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RC45 Rational Choice Session: Rational Action and Trust

Instrumental Action and Rhetoric: rebuilding rational action on linguistic field Prof. Dr. Raul Francisco Magalhães

Universidade Federal de Juiz de Fora - Brasil Federal University of Juiz de Fora – Brazil raul.magalhaes@ufjf.edu.br Abstract The paper makes a theoretical reconstruction of a model for instrumental action in language, using the notion of rhetoric. It takes persuasive language to be constitutive of instrumental reason, and analyses the possibility of bring to the theory of social action some concepts from linguistic field. The first step establishes an analogy between instrumental rationality and rhetorical movements like projection of future, or reconstruction of past. In those operations we use rhetoric in order to create the persuasive frames of reality and use them for self-persuasion and for persuade other people to go into a specific course of action. Since deliberation is a problem of collective action and rationality we can understand rhetoric in terms of building a new descriptive model of rationality, in other words, we can describe rationality as a rhetoric operation: it consists in giving different degrees of truth to the information available and then create conditions for choosing a specific way. This approach builds a critical view to the notion of information as objective data collected by rational actors, and points to the deliberation as a cognitive way to deal with framed discourses about reality. Based on this model we can criticize some analytical problems from the theories of rational choice concerning collective action, here represented by M. Olson’s paradox, and in the same way, criticize Jon Elster paradox of indeterminacy, based on the concept of optimal amount of gathered information. The concepts of rhetoric give to the rational action theory a key to understand how in empirical situation words, and sometimes just words, are enough to create action. Keywords: Instrumental Action; Persuasion; Rationality and Rhetoric

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Note: This paper is laid out in numbered paragraphs organized in a logical sequence. Although it is rather unusual to discuss any matter in Rhetoric using this strategy, it will allow a better understanding. The paragraphs below are steps in building a more general argument: we can conceive Rhetoric as a model of describing how reasoning works when any social actor interacts with others for collective action.

A- Introduction

1- The theoretical debate of instrumental rationality is central to the theory of action, especially as regards the correct understanding of the dimensions of social order and deliberation for collective action. The discussion on this point has been polarized, since the last quarter of the previous century, by a dichotomy in which rationality is imaged on one hand, as a data processing capacity for optimal deliberation (the rational choice tradition) and, on the other hand, as an intersubjective consensus created by the communicative abilities of the social actors (the linguistic turn perspectives). Here, a theoretical and critical synthesis between the two fields will be designed: we can consider that rational actors do not decide anything in social life using objective data, collected by a cognitive device, but they use information received in rhetorical utterances, in other words, framed information, or even distorted, or incomplete, data. So the consensus for collective action is not the result from a deep understanding between parts interested in rational agreement, but rather it derives from persuasion, even though this is precisely the antithesis of communicative action as formulated by Habermasi, for example. Rhetoric is here a field where we can think instrumental reasoning as a process working by exchanges of natural language, so here reason is intersubjective and not entirely individual centered. At the same time, we always use rhetoric for practical instrumental purposes, i.e., the agreement derives from a discourse created to influence, not by any kind of enlightened consensus.

2- If we consider that the theoretical paradigm of language is effective to treat

rationality as intersubjective and decentered of individual calculation, we can also argue that instrumentality (the means ends coordination) is crucial to the idea of reason. Therefore, pointing to the field of language as constituent of instrumental reasoning, we are pointing to Rhetoric. Persuasion, in addition to the strategic objectives of the speaker, depends on his interaction with his audience, as interchangeable positions, considering both as active poles: the reception of discourse is no less rhetorical than its enunciation. The rationality of the actors in the social world is structured by rhetoric, that is, reasoning operates persuasive speeches for the actor himselfii and his interlocutors - as we shall see in the Aristotle’s seminal formulation.

3- A theoretical proposition of the rhetorical nature of reasoning needs necessarily to

equate the correct explanation of empirical contexts of social action. Therefore, we suggest politics in general as the social space in which it is possible to postulate the existence of rational actors, acting according to what their purposes would be and having as its main means of achieving its objectives the ability to produce and

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add persuasive speeches. Passions and moral values do not change the possibility of mainly describing the political arena as a space for instrumental rationality. The normative structure in the parliament should be thought of as a context of interaction, requiring reciprocal shifts between the actors, and imposing on them the realm of speech acts: only by using speeches, could actors achieve persuasion and do politics. The legitimacy of the strategic use of speech only exists if no extra-linguistic means of coercion are present. We should also emphasize that the general rules of social behavior, and the legal structure of society, are minimally present as foundational aspects of any political action.

4- We should first discuss the key concept of rational action showing how an analogy

is possible between the logic of rationality and the logic of reasoning in rhetorical utterances. The second step is the attempt to apply an analytical model that shows a logical-pictorial representation of the rational operation. In order describe that analogy and offer a pictorial layout of the Rhetorical Rationality in actual arguments, we are assuming a logical isomorphism, as Wittgenstein conceived the correspondence between language propositions and possible state of affairs. The layout of the argument is a model designed by the philosopher S. Toulmin based on Wittgenstein’s ideas.

B- Two ways of Reason:

B.1 - The individualistic computational model

5- There is not a universal concept of the rational actor, or even of what rationality is.

There are several authors who have contributed to form of the idea instrumental rationality with emphasis on different aspects. It is possible to propose, however, that Max Weber formulation contains some elements that have shaped the definition of rational action. As we see in his words:

‘Action is human behavior to which the acting individual

attaches subjective meaning. It can be overt or inward and

subjective. Action is social when, by virtue of the subjective

meaning attached to it by the acting individual(s), it takes account

of the behavior of others and is thereby guided. Social action may

be oriented to past, present, or predicted future behavior of

others. Others may be concrete people or indefinite pluralities.’

