theater of jihad. They had been waiting for such

199 Greg Fealy, “Militant Java-based Islamist Movement,” 63-75. 200 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 55. 201 Chris Wilson, Ethno religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God, 43. Sumanto Al Qurtuby, Religious

Violence and Conciliation in Indonesia: Christians and Muslims in the Moluccas, 22.

54

an event for years. Their idea was not only to defend their local Muslim brothers, they also

aimed to take an act of revenge against Christians who persecuted the local Muslims.202

Afghan veterans who regrouped in JI experienced friction because of the debates that ensued

on how to respond to the Ambon conflict. A heated discussion erupted among them about

whether they should engage in this conflict.203 Similar to Achmad Roichan, some members

argued that JI should not take part because the Ambon conflict was just political friction. Their

involvement could jeopardise the long-term goal of establishing an Islamic State as stipulated

in PUPJI. Therefore, he argued that JI was not ready to engage in conflict and instead should

build its social base through education and training before jihad. Several seniors in Mantiqi 2

argued that Ambon was not a religious conflict. rather a political one where jihad was not

needed. On the other side, many Afghan veterans like Abu Tholut argued that it was timely to

wage jihad since the Muslims in Ambon were persecuted, attacked, and killed by Christians.204

Abdullah Sungkar initially sent his members to observe the Ambon conflict to decide whether

jihad was required in this region. A small team consisting of several Afghan alumnae, such as,

Ali Imron, Nurudin, and Saifudin embarked on the short visit to see the ground. Ali Imron

explained that he went to Ambon to investigate the conflict. He said, “From what I saw, and

the stories I heard, I got the impression that they needed lessons to prepare themselves – just

some basic lessons on how to use a gun and how to make bombs, but the most important was

fiqh jihad.”205

JI remained factionalised over which role they should play in the conflict. They failed to come

up with a single plan during their meeting in Solo in June 1999. An intense debate occurred

with no single initiative reached in the discussion. Mostly Afghan veterans argued that JI had

to participate in the Ambon conflict as stated in the guideline book to defend Ambon's Muslims

as ‘defensive jihad.’ Some of them criticised Zulkarnaen and Abu Fatih, the heads of JI

markaziyah and Mantiqi 2, respectively, as they were considered too slow and bureaucratic to

respond to the crisis.206

202 Interviews with several Afghan veterans, 2019. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies,

67. 203

See, Kirsten E. Schulze. “From Ambon to Poso: Comparative and Evolutionary Aspects of Local Jihad in

Indonesia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 41, 1 (2019), 35-62. 204 Ibid 205 Ibid 206 Ibid

55

Amidst the disagreement among the JI elites, several impatient Afghan veterans began to take

individual initiative to wage jihad in Ambon. For example, Aris Munandar established

KOMPAK (Komite Aksi Penanggulangan Akibat Krisis), a humanitarian organization, to help

local Muslims in Ambon. KOMPAK, in its operations, began to engage several Afghan

veterans, such as, Abu Jibril, Farihin, Aris Munandar, Ali Imron, and others. Abu Jibril, who

established Laskar Mujahidin (Mujahidin Force), revealed that their participation with other

Afghan veterans in Ambon was not part of the official programs of JI, rather it was a collective

decision. He argued that Ambon was jihad ‘fard ain’ (an individual obligation) that he did not

necessarily receive permission from Mantiqi 2. Furthermore, he felt obliged since he had the

military capability and combat experience.207

JI members had also individually engaged in the Ambon conflict by establishing military

camps. One of them on the island of Seram, was led by Zurkarnaen and Hambali. They

involved several Afghan veterans as military instructors, such as, Ali Imron and Mubarok.208

To finance this camp, Hambali was reported to receive financial assistance from Al-Qaeda and

Mantiqi 1.209 According to Ali Imron, there had been approximately 200 local Muslims in

Maluku, and other transnational jihadists who had joined in this training for a short military

course, such as, weaponry, military tactics, and making a small bomb.210

Besides JI Afghan veterans, there were other foreign fighters who had also joined in the Ambon

conflict. Jafar Abu Thalib, who had previously joined the Gulbuddin Hekmatyar group during

the Afghanistan war, also participated in the conflict by establishing paramilitary arms called

“Laskar Jihad” (Jihad Army) in Yogyakarta. In the series of mass gatherings, he claimed the

government failed to protect Muslims in Ambon. To respond to this situation, Jafar Abu Thalib

urged all Muslims in Indonesia to help the persecuted local Muslims in Ambon.

During the conflict, Jafar Abu Thalib recruited thousands of militias to wage a holy jihad

against Christians on the Maluku islands in 1999. In 2000, he dispatched around 3000 to 5000

207 Ibid 208 Muhammad Tito Karniavan, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 68. 209 Ibid., 67. 210 Ibid., 68.

56

militias from Java, Sumatra, and the other islands to wage the jihad war.211 He claimed that

jihad was required since the enemy of Islam had already been declared, while the government

failed to protect and save the people.

We are now being attacked by Christian enemies who desire to remove us from the face

of the earth. Therefore, we have to answer this challenge with jihad fi sabil Allah. Don’t

think of any other alternatives. We do not want to be colonized. If we wage a war

against them, we will retain our dignity. That is the only choice.212

Another ex-Afghan jihadist, Abu Jibril alias M Iqbal had also established a paramilitary group

called the “Laskar Mujahidin Indonesia” (the Indonesian Holy Warrior Paramilitary) in 1999.

Although the number was about 500 combatants, it was much smaller than the Laskar Jihad,

and they were better armed and more disciplined.213 With the participation and assistance of

Laskar Jihad, local Muslim fighters were gradually able to turn the conflicts in their favor and

they were able to easily defeat the Christian militias in several clashes.214

3.6.2. The Poso Conflict

The sectarian conflict between Muslims and Christians occurred in Poso, Central Sulawesi at

the beginning of 2000. This conflict triggered further debate for internal members in JI. Unlike

the Ambon conflict, several Afghan veterans made a bold decision that they must participate

in the Poso conflict. As they decided to carry out armed jihad, Abu Tholut was appointed the

head of the mission known as the “Uhud Project” to recruit and send hundreds of militias to

Poso to wage jihad against Christians.

Ali Imron, in his autobiography, asserts that sectarian conflict in Poso did trigger him and his

comrades to engage in jihad. He claims that the conflict was emotional for them as they were

aggrieved to see thousands of their Muslim brothers persecuted by Christians. An attack by

Christians against Muslims who celebrated “Idul Fitri” during the Ambon conflict on 19

211 Chris Wilson, Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia: From Soil to God, 155. Chris Wilson, “Indonesia and

Transnational Terrorism,” Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Group, 11 October 2001.

https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Ar

chive/CIB/cib0102/02CIB06, assessed in 12 March 2019; Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 70.

See also Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 95. Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad: Islam, Militancy, and the Quest for

Identity in Post-New Order Indonesia, 186. 212 Noorhaidi Hasan, Laskar Jihad, 194. 213 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 146. 214 Chris Wilson, Ethno-Religious Violence in Indonesia, 155.

57

January 1999 and thus Wali Songo Islamic Boarding School in Poso on 28 May 2000 were

among the occasions that triggered their jihad.215 Furthermore, Ali Imron recalls that the

conflict made Afghan veterans believe a theater to start a jihad had already opened.

Although the conflict had nothing to do with our group (Jemaah Islamiyah), the conflict

gives us new hope and provides us to gain a moment of jihad and trigger our spirit to

carry out jihad, which we have been waiting for, and we looked for it.216

Similarly, in his memoir, Imam Samudra also recounted his grievances, anger, and humiliation

when he remembered Christians massacred hundreds of Muslims in Ambon and Poso. He

believed that jihad was needed in this communal conflict, and this tragedy should remind all

Muslims that Islam should be must be upheld by the sword.

Approximately 200 students in the Walisongo Islamic Boarding School in Poso had

been killed and brutally butchered by the crusaders with their puppets named Tibo. In

Ambon, while carrying out Eid al-Fitr in 1999, hundreds of men and women Muslim

were attacked with grenades and spears, their stomachs were cut open, chopped, and

burned by crusaders’s puppet named RMS.217

From the narrative of Ali Imron and Imam Samudra, it can be said that the Ambon and Poso

conflicts became triggering events for the majority of Afghan veterans to engage in violent

acts. Especially with regard to the Poso conflict, most of them shared a common view that jihad

was urgently needed. The jihad in Poso was viewed as a defensive jihad, an obligation that

should not be postponed because hundreds of Muslims were tyrannized and killed by

Christians. Abu Rusdan supported this idea as he explained that jihad to defend Muslims was

an obligation to defend Islam against Christians who persecuted them, “the main thing for JI

with respect to the conflict in Ambon and Poso was the defense of the Muslims there. We were

motivated to go there because we wanted to defend our brothers and defend our religion.”218

The Ambon and Poso conflict successfully activated many Afghan veterans to engage in

terrorism as an act of retaliation or revenge against Christians. The central mastermind,

215 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 98. There were approximately 200 Muslims killed in the Wali Songo

Pesantren. 216 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 56. 217 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris!, 233-234. The RMS or the Republic of South Maluku declared its

independence in 1950 from Indonesia. 218 Kirsten E. Schulze, “From Ambon to Poso: comparative and evolutionary aspects of local jihad in

Indonesia.” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 41 no. 1 (2019): 35-62.

58

Hambali, argued that the attacks of Christians against Muslims in Ambon had to be retaliated

based on the doctrine of qisas. He further stated that if Ambon Christians were able to attack

Muslims during the special day “Idul Fitri,” so they would also attack them on their special day

– Christmas.219 To initiate his plan, Hambali recruited several Afghan veterans, such as, Ali

Imron, Mubarok, Imam Samudra, and other JI members to launch attacks targeting churches

on Christmas Eve of 2000. 220 They coordinated with their networks in several provinces to

carry out the attacks under the operation of “Immatul Kuffar,” which means the operation to

quell infidel leaders.221

The attacks occurred on 24 December 2000 during the preparation for Christmas. More than

38 churches located in 11 cities in Indonesia, such as, Bandung, Pekanbaru, Batam, Riau,

Medan, and Mojokerto, became the target of attacks to terrorise local Christians. 222 This series

of bombings killed 19 people and injured 120 others, including the perpetrator, Jabir, who was

Hambali’s friend.223 However, Hambali had a broader agenda to open a new theater of jihad as

a way to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia.224 One of the perpetrator's testimony

highlighted that church bombings' operations were a way to create a new front for jihad.225 This

church's bombing aimed to create chaos that would facilitate a broader jihad.

The attacks on Christian churches triggered not only condemnation from Muslims but also

from some JI members, including Afghan veterans. Based on Faiz Abu Bakar Bafana’s

interrogation deposition, Mantiqi II (Tsani) rejected the bombing operations because it targeted

churches which were prohibited in Islam.226 Ali Imron regretted his involvement in the

bombing operations as unlawful and contradicting the purpose of jihad.227

219 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 65. 220 Muhammad Tito Karniavan, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: The Case of Al-Jamaah Al-Islamiyyah and

the Radicalization of the Poso Conflict, 200-2007. (London: Imperial College Press), 70. 221 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 68-72. Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 257. 222 ICG Asia Report No 63. Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous, 26 August

2003; Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 259. Nasir Abas, in “Peneliti: Terorisme pada Demo 4 November 2016”

(scholars: terrorism in demonstration in 4 November 2016) retrieved from

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLM_yJOV60o 223 Justin Magouirka and Scott Atran, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s radical madrassah networks.” Journal of Dynamics

of Asymmetric Conflict, 1, no. 1 (2008): 25–41. 224 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 260. 225 Ibid., 259. 226 Ibid., 261, 272. 227 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 233.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oLM_yJOV60o

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3.6.3. New jihad call by Al-Qaeda

Besides the Poso and Ambon communal conflicts, the United States' military invasion in

Afghanistan and Osama bin Laden’s fatwa on jihad also influenced Afghan veterans'

involvement in engaging in violent activities. On 23 February 1998, Osama bin Laden released

a fatwa “World Islamic Front Combating Jews and Crusaders,” calling upon Muslims around

the world to kill Americans and its allies, civilians or military officers, wherever and whenever

they can.228 Many Afghan veterans and JI members heard this fatwa in 1999, which changed

jihad disposition from domestic to transnational. It shifted the target of jihad from ‘near enemy’

to ‘far enemy.’229

Abdullah Sungkar did not initially support or endorse the call to jihad by Osama bin Laden. He

accompanied Abu Bakar Bashir to Afghanistan in 1998 to meet Osama bin Laden to discuss

the next stage of jihad following the Soviet withdrawal. In the meeting, Osama bin Laden

argued that jihad should be continued in the Middle East, especially Jazirah Arab, since the

Western powers still occupied it. To justify his argument, Osama bin Laden stated as follows:

Suppose the Arabian Peninsula, as Islam's origin (masdaru diinil Islam) and land of

Islam’s holiest places, is successfully liberated. In that case, both its land and its wealth,

from the grip of the American unbeliever, then God willing it will be able to smooth

the struggle to uphold the Islamic faith all over Allah’s earth. It is highly probable that

one reason for the stagnation and difficulty in upholding the Islamic faith everywhere

is that the American kuffar (unbelievers) are still treading on the Arabian Peninsula.230

Abdullah Sungkar remained firm and did not change his mind even when Hambali tried to

influence him to answer Osama's jihad call. He remained silent; neither did he agree nor reject

Osama bin Laden’s jihad call, and also he gave no fatwa or statement until he died in 1999.231

The silent gesture of Abdullah Sungkar suggests that he was not interested and still focused on

waging jihad against the secular government and JI’s ultimate goal to establish an Islamic State

(Daulah Islamiyah) rather than to engage a broader jihad against a far enemy. The main enemy

was still the government of Indonesia, which was known as the “near enemy.”

228 Mohammed M. Hafez. Why Muslims Rebel (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc, 2003), 187. 229 Nasir Abas, Melawan Pemikiran Aksi Bom Imam Samudra & Noordin M. Top (Fighting against of the

Bombs of Imam Samudra and Noordin M.Top) (Jakarta: Grafindo, 2008), 30. 230 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 249. 231 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2 March 2019. Abdullah Sungkar died on 23 October 1999 because of heart

problem.

60

Abu Bakar Bashir succeeded Abdullah Sungkar after his death. 232 This transfer of power was

significant to the JI as an organisation and other Indonesian returning jihadists. According to

several Afghan veterans, Abu Bakar Bashir could not unify and give his members firm

guidance and directions. Many of them also viewed him just as a cleric, not as a charismatic

and visionary leader like his predecessor.233

The new leadership model of Abu Bakar Bashir led to many JI members' skepticism, even a

debate among senior members.234 The cynicism only grew following his appointment as the

leader of Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (MMI) (or the Indonesian Holy Warriors Council) in

2000. This new appointment triggered rejections and heated debate among JI internal members

because they saw that his new position as an MMI leader contradicted JI’s notion as a

clandestine organisation (Tandzim Sirri), although both organisations sought the

implementation of sharia in Indonesia.235

Hambali, who at that time was the head of Mantiqi 1, took the lead in advocating the call to

jihad by Osama bin Laden. He argued that jihad should be prioritised to liberate the Arabian

Peninsula. To justify his argument, he referred to the Prophet Muhammad's actions when he

asked his followers to free the Arabian Peninsula from the infidels as the priority. With this

fact, Hambali argued that jihad against the United States should not be postponed without any

reason. 236

Abu Bakar Bashir’s weak leadership failed to stop Hambali and his companions’ agenda.

Together with Imam Samudra, Mukhlas, Dulmatin, and other supporters, mostly from Mantiqi

1 (Malaysia and Singapore), Hambali proposed an offensive jihad and considered the home

country a zone of conflict (darul harb). Inspired by Al-Qaeda's ideology and Osama bin

Laden’s fatwa, he urged it was time to engage in armed jihad targeting Western interests and

Christians.

232 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 115. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist

Insurgencies, 52. Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 32. Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 84. 233 Interview with several Afghan veterans, 2019. 234 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 33. 235 Interview with an Afghanistan veteran, 2 March 2019. 236 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 250.

61

Abu Bakar Bashir failed to mediate the divided thinking regarding jihad among JI members.

Unlike Abdullah Sungkar, who was firm and straightforward, Bashir could not set a firm

position and establish a red line. This situation created more confusion, especially for those

who were in the field operation. Hambali took advantage of this situation and began to change

the orientation of the jihad struggle of JI.

A new jihad propagated by Osama bin Laden sparked a hot debate among the Afghan veterans.

Hambali, Zulkarnaen, and Muhaimin Zahya were among the JI elites who tried to get approval

about Osama bin Laden’s fatwa. To obtain support, they went to Mindanao in 1999 and met

with Salamat Hasyim, the MILF leader, to receive his perspective or order (fatwa). Through

this discussion, Salamat Hasyim states, “That fatwa is good, but I cannot implement it here

(Mindanao).”237 Nasir Abas, who also attended this meeting, interpreted Salamat Hasyim’s

response as a soft rejection of Osama bin Laden’s jihad call. Salamat Hasyim’s statement could

also be interpreted that he still focused on his primary jihad to establish an Islamic state in

Mindanao.238

Under Hambali's leadership, several Afghan veterans began to carry out a deadly campaign

against Western interests rather than the secular authorities. They began to set up a plan and

involved several JI members. The first and the most lethal attack occurred in 2002 when they

carried out violent attacks by bombing two tourist destinations, Paddy's Pub and the Sari Club.

The attack killed 202 people and injured hundreds of people.239 Most of the perpetrators

involved directly in the attacks were Afghan veterans.240

After Hambali's arrest in August 2003, other JI members affiliated with Al Qaeda, such as,

Noordin M Top and Dr. Azhari, continued their terrorist attacks in Indonesia until 2005.

Several places associated with Western symbols became the assaults' target, such as. the JW

Marriot Hotel bombing in 2003, the Australian Embassy bombing in 2004, and the second Bali

bombing on 1 October 2005. With this series of attacks with high casualties and damages, JI

was seen as the key terrorist group or the greatest threat to Southeast Asia.

237 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2 March 2019. See also Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 251. 238 Interview with Nasir Abas, 5 November 2019. 239 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 228. 240 The perpetrators are Afghan alumnae such as Ali Gufron, Abdul Ghoni, Mubarok, Imam Samudra, Ali

Imron, Sawad, Umar Patek, Dul Matin, and Dr. Azhari bin Husin (Malaysian). Amrozi, Idris, Isa and Arsana

have never trained and fought as foreign fighters. See, Arief Wachjunadi, Misi Walet Hitam, xxvii, 78.

62

Many other Afghan veterans remained inactive and did not join Hambali’s terror campaigns in

targeting Western interests in Indonesia. Similar to Abu Tholut, Abu Rusydan, and Nasir Abas,

several key jihadi members have shown their rejection as the bombings contradicted and

brought negative consequences to JI’s long-term goal. During my interview, an Afghan veteran

rejected Hambali’s agenda and accused him of treachery and even of hijacking JI’s main

agenda. He states that:

I think Hambali was not loyal to JI because to have his ambition to implement a jihad

call by Osama bin Laden. He violated internal bureaucracy. His authority is in Mantiqi

I, not in Mantiqi II. Furthermore, he was not honest by using Mantiqi I. Because he

gained a green light as he said that the Amir (Abu Bakar Bashir) agreed, so he used

Mantiqi I and Laskar Khost.241

Ali Imron, in his memoir, states that he was initially reluctant to participate in the Bali bombing

in 2002. He even questioned his brother Mukhlas, one of the masterminds of the attack, on the

legality of targeting the civilians, as Bali was not a battle zone. He also raised a clarification

about whether all the members had agreed and supported the bombing plan. Therefore,

Mukhlas cynically replied to his questions with displeasure in his intonations and asked him

just to carry out the plan, “If we inform this to those JI members, it is clear that not all of them

would agree on this decision, this is not your business.”242 In his memoir, Ali Imron says:

Actually, my involvement in several bombing operations was based on my trust to my

seniors in jamaah. And, I considered the bombing operations are part of JI’s program,

which was agreed upon. Although I did not know many things about JI, I feel I am part

of it, so I have to join JI's program. If the seniors whom I believed were not carrying

out the program of jamaah but did their own program so it should be their

responsibilities.”243

Through the series of interviews with Ali Imron, he confirmed his belief of “walla al bara,

especially “wala,” (loyalty) to the groups and leaders. With this doctrine, he positioned himself

as a junior member who was obliged to obey and follow the instruction given from a leader

241 Interview with an anonymous Afghanistan veteran, Jakarta, 2019. 242 Interview with Ali Imron, 2019. See also Arif Wachjunadi, Misi Walet Hitam, 19. 243 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 34.

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(Mukhlas) as he said, “My loyalty (wala) to Mukhlas as my senior in the group, and therefore

I believed he was more knowledgeable than myself.”244

Similar to Ali Imron, Umar Patek also asserted that the spirit of solidarity gave him no option

except to be involved in the Bali bombing in 2002. He initially argued against Mukhlas’s idea

to target civilians in the name of jihad. Therefore, Mukhlas ignored his protest and insisted that

he engage. In the meantime, the process of bomb-making had reached 90 percent when he

hesitated to be involved. So, on the condition related to the sense of solidarity as the

Afghanistan veterans and the group member, Umar Patek continued the plan and assembled

the bomb amounting to one ton.245

3.6.4. Arms Cache

While many Afghanistan veterans engaged in direct bombing operations, many also committed

terrorism by possessing illegal weapons and explosives after they returned home. Abu Dujana,

Abu Tholut, and Agus Dwikarna were among the Afghanistan veterans who were arrested by

the Indonesian police because they hid weapons, ammunition, and explosives materials,

although they had not yet used them in violent acts. Overall, they believed that the possession

of those illegal materials were as a part of their preparation for future armed jihad (idad) at

home.

Shortly after the Bali bombing's main perpetrators in 2002 were arrested, the Indonesian police

began to capture other JI members. A senior Afghan veteran, Abu Tholut, was apprehended in

2003, which gave more information to the Indonesian police to reveal his network, including

his small cell in Semarang. In a rented house addressed to Jalan Taman Sri Rejeki, four

Mindanao veterans under the protégé of Abu Tholut were arrested. The police found a massive

stock, approximately one-ton of explosives material were kept by this group. Abu Dujana, the

head of JI's military wing, was arrested in 2007 by the Densus 88 on charges of his involvement

in Noordin M Top’s series of bombing operations during 2003-2006. When the police arrested

him, they found many weapons in his sanctuaries, such as, M-16s, ammunition, and explosives.

244 Interview with Ali Imron, 29 January 2020. 245 Arif Wachjunadi, Misi Wallet Hitam, 37.

64

During the trial, Abu Dujana admitted to possessing weapons and explosives, and many others

had been sent to Poso during the conflict.246

3.7. Conclusion

This chapter has examined of the waves of hundreds of Indonesian men who trained and fought

during the Afghanistan war. It shows that there were different radical groups that engaged in

this war with diverse ideologies, motives, or “push factors” in joining the conflict as well as

different local group affiliates that supported them during the conflict. They also had various

roles in the conflict zone. Most Indonesian foreign fighters received military training. Some

served as trainers or instructors for a new generation of jihadists rather than engaging in the

real battle in the front line. Therefore, their duties were not static but could be interchangeably

based on the instructions from their leaders.

The participation of Indonesian jihadists in Afghanistan was mostly on a collective basis rather

than individual participation or self-mobilization. They were mostly members of radical groups

in the home country before leaving to fight overseas. JI and DI had recruited those men and

dispatched them to the battleground with a particular assignment and then they returned to the

home country once they had accomplished their missions. They began to regroup in their

previous groups and were tasked to recruit new member and teach in religious schools or

madrasah linked to their groups as requested by their leaders.

Most Indonesian jihadists were not instructed by their leaders to fight and die as a martyr in

Afghanistan, but instead they had a strategic plan to initially obtain military skills and combat

experience. The main purpose was still to wage armed jihad in the home country against the

Suharto secular government as mandated in their guideline. With this context, it is unsurprising

that casualties among Indonesian jihadists were very low; they mostly survived and returned

to Indonesia.247

Indonesian Afghanistan veterans remained inactive for almost a decade after they arrived home

in the 1990s. They believed that the time was not ripe to carry out an armed jihad and the enemy

was too strong. However, the Ambon and Poso conflicts triggered a number of them to wage

246 “Abu Dujana Akui Simpan Senjata” (Abu Dujana Admitted hiding weapons), Koran Tempo, 4 March 2008,

https://koran.tempo.co/read/nasional/124632/abu-dujana-akui-simpan-senjata. Assessed in 6 June 2020. 247 Interviews with several Afghanistan veterans, 2019.

65

jihad against Christians in local arenas. While many joined directly in the Ambon and Poso

conflicts, many veterans expanded the conflict zones by attacking churches in Indonesia's

cities.

Broader international politics influenced many Afghanistan veterans to start their violent jihad

at home. They were influenced by the jihad call by Al-Qaeda to target Westerners and they

believed that killing civilians is halal or permissible to defend Islam. This became another

critical juncture for many Indonesian Afghan returnees to shift the target from the ‘near enemy’

to the ‘far enemy’ as they began to launch bombing campaigns against Western targets in

several cities in Indonesia.

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CHAPTER IV

The Mindanao War

4.1. Introduction

The long bloody conflict in Mindanao, the Southern region of the Philippines, in the 1990s,

caused the mobilisation of hundreds of young Indonesian jihadists to engage in the name of

jihad. Under the protection of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), they established

several military camps in Mindanao's thick jungle, such as, the “Hudaibiyah camp.” It was at

these camps that they began to train local fighters and hundreds of their internal members with

lethal combat arts. While trained, Indonesian jihadists also received indoctrination, such as,

violent jihad.

This chapter aims to narrate the trajectory of approximately 200 Indonesian foreign fighters

recruited and mobilised by Jemaah Islamiyah and Darul Islam to receive military training and

fight in Mindanao. A similar approach to the previous chapter, this section seeks to answer why

many ordinary Indonesian citizens went to fight in this battle zone. What is their purpose in

joining the conflict? How did they gain access to the battle zone? In discussing the foreign

fighter trajectory in the battle, this chapter also describes Indonesian jihadists' roles, military

activities, and their interactions with the MILF.

The second part of this chapter presents the literature on the returning Indonesian jihadists from

Mindanao. It further analyses their post-conflict behaviour. History has shown that the majority

of Indonesian jihadists in Mindanao left their military camps to return home. While many

remained inactive, a relatively small number of Mindanao veterans, fewer than ten percent of

the returnees, engaged in sectarian conflict in Indonesia's Eastern part. Together with a number

of Afghanistan veterans, they also participated in the Al-Qaeda terror campaign in Indonesia

in the 2000s to kill Westerners and Christians.

4.2. Mindanao Conflict: Overview

The war in Mindanao resulted from prolonged bloody conflicts between the Moro people who

struggled to establish an independent Islamic state in Southern Philippines during the 1970s

and the Philippines state. “Bangsamoro” or “the Moro Nation,” as they are referred to, began

an armed insurgency and launched a series of military attacks against the government. Under

67

the leadership of Nur Misuari, the Moro people established the Moro National Liberation Front

(MNLF) in 1972 to fight for independence.248

The insurgencies in Mindanao initially erupted in the 1960s while several Muslims established

the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968 and declared an Islamic State's

independence in Moro. This revolt was initially a political reaction to Muslims' brutal execution

by the Philippines army known as the “Jabidah massacre” or “Corregidor massacre.” In this

incident, the Philippine Armed Forces killed almost one hundred trained Moro people who

refused to continue their mission to infiltrate and destabilise Sabah, which had been disputed

by Malaysia and the Philippines. 249

The Philippine government's ongoing oppression and discrimination against the Mindanao

Muslims triggered a new wave of stronger resistance on a large scale. A new militant

organisation, the MNLF, emerged as a group that was more radical and militant.250 This

insurgent group advocated for the Moro people's independence and emphasised nationalism to

establish a Moro nation covering the Sulu Islands, Palawan, Basilan, and other islands nearby.

The armed jihad was initially carried out, but this organisation began to shift its strategy by

engaging in a series of peace negotiations with the Philippines' state.

The MNLF experienced internal political friction in the early 1980s. Many elites were

disappointed with Nur Misuari’s leadership. Hashim Salamat, a chairman of foreign affairs and

Vice-Chairman of MNLF, was among the ones who criticised Misuari as an incapable leader.

He finally decided to establish a splinter group known as the Moro Islamic Liberation Front

(MILF) in 1984. Another new splinter group also emerged: the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG),

founded in 1991 by Abdurajak Janjani, a Filipino Afghan veteran who wanted to resume armed

jihad against the government of the Philippines.251

248 After a long bloody conflict, the MNLF and the government of Philippines have agreed to settle down the

wars by negotiations. Facilitated by the Libyan government, both parties agreed to sign The Tripoli Agreement

on 23 December 1976 that resulted in the autonomous administrative divisions of Bangsa Moro. 249 Mohammed M. Hafez, Why Muslims Rebel, 95. Rommel C. Banlaoi, “Radical Muslim terrorism’ in the

Philippines,” in A Handbook of Terrorism and Insurgency in Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew T.H.Tan

(Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc, 2007), sec.10. The Philippines’ government recruited militias

from the Moro people to engage in a clandestine operation in Sabah which was claimed as part of the

Philippines territory. Moreover, they refused to continue their mission to destabilise Sabah. 250 Candice Malan and Hussein Solomon, “Between Conflict and Compromise in the Philippines,” Indian

Journal of Asian Affairs, 25 no. 1/2 (2012): 59-82. 251 Pro-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia, IPAC Report No. 33, 25 October

2016.

68

4.3. The MILF

The MILF continued their struggle to establish an Islamic state in the Bangsamoro homeland

after splitting from the MNLF. Hashim Salamat, who initially supported the peace talks

between the MNLF and the Philippines, rejected the Tripoli Agreement's implementation on

26 September 1996.252 He claimed that the peace agreement did not reflect the Bangsamoro

people's real aspiration to gain independence and create an Islamic State.253 In his denial,

Hasyim Salamat highlighted his ultimate goal was to establish an Islamic State as he said, “The

only thing that we can compromise on is the extent of the territory of the Islamic State.”254

Several factors triggered the MNLF’s internal politics, which then led to the creation of MILF.

Hashim Salamat, who used to be a member of the MNLF ruling council, was disappointed with

Nur Misuari. He saw Misuari had lost its credibility to lead the organisation in dealing with the

Philippine government. Furthermore, Salamat also criticised Misuari to bring the organisation

into a secular movement, which contradicted Moro’s ultimate goal to establish an Islamic state

in the region.255

Apart from debatable political friction motives, both Misuari and Hashim Salamat had different

political goals and strategies in their struggle. While Misuari sought to establish a separate state

or special autonomy in the Moro homeland from the Philippines government, Hashim Salamat

uncompromisingly demanded the creation of an Islamic State and the implementation of full

Sharia (Islamic law) in the region.256 In line with his struggle, Hashim Salamat adopted

political and military strategies by entering negotiations and via guerrilla military operations.257

After the split in 1981, Hashim Salamat strengthened his faction. He recruited approximately

between 10,000 to 15,000 new members and built paramilitary training camps in Mindanao's

252 Through the Tripoli Agreement, the MNLF enjoyed an autonomous granted–Autonomous Region of Muslim

Mindanao (ARMM) covering four provinces such as Sulu, Taiw-Tawi, Maguindanao, Lanao del Sur. 253 Candice Malan and Hussein Solomon, “Between Conflict and Compromise in the Philippines,”

Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 25 no. 1/2 (2012): 59-82 254 Zachary Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution,” Studies in Conflict &

Terrorism, 28 (2005):453–479. 255 Paul A. Rodell, “Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines,” in A Handbook of Terrorism and

Insurgency in Southeast Asia, ed. Andrew T.H. Tan (Massachusetts: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited), 230.

See also Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 54. 256 Zachary Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution.” MILF Leader to

"Nida'ul Islam, https://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/ph2.htm. 257 Restoring A Fragile Peace: The 2000 Battle for Central Mindanao, 39.

69

jungle.258 He named his first and biggest camp “Abu Bakar” after the name of the first Khalifa

“Abu Bakar al-Siddique.” He also established other smaller camps, such as, Busrah, Ali, Omar,

Khalid, Othman, and Salman.259

Similar to the Afghanistan War in the 1980s to 1990s, Mindanao's conflict had become a global

theater of jihad. It attracted many transnational radical groups from different countries to wage

jihad in this region. Several radical organisations in the region from Indonesia and Malaysia

joined in Mindanao conflicts, such as, in Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia (KKM), JI, DI,

Wahdah Islamiyah, and in KOMPAK. As many scholars have shown, Al-Qaeda began to

perceive Mindanao as another land of jihad that was against the Western interests and

developed a link with local insurgent groups.260

Hundreds of Indonesian foreign fighters under Jemaah Islamiyah and Darul Islam had engaged

in Mindanao conflicts in the 1990s. They not only sent hundreds of their members to participate

in this conflict, DI and JI also used this conflict as a training ground for their members to obtain

the art of soldiering. Similar to Afghanistan, their primary purpose was not to carry out jihad

defending local Muslims, framing it as prosecution by the Philippines Christian government.

Instead, it was as preparation (idad) to wage their jihad against the infidel rulers in the home

country.

Mindanao remained attractive for Indonesian jihadists for many reasons. First, they believed

Mindanao was a jihad theatre similar to Kashmir, Palestine, and Chechnya, where non-

Muslims have occupied Islamic lands and persecuted local Muslims. Furthermore, Indonesian

jihadists believed that jihad is needed to help Muslims in Mindanao achieve independence and

create an Islamic state. Secondly, the elite of Indonesian jihadists viewed Mindanao as a

training ground, to train their members in the military's art as they could not get that training

at home.

258 Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, ICG, 13 July 2004. 259 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 54. Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,

ICG, 13 July 2004. 260 Zachary Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution.” Candice Malan and

Hussein Solomon, “Between Conflict and Compromise in the Philippines,” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs, 25

no. 1/2 (2012): 59-82.

70

Geographically, Mindanao is close to Indonesia and it is relatively easy to enter because of a

lack of security on the border. Indonesian jihadists used a route from Sulawesi and Sabah

Malaysia as a stepping point before entering Mindanao with traditional fishers' help. With this

advantage, establishing military training in Mindanao is less costly for JI since this group did

not receive financial assistance from Saudi and the Gulf countries after the Afghanistan war.261

In sum, establishing a military camp in Mindanao is much more cost-effective and more

strategic than sending members to Afghanistan or Pakistan.

Despite attracting several regional radical groups, much evidence has shown that the Mindanao

conflict had also attracted Al-Qaeda, who wanted to expand its transnational jihad against the

West in Southeast Asia.262 Several of Al-Qaeda’s elites, such as Muhammad Jamal Khalifa,

brother in law of Osama bin Laden, Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, and Omar al-Faruq had participated

in Mindanao. They offered financial assistance in their campaign to attack Western interests in

the Southeast Asian region. For example, Omar al-Faruq, a senior operative member of Al-

Qaeda, had visited the MILF’s Abu Bakar military camp in 1997.263 He offered funding as a

quid pro quo to build a military camp to train Arab fighters. Further, he asked some instructors

in the camp to receive and train Arab fighters.264

Moreover, mostly Arab foreign fighters could not sustain themselves for a long time in

Mindanao for several reasons. First, they felt disappointed about the way the MILF dealt with

the Philippines' government. They criticised the MILF’s negotiation strategy rather than

pursuing armed jihad as they expected to have a similar situation to fight infidels as in the

Afghanistan War in the 1990s.265 Second, many Arab fighters were frustrated with the long

curriculum training without action or real combat.266 Similar to Afghanistan and other conflict

zones, they wanted to fight right away as soon as they arrived in Mindanao.

261 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 67. 262 Ibid., 58. 263 Angel Rabasa, “The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc” in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing

Terrorism Risks, RAND Corporation. (2007),

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/mg561af.16.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7c241024fe13b8930b3580541

fe4e59a 264 Some Arabian foreign fighters have been receiving military training in “Vietnam Camp” which was close to

the Hudaibiyah Camp. However, they were upset because the Moro fighters were not too radical to fight the

Philippines government. 265 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 154. 266 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 69.

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/mg561af.16.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7c241024fe13b8930b3580541fe4e59a

https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.7249/mg561af.16.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A7c241024fe13b8930b3580541fe4e59a

71

The MILF had also shown its reluctance to Arab foreign fighters’ participation. In the early

2000s Hasyim Salamat and the elites of this group had refused to engage the Arab fighters in

an effort to avoid using foreign terrorists in the war against the Philippines’ army.267

4.4. Darul Islam

Darul Islam was the first jihadi group in Indonesia that recruited and dispatched its members

to Mindanao at the beginning of the 1990s. Under the leadership of Ajengan Masduki, this

radical group had sent a small number of their jihadists. It was approximately five members

from the first group who travelled and lived in Mindanao in 1991. According to Nasir Abas,

the primary purpose was not to engage in any military activities or training, but rather to learn

from the MILF’s insurgency to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia. Among those fighters

were Hambali, Nasrullah, Fahim, Shamsudin, and Akram.268 Recalling when he entered the

Mindanao in 1990, Nasrullah stated, “We were ordered to gain experience and live with the

Moro people.”269

The relationship between DI and MILF developed during the Afghanistan War in the 1980s to

1990s.270 During the war, Abdullah Sungkar and Hashim Salamat saw the Afghanistan war as

a global jihad theater, primarily to obtain military skills and combat experience. Both leaders

sent hundreds of their recruits to travel to a conflict zone to get military training. There were

approximately 360 to 700 young Moro men who travelled to Afghanistan and Pakistan in the

1990s to receive military training in the Saudi-funded Abdul Rasul Sayaf’s camp as a pretext

to wage jihad against the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan.271 In addition to routinely

developed contact in Peshawar, Pakistan, both leaders also met regularly in Saudi when they

performed the Hajj pilgrimage.272

267 Ibid, 69. 268 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 143. Interview with Nasir Abas, 15 November 2019. 269 Nasir Abas, An Autobiography (unpublished). 270 Alan Sipress and Ellen Nakashima, “Al-Qaeda Affiliate Training Indonesian on Philippines Island,” The

Washington Post, Nov.17, 2003. See Edward V. Linden (2204). Foreign Terrorist Organizations: History

Tactics and Connections. New York: Nova Science Publisher, Inc. Muhammad Tito Karniavan, Explaining

Islamist Insurgencies, 66. 271 Margarita Cojuangco, “Terrorism is Necessarily Rooted in Religion and is International in Character,” 28

June 2017, https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/manila-times. Angel Rabasa, “Case Study: The Sulawesi-

Mindanao Arc,” in Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorist Risks, Rand Project Air

Force, 2007, 8. See also Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process, ICG, 13 July

2004. 272 Hashim Salamat stayed in Pakistan in 1982 and returned to Mindanao in 1987.

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The connection of Indonesian and Filipino foreign fighters in Afghanistan was nurtured at the

level of their ground commanders and foot soldiers. Zulkarnaen, the DI/NII office

representative in Pakistan, in 1985, had developed links with many Filipino jihadists who

joined the military academy in Sadda, Pakistan, under Abdul Rasul Sayyaf’s camp in the 1980s.

