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International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 1 International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance The Implementation of Basel II by Islamic Banks: The Case of Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad Abdou DIAW The International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia Omaima El Tahir Babikir Mohamed The International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF) Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia ISSN 2220-8291 VOLUME 1 Issue 2 September 2011 © Hamdan Bin Mohammed e-University, 2011
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International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 1

International Journal of Excellence

in Islamic Banking and Finance

The Implementation of Basel II by Islamic Banks: The Case of Bank Islam

Malaysia Berhad

Abdou DIAW

The International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF)

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Omaima El Tahir Babikir Mohamed

The International Centre for Education in Islamic Finance (INCEIF)

Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

ISSN 2220-8291

VOLUME 1 – Issue 2

September 2011

© Hamdan Bin Mohammed e-University, 2011

International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 2

Abstract

Purpose

This paper is a case study of the

implementation of Basel II Accords, under the

reformulation of IFSB, by Islamic banks with

special reference to Bank Islamic Malaysia

Berhad (BIMB).

Method

We have analysed the content of BIMB annual

reports and interviewed a senior executive to

determine the extent of the implementation

and to identify the issues.

Findings

We have found that BIMB is well capitalised

and is using the standardised and basic

indicator approaches for the calculation of risk

weighted assets. Among all the 3 types of risk

that require capital for their management in

the context of Basel II, credit risk is the most

important at BIMB, as its proportion in the total

risk weighted assets is more than 86%. This can

be explained by the overreliance of BIMB on

debt instruments in its financing activities,

corresponding to more 99%, while equity based

financing represents 0.1%. Basel II seemed to

favor the big banks which are able to set up the

required infrastructure for the implementation

of advance approaches for risk measurement,

which could allow them to qualify for less

capital charge.

Originality

The paper is one of the rare attempts to

investigate the implementation of Basel

Accords by Islamic banks in the Malaysian

context where the Central bank has

reformulated these Accords by taking into

consideration the relevant IFBS Standards.

Keywords: Basel II, IFSB, BNM, Bank Islam, Risk

management.

Introduction

In the aftermath of the recent financial crisis,

many have pointed out the deregulation in

most of the financial markets as a determinant

cause of the crisis. Though deregulation was

thought to be a sine qua non condition for a

well functioning financial markets, one of the

major players in these financial markets, the

banking sector, has been progressively

regulated through the standards issued by the

Basel Committee on Banking Supervision

(BCBS), starting from 1988. The efforts of the

BCBS have culminated with the issuance of the

Basel II Accords, which constitute a general

framework for risk management in the banking

industry. However, the global financial crisis has

revealed many shortcomings of this framework.

This has led to the development of new

accords, termed as ‘Basel III’i, that aim to

further strengthen the resilience of the banking

sector.

On the other hand, Basel II also comports

several inadequacies with respect to the

specificities of Islamic Financial Institutions

which are supposed to conduct their operations

according to Sharī'ah principles. To address

these specificities, the Islamic Financial Services

Board (IFSB) was established as a standards-

setting body.

In Malaysia, a leading country in the area of

Islamic finance, the implementation of the

Basel II framework has started since 2008; the

central bank of Malaysia Bank Negara Malaysia

(BNM) has issued several guidelines for the

purpose of customizing the standards issued by

the international organizations and smoothen

their implementation.

In this paper we investigated the

implementation of Basel II Accords by Islamic

banks in Malaysia with special reference to

International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 3

Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad (BIMB). For this

purpose, we have studied the annual reports

2008 and 2009 of the bank and interviewed a

senior executive in the risk department of the

Bank, in order to identify the issues faced by

Islamic banks in the process of implementing

Basel II.

The remaining of the paper is as follows: in the

next section we will present an overview of

Basel II. Section 3 will be consecrated to the

presentation of IFSB and its standards which are

related to Basel II. In section 4 we discuss the

guidelines issued by BNM in relation with the

implementation of Basel II. In section 5 we carry

out the investigation of the implementation of

Basel II by BIMB and the related issues. The

conclusion will constitute the final section.