(Weber 1968: 3)iii

6- Here, the words in bold indicate some essential features of the concept. First,

Weber thought rationality concerned individuals and not any ‘collective actor’, such as ‘social class’, or ‘group’. Second, reason due to work with a subjective meaning, i.e. the actor processes his movement in an inner reflexive understanding. Third, the actor in order to form his subjective meaning considers the behavior of other actors, so the subjective meaning depends on the interaction between social actors. Fourth, the rational actor manipulates frames of the past, present and he has to predict the future or, in better words, he projects a possible future trying to control the consequences of his movement in the movements of the others with whom his interaction takes place.

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7- Of course, there are important contributions to this early formulation of instrumental reason from Philosophy and, particularly, Economics and Psychology. We can reduce those ideas using the well-known Arrow/Downsiv formula indicating, first, that a rational actor always compares his option with certain alternatives. Second, the actor can create a ranking of preferences (His best choice is A, but if he cannot achieve A, his ‘second best’ choice is B, and so on). Third, he uses previous decisions in order to decide again, then he can repeat a favorable decision (or avoid a bad one) since it is the best choice in the circumstances. Fourth, in all cases a rational decision depends on his abilities in gathering correct information, so a rational actor can be viewed as a computational mind. It is not necessary to emphasize certain controversial aspects of the economic notion of rationality, like the assumption of a selfish psychology, and we may assume for this theory that there is no difference between selfish and altruistic interests. Always it is the same problem: how to manipulate appropriate means to reach appropriate ends. The internal critics of the theory have said that rational behavior is adaptive, often choosing sub-optimal options, rather than a maximizing behaviorv. Other authors have stressed the importance of moral values to bound the choice and sometimes impede full rational deliberation (this problem was explicitly considered by Weber)vi.

8- It is very important to clarify two paradoxes resulting from this way of understand rationality. The first one is the dilemma of collective action by Mancur Olson Jr (1965). It can be described in a few words: Since a rational actor needs collective goods like education, or social security, or even some kind of law enforcement, he will not work hard to obtain such goods if more social actors join the group which is claiming the public good. The reason is simple: as long as the group grows with new members, a truly rational individual will wait till the group achieves the objective, because he cannot be excluded from using the benefits derived from the provision of the public good. In a large group, like a society, the rational individual will calculate as his best option do not spend time and money to obtain a collective good because it is possible use the collective goods provided by others actions. If the best option for the maximizing selfish actor is to become a ‘free rider’ using public benefits conquered by the others’ efforts, thus the paradox: if it is rational for one to wait for the public good without any effort to obtain it, it is rational for anyone do the same, so nobody will work for the provision of public goods. If people are not forced do it, or if there is not some kind of ‘selective incentive’ in order to pay for the effort of the actors, or if there are no coercive devices, the public goods will not be provided. It is best to use the State services without paying taxes if the others can pay them for us. It is fantastic to live in a society without poverty, but is better if other people work to eliminate poverty while the rational individual is concerned with his own problems. Olson’s paradox is still one of the main problems of the rational choice theoryvii, and it has a fundamental assumption: the decision to participate in politics, and produce collective cooperation, results from coercion, or selective gains, and both are derived from adequate information processed by the economic machine assumed to be inside everyone’s mindviii.

9- The second paradox is a logical implication of the idea of defining rationality as a computational operation in which the rational actor evaluates an amount of

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information to decide something. The problem of indeterminacy is clear in Elster’s formulation:

‘(...) in forming their beliefs, the agents should consider all and only the

relevant evidence, with no element being unduly weighted. As a logical

extension of this requirement, we also demand that the collection of

evidence is itself be subject to the canons of rationality. The efficacy of

action may be destroyed both by the gathering of too little evidence and

by gathering too much. The optimal amount of evidence is determined

partly by our desires: more important decisions make it rational to

collect more evidence. It is determined partly by our prior beliefs about

the likely cost, quality and relevance of various types of evidence’ (Elster,1989a)

10- Evidence is made of information. Although Elster is more sophisticated than other

authors in his approach of theory of rationality, discussing interesting aspects of irrationality, and certain kinds of imperfect rationality, we can see again another formulation of the computational model of rationality: information is an amount of data, so we can measure it, or weigh it, or do something similar to show the how much information is necessary to form good evidence, or reasonable evidence. A rational actor processes information in order to decide, so the paradox is to collect too much or too little information, and both can stop the action, or, at least, delay it, generating the loss of a good decision. It is not rational to decide without all the information, nor it is rational to always search for more information if we have to deliberate in a precise time.

11- In order to discuss such paradoxes we need to reframe rationality in another field, pointing to a realistic operation of the rational actor: how can an agent in social life join the others in collective actions without coercion and evidences of gain? We suggest that this empirical phenomena (collective action founded in free aggregation) needs a concept of persuasion. So we need to investigate how language could produce social and rational movements.

B.2- The linguistic model

12- A real alternative to the computational model of rationality was established by the work of Jürgen Habermas (1987). He argues that we cannot properly discuss the reason if we still are thinking from an individualistic standpoint. Habermas is interested in the broad debate about truth and the validity of propositions derived from a new identity between reason and truth. This is a new identity because if we think using an individualistic model of rationality, as the economic tradition has stated with all its possible paradoxes, we conclude inevitably that reason cannot say anything about truth. In this case, reason is only concerned with subjective interests. The Habermasian formulation of the paradox: if the reasoning is just a subjective individualistic function, it cannot state the truth. On the other hand, there is ‘another’ truth assumed to be objective, as conceived by Philosophy, but this truth is only metaphysical discourse, without subjective recognition by individuals. It is not compatible with the individual view, because individuals cannot accept philosophical truth as valid, since it is against their interests, or their subjective experience of life.