This relationship continued as JI took control of their recruitment after the split with DI in

1993. When JI moved its base in Torkham, Afghanistan, its members had established

relationships with several Filipino fighters who later joined the MILF. One of the JI fighters,

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, had nurtured friendships with Salahudin and Habib, among the MILF

elites.273

Indonesian jihadists during the Afghanistan war claimed to be Filipinos. They used the

advantages of similar physical features, skin color, and hair as a way to conceal their identity

or country of origin. Indonesian fighters carried out this practice to avoid surveillance from the

Indonesian intelligence authority.274 As Nasir Abas stated, this strategy was more like a

gentlemen’s agreement between DI and Moro fighters' elites, where they all undertook military

training in Abdul Rasul Sayyaf. Therefore, Sayyaf had known that those fighters came from

Indonesia.275

Abdullah Sungkar and Hashim Salamat shared commonalities in terms of ideologies and

strategic political goals, which motivated the two leaders to continue their close alliance after

the Afghanistan war. Ideologically, both leaders were inspired by Salafism to purify Islam and

Islamize society. They were also inspired by the revolutionary Islamic thinkers, such as, Sayyid

Qutb and Abu A’la Mawdudi.276 As Salamat stated, he was influenced by the Muslim

Brotherhood's ideas derived from Sayyid Qutb’s thoughts while he was studying at Al-Azhar

University, Cairo.277 Both Sungkar and Salamat shared the view that establishing an Islamic

State is the only solution to preserve the Islamic way of life. Similar to Abdullah Sungkar,

Hashim Salamat also imagined forming an Islamic State in Mindanao as a religious duty. In

273 ICG Asia Report No 63, “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous,” 26 August

2003. 274 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 141. 275 Ibid, 142. 276 See, Angel Rabasa, Political Islam in Southeast Asia: Moderates, Radical and Terrorists, (New York:

Routledge, 2010), 51. See also, Zulkarnain Haron and Nordin Hussin, “A Study of the Salafi Jihadist Doctrine

and the Interpretation of Jihad by Al Jama'ah Al Islamiy,” Kemanusiaan 20, no.2 (2013): 15-37. 277 “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” ICG, 13 July 2004.

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his view, jihad through the war was fard ain (obligation) for all Moro people to fight against

the Philippines’ government that occupied their lands.

Abdullah Sungkar and Hashim Salamat developed radical views in their struggle, which caused

the two leaders to establish a splinter group. While Abdullah Sungkar formed JI after the

political friction with DI elites in 1993, Hashim Salamat also created a dissenting group known

as the MILF in 1998. Their motivations to form an exclusive group were similar: to create more

Islamic goals through armed jihad and denounce their former groups as less Islamic if they did

not implement Islam purely.278 By 1999, the MILF was able to double its military forces to

between 8,000 and 15,000 fighters with several military elites and continued insurgencies

against the Philippines’ state.279

As explained in Chapter 3, the political faction or coalition between Abdullah Sungkar and

Ajengan Masduki in 1993 had an impact on the recruits who were undertaking military training

in Afghanistan and members in Mindanao. Like those in Afghanistan, five DI members in this

region were requested to choose JI or remain loyal to DI. Hambali, Fahim, and Nasrullah, who

decided to align with JI were requested to leave Mindanao and return home. However,

Shamsudin and Akram alias Muhammad Taufiqurrahman still gave loyalty to the DI leader,

Aceng Kurnia, and both of them remained in Mindanao.280

Several factions of Darul Islam still recruited and sent its members to Mindanao until the 2000s,

although they had separated with JI. The number of jihadists who trained is unclear since DI

was lacking administrative reports compared to JI. Moreover, the primary purpose for sending

their members was to gain access to weapons and military training as it was impossible to

obtain it at home.281

The Wahdah Islamiyah (the group of Sulawesi) was among the DI’s factions that mobilised

and dispatched their members to have military training in Mindanao. While Darul Islam built

a military camp known as “Ash-Syabab, Wahdah Islamiyah established its military camp,

known as “Al-Fatah.” The location of these groups was close to the Hudaibiyah camp of JI.

278 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 54. 279 Paul A. Rodell, “Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines,” 231. 280 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 143. See also Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 63. “Terrorism

in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks.” ICG, Asia Report N°114 – 5 May 2006. 281 Interview with anonymous former of DI, Jakarta, 2010.

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They operated independently, although still under the authority of the MILF.282 In the interview

with Nasir Abas, he recalls having interacted with several DI foreign fighters who lived and

established their camp in Mindanao in 1994. Although he was instructed to disengage with his

seniors' DI members, he met and asked them to participate in the military training. 283

The Ring Banten was another DI faction that kept recruiting and sending their members to

receive military training in Mindanao. They mostly trained in the MILF’s Abu Bakar camp.

Kang Jaja, who was the leader of Ring Banten in 1999, sent a group consisting of at least nine

jihadists to train in Mindanao. Together with two other DI members, he established a small

courier company to finance the training. Rois, Saptono, and Rosihin Noor were among those

fighters.284

4.5. The Hudaibiyah Military Academy

Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) firstly participated in the Mindanao conflict in 1994 after it split from

DI in 1993. At that time Hashim Salamat, the chief of MILF, personally requested Abdullah

Sungkar to send his men to train Moro insurgents with the art of war. Hashim Salamat believed

that JI could help his armed struggle to establish an Islamic state in Mindanao. Abdullah

Sungkar agreed and further instructed Zulkarnaen, the head of Markaziyah, to send the best

members to serve as military instructors for Moro fighters. A number of senior members, all

Afghan veterans, were appointed in this mission, such as, Abu Tholut, Nasir Abas, Nasrullah,

Qotadah, Ukasyah, and Hussain.

Abu Tholut led a small team to Mindanao and divided the group into two. 285 While Ukasyah,

Nasrullah, Hussain, and Abu Tholut went to Mindanao legally by airplane, the other men

entered Mindanao illegally by sea. Moreover, Abu Tholut decided to cancel the mission even

though the team had arrived in the MILF military camp-Abu Bakar military camp. It was due

to the inability of Hashim Salamat to recruit and select his internal men to join the training. As

Hashim Salamat said, he needed approximately two or three months to recruit participants.286

282 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 165. 283 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2019. 284 “Terrorism in Indonesia: Noordin’s Networks,” ICG, Asia Report N°114 – 5 May 2006. 285 On its departure, the team was divided into two groups, one under leadership Abu Tholut by air

transportation, while another team led by Nasir Abas went to Mindanao through the sea from Sandakan,

Malaysia crossing the sea to Zamboanga. 286 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2019.

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Abu Tholut was disappointed to know that Salamat Hashim had failed to recruit his Moro

members. He finally decided to leave because he was not able to wait for a long time. Moreover,

Nasir Abas disagreed with Abu Tholut and insisted on continuing the mission as part of his

jihad. Abu Tholut was aggrieved with Nasir Abas’decision to stay and left him with no

financial support. He finally left Mindanao with the others, but Nasir Abas, Ukasyah, and

Qatadah remained in Salamat Hashim’s military camp.287

While waiting for the MILF’s trainees' recruitment, Nasir Abas and Qatadah began to train

Hashim Salamat’s personal guards in December 1994. There were sixty students in the first

batch, while between 40 to 60 recruits joined in the second batch in 1997. The Moro

participants were advised to join the drills. They claimed themselves as “Elite Forces” since

they were selected through a tight process and received Afghan veterans' military training.288

Nasir Abas and Qatadah initiated to clear out the forest inside the MILF territory to establish a

military camp. In the interview with Nasir Abas, he mentioned that the main idea of building a

new camp was to have a conducive training ground that was far from a residential area.

Remembering his story he mentioned that while he trained Hashim Salamat’s fighters, many

Moro residents watched the military training, which he felt was inconvenient.289

With approval from Hashim Salamat, Nasir Abas and Qatadah began to clear out an area of the

jungle with several Moro recruits' assistance. The new camp was finally set up and located on

the border between Lanao Province and North Cotabato, Mindanao, close to MILF’s Camp

Abu Bakar. Nasir Abas and Qatadah gave the name of the new camp as “Hudaibiyah,” taken

from the peace treaty between Prophet Muhammad, representing the state of Medina and the

Quraysh tribe in Mecca in 628.290 In his testimony during the interrogation by the Indonesian

police, Nasir Abas revealed that he built the Hudaibiyah camp as an order from Abdullah

Sungkar.

I helped established Camp Hudaibiyah in Moro in 1994 by the order of Abdullah

Sungkar. I trained MILF members. Funding came from Abdullah Sungkar. I was given

287 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2019. 288 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 151. 289 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2019. 290 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah. Interview with Abu Tholut, 3 December 2019.

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2000 RM. In 1996 I went home to Johor. I was succeeded by Umar Patek who was my

junior in Afghanistan and who trained in Moro in 1995.291

The Hudaibiyah camp began its first operation in December 1994, where dozens of local Moro

fighters started to learn the art of war. For the MILF, this new camp became the first military

training ground established by the foreign insurgency group in their territory.292 Sixty Moro

cadets participated in the first batch, followed by the succeeding groups until 1996. Each group

lasted for two months and was joined by between forty and sixty students. The participants

learned military skills, such as, individual combat training, including infantry, marksmanship,

bomb-making, weaponry, navigation, and bombard.293

A year after its operations, JI began to give full attention and funded the operations of the

Hudaibiyah military camp. Zulkarnaen, the operational chief of JI (markaziyah), visited the

camp in 1995 and provided financial support in the amount of 30,000 Pesos for the two camps'

construction and operation.294 As requested by Nasir Abas, JI also sent more military

instructors to train the Moro fighters. Afterward, Abdullah Sungkar instructed Hambali, the

head of Mantiqi 1, to provide financial support to finance the construction and other operations

costs.295 From 1995 to 1996, several JI’s senior members, mostly Afghan veterans, began to

arrive as military instructors, such as, Mubaraq, Sawad, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and others.296

The Hudaibiyah military camp grew rapidly in 1996. More barracks and camp facilities were

built, including the three different military camps that were set up based on tribal recruitment,

such as, Camp Solo, Camp Banten, and Camp Sulawesi.297 Many more foreign fighters from

the Southeast Asian countries, such as, Malaysia and Singapore who were not necessarily JI’s

members came to participate in military training. The students acquired knowledge of the art

291 Indonesian National Police (INP), “Interrogation of Mohammad Nasir bin Abbas,” Jakarta,

18 April 2003. Taken from Zachary Abuza, “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of

the Revolution.” 292 Margarita Cojuangco, “Terrorism in Necessarily Rooted in Religion and is International in Character,” The

Manila Times, 28 June 2017. Accessed in https://www.pressreader.com/philippines/manila-times. 293 Nasir Abas, An Autobiography (unpublished). 294 Nasir Abas, An Autobiography (unpublished). See also, Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and

the Peace Process, ICG, 13 July 2004. 295 Muhammad Tito Karniavan, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 67. Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 69.

“Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” ICG, 13 July 2004. It is said that the

annual cost of the Hudaibiyah operation was US$ 25,000 which was collected by Mantiqi 1 from members’

donations. 296 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 152. Interview with Mubaroq, 2019. 297 Greg Barton, Indonesia’s Struggle, 56. Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 70.

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of war, such as, weaponry, combat tactics, bomb-making, and other lethal skills.298 With the

growing military training activities in this camp, MILF decided to hand this camp over to JI in

1997.299

The Hudaibiyah camp was structurally under Mantiqi 3 when Abdullah Sungkar formed a third

territory division in 1997 after the previous Mantiqi 1 and Mantiqi 2. Nasir Abas argued that

he initially proposed the idea of this new Mantiqi, which covers the Philippines, Brunei

Darussalam, Eastern Malaysia, and Indonesia (Kalimantan and Sulawesi).300 One of the goals

to build this Mantiqi was to have a training ground to produce more fighters. This proposal was

supported by Abdullah Sungkar and the JI elites, it was at this time that Abu Tholut was

appointed to lead this new Mantiqi.301

Abu Tholut, as the chief of the camp, further upgraded this military training into academy

military or “Kuliah Harbiyah Daurah” in 1998, four years after its establishment in 1994.302

This academy adopted the same curriculum, teaching materials, and administrative system, as

such, similar to the previous JI military camp in Sadda, Afghanistan. Overall, this academy

military was a replication of the last camp in Afghanistan.

Moreover, JI markaziyah gave a higher priority to their cadres rather than non-members when

they started the military academy. No more local Moro MILF fighters participated in this

academy.303 In the interview with a former JI elite, he explained that it was based on the JI

leaders’ decision as their priority to train their internal members, “We should think about

jamaah, not other groups. We establish our military academy so that JI members could obtain

military training easily.”304 This explanation has indicated that JI was more pragmatic by

prioritising its agenda rather than the MILF.

298 Muhammad Tito Karniavan, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 67. 299 Solahudin, NII Sampai JI, 242. 300 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 2019. JI has established and divided its operation into four territorial cells

or Mantiqi which cover certain areas, which are Mantiqi 1 (Singapore, Malaysia, and Southern Thailand), Mantiqi

2 (Java, Sumatera), Mantiqi 3 (Sabah, Brunei Darrusalam, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, and Southern Philippines), and

Mantiqi 4 (Australia and Papua New Guinea). 301 Interview with Abu Tholut, Jakarta, 2019. Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 2019. 302 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 70. Interview with Abu Tholut, 2019. 303 Interview with Nasir Abas, 15 November 2019. Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah,155. Interview

with Abu Tholut, 5 December 2019. 304 Interview with an anonymous Afghan veteran, 2019.

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The military academy officially began to welcome the new cadets, JI’s internal recruits, in

1998. The course ran for two years or three semesters, and participants could learn military

arts, such as, weaponry, tactics, bomb-making, and other combat skills. During 1998-2002, JI

sent dozens of recruits to join the academy in three different groups. The first one was held in

1998 and seventeen fighters participated. Twenty-one cadets participated in the second one in

2000, and twenty members attended the third one in 2002.305

Compared to the previous Sadda and Towrkham military camps in Afghanistan, the

Hudaibiyah camp was not as well-equipped, especially in terms of weapons. Moreover, the

camp was operated independently by JI in regard to military curriculum and religious

indoctrination. One of the Mindanao veterans I interviewed said he served as a military trainer

during 1994-1997. After returning to Indonesia in 1997, he was instructed to enter Mindanao

again to train for several months.306 All of the instructors were internal senior members who

were mostly Afghan veterans and selected graduates from the first group in 2000.

Besides accommodations and meals provided, each student in the Hudaibiyah camp received a

monthly stipend of 100 Pesos, while a military instructor gained 500 Pesos monthly.307 During

my interviews with Mindanao veterans, several said that JI financed the camp's operation and

paid all of the costs of the participants traveling to Mindanao. Overall, the Mantiqi 1 was the

main source to secure all operational expenses in the camp.308

The Hudaibiyah camp also offered a short military course for internal members who could not

participate in the military academy. This program was known as “Daurah Asasiyah Askariyah,”

which took place for four months or one-year of intense military training. Compared to the

military academy, the short course only provided basic military skills. One veteran who joined

this short military course described his activities by saying, “In four months, we only got an

introduction to bombs and guns and lessons on how to use them, whereas, at the academy level,

people were trained how to make them.”309 From 1998 to 1999, there were approximately 85

305 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 156-158. 306 Interview with an anonymous Mindanao veteran, Jakarta, 2019. 307 Interview with Mindanao veteran, 12 November 2019. Interview with Nasir Abas, 15 November 2019. 308 Interviews with several Mindanao veterans, 2019. 309 “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but Still Dangerous,” ICG Asia Report No.63, 26 August

2003.

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foreign fighters who undertook this short training. The trainees were mostly members of

Mantiqi 2.310

Several internal members, such as, Imam Samudra, Hambali, and others also visited the

Hudaibiyah camp during the 1990s. Several figures who engaged in a series of terrorist acts in

Indonesia during the 2000s, such as, Noordin M. Top, Azhari, Hambali, Ali Fauzi, Dulmatin,

Umar Patek, and others, had also participated in this short training to upgrade their combat

skills.311 Many of them who were from Mantiqi 1 were sent by Hambali to advance their

military skills, such as, how to make bombs.

JI celebrated the first graduation of the military academy in 2000.312 Seventeen fighters finished

their academy military. On this special occasion, several MILF elites attended, including

Salamat Hashim. Abu Bakar Bashir, who became JI's leader after he succeeded Abdullah

Sungkar, also attended this completion. He flew from Solo to Mindanao and was delighted to

see the camps and graduates. In the interview with a Mindanao veteran, it is said that Abu

Bakar Bashir wanted to document the military activities in the camp but it was canceled for

security reasons.313

Apart from their primary mission to learn military skills, Indonesian jihadists experienced

battle during their training in Mindanao. Many of them were assigned to guard duty (ribath) in

MILF territory and engaged in military operations to counter the enemy military attacks. In his

memoir, Nasir Abas mentions that he had been involved in a series of wars during 1995-1996.

In 1995, he fought with MILF fighters to head off the Philippines’ armies in Sultan Sa Barongis

and Pagalungan. In 1996, he also participated in the war to fight the Philippines’ Army in

Buldon, Maguidanaon Province.314

The intense participation of Indonesian jihadists in combat occurred in July 2000. It happened

at the time that President Estrada decided to intensify his military counter-insurgency in

response to continuing terror attacks by the MILF against the civilians. He mobilised

approximately 70,000 soldiers to rampage the MILF camps as well as other foreign jihadi

310 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 156-164. 311 Ibid. 312 Interview with Nasir Abas, 15 November 2019. 313 Interview with an anonymous Mindanao veteran, 2019. 314 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 166.

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military camps in Mindanao under the military operations “All-Out War Operation.”315

Although the Indonesian jihadists had gone to get training in the art of war, they were obliged

to fight in response to Estrada’s intensified military counter-insurgency.

Based on several interviews with Mindanao veterans, they confirmed experiencing real combat

in fighting the Philippines army. JI’s command center instructed them to fight for the MILF

and secure their base, even though many of them had only received basic knowledge of war.316

Yusuf, a Mindanao veteran in the interview, recalls he participated in this war as he states:

We were allowed to participate in the war when President Estrada launched “All out

war” at the beginning of 2000. I was still a new student and was just able to carry and

use my weapon. There was an agreement from Sarmento, where Mujahidin withdrew

one kilometer, but the Philippines’ armies moved forward one kilometer also. 317

Several Indonesian foreign fighters died defending its military base during the military

operation of the “All-Out War.” In the interview, Yusuf recalls how one of his senior colleagues

in the first group in 1999, named Akhuna Ibnu Sirin, became a martyr. His comrade died when

the Philippines' warship dropped a bomb that tore his body apart. Another jihadist from the

Sulawesi group, a faction of Darul Islam, namely, Akhuna Daarul, also lost his life in this

battle.318

The Philippines' armies were able to destroy and capture the MILF’s Abu Bakar Camp on 9

July 2000 after three-months of military operations. Salamat Hasyim was able to escape to

Malaysia and declared an all-out jihad against the Philippines' government. The Philippines'

massive military assault created a critical moment for the Indonesian jihadists and forced them

to withdraw to avoid a higher casualty. They abandoned their Hudaibiyah camp and let the

enemy take it over.

After retreating to a safe place, Indonesian jihadists subsequently established a training ground

named the “Jabal Quba” Camp in early 2001. This new camp was located on Mount Kaararao,

315 Ibid, 165. 316 Interview with several Mindanao veterans, 2019. 317 Interview with Mindanao veteran, 9 August 2019. 318 Interview with Jusuf, 12 November 2019.

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Lanao de Sur, Mindanao.319 In this new training ground, Indonesian jihadists continued their

military academy and short military course (Daurah Asasiyah Askariyah).320

Despite functioning as a military training camp, the Jabal Quba became a safe haven for JI

members involved in the series of attacks in Indonesia during the 2000s. After the Bali bombing

in 2002, many perpetrators including Umar Patek and Dulmatin sought safety there.

Furthermore, they built a new camp in Pawas under the MILF's authority and began to train

more jihadists with military skills regardless of their group affiliations.321

4.5.1. Jemaah Islamiyah

Why did JI participate and send its members to Mindanao? It is similar to Afghanistan in the

1980s that the primary goal of JI’s engagement in Mindanao involved a strategic purpose rather

than a religious motive in the name of jihad. Abdullah Sungkar considered the conflict in

Mindanao as an opportunity; to send his men to learn military skills and gain combat

experience. He aimed to strengthen the internal resources of the group to wage armed jihad to

topple the secular Indonesian government over the long run.

Abdullah Sungkar saw Mindanao as playing a role in his long-term goals. First, he wanted to

build a coalition with the MILF to extend JI’s sphere of influence and presence in the region.

This strategy was relevant to his broader vision to create an Islamic Caliphate in the region as

he made Mantiqi 3, covering the Eastern part of Indonesia, Eastern Malaysia, and Southern

Philippines.322 Second, the JI’s participation in Mindanao was a way of preparation (idad) to

strengthen the military capabilities of the group. With this role, this Mantiqi is named “training

Mantiqi,” as a training ground to equip the best cadres with advanced military skills and

leadership. Abdullah Sungkar wanted to double his fighters as part of his preparation strategy

(idad) to topple Indonesia's secular government. The quantity of military personnel trained in

Afghanistan was not enough. As stated by Sungkar, he aimed to have 15,000 military men as

a minimum number to start an armed jihad against the state.323

319 “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process.” ICG, 13 July 2004. 320 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 166. 321 “Pros-ISIS Groups in Mindanao and Their Links to Indonesia and Malaysia,” IPAC Report No. 33, 25

October 2016. 322 See the JI’s guideline book-PUPJI. 323 Interview with several Afghan veterans, 2019.

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Abdullah Sungkar began to dispatch his recruits to receive military training after establishing

the Hudaibiyah camp in 1994. Most of the participants were from Ngruki alumnae and several

Usroh circles from different administrative regions (wakallah) in Java, Sumatera, and in the

other regions. Through the interview with a Mindanao veteran, it is said that the administrative

area (wakallah) played an essential role in selecting and recommending its best members to the

command center (markayizah), which then organised the deployment in Mindanao.324

There have been different routes for Indonesian jihadists to enter Mindanao. Many came to this

region through Sabah, Eastern Malaysia, where JI had established office representatives, while

others used several islands in Sulawesi as stopping off points to leapfrog from before crossing

the sea with speedboats. As JI established a headquarters in Malaysia, they built a shelter in

Sandakan, Sabah, where the recruits would continue their trip to Sandakan, then crossing the

Sulu Sea to Mindanao. Overall, illegal sea routes were mainly used by Indonesian jihadists to

enter Mindanao.

All of the Indonesian fighters who went to Mindanao were young men, physically fit, with an

average age between 19 and 30, unmarried, and they had potential leadership skills.325 Nasir

Abas further recalls that the recruits who were the chosen were able to communicate in English

and ready to become a martyr.326 Overall, the selection was undertaken through a very selective

process by JI markaziyah to choose their potential members and leaders in the future.327

Since the main goal was to pursue military skills, most of the Indonesian jihadists in Mindanao

were mainly away from the front line. They were learning the arts of war, leadership, and

religious study rather than to fight until death as martyrs. The emphasis on training can be seen

from the low casualty of those who died on the battlefield. As discussed previously, only a few

died during combat, notably while they participated fully in the battle when President Joseph

Estrada launched a military attack in 2000. Nasir Abas also mentioned that many jihadists lost

their lives during training rather than in real battle. At least three fighters, Mukhriz, Mus’ab,

and Ukasyah, died during bomb-making practices.328

324 Interview with Yusuf, 9 August 2019. 325 Interviews with several Mindanao veterans, 2019. See also Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 70. “Southern

Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” ICG, 13 July 2004. 326 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 135. 327 Interview with a Mindanao veteran, 2019. 328 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 158.

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4.5.2. Jihad and Grievance Narratives

Many Indonesian jihadists saw Mindanao as a new theater of jihad after the Afghanistan war

in the 1990s. They believed the Philippines’ government had persecuted and killed Moro

Muslims who struggled to live under the Islamic way of life. Therefore, they thought that jihad

is an individual obligation (fard ain) for all Muslims without exception, to help the Moro

people.

Yusuf Adirama was a JI member who received military training in Mindanao. He pledged his

allegiance to Abdullah Sungkar as the Amir in 1998 and became a cadre in the administrative

region (wakallah) in Surabaya, East Java. Before joining the ranks, he actively engaged in an

Islamic study group (usroh) in his senior year of high school. Once he became an active JI

member, he received indoctrination about jihad, hijra, the Tauhid Hakimiyya (God’s

sovereignty), and wala al bara (Loyalty and Disavowal). He also believed in the doctrine of

Hakimiyya about the need for sharia law to be implemented in Indonesia. Two years after his

membership, he was nominated by his wakallah to join Mindanao's military training in 2000.

In the interview with Yusuf, he asserts that his motivation to join JI was purely to defend Islam.

He began to believe that jihad is an obligation for all Muslims (fard ain) without exception,

and any Muslim who abandons it would be a sinner. After watching a documentary about the

Bosnian war, he was aggrieved, and this motivated him to defend the oppressed Muslims. In

the documentary, he saw how Christians killed and persecuted many Bosnian Muslims,

especially women and children. He was also told by his ustad the similar narrative of Mindanao

Muslims who were ill-treated by the Philippines' Christian government. These narratives

triggered him to wage jihad. He recalls:

I felt that as a man, I must do something concrete, something real to help the oppressed

women and children. The footage in the video was so powerful. It was so real. I asked

myself over and over again, how could this incident happen? Where is the justice? Why

are we still sitting here? Are we a bunch of cowardly men? I was really shocked. The

image of those crying women and children lingered for days.329


diss., Monash University, 2018), 133.

84

Ali Fauzi, the young brother of Amrozi and Ali Imron, had also experienced a grievance when

he saw a video of conflicts where non-Muslims massacred many Muslims in Afghanistan,

Bosnia, and Palestine. He was spurred to defend his fellow Muslims as he states, “We saw

videos of the brutal attacks on civilians. I wanted to carry out jihad to protect the Muslim people

from the bullies. With young, hot blood, I wanted to fight back.” 330A few years after he joined

JI in 1998, he travelled to Mindanao in 2002 to train and fight under the MILF.

As can be seen from Yusuf and Ali Fauzi’s narratives, it can be interpreted that grievance

against oppression was an important reason for both jihadists to join the jihadi group that sent

them to join the insurgency in Mindanao. The spirit to defend Islam and Muslim brothers in

this region, who had been persecuted by non-Muslims, created grievances and sympathy for

many youths, young men like them, to join JI. They began to believe that jihad was always in

war, and the enemy had to be eliminated through violence.

Abu Tholut, an Afghan veteran who went to Mindanao as a military instructor, shared a

common view with other jihadists, regarding the necessity for jihad. He was appointed as the

head of the Hudaibiyah military camp in 1998 and began the military academy in this region.

Recalling his memoir, Abu Tholut also stated that the Philippine government's repressive

policy against Mindanao Muslims is a fact. This narrative triggered his grievance and

motivated him to wage jihad as he recalls:

The Muslim Mindanao community with the majority of Moro ethnicity have been

facing the repressive policies of the Philippine government. Their rights as Muslims

were often oppressed by the Philippines’ government interests that were being enforced

in the district, the same as a military operation. An enduring consequence of this

oppression is that the Moro ethnic community who inhabited the Southern Philippines

wanted to determine their own fate as a free nation, with the establishment of their own

country. I think we shared the common interest to live under Islamic law. 331

Despite Yusuf and Abu Tholut’s narrative on jihad as a primary motive to engage in Mindanao,

Abdullah Sungkar and other JI elites had broader and long-term goals when they decided to

send their men to this conflict zone. It was likely a strategic or even a pragmatic reason that

330

Rebecca Henschke and Endang Nurdin, “Crossing Divides: The bomb maker turned peacemaker,” BBC

World Service, 28 May 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/world-asia-

51907603?fbclid=IwAR2RMFroba80xYDA1rc-X4Ti_ocWuhi2iRGKeLxyDIKuUOqUxbOc6D38h5Y.

Assessed in 30 May 2020. 331 Noor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization,” (PhD


85

they wanted to train their new recruits in the arts of war, the same as in Afghanistan. This

group’s primary goal was not to wage jihad against infidels or any external power in the

Philippines, but rather as a strategy to provide their members with military training to wage

jihad in the home country. As part of their preparation (idad), the Mindanao theatre conflict

was used as a training ground to equip their members with military skills and create potential

leaders to continue its goal.

Similar to Afghanistan, ideology or indoctrination played an essential role during the military

training in the Hudaibiyah camp. Besides learning military skills, the recruits had to attend

religious education. The indoctrination materials are similar to those in Afghanistan, that the

recruits were required to learn Fiqh, Al-Quran, Hadiths, and jihad. Specific to jihad, most

references were from political Islam ideologues, such as, Ibn Taymiyyah, Abdullah Azzam,

and Abdul Wahab, the founder of Wahabism, that jihad is exclusively or literally defined as

war (qital). The book of jihad by Abdullah Azzam, “Tarbiyah Jihadiyah,” and Ibn

Taymiyyah’s Sharh Al Aqeedat-il-Wasitiah (Fundamental beliefs of Islam and rejection of false

concept) were among the relevant references taught during the class.332 Overall, the core of

indoctrination was Salafi-Jihadism, which was developed by JI during the Afghanistan war.

Slightly different from Afghanistan, all religious teachings were autonomously carried out by

JI internal senior members during the military training. This indoctrination was given without

involving external figures or groups, including from the MILF. Several senior Afghan veterans

were recruited to indoctrinate the recruits. For example, Abu Tholut was amongst the

instructors in Hudaibiyah camp who taught religious classes in the camp besides teaching

military skills to the recruits.

4.6. After the Training and Fighting

Indonesian jihadists who were members of JI mostly left Mindanao once they finished their

military training. Zulkarnaen, the head of the military wing or markaziyah (command center)

was in charge of arranging and giving the new assignments for those who finished either the

short military or academy military. Moreover, mostly Indonesian foreign fighters in Mindanao



86

left the conflict zone and headed back home while many remained in Malaysia to recruit new

members.

Mindanao veterans regrouped in their pre-existing network once they returned home. Most

were under Mantiqi 2. Similar to Yusuf’s experience, he returned home after finishing his two

years at the military academy in the Hudaibiyah camp. He initially wanted to stay longer in

Mindanao and he even wanted to meet Osama bin Laden, but JI's leader requested he return

home. He finally went back to his hometown in Surabaya, East Java, and then shortly rejoined

a small JI cell in Semarang under the protégé of Abu Tholut.333 While working in a small shop

to sell sandals, Yusuf, with three other returning Mindanao veterans, operated their cell. As

preparation for jihad, this small cell kept weapons and a one-ton supply of explosive materials.

Moreover, some veterans remained in Mindanao, such as, Zulkifli, who served as the head of

regional division (wakalah), namely “Wakalah Hudaibiyah.”334 Many graduates also remained

in the Hudaibiyah and Jabal Quba military camps as trainers, while others served as JI’s

representative in this region, and a small number fought under the MILF.335

Mindanao veterans enjoyed prestige as “Mujahidin” even though it was a slightly lower

hierarchy level than their seniors, the Afghan veterans. They were considered as the second

class of jihadists or the juniors for Afghan veterans. Therefore, they still received a social status

as “Mujahid” who had military skills and overseas experience and received respect from the

local jihadists' internal circle. The Mindanao veterans also became a source of reference for

jihad for the new JL members.

Mindanao veterans assumed leadership of JI in the 2000s. Many of them were in vital positions

in the organisational structure. They mostly rose to these positions when many Afghan veterans

were killed and arrested by the Indonesian authority, Malaysia, and Singapore after the Bali

bombing in 2002. One of the best alumnae of Hudaibiyah academy military, Para Wijayanto,

was assigned as JI leader (Amir) in 2007. He received military training in 2000. Another

veteran, Wiji Joko Santoso, the best graduate from the Hudaibiyah military academy in 2000,

333 Interview with Yusuf, Solo, 2019. 334 “Southern Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” ICG, 13 July 2004. 335 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 136.

87

was assigned as the head of the foreign affairs division under Para Wijayanto.336 Furthermore,

Wiji Joko Santoso played an important role in the recruitment of a new generation of jihadists

who travelled to Syria at the beginning of 2013. The JI involvement in the Syrian conflict will

be discussed in the next chapter, Chapter 5.

Mindanao returnees from DI also returned home once their leaders instructed them to do so.

They united with their group and social networks and recruited new members. During 1990-

1999, they remained inactive as their leaders asked them not to engage in violent acts. DI

returnees had also played an important role in training local members. They established a small

regiment of “Abu Bakar” inspired by the MILF’s Abu Bakar military camp in Mindanao. 337

4.7. Acts of violence

Similar to the Afghan veterans, a number of Indonesian jihadists who trained and fought in

Mindanao also engaged in terrorist acts. Many of them participated in the Poso sectarian

conflict, which erupted in 2000. While engaging in attacks against local Christians in

Indonesia, they also launched an armed jihad against the Philippines' interests in Indonesia.

Veterans attacked targets not only in Indonesia but also in the Philippines. The attacks indicate

that many of them perceived the Philippines as another zone conflict, especially after President

Estrada launched the military offensive, ‘Operation Terminal Velocity’ in July 2000 and

successfully conquered the MILF’s military camp and Hudaibiyah camp. This attack became

a turning point for the MILF to launch jihad and Indonesian jihadists in Mindanao to take an

act of revenge.

4.7.1. Salamat Hashim’s Jihad Call

Salamat Hashim declared a jihad to all his fighters and sympathisers against Estrada’s

government in July 2000. He launched this holy war soon after his Abu Bakar camp was

rampaged and occupied by the Philippines’ armies. Shortly after defeating the MILF, President

Estrada came to the Abu Bakar camp with his soldiers to celebrate his victory by dining on

pork and drinking beer. Aggravated with Estrada’s intentional humiliation, Salamat Hashim

336 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 15 November 2019. 337 Interview with an anonymous former DI member, Jakarta, 2019.

88

called on MILF to engage a total war to fight Estrada's Christian army as an obligation (fard

ain) for all his fighters and members without exception.338

Several Indonesian jihadists were aggrieved and gave responses to Salamat Hashim’s jihad

call. They began to believe that Moro Muslims were under attack as the infidel enemy seized

Abu Bakar and their Hudaibiyah camps. To respond to this jihad call, Hambali, who had been

in Mindanao before waging jihad in Afghanistan, began to recruit his men.339 He initially

proposed retaliation to attack the Philippines' interest in Indonesia. To further carry out this

plan, he recruited several Afghanistan veterans many of whom had been in Mindanao, such as,

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Sarjiyo, Ali Imron, Mubarok, and Farihin.340

The attack took place on 2 August 2000. A powerful car bomb was set and detonated in front

of The Philippines’ Ambassador’s residence. The bomb blast killed two people and injured 22

civilians, including Ambassador Leonides Caday, who lost one of her legs.341 This attack

shocked many countries, especially the Philippines’ government since they have never thought

that terrorists would attack and target their diplomatic post overseas.342

Hambali was the mastermind of this act and directly led the bombing operation on the

Philippines’ Consulate. He involved a number of Afghan veterans and local jihadists affiliated

with DI.343 One of his motives to attack was likely an act of revenge.344 Hambali and other

perpetrators wanted to show their solidarity with the MILF that they were not alone fighting

against the enemy. Hambali was aggrieved when Estrada’s army destroyed the camps of

MILF’s Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah during the “All Out War” military campaign. One of the

perpetrators, during my interview, validates this claim by stating that the defeat and destruction

of Abu Bakar and Hudaibiyah camps had triggered a spirit of retaliation against the government

of the Philippines. Thus, the Philippines’ ambassador in Jakarta was selected as the easiest and

338 "One victory, more needed." The Economist, July 15, 2000, 74. Gale Academic OneFile (accessed May 14,

2020). 339 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 143. Interview with Nasir Abas, 15 November 2019 340 Interview with several Mindanao veterans, 2019. See also “Southern Phillipines’ Backgrounder: Terrorism

and The Peace Process, ICG, 13 July 2004. 341 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 61. 342 “Car bomb explodes at home of Philippine ambassador,” 2 August 2000,

http://www.bangla2000.com/news/archive/international/8-2-2000/news_detail4.html. 343 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2020. See also “Southern Phillipines Backgrounder: Terrorism and The Peace

Process,” ICG, 13 July 2004. 344 Interview with Sidney Jones, Jakarta, 2019.

89

closest target. This attack was also an answer to the call to jihad by Salamat Hashim. One of

the perpetrators recalls, “We were Mujahidin Khandaq, who attacked as an act of revenge.”345

It took three years for the Indonesian police to reveal the main perpetrators of the Philippines’

consulate attack. They were able to identify Hambali as the mastermind of the attack after

arresting and interrogating several arrested perpetrators of the 2002 Bali bombing.346 The

police investigation revealed that several Afghan veterans were involved in the attack,

including Imam Samudra, Ali Imron, and Mubaroq. Many of them had been in Mindanao in

the 1990s, mostly as military trainers in the Hudaibiyah camp.

After the attack of the Philippines’ Consulates in Jakarta, Hambali wanted to continue his

armed jihad. He assigned Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi to carry out this plan. After deciding the

target with Hambali, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi travelled to Mindanao to prepare another deadly

attack. Therefore, he brought his new jihad plan, which did not necessarily target the

Philippines' armies, but Filipino civilians were the primary target. A series of bombings hit

Metro Manila at the celebration of the Rizal Day on 30 December 2000. Twenty-two civilians

died in this attack, and a hundred more were seriously injured.347

During my interview, a former JI’s elite states that he had short conversations with Fathur

Rahman al-Ghozi when he entered Mindanao before heading to Manila. It is said that

Faturrohman al-Ghozi told him that he was on a special mission arranged by Hambali. After

knowing Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi’s purpose, Nasir Abas informed Abu Tholut as the head of

Mantiqi 3 about the plan but received no response. 348 It is said that Hambali also engaged in

the Metro Manila bombing as he arrived in Manila in December 2000.349

Hierarchically, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi was under the Mantiqi 3 and was appointed as the cell

leader in Mindanao and developed a close relationship with the MILF fighters. In 1996, he had

345 Interview with anonymous Mindanao veteran, 2019. 346 Interview with anonymous Mindanao veteran, 2019 347 After CBCP rally, PNP prepares for Rizal Day bombing anniversary,

https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2006/12/19/375735/after-cbcp-rally-pnp-prepares-rizal-day-bombing-

anniversary 348 Interview with anonymous former JI’s elite, 2020. 349 Margarita ‘Tingtin’ Cojuanggo, Terrorism is necessarily rooted in religion and is international in character,

The Manila Times, https://staging.manilatimes.net/2017/06/29/opinion/analysis/terrorism-necessarily-rooted-

religion-international-character-3/335456/amp. Assessed in 6 June 2020.