BASEL II AS A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR RISK

MANAGEMENT

Risk management, as a means for value

preservation, has become an area of central

interest for academicians, managers and

regulators. For the regulators this interest is

manifested through the establishment of The

BCBS in 1974 by the Governors of G-10

countries.

The safeguard of the banking organizations is of

crucial importance due to their role as financial

intermediaries in the contemporary economies.

Thus, the failure of any bank, even a small one,

may trigger a contagion effect which results in a

disruption of the payment system and a

negative impact on the economy as a whole.

Basel I: A Landmark in Banking Regulation

With the numerous bank failures in the 1980s,

BCBS concluded Basel Accord (Basel I) in 1988

which constituted a landmark financial

agreement. The main purpose of the 1988 Basel

accord was to provide general terms and

conditions for commercial banks by means of a

minimum standard of capital requirements to

be applied in all member countries. The accord

contained minimal capital standards for the

support of credit risks on balance and off-

balance positions, as well as a definition of the

countable equity capital (Gallati, 2003).

However, despite the significant contribution of

Basel I, there were many drawbacks in the

Accord which called for important

amendments. Firstly, the Basel I was meant for

internationally active banks of G10 and other

OECD countries. But it was embraced by other

countries which do not belong to these two

entities; hence it became desirable to make

adjustments to render it suitable to these

developing countries. Second, Basel I Accord

had encouraged capital arbitrage opportunities,

particularly by encouraging off-balance sheet

and trading activities. For instance, through

securitization good quality assets have been

taken away from the balance sheets of banks

and sold for raising additional funds without

removing the corresponding liabilities from the

balance sheets (Khan and Ahmad, 2001; p.86).

Thirdly, the Accord also completely ignored the

problem of setting aside capital adequacy for

the tradable securities in the trading book.

For all these reasons, among others, the new

Basel II accord was necessary to cater for the

issues raised by the shortcomings of Basel I.

Basel II: Objectives, Rational and Structure

As pointed out by the Basel Committee

fundamental objective of the comprehensive

revised version of the International

Convergence of Capital Measurement and

Capital Standard (Basel II Accords) has been to

develop a framework that would further

strengthen the soundness and stability of the

international banking system while maintaining

sufficient consistency that capital adequacy

Page 4 Volume 1 Issue 2 – September 2011

regulation will not be a significant source of

competitive inequality among internationally

active banks (BIS, 2006; p. 2).

Basel II contains some major innovations,

designed to introduce greater risk sensitivity

into the accord. One was to supplement the

current quantitative standard with two

additional pillars dealing with supervisory

review and market discipline. The second

innovation was the integration of market risk as

well as operational risk, beside credit risk, in the

calculation of the minimum capital

requirement. Another innovation of the new

accord was that banks with advanced risk

management capabilities could use their own

internal systems for evaluating risk, instead of

using the basic or standardised approaches for

measuring risk, upon the approval of the

supervisory authority (Gallati, 2003; p. 346).

Basel II is constituted of three pillars which are

mutually reinforcing to ensure the safety and

soundness of the financial system.

Pillar 1: Minimum Capital

Requirement

Pillar 2: Supervisory Review

Process Pillar 3: Market Discipline

Calculation of capital charge is

connected to credit risk, market

risk, and operational risk,

signifying higher charge for higher

risk in each category.

Supervisors can review and

revise the charge if they feel

that the calculated charge does

not adequately reflect and cover

the risk.

The details of risk management

are required to be made public by

the bank, improving the sharing

of information within the

industry.

Table 1: adapted from Akkizidis and Kumar (2007).

Pillar I: Minimum Capital Requirementii

The Pillar I establishes minimum capital

requirements. The new framework maintains

the minimum requirement of 8 % of capital to

risk-weighted assets. In this framework, capital

represents resources which can be used to

meet current losses while leaving banking

institutions with the ability to continue

operating as a going concern. While equity and

disclosed reserves are the main components of

capital for banking institutions, there are other

legitimate constituents of capital which may be

included for the purposes of the capital base

computation. The capital base, which is used to

compute the Capital Adequacy Ratio (CAR) is

defined as the sum of Eligible Tier 1 Capital and

Eligible Tier 2 Capital less any other deductions

from total capitaliii.