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13- The Habermasian solution of this new paradox is in simple words: we need to reconstruct the idea of reason in another field, in which we may understand rationality decentered from the rule of individual subjectivity and, at the same time, we may discuss in empirical terms the validity of propositions from reason, without imposing on those propositions any philosophical metaphysical requirements, or even ideas divorced from the context that generated the propositions. In short, this ‘Postmetaphysical Thinking’ix, as Habermas named it, has to discuss the reason in the field of language.

14- The Habermasian ‘linguistic turn’ is founded on an ontological and methodological

basis. First, it remains close to the movement inside the philosophy of the twentieth century considering the field of language as the place in which we can ‘see’ the reason. Rationality expresses itself by language, and the language is the way to build valid propositions. Following Wittgenstein, Frege, Austin and Searle, Habermas was able to establish that if reason exists by speech actsx, its nature is pure intersubjectivity. It is the antithesis of any subjective calculus derived from individual interest. Reasoning as a speech act depends, therefore, on a social relationship between actors, so it is not centered in single minds. On the contrary, reasoning is constructed in interaction. Reasoning is a kind of mutual understanding, it is a communicative act. Second, and extremely important, if we treat reasoning as a language we have an empirical field to discuss rationality as an actual manifestation, and no longer as subjective perspectives.

15- In this way, reason is no longer a metaphysical device, working in absolute indifference to any context, nor is reason a tool used just to solve atomic interests. Reasoning is a linguistic agreement between two or more rational beings trying to reach consensus about problematic features of reality. Thereby the validity of a proposition is subject to revision whenever the public audience considers it necessary to debate it again. The development of the Habermasian project resulted in significant consequences, more in the Social Sciences than in Philosophy. Social scientists were impacted differently by the idea of communicative action, because the very idea that the validity of social norms is a function of the extent of social debate changes the basic conception of democracy in complexes societies. The Law and institutions are legitimate if, and only if, citizens can discuss and sometimes make deliberations about them. The theory of Deliberative Democracyxi is directly formulated from the idea that the basic act of reasoning is the communicational act.

16- This was undoubtedly a substantial contribution to the debate of rational action. Although Habermas, in order to purify his concept of communicative rationality from any sin of selfish instrumental reasoning, had established as a basic requirement of communicative understanding a conscious attitude of avoiding any kind of intentional influence in the discourse. In other words, communicative reason is possible if the parts of rational debate do not try to use any kind of influence in order to convince each other. The speaker just has the intention of reaching a clear understanding with his interlocutors. Despite the fact that Habermas has not insisted on the strong idealizations of this 'ideal speech situation' the fact is that he never abandoned the ideal requirement of never using any instrumental strategy in discourse, in order to produce a valid consensus about any public subject.

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17- Here the criticsxii were again skeptical about such fair attitude in public debate, mainly because there are significant differences between the mass media opinion and other social actors, and there are not the same chances for all parties to express their points of view. Habermas’s objection that he was only speaking about ideal conditions of understanding, very useful for analytical and criticism purposes, did not convince the audience of social scientists. They are still resistant to 'buy' the idea of a communicability working without strategically oriented movements. To “save” reason in the intersubjective linguistic field, Habermas created barriers against influence, rejecting it as a valid source of convincing someone of any argument. Habermas talks about language, rational deliberation and agreement, but do not consider any rhetorical device to be valid. He did, however, create another paradox: how to reach linguistic consensus without using the possibilities of language to create persuasion? Is it possible or at least reasonable to imagine a political agreement without rhetoric?

18- Now we can return to our efforts of establishing a new linguistic model of instrumental reason. It is necessary to recognize the importance of reframing rationality in the linguistic field in order to capture the intersubjective construction of social and political meanings that guide the rational actors. However we do not agree with the Habermasian project that communicative action can be possible, even in ideal terms, by avoidance of any influence on the interlocutors. On the contrary, the idea here is that Rhetoric is, par excellence, the field in which to think how language creates consensus, social order and collective action. What we are saying is that rhetoric provides a new analytical model for instrumental reasoning, capable of solving certain individualistic paradoxes attached to the economic individualistic model of reason and also capable to being more effective than the Habermasian solution, based upon an ideal communicative action. We do not need an ideal communicative act as an epistemological step to think how reason is possible, and how it works. We can think of instrumental reason as linguistic persuasion if the model is the Rhetoric, as was established by an ancient political tradition.

C- Rhetoric and Rationality

19- Aristotle found a space for Rhetoric - which was not disputed by the thinkers of his time - defining it as a practical knowledge (thecné) necessary for public issues. In his times such questions usually provoked conflicting opinions about ‘what to do’, and they were generated by the dynamics of democracy, as a form of government in which a large group of ‘non-experts’, the demos, the plain citizens, had voice and political weight. So it was necessary to explain and to convince those non- experts about public questions in order to deliberate. Rhetoric was then a fundamental tool to produce social order under democratic rule. If the truth was not evident in politics, as it was in Metaphysical Philosophy, people needed to argue, and so the practice of Rhetoric was a moral attitude in defense of the best solution for public affairs.

20- In his works about logic and language, called Organon, Aristotle wrote a specific essay to discuss the relationship between reasoning and its constitution by language. He called it Topics, or 'places', meaning the idea of a rationale that uses some expected 'places’ made of wordsxiii: if we talk about war, we have to talk

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about the army, and the enemy’s army too; if we talk about economics we have to talk about the source of income, and so on. For any matter we have topics with which we can better explain the subject in debate. In the first book of the Topics, the philosopher provides a basic identity between rationality and language to define the rationale - the working of reason - as an argument. Aristotle wrote: 'Now reasoning is an argument in which, certain things being laid down, something other than these necessarily comes about through them’.(Aristotle, 2007: 243; 1978: I,1, 101a). Reasoning is to draw conclusions from propositions established by language.