90

military training in Afghanistan during 1993-1994 and established contact with several MILF

members before entering Mindanao. When he entered Mindanao in 1996, Fathur Rahman al-

Ghozi became the JI’s liaison officer with MILF and engaged in military training as well as

taught military skills to MILF fighters, such as, the bomb-making course.350 He was tasked to

train several Arab jihadists under Umar al Faruq in the Abu Bakar camp or the Vietnam camp.

Based on this Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi had a close relationship with Umar al Faruq.351

Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi engaged several MILF fighters, such as, Saifullah Yunos, to launch a

bombing attack targeting Metro Manila.352 This bombing successfully killed 32 Filipinos and

wounded hundreds of other civilians.353 The Philippines National Police investigated this attack

and revealed that al-Ghozi, Bafana, Hambali, Yunos, and five members of the MILF were the

main perpetrators.354

4.7.2. Ambon and Poso Conflicts

The communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso brought the thoughts of carrying out jihad to many

Mindanao veterans regardless of their group affiliations. Many of them who had just finished

their military training in Mindanao were deployed by their leaders to engage in this sectarian

conflict. They were mobilised to wage jihad, especially during the Poso conflict. Similar to

their seniors, the Afghan veterans, many returning jihadists from Mindanao saw the battle as

jihad's door to defend local Muslims who were persecuted by Christians.

Several Mindanao veterans individually took part in the Ambon conflict. Many of them joined

KOMPAK and did not structurally represent JI. Therefore, JI decided to associate directly in

the Poso through the mission called “Uhud Project” in 2002. The word “Uhud” is taken from

the most significant battle between Muslims against the Quraysh tribe on 22 December 624.

Abu Tholut, an Afghan veteran, and former head of Mantiqi 3, was assigned to lead this project.

350 Zachary Abuza, Militant Islam in Southeast Asia, 136. 351 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2020. 352 ICG Asia report No 63. “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous,” 26 August

2003. Paul A. Rodell, “Separatist Insurgency in the Southern Philippines,” 236. Ken Conboy, The Second Front,

130. Saifullah Yunos is an Afghanistan veteran who received military training in Sadda camp. “Southern

Philippines Backgrounder: Terrorism and the Peace Process,” ICG, 13 July 2004. 353 ICG Asia report No 63. “Jemaah Islamiyah in South East Asia: Damaged but still Dangerous.” 354 Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi was arrested and sentenced to 17 years in prison for illegal possession of explosives

and his involvement in Rizal Day bombing. He was able to escape from his prison in July 2003 but was killed

by the Philippines’ military on 13 October 2003. Moreover, Yunos was captured on 25 May 2003.

91

The Uhud Project was a territorial development program by JI in Poso that aimed to carry out

jihad by assisting and strengthening local Poso Muslims through two different religious and

military activities.355 Various religious outreach was carried out, such as, Islamic teaching,

prayer, and reciting the Qur’an. Besides religious outreach, JI members began to recruit local

Muslims to become new members. They trained local Poso youths in military skills, such as,

weaponry, bomb-making, and other combat skills.356

In line with religious activities, Abu Tholut recruited local young Muslims and trained them

with military skills. He established five successive groups known as Uhud 1-5. Forty-five local

Muslim people participated in the first Uhud. Within this group, Abu Tholut selected the ten

best recruits called “10 teams” and further trained them to be military instructors for the next

Uhud 2 in 2002 and to train the next following group.357

Uhud Project involved both Afghan and Mindanao veterans as trainers as well as religious

teachers. Many more veterans began to get involved in 2000 after finishing their military

academy in Hudaibiyah. Among those Mindanao returning jihadists were Abdul Hakim, Abu

Assad, Ustad Toha, Hamzah, Abu Qital, Ustad Haizam, and others.358 Mahfudz Qomari alias

Sutarjo was among the Mindanao veterans who joined Uhud 4 at the beginning of 2002. In this

program, he gave a short military training for two days or “muqoyamah,” focusing on warfare

tactics. 359

JI had learned from their experience not to engage as a group during the Ambon conflict, and

they tried to avoid individual engagement in Poso. They began centralising all activities into

one command and the leaders of the group were involved directly in all programs. They also

changed the strategy where they did not merely emphasise the military aspects, such as, sending

their fighters. Overall, they wanted to pursue a long-term goal in Poso by using this region as

their base to start armed jihad in Indonesia.

355 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 91. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Indonesian Top Secret

Membongkar Konflik Poso, 178. 356 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Indonesian Top Secret Membongkar Konflik Poso, 178. 357 Ibid, 179. 358 Ibid, 182-183. 359 Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 143.

92

Instead of sending its fighters, mostly Afghan and Mindanao veterans, JI deployed many

religious scholars (ustad) from Java to teach local Muslims Islamic teachings, especially JI’s

indoctrination, to recruit new members. Ilyas alias Muchtar, an Afghan veteran (batch eight in

1990) who was also a military trainer in the Hudaibiyah camp, was sent to Poso to teach

military skills, such as, weapon training and tactic map reading skills, and also field engineering

to local fighters. In addition, he carried out religious indoctrination, especially on Salafi Jihadi,

to many of his students. 360

Many Mindanao veterans engaged in arms smuggling during the conflicts of Ambon and Poso.

Mubarok and Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi were among the prominent figures of Mindanao

veterans who bought weapons and explosives from Mindanao, which then transferred to

Ambon and Poso.361 The weapons and explosives procured were transferred to a conflict zone

and were stored in Mantiqi 2, especially in Java. In the interview with a Mindanao veteran, it

is said that many weapons and ammunition were brought illegally from Mindanao.362

JI involved local Muslims in the Uhud project. For example, they involved Adnan Arsal, a

charismatic Muslim leader in Poso who had established the Ulil Albab Islamic boarding house.

In my interviews with Nasir Abas, he said that the only way to succeed in Poso was to win

local people's hearts and minds and involve them. With this strategy, JI began to rebuild many

schools where the children could continue their educations. The local community welcomed

this program and began to give support and sympathy to JI’s initiatives.

Hasanuddin also known as Slamet Raharjo was a Mindanao veteran who was dispatched to

Poso. After finishing the military academy in the Hudaibiyah Camp in February 2000, he was

assigned by Abu Tholut and Nasir Abas to remain in Mindanao while it regrouped to the MILF

for the next two years.363 Once the tasks were completed, Hasanuddin received a new mission

to go to Poso and lead a newly established wakalah (branches) named “Wakalah Khaibar” in

September 2002.

360 Solahudin, Dari NII ke JI, 254. 361 Ibid. 362 Interview with anonymous veteran, Jakarta, 2019. 363 “Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge,” Asia Report No 127, 24 January 2007.

93

In an interview with Nasir Abas, he said that JI aimed to strengthen its presence in Poso. One

strategy to expand its foothold in this region is by new recruitment through marriage and

kinship. With this strategy, Nasir advised Hasanuddin to marry a local girl from a respected

family in Poso. He agreed with this proposal, and Nasir Abas arranged Hasanuddin’s marriage

to Adnan Arsal’s daughter named Aminah. Nasir Abas had expected to win over the support

of local Muslims for the JI mission in Poso. In other words, the marriage would strengthen the

bond and build more coalitions with local Muslims. 364

Hasanuddin began recruiting new members and trained local fighters with military skills and

combat tactics. He established local mujahidin and divided it into two groups: the military and

religious outreach wing. All participants were required to learn JI’s doctrines, such as, jihad,

meaning as qital (war), the necessity of jama’ah (community), loyalty and disloyalty (al-wala’

wal bara), and military skills.

In its operation, Hasanuddin often engaged other local jihadi groups, such as, Mujahidin

KOMPAK in fighting against the Christians.365 Moreover, Hasanuddin’s group began to adopt

a new violent jihad, which was not directed by the JI leader. He believed that revenge against

the local Christians was justified and began to carry out a series of violent acts, such as killing

a Christian Church treasurer in 2003 and a pastor in 2004. Several crimes attributed to

Hasanuddin and his cell included bombing Poso’s central market in 2004 and the Tentena

market in 2005, and the beheadings of three Christian schoolgirls in October 2005.366 Basri,

one of the executors, states that Hasanuddin and Sanusi initiated the plot as he recalls: “Yes,

the plan was initiated by Ustad Sanusi.367 Hasanuddin agreed. At that time I was told to come

since it was the fasting month. They asked, “What is the Lebaran gift?” I said, OK, I’ll find the

target later.”368

364 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2019. Muhammad Tito Karniavan, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 145.

“Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge,” Asia Report No 127, 24 January 2007. 365 “Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge,” Asia Report No 127, 24 January 2007. 366 “Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge,” Asia Report No 127, 24 January 2007. Mohammad Basri: Kami

ini Hanya Kerbau (Mohammad Basri: We are just Buffalo), Tempo, 12 February 2007,

https://majalah.tempo.co/read/nasional/123094/mohammad-basri-kami-ini-hanya-kerbau?hidden=login.

Assessed in 6 June 2020. 367 Sanusi or Ishak was a Mindanao veteran who participated in Poso in 2004. 368 Mohammad Basri: Kami ini Hanya Kerbau (Mohammad Basri: We are just Buffalo), Tempo, 12 February

2007. The perpetrators of the beheadings are Basri, Agus, Wiwin, and Haris.

https://majalah.tempo.co/read/nasional/123094/mohammad-basri-kami-ini-hanya-kerbau?hidden=login

94

The Ambon and Poso conflicts had united many Mindanao returnees from different groups to

wage armed jihad. Many of those returnees affiliated with DI were also involved as they

believed that jihad was needed to protect local Muslims from being persecuted by Christians.

Agus Dwikarna was among the DI members who involved himself in this sectarian conflict.

He was assigned as the chief of a paramilitary group known as Laskar Jundullah in October

2000. 369 Unlike Laskar Jihad, who recruited militias from Java, Laskar Jundullah recruited

local militias, including from Sulawesi. In 2000, these groups recruited 2000 militias and

engaged in the Poso conflict.370 This group established a link with Al Qaeda in its operations.

Agus Dwikarna also served as the head of the KOMPAK branch in Makassar during the Poso

and Ambon conflict. While recruiting new local jihadists, he engaged in weapons smuggling

operations from Mindanao. Moreover, he was arrested by the Philippines’ authority on 13

March 2002 when he tried to leave the country at Ninoy Aquino International Airport, Manila.

The security personnel found bomb-making equipment inside his suitcase, which brought him

a jail term of 17 years for the illegal possession of explosives.371

Other Mindanao returnees under Wahdah Islamiyah (Sulawesi network) and Ring Banten also

participated in the Poso conflict. They believed that jihad to defend Muslims in Poso was an

obligation. To provide arms for its members, Suryadi, a member of the Sulawesi network, built

a connection with JI to smuggle weapons and explosives from Mindanao. They mostly

delivered the guns to Muslims in the Poso conflict.372

In addition, many freelance jihadists who remained in Mindanao under the MILF protection

also took part in the Ambon and Poso conflict.373 Abdullah Sonata was among them. He went

to Mindanao in 2003 and established cooperation with JI members, such as, Umar Patek to

dispatch new recruits to receive military training as suicide bombers in Mindanao.374

369 Interview with Al Chaidar, 30 January 2020. 370 Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 223-224. 371 Agus Dwikarna, United Nations for Security Council,

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1267/aq_sanctions_list/summaries/individual/agus-dwikarna. 372 Justin V. Hastings, No Man’s Land: Globalization, Territory, and Clandestine Groups in Southeast Asia, 61-

62. Muhammad Tito Karnavian, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies: 152. JI was able to collect weapons from

Java and Mindanao. They were also able to get approximately 1000 weapons during the raid on police weapons

depot in Tantui, Ambon in June 2000. 373 Freelance jihadists are those who engaged jihad activities without necessarily having ties or organizational

hierarchy with certain jihadi groups. 374 Kit Collier, “Terrorism Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao,” in Southeast Asian

Affairs 2006, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006.

95

4.7.3. Al-Qaeda’s jihad call

Several Mindanao veterans were also involved in bombing operations carried out by Al Qaeda

sympathisers in Indonesia between 2002 and 2006. Influenced by Osama bin Laden’s call to

jihad, they believed that the main enemy was the US and its allies, who occupied the Arabian

Peninsula. Many of them were involved directly or became supporting units of bombing actions

targeting the Western world's symbols or interests in various cities in Indonesia.

Following Hambali's arrest in August 2003, Noordin M Top took the lead to continue Al-

Qaeda’s armed jihad in Indonesia. Together with Dr. Azhari, he recruited many local jihadi

groups, such as, JI and DI, including Mindanao veterans, to support the preparation, such as, a

survey of the target, transportation, and the execution to provide suicide bombers.

Under the leadership of Adung alias Sunarto bin Kartodiharjo, JI provided men and logistics

to assist Dr. Azhari’s bombing campaign. Masrizal bin Ali Umar alias Tohir was the one who

was recruited by Noordin in the J W Marriot bombing in 2003. He was a JI member in the

1990s and received military training in Mindanao in 1998. In this attack, he helped Noordin

buy a car that was used to transport explosives of 100 kilograms. During the preparation, he

was involved in the survey of the target.

Moreover, shortly after the Indonesian police arrested Adung in 2004, Abu Dujana and

Zarkasih, who served as JI caretakers, began to evaluate their support to Noordin M Top. They

asked JI members not to allow Noordin to use their assets, including weapons and explosive

materials. Both Abu Dujana and Zarkasih rejected Noordin's bombing campaigns because they

believed it contradicted the group’s long-term goal and created drawbacks.375

Noordin M Top began to recruit a small number of Mindanao veterans who were affiliated with

DI after JI stopped providing their men and logistics in bombing operations between 2004 and

2010. Rois alias Iwan Dharmawan was the one who was engaged by Noordin M Top. He

received military training in the Jabal Quba camp between 1999 and 2000 and reunited in the

Ring Banten when he returned home. He provided a sanctuary for Noordin M Top and Azhari

375 Interviews with Adhe Bhakti, 2020.

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after the JW Marriot bombing. In the Australian Embassy bombing on 9 September 2004, he

played a role as the recruiter of a local jihadi named Heri Golun, who acted as a suicide bomber.

Moreover, many Mindanao veterans were arrested by the Indonesian police and convicted of

providing sanctuary for terrorists. They gave shelter and accommodation to their JI senior

members who engaged in terrorism because of the doctrine “al-wala' wa-l-bara” (loyalty

and disavowal). In his memoir, Nasir Abas mentions a number of his former students in the

Hudaibiyah camp, such as, Herlambang, Makmuri, and Ahmad Budi Wibowo who hid the

main perpetrators of the Bali bombing in 2002.376

The Indonesian police also arrested many Mindanao veterans because they were convicted of

helping and providing logistical assistance to Noordin M Top without necessarily being

involved directly in the attack. Although many rejected Noordin M Top’s strategy to target

civilians, they believed it was an obligation as a Muslim not to turn him over to the Indonesian

police. For example, Abu Dujana admitted meeting Noordin M Top before the Marriott

bombing, but he denied his involvement in the attack.377 Similarly, Ubeid or Lutfi Hudaeroh

also helped Noordin M Top as part of his solidarity as Muslims. He became a courier for

Noordin and the Indonesian police arrested him in July 2004 because of his role. 378

4.8. Conclusion

This chapter has examined the participation of hundreds of Indonesian foreign fighters in

Mindanao who were recruited and mobilised by radical groups, such as, JI and several factions

of DI. These militant groups used Mindanao as a safe haven as well as a training ground to

advance their interests. While JI established the Hudaibiyah military training ground, DI

members formed smaller training camps, such as, “Al-Fatah,” and many of them trained in the

MILF’s Abu Bakar camp. While they were still training, Indonesian fighters joined in many of

the MILF’s military operations, especially to defend and counter the attacks by the enemy.

Overall, there has been mutual interest between the foreign fighters’ group and the MILF.

376 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 160. 377 “Accused Asian terror leader: Expect more blood,” CNN International.com, June 26, 2007. Assessed in

https://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/06/25/abu.dujana/index.html, 19 June 2020. 378 Nasir Abas, Membongkar Jamaah Islamiyah, 161.

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Many Mindanao veterans had engaged in terrorism at home as a result of having been exposed

to radical ideologies, such as, jihad which was interpreted as a war. Moreover, many were also

triggered by a feeling of solidarity and revenge when they attacked the Philippines Consulate

in Jakarta shortly after President Estrada launched the “All Out War” military operation. Along

with the MILF members, Indonesian jihadists also perpetuated attacks in the Philippines’

territory, which included the Metro Manila bombing of 2001. The two attacks have indicated

that Indonesian returning jihadists still developed bonds and solidarity with the MILF that had

given their territory to build military training.

During the Poso conflict, a number of Mindanao veterans were instructed by JI’s markaziyah

to join the “Uhud Project,” while those who were affiliated with DI joined local jihadi groups,

such as, KOMPAK to help Muslims in Poso. They not only fought against the Christians during

the sectarian conflict, the Mindanao veterans also recruited new members during the conflict.

Similar to JI, they wanted to establish a base “qoidah aminah.” Many of them joined in a series

of terror campaigns against the Christians, including the beheading of three Christian students.

Apart from armed jihad ideology, it is evident that many Mindanao veterans decided to attack

because of the spirit of solidarity and the act of revenge. They were driven by local factors, and

the desire to take revenge against the attacks by Christians between 2000 and 2001. The two

cases of Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Hasanuddin have shown that these two Mindanao

veterans were involved in terrorism because they believed that killing civilians is permissible

and as a consequence of their solidarity as Muslims.

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CHAPTER V

The Syrian War

5.1. Introduction

The Syrian Civil War, which erupted in 2010, attracted waves of Indonesian citizens to

participate in this conflict in the name of jihad. Approximately 700 to 1,000 jihadists entered

this conflict zone with multiple motivations.379 That number excludes hundreds of other people,

including women and children, who wanted to join yet failed to cross the border and were

deported by Turkish authorities. Overall, the Syrian conflict has caused the most significant

wave of Indonesian jihadists' mobilisation overseas after the Afghanistan war in the 1980s.

The aim of this chapter is twofold. Firstly, to narrate the historical background of the thousands

of Indonesian nationals who flocked to Syria to fight, train, and live under the Islamic

Caliphate. It explicitly explains the different Indonesian jihadi groups that fought alongside

two belligerents, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. Further, it analyses their motives for entering the

war zone and observes their roles during the battle. In the Indonesian context, the jihadists who

fought in Syria are more diverse in terms of motivations, roles, and types of mobilisations than

those who fought in Afghanistan and Mindanao. The majority joined in the conflict

collectively, while many also joined without necessarily serving as active members of radical

groups at home. While the majority fought and preferred to become the Caliphate's citizens,

many others joined the conflict to obtain military skills and war experience and then returned

home to wage jihad in the home country.

Secondly, this chapter will analyse the post-conflict behaviour of Indonesian fighters from

Syria after they returned home. Until 2020, there have been fewer than 100 to 120 returnees

who have returned home.380 Similar to those jihadists who travelled to Afghanistan and

Mindanao, the motives for returning home are various, but many left the conflict in Syria

because they were traumatised and disillusioned.

379 Interview with Sydney Jones, Jakarta, 2019. Interview with several scholars and government officers,

Jakarta, 2019. 380 Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTF) Desk, BNPT. Interviews with many scholars, government officers and

NGOs, Jakarta, 2019.

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5.2. Syrian Conflict: An Overview

The civil war in Syria and the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in the 2010s attracted a

record surge of foreign fighters from many countries. Thousands of international volunteers

from different nationalities flocked and joined insurgencies driven by various motivations and

ideologies. A recent report released by RAN in July 2017 states that approximately 42,000

foreign fighters from 120 countries had entered Syria and Iraq between 2011 and 2016 to join

in this internationalised armed conflict.381 Similarly, the International Centre for the Study of

Radicalisation (ICSR) in 2018 also reported that more than 41,000 civilians embarked from 80

countries and fought in the Syria sectarian conflict as foreign fighters.382

The Syrian conflict began when the Arab Spring spread across the Middle East and North

Africa countries in the early 2010s. The waves of demonstrations erupted to protest the local

corrupt and repressive regimes.383 The Arab Spring uprisings also occurred in Syria in January

2011. Thousands of civilian protesters went to the street to demand political and economic

reform against the Syrian regime under President Bashar al-Assad. Moreover, the Syrian

government reacted harshly, which caused high casualties and created political unrest in the

country. This political turmoil escalated into the bloodiest civilian war and sectarian conflict

between Sunni Muslims, the majority of the Syrian populations, and the Syrian government,

dominated by the Alawi sect.384

The continuing civil war in Syria created a fragmentation of opposition, those who took up

arms against the Syrian government. They were not united under command control but instead

operated based on their strategy and political goals.385 While the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and

Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) preferred to establish a more open and democratic country

based on nationalism and secular state, many Salafi jihadist organisations, such as, Jabhat al-

Nusra aimed to overthrow the Assad government. Also, ISIS fought with its broader plan to

381 RAN Manual on Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families, July 2017. Retrieved

from https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/ran_br_a4_m10_en.pdf. 382 Joana Cook and Gina vale, “From Daesh to ‘Diaspora’: Tracing the Women and Minors of Islamic State,”

International Centre for the Study of Radicalization (ICSR), 2018. https://icsr.info/wp-

content/uploads/2018/07/Women-in-ISIS-report_20180719_web.pdf. 383 The Arab Spring began in 2011 in several Muslim countries like Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Libya,

Syria, Yemen, Bahrain, Jordan and Oman. 384 The Alawi sect or Alawites represent less than 20% of population and has been accused as another branch of

Shia by Syrian Sunni rebellions. 385 Sherifa Zuhur, “The Syrian Opposition: Salafi and Nationalist Jihadism and Populist Idealism,”

Contemporary Review of the Middle East 2 no. 1&2 (2015): 143–163.

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build an Islamic Caliphate with its extreme Islam interpretation. These diversities of goals,

ideology, and social networks made the conflict in Syria more complicated.

The conflict in Syria also attracted many state actors, such as, Saudi, Qatar, Turkey, and even

the United States to involve their national interests. They gave political as well as financial

support to insurgent groups against the Assad government.386 On the other side, the Assad

government received political and military support from Russia and Iran.387 These external

interventions escalated and prolonged the conflict into civil war and have become the longest

and bloodiest one in the Middle East caused by the Arab Spring.388

5.3. Jihad and Transnational Networks

The Syrian sectarian conflict inspired hundreds of Indonesians, especially those from radical

Islamist groups, to carry out jihad. There had been many mass rallies in several cities, such as,

Jakarta, Bekasi, Solo, Malang, Padang, and Ambon to give support to ISIS. For example, in

March 2014, hundreds of Indonesian pro-ISIS gathered in Hotel Indonesia roundabout in the

Capital city. They gave their support to ISIS and the full implementation of Sharia in Indonesia.

Three key men organised this mass gathering of local jihadists named Muhammad Fachry,

Bahrumsyah, and Syamsudin Uba. Both Fachry and Bahrumsyah shortly travelled to Syria to

join ISIS. Overall, approximately 2000 Indonesians pledged their allegiance to ISIS in 2014.389

Therefore, Syria's conflict exerted a decisive pull factor to join compared to Afghanistan and

Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. For the first time, many Indonesian jihadists believed

Syria to be a holy place or a legitimate ground to carry out jihad where Muslims would achieve

triumph against the enemy of God. By citing a hadith, they believed that Prophet Muhammad

had already predicted the rise of an Islamic Caliphate with the black banner under a Caliph's

386 Faysal Itani and Aaron Stein, “Turkey’s Syria Predicament,” Atlantic Council, Rafik Hariri Center for the

Middle East, assessed in https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/wp-

content/uploads/2016/05/Turkey_s_Syria_Predicament.pdf. Yehuda U. Blanga, “Saudi Arabia’s Motives in the

Syrian Civil War,” Middle East Policy, assessed in

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/mepo.12307. 387 Hokayem, E. ” Iran, the Gulf states and the Syrian civil war.” In T. Dodge & E. Hokayem (Eds.), Middle

Eastern security, the U.S. pivot and the rise of ISIS (2014): 447-448. London, England: Routledge. 388 Maya Bhardwa, Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: From Revolution to Civil War,

http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/7367~v~Development_of_Conflict_in_Arab_Spring_Liby

a_and_Syria__From__Revolution_to_Civil_War.pdf. 389 Solahudin, Strategi Soft Approach Harapan Penyelesaian Akar Terorisme di Indonesia (Soft Approach

Strategy is a Hope to Solve Terrorism in Indonesia), AIDA, https://www.aida.or.id/2016/05/564/strategi-soft-

approach-harapan-penyelesaian-akar-terorisme-di-indonesia. Assessed in 24 June 2020.

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leadership who has his bloodline. With this narrative, they viewed joining ISIS as an obligation

for all Muslims, and anyone who fails would be sinful. With this strong narrative, they

preferred to fight until death as a martyr for those who travelled as fighters and had no intention

to return home.390

Indonesian jihadists arrived in Syria and joined a variety of jihadist groups with different

motivations. Moreover, there have been such commonalities of motives to go and fight. First,

many of them believe in Islamic eschatology (hadith) that the final battle (Malhamah al-Kubra)

would take place in Sham (Greater Syria).391 As predicted, Imam Mahdi, the last hidden Imam,

would come alongside Jesus and lead Muslim warriors to triumph. Second, they found that the

Syrian conflict was the holy war between Shia and Sunni, where the Syrian regime under

President Assad was deemed responsible for killing thousands of Sunni Muslims. As Syrian

Muslims were killed and persecuted by the Syrian government, they were called to wage jihad

to defend their Sunni Muslim brothers and fight against the enemy. Lastly, many militants

believed the emergence of ISIS would serve as an excellent opportunity to establish an Islamic

caliphate that would unify all Muslims worldwide.392

At the beginning of the war, a number of Indonesian students were involved in the Syrian

conflict in 2012, a year after the Arab Spring occurred in this country. They mostly attended

religious studies or universities in the Middle East (Saudi and Yemen) and in other countries

like Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt. Riza Fardi, Wildan Mukhollad, Yazid Ulwan Falahuddin,

Rusydan Abdul Hadi, and Wijangga Bagus Panulat were among the students who decided to

drop their studies to travel to Syria for jihad. Most of them had graduated from Pondok Ngruki

and they were linked with Abu Bakar Bashir. Rusydan Abdul Hadi, for example, had graduated

from Al-Mukmin, Ngruki, and continued his study at The International Islamic University,

Pakistan. Together with three other students named Mohammad Fakhiri Ihsani, Arisdiantoro

Sunarno, and Swaiin Nuha Abdullah, he left Pakistan for Syria in August 2013.

Many more jihadists and radical groups in Indonesia, including Jamaah Anshrohul Tauhid

(JAT), Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia (Indonesian Mujahedeen Council-MMI), began to

390 “Indonesians and the Syrian Conflict,” IPAC Report No. 6, 30 January 2014. 391 Joe Cochrane. “Indonesian Militants Joint Foreigners Fighting in Syria,” The New York Times, 1 Feb 2014 392 Sidney Jones and Solahudin, “ISIS in Indonesia,” Southeast Asian Affairs 2015, Retrieved from

http://web.a.ebscohost.com.ezproxy.auckland.ac.nz/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?vid=1&sid=1d635d0f-ba64-

4089-a7ec-f02ff50e02cc%40sessionmgr4007

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participate in the Syrian conflict. Overall, they viewed Syria as a new jihad theatre to fight

Shia-backed Bashar al-Assad as Islam's enemy. The former JI leader, Abu Bakar Bashir, gave

his endorsement to join this conflict by claiming the Syria civil war as a "University for Jihad

Education.” He further urged all Muslims, especially his followers, to perform jihad as an

obligation. Soon after Baghdadi declared Islamic Caliphate on 2 July 2014, Abu Bakar Bashir

pledged his allegiance. Stating his loyalty to IS, he urged his followers to migrate and defend

the creation of the Islamic Caliphate.393

There is no exact number of Indonesian civilians who joined ISIS and other affiliated terrorist

groups in the Syrian war. A report released by The National Counter-Terrorism Agency

(BNPT) in July 2020 states that there are approximately 1,413 civilians who trained and fought

in Syria.394 Therefore, Sidney Jones argued that only hundreds came to Syria to fight. Many

people, especially women and children who travelled to Syria had no intention to fight, they

wanted to live under Islamic Caliphate. Moreover, approximately 500 to 600 men came to Syria

as fighters to join ISIS and other insurgent groups. 395

Indonesian foreign fighters who travelled to Syria mostly supported ISIS to build an Islamic

caliphate. Some of these jihadists wanted to fight till the death if they went as fighters. Some

of them preferred to stay and fight for the Islamic State as they believed it was "Akhir Zaman"

(end time) where the great battle and Muslims' triumph would occur.396 With these narratives,

most fighters wanted to fight until death and had no intention to return home as they had already

sold everything they had to pay their way and to buy their tickets to get to Syria.

There had been a fragmentation of Indonesian jihadists in Syria. They were involved in two

main camps, ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra, in which each of the supporters had a different ideology

and motivation to join the conflict. Therefore, the great majority were aligned to ISIS, while

393 Jailed Terrorist Convict Ba’asyir Pledges Oath with ISIS on the Rise, Jakarta Globe,

http://jakartaglobe.id/news/jailed-terrorist-convict-baasyir-pledges-oath-isis-rise. Abu Bakar Ba’asyir Minta

Pengikutnya Dukung ISIS, Kompas, 15 July 2014,

http://internasional.kompas.com/read/2014/07/15/19331811/Abu.Bakar.Ba.asyir.Minta.Pengikutnya.Dukung.ISI

S. 394 “Lebih dari 500 WNI Sudah Gabung ISIS” (More than 500 Indonesian citizens have joined ISIS), 28 May

2017. Retrieved from http://www.rmoljabar.com/read/2017/05/28/44297/Lebih-Dari-500-WNI-Sudah-Gabung-

ISIS. 395 Interview with Sidney Jones, Jakarta, 2019. 396 Ibid.

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others affiliated with JI and Al-Qaeda mostly joined Jabat Al-Nusra.397 These two group

affiliations are not united and have different goals in their participation in the battlefront.

Furthermore, they even competed with each other to recruit new members in the home country.

5.4. Jihad and Grievance Narratives

Indonesian jihadists in Syria were diverse, and it would be misleading to generalise them into

a single group and the motivations that drove them. In terms of ideology and group networks,

they were far more varied and even more complicated than those jihadi generations who trained

and fought in Afghanistan or Mindanao. They were members of many domestic radical groups

that advocated diverse ideologies, such as, Salafi jihadi and Salafi takfiri.398

At the individual level, Indonesian foreign fighters in Syria were driven by different

motivations. Despite their ideology, many of them went to the conflict zone because of personal

motives. While many also joined because of economic reasons, hundreds of other Indonesian

citizens travelled principally to become the Caliphate's citizens. Therefore, many combatants

joined the conflict to receive military training and combat experience to wage future armed

jihad at home.

Ahmad Junaidi is one of the Indonesian foreign fighters who trained and fought for ISIS. He

travelled to Syria with the other twenty members of JAT Dauroh (Group) Malang, East Java,

who pledged allegiance to Baghdadi.399 He was recruited by Abu Jandal in 2014 and received

indoctrination on jihad, shirk of democracy, thogut Ansor, and the sin of idolatry or polytheism

(shirk). He also received religious teaching from Abu Jandal about "The primacy in the land of

Sham or Syria."

Junaedi initially hesitated to go to Syria. Nevertheless, Abu Jandal tried to convince him that

jihad is needed and becomes an individual obligation for every Muslim, especially while

397 Yenni Kwok, “The ISIS Extremists Causing Havoc in Iraq Are Getting Funds and Recruits From Southeast

Asia,” Time, 17 June 2014. Retrieved from http://time.com/2888423/isis-islamist-state-in-iraq-and-syria-

indonesia/. 398 Muh Taufiqurrohman, “The Road to ISIS: How Indonesian Jihadists Travel to Iraq and Syria.” Counter

Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 7, no. 4 (2015): 17-25. 399 Arif Sudiarto Iskandar, Muhamad Muhiddin Ahmad Gani, Bob Haris, Amin Abdullah Bauzir, Ridwan

Sungkar, Husni Abdillah Smeer, Muhammad, Salim Mubarok, Toriq Taufik Husin, Kadhafi Makhfud

Shammakh, Affan Muhammad Djubeir, Helmi Muhammad Alamudi, Salim, Syahrul Munif, Ayman Affan

Jubair, Heri Kustyanto Hendra, Muchammad Jusuf Agil, Zam Zam Misfandimir, Arizal Ridwan Arif.

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infidels persecuted many Muslims. Abu Jandal also showed him many videos and news about

Assad’s regime's cruelty against innocent Syrian Muslims. This narrative triggered Junaedi’s

emotion and convinced him to carry out jihad. He was in anger and wanted to help Syrian Sunni

Muslims being oppressed by the government of Syria.400 As he agreed to go to Syria, Abu

Jandal informed him to join a humanitarian group to help Syrian Sunni civilians and further

receive a monthly stipend amount of US$ 1,500.401

After arriving in Syria in March 2014, Junaedi began his new life as a foreign fighter and

received the alias name "Abu Salman." He undertook a short military training in the Muazkar

camp to learn necessary combat skills, such as, disassembling AK-47 weapons and shooting.

The training was inadequate, he was even given shooting training with a single bullet. After

joining a short training, he was required to pledge his bai’at to Baghdadi by saying, “We

promise to be obedient and loyal to the Amir of Abu Bakar al Baghdadi as long as he does not

violate the Islamic Sharia.”402

Junaedi participated in guard duty (ribath) after finishing the training and declaring his bai’at

to ISIS. Together with other Indonesian jihadists, he was sent to the Indonesian pro-ISIS

fighters camp named the Katibah Masyariq under the leadership of Abu Jandal. With a new

identity as an ISIS fighter, he describes his roles and military activities in the camps as he

states, “We then spent 24 days at a camp filled with only Indonesians and we were introduced

to weapons, taught Islamic doctrine and encouraged to have morning jogs.”403 In this camp, he

also experienced real combat when the Syrian army attacked their base."404

Moreover, Junaedi began to doubt his jihad and wanted to leave the battlefront. He felt deceived

as he found the reality in the conflict zone contradicted his idea of jihad as it was different from

what he imagined it would be. He just wanted to do humanitarian jobs to help civilians,

especially women and children who suffered the war, not as a fighter who fought in the

battlefront, which he had never imagined before. His psychology was degrading, especially

400 Interview with Adhe Bhakti, 2020. 401 Interview with Adhe Bhakti, 2019. 402 Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR). 403 Is not worth joining: Returnee, The Jakarta Post, 1 April 2015. 404 Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR).

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when he had a call from his wife once a month, and she asked him to return home. He states,

“I admit that I felt very sick and tired of it all.”405

Amidst the resistance from his comrades and commander, he finally was able to leave Syria in

September 2014. One of his motives to leave the battlefield was because he was disappointed

with his role as a fighter in the frontline as he had just imagined he would be assigned to help

fellow Muslims. According to a credible source, it is said that his other reason to leave was the

small stipend he received. It was less than one million Rupiahs or less than US$ 100 monthly,

too small compared to the promised number.406 When he arrived in his hometown, his

disappointment continued as he had to pay his debt even though he was promised that his

recruiter would pay it off.407

Ramdan is another Indonesian pro-ISIS fighter who travelled to Syria and faced disillusioned

as Junaedi experienced. He was previously a secular person and ran a prospective garment

business in the Capital city of Jakarta. Therefore, he entered into bankruptcy and got divorced

after his business collapsed. While living in economic turbulence, he received an offer to join

ISIS by his sibling, who said that Islamic Caliphate could provide him a good job and other

financial incentives. After receiving indoctrination, he finally decided to go to Syria after

attending several Pengajian (small religious studies). He left the home country at the beginning

of 2015 and joined ISIS together with his son.

Ramdan's push factor to go to Syria and join ISIS was not solely driven by ideology, especially

to fight till death in the battlefront as a martyr. Therefore, he wanted to improve his family's

economy as his recruiter promised him that Baghdadi’s Caliphate could pay his debt and

provide other incentives. In his testimony, Ramdan stated as follows:

I did not have any intention to wage jihad there. I wanted to start a new life since my

business in Indonesia had collapsed. I wanted to make my son proud of me. I did not

405 “Is not worth joining: Returnee,” The Jakarta Post, 1 April 2015. 406 Interview with Adhe Bhakti, Jakarta, 2019. “Tukang Bakso Simpatisan ISIS Kecewa di Bayar Murah”

(Bakso seller pro-ISIS symphatiser is disappointed be paid cheap), CNN Indonesia, 27 January 2016,

https://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/20160126180736-12-106865/tukang-bakso-simpatisan-isis-kecewa-

dibayar-murah. 407 Fedina S. Sundaryani, “Is not worth joining: Returnee,” The Jakarta Post, 1 April 2015.

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dare to refuse when they (the Arabs) gave me an AK-47, 6 magazines and 6 grenades,

boots and one set of military uniforms. I was like a member of Delta Force."408

Together with his son, Ramdan arrived in Raqqa, Syria, in February 2015, after crossing the

Turkey-Syrian border. He joined Bahrumsyah’s fighting unit of "Katibah Nusantara." In this

military cell, he joined a short military training and indoctrination. Therefore, Ramdan began

to question his jihad as he was disappointed to find the reality contradicted with the promises.

He finally was able to leave Syria and return to Indonesia in the middle of 2015.

The two cases of Junaedi and Ramdan have shown that both jihadists who joined conflict was

not necessarily triggered by religious ideology as the only driving factor. Moreover, both joined

the Indonesian pro-ISIS fighter units were due to economic reasons, especially to improve their

economic lives from poverty. Therefore, they were disappointed when they saw the

battlefront's reality was different or even contradicted their imagination. Similar to Junaedi

experienced, Ramdan did not get economic benefits as Al Baghdadi's government had

promised free public services, such as, education, job, health service, and other financial

incentives.

Many pro-ISIS Indonesian jihadists went to Syria with no intention to fight and seek death as

a martyr. They came for a short visit to observe the battleground situation and then to return

home to spread the ISIS ideology. Afif Abdul Madjid was among the Indonesian jihadists who

acted as a recruiter and propagandist after he returned home. He was a member and a senior

figure of JAT and went to Syria in December 2013 after giving his allegiance to Baghdadi. He

remained a month in Syria and undertook basic military training. After returning home, he

engaged in a series of religious preachings and began advocating ISIS's great to his JAT

networks, including Abu Bakar Bashir. He also asked people to go to Syria and pledge

allegiance to Abu Bakar Baghdadi in his endorsement.409

While hundreds of Indonesian jihadists fought for Baghdadi and his Caliphate, many people

raved about living as citizens of the Islamic State. Their primary motivation was to bring their

408 Noor Huda, The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization, (PhD diss.,

Monash University, 2018), 148. 409 The Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, No: 0193/Pid.Sus/2015/PN.Jkt.Pst for the

case of Afief Abdul Madjid.