The capital adequacy is measured as follows:

%8)(

riskslOperationarisksmarketCreditAssetsweightedRisk

CapitalTotal

Basel II provides a flexible framework for the

calculation of the weight for each category of

risk. It also provides guidelines for mitigating

the risks faced by the banks in the course of

their business.

Pillar 2: The Supervisory Review Process

To the Basel Committee the supervisory review

process of the new framework is intended not

only to ensure that banks have adequate capital

to support all the risks in their business, but

International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 5

also to encourage banks to develop and use

better risk management techniques in

monitoring and managing their risks. The

development of an internal capital assessment

remains the responsibility of bank’s

management; however the supervisors are

expected to evaluate how well banks are

assessing their capital relative to their risks and

intervene, where appropriate.

Four key principles of supervisory review have

been identified in the present framework.

These principles are:

Principle 1: Banks should have a process for

assessing their overall capital adequacy in

relation to their risk profile and a strategy for

maintaining their capital levels.

Principle 2: Supervisors should review and

evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy

assessments and strategies, as well as their

ability to monitor and ensure their compliance

with regulatory capital ratios. Supervisors

should take appropriate supervisory action if

they are not satisfied with the result of this

process.

Principle 3: Supervisors should expect banks to

operate above the minimum regulatory capital

ratios and should have the ability to require

banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum.

Principle 4: Supervisors should seek to

intervene at an early stage to prevent capital

from falling below the minimum levels required

to support the risk characteristics of a particular

bank and should require rapid remedial action if

capital is not maintained or restored.

This pillar as well as the following one

constitutes a fundamental innovation in the

evolution of risk management as they bring the

supervisors and the other stakeholders at the

heart of this crucial area.

Pillar 3: Market Discipline

By setting Pillar 3 the Basel Committee intends

to encourage market discipline by developing a

set of disclosure requirements which will allow

market participants to assess key pieces of

information on the scope of application, capital,

risk exposures, risk assessment processes, and

hence the capital adequacy of the institution.

Despite its valuable contribution to the area of

risk management in the banking industry, Basel

II does not adequately cater for the needs of

Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs). The obvious

and fundamental reason is that the framework

was designed for the conventional banks which

differ from Islamic banks in term of underlying

principles, the contracts used, and the structure

of the business. To address these issues which

are specific to Islamic finance the Islamic

Financial Services Board (IFSB) issues several

standards that we shall briefly present in the

next section.

CATERING FOR THE SPECIFICITIES OF IFIs: THE

IFSB STANDARDS

Islamic banks are established to carry out the

financial transactions in compliance with the

principles of Sharī'ah. Thus, the risk of violating

the Sharī'ah rulings is supposed to be as serious

as the risk of insolvency. In addition, the Islamic

banks use various contracts in the course of

their business, such as Mudhārabah,

Mushārakah, Murābahah , Salam, Istisnā’,

Ijārah, etc. which have different risk profile as

compared to lending with interest which is the

main contract used in the conventional banking.

It is not unusual to find different types of risks

in one of the above contracts with different

manifestations at various stages of the contract.

Furthermore, the Mudhārabah contract is used

by many Islamic banks on their liability side, to

Page 6 Volume 1 Issue 2 – September 2011

collect deposit in the form of Profit Sharing

Investment Account (PSIA). The particularity of

these accounts is that neither the capital nor

the profit is guaranteed by the banks, in

principle. The banks, as Mudhārib, invest the

funds on behalf of the depositors and share

profit with them according to a pre-agreed

ratio; any loss, not due to negligence, will be

borne by the capital. Such types of accounts are

unique to Islamic banks, and deserve particular

attention since their risk exposures are similar

to equity whereas their holders do not have the

same rights as the equity holders.