21- The philosopher defined four types of reasoning: demonstration (which starts from true premises and is exclusive of logic); dialectic reasoning (which starts from likely premises); contentious reasoning,’ or 'eristic reasoning' (which starts from premises that seem to be true, but are not), and mis-reasoning, or paralogical reasoning, (which starts from false premises)xiv. The last two forms are sophistic and point to an interesting problem: the appearance of the truth is a matter for instrumental reasoning. The apparent similarity between signs and objects allows to talk of logic, but also of quasi-logic, and one can perfectly well produce persuasion, decisions and actions. A rational actor can make, or accept, a decision without clear evidence just because he based his deliberation on premises that are true in appearance. Such reasoning can be perfect reasoning, considering the logical form and its consequences in moving the actor in any direction. We are not talking about evidence, but of the appearance of evidence as ‘concrete motive’ for a deliberation.

22- In the Treatise of Rhetoric, Aristotle was more precise in showing how arguments are the map of reasoning. What we are saying is that Rhetoric could be considered a model of reasoning capable of solving practical problems in the world of action, in the same way we could deal with a mathematical model of reasoning. The proposition of this text is: we can describe reasoning using concepts of the theory of Rhetoric.

23- The Topoi xv, or places, are a key element of Rhetoric. They are pre-structured forms of speech - a convenient package of arguments for different types of themes and strategies. The actor by using a topic puts in motion sequences of ideas previously standardized and organized for the debate about a public issue. So the rhetorical places are essential programs for organizing the argumentation and for understanding speech. The idea of 'commonplace' originally refers to a structure of all kinds of speeches, regardless of the theme: repetition and recapitulation are fundamental commonplaces, and so is the use of assumption. Examples of commonplaces to all scientific discourse are the repertory of opinions and theories about a subject, before you express your own point of view, or start supposing something to support an idea. Here, it is enough to say that places are required for speech, i.e., in situations of debate, reasoning works within a framework of the facts, a pattern of argument. This framework is a necessary limit to persuasion in that it defines both what is at stake and how you can act on the problem with a particular set of words.

24- Aristotle also summarized the organization of persuasive topics according to the requirements of a moral nature (ethos), related to the adequacy and reliability of the values of the actor; The emotional requirements (pathos), responsible for the

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communion of passions between speaker and audience, and very important to move the action, and finally requirements of an analytical nature (logos), that account for the coherence of the discoursexvi.

25- In a computational metaphor we could describe the rhetorical places as means of data organization. They create different values and meanings for the storage of information useful for rational purposes. Repertoires and standardized arguments are files containing intersubjective courses of action ready to share, generating persuasion/deliberation/collective action. The Topics are another way of understanding and describing information and evidence: the data are processed by rhetorical utterances and rhetorical listening, i.e. there is intentionality and persuasion in every speech act. Searching for information is collecting rhetorical places, packages of pre-organized arguments.

26- When a rational actor tries to project his action, he uses rhetorical places that already have some predictable courses of action. It is the same when a rational actor, in a present situation, tries to reconstruct his experience for deliberation. The past is organized by the rhetorical ways of talking about the experience, even for repeating or avoiding a previous decision by the actor.

27- The isomorphismxvii between rhetorical movements and instrumental reasoning supposes the same logical structure working when the actor considers frames of reality and he uses certain specific speeches to depict them. The isomorphism is clear when observing the identity between the features of instrumental reasoning and the kinds of rhetoric (or types of rhetoric, or genres of rhetoric, or modes of rhetoric) described by Aristotle.

28- In his treatise, Aristotle (1988: 16-20; I, 3, 1358b -1359b) established three genres of speaking: Deliberative (political, advisory); Forensic (legal) and Epideictic (ceremonial). Of course, we can imagine more genres of rhetoric, for instance, as we know today the uses of rhetoric in science are not denied, but that is not the pointxviii. The core of isomorphism is the function of each kind of rhetorical speaking. Therefore, in a democratic assembly, if the actors need to deliberate about any public matter, they will use future tenses, projecting a state of affairs probably resulting from any possible alternatives. Rational actors need to imagine future situations and the ways to achieve them, so they have to produce a specific kind of discourse. If the question depends on reconsidering the past (a typical situation of a judgment), we have rhetoric devices ready to fulfill the rational actors with pictures of the past. If we are talking about passion, honor, hate, solidarity and all kinds of feeling that are bounds to rational reflexivity, but capable of moving people, we are talking about kinds of rhetoric, but also about forms of rationality.

29- It is crucial to say that we are not talking about the rhetoric abilities of the actors, but just about structures of common reasoning belonging to all actors in social interactionxix. Treatises of Rhetoric were composed just to improve capacities in persuasion already existing in common social life. Rhetoric, as any reflection on language, assumes that we are facing a process of continuous improvement of the intersubjectivity senses of the actors. Rhetoric puts them in relationships that are usually asymmetric, but not in fixed positions. This takes us away from speculation about a rationality centered on individual consciousness, but not from

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intentionality and interest. Here, rationality is decentered from the individual, but it is still instrumental, we still talk about means (words) to reach ends (collective action/public goods).

D- Enthymemes

30- The isomorphism between Rhetoric and Instrumental Reason is also evident when we discuss the key concept of enthymeme. It means there is a logical structure specific to the rhetorical argument. In the Rhetoric of Aristotle we have the idea of rhetorical syllogism, i.e. a proof created only in words is enough to persuade without any further fact or evidence. Of course, like almost everything in Aristotle, the definitions are unclear but are always fertile. An enthymeme is a kind of syllogism that jumps from a debatable premise to a ‘necessary’ conclusion. The premises and conclusions in formal logic are synthetic propositions like ‘all men are mortal/Socrates is a man/Therefore Socrates is mortal’, but in an enthymeme we have no formal premises; instead we have long or short speeches, depending upon the situation. Those premises are not a consensus like ‘All men are mortal’; they are, on the contrary, controversial ideas like ‘All men were created free and equal by God/ Therefore…’. If we look to the conclusions, we note that in an enthymeme they seems to be as necessary as in formal logic, although they are not synthetic. That is the general formula for an enthymeme: to extract from a dubious sentence (or debatable sentence, or at least just probable sentence) a peremptory conclusion. We do it all the time in social life: we work logically using enthymemes, using debatable discourses as premises.