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children, wife, and relatives to live under an Islamic state where Sharia is fully applied and not

to fight.410 They were mostly people lured by online massive ISIS's propaganda to migrate in

the true Caliphate under Islamic sharia. After ISIS capturing several territories in 2014, many

Indonesians who were pro-ISIS believed it was timely to migrate and live as true Muslims. A

special call was given to several professions, such as, doctors, nurses, engineers, teachers, and

even car drivers, to come to live as Caliphate citizens with many incentives.411

Dwi Djoko Wiwoho and Iman Santoso are ordinary Indonesian citizens who travelled to Syria

in 2015 after Baghdadi called all Muslims worldwide to be part of his Islamic Caliphate. Both

men brought their families, including their wives and children. They sold their properties to

pay a one-way ticket to Syria. During my interview with Dhania and Ratna, a daughter and

wife of Dwi Djoko Wiwoho, who went to Syria, I found that their main motivations were driven

by personal motives rather than extreme ideologies. The recruiters promised they would receive

better jobs, and health insurance if they lived in Islamic State.412 Ratna furthermore said that

the on-line ISIS recruiter pledged to give medical treatment for her mother, who came along to

Syria but could not survive during the conflict zone.413

Febri Ramdani, a son of Iman Santoso, in his autobiography, also states that his motivation to

go to Syria was to follow his family to live under the true Caliphate. During my interview with

him, Febri asserts that the main reason to go to Syria was to live together again with his family

as he said, “80-90% of my motive was because I want to live with my family, especially my

mother.”414 His family's goal was not to fight and seek to be a martyr but rather to become

Caliphate citizens. Being exposed to a rigid interpretation of Islam, he claimed Indonesia was

an infidel country that should be abandoned because it does not implement Sharia law. Before

leaving the country, he received indoctrination from his family and small religious study

networks, where its leader encouraged all members to emigrate (hijra) to Syria, as stated by

God in the Qur'an about the need for oppressed Muslims to migrate (hijra) to an Islamic state.415

410 Interview with Sidney Jones, Jakarta, 2019. 411 Isis leader calls on Muslims to 'build Islamic state,' BBC News, 1 July 2014.

https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-28116846. 412 Interview with Dhania, Depok, 2019. 413 Interview with Dhania and Ratna, Depok, 2019. 414 Interview with Febri Ramdani, 14 November 2020. 415 Febri Ramdani, 300 Hari di Bumi Syam - Perjalanan Seorang Mantan Pengikut ISIS, 23.

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Apart from his testimony, it is not likely that he and his family were influenced by any groups

linked to ISIS.

With the cases of Dwi Djoko Wiwoho , Iman Santoso, and Febri Ramdani, it can be interpreted

that religious ideology has not played a single factor in driving them to travel and live in

Baghdadi Caliphate. The economic reason and personal motive have likely remained a decisive

pull factor even though they believed that their home country is an infidel and should be

abandoned. Based on interviews with several academics, government officers, and returnees, I

found that a number of Indonesian ISIS sympathisers received promises to have better-living

conditions, a good salary, and other social benefits, including having a spouse.416 As stated by

many sources, ISIS promised to pay US$ 800 monthly for any foreign fighters after they

conquered many oil refineries in Iraq and Syria however ISIS reduced the payment to US$ 400

after they lost revenue.417

Indonesian families who travelled to Syria paid for their one-way tickets. They mostly sold

their properties with no intention to return home. For example, Dwi Djoko Wiwoho left his

position as the director of the Indonesia Investment Coordinating Board’s licensing in Batam

and sold his house to pay for tickets and living expenses in Syria for his family. He informed

his colleagues he was going to carry out a religious pilgrimage (Umrah) to Mecca with his

family, but the real purpose was to enter Syria. While many failed to cross the border from

Turkey, he was able to enter Syria in 2015. From 2014 to 2017, approximately 550 Indonesians

failed in their attempts to enter Syria and were deported by the authorities in Turkey.418

ISIS forced all foreign male jihadists to train and fight regardless of their motives, including

those who just wanted to become citizens of the Caliphate. Once they arrived in Syria, men

and women were separated into different places. While women and children were housed in a

dormitory, the men were required to attend military training, such as, shooting using AK-47

and rocket-propelled grenades. Once the basic training was completed, they were required to

join a patrol (ribath) in ISIS territory. Many of them were sent to fight in the frontline with no

416 Kandi, Rosmiyati Kandi, “BNPT: Sudah ada 600 WNI yang diduga bergabung ISIS,” (BNPT: 600 Indonesian

citizens are predicted to join ISIS). CNN Indonesia, 22 April 2015 417 Robert Hackwill, “ISIL faces cash crunch as fighters’ pay is halved and revenues dry up”, Euronews, 21

January 2016, http://www.euronews.com/2016/01/20/isil-faces-cash-crunch-as-fighters-pay-is-halved-and-

revenues-dry-up/, 25.02.2016 418 FTF Desk, BNPT. Interview with several government officers, think tanks and academics, Jakarta, 2019.

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right of refusal. There was a severe punishment for anyone who refused to take up arms and

fight. Dwi Djoko Wiwoho and Iman Santoso were imprisoned by the ISIS authority because

they refused to fight in the front line. As a consequence of their disobedience, their family did

not receive full social benefits from ISIS.419

5.4.1. Islamic State on Iraq and Syria (ISIS)

There have been dozens of radical groups in Indonesia that gave their support and loyalty after

Baghdadi proclaimed his Islamic Caliphate in 2014. Many of those groups advocated extreme

ideologies and have engaged in violent acts in their home country.420 Overall, those groups

were from two different schools of thought, the Salafi jihadi and takfiri, such as, Jamaah

Anshorut Daulah (JAD) and Jamaah Ansharut Tauhid (JAT). Several militant groups linked to

Darul Islam also pledged their allegiance to Baghdadi, such as, Ring Banten, Mujahidin

Indonesia Timur (MIT), and Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB).

The majority of Indonesian civilians who travelled to Syria joined ISIS. Under the banner of

ISIS, Indonesian jihadists established at least three different small operational units in Syria

separated from other Arab foreign fighters. They operated the semi-autonomous group, which

enabled them to manage the recruitment and logistics but still fought under ISIS’s command

center. One reason was language barriers, since mostly Indonesian jihadists had difficulty

speaking Arabic.

Bahrumsyah, one of the key Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters, established a small fighting unit

named Katibah Nusantara (Majmuah Al Arkhabiliy) on 26 September 2014. He operated this

fighting group in Al-Shaddadi, in the Province of Hasakah, Syria. Before joining the conflict

zone, Bahrumsyah was a leader of the West Indonesian Mujahidin (MIB) and he had

participated in several rallies in Jakarta to support ISIS.421 The first time he travelled to Syria

was in May 2014, soon after Baghdadi declared his Caliphate.

419 Interview with Dhania, Jakarta, 2019. 420 Muh Taufiqurrohman, “The Road to ISIS: How Indonesian Jihadists Travel to Iraq and Syria,” Counter

Terrorist Trends and Analyses, 7, no. 4 (2015): 17-25. It is said that 18 local radical groups supported the ISIS

such as: Jamaah Anshorut Daulah (JAD), Mujahidin Indonesia Barat (MIB), Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT),

Jamaah Ansharuut Tauhid (JAT), Ring Banten, Jamaah Tawhid wal Jihad, Forum Aktivis Syariah Islam

(FAksi), Pendukung dan pembela Daulah, Gerakan Reformasi Islam, Asybal Tawhid Indonesia, Kongres Umat

Islam Bekasi, Umat Islam Nusantara, Ikhwan Muwahid Indunisy, Jazirah al-Muluk (Ambon), Ansharul Kilafah

Jawa Timur, Halawi Makmun Group, Gerakan Tawhid Lamongan, Khilafatul Muslimin and Laskar Jundullah 421 The West Indonesian Mujahidin was established in 2012, a splinter of the Hizbut Tahrir and seeks for the

establishment of an Islamic state in Indonesia.

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While in the conflict zone, Bahrumsyah aggressively recruited many jihadists from Southeast

Asian countries, including Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines. 422 Through online media,

he propagated ISIS ideology and he also called other jihadists in the region to join his ranks.

He called himself Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi through a video on YouTube entitled "Join the

Ranks," dated 23 July 2014, and he stated it was a call to wage jihad. In his statement in the

Indonesian language, he emphasised an obligation, a mandate for all Indonesian Muslims to

migrate and fight to defend the Islamic Caliphate. He labelled the Indonesian government as

an infidel (thogut) because the state does not apply Sharia. Moreover, he asked his followers

to emigrate (hijrah) to Syria as an obligation to save their faith from the corrupt system in

Indonesia. 423

Bahrumsyah trained dozens of children brought by their parents as child soldiers. A short video

in March 2015 has shown that many children had to learn the art of soldiering. As a symbol of

their repudiation of the Indonesian infidel government, the participants threw and burned their

national passports. One of the trainees also warned they should launch an attack against the

Indonesian government as an infidel state that corrupted God's law.424

Another small fighting unit of Indonesian pro-ISIS is named Katibah Masyariq (eastern region)

based in Homs. This group was established by Abu Jandal or Salim Mubaroq Attamimi, who

recruited his followers after having friction with the Katibah Nusantara. He was previously the

leader of JAD in Malang before traveling to Syria. His reason to split from the Katibah

Nusantara because he was not pleased with Bahrumsyah's leadership.425 With his followers,

he recruited new members from his JAD networks in Malang and MIT under Abu Wardah as

his alias under Santoso's leadership, who first pledged allegiance to Baghdadi’s Islamic

Caliphate.

Similar to Bahrumsyah, Abu Jandal actively promoted ISIS ideology and urged all Muslims in

Indonesia to engage in jihad to defend the Islamic State under Baghdadi. On a video that lasted

422 “Indonesian Commander Killed in Syria,” The Straits Times, 15 March 2017,

https://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/indonesian-commander-killed-in-syria. 423 "al-Hayat Media Center presents a new video message from The Islamic State: 'Join the Ranks,'" Jihadology,

July 22, 2014, http://jihadology.net/2014/07/22/al-%E1%B8%A5ayat-media-center-presents-a-new-video-

message-from-the-islamic-state-join-the-ranks/. This video is no longer available for the security purpose. 424 ISIS Propaganda on Youtube. This video is no longer available. 425 The Evolution of ISIS in Indonesia, IPAC Report No.13, 24 September 2014.

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four minutes one second on 25 December 2014, he challenged the chief of National Army

(TNI) and National Police Commanders, Densus 88, and NU's Banser (Multipurpose Line) to

fight in Syria. He even threatened to come home to fight if they could not come to Syria. Also,

in his second video entitled "Congratulations Ied from the Earth of the Khilafah" upload on 6

August 2014, Abu Jandal sent a message to all Muslims in Indonesia. In this twenty-minute

video, he invited all Indonesian Muslims to perform a jihad to defend Baghdadi’s Islamic

Caliphate as he said, “To our brothers and sisters in Indonesia, we call on you once again to

come here and perform jihad with the Islamic Caliphate.”426

There have been various reasons behind the rift between Bahrumsyah and Abu Jandal.

Corruption and ideology have played crucial factors that ended their collaboration.427 Abu

Jandal firstly accused Bahrumsyah of being dishonest in the stipend allowance distribution to

his men by cutting daily operational funds by approximately US$ 3.20 for each fighter.428 Apart

from the transparency, many left Katibah Nusantara because they rejected the strict takfiri

doctrine applied by Bahrumsyah, who quickly labeled other disloyal members as "kafir" or

infidels.429

The split and rivalry among Indonesian ISIS fighters had consequences for recruiting

supporters in the home country. Both Bahrumsyah and Abu Jandal contended with each other

to recruit more new jihadists to come to Syria through their channel. In this competition,

Bahrumsyah built an alliance with Abu Bakar Bashir and other radical jihadi networks, such

as, JI, JAT, and MM links. Meanwhile, Abu Jandal relied on Aman Abdurrahman as his main

patron.

Amid the split between the two jihadist leaders, another key Indonesian pro-ISIS jihadist

named Bahrun Naim formed another fighting unit. Under the protection of ISIS, he operated a

small group and named it the Katibah Aleppo. Before joining the Syria conflict in 2014, he was

a member of the Mujahidin Indonesia Timur (MIT) and gave his allegiance to Baghdadi.

426 Fatiyah Wardah, Noor Zahid, “Authorities Probe Reported Death of Indonesian Islamic State Leader,” 10

Nov 2016, https://www.voanews.com/extremism-watch/authorities-probe-reported-death-indonesian-islamic-

state-leader, Accessed in 14 Nov 2020. See also “Abu Jandal di Mata Keluarga” (Abu Jandal on the Eye of

Family), Koran Tempo, 10 November 2016, https://koran.tempo.co/read/nasional/407983/abu-jandal-di-mata-

keluarga 427 Interview with Adhe Bhakti, 2019. 428 Disunity Among Indonesian ISIS Supporters and The Risk of More Violence, 1 Feb 2016, IPAC Report

No.25. 429 Ibid.

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Bahrun Naim remained neutral amidst the friction between Bahrumsyah and Abu Jandal. He

even kept a distance from JAD as he thought this group was too feudal and mistreated their

junior members. To strengthen his unit in Aleppo, Bahrun Naim recruited members mostly

from Mujahidin Indonesian Timur (MIT). This radical group advocated takfiri and aimed to

establish an Islamic state in Poso, Central Sulawesi.430 While recruiting new members to travel

to Syria, he also advocated armed jihad to his followers in the home country and he distributed

many online materials on bomb-making and homemade firearms.

Apart from their friction, Indonesian pro-ISIS fighter groups pledged loyalty to Baghdadi and

fought against the same enemy, the Assad government. As many of them seek to become

martyrs, they mostly went to the front line after attending short military drills. At least one

Indonesian jihadist named Rizq Al Indonesi went to the battle as a suicide bomber. He drove a

truck full of explosive materials and blew himself up in the Syrian army’s security post in

2017.431

The role of fighters deployed in the frontline caused the death of many untrained Indonesia

jihadists who were likely to get killed. The casualty is relatively higher than the first jihadi

generation who trained and fought in Afghanistan or Mindanao. The high death toll of foreign

jihadists have brought speculation among former combatants in Indonesia that those

Indonesian ISIS fighters were exploited and purposely deployed in the frontline to fight till

death.432 Both pro-ISIS Indonesian jihadist leaders, Bahrumsyah and Salim Mubaroq, were

killed during the war. Sydney Jones alleges that many unprepared Indonesian jihadists got

killed. The casualty is high, which is approximately 120 jihadists who died during the war. 433

5.4.2. Takfiri Ideology

Most Indonesian jihadists who aligned and fought for Abu Bakar al Baghdadi have strong

links to terrorist groups at home that advocate a hard-line Salafist-takfiri jihadist ideology.

They remain radical, exclusive, intolerant, and could easily denounce anyone outside their

430

V. Arianti and Jasminder Singh, “ISIS’ Southeast Asia Unit: Raising the Security Threat,” S.Rajaratnam

School of International Studies, No.220-19 October 2015. Kumar Ramakrishna, “The Growth of ISIS

Extremism in Southeast Asia: Its Ideological and Cognitive Features and Possible Policy Responses,” New

England Journal of Public Policy: Vol. 29 : Iss. 1 , Article 6. Interview with Adhe, Pakar, Jakarta, 2019. 431 Rizq Asal Indonesia Pelaku Bom Bunuh Diri di Suriah (Rizr from Indonesia, the Suicide Bomber in Syria)

https://www.viva.co.id/amp/read/924155-rizq-al-indonesi-tewas-di-suriah. 432 Interviews with several former jihadists, Jakarta, 2019. 433 Interview with Sidney Jones, Jakarta, 2019.

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group as infidels (kuffar). The definition of disbeliever also includes any Muslims who disagree

with their thoughts and way of life. Any individuals and groups labeled as infidels are justified

to be killed, and their properties could be seized.

Many Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters are members or have a link with JAD that was established

by Aman Abdurrahman in 2014. They were inspired by this hardline takfiri cleric, who

received acknowledgment from his members and sympathisers as “The Lion of Tawheed”

(unification or oneness of God). Amman highlighted Tawheed's importance and the rejection

of all forms of thagut as Islam's central pillar in his religious sermon. With his vast knowledge

of Islam and fluent Arabic, he actively translated many radical clerics from the Middle East,

including Baghdadi’s speeches, into the Indonesian language and circulated to his followers.

As Aman declared his support to Baghdadi and advocated the obligation to migrate to Syria,

many more Indonesian jihadists left the country to support ISIS.

Aman Abdurrahman initially established JAD as an umbrella group to support or facilitate

anyone who wanted to engage in jihad to support Baghdadi’s Caliphate. He launched this

initiative on 14 October 2014, a few days after the Islamic State's declaration by Baghdadi.434

While he was in Nusa Kambangan prison, he gathered his followers like Marwan, Zainal

Anshori, Ustad M. Fachri, and Khaerul Anwar to discuss his idea and finally, they declared

their support for the formation of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria.435 They pledged allegiance

to Baghdadi as the Amir of the Islamic State and appointed Zainal Anshori as an Amir of

Indonesia's ISIS branch.

Aman advocates the doctrine of takfiri as the most extreme thought in Jihadi-Salafism. With

this belief, he accuses other Muslims of heresy, labeling other people who disagree with his

understanding as thogut (disbelievers) and mainly in an effort to justify the killing. Their assets

are justified to be seized, and their blood is warranted to spill. Amman rejects the prevailing

democracy in Indonesia as he claims it as kufr. Democracy, according to him, contradicts God's

sovereignty principle and is considered a great shirk (polytheism) as the worst of all sins or an

unforgivable crime. He even encourages his followers to show hatred to disbelievers, even to

434 Aman Abdurrahman’s the Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, No

140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN.Jkt.Sel. 435 Solahudin, in Aman Abdurrahman’s the Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, No

140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN.Jkt.Sel.

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those who participated in the general election as he believed they should be considered as an

infidel or apostate.

Ibnu Abdul Wahab (Wahhabi), Ibnu Tamiya, and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi were among the

primary references of Amman Abdurrahman in advocating his hard-line takfiri doctrine.

Through these radical scholars, he wrote a book entitled "Seri Materi Tauhid" (Tawheed

Material Series), which served as the guideline for his followers and terrorist groups. Based on

this book, he claimed Indonesia is an infidel country or thogut and must be fought because it

implements laws other than God's law.436

Aman's narrative on jihad and its obligation for all Muslims to support the true Baghdadi's

Caliphate has influenced many radical people in Indonesia to fight and migrate to Syria. He

strongly believed that the Caliphate was in line with a Hadith stated by the great Prophet

Muhhamad about the emerging of Islamic State (Khilafah) and the "End of Time, "Tsuma

takunu khilafah ala minhajin nubuwwah," (Then it comes Khilafah on the way of the Prophet

Muhammad).437 As Amman said, referring to Hadith by Ibnu Majah, the fifth period of

Muslims has come where all Muslims are obliged to migrate and give their allegiance to Islamic

State.438

Emigrate (hijra) to the Islamic State, and if you cannot emigrate, then jihad with the

soul in this place, and if you cannot or [if you are not] brave, then give your wealth to

those who strive with their souls. And if you are not able to encourage other people to

jihad and if you do not do that, then what is the meaning of your intention? 439

As an ideological leader of the pro-ISIS network in Indonesia, Aman Abdurrahman played a

crucial role in mobilising Indonesian jihadists who wanted to fight for ISIS. He has the

authority to give clearance "tasfiyah" to any local jihadist who wanted to travel to Syria for

jihad. Apart from ideology screening, each jihadist had to pay his own cost to travel to Syria,

approximately 15-20 Million Rupiah.440 Therefore, several well-off members paid the air ticket

436 Aman Abdurrahman, Seri Materi Tauhid for the greatest happiness, 111. 437 Aman Abdurrahman’s the Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, No

140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN.Jkt.Sel 438 Ibid. 439 Ibid 440 Solahudin, in Aman Abdurrahman’s The Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, No

140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN.Jkt.Sel

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for jihadists who were unable. Chep Hermawan, the GARIS leader, was among the donors who

financed the departure of Indonesian jihadists.441

Aman Abdurrahman received broader support from local jihadi groups as Abu Bakar Bashir,

the leader of Jamaah Ansharul Tauhid (JAT) supported his idea on the necessity to support

ISIS. It is said that Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Bashir had an intense debate while

both clerics were in prison on the obligation of jihad and the legitimacy of Baghdadi’s

Caliphate. Amman was able to convince Abu Bakar Bashir, who finally pledged allegiance to

Abu Bakar Baghdadi on 2 July 2014 and called his members to travel to Syria for jihad.

Abu Bakar Bashir’s allegiance to Baghdadi quickly spread and influenced many of his

followers, especially JAT members, to migrate and fight under the ISIS banner. Shortly after

he supported Caliphate, many joined ISIS, including twenty JAT members from Dauroh

Malang (Malang group). Moreover, Abu Bakar Bashir’s self-declaration on Baghdadi’s

Caliphate created internal friction in JAT. Those who opposed Baghdadi’s Caliphate formed a

splinter group - the Jama’ah Ansharusy Syari’ah (JAS) in August 2014. Two of Bashir’s sons

named Abdul Rahim and Abdul Roshid joined in this new group.

5.4.3. Jabhat al Nusra

A number of JI members travelled to Syria to wage jihad. They mostly trained and fought under

Al-Nusra Front or Jabhat al-Nusra, an insurgent group formed in 2012 affiliated with Al-

Qaeda. Under the leadership of Para Wijayanto, this radical group embarked with

approximately 40 to 50 young male members to wage jihad as foreign fighters.442 One of JI's

reasons aligned with Jabhat al-Nusra is that both groups have similar ideologies and purposes,

which is to implement Sharia and establish an Islamic State. Both JI and Jabhat al-Nusra

rejected the takfiri doctrine advocated by ISIS.443

441 Inilah Chep Hernawan, Donatur 156 WNI Jadi Milisi ISIS, 18 Maret 2015, Tempo.co,

https://nasional.tempo.co/read/650865/inilah-chep-hernawan-donatur-156-wnijadi-milisi-isis/full&view=ok. 442 Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR). Interview with Sydney Jones, Jakarta, 2019.

Para Wijayanto was a Mindanao veteran who took JI leadership in 2009 to replace former leader - Abu Husna.

He was one of the best alumnae of Mindanao Hudaibiyah academy military in the 1990s. To run the new

generation of JI, he recruited many Mindanao veterans as structural elites, such as, Wiji Joko Santoso, the best

graduate of the military academy in 2000. 443 Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR).

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JI participated firstly in Syria by sending its humanitarian workers organized by Hilal Ahmar

Society Indonesia (HASI). Many senior members and intellectuals affiliated with Ngruki

Islamic Boarding Schools participated in this mission. They raised donations and channeled it

to Syrian humanitarian groups, such as, the Salma Field Hospital in Latakia, Syria. They also

began to send humanitarian personnel, including doctors and nurses, for short period tours of

duty.444 Many more Salafi organizations were involved in 2013 by providing humanitarian

assistance, such as, the National Committee of Indonesia Muslim for Syria, Peduli Muslim

(Muslim Care), and Medical Mission to Syria.

As the Syrian conflict escalated, Para Wijayanto began to send his members to train and fight.

He viewed this conflict as an excellent opportunity for his long-term goal to wage jihad in

Indonesia. Although he believed in the need for jihad to help the oppressed Syrian Sunni

Muslims, he had a strategic motive as he wanted to use the Syrian conflict as a training ground

for his men. Like the old generations who trained and fought in Afghanistan and Mindanao,

Para Wijayanto thought that the conflict in Syria could provide an opportunity for his group to

learn military skills and gain combat experience they could not obtain at home. 445

Before dispatching his men to Syria, Para Wijayanto delegated his two members, Patria, the

International Division's head, and Askary to conduct a survey in 2012. Both crossed the border

from Turkey and remained in Syria for two weeks to gather information about the route,

expenses, and contact several insurgent groups. They met several insurgent groups, such as,

the Free Syrian Army (FSA), Ahrorul Syam, and Jabhat al-Nusra. Through this process, the

Jabhat al-Nusra was chosen as a group where JI foreign fighters would reunite.446

Para Wijayanto began to send his members to travel to Syria at the beginning of 2013. The first

group consisted of twelve selected members who left Indonesia in April. The participants flew

to Istanbul, Turkey, as an entry point before crossing the Syrian border with a local guide's

assistance. Eleven participants were able to enter Syria and they united with a small Jabhat al-

Nusra group. They began to receive military training in Abu Badi Camp that ranged from one

444 Indonesian and The Syrian Conflicts, 30 January 2014, IPAC Report No. 6. 445 Kirsten E. Schulze & Joseph Chinyong Liow.“Making Jihadis, Waging

Jihad: Transnational and Local Dimensions of the ISIS Phenomenon in Indonesia and Malaysia,”

Asian Security 15 no. 2 (2019): 122-139. Jundi al Muhlis, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and

Deradicalization Studies. 446 Indictment letter of Para Wijayanto, West Jakarta District Attorney’s office.

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month to one year. Only eight participants completed their training and returned to the home

country, while the three jihadists died during the battle.447

Agus Setyawan is one of the twelve jihadists who joined in the first group in 2013. He was a

senior JI member who joined this group in 1993 and served as a military platoon member in

Central Java Wakalah (Brigade). During the leadership of Abu Bakar Bashir, he was nominated

to receive military training in Mindanao. Moreover, he failed to go because JI Markaziyah

canceled its recruit from Mindanao after the Bali bombing incident in 2002.

According to Agus Setyawan, his mission and that of other JI members in the Syrian conflict

were to learn the art of soldiering rather than to fight and die as a martyr. He asserts that Para

Wijayanto, as the leader (Amir), asked all participants to absorb as much as possible the skills

of combat and war experience that could not be obtained in Indonesia. He furthermore

highlights that Para Wijayanto prohibited all the recruits from fighting in the frontline and

emphasised that the ultimate jihad should be at home.

The members' primary purpose [for] going to Syria is to learn and practice the military

on the real combat and experience how to live on the battlefield with the Jabhat al-

Nusra group; it does not aim to die as a martyr in Syria. Before leaving the home

country, all participants are always reminded by the Amir (Para Wijayanto) that they

are allowed to go to war but should not die as martyrs. The primary purpose is to gain

knowledge of war and return to Indonesia to spread [it] to other JI cadres.448

JI dispatched the second group in October 2014. Ten members joined this group after finishing

their intensive physical training program and indoctrination. They used Turkey as a transit

point before crossing the border. All of the participants were able to cross the border and they

remained in the conflict zone between one and three years. The following two groups continued

to come to Syria from 2015 to 2016. While eleven cadres in the third group entered Syria in

June 2015, the other eleven men were able to cross the border in 2015.

Para Wijayanto dispatched the other two groups in April and September 2017. Five members

were able to enter Syria in April, but the other six cadres failed to reach Syrian soil and were

arrested by Turkey's security authority. After being detained in prison, those six JI members

447 Agus Setyawan, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. 448 Ibid.

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were deported to the home country. With this failed attempt, Para Wijayanto evaluated and

decided to postpone the following group.449 There have been approximately 51 members who

had participated in the Syrian conflict to acquire combat experience as a strategy to increase

their capability in future military operations.450

Jundi al Muhlis is another foreign fighter who travelled to Syria in October 2015. Before

heading to Syria, he received intensive physical training in the sports center owned by JI in

Bawen and Salatiga, Central Java.451 Several physical preparations were given, such as, martial

arts, jogging, mountain climbing, and close fighting combat (qital qorib).452 While joining

physical preparation programs, he also received religious indoctrination, such as, fiqh, tawhid,

the virtue of jihad, shirk, ten things canceling Islamic faith, and ways of kuffur against the

infidels (thogut).453

Jundi al Muhlis was triggered to wage jihad after he received the story from his ustad about

the massacre of Syrian Muslims by the Assad government. He was aggrieved to know many

women and children had been killed by the Syrian military backed by the Shia. This atrocious

narrative triggered him to engage in jihad to help Syrian Muslims. Being indoctrinated with

jihad and martyrdom, he wanted to go to Syria to fight and die in the battlefront as he states, “I

want to become a martyr to help my Islamic brothers who are persecuted in Syria.”454 He was

excited when his ustad offered him the chance to go to Syria.

From the two cases of Agus Setyawan and Jundi al Muhlis, it can be stated that JI mostly

recruited their internal members, unmarried and between 16 and 23 years of age. Before

heading to Syria, all recruits received intensive physical training held in the sports center in

several places in Central Java like Unggaran, Ambarawa, Bawen, Salatiga, Magelang, and

Purwodadi.455 They were required to join physical preparations, such as, martial arts, jogging,

mountain climbing, and close fighting combat (qital qorib). While joining physical preparation

449 The Indictment of Para Wijayanto, East Jakarta District Attorney, no. reg. Perk: PDM-11/JKT.TIM/01/2020.

Ahmad Hafid, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. 450 Agus Setyawan, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. 451 Agus Setyawan and Jundi al Muhlis, JI veterans: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. 452 Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR). 453 A life Narrative of Ahmad Hafid, Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR). 454 A life Narrative of Jundi al Muhlis, Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR). 455 A life narrative of Agus Setyawan and Jundi al Muhlis, PAKAR.

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programs, they also received religious indoctrination, such as, fiqh, tawhid, the virtue of jihad,

shirk, ten things canceling Islamic faith, and the ways of kuffur against the infidels (thogut).

Para Wijayanto required his fighters to write wills to their families or parents before departing

to Syria. All recruits were also required to pledge bai'at, giving their loyalty towards Allah, the

Prophet Muhammad, the Amir, and the group by making a statement. By holding the

Amir’hand, each recruit said, “I pledged my allegiance to the Amir of Jemaah Islamiyah to

obey the command from Allah and His messenger, to uphold the divine Shari'a on earth and to

do amar mahruf nahi mungkar ( commanding the good and forbid the evil).”

After the process of the bai’at, Para Wijayanto discussed his motivations as he explained to all

participants that their mission was to learn military skills and experience real combat as part of

preparation (idad) to wage future jihad in the home country. Each member received US$ 3,000,

which excluded the travel cost, which was paid by JI.456

During the conflict zone, JI fighters engaged in short and intensive military training in Jabhat

al-Nusra camps. They learned the arts of soldiering, such as, assembling the weapons, AK-47s,

shooting the target, martial arts, bomb-making, and other deadly skills. The training ranged

from one month to two years. Despite the training, they also engaged in guard duty (ribath) in

the territory of Jabhat al-Nusra like Idlib, Aleppo, and Hama for several days.457 They joined a

joint patrol with other Salafi groups and other insurgent groups, such as, FSA, Ahror Syam,

and Syukur Syam to fight the main enemies: the Assad government, Nusairiyah (Iran backed),

and ISIS.458 Besides military drill, they also received religious teachings, such as, fiqh,

Tawheed, faith (aqidah), jihad, martyrdom, and the history of Prophet Muhammad.459

5.5. After the Training and Fighting

While many got killed and captured during the battle, many Indonesian jihadists survived and

returned home safely. There is no fixed number of returnees who returned home, and many

government institutions in Indonesia have different estimates. Moreover, a report by the Badan

Nasional Penanggulangan Terorisme (BNPT) or The National Counter-Terrorism Agency

456 A life narrative of Agus Setyawan, PAKAR. 457 The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah, IPAC Report no 36, 27 April 2017. 458 A life narrative of Jundi al Muhlis, the Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR). 459 A life narrative of Ahmad Hafid, the Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies (PAKAR).

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determined that approximately 125 returning jihadists arrived until 2020.460 This excludes

hundreds of men who failed to enter Syria, instead Turkey's authority deported them.

Indonesian jihadists' motivations to leave the battlefront in Syria are diverse: to recruit new

members, spread their ISIS ideology, strengthen the local radical groups, and continue their

armed jihad at home. Therefore, many of them decided to leave conflict and return home

because they were traumatised or disillusioned.

Abu Jandal was among Indonesian jihadists who returned home for a specific purpose to recruit

new members to strengthen his fighting unit in Syria. He returned to his hometown, Malang,

East Java, shortly in 2015 and recruited nineteen fresh members to wage jihad in Syria. Most

of them were JAT members who wanted to migrate to Syria after receiving a fatwa from Abu

Bakar Bashir about Muslims' obligation to support Baghdadi’s Caliphate. He also brought his

wife and his two children to Syria. Not long after re-entering Syria, Abu Jandal died in the

fighting in Mosul in December 2016.461

Afief Abdul Majid was another Indonesian pro-ISIS who travelled to Syria in 2013. He joined

ISIS for one month and returned home as his primary motive was to observe Baghdadi’s

Caliphate. Upon his arrival at home, he began to propagate ISIS’s ideology and the Caliphate's

best side.462 He gave religious preaching to his followers and JAT networks about jihad's

obligation in Syria and to support Baghdadi's Caliphate.463 He has been arrested and tried with

a four-year prison sentence after his trial in June 2015.

Many Indonesian jihadists returned home after experiencing trauma and becoming

disillusioned. They decided to leave their group in Syria because they felt deceived and

betrayed by their recruiters. Junaedi, Ramdan, and Syahrul Munif were among the former ISIS

fighters who deserted. All of them experienced trauma since they did not find the reality during

the conflict zone was as propagated by ISIS. Junaedi and Syahrul Munif were said to leave

because they did not receive as much stipend money as promised. Both received less than

460 Interview with Adhe Bakti, Pakar, 2020. 461 Ainur Rohmah, Indonesia verifying death of chief Daesh member in Iraq, 10 October 2016,

https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/indonesia-verifying-death-of-chief-daesh-member-in-iraq/682776.

Accessed in 31 May 2020. 462 The decision of The Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia for Afief Abdul Madjid, No:

0193/Pid.Sus/2015/PN.Jkt.Pst. 463 Ibid.

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US$100 monthly as they claimed the stipend was too small where they had to risk their lives

on the battleground. Feeling angry, they asserted that they can easily obtain compensation by

working in small casual businesses in their hometown.464

Several Indonesian pro-ISIS who wanted to live under the Islamic Caliphate had also returned

home. Many of them found the real situation on the ground contradicted their imagination on

the Islamic Caliphate's glorious story. The families of Dwi Djoko Wiwoho and Iman Santoso

were among those frustrated returnees. Both these families tried to escape from Syria for almost

two years and finally succeeded in 2015. With assistance from a local guide, they finally left

the ISIS territory and entered the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). After being imprisoned by

Kursdih's authority for almost two years, they were rescued and repatriated by the Indonesian

government in 2017. This repatriation was the first and likely the last since the Indonesian

authority decided not to take more Indonesian pro-ISIS back home.465

In contrast with Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters' motivations to return, many jihadists under JI

had a long term strategic goal while they were engaged in the Syrian conflict. As their primary

goal was to wage jihad at home, they left the battleground after learning the art of soldiering.

After safely returning home, they mostly regrouped into previous networks. They lived and

worked in normal activities and kept secret their previous participation in Syria, including from

their families.

Jundi al Muhlis returned home in 2017 after joining the war in Syria. He left the battlezone as

his leader asked him to return home. Soon after he arrived home, he rejoined JI cell in Central

Java and served as a military instructor to teach the military's art to other new members. He

was assigned to run many sport centers owned by JI in Central Java. In this training center, he

taught the art of soldiering, such as, military training (tadrib askary), weaponry, and bomb-

making.466

Jundi al Mukhlis states that his participation in the Syrian conflict was preparation (idad) to

wage jihad in his home country. He believes that the main enemy is still the Indonesian rulers

464 Interview with M. Adhe Bhakti, Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies, Jakarta, 2019. 465 Interview with a foreign officer in the MoFA of the Republic of Indonesia, Jakarta, 2019. 466

Interview with M. Adhe, Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies, Jakarta, 2019.

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preventing the implementation of Sharia. Upon his arrival in the home country, he is still

committed to armed jihad to topple the Indonesian regime as instructed by his leader. He states:

I can explain that JI views that the Indonesian government does not apply Sharia, so

we need to struggle to establish it through religious outreach (dakwah), hijra, and jihad

to apply it to this country. From my perspective, democracy adopted by the Indonesian

government is an infidel because it does not apply Sharia. So, we carry out da'wa by

leaving the country and going to Syria (hijra) to join Jabah al Nusrah and then return

to Indonesia to carry out religious outreach (da'wa).467

Para Wijayanto wanted to use his Syrian veterans as an essential asset for the preparation (idad)

of armed jihad at home. He learned from his experience as a Mindanao veteran in the 1990s

that the military skills obtained during the overseas training were vital to equip new members

as part of their preparation (idad) to wage a future armed jihad in the country. With this

strategy, he instructed all his returning jihadists to maintain their military skills and knowledge

and share their expertise with other local members.468

JIs’ ultimate goal has never changed since its establishment in 1993 to create an Islamic State

in Indonesia. Based on Jundi al Muhlis’s police investigation, JI's ultimate goal is still to

implement Sharia in Indonesia based on "manhaz syalafus sholeh and khalifah's guidance"

through Iman (faith), da'wa (religious preaching), hijra, and jihad.469 The notion that JI's

ultimate goal is to wage jihad at home rather than in an overseas conflict can be seen through

the lower number of casualties of their foreign fighters. From 2014 to 2016, only 13 members

died during the conflict zone out of 51 members in the five groups.

Ahmad Hafid is another Syrian veteran who returned home in 2016. He states that Para

Wijayanto still wants to establish an Islamic state through four stages: da'wa (religious

preaching or outreaching), recruitment of new members, military training or idad (preparation),

and the implementation of jihad to establish Sharia. Moreover, this struggle must be carried

out in the right time and it should also be well supported by society.

467 Jundi al Muhlis, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. 468 Agus Setyawan, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. 469 Agus Setyawan, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. Indictment letter of Para

Wijayanto, West Jakarta District Attorney’s office.

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Both Jundi and Ahmad Hafid also assert that Para Wijayanto did not allow them to carry out

an armed jihad or violent activities at home.470 The group is still undertaking the first and

second stages, which are religious outreach and preparation (idad). This strategy is part of the

long-term goal carried out by Para Wijayanto as he had modified his strategy and tactics when

he took leadership of JI in 2007.471 He decided to leave violent jihad and gave his focus on

strengthening the internal group.

5.6. The Attack: Syawaludin Pakpahan

Until 2020, there has been one terrorist attack carried out by a Syrian veteran named

Syawaludin Pakpahan. Together with three local jihadists named Firmansyah, Ardial, and

Boboy, Pakpahan launched an attack on the local police station in the North Sumatra on the

night of Ramadhan month in June 2017. Their initial motive was actually to seize weapons and

ammunition. During this mission, one of the perpetrators stabbed the police officer on duty,

with a knife, until the officer died.