All these issues discussed above are specific to

Islamic finance and are not addressed by Basel

II accords, hence the pertinence of the

standards issued by IFSB to deal specifically

with them and therefore complement the Basel

II accords as framework for risk management

for IFIs.

IFSB has started its operations, in 2003 in Kuala

Lumpur, as an international standard-setting

body that promotes and enhances the

soundness and stability of the Islamic financial

services industry by issuing global prudential

standards and guidelines principles for the

banking, the capital markets and the insurance

sectors.

To complement the OECD and BCBS's work

relative to the banking industry, the IFSB has

issued 5 standards:

- Capital Adequacy Standard for Institutions

(Other than Insurance Institutions) Offering

only Islamic Financial Services. Issued in

December 2005.

- Guiding Principles of Risk Management for

Institutions (Other than Insurance

institutions) Offering only Islamic Financial

Services. Issued December 2005.

- Guiding Principles on Corporate Governance

for Institutions offering only Islamic Financial

Services (Excluding Islamic Insurance

(Takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual

funds). Issued December 2006.

- Disclosures to Promote Transparency and

Market Discipline for Institutions offering

Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic

Insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic

mutual funds). Issued December 2007.

- Guidance on Key Elements in the Supervisory

Review Process of Institutions offering

Islamic Financial Services (Excluding Islamic

Insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic

mutual funds). Issued December 2007.

A separate analysis of these standards is

beyond the scope of this paper; nonetheless we

can remark that a due attention is given, in

these standards, to the unique risk of Sharī'ah

compliant transactions, the Sharī'ah governance

of the IFIs and the protection of the rights of

PSIA holders. In addition, a new formula for CAR

is proposed to address the issue that with PSIA

there is capital charge only for operational risk.

In addition, the appropriate weight for assets

financed by Islamic banks through the

nominated contracts is determined.

Like the Basel II framework, the IFSB standards

emphasise on the role of the local supervisors

in the process of good governance and risk

management. In Malaysia, BNM has taken

several important measures in that direction,

through the issuance of guidelines which aim to

customise the BCBS specifications as well as

that of the IFSB. In the following section we

briefly discuss some elements of these

guidelines.

International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 7

CUSTOMIZING THE BCBS AND IFSB

FRAMEWORKS: THE BNM GUIDELINES

To address the issue of CAR calculation for

financial institutions licensed under Islamic

Banking Act 1983 (IBA) and Banking and

Financial Institutions Act 1989 (BAFIA)

respectively, BNM has issued various guidelines

which, though consistent with both BCBS and

IFSB standards, are customised to sufficiently

reflect the actual risk profile of banking

institutions operating in emerging markets

(BNM, 2001). If the standards issued by the

international organizations are just optional the

guidelines issued by BNM are to be

implemented by the concerned institutions.

In Malaysia the implementation of Basel II is

applied in 2 stages: since 2008 the standardised

approaches have been implemented while the

Internal Rating Based Approach will be

applicable from 2010.

As far as the institutions offering Islamic

financial services are concerned, we can

identify two main guidelines for the CAR

computation:

- The Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy

Framework (Basel II – Risk Weighted Assets

Computation) which is issued by the

Prudential Financial Policy Department. The

financial institutions licensed under BAFIA

are required to comply with this framework.

- The Capital Adequacy Framework for Islamic

Banks (CAFIB), issued by Islamic Banking and

Takaful Department. This framework is

meant for the banks licensed under IBA.

BNM specifies the approaches to be used to

calculate the Risk-Weighted Capital Ratio

(RWCR) by the financial institutions in each

framework. Thus, in the latter the risk

measurement methodologies for the purpose

of calculating a minimum capital requirement

to be held by Islamic banks against credit risk,

market risk and operational risk are stipulated

as follows:

(i) Standardised Approach for Credit Risk;

(ii) Standardised Approach for Market Risk;

and

(iii) Basic Indicator Approach, The Standardised

Approach and Alternative Standardised

Approach for Operational Risk (BNM,

2001).