31- The enthymeme occupies a vital space in the logical structure of discourse: it is not an explicit syllogistic structure, but the rhetorical argument works similarly to syllogism. Implied terms frequently fulfill their role in the structure of speech. It is important to say that every argument in social life is a kind of rhetorical enthymeme. The press publishes a picture of a well-known politician talking to a gangster; it is not difficult to imagine that this will lead to a “necessarily”, but not explicited by the press, conclusion of the nature of this kind of relationship between a politician and a gangster. Thus, an enthymeme could be a short syllogism, or a non-explicit syllogism, or could be developed with a discourse full of words, metaphors and all kinds of figures of speech.

32- All metaphors, images or analogies, produced by rhetoric imply intersubjective assumptions, which ensure the basic requirements of a logical structure, i.e., they are potentially similar to the syllogism. They are general premises to contextual conclusions. The operation of the enthymeme, the jump from a premise to a conclusion, is a time when the agreement between the speaker and the audience must be fully resolved, because the concepts are not persuasive if they are in the possession of only the speaker. The concepts are assumed to be in the field of common knowledge, and they provide meanings to discursive action. Theories emphasize that an argument combines different schemes of speech, i.e., the speech tries to follow their paths through the rhetorical places. Such schemes, which make the rhetorical places accessible, are argumentative concatenations that Perelmanxx calls quasi-logical arguments, in the same spirit as enthymemes.

33- Arguments in social interaction are, in fact, reduction processes, not always explicit, of non-formal structures into images of formal structures. Of course, the

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idea that the logical form is the expression of reality transforms the logical structure into an instrument of persuasion: if it is logical, is more likely to be real, and more likely to found a reasoned decision, but there is a more radical idea in considering the explicit uses of the appearance of logic for persuasive purposes: the quasi-logical operation, i.e., the movement of reducing heterogeneous data into ‘pure’ logical-discourse and, therefore, easy to handle for action, is, also, a description of the machinery of the language applied to instrumental action in social interaction processes.

E- The design of the rhetorical reasoning

34- The propositions discussed briefly indicate the possibility of approaching theoretically the problem of rationality of social actions by analytical concepts used to explain how persuasive language works. We can only outline the most ambitious aspect of this research, connected to the attempt to apply and refine models of pictorial description, or figurative description, to represent the operation of rhetorical reasoning. Right now, we must remember that we are not illustrating logical operations, but understanding schematically the particulars that make up the quasi-logic of interactions.

35- In this regard, we use as a basis the work of Stephen Toulmin (1997), investigating quasi-logical arguments. One quality of his work consists exactly in approaching the idea of contextual validity of the arguments, and only then discussing their invariant structure (independent of any context). So, let's focus on the concept of ‘field’ as the place where arguments are validated. Fields are areas of knowledge; they are the foundations of the argument. We have the field of law, the field of logic, the field of mechanics, the field of religion, the field of art, criticism, sports, and all segmented areas we use in any social interaction. So the problems of validity are given inside the fields, and not in all fields, for example, a mathematical argument may not work so well in literature, or a physics argument could be subverted by the field of poetry. However, Toulmin discusses whether there is any structural pattern between arguments in different fields.

36- Toulmin has proposed that, in all cases, arguments are composed, i.e., they

develop in stages. These stages, known in logic as premises and conclusions are connected by modal terms, or modal qualifiers. The modulation is given by the use of words such as ‘necessarily,’ ‘probably’, ‘should,’ ‘may,’ ‘certainly’, ‘no doubt’, or any other that gives parameters for the conclusion’s validity of the argument. The model has a stage called ‘problem’, attached to a ‘conclusion’ or a ‘solution’ through a modal qualifier.

37- In the proposition 1) ‘The socialists may win the election,’ there is an underlying

problem in the field of argument: The socialists try to win the election against other political parties (this is the problem); the socialists can beat other political parties and get into power (that is the conclusion). The modal qualifier ‘may’ indicates that the result is possible, probable, but not necessary; 2) ‘The socialists will win the election’ has exactly the same problem and the same solution, but the absence of the qualifier ‘may’ means that ‘necessarily ‘ a socialist victory will occurxxi. This brings into question the debate about the validity of this argument.

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38- Toulmin went further and posed the problem of finding a logic invariant of the

arguments, i.e., a minimal structure, a model of logic operation, crossing separate topics and different fields of validity. So he thought of a graphic plan, a layout of the argument that can be used not only intra-fields, but in all fields.

39- Thus, the reasoning applied to argumentation starts from a fact (datum) ‘D’ and

comes to a conclusion, or claim, ’C’. The model is a dichotomy, because, given any facts, we have propositions resulting from them. So, we have the classic D C (if D then C), or 'if black clouds, then rain'; 'if we have an economic crisis, then the unemployment will be high; if we have high unemployment, then the socialists will win the election’; 'If money is easy, then everybody will buy a lot, and then prices will increase' and all other relationships that we can conceive should work that way.

40- In common social usage, propositions leap from the facts to the assertions, but there is always the possibility of challenges to what is said. So the model ‘if D, then C’ can be improved by introducing some kind of warrant, or justification, ‘W’ in order to support the operation 'data then conclusion'.