Based on Syawaludin Pakpahan’s life narrative, he left Indonesia to travel to Syria at the

beginning of 2013. His motive to wage jihad in Syria was to help Syrian Sunni Muslims. He

was aggrieved to know the government of Syria slaughtered hundreds or even thousands of

Syrian Sunni Muslims. Inspired by the jihad doctrine, he wanted to fight as he believed it was

an individual obligation (fard ain) to fight against the Assad government. To finance his travel

to Syria, he borrowed twenty million Rupiah from a bank in his hometown.472

While Syawaludin Pakpahan wanted to join ISIS, he inadvertently joined the FSA. After taking

part in a short military training, he was assigned as a guard in the FSA military post where he

made contacts with either ISIS or Jabal al Nusrah personnel. His FSA commander was not

happy to find out that he had made a connection with an outside group. Because of this

indiscretion, his commander finally summoned him to surrender his weapon and leave the

conflict zone. Soon after this incident, Pakpahan left Syria and returned to his country of origin

in July 2013.473

470 Ahmad Hafid, JI veteran: Center for Radicalism and Deradicalization Studies. 471 Indonesian authority had arrested JI leader, Zakarsih and Abu Dujana in 2017 and banned JI through

Keputusan Pengadilan Negeri Jakarta Selatan) no: 2189/Pid.B/PN/JKT.Sel tanggal 21 April 2008. 472 Medan Medan Cop Killer Borrows Money From Bank to Join Islamic State Fighters in Syria, 1st July 2017,

https://jakartaglobe.id/news/medan-police-killer-borrows-money-bank-join-islamic-state-fighters-syria/. 473 The Ongoing Problem of Pro-ISIS Cells in Indonesia,” IPAC Report no. 56, 29 April 2019.

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Pakpahan was already obsessed with radical ideology even before joining the conflict in Syria.

During the Ambon and Poso conflicts in 1999-2000, he registered himself as a Mujahidin

member to fight against Christians. Moreover, he was not called until the conflicts ended. In

2005 he radicalised himself through online media, such as, Ar-rahmah.com about jihad, takfiri

and thogut.474 As the Syrian conflict erupted, his jihad was triggered, and he finally decided to

leave the home country for Syria.475

Once he returned to Indonesia, Pakpahan was still committed to ISIS ideology and became a

sympathizer of JAD. He further radicalised himself by searching for many radical online

contents, such as, Situs Milah Ibrahim, which propagate the takfiri ideology.476 Through this

process, he was more influenced by Aman Abdurrahman's takfiri, which branded others outside

of their group as "kafir" and justified to be killed.477 He believed jihad is an obligation for all

Muslims (fard ain) without exception, and it should be done through war (qital). As Khilafa

inspired him, he perceived the Indonesian government as a "thogut" or infidel since it does not

apply Islamic law (sharia). He refused to participate in the election and considered the national

flag as part of the apostate kuffar with this extreme view. He began to spread his radical

ideology to his social networks, especially the obligation to engage an armed jihad against

Islam's enemy.

It is challenging to understand why Pakpahan engaged in a violent act by targeting police

officers. His act of killing becomes the only single terrorism carried out by Syrian veterans at

home. Moreover, it is also interesting to understand why Pakpahan did not attack right away

after he returned home as he remained inactive for almost three years.

The attack of Syawaludin Pakpahan shows that returning foreign fighters from Syria are

potentially dangerous since they have the military skill, and they have been radicalised and

hardened during the conflict. From the case of Pakpahan, it is evident that he is still committed

to armed jihad after he returned. He did not disengage from his radical network and leave

radical ideology. After arriving in his hometown, not only did he continue to promote radical

474 Indictment letter of Syawaludin Pakpahan, No: PDM- 844/JKT.UTR/11/2017. 475 Indictment letter of Syawaludin Pakpahan No: PDM- 844/JKT.UTR/11/2017. 476 Aman Abdurrahman, The Decision of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia, No

140/Pid.Sus/2018/PN.Jkt.Sel 477 Ibid

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thoughts to his networks, he also radicalised his children and other people in his hometown. As

the police discovered, Pakpahan put a flag of ISIS on a wall in his house as a symbol of support

to the Baghdadi Caliphate and he possessed ISIS's radical materials.

At least two factors explain Pakpahan’s motive to carry out a terror attack (irhabiyah) after

remaining inactive for three years at home. Ideology is still a significant factor as he is

committed to armed jihad and obsessed with martyrdom doctrine. In propagating radicalism to

his children, Pakpahan highlights that jihad is mandatory in Islam and whichever Muslims die

without fighting through armed jihad is a sign of hypocrisy (munafiq).478

As Pakpahan adopted the takfiri doctrine, he believed that Indonesia is not an Islamic country

or another zone of war (darul harb) where the infidels must be fought through armed jihad.

Since he was devoted to takfiri ideology, Pakpahan believed that all Indonesian apparatus are

infidels and it is halal or permissible to spill their blood in the name of jihad.

A triggering factor also galvanised Pakpahan’s decision to engage in terrorism. He perceived

that Islam was under attack as Jakarta's governor, Basuki Tjahya Purnama or "Ahok" alleged

blasphemy against Islam during the gubernatorial election campaign in 2017. This made him

angry and thus provoked him to carry out an act of retaliation by targeting local Chinese ethnic

in Medan.479 With this terror plan, he wanted to seize weapons and ammunition from the Medan

police headquarters, to use it to carry out a mass attack against Chinese ethnicity.

Despite Ahok’s alleged blasphemy, Pakpahan was likely influenced to carry out armed jihad

after he received a fatwa from Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the ISIS spokesman in 2016, who

called all ISIS sympathisers around the world to launch an attack in their own home country as

it was getting more difficult to wage jihad in Syria. Through this fatwa, Adnani also instructed

members and sympathisers to kill civilians and soldiers by any means as they were labelled as

disbelievers.

The Pakpahan’s terror can be interpreted that there has been a shift of attack by targeting the

‘near enemy” rather than the “far enemy.” The government apparatus, especially the security

478 Chaula Rininta Anindya, The Syria Alumni Threat: Legal Loopholes and Inadequate De-radicalisation, RSIS

Commentary, No. 133 – 11 July 2017. 479 Indictment letter of Syawaludin Pakpahan, No: PDM- 844/JKT.UTR/11/2017.

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officers, such as, police officers, become the main target rather than Westerners or Christians.

During 2010-2013, there are approximately 24 police officers who had been killed by

homegrown terrorists. Most perpetrators were affiliated with Aman Abdurrahman and the JAD

networks.480 In terms of scale and casualty, those attacks were amateur and low tech compared

to a series of terrors by Afghanistan and Mindanao veterans in the 2000s.

A single case of an attack by Pakpahan can be interpreted such that the great majority of Syrian

veterans who returned home are likely not willing to engage in violent acts shortly after they

returned. As many jihadists got killed in the battlefront and had no intention to return home,

many returnees are disillusioned and traumatised. Though they might carry out terrorism in the

future, it is likely that they will remain inactive, especially those who do not perceive Indonesia

as a zone of conflict (dar harb).

5.7. Conclusion

This chapter explains that Indonesian jihadists' participation in the Syrian war was encouraged

and even facilitated by multiple local radical groups, such as, JI, DI, JAD, JAK, and other small

terrorist groups. Those groups recruited their members to travel to Syria as a way to carry out

jihad. Apart from their varied motivations to send their members to join the conflict, the great

majority believed that jihad in Syria is an obligation (fard ain) primarily to support any Islamic

state once it was formed by Abu Bakar Baghdadi. Therefore, hundreds of Indonesian families,

mostly women and children, also journeyed to Syria with the hope of becoming citizens of the

Islamic Caliphate.

Indonesian jihadists joined several terrorist insurgent groups during the Syrian conflict, mostly

with ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra. Their decision to side with a particular insurgent group was

likely based on their leaders' preference. For example, many of those who united with ISIS

were members of JAD as Aman Abdurrahman gave his allegiance to Abu Bakar Baghdadi and

encouraged his members to support the Islamic Caliphate. On the other side, Para Wijayanto

preferred to support Jabhat al-Nusra affiliated with Al-Qaeda and dispatched his members to

480 Andrew Zammit, “The impact of Syria alumni on Indonesian jihadism,” 31 January 2014,

https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-impact-of-syrian-alumni-on-indonesian-jihadism.

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join this group. As they refused the takfiri doctrine advocated by ISIS, JI did not recommend

its members to join the ISIS.

Indonesian foreign fighters had a different motivation to join and leave the conflict in Syria.

Those who joined ISIS, were likely to fight and become martyrs to defend the Islamic

Caliphate. Many of them went to the frontline with insufficient military training and they were

killed by the Syrian army. On the contrary, Indonesian jihadists who were members of JI had

different motivations for either joining or leaving the battlefield. As they mostly united with

Jabhat al-Nusra, they stayed temporarily in a conflict zone for training. Once they achieved the

mission, they returned home and regrouped in their group social networks. Within this context,

the participation of JI foreign fighters in Syria is likely a strategic decision as a way to increase

their military capacity that they could not obtain at home. The long-term goal is still to carry

out jihad at home to establish an Islamic State.

The attack of Syawaludin Pakpahan has validated the claim that Indonesian returnees from

Syria unquestionably posed a threat to the home country. His takfiri ideology played a

significant factor as he activated his armed jihad by killing security officers shortly after he had

returned home. As he believed that all Indonesian government officers as "infidels," he

considered his action was part of jihad to defend Islam.

The absence of an attack by returning jihadists from Syria shows that mostly returnees have no

enthusiasm to carry out terrorism right away after they have arrived home. Unsimilar to Afghan

and Mindanao veterans, mostly Syrian veterans, were traumatised and disappointed about their

previous jihad. Many of them did not want to continue their jihad in the home country, as it

can be seen in the post-conflict behaviour of Ramdan, Ahmad Junaedi, and Dwi Djoko

Wiwoho. After serving a sentence for years in prison, many of them disengaged from their

previous radical network, abandoned their armed jihad, and further lived as an ordinary person

in society.

A feeling of betrayal or having been deceived was also shown by many former Indonesian pro-

ISIS who wanted to become a Caliphate citizen. Dhania, for example, regretted her mistake by

influencing her family to migrate to Baghdadi's Caliphate. She begins to reinterpret her

definition of jihad and her stance is not in agreement with the ISIS doctrine. After arriving

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home in Indonesia, she has joined one of the non-governmental organisations in Jakarta and

she has advocated deradicalisation.

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CHAPTER VI

The Trajectory of Foreign Fighters

6.1. Introduction

The journey of individuals to become foreign fighters is complex and multifaceted. Foreign

fighters might become radicalized and indoctrinated prior to their pre-departure. Once they

have arrived in a conflict zone, they mostly received military training, practice fighting, and

they will become more radicalized and hardened from their interaction with the rebel and

insurgent groups they have joined. If they survive, they might return home or travel to another

conflict zone. The foreign fighters' path is a long multi-step process. 481 Therefore, each foreign

fighters' trajectory is unique and complex depending on the type of war and the individuals or

groups they have engaged with.

This chapter analyses the trajectory of Indonesian foreign fighters based on the three case

studies discussed in the previous chapters. This analysis chapter is divided into three main

sections: the pre-war mobilization phase, during the war, and the post-conflict period. By

examining and comparing the pathway of Indonesian foreign fighters in Afghanistan,

Mindanao, and Syria War, this chapter seeks to theorize the motives of fighters who have joined

to participate in the overseas conflicts, the pattern of their recruitment and mobilization, their

roles and interaction with foreign insurgent entities, their explanations for leaving the conflicts,

and what they did when they got home.

In the discussion on the pre-departure to war, this chapter intends to answer how Indonesian

civilians gained access to the battlefield. In other words, how are thousands of Indonesian

civilians recruited and mobilized into the global armed jihad? How does the role of the

homegrown jihadi network work to mobilize and channel their members and sympathizers for

jihadist action? In order to understand Indonesian jihadists and what they did once they entered

a conflict, I will describe their military activities, roles, duties, and their interactions with rebel

and insurgent groups during the battle.

481 Gabriel Weimann. “The Emerging Role of Social Media in the Recruitment of Foreign Fighters.” Byman,

Daniel and Jeremy Shapiro. “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid: The Threat of Terrorism from Western Foreign

Fighters in Syria and Iraq.” Brookings, 34.

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History has shown that foreign fighters left the conflict once it ended or after they accomplished

their mission. The fighters who survived will often return to their country of origin or they

could continue the jihad by fighting in another battlefront. Similar to other foreign fighters,

most Indonesian jihadists returned home once they finished their mission. This chapter also

seeks to explain Indonesian foreign fighters’ situation after the conflict. What is the reason they

abandoned the conflict zone? What is their purpose in leaving the conflict and returning home?

This chapter further seeks to explain the reason many returnees become terrorists by analysing

their post-conflict behaviour and the factors that trigger them to engage in terrorism at home.

6.2. Before the conflict

An individual’s decision to voluntarily travel and fight in distant conflict does not happen

overnight. It is a gradual and most likely a lengthy process in which individuals become

radicalized or indoctrinated prior to leaving the home country and entering the battle zone. This

radicalisation that occurs in their pre-departure days, months or even years, involves many

actors, and aspects, such as, their social network, family, peers, elites, as well as the leaders of

the groups they joined.

6.2.1. Motivations

This study highlights the importance of comprehending individuals' motivations to enter the

global armed jihad. This is a crucial step to understanding the foreign fighter’s trajectory in the

battle, to know and understand what they expect to gain during the battle they join.

Furthermore, understanding the motive of those entering the warzone could help us to gain

more knowledge about their decisions to leave the conflict or to disengage from any groups or

organizations they had joined previously.

Based on the three global armed jihads joined by Indonesian jihadists, it is evident that

there are various reasons for travelling to distant conflicts. Their purposes for waging jihad in

each overseas battle are heterogeneous and convoluted, based on the characteristics of the

conflict and based on who was involved and which groups participated. This finding relates to

previous studies by Weiss, Hassan, Venhauss, and Neumann, who assert the motives for joining

the conflicts overseas have never been a single motive.482

482 See, Weiss, Michael and Hassan Hassan. ISIS: Inside the Army of Terror. Neumann, Peter R. “Radicalized

New Jihadist and the Threat to the West.” Venhaus, John M. “Why Youth Join al-Qaeda.”

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Religious doctrines, such as, jihad and martyrdom have always been fascinating to many

radical Muslims, that is, those who have taken up arms and participated in distant conflicts as

foreign fighters. As explained in the previous chapters, religious ideologies have inspired many

Indonesian civilians who have travelled and fought in Afghanistan, Mindanao, and also in

Syria. Overall, many believed that their decision to fight in a conflict overseas is the same as a

religious duty from God. As true Muslims, they are of the belief or thought that to defend their

brothers persecuted by Islam's enemy is every Muslim's obligation and they feel they would be

rewarded by God with seventy-two virgins if they got killed and died as martyrs (shuhada).

A series of interviews with returnees in this study also highlights the power of religious

doctrine. Nasir Abas, Ali Imron, Farihin, and Yusuf, for example, argue that jihad remained a

primary driving factor for them as they took up arms and fought against the enemy of Islam in

either Afghanistan, or in the Mindanao wars. They perceived jihad as one of Islam's important

pillars and it becomes an individual obligation (fard ain) without exception for men to defend

Islam and help the persecuted Muslims worldwide. To fight the enemy and die in the battle is

a heavenly reward, it is the highest deed or amaliyah in Islam. Therefore, from their

perspective, the jihad must be rigidly carried out through war.

The holy texts of the Qur’an and hadith provide not only a rationalisation, they also offer

encouragement for many Indonesian jihadists in Syria to fight and die in the name of God.

Besides jihad and martyrdom, many believed their participation in the war was a response to

the hadith on the final battle, “Malhamah al-Kubra,” where Muslims under the leadership of

Imam Mahdi Islam would gain triumph. Fortified with this belief, many desired to join that

greatest war even though they had to pay their expenses to Syria. Inspired by this prophetic

tradition, many radicalised men wanted to fight shoulder to shoulder with other transnational

jihadists. They welcome and seek death, because they have been inculcated to believe that

martyrdom based on a just cause, is a pleasure and a privilege. Inspired by jihad, martyrdom,

and rewards in heaven, they more or less felt blessed to be deployed in the frontline, although

they were often poorly trained and ill-equipped. With such conditions, many of them got

injured or died in the warzone.

The concept of Hijra (emigration) motivated an unprecedented number of radical Indonesian

Muslims to leave the home country, migrate to Syria, and fight for Baghdadi Islamic Caliphate.

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One of the arguments for many Indonesian civilians to travel to Syria is that the home country

was perceived as a “Darul Kuff,” or ‘land of disbelief’ which should be abandoned to be true

Muslims. Once the Islamic State was established in Syria, they believed that it was an

obligation for those who are the true believers to migrate and live under “Darul Islam,” or the

Islamic State. Hijra is needed to save their faith and create a community based on Islam.

In all three waves of Indonesian foreign fighters, the doctrine of “ummah” and Muslim

solidarity also inspired many jihadists to fight. Within the borderless Muslim community's

narrative, they construct the identity of ‘oneness” or the unity of Islam worldwide. All Muslims

should love, help, and take care of each other, especially to protect their shared values against

the enemy. With this, they claim every Muslim is obliged to help their other Muslim brothers

who were experiencing aggressive expansionism by the enemy of Islam, although they live far

away from the conflict.

Overall, this study reveals that religious ideologies or non-material factors, which should not

be overlooked or ignored, are powerful to motivate many Indonesian jihadists to fight. This

idea relates to other previous studies by Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, who found that

religious doctrine played a critical role in motivating many Arab jihadists who fought in the

Chechnya war.483 Similarly, research by Tanya Silverman also found that many young Muslims

from the UK engaged in the Syrian conflict because of the adherence to the ideology.484

This study also reveals that many decided to wage jihad overseas to show their loyalty to the

group and to the leader of the group. This can clearly be seen for those DI and JI members as

they were asked to fight in Afghanistan and Mindanao. As loyal members of those radical

groups, each participant showed his unquestioned obedience to the leaders and group. The

fatwa or instruction to wage jihad overseas is similar to a moral code that all members must do

without any power to refuse. As explained in the previous chapters, all jihadi members stated

“samina wa atthoina” or “We hear and obey” once they received instructions from their

leaders. Within these circumstances, their participation in the battle zone was driven by their

faithfulness to their group and to their leaders.

483 Cerwyn Moore and Paul Tumelty, “Foreign Fighters and the Case of Chechnya: A Critical Assessment,”

Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 31 no 5 (2008): 412–433. 484 Tanya Silverman. “U.K. Foreign Fighters to Syria and Iraq: The Need for a Real Community Engagment

Approach,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 40 no. 12 (2017): 1091-1107.

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This study also shows that the leaders of jihadi groups had a significant role in recruiting and

mobilizing their members to carry out the holy mission since they view themselves as the

warriors of God. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir were the two elites who had the

authority to decide who could travel and fight in either Afghanistan or in Mindanao. The two

leaders were also in charge of determining who could remain or leave the battlefront. Once the

members finished their military training, both elites asked the jihadists to leave the conflict

zone and then to return home.

In the context of the Afghanistan and Mindanao conflicts, it is evident that mostly Indonesian

jihadists were members of radical jihadi groups. Although many recruits believed that their

participation in the war zone was part of jihad, their leaders had an extended and broader

strategic plan. The elites’ motive to send them was not solely to defend Islam and the Muslims

in the conflict area, it was to gain military training access benefits and equip their members

with the arts of soldiering. In other words, the leader used the conflict as a political opportunity

and wanted the members to come back and wage jihad in Indonesia.

The elites of jihadi groups in Indonesia constructed a frame that jihad in global armed conflicts

is an obligation for all true Muslims without exception. They developed a narrative that Islam

is humiliated, and the Muslim community is persecuted worldwide. During the Afghanistan

war, the main narrative was the invasion of Communists in Afghanistan, where the external

aggressor country oppressed Muslims. A similar story was also constructed to motivate fighters

to engage in jihad in Mindanao. The Philippine's Christian government was framed to have

mistreated Muslims. Thus, the elites used religious jargon, such as, jihad, martyrdom, and

solidarity to help other Muslims who were, in effect, harrased by the enemy of Islam.

The grievance theory is relevant to explain why a number of Indonesian citizens were

motivated to travel to battle and fight as foreign fighters. This study shows that many

Indonesian jihadists initially experienced anger or rage in their pre-departure to a conflict zone.

As explained in the previous discussion, Imam Samudra, Ali Imron, Yusuf, and Junaedi

experienced resentment before entering the battle zone. They all felt angered about the

injustice, humiliation, persecution, and violence experienced by Muslims worldwide,

especially the women and children who were abused and murdered by either non-Muslim or

Muslim regimes. With this narrative, they wanted to do something, to stop the injustice, they

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sought to do something meaningful in their lives by helping the persecuted Muslims as part of

their jihad.

Moreover, identity and a feeling of belonging to a particular group also triggered many men to

travel and fight. The life historical narrative of Nasir Abas and Ali Imron as described in

previous chapters has shown that they went to the battle to feel they belonged to a group and

to maintain their social status. This can be seen as both Afghanistan veterans felt enthusiastic

and even thrilled once they received a new task from their leader to travel and train the MILF

fighters in Mindanao.

While many joined the war because of religious ideology, anger, a sense of identity, and

belonging to the group, many fighters also were driven by personal motives. Chapter 5 has

shown that many travelled to Syria because they wanted to get benefits from their participation.

The life narratives of Ramdan and Junaedi validate this claim, they both explained that they

joined the war after their recruiters promised them certain benefits, such as, money, free health

services, jobs, and other exciting benefits. Since they did not get what they expected, both

jihadists left the battle zone. They were angered and felt deceived by the recruiters. Despite

continuing jihad in the home country, they abandoned their armed jihad and radical networks.

Many of the Indonesian jihadists who went to Syria to fight were not from a radical group,

many were professionals, even government officers. This phenomenon becomes a puzzle

relating their motivation to leave their comfortable environment to go to the battle zone. It is

difficult to explain the motives of Dwi Djoko Wiwoho and his family, who left Indonesia for

Syria to join ISIS for example. The economic motive or financial benefit is perhaps difficult to

explain.

I argue that there can be more than one motive to join the battle overseas , indeed there can be

multiple reasons at the same time. In the case of several Indonesian jihadists who participated

in the Afghanistan and Mindanao wars, it shows that besides religious ideology, the feeling of

respect and obedience to the leaders is also a fact that should not be overlooked. Based on

Yusuf's life description, it can be inferred that his motive to travel to the conflict zone in

Mindanao can be due to both his religious ideology and to his obedience to his leader. As his

leader selected and instructed him to depart to the military academy in the Hudaibiyah camp in

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Mindanao, he felt blessed as he believed that he could and should engage in jihad. Moreover,

as he pledged his allegiance to JI, he was obliged to do what the leaders instructed him to do.

6.2.2. Grievances and Framing

This study captures the underlying grievances that drove radicalization among Indonesian

citizens before they decided to participate in the global armed jihad. The resentment can either

be triggered by domestic or by international contexts. The implementation of a secular system

in Indonesia, such as, democracy, human-made laws, and the political oppression against

Muslims, are among the causal factors of the grievances. Moreover, certain events, such as the

aggression of a foreign power against Muslim countries, and the belief that Islam is under

attack, can trigger a feeling of anger.

In the Afghanistan war context, Chapter 3 has shown that many radical Muslims in Indonesia

were angry that Muslim Afghan people died during the Soviet occupation. They felt bitter as

the world remained silent in the knowledge of the killing of innocent people in Afghanistan.

This grievance that was mentioned by Ali Imron and Imam Samudra in their biographies,

served as a call to action, it triggered them to help and stop that humiliation and injustice.

Whether actual or constructed, the grievances that emerged motivated many DI and JI members

to wage jihad in the Mindanao war. This narrative can be seen in Yusuf's life story as he was

enthused to receive an order from his senior to travel to Mindanao. As described in the previous

chapter, he was aggrieved after watching videos about the persecution of Bosnian and

Mindanao Muslims by Christians. This coverage triggered his empathy to help and protect the

weak and to stop the injustice experienced worldwide by Muslims.

Many Indonesian jihadists revealed their grievances before they participated in the Syrian War.

The life narratives of Jundi al Muhlis, Junaedi, and Ramdan described in the previous chapter

show that all of them felt angry, humiliated, and they wanted to do something to stop the

persecution and injustice in Syria. Overall, apart from other personal motives to gain personal

benefits, they believed that Islam was under threat by the infidel Syrian Assad government

backed by Shia that tortured Sunni Muslims. These atrocities created anger and a feeling they

should help Sunni Muslims in the name of jihad.

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This study shows that Indonesian foreign fighters' recruitment was carried out by either rebel

or insurgent groups in the conflict zone and by radical groups in Indonesia. Overall, the

recruiters have used particular framing narratives to motivate and persuade Indonesian civilians

to engage in the war. During the Afghanistan war, many radical Islamists framed that

Afghanistan, and its Muslim people were under attack or occupation by an external power. The

Soviet army is described as the main enemy because they occupied Afghanistan and persecuted

Muslim Afghans. Similar to the Afghanistan war, DI and JI also developed the narrative that

Islam in Mindanao was under existential threats. The Philippines' government is perceived as

evil because they harassed and killed many Moro Muslims in Mindanao who only wanted to

practice their faith.

During the Syrian conflict, many Indonesian jihadists believed that the war was between Sunni

and Shia. The Assad government, backed by Shia, was perceived as a brutal regime that killed

Sunni Muslims. Moreover, the ISIS recruiters and sympathizers also framed the idea that the

war is the last battle where Islam would obtain triumph under the true caliphate's leadership.

Overall, the common narrative of framing that was used to mobilize Indonesian jihadists is

similar to what was asserted by Hafez.485 The first is the humiliation of Islam and Muslims

worldwide. Within this context, Islam is described as under attack by external oppressors,

Christians, Jews, and other external powers who wanted to destroy Islam and Muslims. The

second narrative is about the obligation to partake in jihad, where the recruiters quote or cite

the Qur’an and Hadith and other statements (fatwa) by prominent radical scholars who endorse

armed jihad through war. The third narrative is martyrdom. This narrative sets forth the

meaning of the willingness to die in the battle as the highest place for Muslims.

6.2.3. The Recruitment and mobilization

This study shows that the warring insurgent group in the conflict zone is not necessarily the

one that generally recruited outside the foreign fighters to fight under their banner. Moreover,

homegrown radical Islamic groups in Indonesia also played a critical role in recruiting and

mobilizing their members to wage jihad in foreign lands. While warring insurgent groups tried

485 Mohammed M. Hafez. “Martyrdom Mythology in Iraq: How Jihadists Frame Suicide Terrorism in

Videos and Biographies.”

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to attract Indonesian Muslims as their potential targets, the local radical groups in Indonesia

also recruited and mobilized their members and sympathizers to wage jihad overseas.

Despite motivating their members to travel and fight, jihadi groups like JI provided their

resources, such as information, logistics, and connections or links with international jihadi

networks during the Afghanistan, Mindanao, and Syrian War. The group offered finances to

help its members travel and join the overseas insurgencies. The group also paid allowances for

its members on the battlefield, and their travel costs if they returned home.

The previous chapters (3-4) have described that Darul Islam and Jemaah Islamiyah are the two

most leading militant groups at home that sent their best members to join the Afghanistan and

Mindanao conflicts. These two homegrown terrorist groups selected their best and most

committed members for jihad and facilitated them to travel to the conflict zone. Prior to

departure to the conflict zone, these groups also provided intense preparation sessions for the

recruits. Not only instilling them with ideology and radical views, the groups also equipped

them with essential skills, such as, self-defense, physical fitness, running, and survival training,

so the candidates would be ready as soon as they arrived on the battlefield.

Not only in the recruitment process, Indonesian jihadi groups also helped their members and

facilitated them to cross the border. During the Afghanistan war, DI and JI established a

representative office in Peshawar, Pakistan, to assist their members in crossing the Pakistan-

Afghanistan border. These liaison officers helped the coming jihadists who arrived in Pakistan

and then guided them to cross the border and join a particular Mujahidin faction to join in the

fight with them. This facilitation was also provided by JI as this radical group mobilized its

members to Mindanao for training and fighting. For example, JI appointed someone in charge

in Sabah, Malaysia, to help members travel to Mindanao by sea routes.

A number of homegrown terrorist groups are also the main actors behind the mobilization of

Indonesian citizens who travelled and fought in Syria. The groups are more varied in terms of

their ideologies, political goals, and motives for joining the conflicts than those who

participated in the Afghanistan and Mindanao wars. Besides DI and JI, many radical groups

were inspired by Takfiri ideology, such as, JAD, JAT, JAK, and other small radical groups that

pledged their allegiances to Abu Bakar Baghdadi.

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Indonesian homegrown radical groups have employed several methods to lure their young

recruits to participate in the distant conflicts. DI and JI, for example, recruited their fighters

initially from internal members. Both jihadi groups used schools, mosques, Pesantren (Islamic

Boarding School), Pengajian (Islamic study gathering), and usrah (small discussion group) as

venues to propagate jihad and recruit participants. This study has revealed, many who travelled

and fought in the Afghanistan and Mindanao conflicts were alumnae of Pondok Al-Mukmin

Ngruki, Al Islam in Lamongan, Lukman al-Hakiem in Johor (Malaysia), and other religious

schools that were affiliated with JI.

The recruitment model is also through kinship ties or blood relationships. The first generation

of jihadists who travelled and fought in either Afghanistan or Mindanao were from a family.

The initial recruitment of those who travelled to wage jihad in Afghanistan was participated in

by many Darul Islam families. Thus, many JI members who joined in both Afghanistan and in

Mindanao were in sibling relationships. For example, Amrozi, one of the Bali bombing

masterminds in 2002, recruited his siblings, Ali Imron and Ali Fauzi, to follow his pathway to

fight in the global jihad as foreign fighters.

Indonesian foreign fighters who joined in Afghanistan and Mindanao conflicts are male, mostly

single or unmarried, and between 17-35 years of age. They participated in the war after a

selective recruitment process. Only the best recruits would have the opportunity to be

dispatched to obtain military academy training. Not only physically fit, the recruits were also

selected based on their commitment to jihad and having intellectual capabilities, such as,

religious knowledge, foreign language (English or Arabic), and leadership skills.

Indonesian jihadists who joined the Syrian war are more heterogeneous than those who

participated in Afghanistan and Mindanao conflicts. While many are from or are members of

existing homegrown radical Islamic groups, an unprecedented number of individuals also

travelled to a conflict zone after receiving propaganda from ISIS. Many of those people were

not members of terrorist groups, they were just ordinary citizens who were lured by their

recruiters.

The prison network has become one of the venues of recruitment for many people who wanted

to go to Syria. Aman Abdurrahman and Abu Bakar Bashir are two radical clerics who actively

propagated the Islamic Caliphate from the prison. Both clerics also influenced and motivated

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their inmates to wage jihad once they finished their detention period. Moreover, both religious

leaders also encouraged their followers outside the prison to participate in jihad in Syria.

In contrast with the way JI and DI recruited their members to wage jihad in Afghanistan and

Mindanao, Indonesian pro-ISIS sympathizers applied massive recruitment through the internet.

Although they still used face-to-face recruitment models, the ISIS cell in Indonesia actively

carried out propaganda through the internet. The cases of Dwi Djoko Wiwoho , Iman Santoso,

and even Syawaludin Pakpahan validates this claim that they all decided to travel to Syria after

actively surfing radical content they found on the internet about the war. They previously were

not active radical members of any homegrown radical group before they left to go to Syria

based on their profiles.

Terrorist groups in Indonesia, such as, DI, JI, JAD, JAT, and others benefit from the

development of social media technology in the recruitment and mobilisation of their members

to fight on foreign soil as foreign fighters. Through social media, they provide indoctrination

and recruitment, and also propaganda and fundraising, such as, the monthly on-line magazine

“Dabiq” in a Bahasa Indonesia version for propaganda and recruitment. This relates to a

previous study on jihadist recruitment, that social media serves in various functions, for

example, propaganda, recruitment, fundraising, and training.

The video entitled “Join the Rank” by Bahrumsyah has shown that Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters

used social media in the conflict zone to attract other Muslims to migrate to Syria and fight

under the banner of ISIS. They also created websites to spread their propaganda and radical

ideology. Furthermore, they produced and uploaded photos and videos to YouTube, Facebook,

and other sites about their victory and the conflict in real-time. Interestingly, they also use

social media to boost their profiles and social status at home, to look more masculine and

impressive by holding weapons and military attributes.486

6. 3. During the conflict

Understanding foreign fighters' activities during the conflict is extremely important to

understand their post-conflict behaviour. The roles or duties, their interaction with local

486 Stone, Jon. “Islamist Fighters in Iraq and Syria Keep Tweeting Pictures of Cats,” BuzzFeed, 16 June 2014.

Accessed 15 September 2017. https://www.buzzfeed.com/jonstone/foreign-jihadi-fighters-in-iraq-and-syria-

keep-tweeting-pict?utm_term=.fiAlo0bXyV#.nxZxoyqElz.

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insurgent groups, how they define the main enemy, and the radicalization process are crucial,

which likely determine the way of their life after they leave the conflict. In other words, foreign

fighters' activities in the battlefield influence their post-conflict behaviour or the returnees'

security risks, which many scholars fail to investigate.

Traveling to reach the battlefield is critical before an individual could participate in the war as

a foreign fighter. The journey, from leaving the home country, arriving in the transit location,

and crossing the border of the conflict zone, is always challenging and dangerous. Foreign

fighters usually travel this journey secretly to avoid detection or arrest from security officers

in their country of origin, transit country, and conflict zone. Moreover, they had to pay some

money to smugglers who helped them enter the border of the conflict zone similar to those

many Indonesian civilians who travelled to Syria in the 2010s.

6.3.1. Roles and Functions

As in many global conflicts, foreign fighters may have different roles in the battle. As foot

soldiers, they can be deployed or tasked by the rebel groups they joined in multiple military

functions: frontline or supporting unit, such as, logistics, transportation, and other non-direct

combat roles. Therefore, as in many cases, foreign fighters' positions during the war are

dynamic and could be multi-tasks or roles which are challenging to be clustered.

Indonesian foreign fighters' roles are diverse in each global armed jihad they participated. This

is relevant to previous studies, such as, Borum and Fein, who argue that foreign fighters had

multi-roles in the battle.487 Moreover, overall Indonesian jihadists engaged in a wide range of

military activities, from foot soldiers to military training, training other fighters, and doing

propaganda and recruitment. Many have also been assigned specific tasks, such as, suicide

bombers, for example, in the Syrian war. Apart from their various roles, it is likely that their

functions are determined by the host groups or organizations that employed them. In other

words, the insurgent groups played a role as a user and gave a particular mission that foreign

fighters could not refuse.

The first generation of Indonesian jihadists in the Afghanistan war was tasked by their leaders

to obtain military training. This role resulted from an agreement between Abdul Rassul Sayyaf

487 Randy Borum and Robert Fein. “The Psychology of Foreign Fighters.”

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and Abdullah Sungkar that all jihadists from Indonesia were more prioritized to learn military

skills rather than to fight. With such an arrangement, Indonesian jihadists were required to

attend the military academy in Abdul Rassul Sayyaf’s military camp, this took at least three

years to finish the course. Once they finished, the graduates were tasked to train new jihadists

or otherwise to return home. As stated by Nasir Abas, not only teaching internal members,

many senior jihadists served as military instructors to train dozens of jihadists from other

Muslim countries who wanted to fight.488

While learning the art of combat, Indonesian jihadists took part in military patrols (ribath) with

other Afghan Mujahidins. They also engaged in real combat, such as defending their territory

against the enemy. Moreover, Indonesian jihadists did not go to the frontline to attack the

enemy territory. Since their leader asked them to remain alive, they were not instructed to fight

until death, they were to survive and return home to continue an armed jihad in Indonesia.

Jihadists do not necessarily join foreign conflict to fights; they sometimes enter as military

trainers or instructors. This can be seen in Mindanao's case, where Abdullah Sungkar initially

sent his selected Afghanistan veterans to become military trainers in Mindanao to teach Moro

fighters the art of soldiering. Under the protection of local insurgent groups – the MILF, those

JI military trainers established several military camps, such as, the Hudaibiyah camp, where

they run the military academy for their internal members. They not only train their internal

members, they trained the MILF fighters and other jihadists from different countries who also

wanted to fight in Mindanao.

While training and learning the art of soldiering, Indonesian jihadists helped the MILF to secure

their territories as a reciprocal action to allow them to build military training camps in

Mindanao. Besides participating in patrolling operations (ribath), Indonesian jihadists fought

shoulder to shoulder with the MILF fighters to defend their territory and engage in counter-

attack military operations once the Philippines armies launched their military operations.

Indonesian jihadists in the Syrian war also engaged in military activities, such as, training and

fighting. Therefore, their battle roles involve a higher and more dangerous risk than those who

joined either the Afghanistan or the Mindanao wars. Overall, most Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters

488 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 2019.

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fought in the frontline soon after arriving in the battle zone. Prior to confronting the enemy

head-to-head at the frontline, they attended short basic military drills, mostly less than two

weeks.

There was likely exploitation or intimidation experienced by Indonesian jihadists who fought

under the ISIS banner. Many of them were forced to fight in the frontline with inadequate

training and preparation. Any deserter who refused to fight would end up in jail or would even

be executed. Dwi Djoko Wiwoho and Iman Santoso experienced this kind of rough treatment

from ISIS. Both were detained after they refused to fight in the frontline.

Host radical groups also tasked many Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters to become suicide bombers,

driving carloads of explosives into enemy targets. The cases of Rizq Al Indonesi and Wildan

Mukholadd shows that both young men were brainwashed to become martyrs by blowing

themselves up to target the enemy. With these roles and duties, many Indonesian fighters who

fought for ISIS died in combat action. Their death toll is likely high with this type of role, much

higher than the Indonesian jihadists in Afghanistan and Mindanao.

The duties of Indonesian foreign fighters in Syria were not just engaging in military operations

at the frontline. Many of them were also delivering propaganda, especially to recruit fresh

combatants from the home country. Two Indonesian key jihadi leaders, Bahrumsyah and Abu

Jandal or Salim Mubaroq Attamimi, actively made propaganda content in videos to recruit

supporters and new members. They used social media, such as, Youtube to propagate the ISIS

ideology and call young men to defend Islamic Caliphate.

Moreover, few men linked with JI in Syria remained away from the frontline as they flocked

to Jabhat al-Nusra. Para Wijayanto, JI leader, instructed his fighters to learn the art of soldiering

as the highest priority rather than to fight and die as a martyr. Since the primary motivation

was to advance their military capabilities, they mostly survived and returned home. Their

casualty is much lower compared to those who fought for ISIS.

6.3.2. Interaction with Rebel and Insurgents Groups

One of the critical questions to understand foreign fighters' trajectory in overseas conflicts is

their affiliation with local insurgent groups. To which insurgent groups did Indonesian jihadists

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flock? Why did Indonesian jihadists regroup in a particular insurgent group? How is the

interaction and relationship between foreign fighters and the hosting group? The answers to

these questions are essential to understand the trajectory and the risks posed by foreign fighters

as they return home.

The previous chapters have explained that most Indonesian foreign fighters joined armed

radical groups who were violently fighting against their government or state. They supported

certain local rebel groups who wanted to topple the government or help rebel groups establish

a new government model based on rigid Islamic Sharia. Moreover, they did not flock to or

fight for secular or non-religious groups during the three global armed jihads.

In their operations, Indonesian jihadists operated as autonomous groups, although they joined

the conflict under local jihadi groups' protection. During the Afghanistan war, they acted as a

semi-independent fighting unit where they were able to recruit and train their members coming

from the home country. After having enough resources, they began to build their military camp

and they trained the new coming jihadists. The groups' leaders could even decide who could

remain or leave the battle zone without asking for permission from the hosting group.