The guideline on Pillar II of CAFIB, deals with the

Supervisory Review Process; it aims to ensure

the adequacy of the capital of Islamic banks for

their operations. The guideline emphasises

BNM right to impose higher capital

requirements or prudential standards on

individual Islamic banks in the event that the

prevailing risk profiles of such institutions are

found to be significantly underestimated. Pillar

2 guidelines, under CAFIB points out aspects of

capital adequacy assessment:

- An Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment

Process (ICAAP) to be undertaken by the

Islamic banks in accordance with the

directives of the guideline and submitted to

BNM by 30 June 2011;

- A supervisory review and evaluation of

Islamic Bank’s ICCAP (BNM, 2002b).

The guideline on Pillar III sets out the coverage

of the required disclosure for Islamic banks.

Thus, it is required from the Islamic banks to

disclose qualitative and quantitative

information with respect to credit risk, market

risk, operational risk, rate of return risk in the

banking book, management of PSIA and key

Sharī'ah governance (BNM, 2007).

Page 8 Volume 1 Issue 2 – September 2011

THE IMPLIMENATION OF BASEL II BY ISLAMIC

BANKS: THE CASE OF BIMB

This section deals specifically with the

implementation of Basel II by BIMB. Bank Islam

is the first Islamic bank in Malaysia; it was

established in 1983, under IBA1983. As on June

30, 2009 its total assets stood at RM

27,488,204,000 with total equity of RM

1,519,553,000.

Our two main sources in this section are based

on the annual reports 2008/2009 and the

interview that we had with a senior executive at

the risk management division of BIMB.

The discussion will generally follow the

structure of Basel II, with the 3 pillars.

The Implementation of Pillar 1

BIMB provides the information related to its

capital base as well as the breakdown of gross

risk-weighted assets and the various categories

of risk weights in its annual report. From there

it appears that the RWCR of the bank is 13.61%

which is above the minimum of 8% required by

Basel II. In managing its various categories of

risk the bank relies mainly on CAFIB.

For the calculation of risk-weighted assets the

bank uses Standardised Approach for credit and

market risks and the Basic Indicator Approach

for operational risk. The use of these basic

approaches is in line with CAFIB requirements

as indicated earlier. The Value-at-Risk (VaR) is

also used, internally, to measure the bank

exposure to market risk. Other approaches

proposed by Basel II are yet to be implemented

as they need the setting up of specific

infrastructure and systems. However, it is worth

noting that, BIMB is planning to adopt the

Internal Ratings Based Approach under Basel II,

and it has taken some measures towards the

enhancement of the internal rating models.

The following sub-section provides a separate

analysis of the categories of risk faced by BIMB

and the way they are dealt with.

Credit Riskiv at BIMB

Credit risk is the most important risk faced by

BIMB, as it represent 86 % of the Total

weighted asset (i.e. RM 9,619892,000 over RM

11,133,458,000). This is can be easily

understood by looking into the breakdown of

BIMB financing by contract, in Chart 1 below. It

clearly appears from there that more than 99%

of the financing are debt based, through the

contracts like Bai’ Bithaman Ajil, Murabahah,

Bai’ Al-Inah, etc. whereas the equity-based

financing (i.e. Mudhārabah) corresponds to a

tiny figure of 0.1%. On the hand, consumer

financing represents more than 66% of the total

financing portfolio (See Chart 2). This would

imply more extensive effort is needed for the

monitoring of the counterparties as their

number will be higher.

For the purpose of determining the capital

requirements under the credit risk standardised

approach, BIMB applies the ratings assigned by

the approved External Credit Assessment

Institutions.

BIMB uses a variety of risk mitigation

techniques in several different markets which

contribute to risk diversification and credit

protection. For the purpose of Asset & liability

Management the bank uses all the techniques

prescribed by Basel II, such as Gap Analysis,

Duration Gap Analysis and by hedging their

fund.