41- Suppose an argument to support socialist struggle to conquer the State in a democratic way. We get ‘There is an economic crisis' (datum) since 'the working class blame the Government' (warrant), so ‘The socialists will win the State’ (conclusion). So, the initial model design is:

‘There is an economic (D)

crisis ‘

So, ‘The socialists will win the

State’ (C)

Since

‘The working class blame

the Government’

(W)

Or:

D So, C

Since

W (Figure 1)

42- We clearly have to distinguish the different role of datum and warrants: the first

term (the fact) is always explicit and from we derive the propositions. The second

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term, the justification, can usually just be implied. Even with the warrants ‘W’, (the working class blame the government) it is not a necessary conclusion that socialists will win the election, hence the operation ‘if D, then C’ needs some modulation. The argument in this case, closer to the field of validity, requires a modal qualifier ‘Q’ to change its evaluation criteria toward a more plausible proposition. The qualifier changes the conclusion based on a necessary statement into a conclusion based on a likely statement. So we have another figure:

‘There is an economic (D)

crisis ‘

So, probably (Q), ‘‘The socialists will win the

State’ (C)

Since

‘The working class blame

the Government’

(W)

which results in:

D so, Q, C

Since

W

(Figure 2)

43- This setting is still subject to controversy. ‘Probably’ is a modal qualifier, which leaves open the probability of the assertion C (The socialists will win the State) not being valid for all possible facts. There is, of course, the possibility of the socialists not winning the election, despite difficulties of the economic crises. The socialists may lose, for instance, if they fail to rally supporters and have a bad campaign. The model needs, therefore, to assume a rebuttal ‘R’, so:

‘There is an economic

(D) crisis’

So, probably (Q), The socialists will win the State (P)

Since Unless

‘The working class blame

the Government’

‘They fail to rally

supporters’

(W) (R)

14

Or:

D so, Q, C

Since Unless

W R

(Figure 3)

44- The modal qualifier Q indicates: there is in reality a possibility of a true conclusion about the socialists victory, and there is also the possibility of the opposite fact occurring. We may also have a challenge to the argument by a contending party who considers the warrant W unsatisfactory. The argument needs to provide the conditions for its own refutation. In defense of a claim, or assertion, the actors produce data by framing facts and use them to explain their reasons and to support a conclusion. The challenge to the proposition is certainly a challenge in respect of its justification, for example: 'Why infer that the socialists will win based on the people’s discontent?'

45- This leads, of course, to the need for further support to the basic warrants. Any fact invoked as a justification must be justified by other sources of authority. People blame the Government for the crisis, and we can say in addition: 'people usually try to change the government in economic crisis and the working class is the majority'. This may be a response to any challenge to the statement about the possibility of the socialists winning and justifies both the framing of the economic crisis as producer of electoral results, and the conclusion that socialists will be (likely) winners (unless…). The argument that warrants the warranty - would be used only under exceptional conditions and Toulmin call it 'backing' (‘B’, in the layout). The function of B is to support all the argument and gives this figure to the model:

There is an economic (D)

crisis

So, probably (Q), The socialists will win the State (P)

Since Unless

‘The working class blame

the Government’

‘They fail to rally

supporters’

(R)

(W)

On account of

‘The working class is the majority’

(B)

15

Or:

D so, Q, C

Since Unless

W R

On account of

B (Figure 4)

46- Above we have the picturexxii of an enthymeme. In conversations or public

debates, arguments are used, and if their validity is solved by the actors without challenges, we have the correct operation of the logic figure: ‘if D so C’. However, if there are adjustments and debates about its validity, the argument must be able to sustain itself in different degrees of knowledge related to the field of the argument. These backings are internal transactions to the discursive field in which the argument is formulated. In a conversation about morals, or aesthetics, while the conversationalists are in agreement, they interact requiring only data and its conclusions (if A then B) to continue to understand each other. However, if there is any disagreement on moral or aesthetic contents, the conversationalists will have to trigger the authority of their warrants and backings. Logic alone does not solve a debate of this nature. The validation of the topics used as backings is, therefore, rhetorical.

47- The arguments are referred to the field of validity, although the underlying quasi-

logical model remains the same. Modal terms transform models of the type 'all As are Bs', or 'no As are Bs' into modulations like ‘almost all As are Bs' or 'hardly an A is a B'. However, the modulations can be just implied like '[almost] every A is a B,' usually accepted. ‘The socialists [probably] will win…’ If challenged, the argument may sustain the conditions of its modulation. If the argument is not challenged its modal qualifier can remain hidden, but it is still there, waiting for an occasion to be made explicit. Thus, the model used in the argument of validity within fields is not defined a priori, but assumed a priori, as in ordinary life. It is what Toulmin calls, in the same spirit of Perelman, quasi-syllogism.

48- The idea of a quasi-logical structure necessary to understand any argument in

social life has obvious consequences for the problem of persuasion. The quasi-syllogisms - or enthymemes - have precisely the appearance of the syllogism as such by drawing it inside a field in which it possibly is acceptable. Toulmin's model is consistent with certain aspects, both of the theories of instrumental rationality, and of the theories of rhetoric.

49- Another central point about the model discussed refers to the existence of an inner, not explicit, intersubjective movement in all arguments. In every speech, new groups of facts can sustain the conclusions even though those backings are

16

supposed to be used just in debates, where arguments can be challenged. So some elements of the speech can - in a contrary motion to the classical syllogism - become implicit, creating enthymemes that link facts to propositions. This is the similarity, and the difference, between 'Every A is a B' and 'Every A (possibly) is a B'.

F- The figuration of the rhetorical genres

50- The first point is how data, or facts, and inferences are produced. It must be clear

that the data is intentionally framed. The framework is part of a dispute between conversationalists, and it is assumed both by the speaker as for the audience. So, instead of ‘D’, datum, we could write ‘Ff’ (framed facts). Another key aspect: an argument sets the form ‘if D, then C’, but a debate is a sequence: ‘if P, then B, then C, then D… ‘. Obviously this chain must be designed taking into account that each link requires a set of hidden and explicit warrants. Thus, for Deliberative Rhetoric, we have the framework of facts involving a projection of the future, so we can write framed facts (Ff) then projection of future (Pfu), then deliberation (Dlb) A, or deliberation B, or dlb C…etc., and so:

Ff then [Q], Pfu, then Dlb A, or B, or C.