Chapter 4 describes that Indonesian foreign fighters in Mindanao received semi-autonomous

operations from the MILF. With permission from the MILF, they built their own military camp,

The Hudaibiyah, and they operated this camp independently. Two years after their arrival, JI

started the military academy to train their internal members. As in Afghanistan, they trained

their new fighters with their military curriculum and religious indoctrination.

Similarly, Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters also built their small semi-autonomous factions,

although they were under the ISIS command control. As explained in Chapter 5, there were

three small independent Indonesian pro-ISIS fighting units that fought for Islamic Caliphate.

The Katibah Nusantara, Katibah Masyariq (eastern region) based in Homs, and Katibah Allepo

were able to recruit new members back home.

Overall, the interaction of Indonesian foreign fighters hosting jihadi groups involved more

mutual beneficiary relationships. It was more mutually beneficial, in which both sides enjoyed

the advantages of their collaboration. As Indonesian jihadists received protection, patronage,

accommodations, weapons, ammunition, and even training facilities, the local insurgent groups

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gained benefits to employ them as their fighters. By having additional resources, the hosting

insurgent groups expect to maximize their probability of winning the war.

Although it is more mutually beneficial, the role of ideology shaping their interaction is still

essential, not completely ignored. The main argument is that Indonesian jihadi groups sent their

members to fight under the banner of insurgent groups where they shared a similar ideology or

political goal. During the Afghanistan war, it is clear that DI and JI sent their members to train

and fight under the Mujahidin faction inspired by Salafi ideology and Wahhabism. There was

an ideological link that both Indonesian jihadi groups and the Mujahidin groups joined that

advocated Salafi jihadi. In this context, both jihadi groups did not dispatch their members to

join Mujahidin factions with a secular or nationalist ideology.

Previous chapters show that Indonesian jihadists developed a bond and a brotherhood with the

armed groups they joined during the battle, such as, Ittihad-al-Islami under the leadership of

Abdul Rassul Sayyaf, the MILF, ISIS, and Jabhat al Nusrah. They developed a sense of

‘oneness’ or ‘We-ness’ as their identity merged with the radical groups they fought. This

identity transformation is like what Buhrmester and Swann define as ‘identity fusion.’489

The spirit of brotherhood is crucial for jihadi groups where each member is required to declare

loyalty and solidarity to the leader and members of the group. With this practice, a member

had to pledge his allegiance or ‘bai’at.’ With the bai'at, the members give their loyalty, even

their lives to the group, and they share a oneness with other members.

The ritual of bai’at can be seen through the case of Indonesian jihadists who fought in

Afghanistan, Mindanao, and Syria. This ritual was performed by Indonesian jihadists who

fought for ISIS during the Syrian war. With this unity, many Indonesian jihadists engaged in

terrorism to show their loyalty to the armed group they joined during the conflict.

Moreover, the interaction between the Indonesian jihadists and local militant groups in the

battle zone is a reciprocal relationship. It is more an opportunity-driven situation where both

parties or groups shared mutual interests. The previous chapter (3-5) shows that Indonesian

489 Buhrmester and Swann, “Identity Fusion,”

https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/9781118900772.etrds0172.

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jihadists participated in the war after receiving an invitation from any warring factions. During

the Afghanistan war, Indonesian jihadists began to travel to a war zone after Abdullah Azzam

and several NGOs funded by Saudi offered Muslims worldwide the opportunity to wage jihad

in many Islamic countries, including in Indonesia. Similarly, Chapter 4 also shows that the

leader of MILF, Salamat Hashim, initially requested Abdullah Sungkar to send his best men to

train the Moro fighters. As reciprocation of Abdullah Sungkar’s commitment to helping, the

MILF allowed him to establish a semi-autonomy military camp in Mindanao.

Global armed jihad allows jihadists to develop or build a transnational jihadi network. Chapter

3 has shown that Indonesian jihadists nurtured ties with other militant international jihadi

groups in the battle while they joined a particular insurgent group. This can be seen during the

Afghanistan war. Although they mostly regrouped in Abdul Rassul Sayyaf’s Mujahidin

faction, a number of them, such as, Hambali, Mukhlas, and others, developed personal contacts

with Abdullah Azzam and Osama bin Laden. With this interaction, JI benefitted from using

Al-Qaeda military camps and facilities, funds, and other benefits.

6.4. After the conflict

This study shows that most Indonesian jihadists left the battle zone either during or after the

conflict. Mostly they did not stay or become residents in the country after the conflict was over.

Moreover, as explained in previous chapters, the majority who survived returned to their home

country for various reasons or motives.

It can be stated that the majority, approximately more than ninety percent of Indonesian

jihadists could survive or did not die in the battle, especially those who participated in either

Afghanistan and in the Mindanao conflicts. During the Afghanistan war, the last contingent

abandoned their military camp in Towrkham and handed it over to their local insurgent group

in 1994. While most returned home, a number of Indonesian jihadists, such as, Hambali, Ali

Gufron, and others continued their relationship with other transnational jihadi groups, such as,

Al-Qaeda. This alliance enabled JI to use Al-Qaeda’s military base in Afghanistan to upgrade

their military skills.

Similarly, most Indonesian foreign fighters left Mindanao during and after the war. During

1994-2000, Indonesian jihadists came to Mindanao to obtain military training in the

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Hudaibiyah military camp and left once the mission was achieved. Yusuf's case explains that

he left the training camp once he finished his two-year military academy. As a loyal jihadi

group member, he followed his leader's instruction to leave Mindanao, although he wanted to

stay longer in the camp and continued his jihad in this region. The last contingent abandoned

Mindanao in the 2000s after the Indonesian jihadists who travelled and fought in Syria quit the

conflict zone during or as the war ended. The number of fighters who abandoned the battle

increased as ISIS began to lose its territory at the beginning of 2015. The motives for leaving

are various. While many jihadists carried out propaganda to recruit new fighters from the

conflict zone, many, such as, Salim Mubarok went back to Indonesia to bring more jihadists to

fight in Syria. After a few months in the conflict zone, Salim Mubarok went home in 2013 to

recruit new fighters. Besides taking his wife and his six children, Salim Mubarok, in 2014,

headed back to Syria with nineteen other men who wanted to fight under his group.

Moreover, many Indonesian pro-ISIS fighters abandoned the conflict zone because they were

disillusioned and traumatized. The cases of Junaedi, Ramdan, Dwi Djoko Wiwoho , and Iman

Santoso have shown that they felt betrayed by the recruiters. As they felt deceived, they decided

to leave their jihad in the battle zone. Once they arrived home, they did not intend to return to

Syria because they did not find the reality coincided with their jihad's previous imagination.

From the life-narrative of two veterans, Ali Imron and Yusuf, it is clear that their motivation

to leave the conflict and return home was based on their leader's instruction. The command

centre (markaziyah) asked them to return home once their mission was achieved. The JI leader,

Abdullah Sungkar, had a prerogative right to decide who remains on the battlefield and return

home. As the group members, they were tied with the doctrine "sami'na wa atho'na" (we hear

and obey) and followed the instruction without objection. Once they returned home, the group

arranged new assignments in line with the group's goal, such as, recruiting new members and

continuing their jihad to establish an Islamic State in Indonesia.

This study shows that Indonesian foreign fighters continued or maintained their bonds with the

insurgent groups they had joined even once they had returned home. They also sustained the

contacts and relations with other transnational jihadi groups. After the Afghanistan war, a

number of JI foreign fighters continued their ties with Abdul Rassul Sayyaf, Abdullah Azzam,

and other Arab jihadists, including Osama bin Laden who established Al-Qaeda. With these

ties, some Indonesian jihadists became more radicalised and shifted their jihad orientation.

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Hambali even received financial aid from Osama bin Laden to continue the armed jihad against

the United States and its allies in Southeast Asia.

Apart from different motives to return home, individuals who trained and fought in foreign

lands experienced a life transformation and a new identity. Those who fought in the overseas

conflict to wage jihad in the name of Islam would receive a new status of Mujahidin, holy

fighter, or the defender of Islam. This is indeed a crucial stage as jihadists experienced a

transformation from a civilian into a militarized person. In his memoir, Imam Samudra states

he experienced a new life transformation as he arrived in Afghanistan. With an AK-47 in his

hands, he identified himself as a warrior of God or Mujahidin with a mission to fight to the

death for Islam as he states: “Really, a happy new chapter in life. Our music is rocket bullets,

mortar explosions, and thumping anti-aircraft guns.”490 Similarly, Nasir Abas also admits his

new identity as he arrived in Afghanistan. He considered himself a soldier and a defender of

Islam.491

As Indonesian jihadists mostly practiced Salafi teachings, they attempt to replicate the model

of the Prophet Muhammad and his companions as the best way of life. It is common practice

that they mostly change their birth names into Arabic, wear Islamic dress, such as, jalabiyya,

speak Arabic to distinguish themselves from other infidels. For the men, they mostly grow their

beards and abandon any daily activities considered as Jahiliya activities, such as, smoking,

watching television, and listening to music, which are regarded as sins (haram).

The new militarized identity created difficulties for many returning jihadists to begin their

ordinary lives as civilians after returning home. A study of disengagement of returning jihadists

has found that many returnees experienced ‘a sense of dislocation and listlessness to live as

civilians.’492 With this mentality, they would prefer to go to another conflict zone and regroup

with their comrades to hold weapons in their hands. Ali Imron, in his memoir, explicitly

mentions his hard times when his leader asked him to become a religious teacher as he states:

490 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris, 46. 491 Justin Magouirk and Scott Atran. “Jemaah Islamiyah’s radical madrassah networks,” Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict 1 no. 1 (2008): 25–41. 492 David Duriesmith & Noor Huda Ismail. “Embodied militarism and the process of disengagement from

foreign fighter networks,” Critical Military Studies, DOI: 10.1080/23337486.2019.1707499

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Actually, I wanted to have an assignment in a place where I could hold arms and use

explosives, not in the Islamic boarding house. Moreover, since it is a duty from my

superior, I have to obey and do it as it has been instructed.493

Nasir Abas also asserts that he had difficulty as he tried to transform his militarised life into a

civilian after leaving the battleground in Afghanistan. While he lived in Malaysia to regroup

with JI networks, he worked as a blacksmith in a small shop owned by a senior member. This

routine work made him frustrated, especially as he remembered his past role as a military

instructor in the camp with a number of students. Moreover, he felt relief as his commander

gave him a new jihad assignment as a military trainer to teach the MILF fighters in Mindanao.

He recalls:

To receive this order, my blood is racing fast. For almost a year, my hand never touched a

weapon. The command center (markazy) now called me to train and perform jihad

alongside the Moro people in Mindanao, a province in the Southern part of the Philippines.

I feel happy to be able to have experience in the forest, which would be different from

Afghanistan.494

Abu Tholut acknowledged that his life has dramatically changed after he joined the war in

Afghanistan. Upon his return, he perceived himself as a military man, not a civilian anymore.

While the combat-experience had shaped his mentality as a soldier, Salafi jihadi and JI

doctrine's ideology constructed his new identity. He became more radical and extreme that the

implementation of Sharia or the establishment of an Islamic state is the only priority in his life.

After combat, I didn’t see myself as purely a civilian anymore. I like to see things in order.

Combat experience in Afghanistan has also changed my worldview. It is not enough

prioritizing dakwah (Islamic proselytization) and eliminating many non-Islamic traditional

Javanese practices. It requires quwwatul aqidah (the power of faith) quwwatul ukhuwah

(the power of brotherhood), and quwwatul musallaha (the power of military) for JI to

succeed against the secular regime of Suharto.495

A Mindanao veteran named Yusuf also experienced a challenging life transition as he returned

home after finishing his military academy in the Hudabiyah camp. He preferred to stay and

continue his jihad in this region. Moreover, his leader asked him to return home, which he

could not resist. Soon after he visited family in Surabaya, East Java, he regrouped in JI a small

493 Ali Imron, Ali Imron sang Pengebom, 31. 494 Nasir Abas, personal memoir (unpublished). 495 Nor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization,” (PhD diss.,

Monash University, 2018), 186.

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network cell in Semarang under the protégé of Abu Tholut. Together with the other three

Mindanao veterans, he worked in a small workshop to produce and sell sandals to local

customers and markets in Semarang. In the interview, Yusuf mentions that his job as a sandal

seller downplayed his previous role and ego as a Mujahidin since he still wanted to hold arms

and use it to fight for his jihad.

Yes, I was thrilled to hold a weapon. When returning from the Philippines, I was just

like missing weapons. I brought ammunition home, out of six people, one of us was

given the task of carrying weapons and ammunition when returning to Indonesia. When

I arrived in Surabaya, I still miss weapons.496

Overall, the cases of Ali Imron, Nasir Abas, Abu Tholut, and Yusuf have shown that many

veterans had difficulty in transforming themselves from fighters to ordinary civilians. They all

missed their previous roles or status as fighters or combatants, where they still wanted to hold

the weapons and fight shoulder to shoulder with their comrades. With this mentality, likely,

the returnees will possibly be tempted to engage in violent acts once they return home.

6.5. Why Returnees attack?

This section addresses one of the main questions in this study: why a number of Indonesian

returning jihadists engaged in terrorism at home. Which factors and circumstances caused

returning Indonesian jihadists to decide to use their military skills and activate their armed jihad

at home? These puzzles remain challenging for many scholars to answer.

I propose two layers of examination as groundwork to answer why some Indonesian returnees

engaged in terrorism. The first is the individual-level analysis, which examines several cases

of Indonesian returning jihadists, specifically in terms of the returnees who have been

convicted as terrorists as narrated in the previous chapters. In this analysis, returnee’s

behaviour, ideologies, grievances, and motivations to return are examined to understand its role

in triggering violence.

The second step is the group-level analysis. With this approach, this chapter examines the jihadi

groups joined by Indonesian foreign fighters at home and in the overseas conflict narrated in

previous chapters. The jihadi group's ideologies, strategies, tactics, and political goals are also

496 Interview with Yusuf, Solo, 2019.

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analysed to explain the correlation in returning jihadists' motivation to engage in violent acts

at home.

After undertaking analysis at both the individual and group levels, this chapter also investigates

possible external factors that are believed to have likely played a critical factor in triggering

the returning jihadists to engage in violent acts. While ideologies played an important factor,

this study found that many returnees were involved in terrorism because of the spirit of revenge

and solidarity. Such a triggering event had also played a crucial factor as many returning

jihadists decided to attack.

6.5.1. Individual-Level Analysis

An Individual’s decision to become a foreign fighter is a long process, it involves more than

just a life incident or a coincidental motivation. It is a life transformation of an identity from a

civilian into a militarized life. There have been gradual stages that occurred, from recruitment,

indoctrination, traveling to the conflict area, training, fighting and then returning to the home

country after the battle ended. Before returning to the country of origin, they may go to other

conflict zones to train, fight, and seek martyrdom to determine their next stage of life.

It is important to note that all foreign fighters would not automatically become terrorists once

they returned home. They might not launch attacks right away or shortly after they arrived

home. Many returning jihadists remained inactive in the Indonesian context for quite a long

time before engaging in violent activities. As they mostly reunited in their previous clandestine

groups, they began to consolidate their internal group, recruiting new local members, spreading

their radical ideologies to the community, and waiting for momentum to start their armed jihad.

Moreover, it is argued that many returning jihadists engaged in terrorism and violent acts, as

previous chapters have explained. Based on an analysis at the individual level of many

returning jihadists, this study captures several elements that likely influence them to engage in

domestic terrorism or violent acts.

6.5.1.2. Violent Jihad

During my interviews with many Indonesian returning jihadists, they overwhelmingly stated

that jihad became a critical motive as they began their life journeys as foreign fighters. They

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believed that their participation in the international armed conflict was as a part of their

religious duty to defend Islam. It is a jihad call to protect the Islamic community (ummah) or

the transnational Islamic community from existential threats.497 For example, Ali Imron stated

that jihad was his main reason to go to Afghanistan as he believed God obligated all Muslims

to perform this duty "Jihad fi Sabillillah.” Because of this, he always wishes to be given

capabilities and opportunities to carry out jihad."498

Indonesian foreign fighters claim that jihad is an obligation for all Muslims even if they lived

far away from the epicentre of the conflict. Jihad is a borderless religious duty without

exception to fight against the enemy of Islam that occupied Muslim lands. Therefore, it should

be an individual obligation (fard ain) and it never could be replaced by someone else, especially

to those men who can do so.

Moreover, most Indonesian jihadists interpreted jihad as a single meaning, which is war (qital)

or violence. Jihad is no longer understood as a spiritual struggle against sin, temptation, lust,

and greed. For example, Imam Samudra claims that jihad is a ‘war’ or sword based on the

jurisprudence of four Sunni schools (Hanafi, Shafi'i, Maliki, and Hanbali). To validate his

claim, Imam Samudra references Islamic scholars who advocated jihad as war, such as,

Abdullah Azzam, Abdul Baqi Ramdhun, and Ibnu Mubarak.499

The rigid construal of jihad as a single meaning of ‘war’ becomes a critical juncture for many

Indonesian jihadists to believe that hard power or violence is the only way or solution to

materialize their jihad. With this thought, they alleged that the enemy could only be defeated

or conquered by power through armed jihad, not by religious preaching or da’wa. It is related

to Abdullah Azzam’s motto of his jihad when he called the mobilization of thousands of

Muslims to fight Soviet aggression in Afghanistan, “jihad and the rifle alone: no negotiation,

no conferences, and no dialogues.”500

On return, returning Indonesian jihadists mostly continued their jihad as they perceive their

home country is not an Islamic country. In other words, they extended the conflict zone to their

497 Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam: The Search for New Ummah, 2004. 498 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 4. 499 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris!, 180. Imam Samudra, Bantahan Terhadap Tulisan Abu Hamza Yusuf

Al-Atsari, 69. 500 Bergen, Holy War, Inc.: Inside the Secret World of Osama bin Laden, 56.

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home country. They did not demobilize or leave their armed jihad. Moreover, the majority

reunited with their radical groups and strengthened the internal organization as a preparation

to seek the power to implement full sharia and establish an Islamic state. With the doctrine of

Hakimiyah, they labelled the government as “thogut” (oppressor) since it does not implement

Sharia and oppresses Muslims.

The terminology of jihad is likely distorted by many returning jihadists as they engaged in

violent acts. For example, Imam Samudra argued that his action in the Bali bombing in 2002

is in accordance with jihad fi-sabillillah. He claimed that the attack against foreign citizens in

the Kuta tourist district was justified according to Islamic jurisprudence. It was the right

retaliation to respond to Americans' mass killing and its allies against women and children in

Afghanistan in 2001. To justify his terror, he recalls, "Based on the will and target plan, it is

clear that Bali bombing is jihad fi-sabillillah because the main target is a coloniser country like

America and its allies."501

Several Mindanao veterans also used the ideology of jihad and retaliation (qisas) to justify their

participation in domestic violent activities. Hasanuddin, for example, viewed his involvement

in the sectarian conflict in Ambon and Poso as a jihad. It was an individual duty to defend local

Muslims who were bitterly persecuted by Christians. As he was inspired by qisas doctrine, he

raised an idea to his members in Poso to kill Christians as a gift of “Lebaran.” This idea was

finally executed; the three Christian girls were ambushed and beheaded.

The most recent attack by a Syrian veteran named Syawaludin Pakpahan indicates that his

attack against police officers in 2017 was motivated by jihad. As he adopted takfiri ideology,

Pakpahan believed that the Indonesian government and all apparatus are infidels because they

follow rules not following God's law and commandment even though they are Muslims. All

government officers, especially police officers, are considered thagut (oppressors) and, as such,

their blood is eligible for targeting, as the enemy, as they arrested and killed fellow Muslims.

Overall, there have been similar patterns to the way returning jihadists use sacred religious

texts with their interpretation to justify their violent acts. First, they mostly developed the

understanding of jihad as a personal obligation of all Muslims (fard ain) rather than a

501 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Terrorist, 109.

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communal responsibility (fard kiffaya). Second, jihad is narrated in a single meaning, a war

(qital) as the only way to bring God's words and Islam in society and state. In other words,

jihad through violence is the only way and should not be abandoned to achieve all Muslims'

glory. Any Muslim who abandons jihad is an unbeliever or even a hypocrite. Third, jihad for

many returning jihadists is not necessarily defensive it could also be offensive. Although it is

debatable among jihadists, many considered the home country a conflict zone (darul harby)

where violent acts (irhabiyah) are correct, including killing innocent civilians. The risk will be

likely higher if the returnees believe that jihad is carried out only through an armed jihad (qital

fisabillilah). The probability of future violent attacks is also higher if they believe the home

country is the extension of a zone of war (darul harby) where offensive jihad is applied to

attack any individuals, groups, or even a state that is viewed as the enemy of Islam.

Therefore, veterans' risks relating to ideology depend on how much they absorb extreme views

and implement them upon returning home. As narrated in previous chapters, not all Afghan

veterans shared the same interpretations of jihad advocated by Hambali, Mukhlas, and Imam

Samudra as they aimed to target Westerners and civilians. Ali Imron, Nasir Abas, and Yusuf

were among returnees who had shown their rejection of the plot targeting innocent civilians.

For example, Yusuf refused to kill innocent civilians as he said: "I never agreed with that

bombing. I was trained as a military person. We will only attack the military, not civilians, like

the ones in Bali. They are innocent people."502 Similarly, Nasir Abas also states that killing

civilians, especially innocent Muslims like the Bali bombing in 2002, is forbidden and

contradicted Islam's jihad. As a Mujahidin, Nasir believed that jihad should be implemented

only in the war zone, not in a peaceful territory, such as, in Indonesia. He says: “soldiers fight

soldiers, not tourists or other people just because they have a different religion.”503

6.5.1.3. Martyrdom

The martyrdom doctrine is a main factor for returning foreign fighters to engage in violent acts

of terrorism. This dogma is constructed and politicised from many religious texts to justify

their violent acts. One of the verses in the Qur’an is mostly used is Surah Ali Imran, which

502 Nor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization, (PhD diss.,

Monash University, 2018), 216. 503 Justin Magouirk and Scott Atran, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s radical madrassah networks,” Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2008, 25–41.

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states, “And if you are killed in the cause of Allah or die - then forgiveness from Allah and

mercy are better than whatever they accumulate [in this world].”504

Jihadists and militant Islamic groups in Indonesia use martyrdom as propaganda,

indoctrination, and incitement. It is part of jihad qital (war), where the act of self-sacrifice is

permissible (halal), the most blessed of death, and it is even endorsed as an effective way to

deter or even defeat the enemy of God. Moreover, they also argue that any jihadists who fight

and die in line with their group’s political goals would become Mujahid and will be rewarded

in paradise and other privileges that other deeds cannot obtain. Abu Jibril, an Afghan veteran,

describes the rewards of being a martyr who dies in jihad. To validate his argument, he cites a

hadith of Ahmad as follows:

There will be six rewards to receive for those who die as a martyr: first, God gives

forgiveness when he first moves and will see his place in Heaven. Second, they survive

the torment of the grave. Third, they survive the doomsday shock. Fourth, they will be

given the crown of greatness made of Yaqut jewels as a mark of honour that is far more

expensive than the rest of the world. Fifth, they will be mated with 72 jelly-eyed angels.

And sixth, a martyr can intercede for 70 families. 505

Jihadi groups have instrumentalised the concept of martyrdom to either recruit and motivate

their members to join overseas conflict as foreign fighters. Heaven and the promise of

immortality would be the reward if they died in the battle as a martyr. Further than that, they

also believed in safaat (protection) if they died in the battle, being freed of the grave

punishment and yaumul qiyamah (day of judgment). They also believed to be able to give

safaat or act of pleading to God’s forgiveness to their family.

Ali Imron, in his memoir, admitted that the virtue of jihad and martyrdom becomes a single

endowment that triggered him to join or carry out an armed jihad. Thus, being a martyr was

always his dream while he fought in the battlefront. He further claimed that any Muslim who

has no desire to fight and die as a martyr is a hypocrite (munafiq fasiq). Even he stated that any

Muslims who had learned the art of war but did not use it in real armed jihad is immoral.506

504

Surah Ali 'Imran [3:157]. 505 Ali Ghufran, Mimpi Suci di Balik Jeruji Besi, (Holy Dream in Prison), 25. 506 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 39.

https://quran.com/3/157

https://quran.com/3/157

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Similar to Ali Imron’s narrative, Ali Fauzi states that the doctrine of martyrdom is so powerful

to motivate him and his comrade to fight and seek death in the battlefront. Recalling his life-

history in Mindanao, he wanted to die as a martyr in the conflict zone and he had no intention

to return. According to him, being a martyr is a dream, and he believed his soul would go

straight to Heaven without any obstacle as he states, “I really wanted to die there (Mindanao).

I imagined my own death all the time. I believe that if I was killed in battle, I would go straight

to Heaven and be met by angels there. That’s what our mentors told us every day.”507

Another Mindanao veteran, Yusuf, was also inspired by martyrdom's doctrine while he was in

the battleground. The teaching from his leaders about martyrdom made him believe that

fighting and dying in the enemy's hand in the battle zone is luck. Recalling his memory in

Mindanao, Yusuf wanted to die as a martyr as he states: “For us, death is luck. Every time a

brother dies syahid on the battlefield, it is not sadness that we feel. We are happy to be a witness

of their martyrdom. Those brothers are martyrs. They got an early victory with a big reward of

happiness in heaven alongside Allah. Their death is not only destiny but syahid, which must be

celebrated.”508

Jihadi leaders use martyrdom doctrine to incite and justify violent behaviour. For example, Abu

Bakar Bashir claims that the perpetrators of a series of bombings in Indonesia during the 2000s

as Mujahid or holy warriors. He argues that those jihadists died in God’s cause. It is because

they performed suicide missions to defend Islam and would receive the highest rewards as a

Mujahid (martyr) for their sacrifices.

I call those who carried out these actions [the Bali, Marriott and Kuningan bombings]

all mujahid [‘‘holy warrior’’]. They all had good intentions, that is, Jihad in Allah’s

way; the aim of the jihad is to look for a blessing from Allah. They are right that

America is the proper target because America fights Islam. So, in terms of their

objectives, they are right, and the target of their attacks was right also. . . If they made

mistakes, they are only human beings who can be wrong. Moreover, their actions could

be considered self-defense . . . they didn’t attack because they defended themselves.509

507 Rebecca Henschke and Endang Nurdin, Crossing Divides: The bomb maker turned peacemaker, BBC World

Service, 28 May 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/world-asia-


Assessed in 30 May 2020. 508 Nor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization,” (PhD diss.,

Monash University, 2018), 172. 509 Justin Magouirk and Scott Atran, “Jemaah Islamiyah’s radical madrassah networks,” Dynamics of

Asymmetric Conflict, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 2008, 25–41

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Many Indonesian jihadists believed that suicide bombing is a legitimate action in conformance

with sacred texts. The case of Wildan Mukholadd had shown how this doctrine influenced him

when he blew in the Fallujah battle on 5 February 2014, three years after joining ISIS. Before

joining the Syrian war, he received indoctrination from his ustad named Sumarno about

martyrdom in Al Islam boarding school in Lamongan, East Java. As he learned the doctrine of

jihad, he raised many questions about death in the way of Islam and its rewards from God. He

even asked his teacher if he blows himself to kill the enemy of God as he states,” If I drive a

car full of bombs to hit a police station, can I be a syahid? His teacher answered ‘yes’, which

Wildan always remembered and finally implemented this doctrine as he believed his death to

defend Islam could give safaat (protection) to his beloved mother.510

Moreover, jihadists developed a more radical conception of martyrdom and used it to

brainwash local recruits to be suicide bombers. During a series of bombing operations in 2002-

2006, many Afghanistan veterans recruited several local jihadists as martyrs. In the Bali

bombing in 2002, Imam Samudra, for example, recruited DI young members named Arnasan

and Iqbal as suicide bombers. The use of local recruits as martyrs became a tactic applied in

several bombing operations, such as, the Philippines Consulate, the Bali, J W Marriott, and the

Australian Embassy bombings. According to Ali Imron, it took a short time to brainwash a

recruit to be ready as a martyr as he states: “Not long to activate someone, just two hours to

provoke him until ready to commit suicide.”511

6.5.1.4. Act of revenge

Substantial pieces of evidence in this study have shown that a spirit of retaliation has become

a theme for returning jihadists to engage in violent activities. With the feeling of humiliation,

angered, and injustice, many returnees believed that their actions to fight and kill Christians

and Westerners were justified, permissible, or halal in line with religious teaching. In addition,

they thought that retaliation is justified and in accordance with religious texts. They began to

510 Nor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization,” (PhD diss.,

Monash University, 2018), 193. Interview with Kharis Hadirin, a close friend of Wildan Mukholad, 2020. See

also, Wildan Mukhollad: Kupersembahkan Kesyahidanku untuk Ibu (Wildan Mukhollad: I dedicate my

martyrdom to Mother), https://ruangobrol.id/2020/03/01/ulasan/tokoh/wildan-mukhollad-5/. Assessed in 7 July

2020. 511 Kisah Para Mantan Teroris (Stories of former terrorists) – ROSI, Kompas TV

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nJL-PBnjeus

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identify individuals who are perceived as the enemy and further executed them as the enemy

of God.

Many returning jihadists instrumentalised the concept of qisas to justify their violent actions.

They prescribed ‘qisas” literally interpreted as retaliation in kind, retributive justice or an ‘eye

for an eye,’ which can be found in sacred texts (Qur’an and hadith) like An-Nahl, which says:

And if you punish [an enemy, O believers], punish with an equivalence of that with which you

were harmed.512

Apart from jihad, many Indonesian jihadists believed in the legitimacy of qisas as they engaged

in violent acts. Ali Imron, in his book, admitted he engaged in the church bombings in 2000.

Moreover, he also claimed that his involvement in this attack was implementing this qisas

doctrine as he states, “The church bombing was a retaliation to the Christians because of the

Ambon and Poso conflicts.”513

In his memoir, Imam Samudra mentions the power of revenge, which triggered his motivation

to attack the Western target in Indonesia. He believed that Christians and Jews tried to weaken

Islam and Muslims in Afghanistan, Palestine, and in many other Islamic countries. He also

thought that Americans had killed thousands of women and children in many Muslim countries.

Based on this belief, he claimed that the Bali bombing in 2002 and the church bombing are

halal or permitted based on justified retaliation.514

This study has also shown that many returnees framed a domestic and international crisis as a

starting point to express their jihad through violence. In the context of the church bombings in

2000 and the Bali bombing in 2002, several veterans, such as, Ali Imron applied qisas to justify

or legitimate the use of violent acts. In his autobiography, Ali Imron stated that his participation

in those attacks was part of his jihad to fight against the enemy of Islam:

Churches' bombing was a retaliation against the Christians in Ambon and Poso. The

Bali bombing was a vengeance of the US and ally's invasion toward Muslims in

Afghanistan and Somalia. It was also because we believed that America becomes the

512 An-Nahl: 126, At Taubah: 36. 513 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 52. 514 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawan Teroris!, 114-115. Imam Samudra, Bantahan Terhadap Tulisan Abu Hamza

Yusuf Al-Atsari, 28.

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allies of Israel in fighting against Palestine. So, when Hambali and Ali Ghufron came

with the agenda of the church bombing and Bali bombing as an act of retaliation against

Islam's enemy, so I joined it.515

Ali Ghufron or Mukhlas also said that the Bali bombing in 2002 was an act of retaliation against

Islam's enemy. In their view, the Westerners could be killed because their governments are

responsible for hundreds and even thousands of Afghan people who died during the Western

coalition war after 9/11. “This bombing is a retaliation against the USA and its allies who

attacked Afghanistan after the collapse of the World Trade Center.”516 Similarly, Ali Imron

also argued that the Bali bombing was a justified retaliation after America invaded Afghanistan

in 2001, “the idea was to get back at the Americans for the invasion of Afghanistan.”517

Several Mindanao veterans also utilised the spirit of hatred and retaliation as they engaged in

a series of terrorism. The bombing of the Philippines consulate in Jakarta was an excellent

example to explain how Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi and Hambali believed that the attack was

justified retaliation. They argued that the Philippines government had purposely launched a

military attack to kill and destroy their Muslim brother of the MILF, who struggled to establish

an Islamic state in Mindanao. They were angered to know many of their JI comrades

undertaking military training in the Hudaibiyah were attacked and forced to leave their military

camp.

Another Mindanao veteran, Hasanuddin, also carried out terrorism driven by a desire for

revenge. During his trial, he admitted taking part in the planning of killing Christians as an act

of revenge for hundreds of Muslims massacred during the Poso conflict. This plan was finally

executed by several local jihadists – Lilik Purwanto and Irwanto Irano - on 29 October 2005

by ambushing Christians in the jungle path. On that day, they beheaded three Christian

students. A note of revenge was purposely left beside their dead bodies: “Wanted: 100 more

Christians heads, teenaged or adult, male or female; blood shall be paid with blood, soul with

soul, head with head.”518

515 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 52-53. 516 Arif Wachjunadi, Misi wallet Hitam, 19. 517 Deborah Cassrels, “Bali bomber ‘regrets’ the carnage,” https://rohangunaratna.wordpress.com/interviews-

2/isis/page-4/bali-bomber-regrets-the-carnage. 518 Cameron Forbes, Under the Volcano: The Story of Bali, 190.

159

In the interview with Nasir Abas, he said that Hasanuddin engaged in the beheading of Poso's

Christian girls. Moreover, he claims that Hasanuddin was undisciplined, out of control, and

disobeyed JI's rules. Hasanuddin was influenced by local Muslims’ agenda of retaliation rather

than to stick to JI’s primary goal in Poso. This beheading shocked several JI elites, such as,

Abu Dujana, who then called him to return to Java to be interrogated. Indonesian police arrested

Hasanuddin and two other perpetrators in 2007. Although he denied the allegation as the

attack's mastermind, he received his twenty years sentence as part of his struggle.519

6.5.2. Jihadi Group-level analysis

Through the three case studies examined in previous chapters, this study found that the jihadi

groups had played a critical role in the Indonesian foreign fighters' phenomenon. Most

Indonesian jihadists were active members of radical groups at home before entering the conflict

overseas. During the conflict, they trained and fought with specific insurgent groups based on

their leaders' preferences. Once the conflict ended, returnees did not disengage and leave their

armed jihad; therefore, they reunited in their radical group to continue an armed jihad at home.

With these characteristics, it can be stated that the groups joined by Indonesian jihadists have

played a critical role. Therefore, it is crucial to analyse the notion of groups, such as, ideologies,

political goals, strategies, and tactics. Moreover, it is also important to understand how the

groups use or mobilise their returning jihadists according to their political goals.

Before training and fighting in overseas conflicts, the vast majority of Indonesian jihadists are

members of extremist organizations at home. They were recruited by Islamist groups that

endorse extreme ideologies and demand the full implementation of sharia. As the groups

struggle to establish an Islamic state, their members' mobilisation to train and fight as a

preparation (idad) to carry out ultimate jihad at home to topple the Indonesian secular

government. Only selected members with certain criteria and capabilities were able to train and

fight in overseas conflict as foreign fighters.

In spite of giving indoctrination like jihad, martyrdom, hijra (migrate), and ummah

(community), the groups also provided directions to their recruits before, during, and after the

conflict. As a common practice, all fighters had to pledge allegiance (baiat) to their leader and

519 Indonesians jailed for beheadings, BBC News, 21 March 2007.

160

the group. The loyalty should only be given to their group and members, although they have to

sacrifice their lives.

While they were in the conflict zone the jihadi group leaders communicated and remained in

contact with their jihadists. As part of their support, the group also provided financial

assistance, including a monthly stipend to their fighters. Furthermore, the group leader also had

engaged by visiting and monitoring their jihadists while on training. As the missions overseas

finished, the group decided to leave the conflict and decided on the next assignment after

returning home.

There have been several key radical groups that have recruited and dispatched their members

to wage jihad overseas. DI was the first group that sent its members to Afghanistan in the

1990s. This rebel group viewed the Afghanistan war as a training ground for their members to

receive military training, which they could not get at home. Their members' participation in the

battleground was a preparation to wage an armed jihad to establish an Islamic state in Indonesia

as written on its political manifesto - "Pedoman Dharma Bakti" and "Qanun Asasi. As this

group perceived the Indonesian government as the main enemy, this group consider Indonesia

as "Dar Harb" or a war of zone, which has to be conquered by an armed jihad.520

JI emerged as the key group that sent their jihadists to Afghanistan after splitting with DI in

1993. This radical group dispatched many of its members to receive military training and fight

under Rasul Sayyaf's Mujahidin faction banner. After closing its last camp in Afghanistan, this

radical group began to build a new training ground in Mindanao under the protection of the

local Islamist group-the the MILF. Like DI, JI adopted a distinctively extreme ideology to build

an Islamic state in Indonesia and further Islamic Caliphate in the Southeast Asian region. As

stated in PUPJI, this organization has adopted Salafi jihadi that jihad must be carried out

through violence against Islam's enemy. This group sent its members to wage jihad in Syria in

the 2010s. They believed the conflict was an opportunity to recover from the hammering in the

2000s since they lost their members who were arrested and killed by Indonesian security

authorities.

520 S. Soebardi. “Kartoisuwiryo and the Darul Islam Rebellion in Indonesia.” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies

14 no. 1 (1983): 109-133.

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JAD became one of the key players to recruit and mobilize hundreds of Indonesian jihadists to

wage jihad in Syria under ISIS's banner. Unlike JI, this group advocates the most extreme jihad

ideology called "Takfiri jihadi." With this ideology, this group perceives anybody outside their

groups as infidels whose blood could be spilled through violence. In line with this belief,

Indonesian jihadists alleged to ISIS that they believe that the Indonesian government is an

infidel and conflict should be waged through jihad.

Based on the group analysis, it can be stated that the jihadi groups have been active to recruit

and dispatch their members overseas as foreign fighters. Ideologically, they advocate the

extreme interpretation of Islam and perceive jihad as war (qital). These groups have also sought

to build an Islamic state in the country through an armed jihad to topple the Indonesian

government. With the jihadi groups' characteristics, it is apparent that they are dangerous and

most likely to engage in violent acts once they return home.

Indonesian jihadists trained and fought under certain warring factions or groups during the

internationalised armed conflict. They aligned with the militant group, mostly Islamist

insurgents, as they shared prevailing radical ideologies. Indonesian jihadists did not join in the

secular or nationalist group. It has been explained in previous chapters, Indonesian jihadists

during the Afghanistan War trained and fought under the banner of Abdul Rasul

Sayyaf’s Ittehad-al-Islami (Islamic Union) and a few trained in Osama bin Laden’s camps. As

most Indonesian jihadists flocked to the MILF in the Mindanao war, the vast majority of

combatants united with Baghdadi’s Islamic Caliphate and Jabhat al-Nusra during the Syrian

war.

Although Indonesian jihadists trained and fought along with the local insurgent group, they

built their military camps to train their internal members, such as, in Torkham in Afghanistan

and the Hudaibiyah in Mindanao. During the Syrian war, Indonesian jihadists also established

their semi-independent fighting unit under IS, for example, in Katibah Nusantara, Katibah

Masyariq, and Katibah Allepo. Other Indonesian jihadists united in Jabhat al-Nusra, a Salafis

group who fought against the Syrian state and preferred Islamisation in Syria.