International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 9

Chart 1: BIMB financing by contract for the year 2009. Source: BIMB annual report 2009

Chart 2: BIMB financing by business segment for the year 2009. Source: BIMB annual report 2009

In addition to the above mentioned techniques,

BIMB uses other techniques like collateral items

and guarantees which are endorsed by CAFIB as

credit risk mitigation. Only certain types of

collateral and some issuers of guarantees are

eligible for preferential risk weights for

regulatory capital adequacy purposes.

Furthermore, the collateral management

process and the terms in the collateral

agreements have to fulfill the BNM prescribed

minimum requirements (such as procedures for

the monitoring of market values, insurance and

Page 10 Volume 1 Issue 2 – September 2011

legal certainty) set out in their capital adequacy

regulations. The Bank manages also its credit

risk by monitoring its customers through their

credit cards and their way of spending and by

getting feedback on their personnel customer’s

behaviour.

Operational Riskv at BIMB

Operational risk constitutes the second most

serious risk based on its proportion in the total

risk weighted assets (11%). As mentioned

earlier, the Bank employed the Basic Indicator

Approach for the calculating the necessary

capital against operational risk.

The sources of operational risk can be either

internal (i.e. people, systems, processes) or

external, such as catastrophic events.

The Operational Risk Management Department

at the BIMB is responsible for determining the

risk profile in comparison to the bank’s risk

appetite and for deciding the risk mitigating

techniques.

Market risk at BIMB

The total risk weighted assets for market risk at

BIMB is estimated at RM 297,754,000, as on 30

June 2009 representing only 3% of the total.

Nevertheless, if not well managed this type of

risk could be the source of other risk. This is

because significant or sudden movements in

market prices and rates could affect the bank’s

liquidity/funding position. Thus, BIMB identifies

6 factors of market risk: Rate of return or profit

risk, foreign exchange risk, equity investment

risk, commodity inventory risk, displaced

commercial risk, and liquidity risk (See BIMB

annual report 2009 for more details).

As we may observe, BIMB is not exposed

directly to interest rate risk because interest is

prohibited under Islamic banking. The indirect

interest rate risk exists and arises from

competition with mainstream banks. This is

managed by regularly reviewing the Bank profit

rates as in conventional banks based on Base

Lending Rate or Based Finance Rate on a daily

basis to mitigate profit rate risk.

However, this practice is of nature to raise

some concerns. This is due to the fact that the

risk-return profile of the deposit accounts on

the liability side of Islamic banks is different

from that of conventional bank. In particular

the PSIA are similar to equity as a result, the

return to these types of account should rather

be compared to that of the equityholders not to

that on debt based products that conventional

banks offer.

BIMB holds derivative financial instruments-

which are deemed compliant with Sharī'ah to

hedge its exposure. Contracts like profit rate

swap and forward, which is based on the

concept of wa'ad (promise) and which is

binding on the customer, are relied upon to

manage the market risk

As in the conventional banking context, the

management of liquidity risk is based on various

techniques. To deal with liquidity risk, BIMB

adopts the strategy consisting of diversifying its

deposit base and at the same time lengthening

the maturity of the deposits. On the other

hand, the bank takes advantage of the liquidity

of the Islamic Interbank Money Market where it

can invest in a variety of liquid assets such as

Islamic negotiable instruments, Islamic treasury

bills, Islamic accepted bills, Islamic commercial

papers and Islamic interbank acceptances etc.

The Implementation of Pillar 2 and Pillar 3

As mentioned in the guideline on Pillar II, BNM

carries out the supervisory review process

through periodic visits to the banks. Thus, at

International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 11

BIMB they receive visit from BNM officers at

least once a year. From time to time BNM gets

feedback from the bank on how it manages the

different types of risk it faces, and then makes

some recommendations if necessary.