51- The modal qualifier [Q] is in brackets, indicating that its use is assumed but not necessarily explicit and can be explained in a challenge about the validity of the speech. That gives the next logical design: Ff so, Q, Pfu so, Q ‘Dlb’ A or B

Since Unless (...) R'

W R W'

On account of (...)

B B'

(Figure 5)

We can imagine an argument for collective action:

(Ff) (Q) (Pfu) (D)

Capitalism has always economic

crises.

So, [probably] people will not

trust the establishment.

So, [prob.] We must join to

the socialist political party

in order to conquer the

State.

17

52- For the convenience of argumentation, the facts of the warrants and even rebuttals can be explicit, or rhetorically hidden. From framed facts the conversationalists leap to projections of the future, and taking those projections as data, they leap again to deliberations.

53- Following such a scheme, we just replace 'projection of the future' by 'reconstruction of the past' to figure the rhetorical judgment of any previous experience used as grounds for new decisions.

54- An explanation, once accepted as valid, or likely to be valid, can be basis for judgments. In fact, any part of the argument must have a similar structure. Even a proposition that is strictly epideictic, such as a eulogy, or a rebuke, can only be understood as a rhetorical expression based on quasi-syllogism, or rather, on a tautology: people praise the laudable, and also criticize what is to be criticized. In an election a rebuke could lead to a deliberation, as political propaganda has shown since the last century.

G- Discussion

55- The consequences of the analytical model designed here are significant to the

debate about action and rationality. We emphasize the plausibility of a model based upon concepts from rhetoric in treating these points, traditionally thought of in terms of pure economic theory and computational formalization. The notion of rhetorical rationality reconfigures a theory of action using mainly descriptive ways to investigate the rational operations. The linguistic paradigm needs to incorporate to processes of action pointing to interactive relationships as an elementary basis for understanding the architecture of intersubjectivity. So the theory of rhetoric is capable of designing a linguistic theory of instrumental rationality, in which influence (the intention to persuade and be persuaded) is necessary to forge social consensus and to deal with social conflict. There is a clear isomorphism between an enthymeme and the ways we reason in order to deliberate, and this allows research to establish a picture of rationality 'in motion' using Toulmin's scheme.

56- The organization of the rational actor's discourse, even in situations of market transactions, with full economic calculus requirements, is settled in intersubjective enthymemes. It is worth emphasizing that the machine devised to maximize utility is nothing more than an actor being persuaded to act, based only on the possibilities of very fallible words. Perhaps the greatest impact of this model for the rational choice theory is removing instrumental action from the methodological individualism.

57- The criterion of motion in the rational choice theories is the correct evidence that

fuels the subjectivist machine and, for virtually the whole tradition of this theory, symmetry is assumed between the subjective perception of the facts and the ‘real’ facts. At best, the only acceptable criterion of rational judgment is the ‘evidence’ subjectively processed by the actors. If they really judge the social world based on such an operation it is always better not to join efforts to any collective action. There is nothing else to do, unless more, undoubted evidence is produced or, in a more realistic sense, instruments of coercion come to oblige a collective effort.

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Here, we offer a new reason to work for collective action: persuasion. Rational actors can be interested in social causes just because they are persuaded by words, without any further proof. If a rational actor needs full information to act, he will not be so rational. The theory of rational choice always faces paradoxes and often has to treat all collective movements as irrationalism, since they are apparently based on social values different from the economic calculus. Here, we have tried to show first that rationality is not individual, it is built collectively in intersubjective exchanges and, second, the logical form of reasoning is rhetorical rather than computational.

58- The validity and accuracy of information is given by its correspondence with reality, but this correspondence depends upon argumentation. The facts are intersubjective propositions about objects, so they are discourse and they are subject to problems of interpretation and meaning inherent to any language. Paradoxes like Olson's dilemma result largely from a naïve theory of language, in which rational agents make their decisions based on ‘objective information’ corresponding exactly to the facts. In utilitarian perspective, evidence of gains and coercion are the only two causes that could move an actor into collective action. Such evidence cannot, in the utilitarian model, be subject to doubt or debate. Rather, the naïve theory of language indicates stable names for empirical objects. They demonstrate, or not, the benefits or losses of collective action. The rhetorical model is not guided by the ideal of accurate names as mathematical entities, on the contrary the names are problems, which need to be manipulated in order to express all their meaning in a particular context.

59- The descriptive principle that guides this paper is the opposite of the utilitarian

theory of language: from the many resources of using words, changing and playing with meanings, it is possible to rally groups and publics producing conditions for collective action. The payoffs from a particular action are never self-evident; they are ‘invented’ and must be supported by arguments. The instrumental rationality of actors works incorporating or rejecting rhetorical utterances. Since deliberation is a problem of collective action and rationality we can understand rationality as a rhetoric operation: it consists in giving different degrees of truth to the information available and then the actor has conditions for choosing a specific way. This approach builds a critical view to the notion of information as objective data collected by rational actors, and points to deliberation as a cognitive way to deal with framed discourses about reality.

60- The search for collective goods is the place for generating rhetoric for the public

debate. The rhetorical tradition is in this sense the very language of politics. The need of persuasion is directly related to the diversity of discourses about the possible problems that require collective action.

61- The descriptive approach intends not only to capture the content of arguments, but

especially their functional operation. Enthymemes are the key to understanding the movement and the logic of a mundane reasoning, which advises politicians, consumers, intellectuals, policemen, or any other actors. This is the same 'logic', the quasi-logic indeed, used by the voter (and by the citizen) to support all kinds of public debate and collective actions. Of course, this perspective is against any illusion of a collective action based upon objective founded deliberations, but we

19

can conceive a collective action based on reasonable deliberations. As Aristotle understood, the rationality of politics depends on ordinary people and they need, in unclear situations, be persuaded to choose the best option, because the wrong way is often attractive. So Rhetoric can help to build a public ’truth’, useful for ‘correct’ action.