The groups still played a role as their members trained and fought in overseas conflicts. They

regularly maintained contacts and communications with their fighters. For example, Abdullah

Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir often travelled to Pakistan to visit Abdul Rasul Sayaf’s military

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ittehad-al-Islami

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camp during the Afghanistan war. Similarly, during the Mindanao conflict, Abu Bakar Bashir

had visited the Hudaibiyah camp to see his fighters.

From the three jihad world theatres joined by Indonesian jihadists, it is clear that they united

with varied Islamist insurgent groups advocating radical ideologies, either Salafi jihadi or

Salafi Takfiri, with the goals to purify Islam and Muslim society. Those groups adopted jihad

fisabillillah, which should only be carried out through an armed jihad (war). With this type of

group joined by Indonesian jihadists, it is apparent that the Indonesian jihadists were exposed

to radical views and could carry an extreme binary worldview back home. Not only would they

be able to keep in touch with transnational jihadi networks, they will also be able to commit an

act of terrorism in the home country.

The great majority of Indonesian foreign fighters did not demobilise after the conflict or leave

the battlefront. The previous discussions (Chapters 3 and 4) have shown that the majority or

perhaps all Indonesian jihadists who fought in Afghanistan and Mindanao reunited with their

group once they finished their mission in the war zone. Their motives to return home were to

continue their jihad at home or extend the conflict.

Returning jihadists enjoyed a higher status after obtaining military training and fighting

overseas. They received privileges as "Warriors of God," and many of them became structural

leaders in JI structural organization. The earliest batch of combatants in the Afghan war became

the head of Mantiqi, and many others served other high ranks. Many jihadists from Mindanao

played essential positions in their group after they returned home.

Many Indonesian returning jihadists from Syria also enjoy the privilege or acknowledgment as

Mujahidin. This can be seen through the cases of Syawaludin Pakpahan, Abu Jandal, and Afif

Abdul Madjid, who became a reference for many local jihadi networks about jihad in Syria.

These three returning jihadists were able to influence many people about jihad. While Abu

Jandal was able to recruit new members to wage jihad in Syria, Syawaludin Pakpahan

successfully brainwashed several local jihadis to participate in the Medan police office attack

in 2017.

Indonesian combatants who trained and fought with Jabhat al-Nusra in the Syrian conflict also

reunited with their group once they returned home. Para Wijayanto, as the Amir of JI, instructed

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them to continue the armed jihad at home to establish a Daula Islamiya in Indonesia. Many

returnees were assigned to train new local members with military skills and war experience

they obtained from the battlefront. Those returnees were also in charge to equip basic skills for

recruits of following batches to go to Syria.

Based on group analysis, this study found that Indonesian returning jihadists who reunited with

their pre-existing radical groups would unquestionably pose threats. They were ideologically

perilous if they still have a fantasy in establishing an Islamic state in the country through armed

jihad to topple the secular government. As part of their jihad preparation, they would strengthen

their group, recruit new members, and wait for the right momentum to launch an armed jihad.

6.5.2.1. Hakimiyya and Khilafa

In the Indonesian context, many Jihadi groups use and implement the Tawhid of Hakimiyya as

one of their political manifesto's key pillars. With this thought, they believe in God's absolute

sovereignty that only Allah has unchallenged authority to make laws or rules for the universe

and all humankind. Islam is complete and universal, which means it should be the source of

law. Moreover, Islam provides a guideline in all aspects of life, including to govern a state.

The rigid interpretation of the Hakimiyya likely becomes a seed or critical juncture for many

Indonesian jihadists to become exclusive, intolerant, radical, and possibly engage in violent

acts. It becomes a powerful tool to radicalise Muslims who, in general, believe that Allah is

One and has absolute sovereignty in the universe.

Abu Jibril, an Afghan veteran, urged the establishment of Khilafah or an Islamic State in

Indonesia. During his Al-Jazeera interview in 2006, Abu Jibril demanded the establishment of

Daulah Islamiyah in Indonesia. The Islamic state should even be carried out by force, and it

should not be by compromise or consultation as he stated: “We want an Islamic state where

Islamic law is not just in the books but enforced and enforced with determination. There is no

space and no room for democratic consultation.”521

521 Zachary Abuza, Jemaah Islamiyah Adops the Hezbollah Model Assessing Hezbollah’s Influence. Al-Jazeera,

August 21, 2006. https://www.meforum.org/2044/jemaah-islamiyah-adopt-the hezbollah-model. Assessed in 23

October 2019.

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Many returning jihadists believed the full implementation of Sharia is the only solution to fix

all world problems. It is the only way to save all Muslims’ faith in Islam. In other words, there

is no ideal system except Islam and the full implementation of Sharia in society and state. The

implementation of this view, they label anyone outside their group as unbelievers, infidels, and

thogut who should be fought through jihad.

With the narrative of Hakimiyya, returning jihadists mostly perceive Indonesia as an infidel

country. It is simply because the state does not implement Sharia. They view the state ideology

- the Pancasila and democracy are great shirks and that God will not forgive the sinners. Thus,

from their point of view, the government apparatus is considered thagut (oppressors) because

the government is arresting or prosecuting Muslims who struggle to implement Islamic sharia.

Ali Imron, in his memoir, argues the implementation of Sharia is the only solution to fix the

multidimensional problem in Indonesia. He believes that Indonesia faces a complex problem

for decades because the Sharia is not yet applied. Thus, the only way to change the Jahiliya

society is through armed jihad. He asserts that one of the reasons he was involved in the Bali

bombing in 2002 is that he was not pleased with the Indonesian secular government, where he

found many immorality practices in societies.522

Ideologically, Indonesian jihadists were mostly inspired by the thoughts of Maududi and

Sayyid Qutb on Hakimiyya. Through Maududi’s concept of the government of God (al-

Khilafah wa al-Mulk), they divided society into three groups: Muslims, protected non-Muslims

(ahl al‐dhimma), and Non-Muslim of Dar al-Harb (the abode of war).523 For the extreme

jihadists, many just acknowledge two types of the state: Islamic State (dar al-Islam) and Non-

Islamic State (dar al-kufr). Through the Qutb’s Ma’alim fu ath-Thariq (Guidance for the path

of Struggle), Indonesian jihadists advocate God’s sovereignty and divide the world into black

and white, which are Islam and Jahiliya. With their concept, anyone who rejects God, and the

Islamic State and Sharia is Jahiliya.

A great number of Indonesian returning jihadists perceived the home country as an infidel

country or Jahiliya. Imam Samudra, for example, denounced Indonesia as a Thogut because it

522 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 41-42. 523 Ana Belén Soage, Islamism and Modernity: The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb, Totalitarian Movements

and Political Religions, 10:2, 189-203, DOI: 10.1080/14690760903119092.

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does not apply Islamic law. In his view, Indonesia is a thagut state, although most people

identify themselves as Muslim. It is because the state does not apply sharia, and people make

the laws, they are not from God, as he states: "If you are in Indonesia, this country is established

based on thagut law! Then, this country's ruler is thagut, not Amir ul-Mu'minin (Commander

of the Faithful)."524

As he viewed Indonesia as Darul Kufr (land of disbelief), Imam Samudra denounced all leaders

or rulers as thagut. All government apparatus, parliamentary members, and security officers

are demons in humans' shape, although they consider themselves as Muslims and believe in

the Five pillars of Islam. With these characteristics, Imam Samudra asked his followers to

disobey the command of the rulers. He argued it is sinful or Haram to follow their laws and

commands. On the other hand, he also encouraged Muslims to rebel, fight, and overthrow the

rulers in Indonesia through armed jihad.

Through the lenses of hakimiyya, many returning jihadists believed that Indonesia is dar al-

harb (zone of conflict). All territory is a part of the battle zone where all people who live in

this country can be targeted if they reject the concept of the Caliphate and help the enemy of

Islam. This is a critical juncture for many jihadists to engage in violent acts. Hambali, Jabir,

Imam Samudra, Edi Setyono, and Yazid, for example, viewed all Indonesia soil is another

conflict zone as they launched a series of bombings by targeting 38 churches in 11 cities in

2000. Bali was another warzone for Hambali, Imam Samudra, and Mukhlas as they launched

an attack on this island on 12 October 2002. In his autobiography, Imam Samudra claimed this

operation (amaliyat) is in accordance with Islamic teaching, especially jihad, to kill the enemy

of God.

Moreover, not all returning jihadists perceived Indonesia as a warzone. For example, Nasir

Abas argues that JI has not yet considered Indonesia as a battle zone but a place of preparation

(idad).525 It means that the Amir (leader) decided the warzone's status when the time is ripe or

ready to launch armed jihad to establish an Islamic State in this country. He called Hambali,

Imam Samudra, and other like-minded jihadists as ‘undisciplined’ members who might not

understand the PUPJI. Nasir Abas’s narrative that Indonesia has not yet been decided as a

524 Imam Samudra, Sekuntum Rosela Pelipur Lara: Catatan dan Renungan dari Penjara, 75. 525 Interview with Nasir Abas, 2020.

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warzone is relevant to another senior Afghan veteran named Farihin. During my interview,

Farihin argued that Indonesia is not yet a war of zones for JI, it is a darul da'wa, which means

a territory for religious outreach.526

A number of returning jihadists engaged in theft, fraud, and robbery to secure funds in their

operations. 527 According to Islam, with the concept of fa’i, they justified such activities as

permissible or halal to take wealth or assets from unbelievers or non-Muslims. For example,

Imam Samudra urged his followers to use ‘carding’ or hacking to steal money from infidels.528

He even implemented this concept by undertaking a robbery against a goal shop “Toko Erlita”

on 22 August 2002 in Banten, West Java. It is said that the money from this action was used to

finance the Bali bombing in 2002. 529

Yusuf was another example of returning jihadists who believed that fa’i is justified in line with

his jihad. After finishing his military in Mindanao, he reunited with his JI cell in Semarang.

Before he was captured by Densus-88 on 9 July 2013, he had a plan to carry out a robbery in

Semarang. Recalling his memory, he states, “A long time ago, I was planning to rob a physician

in Semarang because we thought they have much money to finance our terror operation.”530

6.5.2.2. Group solidarity

Identity fusion creates solidarity, brotherhood, and oneness among Indonesian jihadists before,

during, and after the conflicts they joined. In their pre-departure to a conflict zone, they created

bond and brotherhood with homegrown jihadi groups as they were mostly members of the

group. In the battle, they built comradeship with the group they joined. Thus, after returning

home, they kept cohesion with homegrown radical groups and the insurgent groups they joined

during the conflicts even though they had already left the battle.

526 Interview with Farihin, 2019. 527 Fai refers to an act to take wealth from an enemy. 528 Imam Samudra, Aku Melawam Teroris!, 259. 529 Interviews with several Afghan veterans, 2019. Several Afghan veterans also carried out robberies in several

places. Tony Togar, an Afghan veteran engaged in robbery against a money changer in Dumai in 2002 and

Lippo Bank in 2003. See, Ken Conboy, The Second Front, 179. 530 KisahYusuf dan Rumah Tingkat di Sri Rejeki Tempat Penggerebekan Densus 17 Tahun Silam (A Story of

Yusuf and a House in Sri Rejeki raided by Densus 17 Years ago), https://ruangobrol.id/2020/07/04. Assessed in

6 July 2020. Interviewed with Yusuf, 2020.

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Jihadi groups, such as, JI, have applied the doctrine of solidarity and loyalty as one of the key

pillars in their indoctrination for all members (jamaah). For example, Abu Tholut advocated

the importance of a strong bonding to their leader and group and other members. As a member

of jamaah, he urged his members to show their love, care, and protect each other, either in a

peaceful or difficult situation. Abu Tholut asserts:

There is no Islam except being in the jamaah (an Islamic group). You cannot be in the

jamaah unless you show obedience to the rules of the jamaah. We must protect each

other. Alone, the wolf will eat the sheep. But if the sheep stick together, the wolf will

be scared of them.531

Strong solidarity remains an indirect factor that leads returnees to engage in violent acts or even

terrorism. This is relevant to identity theory, highlighting that identity fusion creates a sense

of oneness, solidarity, and even a willingness to sacrifice for the groups they joined. On

the other hand, identity fusion also creates a purpose to fight if their shared values are

threatened and even to retaliate against the out-groups perceived as the enemy.532

Ali Imron, in his memoir, states that the concept of “wala al bara” left him no option except

to do what his senior instructed him. He was initially reluctant to participate in the Bali

bombing in 2002. He questioned his brother Muhklas on the legality of targeting the civilians

as he thought Bali was not a battle zone. He also raised a clarification on whether all JI members

wholeheartedly agreed and supported the plan. Therefore, Mukhlas cynically replied and asked

him just to follow the plan, “If we inform this to those JI members, it is clear that not all of

them would agree on this decision, this is not your business.”533 In his memoir, Ali Imron says:

Actually, my involvement in several bombing operations was based on my trust to my

seniors in jamaah. And I considered the bombing operations are part of JI’s program,

which was agreed upon. Although I did not know many things about JI, I feel I am part

of it, so I have to join any program by JI. If the seniors whom I believed were not

carrying out the program of jamaah but did their own program so it should be their

responsibilities.”534

531 Nor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalization,” (PhD diss.,

Monash University, 2018), 188. 532 Swann Jr, William B. and Michael D. Buhrmester, “Identity Fusion” Current Directions in Psychological

Science 2015, Vol. 24(1) 52–57. See also, Purzycki, Benjamin Grant and Martin Lang, “Identity fusion,

outgroup relations, and sacrifice: A cross-cultural test, Cognition, Volume 186, 2019, Pages 1-6. 533 Interview with Ali Imron, 2019. See also Arif Wachjunadi, Misi Walet Hitam, 19. 534 Ali Imron, Ali Imron sang Pengebom, 34.

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Through the series interview with Ali Imron, he confirmed his belief of “walla al bara,

especially “wala,” (loyalty) as a norm where all members of the jihadi group are required to

give their full loyalty to the groups and leaders. With this doctrine, he positioned himself as a

junior who was obliged to obey and follow the instruction given from a leader (Mukhlas) as he

said, “My loyalty (wala) to Mukhlas as my senior in the group, and therefore I believed he was

more knowledgeable than myself.”535

Similar to Ali Imron, Umar Patek also asserted that the spirit of solidarity gave him no choice

except to be involved in the Bali bombing in 2002. He was initially against Mukhlas’s idea to

target civilians. Therefore, Mukhlas ignored his objection and insisted that he engage. Umar

Patek was in a dilemma at the same time as the process of bomb-making had already reached

90 percent. With this critical condition, he finally decided to join based on his sense of

solidarity as the Afghan veterans and group’s member. Together with Abdul Ghani and Sawad,

Umar Patek assembled the bomb amounting to one ton.536

The concept of walla al bara can also be seen in the case of Abu Dujana, who was exposed to

an extreme thought from Osama bin Laden. He respected Osama bin Laden as a charismatic

jihad leader during the Afghanistan war. In the interview with CNN, Abu Dujana realized that

he believed it was justified to kill innocent people, especially Westerners, as part of jihad to

defend Islam. He even stated that he received this doctrine from Osama bin Laden who he met

in Afghanistan, as a more respectful figure compared to his teacher or leader in JI. “I didn't

read it in the Koran. It's based on the teachings of our teachers, clerics, especially what Osama

bin Laden first said," said Abu Dujana.537

The concept of solidarity among jihadists is like an unwritten norm with significant

consequences. Any member who left or disengaged would be condemned as a coward, infidel,

or traitor. Even worse than a verbal threat, a betrayer can receive a life threat. During my

interviews with several disengaged returning jihadists, they were condemned and labelled as

kafir and threatened to be killed. Ali Imron, one of the Bali bombing perpetrators, confessed to

535 Interview with Ali Imron, 29 January 2020. 536 Arif Wachjunadi, Misi wallet Hitam, 37. Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 78. 537 Dan Rivers, ‘Accused Asian terror leader: Expect more blood,’ CNN, 26 June 2007, at

https://edition.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/asiapcf/06/25/abu.dujana/index.html (accessed 25 May 2020).

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being labelled as a traitor and faced death threats from other jihadists. He understood his

decision to leave the group and cooperate with police to denounce jihad brought consequence

to his life as he stated, “By my own people, I am not afraid. My blood is halal. It is legitimate

to kill me.”538 Similarly, Umar Patek, an Afghan veteran who was involved in the Bali bombing

in 2002, was labelled as an infidel by his previous jihadi networks as he decided to cooperate

with the Indonesian government and participated in the ceremony to raise the national flag.539

A Mindanao veteran named Ali Fauzi also experienced a verbal threat and even a target of

killing by his previous jihadi networks after leaving JI. His decision to disengage from the

group and cooperate with Indonesian authority has made his life difficult. Moreover, he was

firm with his decision and states that any physical threat will fail to change his decision to leave

wrong armed jihad by killing innocent people. In his interview with BBC on 28 May 2020, he

states, “The threats against me are intense, it’s not just verbal attacks but death threats. But,

honestly, I am not scared because I know what I am doing is right. I am ready and prepared to

die doing this.”540

The Indonesian jihadists developed a sense of solidarity, loyalty, and brotherhood with a jihadi

group they joined during the conflict overseas. During the Afghanistan war, at least three

charismatic radical jihadists, whom Indonesian jihadists respected and gave loyalty to even

after leaving the battlefront: Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, Abdullah Azzam, and Osama bin Laden.

Chapter 3 has narrated many Indonesian jihadists, such as, Hambali, Abu Dujana, Mukhlas,

and Imam Samudra, who had developed contacts and trust with Osama bin Laden. With the

ideology bond, they believed that Osama’s jihad call to target Americans and its allies was

right and in accordance with Islamic teaching.

Indonesian jihadists had also created a bond with the MILF leader and its fighters. Many

returning jihadists were aggravated as they knew the Philippines army attacked their

Islamist comrade in Mindanao and aimed to arrest or kill Salamat Hashim. Both

538

Deborah Cassrels, Bali bomber ‘regrets’ the carnage, https://rohangunaratna.wordpress.com/interviews-

2/isis/page-4/bali-bomber-regrets-the-carnage. 539 Interview with Siti Darojatul Aliah, Executive Director of SeRVe, 2020. 540

Rebecca Henschke and Endang Nurdin, Crossing Divides: The bomb maker turned peacemaker, 28 May

2020, BBC World Service, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/amp/world-asia-


accessed in 31 May 2020.

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Hambali and Faturrohman al Ghozi, who spent a few years in Mindanao, began to react

and mobilise their members to carry out retaliation. The bombing of the Philippine

consulate in Jakarta and Manila Metro was the answer to the jihad call propagated by

the MILF leader.

6.5.2.3. Splinter Group

Yet it is, therefore, challenging to explain why only a few returning jihadists engaged in

terrorism. In the context of returning jihadists from Afghanistan and Mindanao, we can ask

why Hambali and his like-minded jihadists engaged in terrorism while the majority remained

inactive and did not engage in domestic terrorism in the 2000s? This absence of a terror attack

is a puzzle since they reunited in the same radical group (JI) after training and fighting in

Afghanistan. Their absence of violence for almost a decade left the unanswered question and

it needs to be explained.

There have been competing interpretations of jihad among the members of jihadi groups. In JI,

for example, not all members shared the same interpretation of jihad ideology, in other words,

the way the political goals, strategies, and tactics of the group were applied. During the Ambon

conflict, this group failed to reach a consensus while they were discussing their role in this

sectarian conflict. Although JI as a group did not engage, many members, such as, Aris

Munandar and Abu Jibril participated individually without representing the group. Therefore,

they had a single voice to participate in the Poso conflict and engaged its members directly.

Osama bin Laden’s jihad call to kill Americans and allies has created a debate and even friction

among Afghan veterans. This fatwa inspired Hambali and other like-minded returning jihadists

to activate their armed jihad. They believed that it was the right time to carry out jihad because

Americans and its allies occupied the land of the Two Holy Mosques (Makkah and Medina).

By referring to the jihad call from Osama bin Laden, Hambali proclaimed jihad to liberate the

two Holy Places for the infidels was extremely more important rather than to topple the infidel

state in Indonesia.

The substantial evidence has shown that the absence of an attack by JI Afghan returnees for

almost a decade is part of their strategy. This group had not decided yet to begin their armed

jihad at home. The jihadi group leader – Abdullah Sungkar, had not yet launched an armed

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jihad to establish an Islamic state because he thought the group did not have capabilities and

enough resources. As the time was not ripe enough, the priority was to strengthen the internal

group by recruiting new members and carrying out religious outreach.

Hambali’s bombing campaigns in the 2000s contradicted with JI’s gradual strategy to create

an Islamic state and the full implementation of sharia in Indonesia. His motive to shift jihad's

direction, from ‘near enemy’ to ‘far enemy,’ created friction, even rejection by many members,

mostly from Mantiqi 3. The situation became worse since Abu Bakar Bashir failed to stop

Hambali and other like-minded jihadists from engaging in bombing campaigns, which created

a catastrophe and a drawback to the group.

Until 1999, Abdullah Sungkar applied a gradual strategy in the implementation of armed jihad.

He was consistent with the group guideline book of "PUPJI," which emphasises that the jihad

should be a long preparation involving not only internal cadres and the Muslim majority to

give their support. Although JI in the late 1990s had doubled their members and possessed

weapons, Abdullah Sungkar had not yet decided to start an armed jihad. While he continued

recruiting new members, he did not instruct his men to engage in any violent activities. This

strategy was still applied in 1999 until he died, and Abu Bakar Bashir took the position as an

Amir.

Abu Rusydan was the one who rejected Hambali’s armed jihad. Once he was appointed as an

Amir of JI in 2002, he emphasized the need for a gradual strategy to achieve the ultimate goal

of establishing an Islamic state in Indonesia. He was against Hambali's strategy by taking sides

with Al-Qaeda and attacked Westerners as part of an armed jihad. In his view, the sporadic

bombings were ineffective or even counterproductive in the group's long-term goal. It was

because the JI was not ready to wage jihad against the West, that was too powerful, especially

in terms of military strength. In addition, he believed that society was not prepared and had not

yet supported their struggle. Neither giving support or sympathy to JI, the community saw their

bombing operations as an act of terrorism and contradicted Islam's teaching.541

After leaving JI and established JAT, Abu Bakar Bashir emphasised the need to strengthen its

internal resources before engaging an armed jihad. In his closed dakwah in Tasikmalaya, West

541 Muhammad Tito Karnavian. Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 72.

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Java, on 7 August 2010, he still advocates the jihad through war against the infidels. Moreover,

he also emphasised that armed jihad needs preparation (idad), "We will wage our struggle with

dakwah and jihad. This jihad is to wage war on infidels in the interests of upholding Islamic

law. As for the means, they should be under existing opportunities and capabilities." 542

The new generation of JI or ‘neo-JI’ under the leadership of Para Wijayanto has applied a

gradual strategy. He still prioritised developing internal groups by recruiting new members and

strengthening the internal group. He understood that JI had suffered much damage caused by

the state repression after the Bali bombing in 2002, where many key leaders, including senior

Afghan and Mindanao veterans were either killed or arrested by the Indonesian police. With

this drawback, he believed that the strategy had to be changed, leaving armed jihad or terrorism

temporary and focus on recruitment while carrying out preparation (Idad) through military

training for their cadres.

In an interview with Nasir Abas, he recalls having a short communication with Para Wijayanto,

who was arrested by the Indonesian authority in 2019. Through the conversation, Para

Wijayanto mentioned that he was still persistent in using the PUPJI as a guideline for an

organisation, although he set minor modifications in its operation. 543

However, the study of Solahudin reveals that JI leaders understood that the precondition of the

implementation of armed jihad (Mussalah) is still a long way to go. Even internally, they were

not ready in terms of resources and capabilities. Several elites of this group also believed armed

jihad was not ready since most Muslims in Indonesia have not yet supported the idea of Islamic

State establishment. Islam's main pillars, such as, jihad, have been corrupted by impure Islamic

teaching and practices, such as, innovation (Bidah). Thus, most Muslims in Indonesia still

believe that religious and Islamic state are different or separated.

Tito Karniavan argued that JI from 1999 to 2007 had implemented a dual strategy, a gradual

and military-focused strategy. To strengthen an internal organization, this organization keeps

recruiting new members, building community (jamaah) while at the same time building

542 Ibid. 543 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 2019.

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military strength, not only sending their cadres to undertake military training but also procuring

weapons and explosives.544

Through a gradual strategy implementation, JI abandons terror and began to carry out outreach

"da’wa” and recruit new members. They also change the way they frame the home country,

which is not “darul harby” or zone of conflict’, as a “darul da’wah”, or a venue to spread Islamic

thought in society. Interestingly, many members of this group engaged in political parties that

propagate the full implementation of sharia in Indonesia.545

6.6. External Triggering Factors

This study found that a number of Indonesian returning jihadists engaged in violent acts after

having been triggered by certain external factors. There were such specific events - the

‘triggering factor’ that paved the way for many veterans to observe, discuss among the group,

and finally decide to carry out collective action based on their calculations in line with their

jihad at home.

Substantial evidence in this study has shown that many Indonesian returning jihadists were

provoked by a specific event that influenced them to believe that Islam was under attack. They

became aggrieved and motivated to retaliate against the out-groups perceived as the enemy.

The communal conflict in Ambon in 1999 validates this claim that many returning jihadists

were in anger and decided to get involved. As explained in the previous Chapter 3, a number

of returnees linked with JI, DI, and other jihadists began to travel to Ambon. For Afghan

jihadists affiliated with JI, their participation in the Ambon sectarian conflict was initially more

individual rather than in a group because Abu Bakar Bashir failed to make an internal

consensus to participate. Therefore, this group decided to get fully involved in the Poso conflict

in 2000 as they believed that jihad was needed and could not be postponed. This group began

to send their members, especially the Afghan and Mindanao veterans, to help local Poso

Muslims to fight back against Christians.

In the Indonesian context, I argue that returning jihadists behaved rationally the same as any

other homegrown terrorist groups. They took actions based on rationality and calculation in

544 Muhammad Tito Karniavan, Explaining Islamist Insurgencies, 70. 545 Interview with Iswanto, NII Crisis center, Jakarta, 2019.

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line with their interest and ideology. They observed any domestic political development and

used momentum in their decision-making process. While Suharto’s regime collapsed in 1998,

for example, many Afghan veterans who had previously lived in exile in Malaysia returned

home. Even Abdullah Sungkar, as the Amir began to relocate the group headquarters from

Malaysia to Solo, Central Java.

Imam Samudra, Ali Imron, and Hambali's cases show that they decided to carry out terrorism

when they experienced a ‘triggering event.’ The sectarian conflicts in Ambon and Poso

prompted them to start their armed jihad. From being inactive, they were aggrieved and became

angry observers, then they became active terrorists. Ali Imron, in his memoir, explicitly admits

that the Ambon conflict changed his post-conflict behaviour. He began to believe that

Christians launched their holy war against Islam as he states, “My spirit of jihad flared up after

hearing and witnessing the event that took place in Ambon, the war between Islam and

Christianity.”546

Many Mindanao veterans' participation in the Poso conflict in the 2000s as explained in

Chapter 4 reveals that a ‘domestic triggering event’ had played an important role. The Poso

conflict had successfully triggered many of them to engage in military activities. In other

words, this conflict became an enabling environment for those who just finished their military

training in Mindanao to implement their jihad. The case of Hasanuddin demonstrates how he

defines his jihad. He believed that Islam was under attack by Christians, where justified

retaliation was permissible. He engaged in violent acts with this revenge, including the three

Christian girls' beheading in 2005.

In the broader context, the military operation “Out of War” by the Philippines military in 2000

also served as a triggering momentum for a number of returning jihadists in Indonesia to

activate their armed jihad. Hambali was provoked to know the MILF and the Hudaibiyah camp

were rampaged and occupied by the enemy. After receiving a jihad call from Hashim Salamat,

he called on other like-minded jihadists like Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi, Ali Imron, and Mubaroq

to show their solidarity to the Moro people. Soon after they decided on the target, they

detonated a car bomb in front of the Philippine Consulate in Jakarta.

546 Ali Imron, Ali Imron Sang Pengebom, 64.

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The invasion of the United States and its allies in Afghanistan in October 2001 also became a

triggering event for many Indonesian returning jihadists to activate their armed jihad. This war

and Osama bin Laden’s jihad call provoked Hambali and other like-minded jihadists to engage

in violent acts as they believed Islam was under attack by the Christians. They decided to shift

jihad's priority against infidel rulers at home by siding with Al Qaeda to attack Westerners and

Christians. A series of bombings in 2002-2004 was the answer to Osama’s jihad call.

The attack of Syawaludin Pakpahan against the police in Medan is another example of how the

external triggering factor triggered him to engage in a violent act. The Adnani’s jihad call in

2016 inspired him to launch an attack. After remaining inactive for almost three years in his

hometown, Pakpahan began to recruit local jihadists and design an operation (amaliya). He

decided to carry out the Ramadhan month's attack that he believed his action to kill unbelievers

would receive the highest rewards from God.

The attack of Syawaludin Pakpahan can also be seen as a response to a domestic ‘triggering

event.” Basuki Tjahaja Purnama or Ahok’s blasphemy speech provoked him as it triggered

reactions from many radical groups. Ahok slip-of the tongue as he cited a specific Koranic

verse during his gubernatorial campaign in 2017 had triggered many Islamic hard-line groups

to mobilise their members in massive demonstrations. One of the demands was to arrest and

prosecute him.

Interestingly, a number of Afghan returning jihadists and JI members participated in a series

of massive anti-Ahok 212 Movements in December 2019 in Jakarta.547 Their participation in

this demonstration because Para Wijayanyo had issued a directive entitled “Can Peaceful

Demonstrations and the jihad Movement Work Side by Side? (Demonstrasi Damai dan

Gerakan Jihad Mungkinkah Bersanding). As Para Wijayanto allowed his member to

participate, many engaged in a peaceful demonstration against Ahok as they believed their

participation was equivalent to “jihad by the pen” or waging jihad through speech.548

Moreover, the local triggering event is more influential compared to regional or international

factors. In the context of Afghan or Mindanao veterans, it is clear that the sectarian conflict in

547 Interview with several respondents in Jakarta, 2019. 548 The Re-emergence of Jemaah Islamiyah, 27 April 2017, IPAC Report No. 36

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Ambon and Poso activated mostly returnees to practice their military skills obtained during the

battle overseas. Apart from their diverse ideologies and group affiliations, they shared the

common belief that jihad was urgently needed to fight Christians. They began to participate in

the armed jihad during the Poso and Ambon conflicts even though their groups had not been

instructed to do so. Many of them even engaged or participated directly in the conflict, helping

the local Muslims and fighting against Christians as the enemy.

The security challenges posed by the returning foreign fighters may be determined by external

factors, such as, the government response and readiness to address the risks. Andrew Zammit,

Timothy Holman, Daniel Byman, and Jeremy Shapiro in their studies highlight that

government policies have a critical role in decreasing the dangers posed by returnees.549 In this

context, the capability and willingness of the government’s policy, intelligence, and law

enforcement’s previous experiences in dealing with terrorism are essential and further

determine the future activities of foreign fighter returnees.

History has shown that returning foreign fighters are able to carry out violent attacks because

the government, especially their law enforcement, intelligence, and security officials, is not

able and lack appropriate capacity to monitor and mitigate the risks. For example, Indonesian

Afghan veterans were able to establish roots and succeeded in carrying out terrorism in the

2000s because the government had no policy to address their risks. There was no risk

assessment to measure the returning jihadists and even Indonesian officials did not consider

Afghan veterans as a real threat.550

One crucial factor that possibly influences many returning Syrian veterans to be inactive is a

relatively stable domestic situation from 2011 until 2020. Unlike in the 2000s, Indonesia in the

2010s did not experience a significant social or political unrest that became a 'triggering event'

for returnees to become active and wreak havoc. The political stability gave no perfect

environment for any homegrown terrorist and returning fighters to carry out a violent act. This

is relevant to Schumacher and Schraeder's study, who assert that countries with a higher level

549 Andrew Zammit. “Australian foreign fighters: Risks and response.” Timothy Holman. “Blind: Five Factors

Influencing the Foreign Fighters Impact.” Daniel Byman and Jeremy Shapiro, “Be Afraid. Be A Little Afraid.” 550 R. Kim Cragin, “The Challenge of Foreign Fighter Returnees,” Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 33

no 3 (2017):292-312. See also, Kenneth Conboy, The Second Front: Inside Asia's Most Dangerous Terrorist

Network. Jakarta, Indonesia: Equinox, 2006

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of domestic political instability would be likely to experience more terrorism.551 Therefore, the

Indonesian government has learned from previous experience that religious conflict can

quickly provoke terrorism by veterans.

Another factor is that the Government of Indonesia immediately acted tactically and was alert

to anticipate Syrian veterans' potential danger. The attacks of many Afghan veterans in the

2000s have given a lesson that has been learned that returning jihadists pose a real threat and

the dangerous situation should be anticipated. In response to the ISIS ideological threats, the

government banned this group on 4 Augusts 2014 and has issued a revised anti-terrorism law

in 2018, which legitimised the force of law for security forces to arrest any citizens who fought

in the overseas conflict, including those veterans from Syria. 552 This decision was made to

stop Indonesian jihadists' flow and prevent further radical movements in the home country. The

government also states that ISIS remains a terrorist group that poses a severe threat to national

security and contradicts the national ideology.553

A series of terrorist attacks linked with the Islamic Caliphate between 2014 and 2016 gave an

alarm for Indonesian authorities.554 The Kampung Melayu and Thamrin bombings were the

two attacks carried out by homegrown terrorists inspired by Abu Muhammad al-Adnani, the

ISIS spokesman.555 As it was increasingly difficult to wage jihad in Syria, he asked ISIS

supporters to wage jihad in their own countries. With these two terror attacks, the government

began to arrest several returnees who had previously joined ISIS. A few days after Abu Jandal

declared a war against the government through YouTube on 24 December 2014, the Indonesian

551 Michael J. Schumacher & Peter J. Schraeder. “Does Domestic Political

Instability Foster Terrorism? Global Evidence from the Arab Spring Era (2011–14).” Studies in

Conflict & Terrorism, (2019): 1-25. 552Indonesia Government Officially Bans ISIS, Jakarta Globe, http://jakartaglobe.id/news/indonesian-

government-officially-bans-isis. Ishaan Tharoor, The world’s largest Muslim country bans support for the Islamic

State, 7 August 2014. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2014/08/07/the-worlds-largest-

muslim-country-bans-support-for-the-islamic-state/?utm_term=.dc867f2e8889. 553 Perdani, Yuliasri and Ina Parlina, “Govt Bans Support, Endorsement of ISIL, The Jakarta Post, 5 August 2014 554 There were six violent acts and plot of attacks carried out by Indonesia pro-ISIS in 2014. Twenty out of

twenty-two terror attacks occurred in 2015 were done also by ISIS sympathisers. Furthermore, thirteen violent

acts in 2016 were also carried out by ISIS followers. 555 The perpetrators of Thamrin attack on 14 January 2016 had link with Indonesian pro-ISIS unit in Syria-

Katibah Masyariq under leadership of Abu Jandal who summoned and provided financial asiistance. The

kampung Melayu bombing on 24 May 2017 was carried out by JAD pro-ISIS.

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police successfully arrested several ISIS returning jihadists, such as, Junaedi, Syahrul Munif,

and others.556

Indonesian authorities in 2014 were also able to arrest several JI members whom many of them

had just returned home from Syria. Jundi al Muhlis and Agus Setyawan were among dozens of

JI Syria veterans returnees who were detained. Both returnees regrouped and became trainers

in JI's fitness center to train fresh recruits. With JI's Syrian veterans' arrest, Indonesian

authorities were able to track and finally capture Para Wijayanto, including his wife, and the

other three trusted members in July 2019.

In the broader context, the post-conflict behaviour of returning foreign fighters may also be

influenced by the domestic political environment of their country of origin.557 If the domestic

atmosphere is unstable, the returnees may seize the opportunity to regroup, establish a safe

haven, utilise resources, and carry out further violent attacks.558 Indonesia, in the early 2000s,

presented such a context of opportunity for returned militants. From 1998 until approximately

2005, the country was in a state of flux as it democratised after decades of authoritarian rule.

In addition, several localised conflicts gave sanctuary to returned foreign fighters. Overall, it

can be inferred that the risks posed by returnees are high if the domestic political environment

is not conducive and if the government has not been able to address and mitigate their risks as

the foreign fighters return home.

6.7. Unpredicted Potential Risks

Indonesian returning foreign fighters, especially JI and DI members, pose a latent threat to the

home country. Ideologically, as stated in its political manifesto, this organisation is fighting to

establish an Islamic state. In other words, this organization likely continue to struggle until they

556 Interview with Adhek, Pakar, 2019. Abu Jandal in the video of four minutes duration challenged General

Moeldoko, the National Police, Detachment 88 Anti-Terror Police, and Ansor youth organization of Nahdlatul

Ulama (NU) to fight in Syria or otherwise he would return to Indonesia to fight against them. 557 See, Sidney Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1994) 23. Sidney G. Tarrow, Power in Movement: Social Movements and

Contentious Politics (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011): 33. See, McAdam, McCarthy and Zald,

Introduction: Opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing process-toward a synthetic, comparative

perspective on social movement, 1-20. In Doug McAdam, John D. McCarthy, Mayer N. Zald. (Edt).

Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structure, and Cultural

Framing. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996. 558 Tarrow argues that the momentum or favourable political conditions are crucial in the collective action. See,

Sidney Tarrow. Power in Movement: Social Movements, Collective Action and Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1994), 23.

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can achieve their goal. At the time that Para Wijayanto was arrested in June 2019, Nasir Abas

states that the authority asked him to serve as a witness in the meeting with him. In the meeting,

Para Wijayanto said that the JI under his leadership still keeps its ideology as clearly stated in

the PUPJI, although there are several minor changes in its operations.559

Returning foreign fighters, in general, pose some level of security risk at home. There has been

no evidence that the returnees leave or abandon their jihad completely. Even if they abandon

their radical groups, they do not necessarily abandon their radical thoughts. Through the profile

analysis and in-depth interviews with many veterans, it is likely that many of them still keep

their ideology of jihad, the idea of establishment of an Islamic State, and the pride of serving

as a soldier of God-Mujahidin although they are not active members of their previous terrorist

groups.