The BIMB annual report provides a breakdown

of the types of assets and their amounts as well

as that of the deposits. As required by the BNM

guideline on Pillar III, general information on

capital, risk exposures, risk assessment

processes, and the capital adequacy of the

institution are disclosed. However, as

mentioned earlier, the presence of PSIA on the

liability side of IFIs renders it necessary to make

additional disclosure on matters pertaining to

them. Thus, in the annual report the different

types of PSIA, their amounts, the profit

attributable to them as well as the amount of

Profit Equalization Reserve (PER) are made

public.

One of the major issues related to the

implementation of Basel II is the lack of experts

able to elaborate and interpret Basel

requirements; this becomes particularly

relevant if we take into account the various

nature of banks' specialization. The current

practices mainly rely on micro soft excel, while

application of Basel II needs highly

sophisticated infrastructure of IT and advance

system to measure the daily volatility which is

not available currently in BIMB systemvi.

CONCLUSION

In this paper we have studied the

implementation of Basel II by Bank Islam which

is the first and biggest full-fledge Islamic bank in

Malaysia. We have attempted to provide an

overview of the regulatory environment for this

Islamic bank which shares most of the risks that

conventional banks are faced with, in addition

to its unique risks. To address the particularities

of Islamic Banks, BNM has come up with

specific guidelines that combine between the

Basel II accords and the IFSB standards with the

necessary customization.

We have found that BIMB is well capitalised and

is using the standardised and basic indicator

approaches for the calculation of risk weighted

assets. This can be explained by the fact that

BNM allows the use of IRB starting from 2010

but also by fact that BIMB lacks the required

infrastructure to use the advanced approaches.

Among all the 3 types of risk that require capital

for their management in the context of Basel II,

credit risk is the most important at BIMB, as its

proportion in the total risk weighted assets is

more than 86%. This can be explained by the

overreliance of BIMB on debt instruments in its

financing activities, corresponding to more 99%,

while equity based financing represents 0.1%.

We believe that the management of the asset

liability mismatch would be less problematic for

the Islamic Banks if partnership contracts

namely Mudhārabah and Mushārakah were

successfully implemented on the asset side as

they are on the liability side. But for that,

important changes are needed in the

environment and the attitudes. Two common

reasons are usually advanced by practitioners

to justify the small portion of partnership

contracts on the asset side of Islamic banks:

- Established companies with good business

prospects prefer debt financing that allows

them to benefit from the profit enhancing

feature of leverage. Hence, only risky

customers, like start-ups, would be willing to

go for Mudhārabah or Mushārakah

financing.

- In its standard on Capital Adequacy, IFSB

requires a risk-weight of 400% (equivalent to

a capital charge of 32%) for equity exposures

(i.e. Mudhārabah/Mushārakah based

Page 12 Volume 1 Issue 2 – September 2011

financing in the banking book) in private and

commercial enterprisevii. This capital charge

is considered very high compared to other

that required for other modes of financing.

The first argument seems to be well grounded.

However, by undertaking structural changes

Islamic banks may set up specialised units with

qualified main power carry out the financing of

small and medium enterprises based on

partnership contracts. The unit would carry out

all the necessary screening and following-up

required by such a type of financing.

As for the second argument, we are of the view

that it is not convincing. First, while more

capital charge is required for the equity

exposures in the banking book, Islamic banks

are qualified for capital relief with all assets

financed based on Mudhārabah deposits, since

only operational risk is accounted for.

Furthermore, the critical role of banks in a

financial system, the requirement of higher

capital charge for asset financed through

partnership contracts makes sense as it is of

nature to prevent the banks to use take on risky

projects without rigorous screening when its

capital stake is small.

REFERNCES The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, 2004. International Convergence of Capital Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework, 2004. Available at: www.bis.org. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework, comprehensive version, 2006. Available at: www.bis.org. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. International framework for liquidity risk measurement, standards and monitoring, 2009.