NOTES: i See the Theory of Communicative Action from Habermas (1987).

ii About self–persuasion: Boudon (1990).

iii See also: Weber (1991; 1992), Schutz (1972), Sica (1988), Brubaker (1984). iv Anthony Downs (1957) has organized these features of rational actor according to K. Arrow’s theories of economic behavior. For a defense of this kind of rational choice theory see the book edited by Jeffrey Friedman (1996), especially Dennis Chong, Susanne Lohmann and Norman Schofield’s contributions. v Simon (1967) is the reference of adaptive behavior. Green and Shapiro (1994; 1996) have discussed both methodological problems and the paradoxes of rational choice applied to Political Science. ‘Positive’ critics argued for cooperation between economic actors mainly in game theory, for example, Rapport (1980), Taylor (1987), Axelrod (1984). vi Probably Jon Elster (1979; 1986; 1989b) has the deepest discussion about irrationality within the rational choice field. The Psychology of Rationality has insisted on bias of rational behavior created by framed information, for example, Kaneman and Tversky (1986); for the same approach see also March (1986). Also about limits of rational choice theory, see Taylor (1996) evaluating Green and Shapiro’s book about pathologies of rational choice. vii Some pertinent references about collective action for this paper: Orenstein (1998), Santos (1989), Offe and Wiesenthal (1984) Magalhães 2002. viii We can find the same utilitarian idea applied to voting behavior as we see, for instance, in the concept of rationality in Lupia and McCubbins: ‘We define rationality to mean all human behavior that is directed toward the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain’ (1998: 23). ix Habermas (1990) discussed ‘Postmetaphysical Thinking’ as a form of modern Philosophy that cannot deny science and empirical research, but still has the task of hermeneutics and criticism. So language is the field where it is possible talk about reason interpreting reality (hermeneutics) and possible to think of a normative order, beyond individualistic interest (criticism). There are four points in postmetaphysical thinking: 1) we have to accept that fallible knowledge needs argumentation to be valid; 2) Philosophy has to see subjectivity as resulting from history and culture 3) Theory no longer a necessary precedence over practice; 4) the linguistic turn means that Philosophy is not concerned only with individual consciousness but mainly with intersubjective understanding. x For the Speech Acts Theory: Austin (1975), Searle (1969), Habermas (1987), Cooke (1994). xiFor the Deliberative Democracy Theory: Habermas (1997), Cohen (1997), Elster (1998), Bohman (1996), Magalhães (2006), Magalhães and Souza (2006). xii For evaluating Habermasian communicative action theory there is an overwhelming bibliography. Here, some references for this paper: Giddens (1994), Cooke (1994), Wellmer (1994), Dominges (1995), Boladeras (1996). Magalhães (2003), Stevenson (1995).

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xiii About topics: Aristotle (2007), Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1997), Burke (1969), Barilli (1985), Reboul (1998), Cooper (1988). xiv Aristotle (2007) Topics. Op. Cit. pp. 233-234; (1978); Tópicos, Op. Cit. [I, 1, 101a] pp.5-6. xv The word ‘Topoi’ is the plural of ‘topos’ translated to Latin ‘topics’. xvi Aristotle (1988: 8-10; I,2, 1356a-1356b). This paper deals with a specific problem of persuasion: the quasi-logical aspects of Rhetoric. They have, of course, a limited scope for a general treatment of the concept of persuasion. Questions concerning the moral (ethos) and emotional universe (pathos) of rhetorical interactions were only mentioned, although they have a central role in any persuasive utterance. xvii The concept of Isomorphism is widespread in Mathematics, Biology, Chemistry and other sciences and means a strong similarity between two elements, or two beings, in a one-to-one correspondence in their forms. In Philosophy this notion is applied to understanding Wittgenstein’s insight in proposing that language can ‘figure’ (logically) the facts or, in other words, linguistic propositions are ‘pictures’ of reality by corresponding to facts described by the proposition. The word is formed by the Greek iso (equal) and morphosis (to form). In this paper we propose therefore an isomorphism between the form in which we produce rhetoric utterances and the form in which we operate the rationality. We have to consider specific aphorisms in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus: ‘2.1 We make to ourselves pictures of facts’ and ‘2.12 The picture is a model of reality’. The concept of picture indicates that language can show the structure of reality (language is isomorphic to reality). Other aphorisms: ‘2.141 The picture is a fact’ and ‘2.15 That the elements of the picture are combined with one another in a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another’. (Wittgenstein, 2010: 28-30). xviii Magalhães (2003) has proposed the concept of ‘analytic rhetoric’ to deal with the use of scientific theories in deliberative situations. The problem of rhetorical formulations in scientific argumentation is another important field, as we can see in the contributions of Edmondson (1984) studying rhetoric in sociology and McCloskey (1985) in economy. xix At the beginning of the Treatise of Rhetoric, the Philosopher stated: ‘Accordingly, everybody to some extent makes use of both Dialectics and Rhetoric; for all make some attempt to sift or to support theses, and to defend or attack persons’ (Aristotle, 1988; I, 1,1354a). xx For quasi-logical arguments, see specially Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996: 219-295) and Toulmin (1997). Also about enthymemes: Barilli (1995), Osakabe (1979). And for applied research on enthymemes Magalhães (2008). xxi The example is adapted from Toulmin’s investigation specially the chapter III of The Uses of Argument (1997: 94-145) xxii About Pictures in Wittgenstein, with strong disagreement: Ricketts (1996), Toulmin and Janick (1991), Hintikka and Hintikka, Russell (2010). References Aristóteles (1978) Tópicos [Topics]. São Paulo: Abril cultural. Aristotle (1988) The Rhetoric of Aristotle. Translated by Lane Cooper. Englewood

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