Several returning fighters became recidivists. They returned to terrorist activities. For example,

Abu Tholut was involved in a series of terrorist acts and had been imprisoned for the second

time. As many claimed, he disengaged from his previous radical group. He, therefore, is still

committed to jihad as part of his life. He believes that jihad is the central pillar of Islam and it

will remain in his soul and never die as he states: “jihad is teaching in Islam that we cannot

erase jihad until the day after. I will perform jihad whatever I can.”560

Similarly, Abu Rusdan, a senior Afghan veteran, is still committed to jihad even though he had

disengaged from his radical network. Through many of his religious preaching, he still

advocates jihad as a crucial duty for all Muslims. He even calls for his followers to wage jihad

in Syria.561 Another Afghan veteran involved in the Bali bombing in 2002 was also obsessed

with jihad and continued it even though he had abandoned his radical group. He even claims

to break the jail bar if there will be a similar conflict as in Afghanistan War where he could

join.562

559 Interview with Nasir Abas, Jakarta, 2019. 560 Noor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalisation,” (PhD

diss., Monash University, 2018), 208. 561 Tempaan di Bumi Jihad Afghanistan (Forging jihad in Afghanistan), Kiblat TV,

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XPs1RAiYiWY. Assessed 25 August 2019. 562 Interview, anonymous returning jihadist, 2019.

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As discussed in Chapter 3, many JI elites did not give support even though they rejected the

bombing operations carried out by several Afghan veterans during the 2000s. Abu Rusdan was

the first Afghan veteran who opposed Hambali. He argued that the time was not ripe to wage

jihad in Indonesia. He further mentioned that the attacks by targeting civilians could create

severe damage to JI. Not only to non-Muslims who criticised the attacks, but also in general to

Muslims in Indonesia.563

It is difficult to change the jihadists’ radical mindset, especially that of the ideologue or

fundamentalist. In this sense, it is understandable if the security and intelligence authorities

should anticipate that returning jihadists committed to armed jihad would likely engage in

violent activities in the future even though they have been considered inactive, ‘moderate’ or

‘deradicalized,’ and integrated into society.

During my interviews with several returning jihadists that would be categorized as ‘moderate

veterans,’ I still found the nuance of violent jihad and the idea of the Islamic State (Daulah) in

their minds. One veteran even said that he would leave the country again to join jihad if he

finds a similar conflict like Afghanistan in the 1980s. He further said that the communal conflict

in Ambon and Poso should not happen again in the future. Moreover, if it still happens, he

wishes there would be an attack like the Bali bombing, even with a higher explosion.564

Tito Karniavan and Nasir Abas also observed the nuance of veterans' existing potential threats

though they have been categorized as a moderate one. Tito argued that it is not easy to change

extreme jihadist views, especially the ideolog. Giving an example, he believed that Ali Imron

is not totally deradicalised and still has posed the idea of an Islamic caliphate as Tito says: “He

is not really reformed. He is still thinking of an Islamic caliphate. He is still aiming to

implement Islamic sharia in Indonesia, but the way to achieve that goal has already changed

from violent to non-violent.”565 Nasir Abas also asserts that JI poses an inevitable security

threat even though they remain inactive. Having not yet done any amaliyah operation does not

mean they abandon their armed jihad, they are still in preparation, as he said: “They have not

563 Noor Huda Ismail, “The Indonesian Foreign Fighters, Hegemonic Masculinity and Globalisation,” (PhD

diss., Monash University, 2018), 187. 564 Interview with anonymous veteran, 2019. 565 Deborah Cassrels, Bali bomber ‘regrets’ the carnage, https://rohangunaratna.wordpress.com/interviews-

2/isis/page-4/bali-bomber-regrets-the-carnage

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done any operations, but they are recruiting people, strengthening their knowledge,

education, network, and finances. I would not underestimate them.”566

The returning jihadists who are still committed to ISIS and takfiri's ideology are no more

harmless than others. The case of Syawaludin Pakpahan shows that he decided to continue his

jihad at home and applied his extreme thought to spill the blood of either Christians, Muslims,

and thogut associated with police and security officers. After engaging in terrorism in 2017, he

was involved in another act of terrorism when he was imprisoned at the Police’s Mobile

Brigade Corps’s headquarter (Mako Brimob) in Depok, West Java. On 8 May 2018, a number

of convicted terrorists, including Pakpahan, launched an attack and took control of one of the

blocks. They brutally killed five police officers and took other police as hostages. 567

According to the indictment during the 6 July 2020 trial, together with five other convicted

terrorists, Pakpahan was involved in the murder of five police officers in Mako Brimob.568 It

is also stated that Pakpahan broadcasted his video on the dead police officer through Instagram,

intending to ask other like-minded jihadists outside of the prison to come and help them.

Moreover, the possibility of violent acts by returning jihadists is high and deadly. They have

capabilities in terms of military skill, more hardened and radicalised by the experience than

local jihadists. At least, they could use their military skills in a case when they saw local

Muslims oppressed by non-Muslims or when Islamic countries persecuted by internal or

external powers, especially those who would be labelled as “infidels.” The definition of jihad

in the context of “defensive” will always be there if the condition or situation fits with it.

6.8. Conclusion

This chapter has explained the trajectory of Indonesian jihadists who previously engaged in

overseas conflicts as complex and multifaceted. The motives to join a distant war are

homogeneous. Amidst its various motives, it can be concluded that the reasons for participating

in faraway conflicts can be political, theological reasons, such as, jihad and martyrdom. Many

566 Nash Jenkins, Indonesia's Jihadi Extremist Group Is Rebounding, Experts and Members Say,” Times, 15

February 2016. https://time.com/4224585/jemaah-islamiyah-indonesia-terrorist-ji-islamist/ 567

Five police officers named Yudi Rospuji, Fandy Setyo Nugroho, Syukron Fadhli, Wahyu catur Pamungkas,

Denny Setiadi were brutally killed by detainees. Based on the autopsy, all five police officers were shot to death, stabbed with knife and their throats were cut off. 568 Indictment No. Reg. PERK: PDM-28/JKT.TIM/Etl.2/03/2020.

https://time.com/4224585/jemaah-islamiyah-indonesia-terrorist-ji-islamist/

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also joined the war because they were members of a group where their leaders asked them to

participate in the war. Moreover, many even entered the war because of personal motives, such

as, to get money, jobs, and other economic benefits.

Whether actual or constructed, the presence of grievance was stated by many Indonesian

civilians before they decided to participate in the global armed jihad. The feeling of anger,

hatred, humiliation, and revenge are among the grievances they experienced. Thus, radical

groups' leaders used the resentment as a tool to mobilise their members and sympathisers to

travel and fight in foreign lands.

During the conflicts, this chapter also reveals that Indonesia jihadists engaged in different or

multiple military activities. Many engaged in 1) military training, whether as trainees or

trainers; 2) Fighting. Thus, there is a mutually beneficial relationship between Indonesian

jihadists and the group of insurgents during the conflict.

This chapter also shows that the majority of Indonesian jihadists left the conflict during or after

the conflict ended. The reasons to leave the battle zone are various. Moreover, as the Indonesian

jihadists were recruited and active members of jihadi groups at home, they left the conflict as

their leaders determined their mission. In other words, they left the battle because their leaders

asked them to leave.

This chapter highlights that understanding foreign fighters' trajectory before, during, and after

the conflict is essential. It helps to understand the security implication and their post-conflict

behaviour. The assessment can also give valuable information to understand their short,

medium, or even extended plan relating to their plot to carry out violent acts in the future. If

the returnees intend to continue their jihad in the home country, they are unquestionably

dangerous. The risks will be higher if they believe that the home country is the extension of the

war zone (darul harb) where violence and killing are justified as part of jihad. They might

launch an attack right away or wait and prepare for future attacks by having such thoughts.

Disillusioned returnees are clustered as less dangerous compared to committed veterans to

continue their jihad at home. The cases of Ramdan and Juneadi support this claim that they felt

deceived and sold out as mercenaries by their recruiters. As they believed Syria's journey

endangered their lives, they felt their participation and support to ISIS was a mistake and gave

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a lousy story to Islam. This can also be seen in Dhania's case that she felt guilty to influence

her family to travel to Syria. She also felt that her support to ISIS was the biggest mistake in

her life where she wants to pay for this fault by involving in the deradicalisation program to

counter ISIS's propaganda targeting the youth.

The comparative analysis in this chapter has shown that Indonesian returning foreign fighters

are potentially dangerous based on many factors. Based on the individual-level analysis, they

have been exposed to extreme ideologies – either Salafi jihadi and takfiri jihadi, which advocate

violent jihad and the necessity of establishing an Islamic state. Many of them have also

experienced life transformation from civilians to militarized individuals. Though many

returned after experiencing disillusioned and traumatised, many still pose radical views,

maintain their radical networks, and may engage in a violent act in the future.

Through the group-level analysis also shows that Indonesian jihadists posed security threats as

they were active members of radical groups that advocate extreme views. They seek the full

implementation of sharia law and reject any system not ordained by God, including a

parliamentary and democratic West model. Furthermore, many of them have a political agenda

to topple the Indonesian government and build an Islamic state.

During the conflict overseas, Indonesian jihadists mostly regroup with the militant Islamist

insurgent group while keeping contact with their radical group in the home country. This study

had also shown that mostly Indonesian returning jihadists reunited with their radical group after

they returned home. They did not demobilise, they continued their armed jihad at home. As

they are mostly reunited with their radical groups, many of them remain sleeping cell terrorists

on a group’s mission.

This research has explained that the ‘triggering events,’ whether in the domestic, regional, and

international level, has brought a certain impact on many returnees to engage in violent acts.

In other words, any specific incident relating to Islam, where Muslims are persecuted or

attacked by non-Muslims or infidels, could trigger or give a justification for inactive returnees

to become active or even motivated terrorists.

Moreover, the threats posed by returnees are inherently complex and challenging to quantify.

Individual or group analysis is not sufficient as each variable factor can be more dominant from

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others. The returnees' motivation to carry out violent acts can also be influenced by the external

factor or a ‘triggering event.’ It can be more complicated because of multiple factors at the

same time can also trigger their motivation to launch an armed jihad.

Furthermore, through macro analysis, this study also found that many returning jihadists

engaged in violent acts after they were triggered by a specific event, such as, political chaos, a

sectarian conflict if they began to believe their sacred values and religious identity are under

existential threat. In simple words, if they start to feel external power attacks on Islam. The

conflicts of Ambon and Poso, the jihad call of the MILF’s leader -Salamat Hashim and Osama

bin Laden could explain this process that these external factors had likely inspired several

Indonesian jihadists to activate their armed jihad at home.

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CHAPTER VII

Conclusion and Policy Implications

7.1. Introduction

The phenomenon of Indonesian foreign fighters who trained and fought in overseas conflicts

is a sequel of political movements orchestrated by Islamic militants organisations in the home

country. It is part of their struggle and their strategies to achieve their long-term goal to topple

the Indonesian secular government, seeking the full implementation of Sharia, and forming an

Islamic state in the country. The militant groups have intentionally used conflicts overseas as

a training ground for their preparation (idad) of jihad at home rather than to wage jihad overseas

as they have claimed. In this study, it is well explained that a strategic motive has played a

more significant role rather than merely ideology or religious reasons.

The militant groups, such as, Jemaah Islamiyah, Darul Islam, and JAD are among the leading

radical groups in Indonesia that have instrumentalised jihad to send as many individuals to

overseas conflicts as possible. These groups have sent thousands of their members and

sympathisers to join the conflicts as a way to obtain military skills, warfare experience and

expand their international connections with transnational jihadi groups. Neither to fight and die

as a martyr, the groups requested their fighters to return home to continue armed jihad with the

ultimate goal: to topple the secular state as an immediate goal and then establish an Islamic

State.

One of this thesis's finding is relevant to Malet and Roy's theory that the foreign fighters'

phenomenon is not necessarily motivated by solely a religious ideology. The jihad has always

been suppressed, distorted, and even politicised for political or strategic purposes by Islamic

militant groups' leaders in Indonesia. In other words, the participation of individuals to perform

a jihad to fight in the internationalised armed conflict is instrumentalised for a political and

strategic purpose rather than as a pure ideological motive.

The interaction of Indonesian jihadists with insurgent groups they joined during the battle is a

mutually beneficial relationship. There has been reciprocated interest they shared between

them. While warring insurgent groups aim to extract or increase their resources and maximise

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the probability of gaining victory during the conflict, Indonesian foreign fighters could receive

military training and war experience, which they could not obtain at home.

7.2. Elements of the analysis

This study describes the Indonesian foreign fighters' phenomenon is a collective action

orchestrated by homegrown jihadi networks. Indonesian citizens' participation to fight in

foreign lands is organized by jihadist groups that play as rational actors in line with their

ideologies and strategies to achieve their political goals. Their participation in the

internationalised armed jihad by the recruiter- local jihadi groups in Indonesia relates to their

group's political agenda to fight for the implementation of full Islamic law and the creation of

an Islamic state by toppling a status quo government. To achieve this goal, they would look for

a new battleground overseas to participate as part of the idad.

This study also concludes that returning jihadists and the terrorist groups they joined should be

considered as agents with 'political demands’ who seek to materialise their political goals. In

this context, they operate as 'rational actors' where all decisions were made by the leaders or

elites based on a calculation to achieve their political goal, including an armed jihad.569 This is

relevant in the Indonesian context, where the rise of Indonesian jihadi groups recruit and

mobilise their members to engage in the overseas conflict based on their rational decisions to

seek power at home.

There has been a mutual relationship between Indonesian foreign fighters and the insurgent

groups during the conflicts. Mutual interests have been shared between the militant group that

sent their fighters and the insurgent group. In the context of Indonesian jihadists, there is clear

evidence that JI and DI as the recruiter and sender of foreign fighters, had political interests to

equip their cadres with military skills and operational combat experience with the assistance of

a local group they joined with during the war. On the other side, the local insurgent groups

received Indonesian jihadists to gain external supporters or manpower to win the war or

strengthen and back their position against their enemies.

This study highlights the mutual interest between the recruiter and receiver of foreign fighters.

It shows that the recruiter or local insurgent groups had used a foreign connection to obtain

569 Martha Crenshaw, “The Causes of Terrorism,” Comparative Politics, 13, no. 4 (1981): 379-399.

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external support, especially additional combatants, to change the balance of forces or to win

the conflict. Thus, as Malet asserts, jihad is used to frame that foreign participation is necessary

to protect the shared values or duties in religion.570 This research is relevant to Malet's argument

about the way that mutual interests had been shared and enjoyed between local groups in the

conflict countries with the groups who sent it cadres as foreign fighters.

It could be argued that many foreign fighters were like political activists who struggled to create

an 'imagined community' based on ideology in their country yet were not successful. They

wanted to change the system of state or society but succeeded and experienced oppression from

the government. Thus, they left the country and joined the overseas conflict to obtain military

skills and recruited members to return to wage jihad against the government. It is clear that DI,

JI, and JAD are among the radical organisations that wished to induce a fundamental change

in Indonesia yet have failed to do so. Thus, these groups viewed conflict overseas as a political

opportunity to equip their members to obtain military and combat experience they could not

get at home. Participation in global armed jihad is also intended to build transnational jihadi

networks that might help them to establish an Islamic State in the country.

7.3. Theoretical Claims and Empirical Findings

Individuals' reasons to join and leave a faraway war zone and the motives of returning jihadists

to engage in terrorism at home are complicated and multifaceted. Thus, there is no single

theoretical perspective that can provide the only explanation for this phenomenon. Therefore,

this study shows that multi-disciplinary theories, such as, radicalization, grievances, identity

and social movement theory, are relevant to explain this complexity, especially to describe

foreign fighters’ trajectory before, during, and after the conflicts. Thus, the multidisciplinary

approach could also explain why returning jihadists engaged in terrorism upon their arrival at

home.

After examining and comparing the three case studies of Indonesian foreign fighters who

fought in Afghanistan, Mindanao, and Syria and further analysing 25 profiles of returning

jihadists, I found that the motives of waging jihad overseas are various. Their activities and

roles during the conflict are also heterogeneous. The reasons for leaving the battle are also

570 David Malet, Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identity in Civic Conflicts, 26.

188

diverse. These complexities and puzzles need to be explained to understand returnees’ post-

conflict behaviour and their risks after they arrived home.

The motives and factors triggering returning jihadists to become terrorists are multifaceted.

Therefore, I found that they exhibited certain behaviours as groups and individuals as they

decided to start their armed jihad. I also found that the two layers of examination would help

us to assess and predict their post-conflict behaviours, whether they remain inactive or

otherwise become terrorists upon their arrival.

Overall, this study emphasises three important factors as the findings in this study, to explain

the trajectory of foreign fighters and the significant factors that influence the risks posed by

Indonesia returnees at home. The first is the individual level of analysis, which focuses on the

micro-level to identify personal motives, ideology, and a possible grievance. The second is

group-level analysis, which relates to ideology and a strategy adopted by the group joined by

Indonesian foreign fighters. Moreover, this study also found that the external triggering factor

has also played a significant factor in determining foreign fighters' trajectory and their risks

after they return.

7.3.1. Individual Assessment

It is essential to understand foreign fighters' profiles as an individual and member of the jihadi

group. What are their grievances, ideologies, and motivations once they join the overseas

conflict and upon returning home? The answers to these puzzles are critical, which could help

us understand their trajectory in the battle and their motivations to abandon the conflict zone.

Moreover, understanding the pre-war foreign fighters' trajectory may also help us predict their

post-conflict behaviour, whether they would continue or abandon their armed jihad.

As stated by many scholars, this study also finds that religious teaching ideologies played a

multifaceted role in motivating individuals to fight as foreign fighters. Although they joined a

conflict overseas driven by personal motives, identity or status-driven, having been

brainwashed by leaders, still the role of religious ideology, such as, jihad and martyrdom, is

always present and cannot be simply ignored or underestimated.

189

This study also describes that ideology is used as a tool or source of justification for several

returning jihadists if they have engaged in domestic terrorism. This study validates previous

study findings by Borum, Richardson, Bjorgo, and Crenshaw that ideology is distorted or

misinterpreted by terrorists, including returning jihadists to solidify alliance, identify friends

and an enemy that must be fought, and to justify their acts of violence. The doctrine has

successfully provoked returnees to engage violently, trigger combatants' emotions, and to

legitimise their violent acts.

This study found that ideology does not become a single factor for individuals to fight abroad.

Many trained and fought in overseas conflict because their leaders asked them to do so. The

leaders have successfully provoked and brainwashed them to wage jihad. Many men joined the

overseas conflict as a way to be part of the jihadi network. They expected to gain status and

meaning in their lives. Therefore, many also travelled to internationalised armed jihad because

they benefited from this role. In other words, they treat jihad as a profession or job where they

could get economic benefits, such as, competitive salaries, health insurance, and ransom

(ghanimah) may be obtained during the war.

Thus, at the individual level of analysis, the ideology or religion is never the sole reason or

cause for returning jihadists to engage in terrorism. Therefore, ideology is used to incite,

mobilise, and legitimise their violent actions as part of their jihad. The conclusion to this

finding is relevant to other scholars who argue that religion or ideology becomes the sole cause

of terrorism.571

As explained in the previous chapter, there are many types of returnees. Therefore, the

religiously motivated returning jihadists or what Attran called "devoted actors," tend to be

fanatic, cruel, and willing to sacrifice their own lives and carry out mass terrorism by killing

innocent civilians. This can be seen from the case of Hambali, Imam Samudra, Ali Ghufron

(alias Mukhlas), and Syawaludin Pakpahan. Through their life narratives and atrocious armed

jihad described in the previous chapter show that they are more dangerous compared to other

former jihadists. Having military capabilities and radical interpretation of religion makes them

dangerous and provokes other jihadists and local jihadists to engage in terrorism.

571 Richardson, What Terrorists Want, 68.

190

Although the foreign fighter's role during the conflict does not determine returnees' post-

conflict behaviour, the one who fought and gained combat experience likely poses a double

danger compared with homegrown terrorists. This study also found that those who returned

and became an ideologue would not likely engage in physical violence rather they would

provoke or motivate others to engage in terrorism.572 This can be seen from the case of Abu

Rusydan, Para Wijayanto, and Afif Abdul Madjid, who never engaged in violence after they

returned home. Therefore, they provoked others to activate their armed jihad, such as,

immigrating (hijrah) and carrying out jihad in overseas conflicts.

7.3.2. Group-level Assessment

This study reveals that Indonesia's jihadi groups have played a significant role in the foreign

fighters' phenomenon. From the three global armed jihad theatres participated in by Indonesian

foreign fighters, it is evident that many homegrown jihadi groups have played an important

role in foreign fighters' trajectory in pre-war, during, and after the war.

This study also found that the jihadi group level of analysis is of considerable importance for

understanding the risks posed by returning jihadists. It is relevant to several studies of terrorism

that highlight organisational structure, especially on decision making within the group on their

members to engage in terrorism.573 Despite individual psychology, the group, network, and

social psychology provide more analytical tools to understand returning jihadists' motives to

have engaged in violent acts after they return home.

Each radical group joined by foreign fighters is unique and should not be simply considered as

a single entity. Those groups should be analysed based on their ideologies, objectives, and

political goals. This approach is critical to better understand foreign fighters' post-conflict

behaviours and the threat of returning jihadists upon their arrival at home. In other words,

understanding their strategies of jihad applied at home will help to determine the returnees'

risks and post-conflict behaviours.

572 See, Antonio Gramsci. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. In Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith (Eds.). New York:

International Publishers, 1971. 573 Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism,” in Louise Richardson, the Roots of Terrorism

(New York: Routledge, 2006).

191

The jihadi groups' ideologies, strategies, and tactics are likely to determine the returnees' post-

conflict behaviours, whether they would likely engage in violence right away, postpone their

armed jihad, and seek the right momentum or even remain inactive. It is crucial to learn and

distinguish among ideologies that may likely determine or influence the returning fighters to

threaten the home country. For example, DI's armed jihad to seek the full implementation of

Sharia and to topple the Indonesian government is definitely dangerous. Thus, their definition

of the home country as a conflict zone could justify their members, including their returning

fighters, to engage in terrorism.

The Jemaah Islamiyah's ideologies of the Islamic state and Pan Islamism pose a real threat to

Indonesia, especially the Western world, as the main enemy. Moreover, this group has not yet

declared the home country as a conflict zone and implemented full armed jihad. With this

strategy, JI would likely instruct their returning foreign fighters to remain inactive while

waiting for the right momentum to activate armed jihad at home. Moreover, the returning

jihadists affiliated with JAD, which endorses takfiri ideology, is dangerous because they could

extend their jihad to attack any individuals and out-groups against their ideology.

Yet even though the ideology endorsed by the group has never been a primary reason for

violence, it has played a significant role. The returning foreign fighters engaged in terrorism

are not solely driven by ideology, military skill, and combat experience they gained from the

conflict overseas. First, foreign fighters, just like any other group or organization, are recruited

and operated based on the strategic needs of that organisation. They operated based on certain

doctrines, ideology and further a long-term goal to materialise their goal by using strategy or

tactics.

This study has shown that jihadi groups joined by Indonesian jihadists are dynamic and

heterogeneous, which is essential to understand their notion. It is narrated well in this study

that not all members of the jihadi group shared the group's political goals, strategy, or tactics

applied to achieve their goals. There has been a 'splinter group' that may undertake violent acts

that do not necessarily represent or align with the group's ideology or the strategies they

applied. The case of Hambali has given a clear example of how JI experienced a splinter group

that undertook violent acts because they were inspired or influenced by the external group's

political agenda – Al-Qaeda to attack Westerners as the main target rather than the Indonesian

government.

192

This study found one reason for returning jihadists to engage in terrorism is that a sense of

collective identity triggered them. The feeling of revenge and solidarity even becomes a

powerful motive for many returning jihadists, such as, Hambali, Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi,

Hasanuddin, and others to carry out retaliation against an external power who persecuted

Muslims. They also sought to avenge their friends or comrades' death and justify their motive

with religious text, such as, qisas. This finding is relevant to previous studies of terrorism that

revenge is one of the primary motivations for terrorists to engage in terrorism.574

7.3.3. External Factors

Besides individual and group-based analysis, the study of foreign fighters should also give

attention to external factors. This study demonstrates that Indonesian jihadists engaged in a

distant conflict partly because of domestic and global triggering events. At the domestic level,

they decide to engage in violent activities, neither driven by poverty nor alienation from

society. Moreover, as they were members of radical groups, they operated like modern military

organisations where the group and command centre rules regulate their activities or program.

This study findings suggest that despite individual and group level analysis, the risks posed by

returnees can also be determined by external factors or the external environment. There is such

a triggering event. The Ambon and Poso conflict provide clear evidence where the crisis or the

unstable environment in these two regions attracted many veteran jihadists to begin their jihad.

Not only to fight the Christian, they also used this region as a safe haven, a ground of training,

to recruit new members and carry out attacks.

From many cases of terrorist attacks by returning jihadists, it can be stated that returning

jihadists became terrorists simply because they were poor, uneducated, and possibly not

thinking straight: they were easy to manipulate and persuade. Therefore, they were responding

to geopolitical issues, nationally or globally. They are motivated by geopolitical grievances.

The Philippines Consulate's attack in Jakarta, the Bali bombing in 2002, and even Syawaludin

Pakpahan’s attack in 2016 shows that their attacks cannot be separated with external factors

triggering them to do so.

574 Jerrold M. Post, “The Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism,” 17-28, in Louise Richardson, The Roots of

Terrorism (New York: Routledge, 2006).

193

7.4. Political Prescription

Many studies underline the risks posed by foreign fighter returnees. Still, they have not yet

explained why returnees became terrorists in the first place when they returned home or when

they joined the sleeper terrorist group and after they launched a terror attack. It is indeed

challenging to understand returning foreign fighters' behaviour, and further theorise why they

become terrorists at home.

This study offers several policy recommendations in dealing with or mitigating the risks posed

by the returnees. First, it should be underlined that not all foreign fighters would become

terrorists after they return home. This study suggests it is crucial to have a comprehensive

analysis of the microanalysis and macro-level analysis to know their motivations to return, the

ideologies and political goals, and the military skills they have learned and practiced, and the

groups they joined before, during, and after the conflicts. The causes of risks are not single,

they can be multiple.

Not all returning foreign fighters are terrorists, although it is argued that many become

radicalised with extreme or radical thoughts. During my interviews with several veterans who

previously had engaged in terrorism, I found that they were not mentally ill, uneducated,

members of gangs, and thugs. They did not experience socio alienation and discrimination,

such as many of those Western recruits who fought in Syria. This finding is relevant to many

scholars, such as, Jerrold M Post, who found that terrorists are not necessary psychologically

abnormal. They are not emotionally disturbed.575

On the contrary, Indonesian jihadists averagely have a depth of religious knowledge and

idealism, they were able to construct their ideas based on Islamic scripts (Al-Quran and

Hadiths). Even I found that they are not individualists, rather idealists who had a fantasy to

sacrifice their own lives for the sake of religion and their imaginary group and community

(ummah). They have constructed an ‘imagined community’ where Islam is comprehensive and

the only way of life. Therefore, they think Islamic Sharia must be implemented fully in society

and the state.

575 Jerrold M. Post, “the Psychological Dynamics of Terrorism,” in Louise Richardson, The Roots of terrorism.

194

Moreover, through a series of depth interviews and contact with returning jihadists, I found

that many of the returnees have extreme religious teaching interpretations which are likely

different from Islam mainstream. For example, in believing God's sovereignty, they tend to

think in black and white terms, where anything made by people differs from God is an infidel.

Furthermore, they were obsessed with jihad as an obligation for all Muslims and believed

'violent' is justified to achieve such jihad goals. They are deluded by radical ideologies or

religion in viewing the world and lives from their leaders, family, jihadi networks and even

from social media. Especially those inspired by ISIS, they have a rigid and straightforward

interpretation of the Quran and Hadith without any room for alternative interpretations (qiyas).

The religiously motivated returning jihadists are more likely dangerous and would continue

their jihad after they returned home. It is quite different from jihadists who went overseas to a

conflict triggered by personal incentive and returned disillusioned or traumatised. Those who

were disappointed are likely less dangerous and may leave jihad because they feel deceived or

brainwashed by the recruiters. The case of Dwi Djoko Wiwoho, Iman Santoso, Febri Ramdani,

Junaedi, and Ramdan validate this claim.

Thus, this study highlights that uncovering the detailed, historical background of combatants

individually, before, during, and after the conflicts is crucial to understand the risks posed by

returning foreign fighters. The individual level of analysis is crucial to understand the

motivations to join and leave the conflict overseas, based on the grievances, and ideologies of

each of the returning jihadists after they have returned home. Partial or incomplete detail of

foreign fighters may lead to the wrong and erroneous conclusion to know the cause of the risks.

Second, it is important to understand the group and organisational structure where returning

jihadists regroup as it plays a role in determining the returnees' behaviour. For example, DI and

JI are more centralistic, more hierarchical, and even more authoritarian based on their

characteristics. A higher level or its leaders direct all actions. Moreover, the JAD is much looser

and decentralised, where the members could carry out amaliyah (actions) without necessarily

having been instructed by their leaders. The case of Syawaludin Pakpahan validates this

narrative, where he engaged in terrorism individually without necessarily receiving

legitimation or approval from the leader.

195

Many studies on foreign fighters have not yet captured the local jihadi groups' roles in the

mobilisation of foreign fighters to the conflict zone overseas. Many scholars have not

considered jihadi groups as having crucial functions in the recruitment, indoctrination,

mobilization, facilitation to the conflict zone, and then recruiting them back after the conflict.

Many Western scholars, such as, David Malet, Heghhamer tend to discuss a single entity of

foreign fighters without defining which groups, their affiliation with local insurgents,

ideologies, and the motives of joining as well as leaving the conflict zone.

Moreover, some scholars view all Afghanistan veterans in the same category in relation to their

ideology, goals, and, furthermore, their risks after they have returned. I contend that such

generalisation may cause a misleading and an incorrect assessment of their risks. Further than

that, this approach will fail to identify the risks and adopt a strategy or policy recommendations

to mitigate the returnees' security risks. In the context of Syrian veterans, it is critical to

differentiate any returning jihadist based on their group affiliations (ISIS or JI).

To have a clear understanding of the jihadi groups joined by foreign fighters is critical,

especially to deal with or mitigate the formidable threat posed by returning jihadists. It is crucial

to understand their ideologies, strategies, and the tactics they used to achieve their goals. Jihadi

groups have discernible characteristics in terms of ideology, political objectives, and violence

trajectory. Having accurate and representative data on Indonesian returning jihadists is

extremely important.

The distinction between various groups and their transnational affiliation is also critical to

know the risk posed by its returnees of veterans. Understanding the notion of the radical groups

joined by Indonesian foreign fighters during the conflict overseas would give information about

their ideology bond, cooperation or collaboration in their future jihad. The attack of the

Philippine Consulate in Jakarta by Afghanistan and Mindanao veterans show us that they still

shared brotherhood, solidarity, and ideology bonds. Having a piece of comprehensive

information on any group and their religious school of thought will enable us to assess the

potential risks of their returnees.

Overall, the comprehensive life narratives of Indonesian jihadists and the groups they joined

before and after the conflicts will help us distinguish possible patterns or the typology of the

196

returnees. All this information would help us assess whether they would be terrorists right away

once they return, a sleeper cell, or even disengaged with radical groups.

Third, fostering stability is the key to preventing or avoiding any potential terrorism either by

homegrown terrorists or returning jihadists. This study shows that many returning jihadists

activated their armed jihad at home if the political environment was unstable. They activated

their jihad by joining society conflicts, especially the sectarian ones. In this context, the

government has to be able to anticipate any potential conflict, especially a sectarian one, where

the religious setting could be used as a conflict, that can trigger returning jihadists to be active.

Fourth, besides deradicalisation, facilitating returning jihadists to exit from their group is

crucial. Reintegration is crucial to prevent returning fighters from engaging in violent acts or

in terrorism. Reducing social alienation, providing economic opportunities, and changing their

identity from militarised combatant into civilians is essential to prevent the returnees from

reuniting with their old jihadi networks. This program should not always be carried out by

government institutions, but can involve civic society, communities, and even family members

to assist returning jihadists to be able to reintegrate into society.

Although poverty is not a root cause of a returning jihadist to become a terrorist, it is essential

to assist the returnees to integrate into society by providing economic opportunities. This study

shows that returning jihadists face a difficult situation after they return, such as, beginning their

new life as ordinary members of society. They have difficulty getting jobs or gaining

employment. By giving assistance, skills training and opportunities that will help them support

their own lives, returning jihadists would sustain their life and would not be tempted to regroup

or re-join radical groups and continue their armed jihad at home.

197

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APPENDIX

https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/00304387/55/2

219

List of Indonesian Veteran Jihadists from Afghanistan involved in violent

acts NO Name Acts of violence

1 Hambali Christmas bombing (Batam), Philippines Consulate

bombing.

2 Ali Imron Bali bombing 2002, Philippines Consulate bombing.

3 Utomo Pamungkas/

Mubarok

Christmas bombing (Mojokerto), Bali bombing 2002,

and the Philippines Consulate bombing.

4 Dedi Mulyadi Christmas bombing (Ciamis, West Java)

5 Asep/ Darwin Mall Atrium bombing, Christmas bombing

6 Muchlas / Ali Gufron Bali bombing 2002.

7 Dul matin The Philippines Consulate bombing, Bali bombing

2002, Christmas bombing (Mataram), and military

training in Aceh 2010.

8 Fathur Rahman al-Ghozi Philippines Consulate bombing, and Metro Manila

bombing.

9 Holis/ Udin Christmas bombing (Ciamis, West Java)

10 Akim

Hakimuddin/Suheb/Asep

Christmas bombing (Bandung)

11 Usaid/ Zainal Arifin Christmas bombing (Mataram)

12 Edi Setiono alias Abbas alias

Usman

The Philippines Consulate bombing, Christmas

bombing.

13 Wawan Christmas bombing (Bandung)

14 Iswandi alias Polem Christmas bombing (Medan)

15 Amran/ Henry bin Mansur Christmas bombing (Batam)

16 Umar Besar/ Abdul Ghoni/

Umar Wayan

Bali bombing 2002, Christmas bombing (Mojokerto),

Ambon conflict.

17 Sarjiyo/ Sawwad Christmas bombing (Mojokerto), Philippines Consulate

bombing

18 Taufik bin Abdul Haliam/

Dani

Christmas bombing (Jakarta)

19 Ahmad Roichan/Sa'ad Bali bombing 2002

20 Imam Samudra Bali bombing 2002, Christmas bombing, gold shop

robbery in Banten, West Java.

21 Jabir/ Enjang Bastaman Christmas bombing (Bandung)

22 Hizbullah Rasyid Makasar bombing (McDonald restaurant, Ratu Indah

Mall, Automobile Showroom).

23 Farihin Ibnu Ahmad / Yasir Philippines Consulate bombing, Poso conflict, arms

smuggling

24 Muchtar Daeng Lao/ Abu

Urwah

Makasar bombing

25 Kahar Mustafa Makasar bombing (McDonald restaurant, Ratu Indah

Mall, Automobile Showroom).

26 Ustad Mahmud the Poso conflict.

27 Ubay the Poso conflict.

220

28 Abu Tholut/Mustafa Poso conflict, owning illegal weapons and explosive

materials, military training in Aceh

29 Ustad Riansyah/Rian Poso conflict.

30 Abu Jibril/ Mohamed Ibal

bin Abdurrahman

Ambon dan Poso conflict

31 Zuhroni alias Nuim Ambon conflict

32 Firdaus/ Ahmad Azzam Poso conflict, weapons smuggling

33 Muklis Yunos (Filipino) Rizal Day Bombing

34 Zulkarnaen/ Daud Bali bombing 2, engaged in Ambon conflict

35 Achmad Roihan helped hide Muchlas after the Bali bombing 2002.

36 Agus Dwikarna illegal possession of explosives, suspected of

involvement in Manila bombing – channeled arms to

Poso.

37 Syarifudin / Abu Jamiah Ambon and Poso conflict

38 Aris Munandar Ambon and Poso conflict

39 Jafar Umar Thalib Ambon dan Poso conflict

40 Umar Patek Bom Bali 2002.

41 Muchtar alias Ilyas Ambon conflict

42 Abu Dujana Poso conflict. Helping fugitive suspect Noordin Top

plan the attack on the Marriott Hotel in 2003. Hiding

weapon and explosive.

43 Abdul Hakim Poso conflict and served as a military instructor in

Uhud project

List of Indonesian Veteran Jihadists from Mindanao involved in violent

acts

NO Name Acts of violence

221

1 Lukman/Munship Poso conflict

2 Sahl Poso conflict

3 Kholiq Poso conflict, illegal weapons and beheading of three

Christian high school students.

4 Sanusi/ Ishak Engaged in Poso conflict and beheading of three

Christian students.

5 Hasanuddin/ Slamet

Raharjo/Hasan

Poso conflict and engaged in student beheading

6 Muhajir/ Idris Chrismast bombing (Mojokerto)

7 Heru Setiawan weapon cache, protégé of Mustofa.

8 Hizbullah Rashid - Makassar bombing suspect.

9 Luluk Sumaryono/ Joko

Ardianto

weapon cache, protégé of Mustopa

10 Machmudi Hariono/ Yoseph

Adirina/ Yusuf bin Slamet

protégé of Mustofa, weapons cache

11 Siswanto/ Anto bin Supeno Weapon cache – Mustofa connection in Semarang

12 Yudi Lukito/ Abdurrahman arms cache

Usman arms cache

13 Soifiy/ Siswanto weapon and explosives cache

14 Amir/ Yusuf Weapons and explosives cache.

15 Tohir/ Masrizal bin Ali

Umar

Hotel Marriot bombing in 2003.

16 Subai' / Herlambang Bali bombing 2002

17 Malik/ Ahmad Budi

Wibowo

Arrested in 2002- hide Bali bomber 2002

18 Sinan/ Makmuri hiding Bali bomber 2002.

19 Thoriq / Lulu explosive and weapons cache.

20 Suyatno weapons and explosives cache.

21 Ali Fauzi Bali bombing in 2002

22 Para Wijayanto Recruited jihadists to Syria

23 Ubaid/ Lutfi Haidaroh Engaged in JW Marriott bombing

24 Enceng Kurnia alias Arham

alias Arnold

Engaged in the Ambon conflict

25 Ardi alias Arham/ Arnold/

Enceng Kurnia

Military training in Aceh 2010.

26 Mahfud alias Makhruf alias

Joko Sulistyo alias Ridwan

Prayoga

Military training in Aceh 2010.

27 Abu Yusuf alias Mustaqim Military training in Aceh 2010

28 Maulana alias Mukhlis alias

Ruslan alias Lukman alias

Zakaria

Military training in Aceh 2010, suspected in the plot to

kill Matori Abdul Jalil.

29 Ubeid/ Lutfi Hudaeroh Courier for Noordin.

30 Salman/ Apud KOMPAK trainee. arrested in Malaysia in 2003

returning from training in Mindanao

222

31 Mohamed Saifuddin alias

Faiz

Engaged in the Ambon conflict

32 Iwan Dharmawan alias Rois Australia embassy bombing in 2004;

Engaged in the Ambon and Poso conflict

33 Abu Husna alias Abdur

Rohim Thoyib

Bali bombing 200

34 Agus Dwikarna Illegal weapons

35 Mahfud Qomari alias

Sutarjo alias Ayyasi

Poso conflict in 2002

List of Indonesian Veteran Jihadists from Syria involved in violent acts

NO Name Acts of violence

1 Syawaludin Pakpahan Attacked police district office in Medan in 2017 and

engaged in Mako Brimob riot 2018.

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