Consultative document available at: www.bis.org. The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision. Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector, 2009. Consultative document available at: www.bis.org. Bank Negara Malaysia. Risk Weighted Capital Adequacy Framework (Basel II-Risk Weighted Assets Computation), BNM/RH GL001-22, 2001. Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks. BNM/RH/GL/002-14, 2002a. Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Internal capital adequacy assessment process (Pillar 2). BNM/RH/GL 002-22, 2002. Bank Negara Malaysia. Capital adequacy framework for Islamic banks – Disclosure requirements (Pillar 3). BNM/RH/GL 007-18, 2007. Gallati, R. Risk management and capital adequacy. New York: McGraw-Hill, 2003. Islamic Financial Services Board. Capital adequacy standard for institutions (other than insurance institutions) offering only Islamic financial services, 2005a. Available at: www.ifsb.org. Islamic Financial Services Board. Guiding principles of risk management for institutions (other than insurance institutions) offering only Islamic financial services, 2005b. Available at: www.ifsb.org

Islamic Financial Services Board. Guiding principles on corporate governance for institutions offering only Islamic financial services (excluding Islamic insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual funds), 2006. Available at: www.ifsb.org.

Islamic Financial Services Board. Disclosures to promote transparency and market discipline for

International Journal of Excellence in Islamic Banking and Finance Page 13

institutions offering Islamic financial services (excluding Islamic insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual funds), 2007a. Available at: www.ifsb.org. Islamic Financial Services Board. Guidance on key elements in the supervisory review process of institutions offering Islamic financial services (excluding Islamic insurance (Takaful) institutions and Islamic mutual funds), 2007b. Available at: www.ifsb.org. Ikkizidis, I. and Khandalwal, S.K. Financial risk management for Islamic banking and finance. New York: Palgrave macMillan, 2008. Kahf, M. Basel II: Implications for Islamic banks. In: Jakarta, Indonesia the 6th International conference: Islamic Economics and Banking in the 21th Century, Jakarta, Indonesia 21-24 November 2005. Khan, T. and Ahmad, H. 2001. Risk management an analysis of the issues in Islamic financial industry. Occasional Paper no.5. Jeddah: IRTI, 2001. http://www.pdf-finder.com/RISK-

MANAGEMENT-AN-ANALYSIS-OF-ISSUES-IN-ISLAMIC-FINANCIAL-INDUSTRY.html Wignall, A. and Atkinson, P., 2010. Thinking beyond Basel III: Necessary solutions for capital and liquidity. OECD Journal: Financial Market Trends, 2010(1).

Online Resources:

http://www.bankislam.com.my

http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?tpl_id=118&lang=en&qt=CAFIB

http://www.islamicpopulation.com

i In December 2009, BCBS released 2 consultative

documents that are meant to address some issues in the

banking sector that were identified as aggravating factors

during the crisis. These documents are:

- International framework for liquidity risk

measurement, standards and monitoring; and

- Strengthening the resilience of the banking sector.

ii The discussion in this part and the following mainly

refers to BIS (2006).

iii Tier 1 comprises, among others, the following items:

Ordinary paid-up share capital, share premium, statutory

reserve fund, general reserve fund, retained profits

brought forward from previous financial year as in last

audited accounts less any accumulated losses, including

current unaudited losses, etc. However, if the new

framework is adopted, the predominant form of Tier 1,

will be common shares and retained earnings. And Tier 2

comprises hybrid (debt/equity) capital instruments,

subordinated term debt, subject to the prescribed limit,

reserves arising from the revaluation of premises, etc.

iv Credit Risk arises from all transactions that could lead

to actual, contingent or potential claims against any

party, borrower or obligor. BIMB recognizes four kinds of

credit risk in its portfolio: Default Risk, Settlement Risk,

Country Risk and Contingent Risk (BIMB annual report

2009).

v Operational risk can be defined as the risk loss arising

from inadequate or failed processes, people, systems and

external events. It also includes legal risk and Shari`ah

non complaint risk but excludes strategic and

reputational risk (BIMB annual report 2009).

vi An officer from BIMB or update us during the LIFE2

Conference that the bank has made important

investment to acquire the needed sophisticated system.

vii

Upon the permission of the supervisors, the bank may

use the ‘Slotting Method’ which requires less capital

charge.


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